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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
IN the Preface to the first edition of this work, the author stated
it
s purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student o
f
the law such a presentation o
f elementary constitutional principles
a
s should serve, with the aid o
f
it
s
references to judicial decisions,
legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the
examination o
f questions respecting the constitutional limitations
which rest upon the power o
f
the several State legislatures. In
the accomplishment o
f
that purpose, the author further stated that
h
e had faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled
b
y
the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the
same time, h
e did not attempt to deny — what he supposed would
b
e sufficiently apparent—that he had written in full sympathy
with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had im
posed upon the exercise o
f
the powers o
fº withfaith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in
correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than
in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of au
thority, when confided without restriction to any one man o
r body
o
f men, whether sitting in legislative capacity o
r judicial. In this
sympathy and faith, he had written o
f jury trials and the other
safeguards to personal liberty, o
f liberty o
f
the press and o
f
vested rights; and he had also endeavored to point out that there
are o
n all sides definite limitations which circumscribe the legis
lative authority, independent o
f
the specific restrictions which the
people impose b
y
their State constitutions.) But while not pre
disposed to discover in any part o
f
our system the rightful exist
ence o
f any unlimited power, created b
y
the Constitution, neither
o
n
the other hand had h
e designed to advance new doctrines, o
r
to do more than state clearly and with reasonable conciseness the
principles to be deduced from the judicial decisions.
The unexpected favor with which the work has been received
having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed
every part o
f it with care, but without finding occasion to change
(2)
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in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further
reflection has only tended to confirm him in his previous views of
the need of constitutional restraints at every point where agents
are to exercise the delegated authority of the people; and he is
gratified to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is
not in the direction of a disregard of these restraints. The reader
will find numerous additional references to new cases and other
authorities; and some modifications have been made in the
phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate
expression of his views. Trusting that these modifications and
additions will be found not without value, he again submits
his work “to the judgment of an enlightened and generous
profession.” THOMAS M. COOLEY.
UNIversity of Michigan,
ANN ARBoR, July, 1871.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
THE second edition being exhausted, the author, in preparing a
third, has endeavored to give full references to such decisions as
have recently been made or reported, having a bearing upon the
points discussed. It will be seen on consulting the notes that
the number of such decisions is large, and that some of them are
of no little importance. THOMAS M. COOLEY.
UNIversity of Michig AN,
ANN ARBoR, December, 1878.
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.
NEw topics in State Constitutional Law are not numerous;
but such as are suggested by recent decisions have been discussed
in this edition, and it is believed considerable value has been
added to the work by further references to adjudged cases.
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
UNIvERsity of Michig AN,
ANN ARBor, April, 1878.
TA B L E OF CO N T E N T S.
CH A P T E R I.
DEFINITIONS.
Definition of a state, nation, people, sovereignty, and sovereign state 1
What sovereignty consists in . . . . . . . . . - - - 2
Apportionment of sovereignty in America . . . . . . . . . 2
3
4
Definition of constitution and constitutional government . . . . 2
Of unconstitutional law . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER II.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
What the United States government the successor of; Colonial con
federacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Continental Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7
Limitations upon it
s power; the Articles o
f Confederation, and the
supersession thereof b
y
the Constitution . . . . . . . . 8
Adoption o
f
the Constitution b
y
North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
the new States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
,
9
United States government one o
f
enumerated powers . . . . . 1
0
General purpose o
f
this government . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Powers conferred upon Congress . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
Powers under the new amendments . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Executive and judicial power o
f
the nation . . . . . . . . . 1
4
Constitution, laws, and treaties o
f
United States to b
e supreme; final
decision of questions under, to rest with national judiciary . . 14
Removal o
f
causes from State courts; decisions o
f
State courts to be
followed o
n points o
f
State law . . . . . . . . . . 15–18
Protection to privileges and immunities o
f
citizens. . . . . . 13, 2
0
Extradition o
f fugitives from justice . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22
Faith and credit secured to records, &c. . . . . . . . . . . 22
Restrictions upon the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Guaranty of republican government . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Implied prohibitions on the States. . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Reservation of powers to States and people. . . . . . . . . 25
Statutes necessary to jurisdiction of national courts . . . . . . 26
CHAPTER III.
THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
State governments in existence when Constitution of United States
adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Common law in force; what it consists in . . . . . . . . 28–33
English and Colonial legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Colonial charters and revolutionary constitutions . . . . . . . 35
Constitutions of new States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Sovereignty of the people . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36–38
Proceedings in the formation and amendment of constitutions . 38–46
Restraints imposed thereon by Constitution of United States . . 41, 42
What generally to be looked for in State constitutions . . . . 42–46
Rights are protected by, but do not come from them . . . . . 46, 47
CHAPTER IV.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
Interpretation and construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Who first to construe constitutions . . . . . . . . . . . 49–54
Final decision generally with the courts . . . . . . . . . 54–57
The doctrine of res adjudicata and stare decisis . . . . . . 57–66
Construction to be uniform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The intent to govern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The whole instrument to be examined . . . . . . . . . . 70
Effect to be given to the whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Words to be understood in their ordinary meaning . . . . . . 72
Common law to be kept in view . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Words sometimes employed in different senses . . . . . . . . 75
Operation of laws to be prospective . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Implied powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 78
Consideration of the mischief to be remedied . . . . . . . 79
Proceedings of Constitutional Convention may be examined . . . 80
Force of contemporaneous and practical construction . . . . . 81–86
Unjust provisions not invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
TABLE OF CONTENTS. vii
Duty in case of doubt on constitutional questions . . . . . . . 88
Directory and mandatory provisions . . . . . . . . . . 89–99
Constitutional provisions are imperative . . . . . . . . . 94–99
Self-executing provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99–102
Danger of arbitrary rules of construction . . . . . . . . 102
CHAPTER V.
THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE.
Power of American legislatures compared to that of British Par
liament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104–106
Grant of legislative power is grant of the complete power . . . 106
But not of executive or judicial power . . . . . . . . . 107–110
Definition of legislative and judicial authority . . . . . . 109–112
Declaratory statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112–115
Statute setting aside judgments, granting new trials, &c. . . . 115–117
Recitals in statutes do not bind individuals . . . . . . . . 117
Statutes conferring power on guardians, &c., to sell lands . . 118–126
Statutes which assume to dispose of disputed rights . . . . 126–129
Statutes validating irregular judicial proceedings . . . . . 129-131
Legislative divorces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132-137
Legislative encroachments upon executive power . . . . . 138–141
Legislative power not to be delegated . . . . . . . . . 141–152
Conditional legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141–152
Irrepealable laws not to be passed . . . . . . . . . . 152–154
Territorial limitations upon State legislative authority . . . 154, 155
Other limitations by express provisions . . . . . . . . 155–157
Limitations springing from nature of free government . . . 156,157
CHAPTER WI.
THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS.
Importance of forms in parliamentary law . . . . . . . . 158
The two houses of the legislature . . . . . . . . . . 159, 160
Contested elections, rules of proceeding, punishing disorderly be
havior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Contempts; privileges of members . . . . . . . . . . 162, 163
Legislative committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Journal of proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Corrupt contracts to influence legislation . . . . . . . . 165,166
W111 TABLE OF CONTENTS.
---
Counsel before legislature; lobby agents . . . . . . . . 166, n.
The introduction and passage of bills . . . . . . . . 167–169
Three readings of bills . . - - - - - - - - - - 170
Yeas and nays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Vote required for the passage of a bill N. . . . . . . . . , 171
Title of statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 172–183
Amendatory statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . 183–186
Signing of bills by presiding officers . . . . . . . 186
Approval of bills by the governor . . . . . . . . 186–188
Other legislative powers of the governor . . . . . . . . 189
When acts to take effect . . . . . . . . . . . 190–193
CHAPTER VII.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNIDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ACT MAY BE
DECLARED UN CONSTITUTIONAL.
Authority to declare statutes unconstitutional a delicate one . .
Will not be done by bare quorum of court . . . . . .
Nor unless a decision upon the point is necessary . . . . . .
Nor on objection by a party not interested . . . . . . . .
Nor solely because of unjust or oppressive provisions . . .
Nor because conflicting with fundamental principles . . . .
Nor because opposed to spirit of the constitution . . . . .
Extent of legislative power . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Difference between State and national governments . . .
A statute in excess of legislative power void . . . . . .
Statutes invalid as encroaching on executive or judicial authority.
Or conflicting with the bill of rights . . . . . . . . . .
Legislative forms are limitations of power . . . . . . . .
Statutes unconstitutional in part . . . .
Constitutional objection may be waived . . . . . . . . .
Judicial doubts on constitutional questions . . . . . . .
Inquiry into legislative motives not permitted . . . . . .
Consequences if a statute is void . . . . . . . . . . .
-
CHAPTER VIII.
The SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
The American system one of decentralization . . . . . . .
State constitutions framed in reference to it. . . . . . . .
Local government may be delegated to citizens of the municipality
194
197
198
199
200–204
205–207
208
209
209
210
211
212
214
214–219
219
220–225
225–226
227
228
230
230
TABLE OF CONTENTS. ix
Legislative control of municipalities . . . . . . . . . 231-234
Powers of public corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Strict construction of charters . . . . . . . . . . . 235, 236
Contracts ultra vires void . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Corporations by prescription and implication . . . . . . 239–241
Municipal by-laws . . . . . . . 241–247
Delegation of powers by municipality not admissible . . . . . 248
Irrepealable municipal legislation cannot be adopted . . . . . 251
Presumption of correct action . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Power to indemnify officers - - - - - 254, 256
Powers to be construed with reference to purposes of their
creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Authority confined to corporate limits. . . . . . . . . . 260
Municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement . . 260–272
Negotiable paper of corporations . . . . . . . . . . . 268, n.
Municipal military bounties . . . . . . . . . . . 273–281, 289
Legislative control of municipal taxation . . . . . . . . 281–289
Legislative control of corporate property . . . . . . . . 289-295
Towns and counties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295-304
Not liable for neglect of official duty . . . . . . . . . . 302
Different rules govern chartered corporations . . . . . . . 303
In what respect the charter a contract. . . . . . . . . 304–312
Validity of corporate organizations not to be questioned collat
erally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
CHAPTER IX.
PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES.
Bill of Rights, importance of . . . . . . . . . . . Sº 314
Addition o
f,
b
y
amendments to national Constitution . . . . . 317
Bills of attainder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317–322
Ec post facto laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323–333
Laws impairing the obligation o
f
contracts . . . . . . . 333–359
What charters are contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Contracting away powers o
f sovereignty . . . . . . . . 341–346
Grant of exclusive privileges . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Changes in the general laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Obligation o
f
a contract, what it is . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Modification o
f
remedies always admissible . . . . . . . . 351
Appraisal laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
X TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Stay laws, when void .
Validating imperfect contracts
State insolvent laws - - - - -
The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments .
CHAPTER X.
357
359
359, 360
360, 361
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.
Villeinage in England . . .
In Scotland -
In America - - - -
Unreasonable searches and seizures
Every man's house his castle.
Search warrants . - - - - -
Inviolability of papers and correspondence
Quartering soldiers in private houses .
Criminal accusations, how made .
Bail to persons accused of crime . . . .
Prisoner standing mute
Trial to be speedy
To be public .
Not to be inquisitorial . -
Prisoner's statement and confessions
Confronting prisoner with witnesses
Prisoner to be present at trial
Trial to be by jury . . . . . . .
Number of jurors; right of challenge .
Jury to be of the vicinage.
Verdict to be unanimous and free
Instructions of the judge, how limited .
Power of jury to judge of law -
Accused not to be twice put in jeopardy .
Excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments
Right to counsel . . . . . . .
Protection of professional confidence
Duty of counsel . . . . . . . .
Whether to address the jury on the law
Punishment of misconduct in attorneys
Writ of habeas corpus . . . . . .
Legal restraints upon personal liberty.
Necessity of Habeas Corpus Act
What courts issue the writ
362–366
; 366
366, 367
367–377
367–373
370–377
375–377
378
379
380
382
. 382
, 383
. 384
384-391
392
393
394
394, 395
395
396
397
398-402
403–406
406–408
408–417
412,413
414
415
416
418–426
419–422
422–425
426–429
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xi
General purpose of writ, and practice upon . . . . . . . . 430
Right to discussion and petition . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Right to bear arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433,434
CHAPTER XI.
. OF THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY BY THE “LAw of THE LAND.”
Magna Charta, chap. 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Constitutional provisions insuring protection “by the law of the
land”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436, n.
Meaning of “due process of law” and “law of the land” . . 437–440
Wested rights not to be disturbed . . . . . . . . . . . 442
What are vested rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443–448
Interests in expectancy are not . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
Legislative modification of estates . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Control of rights springing from marriage . . . . . . . 446, 447
Legislative control of remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Wested rights of action are protected . . . . . . . . . . 449
Confiscation of rights and property. . . . . . . . . . 450–452
Statutes of limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453-456
Alteration in the rules of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . 457
Retrospective laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Curing irregularities in legal proceedings . . . . . . 463-466,477
Validating imperfect contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Pendency of suit does not prevent healing act . . . . . . 474, 476
What the healing statute must be confined to . . . . . . . 477
Statutory privilege not a vested right . . . . . . . . . . 479
Consequential injuries from changes in the laws . . . . . . 481
Betterment laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Unequal and partial legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Local laws may vary in different localities . . . . . . . 488, 489
Suspension of general laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
Equality the aim of the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
Strict construction of special grants . . . . . . . . . 495–497
Privileges and immunities of citizens . . . . . . . . . . 497
Judicial proceedings void if jurisdiction wanting . . . . . . 498–500
What constitutes jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
Consent cannot confer it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
Jurisdiction in divorce cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
Necessity for process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503–505
Process by publication . . . . - - - - - - - - 505
Courts of general and special jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . 508.
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Effect of irregularities in judicial proceedings . . . . . . 510, 511
Judicial power not to be delegated . . . . . . . . . . . 512
Judge not to si
t
in his own cause . . . . . . . . . . 512-517
CHAPTER XII.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.
Protection o
f,
b
y
the Constitution o
f
the United States . . . . 518
State constitutional provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 518, n
.
Not well protected nor defined at common law . . . . . . . 522
Censorship o
f
the press; publication o
f proceedings in Parliament
not formerly suffered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
Censorship o
f
the press in America . . . . . . . . . . 523
Secret sessions o
f public bodies in United States . . . . . . 524
What liberty o
f
the press consists in . . . . . . . . . 525, 526
Common-law rules o
f liability for injurious publications . . . 527–532
Cases o
f privileged communications . . . . . . . . . 532–534
Libels on the government, whether punishable . . . . . . 534–538
Sedition law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
Further cases o
f privilege; criticism o
f
officers o
r
candidates for
office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539–551
Petitions and other publications in matters o
f public concern . . 542
Statements in course o
f judicial proceedings . . . . . . . 551–556
by witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
b
y
complainant, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . 552
b
y
counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Privileges o
f legislators . . . . . . . . . . . 556
Publication o
f privileged communications through the press . . 559
Accounts o
f judicial proceedings, how far protected . . . . 559–561
Privilege o
f publishers o
f
news . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
Publication o
f legislative proceedings . . . . . . . . . . 569
The jury as judges o
f
the law in libel cases . . . . . . . . 572
Mr. Fox's Libel Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
“Good motives and justifiable ends,” burden o
f showing is on
defendant . . . • - - - - - - - - - - - - 577
What is not sufficient to show . . . . . . . . . . . . 578, n.
CHAPTER XIII.
R E L I G. I O U S L I B E R T Y.
Care taken b
y
State constitutions to protect. . . . . . . 580–586
Distinguished from religious toleration . . . . . . . 581, 582, n
.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii
What it precludes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Does not preclude recognition of superintending Providence by
public authorities . . . - -
Nor appointment of chaplains, fast days, &c., nor recognition of
fact that the prevailing religion is Christian . . . .
The maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land .
Punishment of blasphemy . . . . . . . . . . . .
And of other profanity . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sunday laws, how justified . . . . . . . . . .
Respect for religious scruples . . . . . . .
Religious belief as affecting the competency or credibility o
witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER XIV.
THE POWER OF TAXATION.
Unlimited nature of the power . . . . . . . . . . .
Exemption of national agencies from State taxation . . . .
Exemption of State agencies from national taxation . . . .
Limitations on State taxation by national Constitution . . .
Power of States to tax subjects of commerce . . . . .
Discriminations in taxation between citizens of different States
Elements essential to valid taxation; purposes must be public.
Legislature to judge of purposes . . . . . . .
Unlawful exactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Necessity of apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taxation with reference to benefits in local improvements . .
Local assessments distinguished from general taxation . .
Apportionment of the burden in local assessments . . . . .
Taxations must be uniform throughout the taxing districts .
Road taxes in labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inequalities in taxation inevitable . . . . . . . . . .
Legislature must select subjects of taxation . . . . . . .
Exemptions admissible . . . . . . . . . . . .
Constitutional provisions forbidding exemptions . . . .
Legislative authority requisite for every tax . . . . . .
Excessive taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The maxim de minimis lex: non curat in tax proceedings . .
What errors and defects render tax sales void . . . . . . .
587
587, 588
588–592
589
593
- 594
594, 595
f
596
598–604
600–604
- 602
604–607
605, 606
- 606
- 607
608–610
611—615
- 616
618
620
620–636
623–628
637
638,639
- 640
640–641
642, 643
643–646
646–648
- 647
648
xiv. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
THE EMIN ENT DOMAIN.
Ordinary domain of State distinguished from eminent domain . . G50
Definition of eminent domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
Not to be bargained away; general rights vested in the States . 653
How far possessed by the general government . . . . . . . 654
What property subject to the right . . . . . . . . . . . 654
Legislative authority requisite to it
s
exercise . . . . . . . 657
Strict compliance with conditions precedent necessary . . . 657–660
Statutes for exercise o
f,
not to be extended b
y
intendment; pur
pose must be public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661
What is a public purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663–669
Whether milldams are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
How property to be taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670–672
Determining the necessity for . . . . . . . . . . . 672, 673
How much may be taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674–676
What constitutes a taking . . . . . . . . . . . . 676–697
Consequential injuries d
o not. . . . . . . . . . 677-680
Appropriation o
f highway to plank road o
r
railroad . . . . 681-697
Whether the fee in the land can be taken . . . . . . . 697–699
Compensation to be made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
Time o
f making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700–705
Tribunal for assessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703–705
Principle on which it is to be assessed . . . . . . . . . 705–712
Allowance o
f
incidental injuries and benefits. . . . . . . 706–712
What the assessment covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711
Action where work improperly constructed . . . . . . . . 712
CHAPTER XVI.
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.
Definition o
f police power . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
Pervading nature o
f
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713, 714
Power where vested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715
Exercise o
f,
in respect to charter contracts . . . . . . . 716–725
License o
r prohibition o
f
sales o
f intoxicating drinks . . . . . 725
Payment o
f
license fee to United States gives no right in oppo
sition to State law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
Harbor regulations b
y
States . . . . . . . . . . . 729–731
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV
Distinction between proper police regulation and an interference
with commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
State taxes upon commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . 732–735
Sunday police regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
Regulation of highways by the States. . . . . . . . . 734, 735
Control of navigable waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
What are navigable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735–737
Congressional regulations of . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
Monopolies o
f,
not to b
e granted b
y
States . . . . . . . 737, 738
Power in the States to improve and bridge . . . . . . . . 738
And to establish ferries and permit dams . . . . . . . . 738,740
Regulation o
f
speed o
f
vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
Destruction o
f buildings to prevent spread o
f
fire . . . . . . 74.1
Levees and drains . . . - - - - - - - - - 741
Regulation o
f
civil rights and privileges . . . . . . . 742–746, 750
Establishment o
f
fire limits and wharf lines; abatement o
f nui
sances, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747
Other State regulations o
f police . . . . . . . . . 746–750
Power of States to make breach thereof a crime . . . . . . 750
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.
People possessed o
f
the sovereignty, but can only exercise it under
legal forms; elections the mode . . . . . . . . . . 751
Who to participate in elections; conditions o
f residence, presence
a
t
the polls, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 752–754
Residence, domicile, and habitation defined . . . . . . . . 755
Registration o
f
voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 757
Other regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.58
Preliminary action b
y
authorities, notice, proclamation, &c. . . 7.59
Mode o
f voting; the ballot . . . . . . . . . 760
Importance o
f secrecy; secrecy a personal privilege . . . . . 763
Ballot must be complete in itself . . . . . . . . . . . 764
Parol explanations by voter inadmissible . . . . . . . . . 765
Names on ballot should be full . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
Abbreviations, initials, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . 766, 767
Erroneous additions do not affect . . . . . . . . . . . 768
Evidence o
f surrounding circumstances to explain ballot . . 769, 770
Boxes for different votes; errors in depositing . . . . . . . 772
Plurality to elect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 772
xvi. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Freedom of elections, bribery, treating electors, calling out militia,
service of process . . . . . . - - - - - 773
Betting on elections, contracts to influence them, &c. . . . . 774
Electors not to be deprived of votes . . . . . . . . . . 776
Liability of officers for refusing votes . . . . . . . . . . 777
Elector's oath when conclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . 777
Conduct of election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 778
Effect of irregularities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 778–783
Effect if candidate is ineligible . . . . . . . . . . . . 781
Admission of illegal votes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 782
Fraud, intimidation, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 783
Canvass and return of votes; canvassers act ministerially . . . 784
Contesting elections; final decision upon, rests with the courts . 786
Canvasser's certificate conclusive in collateral proceedings; courts
may go behind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 788
What proofs admissible . . . . . . . . . . . . . 789–791
Whether qualification of voter may be inquired into by courts. . 791
*
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
A.
Page
Abbott r. Lindenbower 458, 459, 478
Abell v. Douglass 31
Abendroth v. Greenwich 231
Abercrombie v. Baxter 356
Aberdeen v. Saunderson 291
Aberdeen Academy v. Aberdeen 295
Abington v. North Bridgewater 756
Ableman v. Booth 2, 429
Ackerman v. Jones 561
Adams, Er parte 394
v. Adams 22, 432
v. Beal 4.58
v. Beman 642
v. Coulliard 728
v. Field 64
v. Hackett 345, 480
v. Palmer 136, 347, 348
v. People 155
v. Rankin 5:30
v. Rivers 697
v. Somerville 627
v. Vose 4:31
v. Wiscasset Bank 296, 303
Adamson v. Davis 456
Ad Hine, Steamer, v. Trevor 24
Ah Fook, Matter of 441
Ahl r. Gleim 278, 465
Alabama, &c. Ins. Co. v. Boykin 471
Alabama, &c. R. R. Co. v. Kenney 344
Alabama R. R. Co. v. Kidd 264
Albany, Street, Matter of 200. 220,
442, 661, 673, 675, 702,
710
Albertson v. Landon 129, 460
Alcock v. Cook 443
Alcorn v. Hamer 143, 637
Aldrich v. Cheshire R. R. Co. 677,
705, 712
22, 23, 507
545
81
v. Kinney
v. Printing Co.
Aldridge v. Williams
b
Page
Alexander v. Alexander 528
v. Baltimore 6:31:
v. Bennett 109
v. McKenzie 3:36
v. Milwaukee 252, 676, 680
v. Mt. Sterling 306
v. Taylor 61
v. Worthington 68, 79
Allbyer v. State 76, 462
Alleghany City v. McClurkan 270
Allegheny County Home's Case 179
Allen v. Aldrich 420
v. Archer 463
v. Armstrong 458, 459, 478
ty
.
Drew 632, 635
v
. Jay 259, 265, 608, 610, 616,
- (568
v
. Jones 6.57
v
. McKeen 308
v
. Staples 373
v
.
State :395
v
. Taunton 260
v
. Tison 178
Allen County Commissioners v. Sil
vers 217, 221
Allentown v. Henry 6:31
Alley v. Edgcombe 27.4
Almy v. People 605
Alston v. Newcomer 7.56
Alter's Appeal 474, 491
Alton v. Hope * 3.11
Alton Woods, Case of 443
Alvord v. Collin 648
Amann v. Damm 5:34
Amberg v. Rogers 458
Amboy v. Sleeper 21:3
Ambrose v. State 243
Amenia v. Stamford 6:38
American Print Works v. Law
rence 655, 747
American River Water Co.
Amsden 737
Ames v. Boland 499
xviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ames v. Lake Superior R. R. Co. 340,
703, 719
v. Port Huron Log Driving
and Booming Co. 451, 516
Amey v. Alleghany City 145
Amis v. Smith 17
Amy v. Smith 21
Anable v. Patch 446
Anderson v. Dunn 162
v. Jackson 62
v, Kerns Draining Co. 636,
665
v. Millikin 494
v. State 422
Andover v. Graſton 268
Andres v. Wells 567
Andrew v. Bible Society 589, 591
Andrews, Er parte 734
v. Insurance Co. 242
v. Russell 469
v. State 108, 205, 393, 434
Annapolis v. State 176
Annis v. People 391
Anonymous 448
Antisdel v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 722
Antoni v. Wright 199, 348
Antonio v. Gould 179, 181
Arbegust v. Louisville 623
Arimond v. Green Bay Co. 655, 677,680
Armington v. Barnet 342, 599, 656, 672
Armstrong v. Harshaw 22, 507
v. Jackson 215, 486
v. State 396, 401
Arnold v. Arnold 596
v. Davis 755
v. Decatur 658, 673
v. Kelley 115, 492
v. Mundy 7:37
Arrowsmith v. Burlington 4:38
Arundel v. McCulloch 737
668, 701, 703Ash v. Cummings
246, 732, 749v. People
Ashbrook v. Commonwealth 7:30
Ashcroft v. Bourne 511
Ashley v. Peterson 373
v. Port Huron 3.11
Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Eliot 356
Aspinwall v. Commissioners 232
Astley v. Younge 552
Astor v. New York 463
Astrom v. Hammond 227
Atchison v. Bartholow 2:32
v. Kin 311
Atchison & Nebraska R. R. Co.
v. Baty 460
Atkins v. Plimpton 603
v. Randolph 286, 30S
Atkinson v. Bennis 241
v. Dunlap 116, 454, 461
Atkinson v. Marietta & Cincin
nati R. R. Co.
Atlanta v. Central R. R. Co.
Atlantic & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Sub
660
712
livant 660
Atlantic, &c. Telegraph Co. v.
Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 264, 680
Atty.-Gen. v. Barstow 784, 786, 787
v. Brown 138, 185, 186, 227
. Brunst 64
. Cambridge 234
. Chicago, &c. R. R.
Co. 206, 342, 719,
721, 745
v. Common Council of
:
l)etroit 101
v. Detroit & Erin Plank
Road Co. 68, 71
v. Eau Claire 224, 611
v. Ely 765, 766, 767, 769,
779, 784, 786,
789, 790
v. Exeter 298
v. Morris & Essex R. R.
Co. 682
v. New York 251
v. Railroad Companies
1S5, 341
tº. Supervisors of Lake
Co. 226
v. Supervisors of St.
Clair 776
v. Winnebago, &c.
Plank Road Co. 627
Atwater v. Woodbridge 342
Atwood v. Welton 596
Auditor of State v. Atchison, &c.
R. R. Co. 109
Augusta v. Sweeney 336
Augusta Bank v. Augusta 351
Augustin v. Eggleston 781
Auld v. Butcher 351, 456
Aurora v. Reed 677
v. West 58, 145
Austen v. Miller 18
Austin et al., In re 416
v. Murray 244, 247, 248
Austine v. State 387
Aycock v. Martin 357
Ayers v. Grider 528
Aymette v. State 434
Ayres v. Methodist Church 589, 592
B.
Babcock v. Buffalo 311
v. Camp 58
Bachelder v. Bachelder 503
v. Moore 394
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xix
Backus v. Lebanon 340, 342, 512
Bacon v. Arthur 740
v. Callender 448, 476, 486
- v. Wayne County 412
v. York County 784
Bagg's Appeal 117, 454
Bagnall v. London & N. W. R. Co. 705
Bailey, v. Commonwealth 88
v. Fiske 494
v. Mayor, &c. 295
v. Milner 19
v. Miltenberger 654
v. New York 305, 338
v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R.
Co. 57, 194, 719, 721, 740
Bailey's Case 420
Bailing r. West 244
Baker v. Braman 199, 218, 219
v. Cincinnati 622
v. Gordon 4.32
v. Johnson 698, 700
v. Kelly 455
v. Kerr 5 12
v. Lewis 737
v. Mattocks 32
v. People
- 504
v. Rand 59
v. State 404, 406
v. Stonebraker's Adm'rs 455
v. Windham 255
Baldwin v. Bank of Newberry 360
v. Green 242
v. Hale 360
v. Newark 351, 462
v. New York 288
v. North Branford 231, 274
Ball v. Chadwick 79
v. Gilbert 774
v. Winchester 303
Ballou v. York Co. Commissioners 784
Baltimore v. Baltimore, &c. R. R.
Co. 405
v. Cemetery Co. 64()
v. Clunet 142, 345
v. Eschbach 270
v. Pendleton 31()
v. State 80, 84, 139, 202,
207, 221, 222, 225, 226,
489, 714
Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. v. Ma
gruder 655
Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. v. Nesbit 659
Baltimore, &c. Turnpike Co. v.
Union R. R. Co. 344
Bancroft v. Dumas 151, 726
v. Lynnfield 2.57
Bandel v. Isaac 80
Bangs r. Snow 648
Bank v. Hines 614
Bank v. Supervisors 602
Bank of Chenango v. Brown 144, 147,
150
Chillicothe v. Chillicothe 236
Columbia v. Okely 440, 494
Commerce v. New York 601,
602
the Dominion v. McVeigh 340
Hamilton v. Dudley's Les
see 16, 215, 449
Mich. v. Williams 212, 439
Republic v. Hamilton 154
Rome v. Village of Rome 144
the State v. Bank of Cape
Fear 340
the State v. Cooper 492
the State v. Dalton 23
United States v. Halstead 83
United States v. Norton 15
Utica v. Mersereau 413
Bank Tax Case 602
Banker's Case 439
Bankhead r. Brown 662, 671, 673
Banks, Ex parte 381
Banks, The, v. The Mayor 602
Banning v. Taylor 437
Baptist Church v. Wetherell 581, 582
Barbemeyer v. Iowa 13, 21
Barber v. Root 503, 504
Barbour v. Barbour 447
v. Camden 278, 476
Barclay v. Howell's Lessee 699
Barker v. Cleveland 58
v. People 25, 78, 406
v. Pittsburgh 337
Barlow v. Lambert . 31
Barnaby r. State 733
Barnard v. Bartlett 377
Barnes v. Atchison 622
v. District of Columbia 232
v. First Parish in Falmouth 84
v. McCrate 552
Barnet r. Barnet 470
Barnett v. People 406
Barrett v. Crane 509
Barring r. Commonwealth 748
Barron v. Baltimore 25
Barronet, Matter of 380, 381
Barrow v. Page 6.57
Barrows r. Bell 560
Barry, Er parte 428
v. Lauck 759, 760, 777
v. Mercein 17, 428, 432
Barry's Case 4:32
Barthelemy v. People 579
Bartholomew v. Harwinton 277, 278,
476
Bartlet v. Knight 22, 506
Bartlett v. Crozier 303
XX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Bartlett v. Lang 448
v. Morris 70
Barto v. Himrod 142, 146, 147, 149
Barton v. Syracuse 254, 304, 310
Bartruff v. Remey 462
Bass v. Fontleroy 154
Bassett v. Porter 240
Basten v. Carew 511
Bates v. Delavan 507
v. Kimball 56, 110, 116, 194
v. Releyea 62
. v. Spooner 59
Bathold v. Fox 356
Batman v. Megowan 786
Batre v. State 401, 403
Battle v. Howard 179
Baugher v. Nelson 325, 445
Baum v. Clause 529
Baxter, Matter of 322
v. Brooks 786
v. Winooski Turnpike 303
Bay v. Gage 461
Bayard v. Klinge 752
Bay City v. State Treasurer 84, 272,
285
Bayerque v. Cohen 17
Baylis v. Lawrence 576
Beach v. Ranney 530
v. Wiles 17
v. Walker 461, 464
Beal v. Nason 454
Beall v. Beall 446, 488
Beals v. Almador Co. 283
Beard v. Beard 506, 508
Beardsley v. Bridgeman 530, 567
v. Smith 296, 302, 303
v. Tappan 5:33
Beardstown v. Virginia 68, 81, 765,
776, 791
Beaty v. Knowles 235
Beauchamp v. State 108, 205
Beauregard v. New Orleans 16
Beck v. Stitzel 528
Bedard v. Hall 165
Bedle v. Beard 240
Beebe v. State 111, 116, 204, 205,
213
Beecher v. Baldy 101, 220
Beeching's Case 425
Beekman v. Saratoga, &c. R. R.
Co. 652, 661, 664, 672
Beene v. State 416
Beers v. Beers 513
v. Botsford 301
v. Haughton 351
Behrens v. Allen 56()
Beirne v. Brown 320, 323
Bell v. Clapp 374
v. Morrison 17, 18, 453, 454
Bell v. Prouty 662
v. West Point 3.11
Belleville R. R. Co. v. Gregory 71
Bellinger v. New York Cent. R. R.
Co. 655, 677, 696, 712
Bellows v. Parsons 65
Bellport, Parish o
f,
v
. Tooker 581
Bemis v
. Becker 64
Benden v. Nashua 678
Bender v. Crawford
- 358, 45.5
Benedict v
. Goit 683
v
. Wanderbilt 731
Benford v. Gibson 336
Bennett v
. Boggs 204
v
. Borough o
f Birmingham 237,
246
v
. Bull 204
v
. Deacon 534
v
. Fisher 463
v
. New Orleans 254
v
.
State 596
Benoist v. St. Louis 628
Bensley v
. Mountain Lake, &c. Co. 660
Benson v
. Albany 207, 209
v
. New York 202,292,293,295,
- 338, 719, 724
Bentinck v
. Franklin 454
Berlin v. Gorham 143
Berry v. Baltimore, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. 165,
215
v
. Carter 529
v
.
Ramsdell 456
Bevard v. Hoffman 777
Bibb County Loan Association v
.
Richards 170
Biddle v. Commonwealth 513
Bidwell v. Whittaker 68
Bigelow v. Bigelow 25
v
. Randolph 303, 304
v
. W. Wisconsin R
.
R
.
Co. 71,
224, 710
Big Grove v. Wells 268, 270
Biggs, Ex parte 416
Bill v. Norwich 311
Billings v. Detten 478
v
. Wing 528
Billmeyer v. Evans 3.59
Bimeler v
.
Dawson 22, 23, 507, 509
Binghamton Bridge Case 340, 343,
482
Bird, Ex parte 734
v
. Daggett 270
• v
. Perkins 312
v
. Smith 737
v
. State 390
v
. Wasco County 185
Birdsall v. Carrick 189
Bishop v. Marks 637
Bishop's Case, The 433
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxi
Bissell v. Briggs 22, 507
v. Jeffersonville 270
v. Kankakee 268
v. Penrose 84
Black v. Black 505
v. State 405
Blackford v. Peltier 456
Blackinton v. Blackinton 58
Blackwood v. Van Vleet 76, 356
Bladen v. Philadelphia . 90
Blain v. Bailey 185
Blair v. Forehand 748
v. Kilpatrick 498
v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. 719
v. Ridgeley 37, 320, 332
Blake v. Dubuque 704
v. Rich 697
v. St. Louis 304, 310
v. Winona, &c. R. R. Co. 721
Blakemore v. Dolan 184
Blanchard v. Stearns 777
Blandford School District v. Gibbs 782
Blanding v. Burr 144, 283
Blatchley v. Moser 243
Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle 465,
468
Blessing v. Galveston 165, 232
Blin v. Campbell 499
Bliss v. Commonwealth 205, 434
v. Hosmer 655
r. Kraus 231
Block v. Jacksonville 729
Blocker v. Burness 596
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson
R. R. Co. 195, 659, 661, 663, 672,
700, 701
Bloom v. Richards 31, 582, 589, 595,
734
Bloomer r. Stolley 153
Bloomfield, &c. Co. v. Calkins 684
Bloomington v. Bay 304
v. Brokaw 252, 311
Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Tioga
R. R. Co. 18
Blount v. Janesville 252, 472, 631
Blydenburg v. Miles 407, 749
Board of Commissioners v. Bright 474
v. Brears's 278
v. Lucas 256
v. Pidge 735
Board of Education v. Minor 45, 586,
589
Board of Public Works v. Colum
bia College 23
Board of Supervisors v. Heenan 174
Boardman v. Beckwith 463
Bode v. State 726, 727
Bodwell v. Osgood 542
Bogardus v. Trinity Church 31
Boggs v. Merced, &c. Co. 651
Bohannon v. Commonwealth 377
Bohlman v. Green Bay, &c. R. R.
Co. 658, 659
Bolling v. Lersner 16
Bollman and Swartout, Ex parte 430
Bolton v. Johns 448, 472
r. Prentice 420
Bombaugh v. Bombaugh 446
Bonaparte, Prince Pierre, Trial of 384
Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy
R. R. Co. 25, 264,672
Bond v. Appleton 64
v. Kenosha 622, 648
v. State 379
Bonsall v. Lebanon 735
Boon v. Bowers 62, 125
Booneville v. Ormrod 704
v. Trigg 185
Booth v. Booth 464
v. Woodbury 278,279, 610,699
Borden v. Fitch 23, 503
Borough of Dunmore's Appeal 234,
283, 288, 339
Bosier v. Steele 179
Bosley v. Mattingley 68
Boston v. Cummins 205, 326
v. Shaw 735
Boston, &c. Railroad Co., In re 695
Boston, Concord, & M. R. R. Co.
v. State 725
Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Sa
lem & Lowell R. R. Co. 343
Boston Mill-dam v. Newman 672
Boston & Roxbury Mill-dam Cor
poration v. Newman 668
Boston Water Power Co. v. Bos
ton & Worcester R. R. Co. 343, 656
Bostwick v. Perkins 499, 500
Boswell v. Commonwealth 379
Botts v. Williams 22
Boucher v. New Haven 311
Boughton v. Carter 655
Bourland v. Edison 5:30
v. Hildreth 156, 754, 779
Bourne v. The King 408
Bow v. Allenstown 229, 239,
240
Bowdoinham v. Richmond 233, 355
Bowen v. Byrie 603
v. Hixon 785
Bowie v. Lott 100
Bowman v. Middleton 201, 212, 443
v. Smiley 359
Boyce v. Sinclair 463, 468, 474
Boyd v. Ellis 25
v. State 345, 386
Boyland v. New York 305
Boyle, Matter of 156, 192
xxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Boyle v. Arledge 17
v. Zacharie 360
Brackett v. Norcross 448, 486
Braddee v. Brownfield 205
Bradford v. Brooks 117
v. Cary 337
v. Shine 358, 4.54
v. Stevens 726
Bradley, Er parte 394, 416
v. Baxter 142
v. Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co. 722,
725
v. Fisher 416
v. Heath 533, 542, 556, 579
v. McAtee 231, 343, 345, 630,
632
v. New York & N. H.
R. R. Co. 495, 662, 672
v. People 602
22, 23, 503, 507Bradshaw v. Heath
v. Omaha 226, 232, 624
v. Rogers .699
Bradt v. Towsley 529, 530
Bradwell v. Illinois 13, 21, 37, 498
Brady v. Brunson 659
v. New York 270
v. Northwestern Insurance
Co. 747
v. Richardson 499
v. West 186
Bragg v. Meyer 18
v. People 480
Bragg's Case 505
Brainard v. Colchester 342
Branch Bank of Mobile v. Murphy 190
Brandon v. Gowing 413
v. People 390
v. State 178
Branham v. Lange 140, 164, 185
Branson v. Philadelphia 722
Braynard v. Marshall 15
Breitenbach v. Bush 357
Brenham v. Story 125
Brent v. Chapman 454
Brevoort v. Detroit 463
v. Grace 123, 125
Brewer v. Brewer 142, 640, 641
v. New Gloucester 299
Brewster v. Hough
v. Syracuse
154, 342, 641
176, 474, 475,
476, 612
Brick Presbyterian Church v. New
York 154, 251, 345, 748
Bricker v. Potts 528
Bridge r. Ford 500
Bridge Co. v. Hoboken Co. 340
Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R.
C 144, 445, 4740.
Bridges v. Shallcross 138
Bridgewater v. Plymouth 481
Brien v. Williamson 75, 100
Brieswick v. Mayor, &c. of Bruns
wick 178
Brig Aurora v. United States 142
Briggs v. Georgia 94
v. Hubbard 445, 454, 461
v. Whipple 257
Brigham v. Miller 86, 136
Bright v. Boyd 486
v. McCulloch 176,618
Brighton v. Wilkinson 232, 233
Brimmer v. Boston 345
Brinkmeyer v. Evansville 304
Brinton v. Seevers 472
Briscoe v. Anketell 354, 448
v. Bank of Kentucky 11, 19,
198
Bristol v. Johnson 256, 257
v. New Chester 233, 292
v. Supervisors, &c. 449, 476
Britain v. Kinnard 509
British Plate Manuf. Co. v. Mere
dith 677
Brittle v. People 39
Britton v. Ferry 84
Broadbent v. State 494
Broadfoot's Case 367
Broadway Baptist Church v. Mc
Atee 640
Brock v. Hishen 701
v. Milligan 596
Brockway v. Kinney 59
Brodnax v. Groom 165
Brodhead v. Milwaukee 278, 610, 611
Broll v. State 415
Bromley v. People 155
Bronson v. Kinzie 350, 352, 353, 356
v. Newberry 351, 352
v. Wallace 17
Brook v. Montague 554
Brooker v. Coffin 528, 529
Brooklyn Central R. R. Co. v.
| Brooklyn City R. R. Co. 241, 688,
| 690
Brooklyn & Newtown R. R. Co.
v. Coney Island R. R. Co. 690
Brooklyn Park Commissioners v.
Armstrong 666, 698
Brooks v. Hyde 156
v. Mobile School Commis
sioners 71
Brower v. O'Brien 784
| Brown v. Beatty 652, 705
v. Brown 166
v. Buzan 220
v. Cayuga, &c. R. R. Co. 655,
678, 705
v. Chadbourne 735, 736
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxiii
Brown v. Commonwealth 740
v. Duplessis 692
v. Fifield 75
v. Fleischner 147
v. Foster 509
v. Grover 78, 754
v. Hanson 528
v. Haywood 490, 492
v. Hummel 340
v. Maryland 605, 606, 726,733
v. New York 472
v. Parker 454
v. Pratt 31
v. Providence W. & B. R. R.
Co. 712
v. Smith 529, 623
v. State 393, 395, 500
v. Storm 485
v. Wilcox 76
p. Worcester 702
Browne r. Scofield 735
Browning v. Springfield 304, 305
Brownville r. W. 243
Bruffet v. Great Western R. R.
Co.
Brumagim v. Tillinghast
Brunnig v. N. O. Canal & Bank
340
605
ing Co. 660
Bruns r. Crawford 358
Brunswick v. Finney 144
Brush r. Carbondale 252
v. Keeler 774
Bryan, Er parte 393
v. Cattel 337
v. Reynolds 166
v. Walker 451
Bryson v. Bryson 136, 137
v. Campbell 136
v. Philadelphia 253
Buckingham v. Davis 517
v. Smith 657, 661
Buckley v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R.
Co 725
Bucknall v. Story 647
Budd v. State 491
Buddington, Matter of 4:30
Buell r. Ball 254, 624
Buffalo v. Holloway 31()
v. Webster 749
Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Burket 512
ty
.
Ferris 701
Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v.
Brainerd
Buffalo & Niagara R
.
R
.
Co. v.
662
Buffalo 722
Buford v. Wible 5:30
Bulger, In re 336
Bulkley v. N. Y
.
& N
.
H
.
R
.
R
.
Co. 722,
724, 725
Bull v. Conroe 480, 490
Bull v. Read 142,143, 148, 204
Bullock v. Curry 260, 267
Bumgardner v. Circuit Court 351
Bumpas v. Taggart 603
Bunn v. Gorgas 357
v
. People 84
v
. Riker 774
Buonaparte v. Camden & Amboy
R. R. Co. 25, 264, 672
Bur, Ex parte 429
Burch v. Newberry 117
Burden v. Stein
665
Burdeno v. Amperse 75
Burdett v. Abbott • 162
Burgess v. Clarke 668
v
. Pue 84, 144, 150, 230
Burgett v. Burgett 172
Burghardt v. Turner 446
Burke v. Gaines 16
v
. Supervisors o
f
Monroe 782,
785
Burkett v. McCurty 112, 754
Burley v. State 393
Burlingame v. Burlingame 552, 55
Burlington v. Bumgardner 617
v
. Kellar 242, 644
v
. Leebrick 122, 142
v
.
Putnam Ins. Co. 246
622, 631, 632
244, 245, 247
Burnet v. Sacramento
Burnett, Ex parte
Burnham v. Chelsea 278
v
.
Commonwealth 506
v
. Morrissey 162, 164
v
.
Stevens 431
Burns, Er parte - 122
v
. Clarion County 234, 283
v
.
State 490
Burr v. Carbondale 284, 615
Burrel v. Associated Reform Ch. 581
Burril v. West 61
Burrill v. Boston 274
Burrit v. New Haven 2:37
Burson v. Huntington 603
Burt v. Brigham 658
v
. Merchants' Ins. Co. 654
v
. Williams 117, 357
Burton v. Burton 528
Bush v. Seabury 749
v
. Shipman 337, 339
Bushel's Case 308
Bushnell v. Beloit 144, 272
Bushnell's Case 4:31
Butler v. Dunham 272
v
. Farnsworth 21
v
. Palmer 350, 357,476
v
. Pennsylvania 336
v
. Porter 649
v
. Pultney 278
xxiv. TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw 115
v. Toledo 463
Butler's Appeal 205, 641
Buys v. Gillespie 529
Byers v. Commonwealth 512
Byler v. Asher 757, 777
Byrne v. Missouri 19
C.
Cabell v. Cabell 136
Cahoon v. Commonwealth 100
Cairo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Sparta 267, 287
Calaveras Co. v. Brockway 786, 789
Calcote v. Stanton 16
Calder v. Bull 11, 110, 205, 323
v. Kurby 345
Caldwell v. Gale 64
v. Justices of Burke 144
Calendar v. Marsh 252
Calhoun v. McLendon 114
Cal. Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co. 343
Calking v. Baldwin 700, 702
Calkins v. State - 390
v. Sumner 552
Call v. Chadbourne 144
v. Hagger 354, 453, 456
Callendar v. Marsh 678
Callendar's Case 5:36
Callison v. Hedrick 700, 702
Calvin v. Reed 503
Cambridge v. Lexington 234
Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v.
Briggs 721, 723
Cameron v. Supervisors 659
Campau v. Detroit 217, 225
Campbell v. Evans 453, 506
v. Fields 43
v. Morris 21, 498, 607
v. Quinlin 64
v. Spottiswoode 576
v. State 25, 406
v. Union Bank 128, 205, 215
Canal Co. v. R. R. Co. 128
Canal Trustees v. Chicago 621
Cancemi v. People 395, 500
Cannon v. Brame 59
v. Hemphill 179
v. Mathes 95, 97, 179
v. New Orleans 606
Canton v. Nist 242
Cantwell v. Owens 68
Cape Girardeau v. Riley 98
Capen v. Foster 757, 759, 777
Caperton v. Martin 455
Carew v. Western Union Tel. Co. 244
Carey v. Giles 128, 205, 220
Cargill v. Power 218, 357
Carleton v. Bickford
v. Goodwin’s Ex’rs
v. People
v. Whitcher
Carlisle v. United States
Carlslake v. Mapledoram
Carman v. Steubenville & Indiana
R. R. Co.
Carne v. Litchfield
Carothers v. Hurly -
Carpenter v. Dane County
v. Jennings
. Landaff 709, 710,
. Lathrop
. Montgomery 192,
. Oswego & Syracuse
R. R. Co.
. Pennsylvania 325,
. People
v. Snelling
v. Tarrant
Carr v. Georgia R. R. Co.
v. Northern Liberties 254,
v. St. Louis
Carroll v. Olmstead's Lessee
v. State
v. St. Louis
Carson v. Carson 325,
v. Coleman
v. McPhetridge
Carter v. Balfour
. Dow 246,
. Dubuque
. Walker
. Wright
Casborus v. People
Case v. Dean
v. Dunmore
v. New Orleans, &c. R. R.
Co.
. Reeve
. Rorabacker
. Thompson
. Wildridge
Cash, *Wº:v. hitworth
Cass v. Dillon 144, 185, 277,
Castellow v. Guilmartin
Castleberry v. Kelly 528,
Cates v. Kellogg
v. Wadlington
Cathcart v. Robinson
Catlin v. Hull
v. Smith
Caulfield v. Bullock
Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee
Cearfoss v. State
Central Bridge Corporation v.
:
:
:
v
455, 459,
:
Lowell 340,
23
116
227
168
139
529
680
889
457
412
711
711
269
226
684
470
401
603
529
703
311
242
124
434
259
348
699
782
31
748
259
511
696
405
647
359
59
61
163
700
68
127
665
281
59
529
567
735
32
607
38
777
97
70
656
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXV
Central City Horse Railway Co. v.
Fort Clark Horse Railway Co. 656
Central Ohio R. R. Co. v. Holler 711
Central Park Extension, Matter of 666
Central Plank Road Co. v. Hanna
man 179
Central R. R. Co. v. Hetfield 684, 696
v. Rockafellow 596
v. State 342
Centralia v. Scott 311
Chadwick r. Moore 357
Chagrin Falls, &c. Plank Road Co.
v. Cane 683
Chalker r. Ives 449
Chamberlain v. Lyell 220
v. Sibley 141
Chamberlain of London v. Compton
244, 246
Chambers v. Fisk 84
v. Satterlee 632
v. State 184
Champaign v. Pattison 311
Chance v. Marion Co. 71, 72
Chandler v. Nash 109, 512
Chapin v. Paper Works 497
Chapinan v. Albany & Schenectady
R. R. Co. - 690
v. Calder 542
v. Gates 700, 701
v. Macon 811
v. Morgan 499
v. Smith 58
Chappee v. Thomas 505
Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge 325, 482, 495, 704
Charleston v. Benjamin 595
Charlestown Branch R. R. Co. v.
Middlesex 700, 702
Charlton v. Alleghany City 677
v. Watton 560
Chase v. Chase 502
v. Cheney 582
v. Merrimac Bank 299
v. Miller 754
v. People 380
Chase's Case 575
Cheaney v. Hooser 143, 279, 610, 613
Cheever v. Wilson 23
Chenango Bridge Co. v. Bingham
ton Bridge Co. 495, 497
Cheney v. Jones 221
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 1, 76
Cherokee Tobacco, The 15
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. 656
Chestnut r. Marsh 92
v. Shane's Lessee 470
Chetwyndr. Chetwynd 4:32
Chicago v. Brophy 311
Chicago v. Langlass 311
v. Larned 621, 622, 624
v. McCarthy 306
v. McGiven 311
p. O'Brennan 311
r. People 779
v. Robbins 17, 304
v. Rumpff 493
v. Wheeler
& Q. R. R.
705
Chicago, Burlington, - -- - ----ºwº 676
Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Adler 450
r. Barrie
#:v. Haggert 2
t". #" y. 341, 721
v. Joliet 245, 681, 692
v. Lake 344, 671, 673
v. People 253, 722
v. Smith 204, 205, 658
v. Stein 680
v. Triplett 724
Chidsey v. Canton 303
Child's Case 4:30
Childs v. Shower 225,486
Chiles v. Drake 179
v. Monroe 179
Chilvers v. People 246, 740
Chiniquy v. People 271
Chisholm v. Georgia 1, 8, 31
v. Montgomery 237
Chrisman v. Bruce 777, 778
Christ Church v. Philadelphia 342,
347, 480
Christian v. Commonwealth 408
Christmas v. Russell 23
Christy v. Commissioners 337
Chumasero v. Potts 141
Church v. Chapin 59
v. Rowell 755
Chute v. Winegar 26)
Cincinnati v. Bryson 246
r. Rice 595
Cincinnati College v. State 641
Cincinnati Gazette Co. r. Timber
lake 559, 560, 562
Cincinnati, &c. R. R. Co. v. Com
missioners of Clinton Co. 111
Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State 246
Cincinnati Health Ass’n v. Rosen
thal 21
Cisco v. Roberts 731, 733
City Council v. Benjamin 7:34
City National Bank v. Mahan 19
Claflin v. Hopkinton 259, 274
Clapp v. Cedar County 272
r. Ely 117
Clark, Matter of 21, 22
v. Baltimore 462
v. Board of Directors 490
xxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Clark v. Bridge Proprietors 234
v. Buchanan 785
v. Clark 134, 136, 348, 449,
462, 502
v. Crane 91
v. Davenport 185, 644 |
v. Des Moines 235, 238, 259,
268, 270
v. Ellis 215
v. Holmes 509
v. Irwin 88
v. Janesville 144, 191, 192, 272
v. Lamb 514
v. Le Cren 244, 246
v. Martin 351, 358
v. McCreary 448
v. McKenzie 785.
v. Miller 227, 704
v. People 80, 221, 222, 394
v. Sammons 58
v. School District 236
v. State 326, 328. 379
v. Washington 251, 304, 308
v. White 662
Clark's Adm'r v. Hannibal & St.
Joseph R. R. Co. 724
Clarke v. Rochester 224
v. Smith 17
v. Van Surlay 123
Clay v. Smith 360
Clayton v. Harris 78
Clegg v. Laffer 529
Clem v. State 400
Clemens v. Conrad 603
Clement v. Mattison 420
Cleveland v. Rogers 509
Clifton v. Cook 779
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R. R.
Co. 690
v. Draper 178
v. Englebrecht 33
Clippinger p. Hepbaugh 167
Clough v. Unity 704
Coates v. Muse 17
Coats v. New York 154, 251, 748
Cobbett v. Hudson 430
Cobbett's Case 430
Coburn v. Ellenwood 241
v. Harvey 31
Cochran v. Darcy 356
v. Van Surley 108, 123, 128,
204, 209
Cochran's Case 419
Cock v. Weatherby 528
Cockagne v. Hodgkisson 534
Cockrum v. State 434
Coe v. Schultz 730, 748
Coffin v. Coffin - 163, 558
v. Rich 351
Coffin v. State 336
v. Tracy 499
Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky 357
v. Keightley 278
Cohen v. Barrett 172
v. Hoff 117
v. Wright 322
Cohens v. Virginia 15, 83
Colburn v. Woodworth 59
Cole v. Bedford 281
v. Medina 305
v. Muscatine 252
v. Wilson 579
Coleman v. Carr 125
v. Holmes 455
Coles v. Madison Co. 232, 339, 450
Collector v. Da 603
Colley v. Merrill 31
Collier v. Frierson 40
Collins v. Henderson 83
Colony v. Dublin 462
Colt v. Eves 25, 94
Coltin v. Ellis 141
Colton v. Rossi 701
Columbia Co. v. Davidson 271
v. King 271
Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius 740
v. Peoria Bridge
Co. 740
Commercial Bank v. Iola 266, 610
Commercial Bank of Natchez v.
State 340
Commissioners, &c. v. Aspinwall º:- 2
v. Beckwith 658
v. Bowie 701
v. Cox 270
- v. Duckett 254,
304, 309
v. Gas Co. 244
v. Holyoke Wa
ter Power Co.
497, 719
v. Martin 303
v. Mighels 296
v. Morrison 513
v. Pidge 740
p. Wallace 145
v. Withers 736
Commissioners of Revenue v. State 285
Commonwealth v. Alderman 404
v. Alger 651, 714,
747
v. Anthes 401
v. Archer 381
v. Austin 416
v. Aves 431
v. Bacon 336
v. Bakeman 405
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxvii
Commonwealth v. Jones 112, 122, 786
v. Judges of Quar
ter Sessions 144
v. Kendall 727
v. Kimball 215, 380,
449, 477
v. Knapp 387, 401,
409
v. Kneeland 590, 592
v. Knowlton 31
v. Leach 31, 787
v. Locke 142
v. Lodge 32
v. Look 651
v. Lottery Tickets 372
v. Mann 336
v. Marshall 449, 463,
477
v. Maxwell 205, 214
v. McCloskey 203
v. McCluley 781
v. McCombs 227, 778
v. McLane 514
v. McWilliams 142,
144, 151
v. Meeser 788
v. Mitchell 387
v. Moore 204, 221, 617
v. Morey 388
v. Morgan 390, $92
v. Mullen 392
v. Myers 380
v. New Bedford
Bridge 855
v. Newburyport 234,
285
v. Nichols 390, 567
v. Olds 405
v. Painter 144
v. Patch 242, 244,730,
749
v. Penn. Canal Co.
, 656, 720, 721
Commonwealth v. Bennett 151, 152
v. Billings 403
v. Bird 342, 480
v. Blanding 526, 561
v. Blood 22
v. Bonner 390, 578
v. Bowden 405
v. Breed 667, 738
v. Brennan 345
v. Brickett 422
v. Byrne 4.38
v. Chapin 735
v. Charlestown 737
v. Clapp 214,215,530.
548, 727
v. Colton 749
v. Com’rs, &c. 448
v. Cook 404
v. County Commis
sioners 780
v. Coyningham 231
v. Crotty 373
v. Cullen 340
v. Cummings 398
v. Curtis 386, 387, 388,
392, 734
v. Dailey 395
v. Dana 380
v. Dean 152
v. Dewey 179
v. Dorsey 3:32
v. Duane 449, 477
v. Eastern R.R. Co. 724
v. Emery 515
v. Emminger 785,788
v. Erie R. R. Co. 606
v. Erie & Northeast
R. R. Co. . .236,
242, 681, 682, 684
v. Fells 405
v. Fisher 595, 698
v. Fredericks 152
v. Gamble 3:37
v. Goddard 404
v. Green 782
v. Hall 22, 332
v. Hamilton Manuf.
Co. 488
v. Harman 388
v. Hartman 210
v. Hartnett 64
v. Hipple 109
v. Hitchings 25, 215
v. Holbrook 729
v. Holt 385
tº
.
Howe 727
v
. Hunt 31
v
. Intoxicating Liq
uors 726
v
. Pittsburg 288
v
. Pittsburg, &c.
R. R
.
Co. . 495, 656
v
. Pomeroy 215
v
. Porter 401, 416
v
. Potts 215, 217
v
. Putnam 504
v
. Randall 422
v
.
Reed 515
v
. Richter 677
v
. Roby 406
v
. Rock 401
v
. Roxbury 229
v
. Ryan 515
v
. Savings Bank 647
v
. Seabrook 512
xxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Commonwealth v. Semmes 381
v. Snelling 579
v. Stodder 246, 749
v. Stowell 405
v. Sturtivant 387
v. Taylor 386, 388
v. Tewksbury 714, 747
v. Towles 21
v. Tuck 404
v. Tuckerman 388
v. Van Tuyl 401
v. Waite 749
v. Webster 403
v. Whitney 513
v. Wilkinson 683
v. Williams 457
v. Woelper • 762
v. Wolf 595
v. Wood 403
v. Worcester 244, 734
Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith 16
Concord v. Boscawen 260
v. Portsmouth Savings
Bank 268
Concord R. R. Co. v. Greeley 661
Cone v. Cotton 506
v. Hartford 631, 637, 735
Coney v. Owen 486
Confiscation Cases 450
Coſgdon v. Norwich 311
Conkey v. Hart 350, 353, º;
35
Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. v. Cross 34
Connell v. Connell 470
Conner, Er parte 178
v. Elliot 20
v. New York 175, 336
Connor v. Fulsom 278
Connors v. People 390, 391
Conrad v. Ithaca 304
Conservators of River Tone v. Ash 241
Contra Costa R. R. v. Moss 673
Conway v. Cable 459, 462, 478
v. Taylor's Ex'r 740
v. Waverly 648
Conwell v. Fimrie 655
v. O'Brien 242
Cook v. Gray 356
v. Gregg 351,453
v. Hill 543
v. Moffat 14, 360
v. South Park Com’rs 703
v. Vimont 61
Cooley v. Board of Wardens 605,731,
733
v. Freeholders 303
Coolidge v. Guthrie 661
v. Williams 496
Cooper, Re 394
Cooper v. Barber 569
v. Board of Works 505
v. Cooper 503, 504
v. Greeley 530, 569
v. McJunkin 421
v. Stone 569
v. Sunderland 509
ty
.
Telfair 110, 205,
220
v
. Williams 657, 661
Cooper's Case 536
Coosa River Steamboat Co. v. Bar
cla 351, 725
Copes v
. Charleston 145
Copp v. Henniker 513
Corbett v. Bradley 92
Corbin v. Hill 459
Corfield v. Coryell 20, 498, 607
Coriell v. Ham 351
Corliss, Matter o
f 78.1
v
. Corliss 94
Corning v. Greene 143
Corwin v. New York & Erie R
.
R.
Co. 722, 723
Cory v. Carter 490
Costar v. Brush 343
Coster v. New Jersey R
.
R
.
Co.
Cotten v. Ellis
698
78
205, 221
Couch v. McKee 454
Cougot v. New Orleans 749
Coulterville v. Gillen 242
County Commissioners v. Jones 336
County Court v. Griswold 666
Courvoisier, Trial of 413
Cousins v. State 617
Coutant v. People 80, 84, 220
Cover v. Baytown 274
Covington v. Bryant 304
v
. East St. Louis 185, 242
v
. Southgate 479, 613, 615,
623
Cowan v. McCutchen 457
v
. Milbourn 590
Coward v. Wellington 543
Cowen v. West Troy 242
Cowgill v. Long 476
Cowles v. Harts 61
Cox v. Bunker 5:30
v
. Coleridge 3S4
v
. Cox 504
v
. Lee 576
v
. Louisville, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. 264,
684
Coxe v. Martin 357
Coxhead v
. Richards 534
Coyner v. Lynde 500
| Craft v. State Bank 31
Cotton v. Commissioners o
f
Leon 145,
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxix
Craig v. Burnett 244, 245 Curtis v. Mussey
545
v. Brown 529 v. State 382
v. Dimmock 603 v. Whipple 212, 614, 616, 658
v. Kline 738 v. Whitney 351, 353
v. Missouri 19 Cushman v. Smith 700
r. RochesterCity & Brighton Cusic v. Douglass' 352, 448
R. R. Co. 684, 687 Cutlip v. Sheriff 179, 182
Crandall, Petition of 430 Cutts v. Hardee 358
v. James 58 Cuyler v. Rochester 499
v. Nevada 606 Cº. Pond Draining Co. v.v. State 21, 498 ooper 516, 610, 613
Crane v. Meginnis 136, 137, 508
Crawford v. Delaware 252, 678,º D.
v. Wilson 38 Dade v. Medcalf 471
Creal v. Keokuk 678 Dailey v. Reynolds 530
Crease v. Babcock 142 Daily v. Swope 637
Creevy v. Carr 579 Daily Post Co. v. McArthur 569
Creighton v. San Francisco 283 Dakin v. Hudson 509
Crenshaw p. Slate River Co. 205,668 Dalby r. Wolf 230
Creote v. Chicago 624 Dale v. Irwin 755, 779
Cronan v. Cotting 65 v. State 401
Crone v. Angell 528 v. The Governor 480
Cronise v. Cronise 136, 348 Dalrymple v. Mead 7:35
Crosby v. Hanover 655 Dalton v. Water Commissioners 658
v. Lyon 642 Dana's Case 396, 513
Cross v. Hopkins 231 Dancaster v. Hewson 553
Croswell's Case 540 Dane County v. Dunning 512
Crouch v. Hall 31 Daniel Ball, The 738
Crow v. Bowlby 59 Daniels v. Clegg 64
Crowell v. Hopkinton 274, 278, 281, Danville v. Pace 204, 209, 210, 448,
612, 616 462, 469
v. Randell 15 Darcy v. Allain 346, 493
Crowley an.Copley 637, 741 Dargan v. Mobile 305
Crozier v. Cudney 377 łºń. v. Rogers - 156
Cruikshanks v. Charleston 441 Darlington v. New York 294
Crump v. Morgan 35 v. United States 654
Cubbison v. McCreary 596 || Darrington v. State Bank of Ala
Culreth, Ec parte 22 bama 19
Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bar- Darst v. People 245
ren County Court 199 || Dart v. Houston 337, 341
Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Washington County Court 462
Cummerford v. McAvoy 567
Cumming v. Police Jury 622
Cummings v. Ash 654, 700
v. Missouri 42, 319, 322,
323, 325
Cunningham v. Brown 552
Cupp v. Seneca Co.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 153,
233, 264, 291, 308, 336, 340, 348,
438, 7.18
Dash v. Van Kleek 76, 77, 112, 115,
325, 449, 461
Davenport v. Barnett 59
v. Stevenson 254
v. Young 127
Davenport, &c. Co. v. Davenport 241
Davidson v. Boston & Maine R. R.
Co. 676, 677
v. Lawrence 456
Davies v. McKeeby 78, 443, 451
v. Morgan 244
Davis v. Bank of Fulton 174
v. Brown 528
v. Duncan 551
Curran v. Arkansas
v. Shattuck 699, 703
Currier r. Marietta & Cincinnati
506, 702
19
R. R. Co. 660
Curry v. Walter 56()
Curtis v. Curtis 528
v. Gibbs 22, 506
v. Gill 513
v. Leavitt 359, 450, 469 v. Holbrook 774
XXX TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Davis v. Kendallville 269
v. Menasha 492
v. Minor 454
v. New York 251, 253
v. Reed 250
v. Richardson 603
v. State 138, 175, 185,215
v. State Bank 125, 464, 470
v. Wood 61
v. Woolnough 179
Davis's Lessee v. Powell 486
Davison v. Duncan 572
v. Johonnot 125, 490
Dawkins v. Pawlet 552
v. Rokeby 553
Dawson v. Coffman 31
v. Duncan 568
v. Shaver 205
v. State 329
Day v. Buffington 603
v. Gallup 16
v. Green 734
v. Jones 754
v. Kent 779
v. Munson 65
v. Savadge 514
v. Stetson 165
Dean v. Borchsenius 459, 474
v. Gleason 478, 642
v. Sullivan R. R. Co. 697, 705
Dean of St. Asaph, Trial of 414
Deansville Cemetery Association,
Matter of 666
Dearborn v. Boston, C. & M. R. R.
Co. 264, 711, 712
Deaton v. Polk Co. 711
Deblois v. Barker 735
Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust
Co. 154
De Camp v. Fveland 225
Decatur v. Fisher 306
Decatur Co. v. Humphreys 658
De Chastellux v. Fairchild 56, 111,
116, 132
De Cordova v. Galveston 462
Dedham v. Natick 420
De Jarnette v. Haynes 200
Dekraſt v. Barney 428
Delancey v. Insurance Co. 495
Delaplaine v. Cook 457, 458
Delegal v. Highley 560
Delmonico v. New York 310
Delphi v. Evans 659
De Mill v. Lockwood 446
Deming v. Houlton 269
De Moss v. Newton 456
Dempsey v. People 393
Den v. Bolton 582
v. Downam 467
Den v. Dubois 71
v. Reid 70
v. Schenck 71
Denham v. Holeman 178
Denison v. Hyde 507
Dennett, Petitioner 141
Denning v. Corwin 509
Denny v. Mattoon 131, 479
v. Reynolds 59
Denton v. Jackson 241, 260, 296
v. Polk 709
Dentzel v. Waldie 470, 471
Depew v. Board of Commissioners 735
v. Trustees of W. & E. Ca
nal 34, 738, 740
Derby v. Derby 386
Derby Turnpike Co. v. Parks 204
Dergan v. Boston 622
Detmold v. Drake 219, 220
Detroit v. Beckman 254
v. Blackeby 304
v. Core 304, 308
v. Martin 227
Detroit Free Press v. McArthur 569
De Varaigne v. Fox 698
Devin v. Scott 728
Devlin v. Brady 169
Devon Witches, Case of 385
De Voss v. Richmond 268
Devoy v. New York 79, 225
Devries v. Conklin 75
v. Phillips 390
Dew v. Cunningham 170
Dewey v. Detroit 306
DeWolf v. Rabaud 17
Dibdin v. Swan 569
Dick v. McLaurin 511
Dickens's Case 416
Dickenson v. Fitchburg 709, 710
Dickey v. Hurlburt 780
v. Reed 122
v. Tennison 662, 704
Dickinson v. Hayes 59
Dicks v. Hatch 499
Dickson v. Dickson 136
Diettendorf v. Ref. Cal. Church 582
Dikeman v. Dikeman 356, 357
Dillard v. Collins 533
Dillingham v. Snow 240, 648
Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand
Junction Canal 514, 515, 516
Dingley v. Boston 666, 698
Dishon v. Smith 760, 779. 784, 786
District of Columbia v. Saville 750
District Township v. Dubuque 68, 71,
79, 90
Ditson v. Ditson 503, 504, 507
Dively v. Cedar Falls 267, 514
Division of Howard Co. 232
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxxi
Dixon v. Parmelee
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
Co.
v. State
Dobyns v. Weadon
Dodge v. Coffin
v. County Commissioners
r. Gridley
v. Woolsey
Doe v. Beebe
v. Braden
v. Douglass
v. McQuilkin
Dole v. Lyon
r. The Governor
Dominick v. Bowdoin
Donahoe v. Richards
Done v. People
Donkle v. Kohn
Donnaher's Case
Donnell v. State
Donnelly v. State
Dorgan v. Boston
Dorlan r. East Brandywine, &c.
R. R. Co.
Dorr, Ez parte
Dorrance Street, Matter of
Dorsey, Matter of
v. Dorsey
v. Gilbert
Dorsey’s Appeal
Doss v. Commonwealth
Dothage v. Stuart
Dougherty v. Commonwealth
Doughty v. Hope
v. Somerville & Eastern
R. R. Co.
Douglas v. Freeholders
Douglas Co. v. Bolles
Douglass v. Placerville
v. Turnpike Co.
Dove v. School District
Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge
Dow v. Norris
Dow's Case
Dowling v. State
Dowling's Case
Downing v. Porter
v. Wilson
Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co.
v. Hallam
v. O'Doherty
Drainage of Lands, Matter of
Draining Co. Case
Drake v. Gilmore
v. Phil., &c. R. R. Co.
Drehman v. Stifel
Drennan v. People
Drew v. Davis
14, 42, 154,
34, 125,
116, 492,
204, 220,
413
601
707
70
269
237
683
490
738
224
22
3:32
395
373
530
226
59
552
665
636, 638
461
723
319, 322, 354
64
647, 648
Dronberger v. Reed
l)ruliner v. State
Drummond v. Leslie
Dryfuss v. Bridges
Duanesburgh v. Jenkins
Dubois v. McLean
Dubuque Co. v. R. R. Co.
Ducat c. Chicago
Duchess of Kingston's Case
Dudley v. Mayhew
Duffy v. Hobson
Dugan v. Hollins
Duke v. Rome
v. Ashbee
Dulany’s Lessee v. Tilghman
Dunbar v. San Francisco
1)uncan v. Thwaites
Duncombe v. Daniell
v. Prindle
Dunden v. Snodgrass
Dunham v. Chicago
v. Hyde Park
v. Powers
v. Rochester
Dunlap v. Glidden
Dunman v. Bigg
Dunmore's Appeal
Dunn v. Burleigh
v. City Council
v. Sargeant
v. State
v. Winters
Dunnovan v. Green
Du Page Co. v. Jenks
Durach's Appeal
Durant v. Essex Co.
v. Kauffman
v. People
Durham v. Lewistown
Durkee v. Janesville
Duverge's Heirs v. Salter
Dwyer v. Goran
Dyckman v. New York
Dyer v. Morris
v. State
702
762
530
94
287
• 126
224, 272
21
58
499
603
62
254
774
469,470
655
560, 578
546
178
463
642, 643
252
552
236, 244, 246,
247
552
533
283
497
675
447, 448
393
553
267, 752
78
231, 641
63
615
391
116, 205, 491
177
185
59
509
529
190
v. Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. 496
E.
Eakin v. Racob
Earle v. Grant
v. Picken
Easley v. Moss
Eason v. State
81
413
386
534
220 -
East & West India Dock, &c. Co.
v. Gattke 705
xxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
East Brandywine, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Ranck
East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co 251, 295, 338
709
East Kingston v. Towle 460
East Lincoln v. Davenport 269
Eastman v. McAlpin 172
v. Meredith 296, 303
East Oakland v. Skinner 238, 268
East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v.
East Saginaw 342, 347, 480
East St. Louis v. Wehrung 250
v. Witts 287
Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston 344
Easton Bank v. Commonwealth 342
Eaton, Matter of 430
v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. 655,
672, 677, 679, 681, 712
v. United States 449, 477
Echols v. Staunton 661
Eckhart v. State 215, 217
Eddings v. Seabrook 676, 678
Eddy v. Capron 168, 169
Edgerly v. Swain 528
Edgerton v. Hart 511
Edgewood R. R. Co.'s Appeal 661
Edmonds v. Banbury 757
Edson v. Edson 22
Edward's Lessee v. Darby 84
Edwards v. Elliott 25
v. Jaggers 340
v. James 94
v. Pope 126, 129
Eels v. People 215, 218
Eggleston v. Doolittle 582
Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin 622,
- 637, 741
Eidemiller v. Wyandotte 659
Eimer v. Richards 59
Eitel v. State 156, 192
Elam v. Badger 5:33
Elbin v. Wilson 777
Elder v. Barrus 7:35
v. Reel 503
Eldridge v. Kuehl 455, 649
v. Smith 655
Election Law, Matter of 774
Elijah v. State 405
Elliott v. Ailsbury 529
v. Fairhaven & Westville
R. R. Co. 688
v. People 408
Ellis v. Jones 351
v. Pacific R. R. Co. 658
v. State 49ſ)
Ellyson, Er parte 786
Elmendorf v. Carmichael 118
v. New York 94
v. Taylor 16
Elmwood v. Marcy 268
Else v. Smith 37.2
Elwell v. Shaw 647, 648
Ely v. Holton 462
v. Thompson 215, 224, 434
Embury b. Conner 199,219, 220, º;
67
Emerick v. Harris 513
Emerson v. Atwater 62, 65
Emery v. Gas Co. 622
v. Mariaville 268
Emery's Case 164, 384
Empire City Bank, Matter of 504, 506
Encking v. Simmons 88
Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hart
ford & N. H. R. R. Co. 343
Engle v. Shurtz 450, 477
English v. Chicot Co. 237
v. New Haven, &c. Co. 482
v. Oliver 165
Ensworth v. Albin 156, 758
Entinck v. Carrington 371, 377
Erie R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth 343
v. New Jersey 606
v. Pennsylvania 154
Erie & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Casey 128
Erlinger v. Boneau 144, 152, 180
Ernst v. Kunkle 6:32
Ervine's Appeal 111, 128, 129, 212,
437, 438
Esman v. State 406
Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills 85
Essex Witches, Matter of 385
Este v. Strong 61
Estep v. Hutchman 125, 127
Esty v. Westminster 281
Etheridge v. Osborn 58
Eustis v. Parker 264
Evans v. Montgomery 325, 351
v. Myers 84
v. Populus 336
v. Sharpe 179
Evansville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dick 679
Evergreen Cemetery v. New Haven 666
Ewing v. Filley 779, 787
Exchange Bank v. IIines 215
Eyre v. Jacob 221
Ezekiel v. Dixon 68
F.
Facey v. Fuller 509, 511
Fairchild v. Adams 550
Fairfield v. McNarey 59
v. Ratcliffe 622
Fairhurst v. Lewis 420
Fairman v. Ives 543
Falconer v. Campbell 18, 325
v. Robinson * 185
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxxiii
Fairbault v. Misener 84
Fales v. Wadsworth 457
Fall v. Hazelrigg 64, 85
Falvey. In re 164, 430
Fanning v. Gregorie 74()
Fansler v. Parsons 758
Farley v. Dowe 352
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v.
Butchers' & Drovers' Bank 268, 270
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v.
Smith 84, 221, 360
Farney v. Towle 16
Farnsworth v. Lisbon 142, 640
v. Vance 358
Farnum v. Concord 303
Farr v. Sherman 75
Fawcett v. Fowliss 509, 511
v. York & North Midland
R. R. Co. 722, 723
Fearing v. Irwin 481, 676
Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co. 712
Fell v. State 146, 152, 345
Felton's Case 3S4
Fenton v. Garlick 22, 507
Fenwick v. Gill 486
Ferguson v. Landraw 281,488, 608,
616
v. Loar 661
Fernandez, Ex parte 4:30
Ferraria v. Wasconcellos 581, 582
Ferris v. Bramble 662
Fetter, Matter of 21
Field v. Des Moines 237, 655
v. Gibbs 23
- r. People 78, 139
Fifield v. Close 602, 603
Filber v. Dauterman 528
Finney v. Boyd 59
Fire Department v. Holfenstein 21
v. Noble 21
v. Wright 21
Fireman's Association v. Louns
bury 178, 179
First National Bank of Wheeling v.
Merchants' National Bank 376
First Parish, &c. v. Middlesex 709, 711
v. Stearns 782, 783
Fischli v. Cowan 59
Fish v. Collens 781
v. Kenosha 270
Fisher v. Deering - 64
r. Haldeman 17
v. Hildreth 774
v. Horricon Co. 668
v. McGirr 215, 374,728, 748
Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell 15
Fisher's Negroes v. Dobbs 462
Fishkill v. Fishkill & Beekman
Plafik Road Co. 177
Fisk v. Kenosha 475
Fiske v. Framingham Manuf. Co. 668
v. Hazzard 274
Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Grand
Junction R. R. Co. 719, 724
Fitzgerald v. Robinson 582
Flanagan v. Philadelphia 740
Flatbush, In re 178, 623
Fleischner v. Chadwick 185
Fletcher v. Auburn & Syracuse
R. R. Co.
v. Lord Somers 62
v. Oliver 78, 173
v. Peck 108, 205, 221, 319,
325, 334, 699
Flint v. Pike 560
Flint, &c. Plank Road Co. v.
Woodhull 116, 128, 226
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Fos
ter 204, 220, 513
Florentine v. Barton 123, 125
Flournoy v. Jeffersonville 512
Floyd v. Mintsey 61
Foley v. People 381
v. State 179, 182
Foote v. Fire Department 748
Forbes v. Halsey 458
Ford v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.
Co. 673, 684
v. County Commissioners 695
Fordyce v. Godman 164
Fort Dodge v. District Township 777
Forward v. Hampshire, &c. Canal
Co. 656
Fosdick v. Perrysburg 185
Foss v. Hildret 577
Foster v. Essex Bank 220, 359, 448,
471
v. Kenosha 644
v. Neilson 14
v. Scarff 760, 776
Fowler, Matter of 673
v. Beebe 778
v. Chatterton 457
v. Chichester 567
v. 1)anvers 277
v. Halbert 486
v. Pierce 187
Fowles v. Bowen 5:33
Fox, Er parte 367
v. State of Ohio 25, 244
v. W. P. Railroad Co. 700
Foxcroft v. Mallett 17
Frain r. State 387
Frankfort v. Winterport 169, 259
Franklin v. State 415
Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood 205, 220
Frary v. Frary 503
Freeborn v. Pettibone 357
xxxiv. TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Freedman v. Sigel 603
Free Fishers' Co. v. Gann 650
Freehölders, &c. v. Barber 246
Freeland v. Hastings 212, 259,281.
608, 616
Freeman v. Hardwick 774
v. Price 530
Freeport v. Marks 254
Frees v. Ford 199
Freeze v. Tripp
-
64
Freleigh v. State
r
345
Frellsen v. Mahan 639
French v. Braintree Manuf. Co. 667
v. Cam 737
v. Commonwealth 336
v. Edwards 93
v. Kirkland 6:36
v. Nolan 782
v. State 449
Friend v. Hamill 777
Frink v. Darst 62
Frisbie v. Fowler 529
Frolickstein v. Mobile 595, 734
Frost v. Belmont 166, 231, 257
Fry v. Bennett 569
v. Booth 94, 780
Fry's Election Case 755, 756
Fryer v. Kinnersley 5:33
Fuller v. Dame 167, 168
v. Eddings 676
v. Groton 255, 256
v. Hampton 301
Fullerton v. Bank of United States 17
Fulton v. Davenport 624
v. McAfee 16
Furman v. New York 68
v. Nichol 3.48
Furman Street, Matter of 621, 677,
709
Furnell v. St. Paul 31 1
Furniss v. Hudson River R. R. Co. 705
G.
Gabbert v. Railroad Co. " 177
Gage v. Graham 287, 288
v. Shelton 528
Gaines v. Buford 484
v. Coates 74)
v. Gaines 1:35
Gale v. Kalamazoo 493, 730, 749
v. Mead 94
v. South Berwick 2.59
Galen v. Clyde & Rose Plank Road*
303O.
Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co.
v. Appleby 719, 724
Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co.
v. Dill 724
Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co.
v. Loomis 718, 724
Galesburg v. Hawkinson 122, 232
Gall v. Cincinnati 749, 750
Gallatin v. Bradford 244, 247
Gannett v. Leonard 125
Gantley's Lessee v. Ewing 356
Garbett, Ex parte 417
Garcia v. Lee 15
Gardner v. Collins 17
-
v. Hope Ins. Co. 341
v. Newburg 655, 665, 696,
697, 700, 701
v. The Collector 164
p. Ward 777
Garland, Ex parte 319, 320, 321, º:25
v. Brown's Adm'r 351
Garner v. Gordon 432
Garr v. Selden 552, 556
Garrard Co. Court v. Kentucky
River Navigation Co. 217
Garrett v. Beaumont 462
v. Cordell 3.54
v. Doe 462
v. St. Louis 630, 631
Garrigas v. Board of Com’rs 172, 179
Garrison v. New York 306
v. Tillinghast 605
Gartin v. Penick 582
Gascoigne v. Ambler 529
Gas Company v. San Francisco 308
v. Wheeling 71
Gaskill v. Dudley 302
Gates v. Neal 777
Gathercole v. Miall 548, 569
Gaulden v. State 417
Geary v. Simmons 59
Gebhardt v. Reeves 690, 699
Geebrick v. State 142, 149, 151
Gelpecke v. Dubuque 18, 145, 268
Gentile v. State 156, 741
Genther r. Fuller 649
Gentry v. Griffith 163, 209
George v. Gillespie 58
v. Oxford 267
Georgia v. Stanton 1
Georgia, &c. R. R. Co. v. Harris 499,
501
Gerard v. People 4().5
German, &c. Cong. v. Pressler 581
German Reformed Church v. Sei
bert 5S2
Gerrish v. Brown 735
Gerry v. Stoneham 461
Giacomo, In re 332
Gibbons v. Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. 145,
474
v. Ogden 10, 11, 72, 738
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XxxW
Gibbs v. Gale 457
Gibson, Ex parte 431
v. Armstrong 582
v. Choteau 16, 456
v. Emerson 109
tº
.
Hibbard 471
v
. Mason 441, 751
Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. & Z
.
R
.
R
.
Co. 676, 697, 711
Gifford v. Railroad Co. 179
Gil v. Davis 169
Gilbert v. People 553, 556
Gildersleeve r. People 505
Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices 230
Gill v. Parker 727
Gillespie v. Palmer 752, 777,778, 781
v
.
State 179, 182
Gillette v. Hartford 628
Gilliland v. Phillips 469
v
. Sellers's Adm'r 499
Gillinwater v. Mississippi & Atlan
tic R. R. Co. 52, 100, 658, 659
Gilman v. Cutts 445
v
. Lockwood 360
v
. Lowell 528
v
. Philadelphia 11, 731, 733,
738
v
. Sheboygan 342
Gilmer v. Lime Point 654, 660, 672,
702, 703
Ginn v
. Rogers 499
Girard r. Philadelphia 232, 589
Girard Will Case 589
Girdner r. Stephens 42, 454
Gladden v. State 393
Gleason c. Dodd 22, 23, 507
v
.
Gleason 503
Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger 18
Glover v. Powell 681, 737
Godard, Petitioner 242, 244, 735
Goddard v. Jacksonville 726
Goddin v. Crump 144, 225
Goenan v. Schroeder 3.57
Goetcheus v. Mathewson 505,777, 778
Goff v. Frederick 2:32
Goggans v. Turnispeed 349
Gohen v
. Texas Pacific R. R. Co. 18.5
Goldthwaite v. Montgomery 2:31
Good c. Zercher 470
Goodell, Matter o
f 488
v
. Jackson 62
Goodenough, In re 432
Goodin p
.
Thoman 78, 337
Goodman v
. Munks 455
- v
.
State 392
Goodrich v. Detroit 2.38
622
19()
633
v
. Winchester, &c. Co.
Goodsell v. Boynton
Goodtitle v. Kibbee
Goodtitle v. Otway 62
Goodwin v. Thompson 31
Gooselink v. Campbell 73%
Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court 154, #42
v
. Building Association 495
v
. Caldeleugh 16
v
. Cornes 284, 285, 614, 615
v
. Farrar 777
v
. Ingraham 1 11
Gorham v. Campbell 779
v
. Cooperstown 3.11
v
. Luckett 394
v
. Springfield 144
Gorman v. Pacific R
.
R
.
Co. 341, 723
Gormley v. Taylor 221
Goshen v. Richmond 481
v
. Stonington 203, 465, 472
Goshorn v. Purcell 462, 470
Goslin v. Cannon 534, 552
Gosling v. Veley 244, 782
Gosset v. Howard 162
Goszler v. Georgetown 251, 678
Gottbehnet v. Hubachek 529
Gough v. Dorsey 109
v
. Pratt 115
Gould v. Hudson River R
.
R. Co. 676,
680
v
. Sterling 238, 268, 269
Gove v. Epping 274, 616
Governor v. Porter 115
Gozzle v. Georgetown 251, 678
Grace v. McElroy 65
Graham, Er parte 462
Grammar School p
. Burt 340
Granby p. Thurston 2:32
Grand Gulf R. R. Co. v. Buck 342
Grand Rapids v. Hughes 236
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jar
vis 680
Grand Rapids, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Heisel 679
Granger v. Pulaski Co. 296, 303
Grannaham v
. IIannibal, &c. R. R
.
Co. 719, 725
Grant v. Brooklyn 31()
v
. Courter 200
v
. Erie 2.54
v
.
Leach 496
v
. Spencer 94
Graves v. Blanchet 529
v
. Otis 252, 677
Gray v. First Division, &c. (584
v
. Pentland 542
v
.
State 494
Gray's Lessee p
.
Askew 64
Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v.
Fernald 668
Great Western R. R. Co. v. Deca
tur 722
xxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Green v. Bidde 335 | Guenther v. People 406
v. Carson 749 Guild v. Rogers 351, 353
- v. Chapman 569 || Guile v. Brown 513
v. Collins 499 || Guilford v. Cornell 177
v. Custard 507 v. Supervisors of Chenan
v. Holway 603 go 257, 279, 283. 288,
v. Mayor, &c. 178 339, 475, 612
v. Neal's Lessee 17, 18 || Guillotte v. New Orleans 749
v. Portland 692 Guiterrez, Ex parte 3:32
v. Reading 678 Gulick v. New 782
v. Sarmiento 23 v. Ward 167
v. Savannah 730 Gunn v. Barry 42, 43, 351, 352
v. Shumway 332, 754 || Gut v. State 332
v. Swift 677, 742 | Gutman v. Virginia Iron Co. 205
v. Telfair 577
v. Van Buskirk 2:3 H.
v. Warren Co. 94
v. Weller 71, 72, 165 Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 722,
Greencastle, &c. Co. v. State 65, 18.5 724
Greencastle Township v. Black 70, 71, Hackettstown v. Swackhamer 2:36
72, 87, 95 || Hadden v. Chorn 582
Greene v. Briggs 374, 437, 513 v. The Collector 172
Greenlaw v. Greenlaw 502 || Hadduck's Case 2:39
Greenough v. Greenough 109, 110, Hadley v. Mayor, &c. 785, 788
111, 114, 129, 472 | Hadsell v. Hancock 256
Greensboro’ v. Mullins 243 Hagan r. Hendry 579
Greenville & Columbia R. R. Co. v. Hagany v. Cohnen 513
Partlow 710, 711 || Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo 6:36
Gregory v. Bridgeport 256 || Hagerstown v. Dechert 215, 218
Grier v. Shackleford 786 v. Schuer 232
Griſlin v. Martin 681 | Haggard v. Hawkins 178
v. McKenzie 455 Haight v. Grist 603
v. Mixon 450 v. Lucia 394
tº
.
New York 254 || Haines v. Levin 513
v
. Ranney 603 || Haines' Appeal 513
v
. Wilcox 354, 449, 450 | Hakewell, Matter o
f
4.32
r. Williamstown 3.11 v. Ingram 576
Griffin's Ex'r v. Cunningham 116, 132. Hale v. Everett 45, 72, 581, 582, 585,
479, 492 589
Griffing v. Gibb 17 v
. Kenosha 641
Griggs v. Foote 252 v
. Lawrence 747
Grim v. Weisenberg School Dis- v
. Wilkinson 603
trict 467, 612 Haley v. Clark 1:39
Grimes v. Coyle 534, 552 v
. Philadelphia 114, 462
v
.
Doe - 469 v
. Taylor 421
Grob v. Cushman 165 | Hall v. Bray 156
Groesbeck v. Seeley 455, 459 v
. Bunte 176
Groesch v. State 151, 152 v
. DeCuir 715, 722, 748
Grogan r. San Francisco 294, 335 v
. Marks 512
r. State 404 v. Thayer 515, 516
Groove v. Gwin 141 v. Washington Co. 412
Grosvenor v. Chesley 351 v
. Williams 22, 23, 506
v
. United Society 582 Hallock r
. Franklin Co. 704
Grove r. Brandenburg 552 v
. Miller 5:30
v
. Todd - 470 Halstead v. New York 235, 257, 259,
Grubb v. Bullock - 1:39 269
Grumline v. Washington 311 || Ham v
. McClaws 201
Grundy v. Commonwealth 448 v
.
Salem 665
Guard v. Rowan 462 | Hamersley v. New York 700
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxxvii
Hamilton v. Carthage 312 Harris v. Colquit 59
v. Kneeland 31 v. Dennie 15
v. St. Louis County Court 47, v. Harrington 542
- 8() v. Harris 58
Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts 16 v. Inhabitants of Marble
v. Mighels 296 head 487
Hamlet v. Taylor 190 v. Morris 420
Hamlin v. Meadville 237, 267 v. People 178
Hammett v. Philadelphia 345, 615, 621, v. Roof 167, 168
632 v. Rutledge 471
Hammond v. Anderson 62 | Harrison v. Baltimore 7:30
v. Haines 150 v. Bridgeton 232, 233,293
v. People 431 v. Bush 5:33, 534
Hampshire v. Franklin 233 v. Harrison 503, 507
Hampton v. Coffin 704 v. Leach 74
v. McConnel 23 v. Metz 462
r. Wilson 567 v. Sayer 64
Hamrick v. Rouse 154 v. Stacy 455
Hand v. Ballou 458 v. State 20.5
Handy c. Chatfield 354, 359 || Harrison Justices v. Holland 232
r. State 401 Harrow v. Myers 65
Haney v. Marshall 21 | Hart v. Albany 249, 714, 747
Hannel v. Smith 65 v. Bostwick 456
Hannibal, &c. R. R. Co. v. Husen 715 v. Brooklyn 306, 735
Hannon v. St. Louis Co. Court 303 v. Evans 769
Hanover v. Turner 502, 504 v. Henderson 459
Hansen v. Vernon 60S v. Holden 278
Hapgood v. Doherty 513 v. Jewett 59
Happel v. Brethauer 165 v. State 332
Happy v. Morton 581 | Harteau v. Harteau 504
v. Mosher 506 || Hartford v. Onaha 92
Harbaugh v. Cicotte 756, 772, 782 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry
Harbeck v. New York 22.5 Co. 205, 220
Hard v. Nearing 440, 441 Hartland v. Church 623
Hardiman v. Downer 352 Hartman, Ex parte 430
Hardenburg v. Lockwood 681 | Hartt v. Harvey 784
Harding v. Alden 503, 504, 507, Hartung v. People 408, 449, 477
508 Harvey v. Lackawanna R. R. Co. 676,
v. Funk 668, 709 679, 709
v. Goodlet 668 v. Thomas 205. 442, 662
v. Rockford, &c., R. R. Harward v. St. Clair, &c. Drainage
Co. 267 Co. 475
v. Stamford Water Co. 681 Harwood v. Astley 547
Hardwick v. Pawlet 420 | Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee 261, 284,
Hare v. Hare 503 286, 475
v. Mellor 542 v. Shipman 357
Harlan v. People 25 | Haskell v. Burlington 488
Harmon v. Dreher 582 v. New Bedford 199, 220,
v. Wallace 3.56 676
Harmony v. Mitchell 747 Hastings v. Lane 461
Harp v. Osgood 422 v. Lusk 5.56
Harpending v. Haight 141, 187 || Haswell's Case 5:36
v. Reformed Church 17 | Hatch v. Lane 533, 534
Harper v. Commissioners 441 v. Vermont Central R. R.
v. Richardson 700, 702 Co. 677, 696, 712
Harriman v. Boston 311 Hatcher v. Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. 462
Harrington v. County Com’rs 704 || Hatcheson v. Tilden 782
v. Miles 528 Hatheway v. Sackett 232
v. State 403 || Hathorn v. Lyon 447
xxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Hatzfield v. Gulden
Haverill Bridge Props. v. County
169
Commissioners 701
Hawbecker v. Hawbecker 68
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee 335
v. Carrol 7()
v. Commonwealth 232
v. Governor 110, 141, 194
v. Jones 58
v. Lawrence 668
Hawthorne v. Calef 358
Hay v. Cohoes Company 668, 680
Hayden v. Foster 648
v. Noyes 244, 246, 247
Hayes v. Reese 58
Haynes v. Burlington 655
v. Thomas 679
Hays v. Brierly 577
v. Risher 673
Haywood v. Savannah 241
Hazen v. Essex Compan 668
Head v. Providence, &c. i. R. Co. 270
Heard v. Brooklyn 690
v. Heard 190
Heath, Ex parte 94, 776, 779, 783,
784
Hector v. State 405
Hedgecock v. Davis 84
Hedges v. Madison Co. 303
Hedley v. Com’rs of Franklin Co. 220
Hegarty's Appeal 122, 128
Hegeman v. Western R. R. Co. 718,
720
Helena v. Thompson 311
Henderson v. Griffin 17
v. Lambert 628
v. Oliver 649
Henderson's Distilled Spirits 37.2
Henderson's Tobacco 185
Hendrick's Case 25
Hendrickson v. Decow 582
v. Hendrickson 190, 192,
226
Henisler v. Freedman 376
Henley v. Lyme Regis 304, 309
Henry v. Chester 642
v. Dubuque & Pacific R. R.
Co. 697, 703, 708
Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwau
kee 642, 648
Hershaw v. Taylor 509
Hess v. Johnson - 354
v. Pegg 64, 156, 231, 232
v. Wertz 468
Hessler v. Drainage Com’rs 475
Hewison v. New Haven 254, 294, 308
Hewitt v. Prince 413
Heydenfeldt v. Towns 517
Heyfron, Ex parte 507
Heyward, Matter of 22
v. Judd 351, 357
v. New York 200, 219, 652,
692, 698
Hibbard v. People 374, 728
Hickerson v. Benson 774
Hickey v. Hinsdale 94
IIickie v. Starke 15
Hickman's Case 662
Hickok v. Plattsburg 305
Hickox v. Tallman 457, 458
Hicks v. Steigleman 454
Higert v. Green Castle 311
Higgins v. Chicago 704, 705
High v. Shoemaker 441
High's Case 755
Hilbish v. Catherman 281
Hildreth v. Lowell 666, 735
Hill, Ex parte 429
v. Boyland - 98
v. Commissioners 178
v. Higdon 622,630,632, 634,635,
v. Henry 179
v. Tilson 80
Henshaw v. Foster 103, 761
Hensley v. Force 23
Hensoldt v. Petersburg 165
Henton v. State 37.8
Henwood v. Harrison 5.51
Hepburn r. Curts 448
Hepburn's Case 661
Herber v. State 328
Herrick v. Randolph 342, 599
641, 645
v. Hill 786
v. Kessler 3.52
v. Kricke 455
v. Morse 59
v. People 395, 500
v. Spear 728
v. Sunderland 117
v. Wells 515
Hill's Case 393
Hillard v. Moore 356
Hilliard v. Connolly 116
v. Miller 472
Hills v. Chicago 81, 204
Himmelman v. Carpentier 457
Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. R.
Co. 692, 695, 696, 740
v. Town 501
II ind v. Rice 179
Hinde v. Wattier 17
Hindman v. Piper 128
Hine, The, v. Trevor 24
Ilines v. Leavenworth 622, 632
v. Lockport 254, 311
Hingham, &c. Turnpike Co. v.
Norfolk Co. 200
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxxix
Hingle v. State 173, 175
Hinman v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 723
Hinsen v. Lott 606
Hirn v. State 185, 345
Hiss v. Bartlett 162
Hoag v. Hatch 528
v. Switzer 678
Hoar v. Wood 555, 556
Hoare v. Silverlocke 559
Hobart v. Supervisors, &c. 144, 205
Hobbs & Johnson, Er rel 490
Hoboken v. Phinney 644
Hodges v. Buffalo 235, 258
Hodgson v. Millward 450, 451
v. Scarlett 554
Hoffman v. Hoffman 22, 23, 503,
504
v. Locke 512
v. State 404, 405
Hogg, Er parte 179
v. Zanesville Canal Manuf.
Co. 34, 740
Hoke v. Henderson 4:39
Holbrook v. Finney 446
v. Murray 22, 23
Holden v. James 205, 454, 490,
491
Holder v. State 399
Holland v. Dickerson 351
v. Osgood 94
Holley r. Burgess
- 5:29
Hollingsworth v. Duane 394
Hollister v. Hollister 503, 504
Holloway v. Sherman 351, 448
Holman's Heirs v. Bank of Norfolk 123,
506, 507
Holmes, Ex parte 22
v. Holmes 348, 508
v. Jennison 16, 22
Holt v. State 329
Holton v. Milwaukee 630, 709
Holyoke Co. v. Lyman 49.5
Home v. Bentinck 552
Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta 3.49
Home of the Friendless v. Rouse 342
Homestead Cases 3.32
Hood v. Finch 7()4
v. Lynn 258
v. State 2:3
Hook v. Hackney 529
Hooker v. Hooker 116
v. New Haven, &c. Co. 676,
679, 680
Hooper v. Bridgewater 665
v. Emery 237, 608, 616
Hoover v. Barkhoof 227
v. Mitchell 59
v. Wood 199
Hope v. Jackson 448
Hopkins v. Hopkins 503
Hopple v. Brown 237,270, 296
Hopps v. People 380
Hopson, In re 429
Horbach v. Miller 454
Horn v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 724
Horne v. Atlantic, &c. R. R. Co. 722,
Horton v. Baptist Church
Hosmer v. Loveland
Hotchkiss v. Oliphant
Hottentot Venus Case
Houghton v. Page
House v. Rochester
Houston v. Moore
Howard, Ex parte
. Church
. Diarmid
. McDiamid
. Moot
. Shields
. State
. Zeyer
Howard County, Division of
Howe v. Plainfield
Howell v. Bristol
v. Buffalo
v. Fry
Hoxie v. Wright
Hoyt v. East Saginaw
v. Hudson
v. Sheldon
Hubbard v. Bell
v. Brainerd
Hubbell v. Hubbell
Huber v. People
:
ty
723
582
543, 558
565, 567
429
31
676
25
140
631
788
232
353
779
78
486
179
513
627, 631
285
5 13
23, 507
631, 632
311
16
736
451, 461
503, 507
178
v. Reily 322, 325, 437, 754
Huckle v. Money
Hudson v. Geary
v. Thorne
Hudspeth v. Davis
Huff v. Bennett
Hughes v. Baltimore
v. Hughes
Hughey's Lessee v. Howell
Hull v. Hull
v. Marshall Co.
v. Miller
Hulseman v. Rems
Humboldt v. Lon g
Humboldt Co. v. Churchill Co.
Com’rs
Hume v. New York
Humes v. Mayor, &c.
v Tabor
Humphrey v. Peques
Humphries v. Brogden
Hungerford's Appeal
Hunsaker v. Wright
377
595, 734
245
357
560, 567
254
84
479, 623
503, 507
270
156
754, 788
269
176, 226
306
252
373
3.42
715
59
154, 643
xl TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Hunscom v. Hunscom 596
Hunt v. Bennett 543, 546, 577
v. Murray 193
Hunt's Lessee v. McMahon 486
Hunter, Ex parte 322
v. Cobb 603
Huntsville v. Phelps 246
Huntzinger v. Brock 351
Hurford v. Omaha 94
Hurley v. Rowell 649
v. Van Wagner 774
Hurst v. Smith 431
Huse v. Merriam 647
Huson v. Dale 5:30
Hutcheson v. Peck 420
Hutchinson v. Wheeler 5:30
Hutson v. New York 304
Hyatt v. Bates 58
v. Rondout 305
v. Taylor 67, 68
Hyde v. Brush 7.58
v. Melvin 775
v. White 186
Hydes v. Joyes 250
I.
Igoe v. State 179
Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Arnold 723
v. Irvin 343
v. Wren 165
Illinois Conf. Fem. Col. v. Cooper 241
Illinois & Mich. Canal v. Chicago
& R. I. R. R. Co. 344
Illinois, &c. Co. v. Peoria, &c. As
sociation 738
Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co. 685,
689
Indiana Cent. R. R. Co. v. Potts 99,
175, 176, 182
Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Ker
cheval 345, 714, 719, 722, 723
Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Smith 679
Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. r.
Townsend 722, 723
Indianapolis Sun v. Horrell 529
Ingalls v. Cole 68
Inge v. Police Jury 665
Inglee v. Coolidge 15
Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor 17
Ingraham v. Regan 64
Insurance Co. v. Ritchie 477
v. Treasurer 16
v. Yard 642
Intendant of Greensboro’ v. Mul
lins 243
Iowa R. R. Land Co. v. Soper 463,
488
Ireland v. Turnpike Co. 199,
Iron Mountain Co. v. Haight
Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton
Irons v. Field -
Isom v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co.
Iverson v. State
Jacoway v.
J.
Denton 42,
Jack v. Thompson
Jackson, Matter of
. Butler
. Chew
. Commonwealth
. Hathaway
. Jackson
:
t”.
t;
Jackson Ir
eral
425,
392,
503,
Lyon
. Munson
. Reeves
. Rutland & B. R. R.
Co. 699,
. Shawl
. Vedder
. Walker
Winn's Heirs
. Young
on Co. v. Auditor-Gen
Jacob v. Louisville
Jacobs v. Cone
v. Smallwood
James v. Commonwealth
v. Reynolds
v. Stull
Jameson v.
Jamison v.
People
Burton
Jane v. Commonwealth
Janson v. Stewart
Jarnigan v. Fleming
Jarvis v. Hatheway
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley
42,
Jefferson City v. Courtmire
Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Hendricks
Jeffersonville, &c.
Nichols
Jeffersonville, &c.
R. R. Co. v.
R. R. Co. v.
Parkhurst
Jeffrey v. Brokaw
Jeffries v. Ankeny
358
187
673
529
215
185
350
504
429
354
393
699
508
448
321
179
723
156
61
774
700
94
605
711
393
357
25
440
356
239
64
25
529
530
552
18,
154
244
494,
v. Lawrence
v. Williams
Jenkins v. Andover
v. Charleston
t”. Ervin
v. Waldron
21
723
723
649
777
236
715
261
607
72
777
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xli
Jennings v. Paine 552, 556 Judson v. Bridgeport 658
v. Stafford 509 v. Reardon 245, 419
Jerome v. Ross 655 Justices v. Murray 25
Jett v. Commonwealth 25
Joannes c. Bennett 534
-
John r. C. R. & F. W. R. R. Co. 145 K.
John & Cherry Streets, Matter of 442,
661 Kaine, Matter of 430
Johns Island Church 582 Kancher v. Blinn 529
Johnson v. Atlantic, &c. R. R. Co. 655 || Kane v. Baltimore 665
v. Bentley 468 v. Cook 23
v. Bond 3.54 v. People 408
v. Campbell 279, 476 || Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mower 722
v. Common Council 270 Kaontz v. Nabb 64
v. Drummond 606 || Karney v. Paisley 457
v. Higgins 179, 226, 349, 358 Kayser v. Bremen 312
v. Hudson R. R. Co. 68 Keal v. Keokuk 252
v. Joliet & Chicago R. R. Kean v. McLaughlin 553
Co. 86, 225 v. Stetson 737
v. Jones 450 Kearney, Ex parte 430
v. Philadelphia 237, 246 Keasy v. Louisville 252
v. Railroad Co. 156 | Keddie v. Moore 513
v. Rich 148 Keen v. State 326, 332
v. Rile 21, 22 Keene v. Clark 15
tº. §. 144 Keith v. Ware 449
v. Stark Co. 272 | Kellar v. State 179
v. State 406 | Kelley v. Corson 647, 648
Johnson Co. v. January 269 v. Marshall 259, 281, 616
Johnston v. Commonwealth 204 v. Partington 5:30
v. Louisville 237 v. Pike 59
Johnstone v. Sutton 553 v. Sherlock 550
Joliet, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jones 723 v. Tinling 550, 551
Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Kellogg, Er parte 431, 511
Co. 34, 740 v. Oshkosh 153
Jones v. Black 200 v. State Treasurer 221
v. Boston 630, 631, 637 v. Union Co. 738
v. Carter 486 || Kelly v. McCarthy 4.48
v. Cavins 192 | Kelsey v. King 692
v. Columbus 178 Kemp, In re 394
v. Fletcher 373 Kemper v. McClelland 647, 648
v. Galena, &c. R. R. Co. 722 | Kendall v. Canton 3:36
v. Harris 596 v. Dodge 449
v. Hutchinson 158, 164, 189 v. Kingston 51, 220, 457
v. Jones 136, 226, 454 v. United States 27
v. Keep's Estate 603 || Kendellon v. Maltby 542
v. New Haven 304, 309, 311 | Kennard v. Louisiana 14
v. People 727 | Kennedy, In re 352
v. Perry 112, 127, 438 v. Phelps 730
v. Richmond 231, 257, 747 | Kennett's Petition 676, 678
v. Robbins 217, 513 | Kentucky v. Dennison 21, 22
v. State 332, 759 Kentworthy v. Ironton 3.11
v. Thompson 182 Kenyon v. Stewart 351
v. Weathersbee 59 | Kerby v. Penn. R. R. Co. 723
Jordan r. Woodward 668 || Kermott v. Ayer 32
Jordan's Case 385 | Kern v. Kitchen 125, 128
Journeay v. Gibson 470 | Kerr, Matter of 343
Joy v. Thompson 3.59 v. Kerr 503
Joyner v. School District 647 v. Union Bank 58
Judkins v. Hill 782 | Kershaw v. Bailey 542
xlii • TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, &c. R. R.
Co. 681
Ketcham v. Buffalo 235
Kettering v. Jacksonville 312, 726
Keyser v. Stansifer 581, 582
Kibbe v. Kibbe 22
Kibbey v. Jones 352
Kibby v. Chetwood's Adm'rs 125
Kidder v. Parkhurst 552
Kilbourn, Matter of 164
Kilburn v. Woodworth 22, 506
Kilham v. Ward 777
Kimball v. Alcorn 313, 779
v. Kimball 503
v. Rosendale 649
v. Rosenthal 477
Kimble v. Whitewater Valley Canal
705
Kimbro v. Bank of Fulton 456
Kincaid's Appeal 154, 251, 748
Kine v. Sewell 552
King v. Dedham Bank 111, 340
v. Hopkins 512
v. Hunder
-
337
v. Hunter 79
v. Root 546, 565, 567, 577
v. Wilson 17
King, The, v. Abingdon 570
v. Campbell 5:32
v. Carlile 560, 590
v. Chancellor of Cam
bridge 505
v. Clews 387
v. Cooper 388
v. Cox 62
v. Creevey 560, 570
v. De Manneville 432
v. Dunn 387
v. Ellis 384
t’
. Enoch 386
v
. Fisher 560
v
. Fletcher 408
v
. Foxcroft 781, 782
v
. Gardner 309
v
. Hagan 392
v
. Hawkins 782
v
. Howes 388
v
. Inhab. of Hardwicke
209
v
. Inhab. o
f Hipswell 90
v
. Inhab. o
f
St. Gregory 90
v
.
Inhab. o
f Woburn 299
v
. Kingston 387
v
. Lee 560
v
. Lewis 385
v
. Locksdale 90
v
. Mayor o
f
Stratford
on Avon 239
v
. Monday 782
King, The, v. Moore
Parry
. Partridge
Ravel
. Richards
River
. Simpson
. Smith
. St. Olaves
. Sutton
Taylor
. Thomas
. Tubbs
Walkley
Webb
. Withers
. Woolaston
. Wright
v
. Younger
Kingsbury's Case
Kingsley v. Cousins
Kinkead v. McKee
Kinmundy v. Mahan
Kinney v. Beverley
Kinsworthy v. Mitchell
Kip v. Patterson
Kirby v. Shaw
Kirk v. Knowell
v
. Rhodes
v
. State
Kisler v. Cameron
Kleinechmidt v. Dunphy
Klinck v. Colby
Kling v. Fries
Klumph v. Dunn
Knapp v. Grant
Kneass's Appeal
Kneeland v. Milwaukee
Knight v. Begole
v
. Foster
v
. Gibbs
Kniper v. Louisville
Knoop v. Piqua Bank
Knote v. United States
Knoulton v. Redenbaugh
Knowles v. People
v
. Yeates
Knowlton v. Supervisors o
f
Rock
Knox v. Chaloner
v
. Cleveland
Knox Co. v. Aspinwall
Kobs v. Minneapolis
Koestenbader v. Pierce
Kohl v. United States
Kohlheimer v. State
Koontz v. Franklin Co.
Kraft v. Wickey
. Waddington
190
782
386
394
388
385
387
385
756
118
590
387
367
590, 592
387
385
781
590, 592
57.1
62
22
359
582
250
4.38
647
246
210, 284, 285. 599
249
762
396
785
395
533
728
528
286, 475
128
62, 65, 88,
641
462
5:30
530
237
342
139
462
390, 494
780
625
735
454
270
311
7 12
654
405
3:36
507
TABLE OF CASEs crted. xliii
Kramer v. Cleveland, &c. R. R.
Co. 657, 661
Krebs v. Oliver 529
Kroop v. Forman 658R. v. People 3:31
Kuhn r. Board of Education 232
Kune v. Weller 7.59
Kunkle v. Franklin 474
Kurtz v. People 176, 179, 734
Kyle r. Jenkins 323
v. Malin 237
L.
Lacey v. Davis 458
Lackland v. North Mo. R. R. Co. 231,
237, 681, 682
Lacy v. Davis 648
Lackawana Iron Co. v. Little Wolf 94
Ladd v. Adams 352
Laeſon v. Dufoe 179
La Fayette v. Bush 252, 677
235, 236, 267
252, 631, 632
220
640
v. Cox
v. Fowler
v. Jenners
v. Orphan Asylum
La Fayette Plank Road Co. v. New
Albany, &c. R. R. Co.
La Fayette, &c. R. R. Co. v. Gei
ger 84, 144
La Fayette, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Winslow
Lake Erie, &c. R. R. Co. v. Heath
678
695
25,
512
Lakeman v. Burnham 651
Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery 233,
748
Lamb v. Lane 100, 704
v. Lynd 161
Lambertson v. Hogan 115
Lammert v. Lidwell 144, 151
Lancaster v. Barr 492
Lancey r. Clifford 735
Lander v. Seaver 422
Landon v. Litchfield 342
Lane v. Dorman 126, 221, 438
v. Nelson 131, 461, 463
r. Vick 17
Langdon r. Applegate 64, 185
Lange, Ex parte 408
Langford v. Ramsey Co. 701
Langhorne v. Robinson (323
Langworthy v. Dubuque 232, 624
Lanier v. Gallatas 116, 772, 780
Lanning v. Carpenter 312, 776
Lansing r. Lansing 774
178
139
Lanzetti, Succession of
Lapeyre v. United States
La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v.
Monroe 34
Laramie Co. v. Albany Co. 232
Larkin v. Noonan 542
v. Saginaw Co. 254
Larrison v. Peoria, &c. R. R. Co. 165
Lasure v. State 332
Lathrop v. Mills 215
Latless v. Holmes 190
Lauck's Appeal 359
Laude v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 76
Lauer v. State 179
Laval v. Myers 774
Law, Ex parte 320, 322
Lawler v. Earle 534
Lawrence, In re 446
v. Great Nor. R. R. Co. 705
Lawrenceburg v. Wuest 243
Lawson v. Hicks 556
v. Jeffries 42, 116, 492
Lawyer v. Clifferly 581
Layton v. New Orleans 234, 283, 289
9Lea v. Lea 5
v. White 556
Leach v. Money 377
League v. Journeay 748
Leary v. Mankato 3.11
Leavenworth v. Norton 237
v. Rankin 271
Leavenworth Co. v. Miller 145, 272
Leavitt v. Watson 649
Lebanon v. Olcott 672
Le Barron v. Le Barron 35
Lebois v. Bramel 472
Leclaire v. Davenport 749
Lee v. Lee 59
v. Murphy 140
v. Sandy Hill 304, 311
v. State 47, 404
v. Tillotson 220
Leefe, Matter of 5 16
Lefever v. Detroit 640
Leffingwell v. Warren 18, 453, 454,
455
Legg v. Annapolis 159, 186
Leggett v. Hunter 108, 125
Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macun
ie 100
Liºn v. McBride 185, 755
Leith v. Leith 503
Leland v. Wilkinson 112
Lemmon v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 722
v. Smith 679
v. Stone 31
v. Van Gorder 238
v. People 21
Lemons v. People 98
Lennon v. New York 449, 463
Lenz v. Charlton 441, 459
Leonard v. Wiseman 70
xliv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Leslie v. State 406
Lester v. State 405
v. Thurmond 556
Levins v. Sleator 133, 136
Levy v. State 242, 243
Lewis v. Chapman 533, 534
v. Clement 560
v. Commissioners 785
v. Few 545
v. Foster 469
.v. Garrett's Adm'r 505
v. Hawley 529
v. Levy 559, 561
v. Lewis 359
v. McElvain 448, 467
v. Thornton 62
v. Walter 560
v. Webb 116, 132, 205, 454, 491
Lewis's Appeal 108, 205
Lexington v. Butler 268
v. Long 709, 710, 711
v. McQuillan's Heirs 622,
6:33
Libby v. Burnham 648
License Cases 2, 606, 715, 716, 726,
728, 729, 748
License Tax Cases 206, 716, 729
Life Association v. Assessors 91
Ligat v. Commonwealth 703
Limestone Co. v. Rather 94
Lincoln v. Hapgood 755, 777
v. Smith 25, 395, 513, 726,
727, 728
ty
.
Tower 23
Lindenmuller v. People 734
Lindholm v. St. Paul 3.11
Lindsay v. Commissioners 195
Lindsley v. Coats 31
v
. Smith 529
Linford v. Fitchroy 3.81
Lining v. Bentham 394
Linn v. Minor 65
Linney v. Malton - 529
Lin Sing v. Washburn 490, 606, 627,
733
Linton v. Stanton 16
Litchfield v. McComber 351
v
. Vernon 608
Little v. Fitts 499
v
. Smith 64
Littlefield v. Brooks 7:55
Little Miami R. R. v. Collett 710
Little Rock r. Willis 254
Littleton v. Richardson 505
Live Stock, &c. Association v. Cres
cent City, &c. Co. 11, 13, 21, 346,
347, 361, 716, 730
Livingston v. New York 621, 631, 636
v
. Van Ingen 28
Livingston's Lessee v. Moore 25
Livingston Co. v. Weisler 284, 615
Lloyd v. New York 305, 309, 310
Loan Association v. Topeka 105, 266,
610, 616
Lobrano v. Nelligan 125
Locke v. Dane 325, 463
Locke's Appeal 151
Lockhart v. Horn 454
v
. Troy 179
Lockwood v. St. Louis 640
Loeb v. Mathis 65
Loeffner v. State .879
Logan v. Payne 237
Logue v. Commonwealth 377
Lonas v. State 490
Londonderry v. Andover 2:39
Long v. Fuller 665, 701
Long's Case 386
Long Island R
.
R
. Co., Matter o
f
783
Longworth v. Worthington 486
Loomis v. Jackson 41, 779
v
. Wadhams 512
Lord v. Chadbourne 448
v
. Litchfield 342, 480
v
. Thomas 349
Lorillard v. Monroe 303
Loring v. Marsh 17
Lorman v. Benson 31, 735
v
. Clarke 27
Lothrop v. Steadman 52, 118, 128, 142
Lott v. Morgan 606
Loughbridge v. Harris 668, 669, 671
Louisiana State Lottery v. Richoux 165
Louisville v. Commonwealth 309
v
. Rolling Mill Co. 252
v
. University 293
Louisville, &c. Co. v. Ballard 179
Louisville, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Burke 725
v
. Davidson 144
v
. State 643
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v.
County Court 776
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.
v
. Thompson - 711
Louisville City R
.
R
.
Co. v. Louis
ville 251, 253
Love v. Moynahan 420
v
. Shartzer 486
Lovingston v. Wider 287, 475, 614
Low v. Blanchard 65
v
.
Dunham 93
v
.
Galena & Chicago U
.
R
.
R
.
Co. 676
v
. Towns 141
Lowe v. Commonwealth 78, 337
Lowell v. Boston 212, 266, 610
v
. Hadley 94, 735
v
. Oliver 277, 278
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlv.
Lowenburg v. People 408
Loweree v. Nº. 701, 702
Lowndes Co. v. Hunter 215
Lowry v. Francis 335
Lucas v. Case 582
v. Sawyer 447
v. Tucker 464
Ludlow v. Jackson 449
Ludlow's Heirs v. Johnson 68
Ludwig v. Stewart 456
Lumsden v. Cross 458, 611, 622, 632
Lund v. New Bedford 658
Lunt's Case 205
Lusher v. Scites 225
Luther v. Borden 38, 39, 751
Lycoming v. Union 471
Lyle v. Richards 31
Lyman v. Boston & Worcester
R. R. Co. 723
v. Mower 449
Lynch v. Brudie 486
v. Hoffman 32:
v. State 401, 415
Lynde v. County 267
Lyon v. Jerome 250, 655, 673, 700
v. Lyon 504
v. Norris 226, 450
Lyon's Case 536
M.
Machette v. Wanless 413
Machir v. Moore 774
Mackaboy v. Commonwealth 511
Mackay v. Ford 554
Macon v. Macon & Western R. R.
Co. 237
Macon & Western R. R. Co. v.
Davis 205, 220
Macready v. Wolcott 420
Macy v. Indianapolis 677
Madison Co. v. People 643
Madison & Ind. R. '. Co. v. Nor
wich Savings Society 269, 270
Madison & Ind. R. R. Co. v. White
neck 204, 722
Madox v. Graham 58
Magee v. Commonwealth 6:82
v. Supervisors 785
Magruder, Ex parte *322
v. Governor 141
Maguire v. Maguire 348, 503, 504,
507, 508
Mahala v. State 405
Maher v. People 377, 391, 403
Mahon v. New York Central R. R.
Co. 684
Mahoney v. Bank of the State 241
Maiden v. Ingersoll 14
Maize v. State 142, 151, 205, 216
Mallory v. Hiles 190
Malone v. Clark 512
v. Stewart 529
Maloy v. Marietta 53, 622,630, 645
Maltus v. Shields 613
Manchester, Matter of 22
Manley v. Manley 503, 507
v. Raleigh 231
Manly v. State 71, 72, 81
Mansfield v. McIntyre 503, 507
Mansfield, &c. R. R. Co. v. Clark 673
Mapes v. Weeks 567
Marbury v. Madison 57
March v. Commonwealth 242
v. Portsmouth, &c. R. R.
Co. 655
Marchant v. Langworthy 94
Marcy v. Oswego 269
Marietta v. Fearing 247, 337
Mariner v. Dyer 394
Marion v. Epler 622, 630
Mark v. State 192, 226
Marks v. Morris - 31
v. Pardue University 156, 284,
615
Marlatt v. Silk 17
Marlow v. Adams 486
Marsh v. Chestnut 91
v. Ellsworth - 551
v. Fulton Co. 268, 270
v. New York & Erie R. R.
Co. 723
v. Putnam 360
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co. 168
v. Donovon 199, 366
v. Grimes 224, 740
v. Gunter 556
v. Harwood 164
v. Kerns 776, 784, 786, 789
v. Silliman 287, 475
v. Vicksburg 606
Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway
Co. Court 233
Marten v. Wan Schaick 567
Martin, Er parte 605
v. Bigelow 31
v. Broach 178
v. Brooklyn 305
v. Dix 204, 232
v. Hunter's Lessee 11, 15, 24,
82, 110
v. Mott 52
v. Waddell 17
v. Wade 169
Martin's Appeal 128
Mary Smith's Case 385
Mason, Matter of 431
xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Mason v. Haile 352, 354
v. Kennebeck, &c. R. R.
Co. 705, 712
v. Mason 567
v. Messenger 506
v. Wait 108, 127
Masterton v. Mt. Vernon 311
Mather v. Chapman 464, 476
v. Hodd 511
Mathews v. Beach 560
v. Zane 190
Matter of Election Law 774
Mauch Chunk v. McGee 176
Maul v. State 326
Mauran v. Smith 141
Maurer v. People 393
Maxey v. Loyal 352
v. Williamson Co. 269
v. Wise 469
Maximilian v. New York 305
Maxwell v. Newbold 16
May v. Holdridge 474
Mayberry v. Kelly 198
Mayer, Ex parte 480
v. Schleichter 5:30
Maynes v. Moore 351
Mayo v. Freeland 784
v. Wilson 31
Mayor, &c., Matter of 621, 640
v. Horn 115, 116
v. Medbur 735)
Mayor of Annapolis v. State 176
Mayor of Hull v. Horner 239, 240
Mayor of London's Case 426
Mayor of Lyme v. Turner 304, 309
Mayor of Wetumpka v. Winter 144
Mayrant v. Richardson 551
Mays v. Cincinnati 231, 242, 246, 644
McAdoo v. Benbow
McAffee's Heirs v. Kennedy 668
McAllister v. Hoffman 774
McArthur v. Goddin 448
McAuley v. Boston 311
McAurich v. Mississippi, &c. R. R.
Co. 156, 179
McBrayer v. Hill 5:30
McBride v. Chicago 6:22
McCafferty v. Guyer 78, 322
McCann v. Sierra Co. 701
McCardle, Er parte 116,226,477,481
McCarthy v. Hoffman 472
McCaslin v. State 179
McCauley v. Brooks 57, 355
v. Hargroves 23, 59
McClaughry v. Wetmore 553
302
190, 268, 270
68
20
McCloud v. Selby
McClure v. Oxford
McClusky v. Cromwell
McCollum, Ex parte
7()
McComb v. Akron 252, 678
v. Bell 627
v. Gilkey 125, 126
McConkle v. Binns 577
McCool v. Smith 185
McCormick v. Rusch 358, 448
McCoy v. Grandy 486
v. Huffman 420
v. Michew 463
McCracken v. Hayward 349, 350, 353,
- 355
McCready v. Sexton 459, 649
v. Virginia 20
McCuen v. Ludlum 528
McCulloch v. Maryland 14, 24, 77, 599,
600, 601
v. State 97, 164, 165, 170,
- 215, 226
McDaniell v. Correll 115, 130, 479
McI)ermott's Appeal 503
McDonald v. Redwing 655, 747
v. Schell 513
v. State 408
McDonough v. Millaudon 16
McElvain v. Mudd 603
McFadden v. Commonwealth 404
McFarland v. Butler 354, 450
McGatrick v. Wason 595
McGear v. Woodruff 394
McGee v. Mathis 342, 622
McGehee v. Mathis 637, 741
McGiffert v. McGiffert 502, 503, 504
McGinnis v. Watson 582, 590
McGinnity v. New York 306
McGlinchy v. Barrows 373
McGowan v. State 401
McGuffie v. State 397, 400
McHaney v. Trustees of Schools 462
McKee v. McKee 230, 734
v. People 406
v. Wilcox 75
McKeen v. Delancy's Lessee 17
McKenzie v. State 379
McKim v. Odorn 232
v. Weller 94
McKinney v. Carroll 16
v. O'Connor 772, 779
v. Springer 454
McKune v. Weller 7.59
McCaughlin, Ex parte 40.5
v. Correy 311
McLaurine v. Monroe 22
McLean v. Hugarian 59
McLeod's Case 428
McManus v. Carmichael 736
v. O'Sullivan 16
McMasters v. Commonwealth 6:31
McMerty v. Morrison 455
McMillan v. Birch 555
TABLE OF CASES - CITED. xlvii
McMillan v. Boyles 474
v. Lee County 235
v. McNiell 24, 360
McMinn v. Whelan 649
McMullan v. Hodge 42, 88
McPherson v. Foster 236, 268, *.8v. Leonard
v. State 401
McReady v. Sexton 459, 649
McReynolds v. Smallhouse 738
McSpeddon v. New York 259
McVeigh r. United States 505, 506
Meacham v. Dow 774
v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. 710
Mead v. Derby 311
v. McGraw 65
v. Walker 512
Meade v. Beale 17
v. Deputy Marshall 505
Meagher v. Storey Co. 227
Mears v. Commissioners of Wil
mington 304
Mechanics', &c. Bank Appeal 351
Mechanics' & Farmers' Bank v.
Smith 247
Mechanics’ & Traders' Bank v.
Debolt 154, 342
Mechanics’ & Traders' Bank v.
Thomas 342
Meddock v. Williams 470
Medford v. Learned 460, 461
Meeker v. Van Rensselaer 729, 747
Meighen v. Strong 472
Meister v. People 4.18
Melizet's Appeal 136
Mellen v. Western R. R. Corp. 678
Memphis v. Winfield 244
Memphis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Payne 703
Menard Co c. Kincaid 449
Mendota v. Thompson 312
Menges v. Wertman 463, 465, 468
Mercer v. McWilliams 700
Meredith r. Ladd 168
Merrick p. Amherst 261,284, 615
Merrifield r. Worcester 254, 311
Merrill p. Plainfield 257, 259
v. Sherburne 112, 116, 445
Merritt v. Farris 642
Merwin c. Ballard 462
Meshmeier v. State 142, 152, 216, 224,
727, 728
Messenger v. Mason 16
Methodist Church v. Ellis 64()
v. Wood 582
Metropolitan Board v. Barrie 345, 480,
726, 727
v. Heister 7:30
Metzger, Matter of 430, 431
Mewherter v. Price 179, 182
Meyer v. Muscatine 267
Miami Coal Co. v. Wigton 660
Michigan State Bank v. Hastings 340
Middlebrook v. State 394
Middlebrooks v. Ins. Co. 22
Middleton r. Lowe 141
Milan, &c. P. R. Co. v. Husted 342
Milburn, Er parte 430
v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R. R.
Co. 690
Miles v. Caldwell 17
v. State 331
Milhau v. Sharp 237, 247, 253,254,
682
Milledgeville v. Cooley 311
Miller v. Craig 747, 748
v. English 582
v. Gable 581
v. Graham 476, 479
v. Grandy 281, 612
v. Miller 446
v. New York & Erie R. R.
Co. 719, 721
v. Nichols 15
v. Parish 529
v. People 385
v. Rucker 777
v. State (3 Ohio) 97, 165, 170,
183, 198
v. State (358 Ala.) 164
v. State (8 Ind.) 405
v. Troost 668
Miller's Case 573
Miller's Executor v. Miller 506
Millholland v. Bryant 762
Milligan, Er parte 379, 394
Mills, Matter of 4.17
v. Brooklyn 254, 304, 309
v. Charlton 179, 180, 231, 286,
475, 610
v. Duryea 23
v. Gleason 235, 236, 648
v. Jefferson 192
v. St. Clair Co. 497
v. Williams 232, 337, 340, 341
Milner v. Pensacola 2:32
Milwaukee r. Gross 7:30
Milwaukee Gas L. Co. v. Steamer
Gamecock 34
Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee City 233
Miners' Bank v. Iowa 33
v. United States 128, 340
Minor v. Board of Education 586
v. Happerstett 13, 36, 37, 83,
498, 753
Minot v. West Roxbury 168
Mississippi Society v. Musgrove 340
Mitchell v. Burlington 267
v. Deeds 463, 467
xlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Mitchell v. Harmony 661
v. Illinois, &c. Coal Co. 101,
658
v. Rome 252
v. Williams 748
Mitchell's Case 413
Mithoff v. Carrollton 665
Moberly v. Preston 529
Mobile v. Allaire 242, 243
v. Dargan 28, 614, 622
v. Rouse 243
v. Yuille 246, 749
Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. State 186,
199, 215, 219, 220
Moers v. Reading 84, 145
Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica &
Schenectady R. R. Co.
Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co.,
Matter of . 94
497
Mok v. Detroit, &c. Association 184
Monell v. Dickey 507
Money v. Leach 371
Monford v. Barney 513
Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
Coons 676, 679
Monopolies, Case of 493
Monroe v. Collins 78,217,494, 759,777
Montee v. Commonwealth 401
Montgomery v. Deeley 528
v. Kasson 335, 347
v. Meredith 463
v. State 401, 576
Montgomery Co. v. Elston 602
Montpelier v. East Montpelier 232,
233, 293, 339
Montpelier Academy v. George 232,233
Moodalay v. East Indian Co. 308
Moody v. State 159, 164, 186
Moon v. Durden 76
Moor v. Luce 454
Moore, Matter of 416
v. Cass 48()
v. Detroit Locomotive
Works 500
v. Houston 205
v. Maxwell 125
v. Meagher 5:30
v. Minneapolis 3 11
v. Moore 603
v. New York 447
v. People 25, 244
v. Quirk 6():}
v. Railway Co. 658
v. Sanbourne 735, 736
v. Sinaw 651
v. State 381
v. Stephenson 578
Moran v. Commissioners of Miami
Co. 269
Moreau v. Detchamendy 19
Morehead v. State 386
Morey v. Brown 748
v. Newfane 303, 305
Morford v. Unger 143, 176, 178, 189,
479, 608, 615, 623
Morgan v. Buffington 139
v. Cree 154
v. King 31, 697, 735, 736, 737
v. Livingston 528
v. Plumb 59
v. Quackenbush 784, 788, 789
v. Smith 154
v. State 393
Morril v. Haines 780
Morrill v. State 617, 749
Morris v. Barkley 530
v. People 204, 221
v. State 406
v. Vanlaning 779
Morris Canal & Banking Co. v.
Fisher 270
Morris & Essex R. R. Co. v. New
ark 684
Morrison v. M’Donald 394
v. Springer 205
Morrissey c. People 155
Morrow v. Wood 422
Morse v. Boston 3.11
v. Goold 63,351, 352
Morton, Matter of 374
v. Sharkey 454, 456
v. The Controller 177, 179
Mortun v. Valentine 352
Mose v. State 393
Moseley v. State 405
Moser v. White 116
Moses v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, &
C. R. R. Co. 690
Moses Taylor, The, v. Hammons 24
Mosier v. Hilton 180
Mott v. Comstock 529
v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 154,
342
Motz v. Detroit 488
Moulton v. Raymond 611
Mount v. Commonwealth 405
Mount Carmel v. Wabash Co. 233
Mount Pleasant v. Breeze 237
Mount Washington Road Co.'s
Petition 672, 703, 710, 711
Mounts v. State 404
Mower v. Leicester 303
v. Watson 553, 556
Mundt v. Sheboygan, &c. R. R. Co. 172
Mundy v. Monroe 218, 356
Munger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co. 698
Municipality v. Blanc 734
v. Cutting 750
TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlix
Municipality v. Wheeler 325
p. White 622, 634
Munn v. Illinois 25, 204, 444, 715, 743
v. People 744, 745
v. Pittsburg 311
Munson v. Hungerford 735
Murford v. Barnes 513
Murphey v. Menard 178
Murphy, Er parte 782
In re 68, 325
v. Chicago 252, 677
v. Commonwealth 395
v. People 480
v. State 415
Murray v. Commissioners of Berk
shire 683, 688
v. Hoboken Land Co. 437, 505
v. McCarty 21
v. Meniſee 676, 680
v. Sharp 680
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
Co. 437, 505
Murtaugh r. St. Louis 254, 304
Musgrove v. Vicksburg 449
Musselman r. Logansport 463
Mutual Assurance Co. v. Watts 17
Myers v. English 100, 205
r. Manhattan Bank 36
v. People 215
Mygatt v. Washburn 623
Myrick v. Hasey 64
v. La Crosse 648
N.
Nashville v. Ray 236, 237
National Bank v. Commonwealth 601
Nations v. Johnson 504, 506
Naylor v. Field 185
N. C. Coal Co. v. G. E. Coal & "
Iron Co. 77
Neaderhouser v. State 740
Neal r. Green 17
Neass v. Mercer 353
Nebraska v. Campbell 304
Nefzeger v. Davenport 7.58
Neifing v. Pontiac 180
Neill v. Keese 499
Nels v. State 401
Nelson v. Allen 62, 63, 486
v. Borchenius 529
v. Goree 64
v. Milford 255, 257
v. Rountree 479
v. State 401
Nesbitt v. Trumbo 662
Nesmith r. Sheldon 18
Nevins v. Peoria 252
d
New Albany & Salem R. R. Co. v.
O'Daily 679, 690
New Albany & Salem R. R. Co.
v. Maiden 722
New Albany & Salem R. R. Co.
v. McNamara 722
New Albany & Salem R. R. Co.
v. Tilton 714, 722, 725
Newberry v. Trowbridge 58, 59
New Boston, Petition of 514
v. Dunbarton 240
Newby v. Platte County 709, 710
Newby's Adm'rs v. Blakey 454
Newcastle, &c. R. R. Co. v. Peru
& Indiana R. R. Co. 656
Newcomb v. Peck 23
Newcome v. Smith 668
Newcum v. Kirtley 782, 786
Newell v. Newton 507
v. People 67, 68, 70
v. Smith 668
v. Wheeler 649
New Jersey v. Wilson 154, 342
Newland v. Marsh 111, 205, 221, 224
New London v. Brainerd 235, 258
Newman, Ex parte 205, 226
New Orleans v. De Armas 15
v. Poutz 325
v. Southern Bank 185
v. Stafford 749
v. St. Rowe's 94
v. Turpin 230
New Orleans, &c. º R. Co. v.
New Orleans 294, 681
Newsom v. Cocke 221
v. Greenwood 449
New York, Matter of 621, 640
v. Furze 304
v. Hyatt 243
v. Kerr 690
v. Lord 747
v. Miln 606, 733
v. Nichols 242, 244, 247
v. Ryan 231
tº. Second Ave. R. R.
Co. 246, 251
New York Central, &c. R. R. Co.
v. Gaslight Co. 344, 673
New York, &c. R. R. Co. v. Van
Horn 221, 287, 472
N. E. Screw Co. v. Bliven 17
N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co. v. Kip 661,
662
N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co. v. New"
York 254, 682
Niccolls v. Rugg 582
Nichol v. Nashville 144
Nichols, Matter of 352
v. Bertram 340
l TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Nichols v. Bridgeport 621, 631, 658,
709, 711
v. Guy 529
v. Mudgett 774
v. Somerset, &c. R. R. Co. 700
Nicholson v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R.
Co. 687, 709
Nickerson v. Howard 421
Nicolay v. St. Clair 269
Nicolls v. Ingersoll 422
Nightingale's Case 749
Nightingale v. Bridges 443
Nims v. Troy 3.11
Noel v. Ewing 136,447
Nolan v. State 404
Nolin v. Franklin 749
Nomaque v. People 393
Noonan v. Orton 533
v. State 31
Norman v. Curry 179
v. Heist 439, 446, 472
Norris v. Abingdon Academy 205,
340
v. Beyea 448, 461
v. Boston 215
v. Clymer 84, 123, 125
v. Crocker 477
v. Doniphan 449, 451
v. Harris 31
v. Newton 429
v. Vt. Central R. R. Co. 655,
678
Norristown, &c. Co. r. Burket 513
Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v.
Connelly 620, 622, 631, 632, 645
Northern Liberties v. St. John's
Church
Northern R. R. Co. v. Concord
R. R. 63
North Hempstead v. Hempstead 241,
- 260
North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Gott 673
North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Lack
land
North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Ma
guire 25, 343
North-western Fertilizing Co. v.
622
673
Hyde Park 77, 719
North Yarmouth v. Skillings 293
Norton v. Pettibone 464
Norwich v. County Commissioners
205, 220
Norwich Gas Co. v. Norwich City
Gas Co. 493
Norwood v. Cobb 23
Nougues v. Douglass 99
Noyes v. Butler 22
Nugent v. State 40.5
Nunn v. State 434
O.
Oakland v. Carpentier 250
Oakley v. Aspinwall 87, 516
Oatman v. Bond 355
O’Bannon v. Louisville, &c. R. R.
Co. 456, 723
O'Brian v. Commonwealth 404
O'Conner v. Warner 115
O'Connor v. Pittsburg 252, º,
12
O'Donaghue v. McGovern 542
O'Donnell v. Bailey 342
O'Farrell v. Colby 784
Officer v. Young 462, 492
Ogden v. Blackledge 112, 115
v. Riley 528
v. Saunders 75, 83, 221, 325,
349, 350, 351, 353, 360, 457
v. Strong 68, 71
O'Grady v. Barnhisel 647
O'Hara v. Carpenter 278
Ohio, &c., R. R. Co. v. Ridge 264
Ohio & Lexington R. R. Co. v.
Applegate 692
Ohio & M. R. R. Co. v. Lackey 129,
723
Ohio & M. R. R. Co. v. McClel
land 345, 714, 722, 724, 725
Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. De
bolt 154, 342
O'Kane v. Treat 627, 643, 647
O'Kelly v. Athens Manuf. Co. 450
Olcott v. Supervisors 18
Oldknow v. Wainwright 781
O'Leary v. Cook Co. 180
Oleson v. Green Bay, &c. R. R.
Co. 153, 185, 221
Oliver v. McClure 116, 351
v. Memphis, &c. R. R. Co. 349
v. Washington Mills 498, 607,
617
v. Worcester 308
Oliver, Lee, & Co.'s Bank, Matter
of 42, 47, 77
Olmstead v. Camp 668, 670, 671, 672
Olmsted v. Miller 5:30
Olney v. Harvey 233
Omaha v. Olmstead 3 11
One House v. State 727, 728
Onslow v. Hone 547
Opinions of Judges, (6 Shep.) 95; (16
Me.) 136; (18 Me.) 99; (38 sº768, 781; (45 Me.) 762; (52 Me.
277; (58 Me.) 212, 610, 611; (62Nº!"; "S) ſº. II. ) 123; (41 N. H.) 395, 512;
(44 N
. H.), 754; (45 N
.
H.) 187,
754; (52 N
.
H.) 165; (53 N
.
H.)
TABLE OF CASES CITED. li
784; (56 N. H.) 161 ; (3 R. I.) 116;
(7 Mass.) 759; (15 Mass.) 759; (18
Pick.) 38; (6 Cush.) 40; (1 Met.)
756; (99 Mass.) 187; (117 Mass.)
79, 336, 785; (37 Vt.) 754; (30
Conn.) 754; (49 Mo.) 51, 54; (55
Mo.) 144.
Orange, &c. R. R. Co. v. Alexan
dria 641
Ordineal v. Barry 169
O'Reiley v. Kankakee Co. 636
Oriental Bank v. Freeze 450, 480
Ormichund v. Barker 596
Ormond v. Martin 486
Orphan House v. Lawrence 61
Orr v. Quimby 700
v. Skofield 529
Ortman r. Greenman 198
Orton v. Noonan 471
Osage, &c. R. R. Co. v. Morgan
. Co. 271
Osborn v. Hart 442, 662
v. Jaines 456
v. Mobile 606
r. Nicholson 350, 354
r. State 396
v. Staley 164, 205, 222
v. United States 139
v. United States Bank 601
Osborne v. Humphrey 342
Oswald's Case 394
Ottawa r. People 179
Ould v. Richmond 231, 618
Overstreet r. Brown 499
Oviatt r. Pond 727, 728
Owen v. State 434
Owings r. Norwood's Lessee 14, 15
Owners of Ground r. Albany 666
Owners of the James Gray v.
Owners of the John Frazer 731
P.
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Chrystal 709,710
v. Maguire 42, 342
Packet Co. v. Sickles 59
Pacquette c. Pickness 486
Padmore r. Lawrence 552, 5.56
Page, Er parte 408
v. Allen 757
v. Commonwealth 38.5
r. Fazackerly 749
r. Fowler 59
v. Hardin 451
v. Mathew's Adm'rs 116
Paine v. Wright 17
Paine's Case 5:35
Palairet's Appeal 349
Palfrey v. Boston 602
Palmer v. Commissioners of Cuya
hoga Co. 34, 738
v. Concord 531, 565
v. Fitts 294, 296
v. Lawrence 62
v. Napoleon 618
v. Smith
-
579
r. Stumph 622, 632, 641
Palmer Co. v. Ferrill 710
Palmore v. State 513
Pangborn v. Westlake 64
Paris v. Mason 6.59
Parish r. Eager 454
Park Commissioners v. Common
Council 44
Parker v. Bidwell 422
v. Commonwealth 142, 149,
151
v. Cutler Mill-dam Co. 740
v. Kane 17
tº
.
McQueen 567
v
. Metropolitan R
.
R
.
Co. 341,
721, 740
v
. Phetteplace 17
v
.
Redfield 342
v
. Sexton 647
v
.
Shannonhouse 449
v
. Sunbury & Erie R
.
R
.
Co. 495
Parkins's Case 410
Parkinson v. State 71, 179, 190,
19:3
Parks, Er parte 4:30
v
. Boston 709
v
. Goodwin 94
Parliamentary Cases 164
Parmele v
. Thompson 118
Parmelee v
. Lawrence 16, 450, 465,
469
Parmiter v. Coupland 576
Parsons v. Bangor 7:55
v
. Casey 3. 1
v
.
Goshen 259, 260
v
. Howe 660
v
. Russell 4:37
Paschal v. Perez 3.51
Paschall v. Whitsett 448
Passenger Cases 716, 733
Patten v. People 378
Patterson v. Barlow 757
v
.
Commonwealth 715
v
. Mississippi, &c. Boom
Co.
v
. Philbrook
v
. Society
666
449, 463, 476
143, 144, 232,
64 1
v
. Wilkinson 5:30
v
. Winn 31
lii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Pattison v. Jones 533
v. Yuba 68, 144
Paul v. Detroit 513, 675
v. Virginia 21
v. Hazelton 21
Pawlet v. Clark 291, 335, 339
Pawling v. Bird's Executors 22, 503
v. Wilson 506
Paxson v. Sweet 7:35
Payne v. Treadwell 294, 469
v. Wright 17
Payson v. Payson 503
Pearce v. Atwood 31, 514
v. Olney 2:3
v. Patton 45.5
Pearse v. Morrice 90
Pease v. Chicago 281
v. Peck 17
Peavey v. Robbins 777
Peay v. Duncan 59
Peck v. Batavia 305
v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 721
v. Freeholders of Essex 514
v. Lockwood 247
v. Weddell 142, 771
Peddicord v. Baltimore, &c. R. R.
Co. 684
Pedrick v. Bailey 244
Peerce v Carskadon 320, 323
Pekin v. Brereton 311, 679
v. Reynolds 267
v. Winkel 311
Pemble v. Clifford 32
Pendleton Co. v. Amy 268, 269
Penhallow v. Doane's Administrator 8
Peninsula R. R. Co. v. Howard 517
Penn v. Tollison 42
Penn's Case 397
Pennsylvania Hall, In re 289
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Canal
Commissioners 495
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Common
wealth 606
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lewis 722
1’ennsylvania R. R. Co. v. New
York, &c. R. R. Co.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Reily 710,
711
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Riblet 204,
722, 725
680
Pennywit v. Foote 23
Penrice v. Wallace 710
Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 351, 354
People v. Alameda 283
v. Albany, &c. R. R. Co. 787
v. Albertson 44, 79, 204, 211,
3.13
v. Allen 52, 86, 94, 178
v. Auditor-General 347
People v. Banvard 337
v. Barrett 404
v. Batchellor 212, 286, 287,
294, 308. 614
v. Bates 765, 772, 779
v. Bircham 139
v. Bissell 141
v. Blake 79
v. Blakely 413
v. Blodgett 68, 80, 223, 754
v. Board of Education 490
v. Board of Registration 785
v. Board of Supervisors 291
v. Board, &c. of Nankin 785
v. Bowen 187
v. Brady 22, 494
v. Bradley 101
v. Brenahm 760
v. Briggs 176, 181, 215
v. Brighton 6.58
v. Brooklyn 285, 288, 599,
t?
v
. Cicotte
620, 621, 635, 636, 699
v. Bull 78, 216, 336, 337
v. Burns 71
v. Burt 165
v. Butler 3:32
v. Campbell 97, 170
v. Canaday 754
v. Canal Appraisers 696
v. Canty 287
v. Cassells 431
v. Chicago 212, 272, 286, 287,
294, 475
63, 513, 762, 764,
766, 768, 770, 780, 782, 787,
789, 790, 792
v. Clark 19()
v. Clute 782
v. Coleman 21, 64
v. Collins 142, 149
v. Commissioners (59 N. Y.)
34.5, 394
. Commissioners (4 Wall.) 602
. Commissioners of High
ways 159, 165, 171
. Commissioners of Taxes 342
. Comstock
. Common Council of De
39S
44, 282, 287, 291,
309, 313, 610, 614
troit
. Cook (14 Barb. and 8
N.Y.) 90, 765, 766, 767,
768, 772, 784, 786, 789
v. Cook (10 Mich.) 404, 405
v. Corning 398
v. County Board of Cass 257
v. Cover 789
v. Cowles 102, 760
v. Croswell 401
TABLE OF CASES CITED. liii
People v. Curtis 22
v. Daniel 109
v. Dawell 23, 503
v. Dayton 84
v. Dean 494
t. Denahy 179, 182
r. 1)evlin 187
v. Dill 398
v. Doe 94
v. Draper 57, 108, 206, 207,
226, 230, 232, 714
v. Dubois 337
r. Dudley 178
v. Fancher 102
v. Ferguson 766, 767, 794
v. Finnegan 401
v. Fisher 208
v. Flagg 226, 283, 614, 616
v. Flanagan 337
v. Ford 4.17
v. Frisbie 116, 492
v. Gallagher 209, 210, 727
v. Garbutt 403
v. Gates 141, 603
v. Gerke 15
v. German, &c. Church 582
v. Gies 80, 515
v. Gilbert 456
v. Goodwin 405, 786
r. Gordon 778
v. Governer 141, 194
r. Gray 268
t. Green 336, 700, 702
v. Hartwell 94, 760, 781
v. Haskell 337
v. Hatch 160, 188
t. Hawes 288
r. Hawley 727
v. Hayden 700, 701
v. Hennesse 386
r. Higgins 768, 779, 780, 786,
789
p. Hill 215
r. Hilliard 784
v. Holden 756, 765, 789
r. Holley 94
v. Hurlbut 47, 165, 179, 212,
229, 231, 282, 294, 308
v. Imlay 21
v. Ingersoll 339, 349
v. Institution, &c. 175
v. Jackson & Michigan
Plank R. Co. 340, 358,
719, 720
r. Jenkins 734, 741
v. Jenness 596
r. Jones 786
v. Keenan 415
v. Kelsey 231
People v. Kent County Canvassers 773
v. Kerr 676, 688, 689, 690, 692
v. Kilduff 761, 784
v. Kniskern 703
v. Koeber 509
v. Kopplekom 757, 7.58
t’. }. Co. 100
v. Lamb 403
v. Lambert 386, 392
v. Lambier 497
v. Lawrence 95, 99, 173, 215,
225, 257, 259
v. Lippincott 336
v. Liscomb 4:30
v. Loomis 765
v. Lothrop 3.13
v. Lott 505
v. Lynch 463, 478
c. Mahaney 161, 164, 174, 176,
:
. Manhattan Co.
. Martin
184, 185, 207, 294, 645
340
7.59
v. Matteson 765, 771, 786, 789
v. Maynard 88, 239, 312, 776
v. Mayworm 766
v. McCallum 176, 179, 185
v. McCann 178, 180
v. McCreery 283
v. McGowan 404, 406
v. McKay :393
v. McKinney 79, 337
v. McMahon 385, 387, 388
v. McManus 765, 771, 779
v. McNealy 405
v. McRoberts 101, 659
v. Medical Society of Erie 249
v. Mellen 177
v. Mercein 432
v. Merrill 155
v. Mitchell 459, 476
v. Molliter 781
p. Morrell 67, 108
v. Morris 212, 233, 292, 308,
3:37
v. Mortimer 3:32
v. Murray 220
v. Nally 144
v. Nearing 665
v. New York 344, 652, 654, 720,
74()
v. Nichols 647
v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.
68, 7.2, 80, 209, 210, 225
v. Parker 52
. Peck
. Phelps
. Pease 762, 763, 764,768.770,
778, 784, 790, 791,
792, 794
94
332
liv TABLE OF CASES CITED.
People v. Phillips 387, 783
v. Pine 401
v. Pinkney 232
v. Platt 186, 335
v. Porter 386, 593, 759
v. Potter 79
v. Power 232, 283, 289,
339
v. Pritchard 185
v. Purdy 68, 71, 95, 187
v. Quigg 178, 185
v. Raymond 79, 337
v. Reed 74.1
v. Robertson 785, 786, 788
v. Rochester 178, 218
v. Roe 734, 741
v. Roper 342
v. Royal 398
v. Ruggles 590, 592
v. Rumsey 101
v. Runkel 94
v. Sackett 789
v. Salomon 144, 250, 227, 313,
777
v. Saxton 765
v. Schermerhorn 90
v. Schryver 380
v. Seaman 765, 767, 786
v. Seymour 467
v. Smith 371, 381
v. Springwells 313, 614
v. Starne 97, 99, 170
v. State Auditors 48()
v. Stevens 243
v. Stewart 401
v. Stout 142, 147
v. Sullivan 377
v. Supervisor, &c. 115
v. Supervisor of Onondaga
ty
tº
. Supervisors of Orange
186, 256
Supervisors, &c. 785
. Supervisors of Chenango 95.
164, 479, 623
. Supervisors of Columbia
274, 461
. Supervisors of El Dorado 267
. Supervisors of Greene 785
Supervisors of New York 111.
113, 288
108,
204, 210, 224
. Supervisors of Saginaw 608
. Supervisors of San Fran
cisco 283
v. Tallman 7()4
v. Tappan 294
v. Tazewell County 267
v. Thacher 764
v. Thayers 401
People v. Thomas
v. Thurber
v. Tisdale
. Tompkins
. Toynbee
. Turner
. Tweed
. Tyler
. Van Cleve
. Van Eps
Van Horne
. Van Slyck
. Wide to
. Waite
. Wallace
Webb
..
. Weissenbach
. Whyler
. Williams
. Willsea
. Wilson
. Worthington
. Wright
. Young
Calhoun
. Harvey
v
. Kidder
Peoria County v. Harvey
::
**
404,
i
t;
Peoria :
394,
621,
385, 391
21
766, 768
94
. Township Board o
f
Salem
261, 493, 608, 615, 669
210
367
232
221, 389, 404
784, 786,
789
505
381
784
401
780
97,156
405, 406
4:32
639
155
178
779
640
184
303
249
704
641
704
565,
108,
109,
630,
Peoria, &c. R. R. Co. v. Peoria,
&c. Co.
Percy, In re
Perdue v. Burnett -
Pereless v. Watertown .
Perkins v. Corbin
v
. Lewis
v
. Milford
t"
.
Mitchell
v
. Perkins
Perret v. New Orleans Times
344
417
528
456
336
272
281
552
461
569
Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware
Canal Co.
v
. Farr
v
. Serrell
Perry v. Keene
v
. Lewis
v
. Mann
v
.
State
v
. Whittaker
Perry's Case
Persons v. Jones
Peru v. French
Pesterfield v. Vickers
Peterman r. Huling
Peters v. Iron Mt. R. R. Co.
Petersburg v. Metzker
Peterson v. Lothrop
495
509
59
206
59
528
4:30
785
596
61
304
242
193
719, 725
242
61
325,
TABLE OF CASES CITED. ly
Pettibone v. La Crosse & Mil
waukee R. R. Co. 705
Pettigrew v. Janesville 655
Petty v. Tooker 582
Pharis v. Dice 356
Phelps v. Goldthwaithe 771
v. Meade 649
v. Racey 747
v. Schroder 784, 785
Philadelphia v. Commonwealth 505
v. Dickson 704
v. Dyer 704
v. Fox 232, 308
v. Scott 715, 741, 747
v. Tryon 637, 735
Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Bowers 721
Philadelphia Assoc., &c. v. Wood 627
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co.
v. Yeiser 712
Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co.,
Case of 684
Phillips v. Allen 249
v. Berick 59
v. Bridge Co. 179, 181
v. Bury 308
v. Covington, &c. Co. 179
v. Dunkirk 657
v. People 244
v. Wickham 6:36
v. Wiley 530
Phillpots v. Bladsdel 59
Phinizy v. Augusta 31 l
Phipps v. State 74.1
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen 415
v. Commonwealth 21
Piatt v. People 779
Picquet, Appellant 116, 491
Pierce v. Bartrum 7:30
v. Pierce 227
v. State 401
Pierson v. State
-
31
Pike v. Megoun 83, 777
v. Middleton 256
Pike Co. v. Barnes 144, 779
Pilkey r. Gleason 193
Pim v. Nicholson 98, 170, 183,
198
Pingrey v. Washburn 167, 719, 720
Piper v. Chappell 246
Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop 154, 340,
342
Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp
shire Bridge 342, 343, 482, 655
Pitman v. Bump 454
Pittock v. O'Neil 397, 560, 561, 576
Pittsburg v. Coursin 90
v. Grier
v. Scott
3()4
661, 662
Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. S. W.
Penn. R. R. Co.
Pixley v. Clark
Plant, Ex parte
Planter's Bank v. Black
v. Sharp
Platner v. Best
Pleasant v. Kost
v State
Pleasants v. Rohrer
Pledger v. Hitchcock
Plimpton v. Somerset
Plitt v. Cox
Plumb v. Sawyer
Plummer v. Plummer
Pocopson Road
Poertner v. Russel
153,
288,
692,
448,
Police Commissioners v. Louisville
Police Jury v. Britton
v. Shreveport
Polk v. State
Polk's Lessee v. Wendal
Pollard v. Lyon
v. Fºam Hill
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan
Pollock v. McClurken
232,
528,
724
715
430
115
340
59
6:38
401
454
5:30
394
698
461
84
662
. 64
715
267
233
380
17
529
269
31, 652,
Pomeroy v. Chicago, &c. R. R.
CO.
Pond v. Negus
v. People
Ponder v. Graham
Pontiac v. Carter
Pope v. Macon
v. Phifer
Popham v. Pickburn
Porter v. Bothius
v. Hill
v. Marriner
v. Sawyer . .
Porterfield v. Clark
Port Huron v. Ashley
Portland v. Bangor
Portland Bank v. Apthorp
Port Wardens v. The Ward
Portwood v. Montgomery
Postmaster r. Early
Potter v. Hiscox
Powell v. Brandon
v. Sims
Powers v. Bears
v. Bergen
v. Dougherty Co.
v. Dubois
v. Skinner
Powers's Appeal 658,
377,
252,
459,
703,
Pratt v. Brown 65, 481,651, 668,
v. Donovan
v. Jones
6.53
488
684
93
37.8
136
678
486
179
57.1
53
58
351
774
17
680
497
509
7:31
289
115
507
31
31
702
127
144
53
169
7()4
672
5().5
457
lvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Pratt v. People 774
v. Tefft 447
Pray v. Northern Liberties 640
Prentiss v. Boston 311
v. Holbrook 58
Presbyterian Society v. Auburn,
&c. R. R. Co. 684, 696
Prescott v. City of Chicago 179
v. State 25, 367
v. Trustees of Illinois &
M. Canal 165
Preston v. Boston 499
v. Browder 17
Prettyman v. Supervisors, &c. 144,
272
Price v. Hopkin 191, 456
. v. Mott 76
v. New Jersey R. R. Co. 723
v. State 404, 405, 406
Prichard's Case 163
Prigg v. Pennsylvania 218
Primm v. Belleville 642
Pritchett v. State 40.5
Pritz, Ex parte 156
Proctor v. Andover 662
Proprietors, &c. v. Laboree 456
Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua &
Lowell R. R. Co. 655, 694, 710,
711
Prother v. Lexington 305
Protho v. Orr 99, 178
Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c. R. R.
Co. 679, 690
Prout v. Berry 116
Providence v. Clap 3.11
Providence Bank v. Billings 342, 495,-
599
Pryor v. Downey 131, 479
Pulford v. Fire Department • 170
Pullen v. Raleigh 237
Pumpelly v. Green Bay, &c. Co. 677,
680
Purcell v. Lowler 551
Purdy v. People 80
Purvear v. Commonwealth 25, 729
Putnam v. Flint 68
v. Johnson 755
Q.
Quackenbush v. Danks 351, 352, 461
Quarrier, Ex parte 322
Queen, The, v. Badger 381
v. Collins 535, 5:36
v. Cooks 782
r. Hennessy 155
v. Justices of Hert
fordshire 516
Queen, The, v. Justices of London 517
v. Justices of Suffolk 517
v. Lefroy 566
v. Newman 579
v. Pikesley 38.5
Quick v. Whitewater 71
Quimby v. Vermont Central R. R.
Co. (;97
Quin v. State 78, 754
Quincy v. Jones 252
R.
Radcliffe's Executors v. Brooklyn 252,
254, 676, 677
Rader v. Road District 232
Ragatz v. Dubuque 701
Rail v. Potts 777
Railroad Co. v. Brown 14
v. Com’rs of Clinton
Co. 142, 144
v. Dayton 695
v. Ferris 699
v. Fuller 719, 721
v. Gregory 179
v. Jackson 607
v. Lake 657
v. McClure 42
v Peniston 603
v. Rock 16
v. Shurmeir 692
v. Trimble 2:3
v. Whiteneck 178
Railroad Commissioners v. Port
land, &c. R. R. Co. 340, 341,
724
Railway Gross Receipts Tax 606
Raleigh v. Sorrell 749
Raleigh, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis 672
v. Reid 342
Ralston v. Lothain 448
Ramsey v. People 88
Rand v. Commonwealth 332, 333
Randall v. Eastern R. R. Corp. 254
v. Kehlor 513
Randolph, Ex parte 199
v. Good 78, 320
Randolph Co. r. Ralls 512
Rangeley v. Webster 22
Ranger v. Goodrich 530
v. Great Western R. R. 515
Rankin v. West 75
Rape v. Heaton 23, 507, 509
Rathbone v. Bradford 190
Rathbun v. Wheeler 449
Ratzky v. People - 331
Rawley v. Hooker 355
Rawson v. Spencer 234
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lvii
461Ray r. Gage
296Ray Co. r. Bentley
Read r. Beall 349
Read's Case 422
Reading v. Keppleman 252
Reames v. Kerns 5 17
Reardon v. St. Louis 303
Rearick v. Wilcox 546
Reaume v. Chambers 31
Reciprocity Bank, Matter of * 42
Reckner v. Warner 513
Rector v. Smith 534, 552, 553
Red River Bridge Co. v. Clarkville
656
Reddall v. Bryan 16, 653, 665
Redfield v. Florence 774
Reed v. Rice 25
v. State 179
r. Toledo 236
v. Tyler 4.59
v. Wright 4:38
Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 622,
630, 636, 661, 662, 665, 741
Reformed Church v. Schoolcraft 454,
582
Regents of University v. Williams 128,
154, 201
Regnier v. Cabot 5:30
Rehoboth v. Hunt 3:35
Reid v. Delorme 542
Reimsdyke v. Kane 18
Reiser v. Tell Association 114, 115
Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley
R. R. Co. 658
Remington, In re 394
Reinsen v. People 403
Renner v. Bennett 783
Requa v. Rochester 306
Respublica v. Dennie 526, 538
v. Duquet 747
v. Gibbs 774
Revis v. Smith 552
Rex. See King, The.
Rexford v. Knight 698, 700, 702
Reynolds v. Baldwin 232, 233
v. Geary 727
v. Shreveport 252
v. Smallhouse 738
Rhines v. Clark 5 13
Rhodes v. Cincinnati 252
v. Otis 7:36
Rice v. Des Moines 311
v. Foster 142, 149, 151
v. Parkman 128
v. Ruddiman 191
v. State 156, 195
v. Turnpike Co. 7 11
Rice's Case 416
Rich v. Chicago 703
Rich v. Flanders 220, 353, 445, 457,
462, 477
Richard Oliver, In re 148
Richards v. Rote 131, 479
Richardson v. Boston 517
v. Monson 125
v. Morgan 622, 637
v. Roberts 530
v. Vermont Central R.
R. Co. 676, 679
v. Welcome 516
232, 233, 286,
29:3, 339
Richmond v. Long 304, 305, 308
v. Richmond, &c. R. R.
Richland v. Lawrence
Co. 350, 351, 495
Richmond, &c. Co. v. Rogers 676.
678, 700
Richmond, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lou
isa, &c. R. R. Co. 495, 656
Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks,
&c. 296, 304
Ridge Street, In re 678
Riggin's Ex’rs v. Brown 61
Riggs v. Wilton 64
Riley v. Rochester 260
Riley's Case 333, 431
Rima v. Cowan 649
Ring, Matter of 431
v. Wheeler 556
Rison v. Farr 78, 351, 354, 450, 451
Roanoke, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis
264
Robbins v. Fletcher 529
v. State 401
v. Treadway 529
Roberts v. Caldwell 23
v. Chicago 252, 677
v. Ogle 7:34
Robertson v. Bullions 581
v. Rockford 144, 232, 272
Robeson v. Brown 356
Robie v. Sedgwick 239
Robinson, Er parte 24, 427
v. Bank of Darien 215
v. Bidwell 148, 215
v. Commonwealth Insur
ance Co. 18
v. Howe 357
v. N. Y. & Erie R. R.
Co. 679
v. Richardson 377
v. Robinson 709
v. Skipworth 177
v. State 179
v. Swope 662
v. Ward's Ex’rs 22, 506
v. West 512
v. White 336
lviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Rochester v. Collins 236
Rochester White Lead Co. v. Roch
ester 304, 310
Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. v. Cop
pinger 711
Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hil
mer 724
Rockport v. Walden 454
Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs 351,
352,448
v. Nearing 452, 506
Rodemacher v. Milwaukee 340, 723
Roderigas v. East R. Sav. Inst. 59* v. Philip Best BrewingO. "
Rogers v. Bradshaw
v. Burlington
v. Coleman
728
700
145, 267
22
v. Collier 250
v. Goodwin 85
v. Greenbush 461
v. Jones 242
v. State 185
- v. Wass 191
Rohrbacker v. Jackson 753
Roll v. Augusta 252
Rome v. Omberg 252
Rood v. McCargar 215
Roosevelt v. Meyer 16
Root's Case - 709
Ropes v. Clinch 15
Rose v. Lonax 169
Roseberry v. Huff 648
Rosenburg v. Des Moines 306
Rosier v. Hale 448
Ross v. Duval 17
v. Irving 485
v. Melung 17
v. Whitman 11()
Ross's Case 332, 431
Rothschild v. Grix 65
Rounds v. Mumford 252
v. Waymart 185
Roush v. Walter 740
Routsong v. Wolf 470
Rowan v. Runnels 17, 18
v. State 4:38
Rowe v. Addison 655
v. Granite Bridge Corpora
tion 679
v. Portsmouth 3.11
Royal British Bank v. Turquand 270
Rozier v. Fagan 127
Rue High's Case 755
Ruggles v. Nantucket 655
Ruloff v. People 386, 389
Rumney v. Keyes 420
Rumsey v. People 312
Runnels v. State 385
Ruohs v. Backer 556
Rusch v. Davenport 304, 305
Rush v. Cavenaugh 417
Rushing v. Sebree 182
Russell v. Burlington 252
v. Burton 166
v. Jeffersonville 268
v. Men of Devon 241, 303
v. New York 655, 747
v. Pyland 774
v. Rumsey 470, 471
v. Whiting 431
Rust v. Gott 774
v. Lowe 699
Ruth, In re 729
Rutland v. Mendon 64
Ryalls v. Leader 559, 561
Ryan v. Lynch 97, 170, 171
v. Thomas 16
Ryckman v. Delavan 531
Ryegate v. Wardsboro' 71
Ryerson v. Brown 667, 668
v. Utley 177, 182,614, 617
S.
Sackett v. Sackett 31
Sacramento v. Crocker 627
Sadler v. Langham 84, 86, 218, 661,-
662, 668
Safford v. People 401
Sailly v. Smith 371
Salem Turnpike v. Essex Co. 233
Salters v. Tobias 115
Saltmarsh v. Bow 311
Saltpetre Case 747
Sammons v. Holloway 603
San Antonio v. Jones 144
v. Lane 268
Sanborn v. Deerfield 270
v. Rice 288, 614, 617
Sanders v. Hillsboro' Ins. Co. 351
v. Metcalf 394
Sandford v. Nichols 373
Sands v. Kimbark 512
Sanford v. Bennett 567, 568
San Francisco v. Canavan 232, 294
Sangamon Co. v. Springfield 339
San Mateo Water Works v. Sharp
stein 681
Sans v. Joerris 567
Santo v. State 142, 147, 205, 215, 216,
727
Sater v. Burlington & M. P. Plank
R. Co. 708
Satterlee v. Mathewson 325, 469,
476
v. San Francisco 172
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lix
Saunders v. Baxter 560
v. Cabaniss
º
116
v. Haynes 781
v. Mills 560, 579
v. Rodway 420
v. Springstein 622
v. Wilson 486
Savage v. Walshe 94
Savannah v. Hartridge 236
v. State 174, 215
Savannah, &c. R. R. Co. v. Savan
nah 690
Savings Bank v. Allen 469
v. Bates 468
Savings Society v. Philadelphia 241
Sawyer v. Alton 638
v. Corse 304
v. Insurance Co. 79
v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co. 722
Sayles v. Davis 603
Sayre v. Wisner 461
Scales v. Chattahoochee Co. 296
Scanlan v. Childs 84, 85
Schenley v. Alleghany Cit 621
tº. Čºli 448, 461,
467
Schiner v. People 37.8
School District v. Merrills 647
v. Wood 296,297, 298
Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United
States 68
Schooner Rachel v. United States 449,
477
Schrader, Ex parte 112
Schurman v. Marley 32
Schurmeier v. St. Paul, &c. R. R.
Co. 684
Scituate v. Weymouth 234
Scofield v. Watkins 642
Scott, Ex parte 140
v. Clark 192, 193
v. Detroit Young Men's
Society Lessee 36, 43
Sedgwick v. Bunker 233, 448
v. Stanton 167
Seely v. Pittsburg 6:32
Seibert v. Linton 115
Selby v. Bardons 62
Selin v. Snyder 509
Selma, &c. R. R. Co., Ex parte 145
Selman v. Wolfe 737
Selsby v. Redlon 465
Semayne's Case 371
Semler, Petition of 430
Sequestration Cases 358
Sergeant v. Kuhn 125
Serrill v. Philadelphia 628
Servis v. Beatty SO
Sessions v. Crunkilton 630, 636, 741
Sessurus v. Botts 227
Settle v. Wan Enrea 72
Seven Bishops' Case, The 433
Sewall v. St. Paul 311
Sexton v. Todd 529
Seymour v. Hartford 641
v. Turnpike Co. 264
Shackford v. Newington 278, 612
Shackleford v. Coffey 668
Shafer v. Mumma 243
Shannon v. Frost 581, 582
Sharp v. Contra Costa Co. 283
v. New York 180
v. Spier 621
Sharp's Ex’rs v. Dunovan 6.13
Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 144, 279, 599,
6 | 1
Shartel v. Minneapolis 3.11
Shattuck v. Allen 576
Shaw, Ex parte 4:30
v. Charlestown 704
v. Crawford 73.5
v. Dennis 613, 639
v. Macon 154
v. Moore 596
v. Nachwes 432
v. Norfolk R. R. Corp. 474
v. Thompson 420
Shawnee County v. Carter 91
Shearlock v. Beardsworth 532
Sheckel v. Jackson 565
Shehan's Heirs v. Barnett's Heirs 125
Shelby v. Guy 17, 45.5
Sheldon v. Kalamazoo 3.11
v. Wright 500, 511
Shepardson v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R.
Co. 225, 701, 702, 703
Shepherd v. People
v. Jones 16
v. Manchester 304
v. Mather 486
v. McKinnish 5:30
v. Sandford 68
v. Smart's Ex’rs 205
v. Willson 7:35
Scoville v. Cleveland 620, 630, 632
Scripps v. Reilly 569
Scuffletown Fence Co. v. McAllis
ter 516, 610, 741
Seaman's Friend Society v. Boston 641
Sears v. Com'rs of Warren Co. 21
v. Cottrell 108, 210, 221, 441
v. Terry 509
Secombe v. Railroad Co. 657
3.31
Sheppard's Election Case 779
Sherburne v. Yuba Co. 303, 305
Sherman v. Buick -(362
v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R.
Co. 659
lx TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Sherman v. Story 165
Sherrard v. Lafayette Co. 268
Sherwood v. Fleming 472
Shields v. Bennett 179, 185
Shiftlet v. Commonwealth 385
Shinner v. Hartford Bridge Co. 252
Shipley v. Todhunter 534
Shipp v. Miller 17
Shipper v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 21
Shore v. State 381
Shorter, Matter of 322
v. People 377
v. Smith 343
Shouk v. Brown 131, 461, 473
Shover v. State 595, 734
Shrader, Ex parte 7:30
Shreveport v. Levy 584
Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Co. 676,
677
Shumway v. Bennett 112, 122
r. Stillman 23
Sibley v. Williams 31
Sidgreaves v. Myatt 529
Sigourney v. Sibley 514, 516
Sill v. Corning 204, 210
Silliman v. Cummins 470
Sills v. Brown 392
Silvus v. State 403
Simmons v. Holster 528
Simonds's Ex’rs v. Gratz 59.5
Simonds v. Simonds 117, 134, 491
Simpson v. Bailey 179, 180
v. Savings Bank 351, 462
v. State 31
Sims v. Irvine 17
Sinclair v. Jackson 199, 200
Single v. Supervisors of Marathon 179,
475.
Sinks v. Reese 756
Sinton v. Ashbury 232, 283
Skelding r. Whitney 58
Skilding v Herrick 59
Skinner, Ex parte 4:32
v. Hartford Bridge Co. 678
Slack v. Jacobs
v. Maysville
v. Railroad Co.
67, 68, 221, 226
610
77, 145, 271
Slade v. Slade 58
Slatter v. Des Moines Valley R. R.
Co. 678, 712
Slaughter v. Commonwealth 21
v. People 244
Slaughter-House Cases. See Live
Stock, &c. Association v. Cres
cent City. &c. Co.
Slauson v. Racine 217
Slave Grace, The 366
Slayton v. Hulings
Sleght v. Kane
Smails v.
Co.
Smith,
77.
ty.
n:
:
!
t”
Smith, M
Smoot v.
t).
Slinger v. Henneman
Sloan v. Cooper
v. Pacific R. R. Co.
v. State
White
Small v. Danville
Smalley v. Anderson
Smead v. Indianapolis, &c. R. R.
Ex parte
Matter of
Petition of
Adrian
Appleton
. Ballantyne
Brown
. Bryan
. Cheshire
. Clark Co.
. Cleveland
. Commonwealth
. Connelley
. Eastern R. R. Co.
. Gould
. Howard
Hoyt
. Hunter
. Janesville
. Judge
. Leavenworth
. Levinus
. Macon
. Maryland
. McCarthy
. McMasters
. Merchand's Ex’rs
. Morrison
. Morse
. Nelson
. Packard
. People
Rice
. Scott
. Short
v. Shriver
. Silence
. Smith
. Speed
. Stewart
. Swormsted
. Thomas
. Thursby
. Van Gilder
. Washington
ary, Case of
Wetumpka
90, 94 Smyth v. McMasters
20 Titcomb
144, 152
59
340, 719
2:32
179
308
5:30
269
21, 22
25
431
150
358
61
366
4.48
268
271
459, 478
180, 181,
385
668
722
366
551
186, 192
16
146, 148
110, 210
3.11
2:30
206
25
144, 199
774
46.5
191, 456
237, 250
581
351, 357
79, 500
509
561
603
18
5:30
190, 503
199
529
582
5:33
68
351
252, 678
385
304
774
144
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxi
Sneider v. Heidelberger 352
Snowhill v. Snowhill 125
Snyder v. Andrews 577
v. Bull 472
v. Fulton 579
v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 684
v. Rockport 252
Society, &c. v. Wheeler 17, 456, 462
Society for Savings v. Coite 602
Society of Scriveners v. Brooking 245
Sohier v. Massachusetts Hospital 125
v. Trinity Church 581
Solomon v. Cartersville 187
Somerset v. Stoystown Road 18.5
Somerville v. Hawkins 533
Somerville & Easton R. R. Co.
ads. Doughty 707, 709, 711
Sommersett's Case 365, 366
Sorchan v. Brooklyn 94
Sorocco v. Gear 655, 747
Sortwell v. Hughes 728
Southard v. Central R. R. Co. 472
South Carolina R. R. Co. v. Steiner
684, 687
South Ottawa v. Perkins 164, 268
Southport v. Ogden 242
Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth 68,
164
South-western R. R. Co. v. Paulk 725
South-western R. R. Co. v. Tele
graph Co. 701, 703
Southwick v. Southwick 457
Southworth v. Palmyra & Jackson
burgh R. R. Co. 171
Soutter v. Madison 358
Spangler v. Jacoby 97, 164, 171
Spangler's Case 15, 429
Sparhawk v. Salem 254
v. Sparhawk 116, 136
Sparrow v. Kingman 65
Spaulding v. Lowell 750
Spears v. State 387
Specht v. Commonwealth 595, 734
Speer v. Plank Road Co. 186
v. School Directors 277, 610
Spencer v. Board of Registration 753
v. 1) earth 59, 61
v. McMasters 529
v. State 68, 70, 185, 186
Spiller r. Woburn 586
Spooner v. McConnell 34, 36, 154
Sporrer v. Eitler 603
Spragg v. Shriver 131
Sprague r. Birdsall 496
v. Brown 79
v. Norway 779
v. Worcester 678, 679
Sprecker v. Wakeley 351, 352, 454
Spriggins v. Houghton 778
Spring v. Russell 610
Springer r. Foster 17, 360
Springfield v. Connecticut River
R. R. Co. 656, 682, 684
Springfield v. Doyle 306, 311
v. Le Claire 304,310
Springfield, &c. R. R. Co. v. Cold
Spring 267
Springfield, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hall 658
Stackhouse v. Lafayette 304
Stacy v. Vermont Central R. R.
Co. 659
St. Albans v. Bush 507
Standiford v. Wingate 337
Stanfield v. Boyer 529
Stanford v. Worn 658
Staniford v. Barry 116
Stanley, Ex parte 382
v. Colt 125
v. Stanley 725
v. Webb 559, 560, 562
Starbuck v. Murray 23, 507
Starin v. Genoa 144, 267
Starr v. Camden, &c. R. R. Co. 684,
696
v. Pease 135, 137
State v. Adams 116,320,322,311,789
401, 441, 513, 576v. Allen
v. Allmond 726
v. Alman 393, 404
v. Ambs 595, 734
v. Arlin 326
v. Ashley 205
v. Atwood 462
v. Avery 786
v. Auditor 449, 462
v. Bailey 192
v. Baker 78, 757, 758
v. Bank of South Carolina 354
v. Barbee 77, 462
v. Barker 335
v. Barnett 25
v. Barrett 420
v. Bartlett 389
v. Battle 405
v. Behimer 406
v. Beneke 142, 147, 513
v. Benham 406
v. Bernoudy 323
v. Berry 185
v. Binder 752, 781
v. Bladsdell 68
v. Bond 191, 757
v. Bonny 499
v. Boone County Court 52
v. Bostick 386
v. Bowers 178
v. Branin 232, 233
v. Brennan's Liquors 377, 513
lxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
State v. Brockman 387
v. Brooks 405
v. Brown 399
v. Brunetto 393
v. Brunst 337
v. Buchanan 31
v. Bunker 239
v. Burlington, &c. R. R. Co. 709
v. Burnett 787
v. Burnham 534, 543, 558, 579
v. Burns 399
v. Butman 567
v. Buzine 22
v. Buzzard 434
v. Cain 185
v. Callendine 404
v. Cameron 389
v. Campbell 31
v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R. R.
Co. 28, 221
v. Cardozo 226
v. Carew 357
v. Carr 312
v. Carro 25
v. Carroll 778
v. Cavers 771, 784
v. Cawood 31
v. Chambers 386
v. Chandler 589, 590, 591
v. Charleston 606, 631, 741, 784
v. Cincinnati Gas Co. 254, 493,
682, 690
v. Clark 215
v. Clarke - 242
v. Cleaves . 389
v. Clerk of Passiac 784, 786, 789
v. Click 94
v. Coleman & Maxy 440
v. Collector of Jersey City 642
v. Commissioners 185
v. Com’rs of Baltimore 215
v. Com’rs of Clinton Co. 144
v. Com’rs of Hancock 144
v. Com’rs of Ormsby Co. 109
v. Com'rs of Perry 217
v. Com’rs of School, &c.
Lands 357
v. Common Council of Mad
ison 236
v. Conner 4()4
v. Constitution 7:33
v. Cooper 406
v. Copeland 142, 151, 215
v. Corson 332
v. County Com’rs of Balti
in ore 94, 488
v. County Court 641
v. County Court of Boone 156
v. County Judge 785
State v. County Judge of Davis 175,
176
v. Covington 1:38
v. Cowan 232, 243
v. Cox 215, 395
v. Crane 5 16
v. Croteau 401
v. Crowell 582
v. Cummings 31, 323
v. Curtis 405
v. Daley 449
v. Danforth 407
v. Daniels 777
v. Dean 622
v. Demorest 278
v. Denton 396
v. Dews 337
v. Doherty 132, 139, 441, 479
v. Dombaugh. 216
v. Donehey 727
v. Donnewirth 785
v. Doron 68, 81
v. Douglass 336
v. Douseman 217
v. Draper 185, 337, 789
v. Duffy 490, 491
v. Dunning 140
v. Easterbrook 215
v. Ellis 193
r. Elwood 765, 768, 771
v. Ephraim 404, 405
v. Everett 395
v. Fagan 226
v. Felton 379
v. Ferguson 235, 236, 249, 462
v. Fetter 786
p. Field 147, 151
v. Fisher 750
v. Fiske 250
v. Fleming 116
v. Foley 734
v. Forshner 480
v. Fosdick 21
v. Framburg 303
v. Franklin Falls Co. 456
v. Freeman 244, 393, 749
r. Fry 1:36
v. Fuller 6:30
v. Garesche 322
v. Garton 603
v. Garvey 404
v. Gatzweiler :350
v. Gates 768
v. Georgia Medical Society 242
v. Gibbs 785
v. Gibson 490
v. Giles 781
v. Gleason 110
v. Goetze 760
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxiii
State v. Goldspecker 79
v. Governor 141, 784
v. Graves 251, 253, 699, 702
v. Green 404
r. Griffey 765, 770
v. Guild 386, 387, 388
v. Guiterez 210
v. Gurney 179, 513
v. Gut 179
v. Guttenberg 463
v. Guttierrez 210
v. Haben 284, 291, 614
t. Hairston 490
v. Halifax 6:38
v. Hammonton 256
r. Harris 281
v. Harrison 179, 784, 785
v. Hawthorn 345, 355
v. Hay 749
v. Hayne 617
v. Hays 226
v. Henry 403
v. Herod 246
r. Heyward 340
v. Hilmantel 757, 764, 782, 789,
-
792
v. Hitchcock 52, 156
v. Hudson Co. 142, 303, 640
v. Hufford 22
v. Hundley 380
v. Ingersoll 184
v. Jackson 278, 602
v. Jarrett 16.1
v. Jay 576
v. Jennings 232
v. Jersey City 244, 248, 250,
622, 722, 7:35
v. Johnson 95, 513, 786, 787
v. Jones (50 N. H.) 38ſ)
v. Jones (5 Ala.) 401, 403
r. Jones (21 Md.) 454
v. Jones (19 Md.) 760, 779
r. Judge, &c. 193, 788, 789
v. Judge of Co. Court 225
v. Jumel 4:34
v. Justices of Middlesex 786
v. Kanouse 399
v. Kason 405
v. Kattleman 406
v. Keith 42, 32.5
v. Kemp 398
v. Kennon , 80, 1:38
v. Kettle 406
v. King 69
v. Kinsella 182
v. Kirke 4 16
v. Kirkley 142, 238
v. Kirkwood 141
v. Klinger 380
State v. Knight 155
v. Krebs 495
v. Kruttshnitt 204
v. Lafayette Co. Court 179, 182
v. Laverack 683, 692, 694
v. Lawrence 389
v. Lean 93, 192
v. Learned 3:32
v. Lehre 526
v. Lee 406
v. Leiber 749
v. Linn Co. Court 145
v. Litchfield 375
v. Little 404
v. Lowhorne 388
v. Lyles 20.5
v. Mace 72, 81
v. Macon Co., Court 77
v. Main 155
v. Manning 332, 477
v. Mansfield 395
v. Marlow 786
v. Marler 380
v. Martin 406
v. Mathews 162,719
v. Mayhew 84, 85, 441
v. Maynard 109
v. Mayor, &c. 253, 752
v. McAdoo 323
v. McBride 40, 171
v. McCann 157, 490
v. McCracken 179, 181
v. McDaniel 783
v. McGinley 94
v. McGinnis 397
v. McNiell 144
v. Medbury 21, 498
v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 627
v. Messmore 3:37
v. Metzger 509
v. Miller 99, 179,480
v. Mills 64()
v. Milwaukee Gas Co. 493
v. Mitchell 434
v. Mobile 694, 696
v. Moſhit 141, 164, 737
v. Montclair R. Co. 69.5
. v. Morrill 394
v. Morris Co. 152
v. Morristown 235
v. Neal 41, 323, 332, 404
v. Ned 754
v. Neill 2:31
v. Nelson 404
v. Newark 179, 180, 463, 467,
. New Haven
. Newton
. New York
472, 493, 647, 741
142, 719
403
253
lxiv. TABLE OF CASES CITED.
State v. Nichols 140
v. North 641
v. Northern Central R. R.
Co. 116
v. Norwell 404, 405
v. Norwood 449, 471, 477
v. Noyes 128, 148, 150, 230,
340, 345, 656, 719, 721
v. Ober 391
v. O'Flaherty 379
v. Olin || 764, 773, 791
v. Oliver 393
v. O'Niell 149
p. Orvis 760
v. Oskins 153
v. Osawkee 266, 610
v. Parker 142, 147, 149,
641
v. Parkinson 83, 156
v. Passaic 449
v. Patterson 250, 403
v. Peace 401
v. Pendergrass 421
v. Peterson 394, 512
v. Phalen 345, 355
v. Philadelphia (500
v. Pierce 98, 765, 789
v. Pike 380
v. Platt 159, 164
v. Portage 6:35
v. Powers 176
v. Prescott 727
v. Prince 40.5
v. Pritchard 451
v. Purdy 773
v. Quarrel 395
v. Quick 393
v. Quimby 480
v. Redman 405
v. Reed 404, 434
v. Reynolds 144, 148, 398
v. Rich 200
v. Richland 462
v. Richmond 340, 431
v. Robb 778
v. Robbins 156
v. Roberts 246, 388
v. Robinson 205, 221, 396, 726,
728
v. Rockafellow 3.81
v. Rodman 784, 785
v. Rogers 98
v. Rollins 31
v. Ross 406
v. Rutledge 773
v. Ryan :3:32
v. Sauvinet 139
v. School Board Fund 193
v. Scott 144, 511
State v. Seymour 659, 700
v. Shaddle 179
v. Shattock 4:31
v. Shumpert 25
v. Silver 175, 176
v. Simonds 230
v. Simons 437, 440
v. Slack 405
v. Smith 140, 781
v. Snow 215, 374, 401
v. Spier 404, 405
v. Squires 156, 179, 182, 461,
476
v. Staley 387
v. Stanley 1:38
v. State Canvassers 784
v. Staten 78, 208, 320, 437, 440,
- 443, 451
v. Steers 784
v. Sterling 345
v. St. Joseph 781
v. St. Louis Cathedral 180
v. St. Louis Co. Court 293
v. Stone 395
v. Stumpf 779
v. Sullivan 279, 476
v. Summons 380, 381
v. Sutterfield 271
v. Swearingen 781
v. Swift 165
v. Swisher 142, 147
v. Symonds 78, 322, 754
v. Tait 398, 406
v. Tappan 257, 281, 286, 613,
614
v. Taylor 309
v. Thomas 392
v. Thompson 77
v. Tipton 394
v. Tombeckbee Bank 340, 358
v. Towle 431
v. Treasurer 185
v. Trenton 682
v. Trustees of Union 144
v. Tucker 156
v. Turner 500
v. Union 176, 463,467
v. Vaigneur 388
v. Vail 513, 781
v. Van Baumbach 336
v. Van Horne 144
v. Walker 405
v. Wallem 780
v. Wapello 267, 272
v. Warren 472, 785
v. Weir 142, 149, 151
v. Welch 244
v. Wentworth 391
v. Wheeler 215, 727
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxv.
State v. White 894, 579
v. Wilcox 142, 144, 147, 152,
231
v. Wilkesbarre 277
v. Wilkinson 401
v. Williams 78, 328, 332
v. Wilson 332
v. Wiltz 337
v. Wiseman 405
v. Woodfin 394
tº
.
Woodruff 38
v
. Wright 480
v
. Youn 176, 182, 760
State Bank v. known 18
State Freight Tax Case 606
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds 607,
623
State Tonnage Tax Cases 606
St. Charles v. Noble 623
Steamship Co. v. Jolliffe 731, 733
v
. Port Wardens 606
Stearns v. Gittings 454, 455, 456
Stebbins v. Jennings 241
Steckert v. East Saginaw 171
Steele v
. Smith 23
v
. Southwick - 529, 530
v
. Spruance 486
Stein v
. Burden 655
v
. Mobile 144, 349
Steines v
. Franklin Co. 271
Stephenson v. Osborn 352
Stetson v. Kempton 231, 274, 648
Steuart v. Baltimore 513
Stevens v. Andrews 357
v
. Middlesex Canal 672
v
. Paterson, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. 680
v
. State 380
Steward v. Jefferson 144
Stewart v. Blaine 162
v
. Griffith 125
v
. Hartman 662
v
. Kinsella 179, 182
v
.
Mechanics' and Farm
ers' Bank 515
v
. New Orleans 305
v
. Ripon 311
v
. Supervisors 145
Sticknoth's Estate 47()
Stiles v. Nokes 560, 561
Stilwell v. Kellogg 512
Stine v
.
Bennett 191
Stinson v. Smith 187
Stipp v. Brown 454
Stittinus v. United States 401
Stitzell v. Reynolds 528
St. Joseph v. Anthony 622
v
. O'Donohue 622,632
v
. Rogers 268, 269
St. Joseph, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Cal
lender 659
St. Joseph, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
County Court 78, 145
St. Joseph School Board v. Bu
chanan Co. 100
St. Louis v. Alexander 145
v
. Allen 232, 234
v
. Bentz 242, 243
v
.
Cafferata 232, 242, 243,
734
v
. Foster 98
v
. Gurno 252, 254
v
.
Oeters 637
v
. Russell 231, 232, 233,
295
v
.
Shields 156
v
. Tiefel 174, 177
v
. Weber 242, 244
St. Louis, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Clark 68
v
. Loften 342
St. Louis, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Rich
ardson 710
St. Louis, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Teters 659
St. Mary's Industrial School v.
Brown 609
Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge 240
1Stockdale v. Hansard 64
v
.
State 434
Stocking v. Hunt 350, 354, 449
v
.
State 205, 220, 401
Stockton v. Whitmore 658
Stockton, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Stock
ton 145
Stockwell v. White Lake 514
Stoddard v. Martin 774
Stoddart v. Smith 205
Stokes, In re 4:30
v
. People 3:32
v
. Scott Co. 267
Stone v
.
Basset 357
v
. Cooper 5:30
v
.
Dana 372
v
.
New York 655
Stoney v. Life Ins. Co. 268
Storey v. Eager 566
v
.
Furman 351
v
. People 394, 566
v
. Wakace 560
Storrs v. Utica 310
Story v. Challands
-
533
Stoughton v. State 740
Stout v. Hyatt 33
•
. Keyes 31
Stove v
. Charlestown 233
Stover v. People 390
Stowell v. Lord Zouch 71
St. Paul v. Coulter 249
v
. Leitz 310
lxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED.
St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. r. Gardner 512
v. Parcher 342
Strader v. Graham 34
Strahl, Ex parte 431
Strauch v. Shoemaker 463
Strauss v. Meyer 552
v. Pontiac 247
Strang, Ex parte 778
Street Railway v. Cumminsville 679,
690, 693
Streety v. Wood 542, 543
Streubel v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R.
Co. 449
Striker r. Kelley 94
Stringfellow v. State 386
Strong v. Daniel 227
v. State 326
Stroud v. Philadelphia 637, 735
Stuart v. Clark 735
v. Commonwealth 406
v. Hamilton 72
v. Kinsella 179, 182
v. Laird 82, 84
v. Warren 474
Stupp, Re 430
Sturgeon v. Hitchins 179
Sturges v. Crowninshield 24, 68, 351,
352, 353, 360, 455
v. Hull 461
Sturgis v. Spofford 477
Stuyvesant v. New York 241, 724
Sublett v. Bedwell 781
Succession of Lanzetti 178
Succession of Tanner I09
Suffolk Witches, Case of 385
Sullivan v. Adams 225
v. Oneida 245, 374, 378
Sumner v. Beeler 227
v. Hicks 17
v. Miller 449
Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. New York 174,
222
Sunbury and Erie R. R. Co. v.
Cooper 226
Sunbury and Erie R. R. Co. v.
Hummel 680
Sunderlin v. Bradstreet 5:33
Supervisors v. People 165, 177
v. United States 17
v. Wisconsin Cent. R.
R. Co. 463
Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan 174
Supervisors of Doddridge v. Stout 100,
658
Du Page v. People 779
Election 112, 122
Iroquois v. Keady 191
Jackson v. Brush 250,
271
Supervisors of Knox Co. v. Davis º78
Schuyler v. People 170,
171
Surgett v. Lapice 84
Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright 679
Susquehanna Depot v. Barry 279
Sutherland v. De Leon 448
Sutton v. Asker 448
v. Board 303
v. Tiller 661
Sutton Hospital, Case of 241
Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville 710, 711
Suydham v. Broadnax 360
Suydam v. Moore 718, 723
17, 18, 123
33, 653, 672
v. Williamson
Swan v. Williams
Swann v. Buck 98, 185
Swayze v. Hull 169
Swift v. Fletcher 351
v. Newport 623
v. Tousey 32
v. Tyson 18, 110
v. Williamsburg 237, 270
Swindel v. State 404
Swindle v. Brooks 480
Sydnor v. Palmer 116
Symonds v. Carter 530
v. Clay Co. 303
Syracuse Bank v. Davis 463, 468
T.
Tabor v. Cook 512
Taft v. Adams 337
Talbot v. Dent 145, 261
v. Hudson 220, 608, 665,
701
Talkington v. Turner 768
Tallman v. Janesville 473, 478
Tanner v. Albion 230, 749
Tarble's Case 2, 15, 429
Tarleton v. Baker 774
Tarlton v. Peggs 188
Tash v. Adams 258
Tate v. M. K. & T. R. R. Co. 254
v. Stooltzſoos 470
Tate's Executors v. Bell 205
Taunton v. Taylor 730
Tayloe, Ex parte 380
Taylor v. Chambers 58
v. Church 533
v. Commissioners of Ross
County 211, 217
v. Commonwealth 138
v. French 65
v. Hall 529
v. Marcy 700, 702
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxvii
Taylor v. McCracken 61 | Thompson r. Morgan 469, 472
v. Miles 460 v. Pacific R. R. Co. 601
v. Nashville, &c. R. R. Co. 661 v. Pittston 259, 281
v. Newberne 144 v. Reid 454
v. Place 111, 116, 132 v. Schermerhorn 250
v. Plymouth 655 v. State 503, 507
v. Porter 108, 112, 438, 442, v. Steamboat Morton 499
652, 662 v. Whitman 23
v. State 749 | Thomson v. Booneville 2.50
v. Stearns 357 Thorn v. Blanchard
-
542
v. St. Louis 252 v. Com’rs of Miami Co. 268
v. Taylor 81,752, 779, 780, Thorndyke v. Boston 756
784, 786 Thorne v. Cramer 142
v. Thompson 278 Thornington v. Smith 356
Teel v. Yancey 116 || Thornton v. McGrath 461
Teſt v. Griffin 500 v. Turner 449, 456
v. Teft 134, 491 Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington
Temple v. Mead 102, 761, 762
Ten Eyck v. D. & R. Canal 264
Tennessee, &c. R. R. Co. v. Adams 681
v. Moore 141
Tenney v. Lenz 246
Terre Haute, &c. R. R. Co. v.
McKinley 712
Terrett v. Taylor 201,212,291,335,339
Terrill v. Rankin 449
Territory v. Pyle 337
Terry v. Bright 529
v. Fellows 550, 551, 560, 561
Texas v. White 1, 8, 10, 43
Thacker v. Hawk 494
Thames Bank v. Lovell 738
Thames Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop 94,478
Tharp r. Fleming 128
Thatcher v. Powell 17
The Cherokee Tobacco 15
The Rio Grande 58
The Slave Grace 366
Thien v. Voegtlander 668
Thistle v. Frostbury Coal Co. 351
Thomas v. Board of Commission
ers 156
v. Dakin 241
v. Dunaway 5:30
v. Hubbell 61
v. Leland 285,287, 475, 476,
599, 612, 636
R. R. Co. 108, 154, 264, 342, 345,
715, 717, 722, 724
Thunder Bay, &c. Co. v. Speechly 696
Thurber v. Blackbourne 22
Thursfield v. Jones 309
Thurston v. Little 648
v. Thurston 58, 125
Tide Water Co. v. Archer 709
A v. Costar 615, 617
Tift v. Griffin 459
Tillinghast v. Carr 164
Tillman v. Arles 395
v. Shackleton 75
Tilton v. Swift 463
Tims v. State 225, 394
Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter 676
Tinsman v. Belvidere & Del. R. R.
Co. 264, 680
Tioga R. R. Co. v. Blossburg, &c.
R. R. Co. 58
Todd v. Hawkins 534
v. Kankakee, &c. R. R. Co. 711
v. Kerr 503, 504, 507
v. Rough 528
v. Troy 3.11
Toledo Bank v. Bond 342
Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Deacon 719
Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jackson
ville 345, 724
Tolen v. Tolen 503
Tomlin v. Dubuque, &c. R. R. Co. 680
Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger 681,
723
v. Owens 78
v. Richmond 267
v. Scott 193, 462
v. Steckle 649
Thomasson v. State 726
Thompson v. Alexander 462
v. Caldwell 454
v. Carr 320
v. Circuit Judge 784
v. Commonwealth 354, 388
v. Grand Gulf R. R. Co. 215
v. Lee County 145, 267,474
Tong v. Marvin 75, 447
Torrey v. Corliss 461
v. Field 553, 559
v. Milbury 92, 618
Touchard v. Touchard - 308
Tower v. Lamb 512
Towle v. Forney 125
v. Eastern Railroad 449, 461
Townsend v. Des Moines 311
lxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
136, 508
507
Townsend c. Griffin
v. Kendall
Trabue v. Mays 528
Trapley v. Hamer 351
Treat v. Lord 736, 737
Tremain v. Cohoes Co. 68()
Trevett v. Weeden 35
Trice v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. Co. 723
Trigally v. Memphis 2:31
Trombley v. Auditor-General 654
Troppman, Trial of 384
Trott v. Warren 240
Troup v. Haight 84
Troy & Boston R. R. Co. v. Lee 709
Troy & Boston R. R. Co. v. North
ern Turnpike Co. 678
Truchelot v. Charleston 474
True v. Plumley 528
Truehart v. Addicks 779
Truman v. Taylor 5:30
Trustees v. Bailev 117, 492
v. McCaughey 448, 463,46s
v. McConnel 643
Trustees of Cass v. Dillon 277
Erie Academy v. Erie 232
Paris v. Cherry 144
Schools v. Tatman 232, 233,
286, 293, 337
W. & E. Canal r. Spears 679
Trustees, &c. v. Auburn & Roch
ester R. R. Co. 264
v. Bailey 111
v. McIver 40
v. Shoemaker 144
Tucker v. Aiken 778
v. Coldwater 260
v. Harris 325
v. Magee 421
v. Virginia City 237, 260
Tucker et al., Trials of 411
Tugman v. Chicago 231, 244
Tuller, In re 462
Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedg
wick 355
Turbeville v. Stampe 715
Turley v. Logan Co. 164
Turner, Matter of 366
v. State 326
Turnpike v. Champney 777
Turnpike Co. v. People 64
v. State 482
v. Wallace 264
Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmsted 179,
182, 185
Tuttle v. Strout 179
Twombly v. Henley 61
Twitchell v. Commonwealth 25
Tyler r. Beacher 616, 662, 669, 671
v. People 155, 205
Tyler v. Tyler 64
Tyson v. School Directors 212, 259,
281, 462, 608, 6.11
Tyzee v. Commonwealth 395
U.
Uhrig v. St. Louis 630
Ullery v. Commonwealth 381
Underhill v. Welton 528, 529
Underwood, Matter of 4:30
v. Lilly 465, 470, 473
v. McVeigh 505
Union v. Durkees 254
Union Bank v. Hill 603
v. State 42
Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge 84
Union Iron Co. v. Pierce 114, 115, 477
Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. United
States 84
Union R. R. Co. v. Traube 59
United States v. Aredondo 15
v. Barney 27
v. Battiste 401
v. Benner 392
v. Brown 204
v. Callendar 415
v. Cathcart 10
v. Conway 3.54
v. Coolidge 26
v. Cox 385
v. Cruikshanks 2, 11, 14,
21, 361, 366, 433,
7 15
v. Davenport 406
v. 1)eWitt 11, 715
v. Fisher 68, 77
v. French 42S
tº
.
Gilmore 84
v
. Hamilton 381
v
. Harris 673
v
. Hoar 456
v
. Hudson 26, 394,535
v
. Jailer of Fayette 427
v
. Jones 381
v
. Lancaster 27
v
. Little 392
v
. Lyon 536
v
. Mann - 17
v
. Marigold 25
v
. Minn. &c. R. R.
Co. 699
v
. More 398
v
. Morris 401
v
. Morrison 17
v
. New Bedford
Bridge 27, 394, 740
v
. Ortega 392
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxix
United States v. Palmer 172
v. Passmore 449, 477
v. Percheman 15
v. Perez 405
v. Ragsdale 68
v. Railroad Bridge
Co. 653
v. Railroad Co. 60 |
v. Rector 429
v. Reed 658
v. Reese 13, 100, 715
v. Riley 401, 404
v. Samperyac 448
v. Tobacco Factory 15
v. Tyner 450, 477
v. Union Pacific R.
R. Co. 172
v. Wilson 27
United States Bank v. Daniel 17
v. Halstead 83
w v. Norton 15
v. Planters'
Bank 308
Universalist Society v. Providence 641
University of N. C. v. Foy 3:35
Updegraph v. Commonwealth 590, 592
Upshaw, Er parte 179, 181º v. South Reading BranchR- a--- 710
Usher v. Colchester 281
v. Severance 560, 561
Utley v. Campbell 529
V.
Van Allen v. Assessors 602
Van Alstyne v. Indiana P. & C.
R. R. Co. 61
Van Ankin v. Westfall 529
Van Arsdale v. Laverty 542
Van Baumhach p. Bade 349, 350
Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City
R. R. Co.
-
Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll 61
Van Camp r. Board of Education 494
Vance v. Little Rock 2:37
Wanderbilt c. Adams 345, 731, 747
Wanderzee v. McGregor 542, 543
Van Hagan, Ex parte 4:30
Van Hoffman r.'Quincy 358
Van Horne v. Dorrance 20.5
Van Inwagen r. Chicago 450
Wan Kleek v. Eggleston 58
Van Ness v. Hamilton 529
v. Pacard 27, 31
Van Pelt v. Davenport 254, 311
Van Rensselaer v. Ball 351, 448
v. Hays 351, 448
v. Kearney 17
Van Rensselaer v. Read 449
v. Snyder 350, 353.
354
Van Slyke v. Ins. Co. 109, 117
Van Valkenburg v. Brown 497, 753
Van Wormer v. Albany 7:30
Van Wyck v. Aspinwall 543
Wanzant v. Waddell 437, 440, 441,
492
Varich v. Smith 204, 680
Vaughan v. Seade 395
Veazie v. China 90
v. Mayo 719, 724
v. Moore 738
Veazie Bank v. Fenno 601, 604
Weeder v. Lima 238, 270
Venard v. Cross - 668
Venice v. Murdock .269
Verner v. Carson 58
Wicksburg v. Lombard 269
Victory, The 16
Vidal v. Girard’s Executors 589
Vilas v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. 705
Vincennes v. Richards 677
Vincennes University v. Indiana 33,
340
Vincent v. Nantucket 257, 259
Violett v. Violett 484
Vischer v. Vischer 502, 504
Wise v. Hamilton Co. 412
Voglesong v. State 595, 734
Voorhies, Matter of 21
Wose v. Morton 501
W.
Wabash, &c. Co. v. Beers 335
Wade v. Richmond 2:32
v. State 393
Wadleigh v. Gilman 747
Wadsworth's Adm'r v. Smith 7:36
Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co. 684,
687
Wagner v. Bissell 31
Wagoman v. Byers 528
Walcott v. Wigton 9.5
Waldo v. Portland 277
Waldron v. Rensselaer, &c. R. R.
Co. 718, 723.
Wales v. Lyon 58
v. Stetson 340, 495
v. Wales 3.51
Walker v. Caldwell 173, 185
v. Cincinnati 64, 88, 108,
145, 156, 204, 208
v. Dunham 176
v. Harbor Commissioners 17
v. Peelle 337
v. Sauvinet 13, 25
lxx TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Walker v. State 179, 416
v. Taylor 16
v. Willavaso 16
v. Whitehead 354, 355
Wall, Ex parte 101, 142, 147, 151
v. State 153
v. Trumbull 509, 511
Wallace, In re 416
v. Shelton 622, 637
Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy 437, 492
Walpole v. Elliott 210, 479
Walschlager v. Liberty 274
Walston v Commonwealth 332
Walter v. Bacon 463
v. People 332
Waltham v. Kemper 303, 304
Walther v. Warner 700, 703
Walton v. Develing 760
v. Greenwood 142
Walton's Lessee v. Bailey 470
Waltz v. Waltz 503
Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen 658
Wammack v. Holloway 786
Wantlan v. White 459
Wanzer v. Howland 511
Ward v. Brainerd 449
v. Flood 490
v. Maryland 20, 21, 603, 604,
606, 607
v. Morris 607
v. New England, &c. Co. 125
v. State 388
v. Warner 736
Wardlaw v. Buzzard 455
Ware v. Hylton 8, 15
v. Little 649
Warickshall's Case 388
Waring v. Jackson 17
Warner v. Grand Haven 637
v. Paine 552, 556
v. People 79, 336
v. Scott 58
v. State 401
v. Trow 59
Warren v. Charlestown 215, 217
v. Commonwealth 3:32
v. Glynn 512
v. Henley 633, 635, 639
v. Lyons City 292
v. McCarthy 22
v. Paul 60;3
v. Sherman 71
v. State 401
v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. 653,
673
Warren Manuf. Co. v. AEtna Ins. Co. 21
Wartman v. Philadelphia 750
Warwick v. Underwood 59
Washburn v. Cooke 534
|
Washburn v. Franklin 450, 469
Washington v. Meigs 748
v. Murray 98, 183
v. Nashville 734, 735
v. Page 84
Washington Avenue 608, 620, 622,
632, 635
Washington Bridge Co. v. State 719,
721
Washington Co. v. Berwick 277
v. Franklin R. R.
Co. 176
Washington Ins. Co. v. Price 514, º;
51
Washington University v. Rouse 342
Wason v. Walter 523, 550, 551,
561
Waters v. Leech 244
Watertown v. Mayo 730, 748, 749
Watertown Bank, &c. v. Mix 513
Waterville v. County Commission
ers 283, 285
v. Kennebeck Co. 234
Water Works Co. v. Burkhart 185,652,
671, 673, 690, 699
Watkins, Er parte 430, 431
ºx. #. 461
v. Holman's Lessee 125
v. Walker Co. 655
Watson v. Avery 581
v. Farris 582
v. Jones 581, 582
v. McCarthy 529
v. Mercer 325, 469, 470, 476
v. New York Cent. R. R.
Co. 351, 352
v. Thurber 75
Watts v. Greenlee 530
v. State 383
Way v. Lewis 58
v. Way 72
Wayman v. Southard 110
Weaver v. Cherry 260
v. Lapsley 99, 116, 179, 182
Webb v. Baird 412,494
v. Den 457, 458
Weber v. Donnelly 728
v. Harbor Commissioners 653
v. Morris 59
v. Reinhard 204, 631
Webster v. French 94
v. Harwinton 229, 231, 274
v. Reid 507, 509
v. Rose 358
Webster, Professor, Trial of 403
Wecherley v. Guyer 77
Weckler v. Chicago 699
Weed v. Donovan 463
v. Foster 530
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxxi
Weeks v. Milwaukee 232, 478, 614,
622,627, 633, 637, 641, 645, 748
Weet v. Brockport 304, 305
Wegmann v. Jefferson 252, 254
Weightman v. Washington 254, 303,
304
Weimer v. Bunbury 205
Weir v. Cram 216
Weise v. Smith 736, 737
Weismer v. Douglas 266, 610
Weiss v. Whittemore 529
11, 210, 221, 278,
279, 465, 476, 599
Weister v. Hade
Welborn v. Aikin 355
Welch v. Stowell 728
v. Sykes 23
v. Wadsworth 359, 450, 464,
469
Welker v. Potter 156
Wellington, Petitioner 200, 215, 220,
Wells v. Bain 39, 41
v. Burbank 647
v. McClenning 59
v. Scott 512
v. Somerset, &c. R. R. Co. 655
v. Weston 479
Welman, In re 190
Wendel v. Durbin 93
Wenzler v. People 178
West v. Bancroft 692
v. Sansom 354
West Branch, &c. Canal Co. v.
Mulliner 677
Westbrook v. Dearin 168
Western College v. Cleveland 254,
308
Western Fund Savings Society v.
Philadelphia - 309
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Mayer 509
Westervelt v. Gregg 440, 447, 448,
449
v. Lewis 23
Westfall v. Preston 649
Weston v. Charleston 24, 601, 602
v. Foster 697
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix 343,
656
West Virginia Trans. Co. v. Vol
canic Oil Co. 658, 660, 666
West Wisconsin R. Co. v. Super
visor of Trempeleau Co.
Wetherell v. Stillman
Weymouth & Braintree Fire Com’rs
v. County Com’rs 232, 234, 293
Whalin v. Macomb 94
342
23
Wheat v. Ragsdale 789
Wheaton v. Peters 27, 31
Wheeler v. Chicago 92
Wheeler v. Chubbuck 190, 191
v. Cincinnati 254
v. Patterson 777
v. Rochester, &c. R. R.
Co. 698
v. Shields 567
v. Spencer 774
v. State 178, 396
v. Wall 206
Wheeling Bridge Case 737, 740
Wheelock v. Young 655
Wheelock’s Election Case 779
Whipley v. McCune 779
Whipple v. Farrar 448
Whitcomb's Case 394
White, Er parte 22
v. Buchanan 499, 500
v. Carroll 552
v. Charleston 655
v. Clark 662
v. Com’rs of Norfolk Co. 711
v. Flynn 459
v. Hart 42, 350
v. Kendrick 440
v. Kent 749
v. The Mayor 244
v. Nashville, &c. R. R. Co. 700
v. Nichols 533
v. Scott 199
v. Stamford 207, 260
v. Tallman 249
v. White 134, 465, 662
v. Yazoo City 252
v. Zane 75
Whitebread v. The Queen 408
Whited v. Lewis 179
Whitehouse v. Androscoggin R. R.
Co. 712
Whitehurst v. Cohen 505
v. Rogers 58
Whiteley v. Adams 533
Whiteman's Ex’rs v. Wilmington,
&c. R. R. Co. 672
White Mountains R. R. Co. v.
White Mountains R. R. Co. of
N. H. 473
White River Turnpike Co. v. Cen
tral R. R. Co. 656, 672
White School House v. Post 448
Whitfield v. Longest 734
Whiting v. Barney 413
v. Earle 420
v. Mt. Pleasant 176
Whitley v. State 393
Whitman v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. 711
v. Hapgood 461
Whitney v. Allen 542
v. Richardson 486
v. Stow 233
lxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Whitson v. Franklin 722
Whittaker v. Johnson Co. 58
Whittemore v. Weiss 579
Whittier v. Wendall 22
Whittingham v. Bowen 662
Whittington v. Polk 57, 194,
205
Whyte v. Nashville 250
Wick v. The Samuel Strong 17
Wider v. East St. Louis
Wier v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co.
Wilbraham v. Ludlow 755
Wilby v. Elston 529
Wilcox v. Deer Lodge Co. 287
v. Jackson - 17
v. Kassick 23, 509
v. Wilcox 503
Wild v. Deig 662
Wilder v. Case 59
v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co. 722
Wildes v. Van Voorhies 446
Wildey v. Collier 166
Wiley v. Flournoy 93
v. Parmer 606
Wilkes v. Wood 376
Wilkes's Case 368
Wilkins v. Miller 178
Wilkinson v. Cheatham 480, 481
v. Leland 112, 125, 128,
201, 212
Willar v. Baltimore 450
Willard v. Harvey 462
v. Killingworth 231, 246
v. Longstreet 355
v. People 215, 218
v. Presbury 6:32
Willcox v. Kassick 23, 509
Willey v. Belfast 3.11
Williams v. Augusta 748
v. Bank of Michigan 33
v. Bidleman 156
v. Bryant 5:30
v. Commonwealth 385, 404
v. Davidson 236, 237
v. Detroit 100, 205, 620,
621, 632, 636
v. Haines 351
v. Ilill 5:30
v. Johnson 462
v. Kirkland 17
v. Natural Bridge Plank
R. Co. 683
v. N. Y. Central R. R.
Co. 684, 696
v. Newport 336, 337
v. Norris 15
v. Oliver 16
v. Payson 179, 215
v. People 178
Williams v. School District 94, 610,
642, 665
v. State 179
v. Stein 762
v. Wickerman 661
Williamson v. Carlton 200
v. Suydam 123
v. Williamson 125
Willis v. Owen 65, 142
Williston v. Colkett 463
Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid 342
Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co. 605, 664, 672, 737,
740
v. Collins 552
v. Crockett 661
v. Fitch 551
v. Franklin 661
v. Hardesty 469
v. Jackson 22
v. McKenna 451, 459
v. New York 641, 677
v. Noonan 579
v. Ohio, &c. R. R. Co. 325
v. People 408
v. Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. 711
v. Runyan 529
v. Simonton 513
v. State 4.17
v. Supervisors of Sutter 640
Wilson's Case 426
Winbigler v. Los Angelos 3.11
Winchell v. State 393
Winchester v. Ayres 501
Windham v. Portland 233
Wingate v. Sluder 599
Winona, &c. R. R. Co. v. Denman 711
v. Waldron 709,
722
Winsor v. The Queen 405
Winslow, Ex parte 430
v. Grindall 58
Winter v. Jones 3.48
Wires v. Farr 454
Wirth v. Wilmington 242
Wisconsin River Turnp. Co. v.
Lyons 34
Wisners v. Monroe 179
Witham v. Osborn 662
Withers v. State 4 16
Withington v. Corey 486
Witmer v. Schlatter 58
Witt v. State 393
Woart v. Winnick 325, 326, 454, 462
Wolcott v. People 606
v. Rickey 420
v. Wigton 71
Wolcott Manuf. Co. v. Upham 667
Wolfe v. Covington, &c. R. R. Co. 684
TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxxiii
Wood v. Brooklyn 242
v. Fort 190
v. Kennedy 469
v. McCann 167, 169
v. ltandall 512
v. Stephen 61
v. Watkinson 22
Wood's Appeal 41
Woodbridge v. Detroit 621, 633, 699,
7:35
Woodburn v. Manuf. Co. 34, 740
Woodbury v. Grimes
v. Thompson 529, 530
Woodcock v. Bennett
Woodſall's Case 572
Woodfolk v. Nashville R. R. Co. 711
Woodhull v. Wagner 360
Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett 748
Woodruff v. Fisher 6:36
v. Neal 681
v. Parham 605
v. Scruggs 450, 469
v. Trapnall 19, 348
Woodson v. Murdock 103, 176
Woodward r. Landor 542, 543
v. Worcester 311
Woodworth v. Spring 507
v. Tremere 22
Woolsey v. Commercial Bank 227
Worcester v. Norwich, &c. R. R.
Co. 340
Work v. State 395, 500
Worth v. Butler 530
Worthy v. Commissioners 16
Wray, Ex parte 381
v. Pittsburg 621, 632
Wreford v. The People 245, 248
Wright v. Boston 631, 637
v. Carter 683
v. Chicago 621
v. Cradlebaugh 459
v. DeFrees 226, 227
v. Dunham 458
v. Hawkins 450, 472
v. Le Claire 58
v. Lindsay 528
Wright v. Oakley 454
v. State 404, 405
v. Woodgate 533
v. Wright 136
Wroth v. Johnson 774
Wyatt v. Buell 552
Wynne, In re 190
Wynehamer v. People 109, 204, 207,
209, 439, 441, 453, 715, 727, 728, 7.30
Y.
Yale, Er parte 322
Yancy v. Yancy 205, 454
Yates v. Lansing 394
v. Milwaukee 680
v. People 377
v. Yates 503
Yeaker v. Yeaker 15
Yeatman v. Crandell 622, 637, 741
Yeazel v. Alexander 748
York v. Pease 553
Yost v. Stout 661
Yost's Report 463
Young v. Beardsley 460
v. Black 58
v. Commissioners, &c. 303
v. Harrison 699
v. McKenzie 662
v. Miller 528
v. State Bank 116
Youngblood v. Sexton 231, 284, 729
Z.
Zabriske v. R. R. Co. 145, 270
Zanesville v. Auditor of Muskingum 643
Zeiler v. Chapman 7.58
Zersweiss v. James 590
Zimmermann v. Union Canal Co. 676,
738, 740
Zitske v. Goldberg 2:33
Zottman v. San Francisco 259
Zumhoff v. State 727
Zylstra's Case 440

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
C H A P T E R I.
DEFINITIONS.
A STATE is a body politic, or society of men, united together
fo
r
the purpose o
f promoting their mutual safety and advantage
b
y
the joint efforts o
f
their combined strength." The terms
nation and State are frequently employed, not only in the law o
f
nations, but in common parlance, as importing the same thing; *
but the term nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and
while a single State may embrace different nations o
r peoples, a
single nation will sometimes be so divided politically as to consti
tute several States.
In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the
several members o
f
the American Union, while the word nation
is applied to the whole body o
f
the people embraced within the
jurisdiction o
f
the federal government.
Sovereignty, a
s applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute,
uncontrollable power b
y
which any State is governed.” A State
is called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within
itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number o
f
* Wattel, b
. 1
,
c. 1
,
§ 1
; Story on
Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt.
1
,
c. 2
,
§ 2
;
Halleck, Int. Law, 63;
Bouv. Law Dict. “State.” “A mul
titude o
f people united together b
y
a
communion o
f interest, and b
y
com
mon laws, to which they submit with
one accord.” Burlamaqui, Politic
Law, c. 5. See Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 Dall. 457; Georgia v. Stanton, 6
Wall. 65.
* Thompson, J., in Cherokee Na
tion v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 52; Chase, Ch.
J., in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 720;
Wattel, supra.
* Story on Const. § 207; 1 Black.
Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1
,
c.
2
,
§ 5
;
Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64;
Austin, Province o
f Jurisprudence,
Lec. VI. : Chipman on Government,
137. “The right of commanding
finally in civil society.” Burlamaqui,
Politic Law, c. 5.
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individuals, or in the whole body of the people." In the view of
- international law, all sovereign States are and must be
[*2] equal in rights, * because from the very definition of
sovereign State, it is impossible that there should be, in
respect to it
,
any political superior.
The sovereignty o
f
a State commonly extends to all the sub
jects o
f government within the territorial limits occupied b
y
the
associated people who compose it; and, except upon the high
seas, which belong equally to a
ll men, like the air, and no part o
f
which can rightfully be appropriated b
y
any nation,” the dividing
line between sovereignties is usually a territorial line. In Amer
ican constitutional law, however, there is a division o
f
the powers
o
f sovereignty between the national and State governments by
subjects: the former being possessed o
f supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power over certain subjects throughout all the
States and Territories, while the States have the like complete
power, within their respective territorial limits, over other sub
jects.” In regard to certain other subjects, the States possess
powers o
f regulation which are not sovereign powers, inasmuch
a
s they are liable to be controlled, o
r for the time being to become
altogether dormant b
y
the exercise o
f
a superior power vested in
the general government in respect to the same subjects.
A constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of
a State, containing the principles upon which the government is
founded, regulating the division o
f
the sovereign powers, and
directing to what persons each o
f
these powers is to be confided,
and the manner in which it is to be exercised.* Perhaps an
* Wattel, b. 1
,
c. 1
,
§ 2
;
Story o
n
Const. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65.
In other words, when it is an inde
pendent State. Chipman on Govern
ment, 137.
* Wattel, b
. 1, c. 23, § 281; Wheat.
Int. Law, pt. 2
,
c 4
,
§ 10.
* McLean, J., in License Cases, 5
How. 588. “The powers of the gen
eral government and o
f
the State,
although both exist and are exercised
within the same territorial limits, are
yet separate and distinct sovereignties,
acting separately and independently
o
f
each other, within their respective
spheres. And the sphere of action
appropriated to the United States is
a
s far beyond the reach o
f
the judicial
process issued by a State judge o
r
a
State court, as if the line of division
was traced b
y
landmarks and monu
ments visible to the eye.” Taney,
Ch. J., in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How.
516. See Tarble's Case, 13 Wall.
406. That the general division o
f
powers between the federal and State
governments has not been disturbed
b
y
the new amendments to the federal
Constitution, see United States v.
Cruikshanks, 92 U
.
S
. Rep. 542.
* 1 Bouv. Inst. 9
;
Duer, Const.
Juris. 26. “By the constitution of
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equally complete and accurate definition would be, that body of
rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sover
eignty are habitually exercised.
In a much qualified and very imperfect sense every State may
be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading
principle has prevailed in the administration of its government,
until it has become an understood part of its system, to
which obedience * is expected and habitually yielded; [* 3]
like the hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the
custom of choosing the chieftain by the body of the people which
prevails among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitu
tional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules
or maxims not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or
bodies designated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also
define the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights,
and shield them against the assumption of arbitrary power." The
number of these is not great, and the protection they afford to
individual rights is far from being uniform.”
In American constitutional law, the word constitution is used
in a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed
upon by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as
the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and
officers of the government, in respect to all the points covered by
it
,
which must control until it shall be changed b
y
the authority
which established it
,
and in opposition to which any act or regu
lation o
f any such department or officer, o
r
even o
f
the people
themselves, will be altogether void.
a State I mean the body of those
written or unwritten fundamental
laws which regulate the most impor
tant rights o
f
the higher magistrates
and the most essential privileges o
f
the
subjects.” Mackintosh on the Study
of the Law of Nature and Nations.
* Calhoun’s Disquisition on Gov
ernment, Works, I. p
.
11.
* Absolute monarchs, under a
pressure o
f necessity, o
r
to win the
favor o
f
their people, sometimes grant
them what is called a constitution;
but this, so long as the power o
f
the
monarch is recognized as supreme,
can b
e
no more than his promise that
he will observe its provisions, and
conduct the government accordingly.
The mere grant o
f
a constitution does
not make the government a constitu
tional government, until the monarch
is deprived o
f power to set it aside at
will. The grant of Magna Charta
did not make the English a constitu
tional monarchy; it was only after
repeated violations and confirmations
o
f
that instrument, and when a fur
ther disregard o
f
its provisions had
become dangerous to the Crown, that
fundamental rights could be said to
have constitutional guaranties, and
the government to be constitutional.
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The term unconstitutional law must vary in it
s meaning in dif
ferent States, according a
s
the powers o
f sovereignty are o
r
are
not possessed b
y
the individual o
r body which exercises the pow
ers o
f ordinary legislation. Where the law-making department
o
f
a State is restricted in it
s powers b
y
a written fundamental
law, as in the American States, we understand by unconstitu
tional law one which, being opposed to the fundamental law, is
therefore in excess o
f legislative authority, and void. Indeed,
the term unconstitutional law, as employed in American jurispru
dence, is a misnomer, and implies a contradiction; that enactment
which is opposed to the constitution being in fact no law a
t
all.
But where, b
y
the theory o
f
the government, the exercise o
f
complete sovereignty is vested in the same individual or body
which enacts the ordinary laws, any law, being an exercise o
f
power b
y
the sovereign authority, must be obligatory, and, if it
varies from or conflicts with any existing constitutional principle,
must have the effect to modify o
r abrogate such principle, instead
o
f being nullified b
y
it
.
This must be so in Great Britain with
every law not in harmony with pre-existing constitutional princi
ples; since, by the theory o
f
it
s government, Parliament exercises
sovereign authority, and may even change the Constitu
[*4] tion * at any time, as in many instances it has done, by
declaring it
s
will to that effect." And when thus the
power to control and modify the constitution resides in the ordi
nary law-making power o
f
the State, the term unconstitutional law
can mean n
o
more than this: a law which, being opposed to the
settled maxims upon which the government has habitually been
conducted, ought not to be, o
r
to have been, adopted.” It follows,
therefore, that in Great Britain constitutional questions are for the
most part to be discussed before the people or the Parliament,
since the declared will o
f
the Parliament is the final law; but in
America, after a constitutional question has been passed upon
b
y
the legislature, there is generally a right o
f appeal to the
courts when it is attempted to put the will o
f
the legislature in
* 1 Black. Com. 161 ; De Tocque- illustrations to show that in England,
ville, Democracy in America, c. 6
;
and indeed under most governments,
Broom, Const. Law, 795. a rule prescribed by the law-making
* Mr. Austin, in his Province o
f authority may be unconstitutional,
Jurisprudence, Lec. VI., explains and and yet legal and obligatory.
enlarges upon this idea, and gives
CH. I.
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force. For the will o
f
the people, as declared in the Constitu
tion, is the final law; and the will of the legislature is only law
when it is in harmony with, or at least is not opposed to, that
controlling instrument which governs the legislative body equally
with the private citizen."
* See Chapter VII. post.
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[*5] * CHAPTER II.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
THE government of the United States is the existing repre
sentative of the national government which has always in some
form existed over the American States. Before the Revolution,
the powers of government, which were exercised over a
ll
the
colonies in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the
Crown o
f
Great Britain o
r
to the Parliament; but the extent o
f
those powers, and how far vested in the Crown and how far in
the Parliament, were questions never definitely settled, and which
constituted subjects o
f dispute between the mother country and
the people o
f
the colonies, finally resulting in hostilities." That
the power over peace and war, the general direction o
f
commer
cial intercourse with other nations, and the general control o
f
such subjects as fall within the province o
f
international law,
were vested in the home government, and that the colonies were
not, therefore, sovereign States in the full and proper sense o
f
that term, were propositions never seriously disputed in America,
and indeed were often formally conceded; and the disputes
related to questions as to what were o
r
were not matters o
f inter
nal regulation, the control o
f
which the colonists insisted should
b
e left exclusively to themselves.
Besides the ti
e uniting the several colonies through the Crown
o
f
Great Britain, there had always been a strong tendency to a
more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances o
f
danger threatened them ; and this tendency led to the New Eng
land Confederacy o
f 1643, to the temporary Congress o
f 1690, to
the plan o
f
union agreed upon in Convention o
f 1754, but rejected
b
y
the Colonies as well as the Crown, to the Stamp Act Con
1 1 Pitkin's Hist. U
.
S
.
c. 6
;
Life o
f 1765; Ramsay's Revolution in
and Works o
f John Adams, Vol. I.
pp. 122, 161; Vol. II
.
p
. 311; Works
o
f Jefferson, Vol. IX. p
. 294; 2
Marshall's Washington, c. 2
;
Decla
ration o
f Rights b
y
Colonial Congress
South Carolina, pp. 6–11; 5 Ban
croft's U. S. c. 18; 1 Webster's
Works, 128; Von Holst, Const. Hist.
c. 1
;
Story on Const. § 183 et seq.
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gress of 1765, and finally to the Continental Congress of 1774.
When the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual
war, the Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of
external control which before had been conceded to the
Crown or to the * Parliament, together with such other [*6]
powers of sovereignty as it seemed essential a general
government should exercise, and thus became the national gov
ernment of the United Colonies. By this body, war was con
ducted, independence declared, treaties formed, and admiralty
jurisdiction exercised. It is evident, therefore, that the States,
though declared to be “sovereign and independent,” were never
strictly so in their individual character, but that they were
always, in respect to the higher powers of sovereignty, subject to
the control of a central authority, and were never separately
known as members of the family of nations."
* “All the country now possessed
by the United States was [prior to the
Revolution] a part of the dominions
appertaining to the Crown of Great
Britain. Every acre of land in this
country was then held, mediately or
immediately, by grants from that
Crown. All the people of this country
were then subjects of the King of
Great Britain, and owed allegiance to
him; and al
l
the civil authority then
existing o
r
exercised here flowed from
the head o
f
the British empire. They
were in a strict sense fellow-subjects,
and in a variety o
f respects one peo
ple. When the Revolution com
menced, the patriots did not assert
that only the same affinity and social
connection subsisted between the peo
ple o
f
the colonies, which subsisted
between the people o
f Gaul, Britain,
and Spain while Roman provinces,
namely, only that affinity and social
connection which result from the mere
circumstance o
f being governed by
one prince ; different ideas prevailed,
and gave occasion to the Congress o
f
1774 and 1775.
“The Revolution, or rather the
Declaration o
f Independence, found
the people already united for general
The Declaration
purposes, and a
t
the same time pro
viding for their more domestic con
cerns by State conventions and other
temporary arrangements. From the
Crown of Great Britain the sover
eignty o
f
their country passed to the
people o
f it; and it was not then an
uncommon opinion that the unappro
priated lands which belonged to the
Crown passed, not to the people o
f
the colony or State within whose
limits they were situated, but to the
whole people. On whatever princi
ples this opinion rested, it did not give
way to the other, and thirteen sover
eignties were considered as emerged
from the principles o
f
the Revolution,
combined with local convenience and
considerations; the people, neverthe
less, continued to consider themselves,
in a national point o
f view, as one
people; and they continued without
interruption to manage their national
concerns accordingly. Afterwards,
in the hurry o
f
the war, and in the
warmth o
f
mutual confidence, they
made a confederation of the States
the basis o
f
a general government.
Experience disappointed the expecta
tions they had formed from it
;
and
then the people, in their collective
8 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. II
.
o
f Independence made them sovereign and independent States,
by altogether abolishing the foreign jurisdiction, and substituting
a national government o
f
their own creation.
But while national powers were assumed b
y
and con
[*7] ceded to " the Congress of 1775–76, that body was never
theless strictly revolutionary in its character, and, like all
revolutionary bodies, its authority was undefined, and could be
limited only, first, b
y
instructions to individual delegates b
y
the
States choosing them; second, b
y
the will o
f
the Congress; and
third, by the power to enforce that will." As in the latter par
ticular it was essentially feeble, the necessity for a clear specifi
cation o
f powers which should be exercised b
y
the national
government became speedily apparent, and led to the adoption o
f
the Articles of Confederation. But those articles did not concede
the full measure o
f power essential to the efficiency o
f
a national
government a
t home, the enforcement o
f respect abroad, o
r
the
preservation o
f
the public faith or public credit; and the difficul
ties experienced induced the election o
f delegates to the Consti
tutional Convention held in 1787, b
y
which a constitution was
formed which was put into operation in 1789. As much larger
powers were vested b
y
this instrument in the general government
than had ever been exercised in this country, b
y
either the
Crown, the Parliament, o
r
the Revolutionary Congress, and
larger than those conceded to the Congress under the Articles o
f
Confederation, the assent o
f
the people o
f
the several States was
essential to its acceptance, and a provision was inserted
[* 8] in the Constitution that the ratification * of the conven
tions of nine States should be sufficient for the establish
ment o
f
the Constitution between the States so ratifying the
same. In fact, the Constitution was ratified b
y
conventions o
f
delegates chosen b
y
the people in eleven o
f
the States, before the
new government was organized under it; and the remaining two,
capacity, established the present Con
stitution.” Per Jay, Ch. J., in Chis
holm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 470. See this
point forcibly put and elaborated by
Mr. A. J. Dallas, in his Life and
Writings, by G
.
M. Dallas, 200–207.
Also in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 724.
Professor Von Holst, in his Constitu
tional History o
f
the United States,
c. 1
,
presents the same view clearly
and fully.
1 See remarks o
f Iredell, J., in
Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm'r, 3 Dall.
91, and o
f Blair, J., in the same case,
p
.
111. The true doctrine on this
subject is very clearly explained by
Chase, J., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall.
231.
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North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their refusal to accept, and
by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were ex
cluded altogether from that national jurisdiction which before
had embraced them. This exclusion was not warranted by any
thing contained in the Articles of Confederation, which purported
to be articles of “perpetual union; ” and the action of the eleven
States in making radical revision of the Constitution, and exclud
ing their associates for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary
in character," and only to be defended on the same ground of .
necessity on which all revolutionary action is justified, and which
in this case was the absolute need, fully demonstrated by experi
ence, of a more efficient general government.”
1 Mr. Van Buren has said of it
that it was “an heroic, though per
haps a lawless act.” Political Parties,
p. 50.
* “Two questions of a very delicate
nature present themselves on this oc
casion: 1. On what principle the con
federation, which stands in the form
of a solemn compact among the
States, can be superseded without the
unanimous consent of the parties to
it; 2. What relation is to subsist
between the nine or more States, rat
ifying the Constitution, and the re.
maining few who do not become
parties to it
.
The first question is
answered a
t
once by recurring to the
absolute necessity o
f
the case; to
the great principle o
f self-preserva
tion; to the transcendent law of
nature and o
f
nature's God, which
declares that the safety and happi
ness o
f society are the objects at
which all political institutions aim,
and to which all such institutions
must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an
answer may be found without search
ing beyond the principles o
f
the com
pact itself. It has been heretofore
noted, among the defects o
f
the con
federation, that in many o
f
the States
it had received no higher sanction
than a mere legislative ratification.
The principle o
f reciprocality seems
to require that it
s obligation on the
other States should be reduced to the
same standard. A compact between
independent sovereigns, founded on
acts o
f legislative authority, can pre
tend to no higher validity than a
league o
r treaty between the parties.
It is an established doctrine on the
subject o
f treaties, that all of the
articles are mutually conditions o
f
each other; that a breach o
f any one
article is a breach of the whole
treaty; and that a breach committed
by either o
f
the parties absolves the
others, and authorizes them, if they
please, to pronounce the compact vio
lated and void. Should it unhappily
b
e necessary to appeal to these deli
cate truths for a justification for dis
pensing with the consent o
f particular
States to a dissolution of the federal
pact, will not the complaining parties
find it a difficult task to answer the
multiplied and important infractions
with which they may be confronted?
The time has been when it was in
cumbent on us all to veil the ideas
which this paragraph exhibits. The
scene is now changed, and with it the
part which the same motives dictate.
The second question is not less deli
cate, and the flattering prospect o
f
its
being merely hypothetical forbids an
over-curious discussion o
f
it. It is
one of those cases which must be left
to provide for itself. In general it
10 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. II
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* Left at liberty now to assume complete powers o
f
sovereignty as independent governments, these two States
saw fi
t
soon to resume their place in the American family, under
a permission contained in the Constitution ; and new States have
since been added from time to time, all o
f them, with a single
exception, organized b
y
the consent o
f
the general government
and embracing territory previously under its control. The ex
ception was Texas, which had previously been an independent
sovereign State, but which, b
y
the conjoint action o
f
it
s govern
ment and that o
f
the United States, was received into the Union
o
n
a
n equal footing with the other States.
Without therefore discussing, or even designing to allude to
any abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power
o
f
the several States a
t
the time o
f forming the present Constitu
tion," it may be said of them generally that they have at al
l
times
been subject to some common national government, which has
exercised control over the subjects o
f
war and peace, and other
matters pertaining to external sovereignty; and that when the
only three States which ever exercised complete sovereignty
accepted the Constitution and came into the Union, on an equal
footing with all the other States, they thereby accepted the same
relative position to the general government, and divested them
selves permanently o
f
those national powers which the others had
never exercised. And the assent once given to the Union was
irrevocable. “The Constitution in al
l
it
s provisions looks to an
indestructible Union composed o
f
indestructible States.””
The government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers ; the national Constitution being the instrument which
specifies them, and in which authority should be found for the
exercise o
f any power which the national government assumes
may be observed, that although no
political relation can subsist between
the assenting and dissenting States,
yet the moral relations will remain
uncancelled. The claims o
f justice,
both on one side and on the other,
will be in force and must be fulfilled;
the rights o
f humanity must in all
cases b
e duly and mutually respected;
whilst considerations of a common
interest, and above all the remem
brance o
f
the endearing scenes which
are past, and the anticipation o
f a
speedy triumph over the obstacles to
reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in
vain moderation on one side, and pru
dence on the other.” Federalist, No.
4
3 (by Madison).
* See this subject discussed in Gib
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
* Chase, Ch. J., in Texas v. White,
7 Wall. 700, 725. See United States
v
. Cathcart, 1 Bond, 556.
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to possess." In this respect it differs from the consti
tutions of the * several States, which are not grants of [*10]
powers to the States, but which apportion and impose
restrictions upon the powers which the States inherently possess.
The general purpose of the Constitution of the United States is
declared by it
s
founders to be, “to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings o
f liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” To accom
plish these purposes, the Congress is empowered b
y
the eighth
section of article one : — - -
1
. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare o
f
the United States. But a
ll duties, imposts, and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.
2
. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
3
. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.
4
. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject o
f bankruptcy, throughout the United
States. -
5
. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin, and fix the standard o
f weights and measures.
6
. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securi
ties and current coin of the United States.
7
. To establish post-offices and post-roads.
8
. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
United States v.* “The government of the United
States can claim no powers which are
not granted to it by the Constitution;
and the powers actually granted must
b
e
such a
s
are expressly given, o
r
given by necessary implication.”
Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 326.
“This instrument contains an enu
meration o
f
the powers expressly
granted by the people to their gov
ernment.” Marshall, Ch. J., in Gib
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 187. See
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Briscoe
r. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257;
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713;
Cruikshanks, 92
U
.
S
. Rep. 542, 550, 551, per Waite,
Ch. J.; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn.
St. 477. The tenth amendment to
the Constitution provides that “the
powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor pro
hibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, o
r
to the
people.” No power is conferred by
the Constitution upon Congress to
establish mere police regulations
within the States. United States v.
Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41. See Live Stock,
&c. Association v. Crescent City, &c.
Co., 16 Wall. 36.
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securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.
9
. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high
seas, and offences against the law o
f
nations.
10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures o
n land and water.
11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.
12. To provide and maintain a navy.
13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.
[*11] * 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute
the laws o
f
the nation, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.
15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part o
f
them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States re
spectively the appointment o
f
the officers, and the authority o
f
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by ces
sion o
f particular States, and the acceptance o
f Congress, become
the seat o
f government o
f
the United States; and to exercise like
authority over a
ll places purchased by the consent o
f
the legis
lature o
f
the State in which the same shall be, for the erection o
f
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.
17. To make al
l
laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested b
y
the Constitution in the government o
f
the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Congress is also empowered b
y
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same b
y
appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, throughout the United States and all places subject to
their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several ob
jects. 1. It declares al
l
persons born o
r
naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens o
f
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the United States and of the State wherein they reside; and it
forbids any State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or
to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, or to deny to any person within it
s jurisdiction the
equal protection o
f
the laws. 2. It provides that when the right
to vote a
t any election for the choice o
f
electors for President o
r
Vice-President o
f
the United States, representatives in Congress,
the executive and judicial officers o
f
a State, o
r
the members o
f
the legislature thereof, is denied to any o
f
the male inhabitants
o
f
such State, being twenty-one years o
f age, and citizens o
f
the
United States, or is in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion o
r
other crime, the basis o
f congressional representa
tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number
of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citi
zens twenty-one years o
f age in such State. 3. It disqualifies
from holding Federal o
r
State offices certain persons who shall
have engaged in insurrection o
r
rebellion against the United
States, o
r given aid o
r
comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It
declares the inviolability o
f
the public debt o
f
the United States,
and forbids the United States or any State assuming or paying
any debt o
r obligation incurred in aid o
f
insurrection o
r
rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipa
tion o
f any slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that the
right o
f
citizens o
f
the United States to vote shall not be denied
o
r abridged b
y
the United States or b
y
any State, on account o
f
race, color, o
r previous condition o
f
servitude."
* See, a
s
to these amendments,
Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 46, 47,48,
and App. to Vol. II
.
The new amend
ments d
o not enlarge the privilege o
f
suffrage so as to entitle women to
vote. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall.
130; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
162. They do not entitle persons as
o
f right to sell intoxicating drinks
against the prohibitions o
f
State laws.
Barbemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129.
They are not violated b
y
the grant by
a State, under its police power, o
f
a
n
exclusive right for a term o
f years to
have and maintain slaughter-houses,
landings for cattle, and yards for in
closing cattle intended for slaughter,
within certain specified parishes: Live
Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent
City,’ &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36; nor by
denying the right o
f jury trial in
State courts: Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U. S. Rep. 90. Since these amend
ments, as before, sovereignty for the
protection o
f
life and personal liberty
within the respective States rests
alone with the States, and the United
States cannot take cognizance o
f inva
sions o
f
the privilege o
f suffrage when
race, color, o
r previous condition o
f
suffrage is not the ground thereof.
United States v. Reese, 92 U
.
S
. Rep.
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The executive power is vested in a president, who is made
commander-in-chief o
f
the army and navy, and o
f
the militia o
f
the several States when called into the service of the United
States; and who has power, by and with the consent o
f
the Sen
ate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds o
f
the Senate concur,
and, with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors
and other public ministers and consuls, judges o
f
the Supreme
Court, and other officers o
f
the United States, whose appoint
ments are not otherwise provided for."
The judicial power o
f
the United States extends to a
ll
cases in
law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws
o
f
the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls ; to a
ll
cases o
f admiralty and mari
time jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens o
f
another State ; between citizens
o
f
different States; between citizens o
f
the same State claiming
lands under grants o
f
different States; and between a
[* 12] *State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens
o
r subjects.” But a State is not subject to be sued in
the courts o
f
the United States b
y
citizens o
f
another State, o
r
b
y
citizens o
r subjects o
f any foreign State.”
The Constitution and the laws o
f
the United States, made in
pursuance thereof, and a
ll
treaties made under the authority o
f
the United States, are declared to be the supreme law o
f
the
land; and the judges of every State are to be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws o
f any State to the con
trary notwithstanding.”
214; United States v. Cruikshanks,
92 U
.
S
. Rep. 542. See, further,
Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U
.
S
. Rep.
480; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall.
446.
1 U. S. Const. art. 2.
2 U
.
S
. Const. art. 3
,
§ 2.
* U. S. Const. 11th Amendment.
* U
.
S
. Const. art. 6
;
Owings v.
Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348;
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253,
314; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295;
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331.
When a treaty has been ratified by
the proper formalities, it is
,
by the
Constitution, the supreme law o
f
the
land, and the courts have no power
to inquire into the authority o
f
the
persons by whom it was entered into
on behalf o
f
the foreign nation: Doe
v
. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657; o
r
the
powers o
r rights recognized by it in
the nation with which it was made:
Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 Mich. 373. A
State law in conflict with it must give
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It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and
to prevent collision between State and national authority, that
the final decision upon all questions arising in regard thereto
should rest with the courts of the Union;' and as such questions
must frequently arise first in the State courts, provision is made
by the Judiciary Act for removing to the Supreme Court of the
United States the final judgment or decree in any suit, rendered
in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a de
cision could be had, in which is drawn in question the validity
of a treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under the United
States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority
exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repug
nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title,
right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution
or any treaty or statute of or commission held or authority exer
cised under the United States, and the decision is against
the * title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up [*13]
or claimed by either party under such Constitution, treaty,
statute, commission, or authority.”
But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by
the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment,
that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State
court, and was there passed upon.
might have arisen or been applicable.”
way to its superior authority. Ware
r. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99; Yeaker v.
Yeaker, 4 Met. (Ky.) 33; People v.
Gerke, 5 Cal. 381. See, further,
United States v. Aredondo, 6 Pet.
691; United States v. Percheman, 7
Pet. 51; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511;
Ropes v. Clinch, 8 Blatch. 304; United
States v. Tobacco Factory, 1 Dill.
264; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall.
616. In this last case it is decided,
as before it had been at the Circuit,
that a law of Congress repugnant to
a treaty, to that extent abrogates it
.
* Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1
Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264; Bank o
f
United States
It is not sufficient that it
And if the decision of
v
. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v.
Marshall, 8 Pick. 196, per Parker,
Ch. J.; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich.
298; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.
* Acts 1789 and 1867; R
.
S
. 1875,
§ 709.
* Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5
Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Les
see, 1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge,
2
. Wheat. 363; Miller v. Nicholls, 4
Wheat. 311; Williams v. Norris,
1
2 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1
Pet. 98; Harris r. Dennie, 3 Pet 292;
Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet.
256; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9
Pet. 223, 234 ; Keene v. Clarke, 10
Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet.
16 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. II
.
the State court is in favor o
f
the right, title, privilege, or exemp
tion so claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such re
moval." Neither does it where the validity of the State law is
drawn in question, and the decision o
f
the State court is against
its validity.”
-
But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon
all questions o
f
national jurisdiction should be left to the national
courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the
decisions o
f
the State courts upon a
ll questions arising under the
State constitutions and laws, where n
o question o
f
national
authority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct,
and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the
national courts.” With the power to revise the decisions of the
368; McKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66;
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540;
Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Smith v.
Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v.
Oliver, 12 How. 111; Calcote v. Stan
ton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. New
bold, 18 How. 511; Hoyt v. Shelden,
1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1
Black, 350; Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall.
97; Walker v. Villavaso, 6 Wall. 124;
The Victory, 6 Wall. 382; Hamilton
Co. v. Mass., 6 Wall. 632; Gibson v.
Choteau, 8 Wall. 314; Worthy v.
Commissioners, 9 Wall. 611; Messen
ger v. Mason, 10 Wall. 507; Insur
ance Co. v. Treasurer, 11 Wall. 204;
McManus r. O'Sullivan, 91 U
.
S
. Rep.
578; Bolling v. Lersner, 91 U
.
S
. Rep.
594. It is not sufficient that the pre
siding judge o
f
the State court certifies
that a right claimed under the national
authority was brought in question.
Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177;
Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36.
1 Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch,
268; McDonough v. Millaudon, 3
How. 693; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet
149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423;
Burke v. Gaines, 19 How. 38S; Red
dall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roose
velt v. Meyer, 1 Wall. 512; Ryan v.
Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.
* Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith,
1
4 Pet. 56; Walker v. Taylor, 5 How.
64. We take no notice here of the
statutes for the removal of causes
from the State to the Federal courts
for the purposes of original trial, as
they are not important to any discus
sion we shall have occasion to enter
upon in this work.
* In Beauregard v. New Orleans,
1
8 How. 502, Mr. Justice Campbell
says: “The constitution of this court
requires it to follow the laws of the
several States as rules of decision
wherever they apply. And the habit
of the court has been to defer to the
decisions o
f
their judicial tribunals
upon questions arising out o
f
the com
mon law o
f
the State, especially when
applied to the title o
f
lands.” In Bank
o
f
Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet.
524, it was contended that the exclu
sive power o
f
State courts to construe
legislative acts did not extend to the
paramount law, so as to enable them
to give efficacy to an act which was
contrary to the State constitution; but
Marshall, Ch. J., said: “We cannot
admit this distinction. The judicial
department o
f every government is
the rightful expositor o
f
its laws, and
emphatically o
f
its supreme law.”
Again, in Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10
Wheat. 159, the same eminent judge
says: “The judicial department of
every government, where such depart
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State * courts in the cases already pointed out, the due [*14]
observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of
ment exists, is the appropriate organ
for construing the legislative acts of
that government. Thus no court in
the universe which proposed to be gov
erned by principle would, we presume,
undertake to say that the courts of
Great Britain or France, or of any
other nation, had misunderstood their
own statutes, and therefore erect it
self into a tribunal which should correct
such misunderstanding. We receive
the construction given by the courts
of the nation as the true sense of the
law, and feel ourselves no more at lib
erty to depart from that construction
than to depart from the words of the
statute. On this principle, the con
struction given by this court to the
Constitution and laws of the United
States is received by all as the true
construction; and on the same princi
ple the construction given by the courts
of the several States to the legislative
acts of those States is received as true,
unless they come in conflict with the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” And in Green v.
Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 298, it is said by
McLean, J.: “The decision of the
highest judicial tribunal of a State
should be considered as final by this
court, not because the State tribunal
in such a case has any power to bind
this court, but because, in the lan
guage of the court in Shelby v. Guy,
11 Wheat. 361, a fixed and received
construction by a State, in its own
courts, makes a part of the statute
law.” And see Jackson v. Chew, 12
Wheat. 162, per Thompson, J.; also
the following cases: Sims v. Irvine,
3 Dall. 425; McKeen v. Delancy, 5
Cranch, 22 ; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal,
9 Cranch, 87 ; Preston v. Browder, 1
Wheat. 115; Mutual Assurance Co. v.
Watts, 1 Wheat. 279; Shipp v. Miller,
2. Wheat. 316; Thatcher v. Powell, 6
Wheat. 119; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet.
*
351; Waring v. Jackson, 1 Pet. 570;
DeWolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476; Ful
lerton v. Bank of United States, 1
Pet. 604; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet.
58; Beach v. Wiles, 2 Pet. 675; Inglis
v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99;
United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124;
Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151;
Hinde v. Wattier, 5 Pet. 398; Ross v.
McLung, 6 Pet. 283; Marlatt v. Silk,
11 Pet. 1; Bank of United States v.
Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Clarke v. Smith,
13 Pet. 195; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet.
45; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498;
Harpending v. Reformed Church, 16
Pet. 445; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet.
367; Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 303; Por
terfield v. Clark, 2 How. 76; Lane v.
Wick, 3 How. 464; Foxcroft v. Mal
lett, 4 How. 353; Barry v. Mercein, 5
How. 103; Rowan v. Runnells, 5 How.
134; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney,
11 How. 297; Pease v. Peck, 18 How.
595; Fisher v. Haldeman, 20 How.
186; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1; Suy
dam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427;
Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532; Chi
cago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Miles
v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35; Williams v.
Kirkland, 13 Wall. 306; Walker v.
Harbor Com’rs, 17 Wall. 648; Super
visors v. United States, 18 Wall. 71;
Springer v. Foster, 2 Story C.C. 383;
Neal v. Green, 1 McLean, 18; Paine
v. Wright, 6 McLean, 395; Boyle v.
Arledge, Hemp. 620; Griffing e. Gibb,
McAll.212; Bayerque v. Cohen, McAll.
113; Wick v. The Samuel Strong,
Newb. 187; N. F. Screw Co. v. Bliven,
3 Blatch. 240; Bronson v. Wallace, 4
Blatch. 465; Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn
City R. R. Co., 5 Blatch. 379; United
States v. Mann, 1 Gall. 5; Society, &c.
v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Coates v.
Muse, Brock. 539; Meade v. Beale,
Taney, 339; Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff.
311; Parker v. Phetteplace, 2 Cliff.
70; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 555. In
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judicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable,
[* 15] and which, besides being unseemly, " would be danger
ous to the peace, harmony, and stability o
f
the Union.
Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291,
a
n important question was presented
a
s
to the proper course to be pursued
b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
the United
States, under somewhat embarrassing
circumstances. That court had been
called upon to put a construction upon
a State statute o
f limitations, and had
done so. Afterwards the same ques
tion had been before the Supreme
Court o
f
the State, and in repeated
cases had been decided otherwise. The
question now was whether the Su
preme Court would follow its own
decision, o
r
reverse that, in order to
put itself in harmony with the State
decisions. The subject is considered
a
t length by McLean, J., who justly
concludes that “adherence by the fed
eral to the exposition o
f
the local law,
a
s given by the courts o
f
the State,
will greatly tend to preserve harmony
in the exercise o
f
the judicial power
in the State and federal tribunals.
This rule is not only recommended by
strong considerations o
f propriety,
growing out o
f
our system o
f juris
prudence, but it is sustained by
principle and authority.” The court
accordingly reversed its rulings to
make them conform to those of the
State court. See also Suydam v. Wil
liamson, 24 How. 427; Leffingwell v.
Warren, 2 Black, 599; Blossburg, &c.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Tioga R
.
R
. Co., 5 Blatch.
387; Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall, Jr.
219. It is of course immaterial that
the court may still be o
f opinion that
the State court has erred, o
r
that
the decisions elsewhere are different.
Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360. But
where the Supreme Court had held
that certain contracts for the price o
f
slaves were not made void b
y
the
State constitution, and afterward the
State court held otherwise, the Su
preme Court, regarding this decision
wrong, declined to reverse their own
ruling. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How.
134. Compare this with Nesmith v.
Sheldon, 7 How. 812, in which the
court followed, without examination
o
r question, the State decision, that a
State general banking law was in vio
lation of the constitution of the State.
The United States Circuit Court had
held otherwise previous to the State
decision. Falconer v. Campbell, 2
McLean, 195.
This doctrine does not apply to
questions not a
t all dependent upon
local statutes o
r usages; as, for in
stance, to contracts and other instru
ments o
f
a commercial and general
nature, like bills o
f exchange: Swift
v
. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1
;
and insurance
contracts : Robinson v. Common
wealth Ins Co., 3 Sum. 220. And
see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376;
Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153;
Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt.
C
.
C
.
322; Bragg v. Meyer, McAll.
408. And of course cases presenting
questions o
f
conflict with the Consti
tution of the United States cannot be
within it
.
State Bank v. Knoup, 16
How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelley, 1 Black, 436. And where a
contract had been made under a set
tled construction of the State constitu
tion b
y
its highest court, the Supreme
Court sustained it
,
notwithstanding
the State court had since overruled its
former decision. Gelpecke v. Du
buque, 1 Wall. 176. See Olcott v.
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678. Of late it
has seemed that new and doubtful
grounds were being taken for disre
garding State decisions, and in several
cases nearly one-half the members
o
f
the federal Supreme Court have
deemed it necessary to protest against
an abandonment of the sound and
safe doctrine of the earlier decisions.
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Besides conferring specified powers upon the national govern
ment, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the
action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent en
croachments upon the national authority, and another portion to
protect individual rights against possible abuse of State power.
Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or re
prisal, coin money, emit bills of credit," or make any thing but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State
shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties
upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely neces
sary for executing it
s inspection laws; and the net produce o
f
all
duties and imposts laid b
y
any State o
n imports o
r exports shall
b
e for the use of the treasury o
f
the United States, and al
l
such
laws shall be subject to the revision and control o
f Congress. No
State shall, without the consent o
f Congress, lay any duty o
f
tonnage, keep troops o
r ships o
f
war in time o
f peace, enter into
any agreement o
r compact with another State or with a foreign
power, o
r engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such im
minent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class
are the following: No State shall pass any bill o
f attainder, ea
:
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation o
f contracts,” o
r
make o
r
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities o
f
citizens o
f
the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person o
f life, liberty, or property without due pro
cess o
f law, nor deny to any person within it
s jurisdiction the
equal protection o
f
the laws,” nor base discriminations in suffrage
o
n race, color, o
r previous condition o
f
servitude.*
1 To constitute a bill of credit
within the meaning o
f
the Constitu
tion, it must be issued by a State,
involve the faith o
f
the State, and be
designed to circulate as money on the
credit o
f
the State in the ordinary
uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of
Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v.
Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The facts
that a State owns the entire capital
stock o
f
a bank, elects the directors,
makes it
s
bills receivable for the pub
lic dues, and pledges it
s
faith for their
redemption, d
o not make the bills o
f
such bank “bills of credit ’’ in the
constitutional sense. Darrington v.
State Bank o
f Alabama, 13 How. 12.
See, further, Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet.
410; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40;
Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 317;
Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431;
Bailey r. Milner, 35 Geo. 330; City
National Bank v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann.
751.
* Const. o
f
U
.
S
. art. 1
,
§ 10;
Story on Const. c. 33, 34.
* Const. of U. S. 14th Amend
ment; Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 47.
* Const. of U. S. 15th Amend
ment; Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 48.
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Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations
b
y
the several States against the citizens and public authority and
proceedings o
f
other States. Of this class are the provisions that
the citizens o
f
each State shall be entitled to a
ll
the privileges
and immunities o
f
citizens in the several States; that fugi
1 Const. o
f U. S. art. 4. “What
are the privileges and immunities o
f
citizens in the several States? We
feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are in their nature
fundamental; which belong o
f right
to the citizens o
f
a
ll
free governments;
and which have, a
t
all times, been
enjoyed b
y
the citizens o
f
the several
States which compose this Union,
from the time o
f
their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign. What
those fundamental principles are, it
would perhaps be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under
the following general heads: protec
tion b
y
the government, the enjoy
ment o
f
life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property
o
f every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety, subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for
the general good o
f
the whole. The
right of a citizen of one State to pass
through o
r
to reside in any other
State, for purposes of trade, agricul
ture, professional pursuits, o
r other
wise; to claim the benefit o
f
the writ
o
f
habeas corpus; to institute and
maintain actions o
f every kind in the
courts o
f
the State; to take, hold,
and dispose o
f property, either real o
r
personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes o
r impositions than are
paid by the citizens o
f
the other State,
— may be mentioned as some of the
particular privileges and immunities
o
f citizens, which are clearly embraced
by the general description o
f privi
leges deemed to b
e fundamental : to
which may be added the elective
franchise as regulated and established
by the laws or constitution o
f
the
State in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might
b
e mentioned, are, strictly speaking,
privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment o
f
them b
y
the citizens o
f
each State in every other State was
manifestly calculated (to use the ex
pressions o
f
the preamble o
f
the cor
responding provision in the old Arti
cles o
f
Confederation) “the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friend
ship and intercourse among the peo
ple o
f
the different States o
f
the
Union.’” Washington, J., in Cor
field v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C
.
C
.
380.
The Supreme Court will not describe
and define those privileges and immu
nities, in a general classification; pre
ferring to decide each case as it may
come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How.
591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall.
418; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U
.
S
.
Rep. 391. The question in this last
case was whether the State of Vir
ginia could prohibit citizens o
f
other
States from planting oysters in Ware
River, a stream in that State where
the tide ebbs and flows, and the right
b
e granted by the State to it
s
own
citizens exclusively. Waite, Ch. J.,
in answering the question in the
affirmative, said: “The right thus
granted is not a privilege o
r immunity
o
f general but o
f special citizenship.
It does not belong of right to the citi
zens o
f
a
ll
free governments, but only
to the citizens o
f Virginia, on account
o
f
the peculiar circumstances in which
they are placed; they, and they alone,
owned the property to be sold o
r
used, and they alone had the power
to dispose o
f it as they saw fit.
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tives from justice shall" be delivered up, and that full [*16]
They owned it
,
not b
y
virtue o
f
citizenship merely, but o
f citizenship
and domicile united; that is to say,
by virtue o
f
a citizenship confined to
that particular locality.” See also
Paul v. Hazelton, 37 N. J. 106. For
other discussions upon this subject, see
Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393;
Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and
2
0 N
.
Y
. 562; Campbell v. Morris,
3 Har. & M’H. 554; Amy v. Smith,
1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10
Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4
Wash. C
.
C
.
101; Commonwealth v.
Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Mar
shall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v. Com
monwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v.
Medbury, 3 R
.
I. 138; People v. Im
lay, 20 Barb: 68; People v. Coleman,
4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill.
544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Com
monwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v.
Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Fire Department
v
. Noble, 3 E
.
D
. Smith, 441; Same v.
Wright, 3 E. D
. Smith, 453; Same
v
. Holfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; Sears v.
Commissioners o
f
Warren Co., 36
Ind. 267; Jeffersonville, &c. R
.
R
.
Co.
v
. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 71; Cincinnati
Health Association v. Rosenthal, 55
Ill. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann.
434; Live Stock, &c. Association v.
Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36;
Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Barbe
meyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; United
States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U
.
S
. Rep.
542. The constitutional provision
does not apply to corporations. War
ren Manuf. Co. v. AEtna Ins. Co., 2
Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168. A discrimination between local
freight on railroads and that which is
extra-territorial is not personal, and
therefore not forbidden by this clause
o
f
the Constitution. Shipper v.
Pennsylvania R
.
R
. Co., 47 Penn. St.
338. A State cannot impose, for the
privilege o
f doing business within its
limits, a heavier license tax upon
non-residents than is required o
f resi
dents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall.
418.
* Extradition as between the States.
The return by one State o
f fugitives
from justice which have fled to it from
another State is only made a matter
o
f rightful demand b
y
the provisions
of the federal Constitution. In the
absence o
f
such provisions, it might
be provided for by State law; but the
Constitution makes that obligatory
which otherwise would rest in the im
perfect and uncertain requirements o
f
inter-state comity. The subject has
received much attention from the
courts when having occasion to con
sider the nature and extent of the
constitutional obligation. It has also
been the subject o
f many executive
papers; and several controversions be
tween the executives of New York and
those of more southern States are re
ferred to in the recent life of William
H
.
Seward, b
y
his son. The follow
ing are among the judicial decisions:
The offence for which extradition may
be ordered need not have been an
offence either at the common law or
at the time the Constitution was
adopted; it is sufficient that it was so
a
t
the time the act was committed,
and when demand is made. Matter
o
f Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnston v.
Riley, 13 Geo. 97: Matter of Fetter,
23 N
. J. 311; Matter of Voorhies,
32 N. J. 141; Morton v. Skinner, 48
Ind. 123; Matter o
f Hughes, Phill.
(N. C.) 57; Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. 66. The offence must have
been actually committed within the
State making the demand, and the
accused must have fled therefrom.
Er parte Smith, 3 McLean, 133. The
accused may b
e arrested to await
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[* 17] faith and credit shall be given in * each State to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings o
f every
other State." Many cases have been decided under these several
demand: State v. Buzine, 4 Harr.
572; Er parte Culreth, 49 Cal. 436;
but he cannot be surrendered before
formal demand is made, and parties
who seize and deliver him up without
demand will be liable for doing so:
Botts v. Williams, 17 B
.
Monr. 677.
Still, if he is returned to the State
from whence he fled without proper
papers, this will be no sufficient
ground for his discharge from custody.
Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 39. The
demand is to be made by the execu
tive o
f
the State, by which is meant
the governor: Commonwealth v. Hall,
9 Gray, 262; and it is the duty of the
executive of the State to which the
offender has fled to comply: Johnston
v
. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; but if he refuses
to do so, the courts have no power to
compel him: Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. 66; Matter o
f Manchester,
5 Cal. 237. There must be a show
ing o
f
sufficient cause for the arrest
before the requisition can issue; but,
after it is issued and complied with,
it is competent for the courts of either
State on habeas corpus to look into
the papers, and, if they show no suffi
cient legal cause, to order the pris
oner's discharge. Ez parte Smith,
3 McLean, 121; Matter o
f Clark, 9
Wend. 219; Matter o
f Manchester,
5 Cal. 237; Matter o
f Heyward, 1
Sandf. 701; Er parte White, 49 Cal.
434; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 391;
People v. Brady, 56 N
.
Y
.
182; Kings
bury's Case, 106 Mass. 223. The
federal courts have no power to com
pel the State authorities to fulfil
their duties under this clause of the
Constitution. Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. 66.
Extradition to foreign countries is
purely a national power, to be exer
cised under treaties. Holmes v. Jen
nison, 14 Pet. 540; Er parte Holmes,
1
2 Vt. 631; People v. Curtis, 50 N
.
Y
.
321.
1 Const. of U. S. art. 4. This
clause of the Constitution has been
the subject o
f
a good deal o
f discus
sion in the courts. It is well settled
that if the record of a judgment shows
that it was rendered without service
o
f process o
r appearance o
f
the de
fendant, o
r if that fact can be shown
without contradicting the recitals o
f
the record, it will be treated as void
in any other State, notwithstanding
this constitutional provision. Kibbe
v
. Kibbe, Kirby, 126; Aldrich v. Kin
ney, 4 Conn. 380; Middlebrooks v.
Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 307; Wood v.
Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Bartlett
v
. Knight, 1 Mass. 409; Bissell v.
Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Hall v. Wil
liams, 6 Pick. 232; Woodworth v.
Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Gleason v.
Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Commonwealth
v
. Blood, 97 Mass. 538; Edson v.
Edson, 108 Mass. 590; s. c. 11 Am.
Rep. 393; Kilbourne v. Woodworth,
5 Johns. 37; Robinson v. Ward's Exec
utors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Gar
lick, 8 Johns. 194; Pawling v. Bird's
Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Holbrook
v
. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Bradshaw
v
. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Noyes v.
Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; s. c. 7 Am.
Rep. 299; Thurber v. Blackbourne,
1 N. H. 242; Whittier v. Wendell, 7
N
.
H
.
257; Rangely v. Webster, 11
N
.
H. 306; Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H.
388; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 134; Wilson v.
Jackson, 10 Mo. 334. See McLau
rine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Bimeler
v
. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Warren v.
McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95; Curtiss v. Gibbs,
1 Penn. 406; Rogers v. Coleman, Hard.
416; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 3 Dev.
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provisions, the most important of which are collected in the mar
ginal notes.
The last provisions that we shall here notice are that the
United States shall guarantee to every State a republican form
of government," and that no State shall grant any title of
nobility.” The purpose of these is to protect a Union
founded on republican principles, and composed entirely of
187; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551;
Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Mc
Cauley v. Hargroves, 48 Geo. 50; s. c.
15 Am. Rep. 660; People v. Dawell,
25 Mich. 247; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 260;
Hood v. State, 5 Cent. Law Journ.
35; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473;
Westerwelt v. Lewis, 2 McLean, 511;
Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 377;
Board of Public Works v. Columbia
College, 17 Wall. 521. But whether
it would be competent to show, in
opposition to the recitals of the record,
that a judgment of another State
was rendered without jurisdiction
having been obtained of the person
of the defendant, the authorities are
not agreed. Many cases hold not.
Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C. 156;
Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Pet. C. C. 76;
Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473;
Westerwelt v. Lewis, 2 McLean,
511; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana,
512; Hensley v. Force, 7 Eng. 756;
Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544;
Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt 263; New
comb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Willcox v.
Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimeler v. Daw
son, 4 Scam. 536; Welch v. Sykes,
3 Gil. 197; Wetherell v. Stillman,
65 Penn. St. 105. Other cases admit
such evidence. Starbuck v. Murray,
5 Wend. 148; Holbrook v. Murray, 5
Wend. 161; Shumway v. Stillman, 6
Wend. 447; Borden v. Fitch, 15
Johns. 121; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick.
232; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380;
Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407;
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30;
Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Kane
v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Norwood v.
Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; Russell v.
Perry, 14 N. H. 155; Rape v. Heaton,
9 Wis. 328; Carleton v. Bickford, 13
Gray, 596; Mackay v. Gordon, 34
N. J. 286; Thompson v. Whitman,
18 Wall. 457. In People v. Dawell,
25 Mich. 247, on an indictment for
bigamy, in which the defendant relied
on a foreign divorce from his first
wife, it was held competent to show,
in opposition to the recitals of the
record, that the parties never resided
in the foreign State, and that the
proceedings were a fraud. Recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of
Indiana, and of the Supreme Court
of Commission of Ohio, are to the
same effect. See Hood v. State, re
ported in Central Law Journal, July
13, 1877, and Pennywit v. Foote, 27
Ohio, N. s. 600. Mr. Freeman dis
cusses this general subject in his
treatise on Judgments, c. 26. The
same defences may be made to a
judgment when sued in another State
which could have been made to it in
the State where rendered: Hampton
v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mills v.
Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Steele v.
Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the
State v. Dalton, 9 How. 528; but no
others: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall.
139; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall.
290; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108;
People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; s. c.
12 Am. Rep. 260; Dodge v. Coffin,
15 Kan. 277.
1 Const. of U. S. art. 4, § 4.
* Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.
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[*18] * republican members against aristocratic and monarchical
innovations."
S
o far as a particular consideration o
f
the foregoing provisions
falls within the plan o
f
our present work, it will be more conven
ient to treat o
f
them in another place, especially as a
ll o
f
them
which have for their object the protection o
f person o
r property
are usually repeated in the bills o
f rights contained in the State
constitutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part
of State constitutional law.
Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the
exercise o
f
the same powers b
y
the States is impliedly prohibited,
wherever the intent o
f
the grant to the national government
would be defeated b
y
such exercise. On this ground it is held
that the States cannot tax the agencies or loans o
f
the general
government; since the power to tax, if possessed b
y
the States
in regard to these objects, might be so exercised as altogether to
destroy such agencies and impair or even destroy the national
credit.” And where by the national Constitution jurisdiction is
given to the national courts with a view to the more efficient
and harmonious working o
f
the system organized under it
,
it is
competent for Congress in it
s
wisdom to make that jurisdiction
exclusive o
f
the State courts.” On some other subjects State laws
may b
e
valid until the power o
f Congress is exercised, when they
become superseded, either wholly, or so far as they are found
inconsistent. The States may legislate on the subject o
f bank
ruptcy if there be no national bankrupt law.” State laws for
organizing and disciplining the
1 Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It
does not fall within our province to
discuss these provisions. They have
been much discussed in Congress
within a few years, but in a party,
rather than a judicial, spirit. See
Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 41, and
notes, and article in International
Review for January, 1875, on “ The
Guaranty o
f
Order and Republican
Government in the States.”
* McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 427; Weston v. Charleston, 2
Pet. 449. See cases collected, post,
militia are valid, except as they
p
.
*482. State laws cannot regulate
the sale o
f patents, the whole subject
belonging exclusively to Congress.
Ex parte Robinson, 2 Biss. 309.
* Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1
Wheat. 334; The Moses Taylor v.
Hammons, 4 Wall. 411; The Ad Hine
v
. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555. And see
note to these cases in the Western
Jurist, Vol. I. p
.
241.
* Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill,
4
. Wheat. 209. And see post, pp.
* 293–294.
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may conflict with national legislation; 1 and the States may con
stitutionally provide for punishing the counterfeiting of coin” and
the passing of counterfeit money,” since these acts are offences
against the State, notwithstanding they may be offences against the
nation also.
* The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides [*19]
that the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be
observed of this instrument, that being framed for the establish
ment of a national government, it is a settled rule of construction
that the limitations it imposes upon the powers of government are
in all cases to be understood as limitations upon the government
of the Union only, except where the States are expressly men
tioned.* As illustrations, the sixth and seventh amendments to
the Constitution may be mentioned. These constitute a guaranty
of the right of trial by jury; but, as they do not mention the
States, they are not to be understood as restricting their powers;
and the States may, if they choose, provide for the trial of all
offences against the States, as well as for the trial of civil cases in
the State courts, without the intervention of a jury, or by some
different jury from that known to the common law.”
With other rules for the construction of the national Constitu
1 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 51.
* Harlan v. People, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 207.
* Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; United
States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. And
see Hendrick’s Case. 5 Leigh, 707;
Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933;
Moore v. People, 14 How. 13.
* Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243;
Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet
551: Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 432; Smith
v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Buona
parte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co.,
Baldw. 220; James v. Commonwealth,
12 S. & R. 221; Barker v. People, 3
Cow. 686; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn.
243; Jane v. Commonwealth, 3 Met.
(Ky.) 18: Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt.
336; Matter of Smith, 10 Wend.
449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kansas, 250;
Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45;
North. Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49
Mo. 490; Lake Erie, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Prescott v. State, 19
Ohio, N. s. 184; State v. Shumpert,
1 So. Car. N. s. 85; Commonwealth
v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482; Bigelow v.
Bigelow, 120 Mass. 320; Boyd v.
Ellis, 11 Iowa, 97; Cambell v. State,
11 Geo. 353; State v. Carro, 26 La.
Ann. 377; Purvear v. Commonwealth,
5 Wall. 475; Twitchell v. Common
wealth, 7 Wall. 321.
* Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7
Wall, 321; Justices r. Murray, 9 Wall.
274; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall 532;
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S Rep.
90; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Rep.
113.”
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tion we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been the
subject o
f
elaborate treatises, judicial opinions, and legislative
debates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the
public at large. So far as that instrument apportions powers to
the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part,
a
s simply authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation
for the exercise o
f
those powers b
y
the federal courts, and not a
s
directly, o
f
it
s
own force, vesting them with that authority. The
Constitution does not, o
f
its own force, give to national courts
jurisdiction o
f
the several cases which it enumerates, but an act
o
f Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to
apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are o
f
those few cases o
f
which the Constitution confers jurisdiction
upon the Supreme Court b
y
name. And although the courts o
f
the United States administer the common law in many cases, they
do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance
o
f
and punish offences against the government. Offences against
the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed b
y
acts o
f
Congress."
* Demurrer to an indictment for a
libel upon the President and Congress.
By the court: “The only question
which this case presents is
,
whether
the circuit courts can exercise a com
mon-law jurisdiction in criminal cases.
. . . The general acquiescence o
f
legal men shows the prevalence o
f
opinion in favor o
f
the negative o
f
the
proposition. The course of reasoning
which leads to this conclusion is sim
ple, obvious, and admits o
f
but little
illustration. The powers o
f
the gen
eral government are made up o
f con
cessions from the several States:
whatever is not expressly given to
the former, the latter expressly re
serve. The judicial power o
f
the
United States is a constitutional part
o
f
these concessions: that power is to
b
e
exercised b
y
courts organized for
the purpose, and brought into exist
ence by an effort o
f
the legislative
power o
f
the Union. Of al
l
the
courts which the United States may,
under their general powers, consti
tute, one only, the Supreme Court,
possesses jurisdiction derived imme
diately from the Constitution, and o
f
which the legislative power cannot
deprive it
. All other courts created
by the general government possess no
jurisdiction but what is given them
by the power that created them, and
can be vested with none but what the
power ceded to the general govern
ment will authorize them to confer.
It is not necessary to inquire whether
the general government, in any and
what extent, possesses the power o
f
conferring on its courts a jurisdiction
in cases similar to the present; it is
enough that such jurisdiction has not
been conferred by any legislative act,
if it does not result to those courts as
a consequence o
f
their creation.”
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch,
32. See United States v. Coolidge, 1
Wheat. 415. “It is clear there can
be no common law o
f
the United
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States. The federal government is
composed of twenty-four sovereign
and independent States, each of
which may have its local usages, cus
toms, and common law. There is no
principle which pervades the Union,
and has the authority of law, that is
not embodied in the Constitution or
laws of the Union. The common law
could be made a part of our federal
system only by legislative adoption.”
Per McLean, J., Wheaton v. Peters, 8
Pet. 658. See also Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. 524; Lorman v.
Clarke, 2 McLean, 568; United
States v. Lancaster, 2 McLean, 433;
United States v. New Bedford Bridge,
1 Wood. & M. 435; United States v.
Wilson, 3 Blatch. 435; United States
v. Barney, 5 Blatch. 294. As to the
adoption of the common law by the
States, see Van Ness v. Pacard, 2
Pet. 144, per Story, J.; and post,
p. *23, and cases cited in notes.
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[*21] * CHAPTER III.
THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
THE Constitution of the United States assumes the existence
of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its
authority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen
for the purpose. Each of these States was then exercising the
powers of government under some form of written constitution,
and that instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of
the national Constitution, except in those particulars in which
the two would come in conflict; and as to those, the latter would
modify and control the former." But besides this fundamental
law, every State had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights,
duties, and obligations of persons within it
s jurisdiction, and
establishing those minute rules for the various relations o
f
life
which cannot be properly incorporated in a constitution, but
must be left to the regulation o
f
the ordinary law-making
power.
By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body o
f
laws consisted o
f
the common law o
f England, which had been
transplanted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists,
now become an independent nation, had found a shelter o
f pro
tection during a
ll
the long contest with the mother country,
brought a
t
last to so fortunate a conclusion.
The common law o
f England consisted o
f
those maxims o
f
freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the
conduct o
f public affairs, the management o
f private business, the
regulation o
f
the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, con
trol, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the
outgrowth o
f
the habits o
f thought and action o
f
the people, and
1 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 &c. o
f
Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala.
Johns. 507; State v. Cape Girardeau, 310.
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Mayor,
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was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time as those
habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new in
ventions introduced new wants and conveniences, and new modes
of business. ! Springing from the very nature of the people them
selves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously
the body of laws best adapted to their needs; and as they took
with them their nature, so also they would take with them these
laws whenever they should transfer their domicile from one coun
try to another.
*To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [*22]
ent purpose. Many of it
s
features were exceedingly harsh
and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their
origin in times o
f profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism.
The feudal system, which was essentially a system of violence,
disorder, and rapine,” gave birth to many o
f
the maxims o
f
the
common law ; and some o
f these, long after that system has
passed away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the
rules which govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment o
f
real estate. The criminal code was also marked b
y
cruel and
absurd features, some o
f
which have clung to it with wonderful
tenacity, even after the most stupid could perceive their incon
sistency with justice and civilization. But, on the wholeſ the
system was the best foundation o
n
which to erect an enduring
structure o
f
civil liberty which the world has ever known. It
was the peculiar excellence o
f
the common law o
f England that
it recognized the worth, and sought especially to protect the
rights and privileges, o
f
the individual man. It
s
maxims were
those o
f
a sturdy and independent race, accustomed in an unusual
degree to freedom o
f thought and action, and to a share in the
administration o
f public affairs; and arbitrary power and uncon
trolled authority were not recognized in it
s principles. LAwe
surrounded and majesty clothed the king, but the humblest
subject might shut the door o
f
his cottage against him, and
defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the
kingly prerogatives.” The system was the opposite o
f
servile ;
* “A feudal kingdom was a con- cipher or a tyrant, and a great por
federacy o
f
a numerous body, who tion o
f
the people were reduced to
lived in a state o
f
war against each personal slavery.” Mackintosh, His
other, and o
f rapine towards a
ll
man- tory o
f England, c. 3.
kind, in which the king, according to * See post, p
.
*299.
his ability and vigor, was either a
-
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its features implied boldness, and independent self-reliance on
the part of the people iſand if the criminal code was harsh, it at
least escaped the inquisitorial features which were apparent in
criminal procedure of other civilized countries, and which have
ever been fruitful of injustice, oppression, and terror.
For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to
time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Origi
nally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and
reaffirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usurpations
and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which,
[* 23] therefore, * needed to be authoritatively announced, that
king and subject alike might understand and observe
them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promul
gated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the
king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King
John." Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of
that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,” and the Bill of
Rights,” each of which became necessary by reason of usurpations.
But further statutes also became needful because old customs and
modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things when
property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce
more extended, and when all these changes had brought with
them new desires and necessities, and also new dangers against
which society as well as the individual subject needed protection.
For this reason the Statute of Wills 4 and the Statute of Frauds
and Perjuries" became important; and the Habeas Corpus Act"
was also found necessary, not so much to change the law," as to
1 It is justly observed by Sidney
that “Magna Charta was not made
to restrain the absolute authority, for
no such thing was in being or pre
tended (the folly of such visions
seeming to have been reserved to
complete the misfortunes and igno
miny of our age), but it was to assert
the native and original liberties of
our nation by the confession of the
king then being; that neither he nor
his successors should any way en
croach upon them.” Sidney on Gov
ernment, c. 3, sec. 27.
* 1 Charles I. c. 1.
* 1 William & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2.
* 32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 &
35 Henry VIII. c. 5.
5 29 Charles II. c. 3.
6 31 Charles II. c. 2.
7 “I dare not advise to cast the
laws into a new mould. The work
which I propound tendeth to the
pruning and grafting of the law, and
not the plowing up and planting it
again, for such a remove I should
hold for a perilous innovation.” Ba
con's Works, Vol. II
.
p
.
231, Phil.
ed. 1852.
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secure existing principles of the common law against being
habitually set aside and violated by those in power.
From the first the colonists in America claimed the benefit and
protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the
common law as then existing in England was not suited to their
condition and circumstances in the new country, and those
particulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them."
* “The common law of England
is not to be taken, in all respects, to
be that of America. Our ancestors
brought with them its general princi
ples, and claimed it as their birth
right; but they brought with them
and adopted only that portion which
was applicable to their condition.”
Story, J., in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2
Pet. 144. “The settlers of colonies
in America did not carry with them
the laws of the land as being bound
by them wherever they should settle.
They left the realm to avoid the incon
veniences and hardships they were
under, where some of these laws were
in force; particularly ecclesiastical
laws, those for payment of tithes, and
others. Had it been understood that
they were to carry these laws with
them, they had better have stayed at
home among their friends, unexposed
to the risks and toils of a new settle
ment. They carried with them a right
to such parts of laws of the land as
they should judge advantageous or
useful to them ; a right to be free
from those they thought hurtful, and
a right to make such others as they
should think necessary, not infringing
the general rights of Englishmen; and
such new laws they were to form as
agreeable as might be to the laws
of England.” Franklin, Works by
Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271. See also
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 435;
Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 241;
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 659; Pol
lard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Com
monwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 59;
Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass.
534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met.
122; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass.
354; Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. 309;
Marks v. Morris, 4 Hen & M. 463;
Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H. 58; Houghton
v. Page, 2 N. H. 44; State v. Rollins,
8 N. H. 550; State v. Buchanan, 5
H. & J. 356; Sibley v. Williams, 3
G. & J. 62; State v. Cummings, 33
Conn. 260; Martin v. Bigelow, 2
Aiken, 187; Lindsley v. Coats, 1 Ohio,
245; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s.
390; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R.
330; State v. Campbell, T. U. P.
Charlt. 167; Craft v. State Bank, 7
Ind. 219; Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind.
220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4
Sandf. Ch. 757; Morgan v. King, 30
Barb. 9; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb.
15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. 356;
Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263; Brown v.
Pratt, 3 Jones (N. C.) Eq. 202;
Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 184;
Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pier
son v. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris v.
Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Powell v. Sims,
5 W. Va. 1; Colley v. Merrill, 6 Me.
55; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 362;
Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 814; Bar
low v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704; Good
win v. Thompson, 2 Greene (Iowa),
329; Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa, 396;
Noonan v. State, 9 Miss. 562; Pow
ell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343; Coburn
v. Harvey, 18 Wis 147; Reaume v.
Chambers, 22 Mo. 36; Hamilton v.
Kneeland, 1 Nev. 40. The courts of
one State will presume the common
law of a sister State to be the same as
their own, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary. Abell v. Douglass,
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[*24] They also claimed the benefit of * such statutes as from
time to time had been enacted in modification of this
body of rules." And when the difficulties with the home govern
ment sprung up, it was a source of immense moral power to the
colonists that they were able to show that the rights they claimed
were conferred by the common law, and that the king and Par
liament were seeking to deprive them of the common birthright of
Englishmen. Did Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America,
the people demanded the benefit of that maxim with which for
many generations every intelligent subject had been familiar, that
those must vote the tax who are to pay it.” Did Parliament
order offenders against the laws in America to be sent to England
for trial, every American was roused to indignation, and protested
against the trampling under foot of that time-honored principle,
that trials for crime must be by a jury of the vicinage. Contend
ing thus behind the bulwarks of the common law, Englishmen
would appreciate and sympathize with their position, and Ameri
cans would feel doubly strong in a cause that was right not only,
but the justice of which must be confirmed by an appeal to the
consciousness of their enemies themselves.
The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declar
atory statutes we have mentioned,” in part of the commentaries
4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11
Mich. 181; Schurman v. Marley, 29
Ind. 458.
* The acts of Parliament passed
after the settlement of a colony were
not in force therein, unless made so
by express words, or by adoption.
Commonwealth v. Lodge, 2 Grat.
579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord,
31. See Swift v. Tousey, 5 Ind. 196;
Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72 ; Cath
cart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280. Those
amendatory of the common law, if
suited to the condition of things in
America, were generally adopted by
tacit consent. For the differing views
taken by English and American
statesmen upon the general questions
here discussed, see the observations
by Governor Pownall, and the com
ments of Franklin thereon, 4 Works
of Franklin, by Sparks, 271.
* “The blessing of Judah and
Issachar will never meet; that the
same people or nation should be both
the lion's whelp and the ass between
burdens; neither will it be that a
people overlaid with taxes should ever
become valiant and martial. It is
true that taxes levied by consent of
the State do abate men's courage less,
as it hath been seen notably in the
exercise of the Low Countries, and in
some degree in the subsidies of Eng
land, for you must note that we speak
now of the heart and not of the
purse; so that although the same
tribute or tax laid by consent or by
imposing be all one to the purse, yet
it works diversely upon the courage.
So that you may conclude that no
people overcharged with tribute is fi
t
for empire.” Lord Bacon on the
True Greatness o
f Kingdoms.
* These statutes upon the points
which are covered b
y
them are the
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of such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority,
but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying the
* law to actual controversies. While colonization cón- [*25]
tinued, - that is to say, until the war of the Revolution
actually commenced, – these decisions were authority in the
colonies, and the changes made in the common law up to the
same period were operative in America also if suited to the con
dition of things here. The opening of the war of the Revolution
is the point of time at which the continuous stream of the common
law became divided, and that portion which had been adopted
in America flowed on by itself, no longer subject to changes from
across the ocean, but liable still to be gradually modified through
changes in the modes of thought and of business among the peo
ple, as well as through statutory enactments.
The colonies also had legislatures of their own, by which laws
had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation,
and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they
emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the
laws which governed them consisted, first, of the common law of
England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to their
condition; second, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain,
amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner
adopted; and, third, of the colonial statutes." The first and
second constituted the American common law, and by this in
best evidence possible. They are the islature chosen by the people; and
living charters of English liberty, to
the present day; and as the forerun
ners of the American constitutions
and the source from which have been
derived many of the most important
articles in their bills of rights, they
are constantly appealed to when per
sonal liberty or private rights are
placed in apparent antagonism to the
claims of government.
* The like condition of things is
found to exist in the new States
formed and admitted to the Union
since the Constitution was adopted.
Congress creates territorial govern
ments of different grades, but gener
ally with plenary legislative power
either in the governor and judges, a
territorial council, or a territorial leg
the authority of this body extends to
all rightful subjects of legislation,
subject, however, to the disapproval
of Congress. Vincennes University
v. Indiana, 14 How. 273; Miners’
Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1. The legis
lation, of course, must not be in
conflict with the law of Congress con
ferring the power to legislate, but a
variance from it may be supposed
approved by that body, if suffered to
remain without disapproval for a
series of years after being duly re
ported to it
.
Clinton v. Englebrect,
1
3 Wall. 434, 446. See Williams v.
Bank o
f Michigan, 7 Wend. 539;
Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Stout
v
. Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232.
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great part are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in the
American States to this day."
* A few of the States, to get rid
of confusion in the law, deemed it
desirable to repeal the acts of Parlia
ment, and to re-enact such portions of
them as were regarded important
here. See the Michigan repealing
statute, copied from that of Virginia,
in Code of 1820, p. 459. Others
named a date or event, and provided
by law that English statutes passed
subsequently should not be of force
within their limits. In some of the
new States there were also other laws
in force than those to which we have
above alluded. Although it has been
said in La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co.
v. The City of Monroe, Walk. Ch. 155,
and Depew v. Trustees of Wabash &
Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8, that the ordi
nance of 1787 was superseded in each
of the States formed out of the
North-West Territory by the adop
tion of a State constitution, and ad
mission to the Union, yet the weight
of judicial authority is probably the
other way. In Hogg v. The Zanes
ville Canal Manufacturing Co., 5
Ohio, 410, it was held that the provi
sion of the ordinance that the naviga
ble waters of the Territory and the
carrying-places between should be
common highways, and for ever free,
was permanent in it
s obligation, and
could not be altered without the con
sent both o
f
the people o
f
the State
and o
f
the United States, given
through their representatives. “It
is an article o
f compact; and until
we assume the principle that the sov
ereign power o
f
a State is not bound
b
y
compact, this clause must be con
sidered obligatory.” Justice McLean
and Judge Leavitt, in Spooner v. Mc
Connell, 1 McLean, 337, examine
this subject a
t
considerable length,
and both arrive at the same conclu
sion with the Ohio court. The view
taken of the ordinance in that case
was, that such parts o
f it as were
designed temporarily to regulate the
government o
f
the Territory were
abolished b
y
the change from a terri
torial to a State government, while
the other parts, which were designed
to be permanent, are unalterable ex
cept by common consent. Some o
f
these, however, being guaranteed by
the federal Constitution, afterwards
adopted, may be regarded as practi
cally annulled, while any others which
are Qpposed to the constitution o
f any
State formed out o
f
the Territory
must also be considered as annulled
by common consent; the people o
f
the State assenting in forming their
constitution, and Congress in admit
ting the State into the Union under
it
.
The article in regard to naviga
ble waters is therefore still in force.
The same was also said in regard to
the article prohibiting slavery, though
that also may now be regarded as
practically annulled by the amendment
to the federal Constitution covering
the same ground. The like opinion was
subsequently expressed in Palmer v.
Commissioners o
f Cuyahoga Co., 3
McLean, 226, and in Jolly v. Terre
Haute Drawbridge Co., 6 McLean,
237. See also Strader v. Graham, 10
How. 82; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf.
12; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v
. Cross, 18 Wis. 109; Milwaukee
Gaslight Co. v. Schooner Gamecock,
23 Wis. 144; Wisconsin River Im
provement Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61.
Compare Woodburn v. Kilbourn
Manuf. Co., 1 Abb. U. S. 158; s. c.
1 Biss. 546. In the cases in the first
and third McLean, however, the opin
ion was expressed that the States
might lawfully improve the navigable
waters and the carrying-places be
tween, and charge tolls upon the use
o
f
the improvement to obtain reim
bursement o
f
their expenditures.
In some of the States formed out
o
f
the territory acquired by the
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* Every colony had also it
s charter, emanating from the [*26]
Crown, and constituting it
s
colonial constitution. All
but two o
f
these were swept away b
y
the whirlwind o
f revolu
tion, and others substituted which had been framed b
y
the people
themselves, through the agency o
f
conventions which they had
chosen. The exceptions were the States o
f
Connecticut and
Rhode Island, each o
f
which had continued it
s government as a
State under the colonial charter, finding it sufficient and satisfac
tory for the time being, and accepting it as the constitution for
the State.”
New States have since, from time * to time, formed con- [*27]
stitutions either regularly in pursuance o
f enabling acts
passed b
y
Congress, o
r irregularly by the spontaneous action o
f
the people, o
r
under the direction o
f
the legislative o
r
executive
authority o
f
the Territory to which the State succeeded. Where
irregularities existed, they must be regarded as having been cured
by the subsequent admission o
f
the State into the Union by Con
gress; and there were not wanting in the case o
f
some States
plausible reasons for insisting that such admission * had [* 28]
become a matter o
f right, and that the necessity for an
enabling act b
y
Congress was dispensed with b
y
the previous
stipulations o
f
the national government in acquiring the Territory
from which such States were formed.” Some of these constitu
United States from foreign powers,
traces will be found of the laws exist
ing the canon and ecclesiastical law,
and their force in this country, see
ing before the change of government.
Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself,
based upon the civil law. Much o
f
Mexican law, and especially as re
gards lands and land titles, is retained
in the systems of Texas and Cali
fornia. In Michigan, when the acts
of Parliament were repealed, it was
also deemed important to repeal all
laws derived from France, through
the connection with the Canadian
provinces, including the Coutume de
I’aris, or ancient French common
law. In the mining States and Ter
ritories a peculiar species of common
law, relating to mining rights and
titles, has sprung up, having its ori
gin among the miners, but recognized
and enforced by the courts. Regard
Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91; Le
Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365.
* It is worthy of note that the
first case in which a legislative enact
ment was declared unconstitutional
and void, on the ground o
f incompati
bility with the constitution of the
State, was decided under one o
f
these
royal charters. The case was that of
Trevett v. Weeden, decided by the
Superior Court o
f
Rhode Island in
1786. See Arnold's History of Rhode
Island, Vol. II. c. 24. The case is
further referred to, post, p
.
* 160, note.
* This was the claim made on be
half o
f Michigan; it being insisted
that the citizens, under the provisions
o
f
the ordinance o
f 1787, whenever
the Territory acquired the requisite
36 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. III.
tions pointed out the mode for their own modification; others
were silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such
cases the power to originate proceedings for that purpose rested
with the legislature of the State, as the department most nearly
representing its general sovereignty; and this is doubtless the
correct view to take of this subject."
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sover
eignty is in the people, from whom springs a
ll legitimate author
ity.” The people o
f
the Union created a national constitution, and
conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and
the people o
f
each State created a State government, to exercise
the remaining powers o
f sovereignty so far as they were disposed
to allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which
they establish, they not only tie up the hands o
f
their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of
the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at lib
erty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law. But in
every State, although all persons are under the protection o
f
the
government, and obliged to conform their action to it
s laws, there
are always some who are altogether excluded from participation
in the government, and are compelled to submit to be ruled by
a
n authority in the creation o
f
which they have no choice. The
political maxim, that government rests upon the consent o
f
the
governed, appears, therefore, to be practically subject to many
exceptions; and when we say the sovereignty o
f
the Sate is
vested in the people, the question very naturally presents itself,
What are we to understand b
y
The People as used in this con
nection ?
[*29]
population, had an absolute right to
form a constitution and be admitted
to the Union under it. See Scott v.
Detroit Young Men's Society’s Lessee,
1 Doug. (Mich.) 119, and the contrary
opinion in Myers v. Manhattan Bank,
20 Ohio, 283. The debates in the
Senate of the United States on the
admission o
f Michigan to the Union
go fully into this question. See Ben
ton's Abridgment o
f Congressional
Debates, Vol. XIII. pp. 69–72. And
* What should be the correct rule upon this subject, it
does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this
a
s to the right o
f
the people o
f
a
Territory to originate measures look
ing to an application for admission to
the Union, see opinions o
f Attorneys
General, Vol. II. p. 726.
* See Jameson on Constitutional
Conventions, c. 8.
* McLean, J., in Spooner v. Mc
Connell, 1 McLean, 347; Waite, Ch.
J., in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
162, 172; Potter's Dwarris on Stat.
c. 1
.
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men will theorize; but the practical question lies back of the for
mation of the Constitution, and is addressed to the people, them
selves. As a practical fact, the sovereignty is vested in those
persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to
exercise the elective franchise." Such persons may have been
designated by description in the enabling act of Congress permit
ting the formation of the constitution, if any such there were, or
the convention which framed the constitution may have deter
mined the qualifications of electors without external dictation.
In either case, however, it was essential to subsequent good order
and contentment with the government, that those classes in gen
eral should be admitted to a voice in its administration, whose
exclusion on the ground of want of capacity or of moral fitness
could not reasonably and to the general satisfaction be defended.
Certain classes have been almost universally excluded, - the
slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelli
gence and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of
the right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly perhaps,
because, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to
be under the influence of her husband, and, where the common
law prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon
and subjection to him ;” the infant, for reasons similar to those
which exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on
obvious grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion
it is difficult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory.
The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are ex
cluded because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the
liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective
franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of
these qualifications is to be determined, it is not easy to establish
on grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by
all. It must be one that is definite and easy of application, and
it must be made permanent, or an accidental majority may at any
time change it
,
so a
s
to usurp all power to themselves. But to
be definite and easy o
f application, it must also be arbitrary. The
* “The people, for political pur- reasons for the exclusion in the opin
poses, must be considered as synony- ions in Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall.
mous with qualified voters.” Blair 130, and Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
v
. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63. 362.
* Some reference is made to the
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infant of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily
acquiring it
,
and a period is fixed a
t
which he shall conclusively
b
e presumed to possess what is requisite. The alien may know
nothing o
f
our political system and laws, and he is ex
[* 30] cluded until "he has been domiciled in the country for
a period judged to be sufficiently long to make him
familiar with its institutions; races are sometimes excluded
arbitrarily ; and at times in some o
f
the States the possession o
f
a certain amount o
f property, o
r
the capacity to read, seem to
have been regarded as essential to satisfactory proof o
f
sufficient
freedom o
f
action and intelligence."
Whatever rule is once established must remain fixed until
those who by means o
f it have the power of the State put
into their hands see fi
t
to invite others to participate with them in
its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their
right to a share in the government, otherwise than b
y
operating
upon the public opinion o
f
those who possess the right o
f suffrage,
would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down
by the strong arm o
f
the government o
f
the State, assisted, if
need be, by the military power o
f
the Union.”
In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitu
tions, the following appear to be settled principles o
f
American
constitutional law : —
I. The people of the several Territories may form for them
selves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose
are passed b
y
Congress, but only in the manner allowed b
y
such
enabling acts, and through the action o
f
such persons a
s
the en
abling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end.
If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without
such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a consti
1 State v. Woodruff, 2 Day, 504;
Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 267;
Opinions o
f Judges, 18 Pick. 575. See
Mr. Bancroft's synopsis of the first
constitutions o
f
the original States,
in his History o
f
the American Rev
olution, c. 5. For some local elec
tions it is quite common still to
require property qualification o
r
the
payment o
f
taxes in the voter; but
statutes o
f
this description are gener
ally construed liberally. See Craw
ford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504. Many
special statutes, referring to the peo
ple o
f
a municipality the question o
f
voting aid to internal improvements,
have confined the right o
f voting on
the question to tax-payers.
* The case of Rhode Island and
the “Dorr Rebellion,” so popularly
known, will be fresh in the minds o
f
all. For a discussion of some of the
legal aspects o
f
the case, see Luther
v
. Borden, 7 How. 1.
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tution, and demand admission to the Union under it
,
such action
does not entitle them, as matter o
f right, to be recognized as a
State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the
territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satis
fied to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always
in these cases questions o
f policy as well as o
f
constitutional law
to b
e
determined b
y
the Congress before admission becomes a
matter o
f right; — whether the constitution formed is republican;
whether suitable and proper State boundaries have been fixed
upon ; whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper
qualifications for the exercise o
f
the elective franchise have been
agreed to ; whether any inveterate evil exists in the Territory
which is now subject to control, but which might be perpetuated
under a State government; — these and the like questions, in
which the whole country is interested, cannot be finally solved
b
y
the people o
f
the Territory for themselves, but the final deci
sion must rest with Congress, and the judgment must be favora
ble before admission can b
e
claimed o
r expected."
II. In the original States, and al
l
others subsequently admitted
to the Union, the power to amend o
r
revise their constitutions
resides in the great body o
f
the people a
s
a
n organized body poli
tic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source
o
f
all State authority, have power to control and alter at will the
law which they have made. But the people, in the legal sense,
must be understood to be those who, by the existing constitution,
are clothed with political rights, and who, while that instrument
remains, will be the sole organs through which the will of the
body politic can be expressed.”
III. But the will of the people to this end can only be ex
pressed in the legitimate modes b
y
which such a body politic
can act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution
whose revision o
r
amendment is sought, o
r by an act o
f
the legis
1 When a constitution has been the legislature accepts such changes
adopted b
y
the people o
f
a Territory,
preparatory to admission as a State,
and Congress prescribes certain
changes and additions to be adopted
by the legislature as part of the con
stitution, and declares such changes
and additions to be fundamental con
ditions o
f
admission o
f
the State, and
and additions, and it is admitted, the
changes become a part o
f
the consti
tution, and binding as such, although
not submitted to the people for ap
proval. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb.
198.
* Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 ;
Wells v. Bain, 75 Penn. St. 39.
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lative department of the State, which alone would be author
ized to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point out
a mode for the expression of their will in the absence of any pro
vision for amendment or revision contained in the constitution
itself."
* Opinions of the Judges, 6 Cush.
573; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100.
The first constitution of New York
contained no provision for its own
amendment, and Mr. Hammond, in
his Political History of New York,
Vol. I. c. 26, gives a very interesting
account of the controversy before the
legislature and in the council of revi
sion as to the power of the legislature
to call a convention for revision, and
as to the mode of submitting its work
to the people. In Collier v. Frierson,
24 Ala. 108, it appeared that the leg
islature had proposed eight different
amendments to be submitted to the
people at the same time; the people
had approved them, and a
ll
the requi
site proceedings to make them a part
o
f
the constitution had been had,
except that in the subsequent legisla
ture the resolution for their ratifica
tion had by mistake omitted to re
cite one o
f
them. On the question
whether this one had been adopted,
we quote from the opinion o
f
the
court: “The constitution can be
amended in but two ways: either by
the people who originally framed it
,
o
r
in the mode prescribed by the in
strument itself. If the last mode is
pursued, the amendments must b
e
proposed b
y
two-thirds o
f
each house
o
f
the general assembly; they must
b
e published in print, at least three
months before the next general elec
tion for representatives; it must appear
from the returns made to the Secre
tary o
f
State that a majority o
f
those
voting for representatives have voted
in favor o
f
the proposed amendments,
and they must be ratified b
y
two
thirds o
f
each house o
f
the next gen
eral assembly after such election,
voting b
y
yeas and nays, the proposed
amendments having been read a
t
each
session three times on three several
days in each house. We entertain no
doubt that to change the constitution
in any other mode than by a conven
tion, every requisition which is de
manded by the instrument itself must
b
e observed, and the omission o
f any
one is fatal to the amendment. We
scarcely deem any argument necessary
to enforce this proposition. The con
stitution is the supreme and para
mount law. The mode by which
amendments are to be made under it
is clearly defined. It has been said
that certain acts are to be done, cer
tain requisitions are to be observed,
before a change can be effected. But
to what purpose are those acts re
quired o
r
those requisitions enjoined,
if the legislature or any department
o
f
the government can dispense with
them? To do so would be to violate
the instrument which they are sworn
to support, and every principle o
f
public law and sound constitutional
policy requires the courts to pro
nounce against any amendment which
is not shown to have been made in
accordance with the rules prescribed
by the fundamental law.” See also
State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303. But
where the constitution provided that
amendments should be proposed by
one general assembly, and approved
and submitted to popular vote by a
second, and seventeen amendments
were thus approved together, and the
second general assembly passed upon
and submitted eight by one bill and
nine by another, the submission was
held sufficient and valid. Trustees
o
f University v. McIver, 72 N
.
C
.
76.
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* IV. In accordance with universal practice, and from [* 32]
the very necessity of the case, amendments to an existing
constitution, or entire revisions of it
,
must be prepared and
matured by some body o
f representatives chosen for the purpose.
It is obviously impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare,
and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems to be n
o
feasible mode b
y
which a
n expression o
f
their will can be obtained,
except by asking it upon the single point of assent or disapproval.
But no body of representatives, unless specially clothed with
power for that purpose by the people when choosing them, can
rightfully take definitive action upon amendments o
r revisions;
they must submit the result o
f
their deliberations to the people'—
who alone are competent to exercise the powers o
f sovereignty in
framing the fundamental law—for ratification or rejection. The
constitutional convention is the representative o
f sovereignty only
in a very qualified sense, and for the specific purpose, and with
the restricted authority to put in proper form the questions o
f
amendment upon which the people are to pass; but the
changes in the * fundamental law o
f
the State must be [* 33]
enacted b
y
the people themselves."
V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitu
tions is limited b
y
the Constitution o
f
the United States in the
following particulars: —
1
. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since
such act would be revolutionary in it
s character, and would call
for and demand direct intervention on the part o
f
the government
of the United States.” -
2
. It must not provide for titles of nobility, or assume to violate
* See, upon this subject, Jameson
on the Constitutional Convention,
§§ 415–418, and 479–520. This work
is so complete and satisfactory in its
treatment o
f
the general subject, as
to leave little to be said b
y
one who
shall afterwards attempt to cover the
same ground. Where a convention
to frame amendments to the consti
tution is sitting under a legislative
act from which all its authority is
derived, the submission o
f
its labors
to a vote o
f
the people in a manner
different from that prescribed by the
act is nugatory. Wells v. Bain, 75
Penn. St. 39. Such a convention has
no inherent rights; it has delegated
powers only, and must keep within
them. Wood's Appeal, 75 Penn. St.
59. Compare Loomis v. Jackson, 6
W. Va. 613, 708. The Supreme
Court o
f
Missouri have expressed the
opinion that it was competent for a
convention to put a new constitution
in force without submitting it to the
people. State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119.
But this was obiter.
* Const. o
f U
.
S
.
art. 4
,
§ 4
;
Fed
eralist, No. 43.
42 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. III.
the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or pro
vide ea post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which
were innocent when committed, or contain any other provision
which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power ex
pressly or impliedly prohibited to the States by the Constitution
of the Union. For while such provisions would not call for the
direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union,
it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to
refuse to enforce them, and to declare them altogether void, as
much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as
makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in the form of
statutes through the delegated power of their legislatures."
VI. Subject to the foregoing principles and limitations, each
State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in it
s
constitution ; how the powers o
f government shall be apportioned
in order to their proper exercise; what protection shall be thrown
around the person o
r property o
f
the citizen; and to what extent
private rights shall be required to yield to the general
[* 34] good.”
* Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly,
1 Black, 436; State v. Keith, 63 N
.
C
.
140; Jackoway v. Denton, 25 Ark.
525; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg.
490; Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heis. 280;
Lawson v. Jeffries, 47 Miss. 686; s. c.
1
2 Am. Rep. 342; Penn v. Tollison,
2
6 Ark. 545; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18
How. 331; Pacific R
.
R
.
Co. v. Ma
guire, 20 Wall. 36; Railroad Co. v.
McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White v.
Hart, 13 Wall. 649. The fact that
the constitution containing the ob
noxious provision was submitted to
Congress, and the State admitted to
full rights in the Union under it
,
can
not make such provision valid. Gunn
v
. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
* Matter o
f
the Reciprocity Bank,
22 N
.
Y
. 9; McMullen v. Hodge, 5
Texas, 34; Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark.
545; Matter o
f
Oliver Lee & Co.'s
Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. In the case last
cited, Denio, J., says: “The [consti
tutional] convention was not obliged,
*And the courts of the State, still more the
like the legislative bodies, to look
carefully to the preservation o
f
vested
rights. It was competent to deal,
subject to ratification b
y
the people
and to the Constitution o
f
the fed
eral government, with all private
and social rights, and with all the
existing laws and institutions o
f
the
State. If the convention had so
willed, and the people had concurred,
all former charters and grants might
have been annihilated. When, there
fore, we are seeking for the true
construction o
f
a constitutional pro
vision, we are constantly to bear in
mind that its authors were not exe
cuting a delegated authority, limited
by other constitutional restraints, but
are to look upon them as the founders
o
f
a State, intent only upon establish
ing such principles as seemed best
calculated to produce good govern
ment and promote the public happi
ness, a
t
the expense o
f any and all
existing institutions which might
stand in their way.”
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courts of the Union, would be precluded from inquiring into
the justice of their action, or questioning its validity, because
of any supposed conflict with fundamental rules of right or of
government, unless they should be able to show collision at some
point between the instrument thus formed and that paramount
law which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the
fundamental rule of action throughout the whole United States."
How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the par
ticulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the
convention which forms it
.
Certain things are to be looked for
in all these instruments; though even as to these there is great
variety, not only o
f substance, but also in the minuteness o
f
their
provisions to meet particular cases.
I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be
designed, under which the sovereignty o
f
the people is to b
e exer
cised b
y
representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner
a
s
the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it
makes.
1 All the State constitutions now
contain within themselves provisions
for their amendment. Some require
the question o
f calling a convention
to revise the constitution to be sub
mitted to the people a
t
stated periods;
others leave it to the legislature to
call a convention, o
r
to submit to the
people the question o
f calling one;
while the major part allow the legis
lature to mature specific amendments
to be submitted to the people sepa
rately, and these become a part o
f
the
constitution if adopted by the requi
site vote.
When the late rebellion had been
put down b
y
the military forces o
f
the United States, and the State gov
ernments which constituted a part o
f
the disloyal system had been dis
placed, serious questions were raised
a
s
to the proper steps to be taken in
order to restore the States to their
harmonious relations to the Union.
These questions, and the controversy
over them, constituted an important
part o
f
the history o
f
our country
during the administration o
f Presi
dent Johnson; but as it is the hope
and trust o
f
our people that the occa
sion for discussing such questions will
never arise again, we d
o
not occupy
space with them in this work. It
suffices for the present to say, that
Congress claimed, insisted upon, and
enforced the right to prescribe the
steps to b
e taken and the conditions
to be observed in order to restore
these States to their former positions
in the Union, and the right also to
determine when the prescribed condi
tions had been complied with, so as
to entitle them to representation in
Congress. There is some discussion
o
f
the general subject in Texas v.
White, 7 Wall. 700. And see Gunn
v
. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
It has been decided in some cases
that a constitution is to have effect
from the time o
f
its adoption by the
people, and not from the time o
f
the
admission of the State into the Union
by Congress. Scott v. Young Men's
Society's Lessee, 1 Doug. (Mich.)
119; Campbell v. Fields, 35 Texas,
751.
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II
. Generally the qualifications for the right of suffrage will
be declared, a
s well as the conditions under which it shall be
exercised.
III. The usual checks and balances of republican government,
in which consist its chief excellencies, will be retained. The most
important o
f
these are the separate departments for the exer
cise o
f legislative, executive, and judicial power; and these are to
b
e kept as distinct and separate as possible, except in so far as
the action o
f
one is made to constitute a restraint upon the action
o
f
the others, to keep them within proper bounds, and to prevent
hasty and improvident action. Upon legislative action there is
,
first, the check o
f
the executive, who will generally be clothed
with a qualified veto power, and who may refuse to execute laws
deemed unconstitutional; and, second, the check o
f
the judiciary,
who may annul unconstitutional laws, and punish those concerned
in enforcing them. Upon judicial action there is the legislative
check, which consists in the power to prescribe rules for the
courts, and perhaps to restrict their authority; and the executive
check, o
f refusing aid in enforcing any judgments which are be
lieved to be in excess o
f jurisdiction. Upon executive action the
legislature has a power o
f restraint, corresponding to that which
it exercises upon judicial action; and the judiciary may punish
executive agents for any action in excess o
f
executive authority.
And the legislative department has an important restraint upon
both the executive and the judiciary, in the power o
f impeach
ment for illegal or oppressive action, or for any failure to perform
official duty. The executive, in refusing to execute a legislative
enactment, will always do so with the peril of impeachment in
view.
IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the
English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition
in any such instrument. And even if not expressly recognized,
it is still to be understood that all these instruments are framed
with it
s present existence and anticipated continuance in view."
V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the pro
tection o
f
individuals and minorities. This declaration usually
contains the following classes o
f provisions : —
1
. Those declaratory o
f
the general principles o
f republican
* Park Commissioners v. Common Council o
f Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 ;
People v. Albertson, 55 N
.
Y
.
50.
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government; such as, that all freemen, when they form a social
compact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to ex
clusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the com
munity, but in consideration of public services; that absolute,
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority;
that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,
safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that
for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an in
alienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their
government in such manner as they may think proper; that all
elections shall be free and equal ; that no power of suspending
the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its author
ity; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of
peace ; that representation shall be in proportion to population ;
that the people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult
of the common good, to instruct their representatives, and petition
for redress of grievances; and the like.
2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen :
aS thatſall men are by nature free and independent, and have cer
tain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness; that
the right to property is before and higher than any consti
tutional * sanction; \that the free exercise and enjoyment [* 36]
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall for ever be allowed ; ' that every man may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on al
l
subjects, being
responsible for the abuse o
f
that right; that every man may bear
arms for the defence o
f
himself and o
f
the State; that the right
o
f
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time o
f
peace ; and the like.
3
. Those declaratory o
f
the principles which ensure to the citizen
a
n impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and property
against the arbitrary action o
f
those in authority : as that no bill
* Hale v. Everett, 53 N
.
H
. 9; Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio, N. s.
211.
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of attainder or ea post facto law shall be passed ; that the right to
trial by jury shall be preserved ; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive punishments inflicted ; that no person shall
be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence, nor
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; that private property shall not be taken for public use with
out compensation ; and the like.
Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the principles
of morality and virtue; and it is also sometimes expressly de
clared — what indeed is implied without the declaration — that
every thing in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out
of the general powers of government, and a
ll
laws contrary thereto
shall be void.
Many other things are commonly found in these charters o
f
government; * but since, while they continue in force, they are to
remain absolute and unchangeable rules o
f
action and decision, it
is obvious that they should not be made to embrace within their
iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest
o
f
the State o
r o
f
it
s people may vary from time to time, and
which are therefore more properly left to the control o
f
the legis
lature, which can more easily and speedily make the required
changes.
DIn considering State constitutions we must not commit the mis
take o
f supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and
protected b
y
them, they must also be considered as owing their
origin to them. These instruments measure the powers o
f
the
rulers, but they do not measure the rights o
f
the governed.
* “What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is
easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the
beginning o
f
a community, nor the origin o
f private rights; it
is not the fountain o
f law, nor the incipient state o
f government;
[*37]
* “This, then, is the office of a
written [free] constitution: to delegate
to various public functionaries such o
f
the powers o
f government as the peo
ple do not intend to exercise for
themselves; to classify these powers,
according to their nature, and to com
mit them to separate agents; to pro
vide for the choice o
f
these agents b
y
the people; to ascertain, limit, and
define the extent o
f
the authority thus
delegated ; and to reserve to the peo
ple their sovereignty over all things
not expressly committed to their
representatives.” E
.
P
. Hurlbut in
Human Rights and their Political
Guaranties.
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it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political free
dom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their
power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their
protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they
possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework
of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre
existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought.
There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived from a known
source. It presupposes an organized society, law, order, property,
personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and enough of culti
vated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroach
ments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every instance a
limitation upon the powers of government in the hands of agents;
for there never was a written republican constitution which del
egated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant
in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapable o
f
definition.” "
* Hamilton v. St. Louis County
Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bates, arguendo.
And see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s
Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; Lee v. State, 26
Ark. 265-6. “Written constitutions
sanctify and confirm great principles,
but the latter are prior in existence to
the former.” 2 Webster's Works,
392. See also 1 Bl. Com. 124;
2 Story, Life and Letters, 278; Sidney
on Government, c. 3
,
secs. 27 and 33.
“If this charter of State government
which we call a constitution were all
there was o
f
constitutional command;
if the usages, the customs, the max
ims, that have sprung from the habits
o
f life, modes of thought, methods of
trying facts by the neighborhood, and
mutual responsibility in neighborhood
interests; the precepts that have come
to us from the revolutions which over
turned tyrannies; the sentiments o
f
manly independence and self-control
which impelled our ancestors to sum
mon the local community to redress
local evils, instead o
f relying upon
king o
r legislature at a distance to do
so, - if a recognition of all these were
to be stricken from the body o
f
our
constitutional law, a lifeless skeleton
might remain, but the living spirit,
that which gives it force and attrac
tion, which makes it valuable, and
draws to it the affections o
f
the peo
ple; that which distinguishes it from
the numberless constitutions, so called,
which in Europe have been set up and
thrown down within the last hundred
years, many o
f which, in their ex
pressions, seemed equally fair and to
possess equal promise with ours, and
have only been wanting in the sup
port and vitality which these alone
can give, – this living and breathing
spirit which supplies the interpreta
tion o
f
the words of the written char
ter would be utterly lost and gone.”
People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44–107.
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[* 38] * CHAPTER IV.
OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
THE deficiencies of human language are such that if written
instruments were always prepared carefully by persons skilled in
the use of words, we should still expect to find their meaning
often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties in
their practical application. But when draughtsmen are careless
or incompetent, these difficulties are greatly increased, and they
multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only
to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who
framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances
which could not have been anticipated, but which must never
theless be governed by the general rules which the instruments
establish. Moreover, the different points of view from which
different interests regard these instruments incline them to differ
ent views of the instruments themselves. All these circumstances
tend to give to the subjects of interpretation and construction
great prominence in the practical administration of the law, and
to suggest questions which often are of no little difficulty.
Interpretation differs from construction in that the former “is
the act of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that
is
,
the sense which their author intended to convey ; and o
f
enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the
author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is
the drawing o
f
conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond
the direct expressions o
f
the text, from elements known from
and given in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though
not in the letter o
f
the text. Interpretation only takes place if
the text conveys some meaning o
r
other. But construction is
resorted to when, in comparing two different writings o
f
the same
individual, or two different enactments b
y
the same legislative
body, there is found contradiction where there was evidently no
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intention of such contradiction one of another, or where it hap
pens that part of a writing or declaration contradicts the rest.
When this is the case, and the nature of the document or dec
laration, or whatever else it may be, is such as not to allow us to
consider the whole as being invalidated by a partial or other con
tradiction, then resort must be had to construction; so, too, if
found to act in cases which have not been foreseen by the framers
of those rules, by which we are nevertheless obliged, for some
binding reason, faithfully to regulate as well as we can our action
respecting the unforeseen case.”” In common use, however, the
word construction is generally employed in the law in a sense em
bracing all that is properly covered by both when each is used in
a sense strictly and technically correct; and we shall so employ
it in the present chapter.
From the earliest periods in the history of "written [* 39]
law, rules of construction, sometimes based upon sound
reason, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at
other times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down
by those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have
been called upon to administer it
,
by the aid o
f
which the mean
ing o
f
the instrument was to be resolved. Some o
f
these rules
have been applied to particular classes o
f
instruments only ;
others are more general in their application, and, so far as they
are sound, may be made use o
f
in any case where the meaning
o
f
a writing is in dispute. To such of these as seem important
in constitutional law we shall refer, and illustrate them by refer
ences to reported cases, in which they have been applied.
A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the
questions, who are to apply these rules; what person, body, o
r
department is to enforce the construction; and how far a deter
mination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons,
bodies, o
r departments.
We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitu
tion an apportionment o
f
the powers o
f government. We shall
* Lieber, Legal and Political Her
meneutics. See Smith on Stat. and
Const. Construction, 600. Bouvier
defines the two terms succinctly as
follows: “Interpretation, the discovery
and representation o
f
the true mean
ing o
f any signs used to convey ideas.”
“Construction, in practice, determin
ing the meaning and application as to
the case in question o
f
the provisions
o
f
a constitution, statute, will, or
other instrument, o
r
o
f
a
n oral agree
ment.” Law Dic.
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also find certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as
well as upon specified officers in each, and we shall likewise dis
cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action
in various ways, with a view to the protection of individual
rights, and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any
one is called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do
any act in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitu
tion has spoken, it is obvious that a question of construction may
at once arise, upon which some one must decide before the duty
is performed or the act done. From the very nature of the case,
this decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or
department upon whom the duty is devolved, or from whom the
act is required.
Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the
[*40] legislature, * that, in establishing municipal corporations,
it shall restrict their powers of taxation; and a city char
ter is proposed which confines the right of taxation to the raising
of money for certain specified purposes, but in regard to those
purposes leaves it unlimited ; or which allows to the municipality
unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which per
mits persons to be taxed indefinitely, but limits the taxation of
property: in either of these cases the question at once arises,
whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the
constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of su
pervisors is
,
b
y
the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon
the credit o
f
the county for any county purpose, and that they are
asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some railway
company which proposes to construct a road across the county;
and the proposition is met with the query, Is this a county pur
pose, and can the issue o
f
bonds be regarded as a borrowing o
f
money, within the meaning o
f
the people as expressed in the con
stitution ? And once again: let us suppose that the governor is
empowered to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and he is requested to do so in order to provide for a class o
f
private claims whose holders are urgent ; can this with any pro
priety be deemed an extraordinary occasion ?
In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no
tribunal for the specific duty o
f solving in advance the questions
which arise. In a few of the States, indeed, the legislative de
partment has been empowered b
y
the constitution to call upon
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the courts for their opinion upon the constitutional validity of a
proposed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant,
the legislature may abstain from enacting it." But those pro
visions are not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, espe
cially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law,
can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they commonly
will be under such calls, without the benefit of argument at the
bar, and of that light upon the questions involved which
might "be afforded by counsel learned in the law, and [*41]
interested in giving them a thorough investigation.
It follows, therefore, that every department of the government
and every official of every department may at any time, when a
duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of
constitutional construction.” Sometimes the case will be such
that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be
conclusive and subject to no appeal or review, however erroneous
it may be in the opinion of other departments or other officers;
but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed
upon again before the duty is completely performed. The first
of these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular ques
tion is plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some
one department or officer, so that the interference of any other
department or officer, with a view to the substitution of it
s
own
* By the constitutions of Maine,
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts,
the judges o
f
the Supreme Court are
required, when called upon b
y
the
governor, council, o
r
either house o
f
the legislature, to give their opinions
“upon important questions of law,
and upon solemn occasions.” In
Florida the governor, and in Rhode
Island the governor or either house
o
f
the general assembly, may call
for the opinions of the judges of the
Supreme Court upon any question o
f
law. In Missouri, previous to the
constitution o
f 1875, the judges were
required to give their opinions “upon
important questions o
f
constitutional
law, and upon solemn occasions; ”
and the Supreme Court held that
while the governor determined for
himself whether the occasion was such
as to authorize him to call on the
judges for their opinion, they must
decide for themselves whether the
occasion was such as to warrant the
governor in making the call. Opin
ions o
f Judges, 49 Mo. 216.
* “It is argued that the legislature
cannot give a construction to the
constitution relative to private rights
secured b
y
it
. It is true that the
legislature, in consequence o
f
their
construction o
f
the constitution, can
not make laws repugnant to it
.
But
every department o
f government,
invested with certain constitutional.
powers, must, in the first instance,
but not exclusively, be the judge o
f
its powers, o
r it could not act.”
Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. In
habitants o
f Kingston, 5 Mass. 533.
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discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the constitu
tion has confided the decision, would be impertinent and intru
sive. Under every constitution cases of this description are to
be met with ; and, though it will sometimes be found difficult to
classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly
determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail
which makes the decision final.
We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the
executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else
in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the
constitutional sense ; it is obvious that the question is addressed
exclusively to the executive judgment, and neither the legislative
nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action if the
executive decide against it
,
o
r
to enjoin action if
,
in his opinion,
the proper occasion has arisen." And again, if
,
b
y
the
[*42] constitution, * laws are to take effect at a specified time
after their passage, unless the legislature, for urgent
reasons, shall otherwise order, we must perceive a
t
once that the
legislature alone is competent to pass upon the urgency o
f
the
alleged reasons.”
* In exercising his power to call
out the militia in certain exigencies,
the President is the exclusive and
final judge when the exigency has
arisen. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.
29. In People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409,
s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 634, it appeared that
a
n
officer assuming to act as governor,
in the absence o
f
the governor from
the State, had issued a proclamation
convening the legislature in extraor
dinary session. The governor re
turned previous to the time named for
the meeting, and issued a second proc
lamation, revoking the first. Held,
that the power o
f convening the legis
lature being a discretionary power,
it might be recalled before the meet
ing took place.
How far the decision o
f
the legisla
ture that a certain act is a local act
concludes the courts, see People v.
Allen, 1 Lans. 248. It is undoubted,
that, when a case is within the legis
And to take a judicial instance: If a court is
lative discretion, the courts cannot
interfere with its exercise. State
v
. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178; State v.
Boone County Court, 50 Mo. 317;
Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Penn. St. 54.
The statement o
f legislative reasons
in the preamble o
f
a
n act will not
affect it
s validity. Lothrop v. Stead
man, 42 Conn. 583.
* See post, p
.
* 157. In Gillinwater
v
. Mississippi & Atlantic Railroad
Co., 13 Ill. 1
,
it was urged that
a certain restriction imposed upon
railroad corporations by the general
railroad law was a violation of the
provision o
f
the constitution which
enjoins it upon the legislature “to
encourage internal improvements by
passing liberal general laws o
f incor
poration for that purpose.” The
court say o
f
this provision: “This is
a constitutional command to the leg
islature, as obligatory on it as any
other o
f
the provisions o
f
that instru
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required to give an accused person a trial at the first term after
indictment, unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is
obvious that the question of good cause is one for the court alone
to pass upon, and that it
s judgment when exercised is
,
and must
b
e
from the nature o
f
the case, final. And when in these or any
similar case the decision is once made, other departments or other
officers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume
the decision to be correct, and are not a
t liberty to raise any
question concerning it
,
unless some duty is devolved upon them
which presents the same question anew.
But there are cases in which the question of construction is
equally addressed to two or more departments o
f
the government,
and it then becomes important to know whether the decision by
one is binding upon the others, o
r
whether each is to act upon it
s
own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the governor,
being empowered by the constitution to convene the
* legislature upon extraordinary occasions, has regarded [*43]
a particular event as being such an occasion, and has
issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to the
enactment o
f
some particular legislation which the event seems
to call for, and which he specifies in his proclamation. Now, the
legislature are to enact laws upon their own view o
f necessity
and expediency; and they will refuse to pass the desired statute
if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so doing they
indirectly review the governor's decision, especially if in refusing
ment; but it is one which cannot be
enforced by the courts o
f justice. It
addresses itself to the legislature alone,
and it is not for us to say whether it
has obeyed the behest in it
s
true spirit.
Whether the provisions o
f
this law are
liberal, and tend to encourage internal
improvements, is matter o
f opinion,
about which men may differ; and as
we have no authority to revise legis
lative action on the subject, it would
not become us to express our views in
relation to it. The law makes no
provision for the construction o
f ca
nals and turnpike roads, and yet they
are as much internal improvements as
railroads, and we might as well be
asked to extend what we might con
sider the liberal provisions o
f
this law
to them, because they are embraced
in the constitutional provision, as to
ask us to disregard such provisions o
f
it as we might regard as illiberal.
The argument proceeds upon the idea
that we should consider that as done
which ought to be done; but that
principle has no application here.
Like laws upon other subjects within
legislative jurisdiction, it is for the
courts to say what the law is
,
not
what it should be.” It is clear that
courts cannot interfere with matters
o
f legislative discretion. Maloy v.
Marietta, 11 Ohio, N
.
s. 639. As to
self-executing provisions in general,
see post, p
.
* S3.
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to pass the law they do so on the ground that the specific event
was not one calling for action on their part. In such a case it is
clear that, while the decision of the governor is final so far as to
require the legislature to meet, it is not final in any sense that
would bind the legislative department to accept and act upon it
when they are called to enter upon the performance of their duty
in the making of laws."
So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legis
lature have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain
sense subject to review by the governor. If a bill is introduced
the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill
by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their
judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the
constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same
question of constitutional authority will be brought by the bill
before him, since it is manifestly his duty to withhold approval
from any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for
any reason to pass. And what reason so valid as that the con
stitution confers upon them no authority to that end ? In al
l
these and the like cases, each department must act upon it
s
own
judgment, and cannot be required to do that which it regards as
a violation o
f
the constitution, on the ground solely that another
department which, in the course o
f
the discharge o
f
it
s
own duty,
was called upon first to act, has reached the conclusion that it
will not be violated by the proposed action.
But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred,
where from the nature o
f things, and perhaps from explicit terms
o
f
the constitution, the judgment o
f
the department o
r
officer
acting must be final, we shall find the general rule to be, that
whenever an act is done which may become the subject o
f
a suit
o
r proceeding in court, any question o
f
constitutional authority
that was raised or that might have been raised when the act
[*44] was done will be * open for consideration in such suit or
proceeding, and that as the courts must finally settle the
controversy, so also will they finally determine the question o
f
constitutional law.
For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any
law, direction, or order made b
y
any body o
r any officer assuming
to act under it
,
since such body o
r
officer must exercise a dele
* See Opinions o
f Judges, 49 Mo. 216.
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gated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to
the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of
conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict
with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has
yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be
discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination
is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights
would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal
controversy; and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.
The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon
the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and some
times of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority,
not only to judge, but also to enforce their judgments, the result
of a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or execu
tive act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the
paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question."
* “When laws conflict in actual
cases, they [the courts] must decide
which is the superior law, and which
must yield; and as we have seen that,
according to our principles, every
officer remains answerable for what
he officially does, a citizen, believing
that the law he enforces is incompati
ble with the superior law, the con
stitution, simply sues the officer before
the proper court as having unlawfully
aggrieved him in the particular case.
The court, bound to do justice to
every one, is bound also to decide this
case as a simple case of conflicting
laws. The court does not decide
directly upon the doings of the leg
islature. It simply decides for the
case in hand, whether there actually
are conflicting laws, and, if so, which
is the higher law that demands obedi
ence, when both may not be obeyed
at the same time. As, however, this
decision becomes the leading decision
for all future cases of the same import,
until, indeed, proper and legitimate
authority should reverse it
,
the ques
tion o
f constitutionality is virtually
decided, and it is decided in a natural,
easy, legitimate, and safe manner,
according to the principle o
f
the
supremacy o
f
the law, and the de
pendence o
f justice. It is one of the
most interesting and important evo
lutions o
f
the government o
f law, and
one o
f
the greatest protections o
f
the
citizen. It may well be called a very
jewel o
f Anglican liberty, and one o
f
the best fruits of our political civili
zation.” Lieber, Civil Liberty and
Self-Government.
“Whenever a law which the judge
holds to be unconstitutional is argued
in a tribunal o
f
the United States, he
may refuse to admit it as a rule; this
power is the only one which is peculiar
to the American magistrate, but it
gives rise to immense political influ
ence. Few laws can escape the
searching analysis; for there are few
which are not prejudicial to some
private interest o
r other, and none
which may not be brought before a
court o
f justice by the choice o
f par
ties, o
r by the necessity o
f
the case.
But from the time that a judge has
refused to apply any given law in a
case, that law loses a portion o
f
its
moral sanction. The persons to
whose interest it is prejudicial learn
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[*45] * The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecu
tive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The admin
istration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform
this duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the
next to determine the law applicable to such facts. The consti
tution is the fundamental law of the State, in opposition to which
any other law, or any direction or order, must be inoperative and
void. If, therefore, such other law, direction, or order seems to
be applicable to the facts, but on comparison with the funda
mental law the latter is found to be in conflict with it
,
the court,
in declaring what the law o
f
the case is
,
must necessarily deter
mine it
s invalidity, and thereby in effect annul it." The right
and the power o
f
the courts to d
o
this are so plain,
[*46] * and the duty is so generally — we may almost say uni
versally — conceded, that we should not be justified in
that means exist for evading its au
thority; and similar suits are multi
plied until it becomes powerless. One
of two alternatives must then be re
sorted to, - the people must alter the
constitution, o
r
the legislature must
repeal the law.” De Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, c. 6.
* “It is idle to say that the au
thority of each branch of the govern
ment is defined and limited b
y
the
constitution, if there be not an in
dependent power able and willing
to enforce the limitations. Experi
ence proves that the constitution is
thoughtlessly but habitually violated;
and the sacrifice o
f
individual rights
is too remotely connected with the
objects and contests o
f
the masses to
attract their attention. From its
very position it is apparent that the
conservative power is lodged in the
judiciary, which, in the exercise o
f
its
undoubted rights, is bound to meet
any emergency; else causes would be
decided, not only b
y
the legislature,
but sometimes without hearing o
r
evidence.” Per Gibson, Ch. J., in
De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn.
St. 18.
“Nor will this conclusion, to use
the language o
f
one o
f
our most emi
nent jurists and statesmen, by any
means suppose a superiority o
f
the
judicial to the legislative power. It
will only be supposing that the power
o
f
the people is superior to both; and
that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that declared by the
people in the constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fun
damental laws rather than b
y
those
which are not fundamental. Neither
would we, in doing this, be under
stood as impugning the honest inten
tions, o
r
sacred regard to justice,
which we most cheerfully accord to
the legislature. But to be above error
is to possess an entire attribute o
f
the
Deity; and to spurn its correction,
is to reduce to the same degraded
level the most noble and the meanest
o
f
his works.” Bates v. Kimball,
2 Chip. 77.
“Without the limitations and re
straints usually found in written con
stitutions, the government could have
n
o
elements o
f permanence and dura
bility; and the distribution of its
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wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very
numerous authorities upon the subject."
* Conclusiveness of Judicial Decisions. [*47]
But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one
case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under
powers and the vesting their exercise
in separate departments would be an
idle ceremony.” Brown, J., in Peo
ple v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 558.
1 1 Kent, 500–507; Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Webster on
the Independence of the Judiciary,
Works, Vol. III. p. 29. In this
speech Mr. Webster has forcibly set
forth the necessity of leaving with the
courts the power to enforce constitu
tional restrictions. “It cannot be
denied,” says he, “that one great
object of written constitutions is
,
to
keep the departments o
f government
a
s
distinct as possible; and for this
purpose to impose restraints designed
to have that effect. And it is equally
true that there is no department on
which it is more necessary to impose
restraints than upon the legislature.
The tendency of things is almost
always to augment the power o
f
that
department in its relation to the
judiciary. The judiciary is composed
o
f
few persons, and those not such as
mix habitually in the pursuits and
objects which most engage public
men. They are not, o
r
never should
be, political men. They have often
unpleasant duties to perform, and
their conduct is often liable to be can
vassed and censured where their rea
sons for it are not known or cannot
be understood. The legislature holds
the public purse. It fixes the com
pensation o
f all other departments; it
applies as well as raises all revenue.
It is a numerous body, and necessa
rily carries along with it a great force
o
f public opinion. Its members are
public men, in constant contact with
one another and with their constit
uents. It would seem to be plain
enough that, without constitutional
provisions which should be fixed and
certain, such a department, in case o
f
excitement, would be able to encroach
o
n
the judiciary.” “The constitu
tion being the supreme law, it follows,
o
f course, that every act o
f
the legis
lature contrary to that law must be
void. But who shall decide this ques
tion? Shall the legislature itself de
cide it? If so, then the constitution
ceases to b
e
a legal, and becomes only
a moral, restraint upon the legislature.
If they, and they only, are to judge
whether their acts be conformable to
the constitution, then the constitution
is admonitory o
r advisory only, not
legally binding; because if the con
struction o
f it rests wholly with them,
their discretion, in particular cases,
may be in favor of very erroneous
and dangerous constructions. Hence
the courts o
f law, necessarily, when
the case arises, must decide on the
validity o
f particular acts.” “With
out this check, no certain limitation
could exist on the exercise o
f legisla
tive power.” See also, as to the
dangers o
f legislative encroachments,
De Tocqueville, Democracy in Amer
ica, c. 6
: Story on Const. (4th ed.)
§ 532 and note. The legislature,
though possessing a larger share o
f
power, n
o
more represents the sover
eignty o
f
the people than either o
f
the
other departments; it derives its au
thority from the same high source.
Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. Railroad
Co., 4 Harr. 402; Whittington v.
Polk, 1 H
.
& J. 244; McCauley v.
Brooks, 16 Cal. 11.
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different circumstances for the decision of some other department
or officer of the government. It therefore becomes of the high
est importance to know whether a principle once authoritatively
declared is to be regarded as conclusively settled for the guidance,
not only of the court declaring it
,
but o
f
all courts and all depart
ments o
f
the government; or whether, on the other hand, the
decision settles the particular controversy only, so that a different
decision may b
e possible, or, considering the diversity o
f
human
judgments, even probable, whenever in any new controversy other
tribunals may be required to examine and decide upon the same
question.
In some cases and for some purposes the conclusiveness of a
judicial determination is
,
beyond question, final and absolute. A
decision once made in a particular controversy, b
y
the highest
court empowered to pass upon it
,
is conclusive upon the parties
to the litigation and their privies, and they are not allowed after
wards to revive the controversy in a new proceeding for the pur
pose o
f raising the same or any other questions. The matter in
dispute has become res judicata ; a thing definitely settled by
judicial decision; and the judgment o
f
the court imports absolute
verity. Whatever the question involved, - whether the inter
pretation o
f
a private contract, the legality o
f
a
n individual act,
o
r
the validity o
f
a legislative enactment, — the rule of finality is
the same. The controversy has been adjudged ; and, once finally
passed upon, it is never to be renewed." It must frequently
* Duchess o
f Kingston's Case, 11
State Trials, 261; s. c. 2 Smith,
Lead. Cas. 424; Young v. Black, 7
Cranch, 567; Chapman v. Smith, 16
How. 114; Aurora City v. West, 7
Wall. 82; Tioga R
.
R
.
Co. v. Bloss
burg, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 20 Wall. 137;
The Rio Grande, 23 Wall. 458; Skeld
ing v. Whitney, 3 Wend. 154; Ether
edge v. Osborn, 12 Wend. 399; Hayes
v
. Reese, 3
4 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Bates,
35 Barb. 308; Harris v. Harris, 36
Barb. 88; Madox v. Graham, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 56; Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 34;
Norton v. Doherty, 3 Gray, 372; Thur
ston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39; Way
v
. Lewis, 115 Mass. 26; Blackinton v.
Blackinton, 113 Mass. 231 ; Witmer
v
. Schlatter, 15 S
.
& R
.
150; Warner
v
. Scott, 39 Penn. St. 274; Verner v.
Carson, 66 Penn. St. 440; Kerr v.
Union Bank, 18 Md. 396; Whitehurst
v
. Rogers, 38 Md. 503; Wales v Lyon,
2 Mich. 276; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2
Mich. 372; Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7
Mich. 511; Newberry v. Trowbridge,
1
3 Mich. 278; Barker v. Cleveland, 19
Mich. 230; Winslow v. Grindall, 2
Me. 64; Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157;
Crandall v. James, 6 R
. I. 144; Bab
cock v. Camp, 12 Ohio, N
.
s. 11;
Hawkins v. Jones, 19 Ohio, N
.
s. 22;
George v. Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa),
21; Taylor v. Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124;
Wright v. Leclair, 3 Iowa, 241; Clark
v
. Sammons, 12 Iowa, 368; Whittaker
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happen, therefore, that a question of constitutional law will be
decided in a private litigation, and the parties to the controversy,
and a
ll
others subsequently acquiring rights under them, in the
subject-matter o
f
the suit, will thereby become absolutely and for
ever precluded from renewing the question in respect to the mat
ter then involved. The rule of conclusiveness to this
extent is one o
f
the most inflexible principles * o
f
the [*48]
law; insomuch that even if it were subsequently held by
the courts that the decision in the particular case was erroneous,
such holding would not authorize the reopening o
f
the old con
troversy in order that the final conclusion might be applied
thereto."
But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus
disposed o
f
in suits involving only private rights, and when pri
vate individuals and their counsel alone are heard, it becomes of
interest to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the pub
v
. Johnson Co., 12 Iowa, 595; Dwyer
r. Goran, 29 Iowa, 126; Fairfield v.
McNarey, 37 Iowa, 75; Eimer v. Rich
ards, 25 Ill. 289; Wells v. McClen
ning, 23 Ill. 409; Crow v. Bowlby, 68
Ill. 23; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85;
Perrine v. Serrell, 30 N. J. 458;
Weber v. Morris, &c., 36 N. J. 213;
Fischli v. Cowan, 1 Blackf. 350;
Denny v. Reynolds, 24 Ind. 248; Bates
v
. Spooner, 45 Ind. 489; Davenport
v
. Barnett, 51 Ind. 329; Warwick v.
Underwood, 3 Head, 238; Jones v.
Weathersbee, 4 Strob. 50; Hoover
v
. Mitchell, 25 Gratt. 387; Hunger
ford's Appeal, 41 Conn. 322; Union
R. R. Co. v. Traube, 59 Mo. 355; Perry
v
. Lewis, 49 Miss. 443; Harris v. Col
quit, 44 Geo. 663; McCauley v. Har
groves, 48 Geo. 50; s. c. 15 Am. Rep.
660; Castellow v. Guilmartin, 54 Geo.
299; Sloan v. Cooper, 54 Geo. 486;
Doyle v. Hallam, 21 Minn. 515; Phill
pots r. Bladsdel, 10 Nev. 19; Case v.
New Orleans, &c. R
. R., 2 Woods, 236;
Geary v. Simmons, 39 Cal. 224; Can
non v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Finney v.
Boyd, 26 Wis. 366; Warner v. Trow,
36 Wis. 195; Ram on Legal Judgment,
c. 14. A judgment, however, is conclu
sive as a
n estoppel a
s
to those facts only
without the existence and proof o
f
which it could not have been rendered;
and if it might have been given on
any one o
f
several grounds, it is con
clusive between the parties as to nei
ther o
f
them. Lea v. Lea, 99 Mass.
493. And see Dickinson v. Hayes, 31
Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt.
223; Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall.
580: Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98;
Hill v. Morse, 61 Me. 541. A judicial
sale o
f property by an administrator
held conclusive in Roderigas v. East
R
.
Sav. Inst., 63 N
.
Y
.
460, a
s against
the supposed intestate himself, who
proved not to be dead.
1 McLean v. IIugarian, 13 Johns.
184; Morgan v. Plumb, 9 Wend. 287;
Wilder v. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker
v
. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v.
Pike, 5 Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11
Iowa, 276; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31
Barb. 381; Newberry v. Trowbridge,
1
3 Mich. 278; Skildin v. Herrick, 3
Wend. 154; Brockway v. Kinney, 2
Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns.
530; Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johns.
136; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100.
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lic at large are affected b
y
the decision. And here it will be dis
covered that quite a different rule prevails, and that a judicial
decision has no such force of absolute conclusiveness as to other
parties as it is allowed to possess between the parties to the liti
gation in which the decision has been made, and those who have
succeeded to their rights.
A party is concluded by a judgment against him from disput
ing its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case
was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were
sound o
r not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And
if the parties themselves are concluded, so also should be all those
who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the
subject-matter o
f
the judgment from o
r
under the parties, as per
sonal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, o
r purchasers, and who
are therefore considered in the law as privies." But if strangers
who have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like man
ner concluded, because their controversies are supposed to involve
the same question o
f law, we shall not only be forced into a series
o
f
endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order
to ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also
b
e
met b
y
the query, whether we are not concluding parties b
y
de
cisions which others have obtained in fictitious controversies and by
collusion, o
r
have suffered to pass without sufficient consideration
and discussion, and which might perhaps have been given other
wise had other parties had a
n opportunity o
f being heard.
* We have already seen that the force o
f
a judgment
does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon
the circumstance that any were o
r
were not given. If there were,
they may have covered portions o
f
the controversy only, or they
may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that
in any other controversy, though somewhat similar in it
s facts,
and apparently resembling it in it
s legal bearings, grave doubts
might arise whether it ought to fall within the same general prin
ciple. If one judgment were absolutely to conclude the parties
to any similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look
[*49]
* The question whether a judg
ment, by force o
f
its recitals, shall
operate as a technical estoppel, o
r
whether it shall operate as a bar only
after the proper parol evidence shall
have been given to identify the subject
o
f litigation, is one which our subject
does not require us to discuss. The
cases are examined fully and with
discrimination in Robinson's Prac
tice, Vol. VI. ; and are also discussed
in Bigelow on Estoppel.
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into the judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety
that all those facts which should influence the questions of law
were substantially the same in each, and we ought also to be able
to see that the first litigation was conducted in entire good faith,
and that every consideration was presented to the court which
could properly have weight in the construction and application
of the law. All these things, however, are manifestly impossi
ble ; and the law therefore wisely excludes judgments from being
used to the prejudice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts
their conclusiveness to the parties thereto and their privies."
Even parties and privies are bound only so far as regards the
subject-matter then involved, and would be at liberty to raise the
same questions anew in a distinct controversy affecting some dis
tinct subject-matter.”
All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing
law to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are sufficient
to influence the court to a particular conclusion in one case ought
to be sufficient to bring it or any other court to the same conclu
sion in all other like cases where no modification of the law has
intervened. There would thus be uniform rules for the adminis
tration of justice, and the same measure that is meted
out * to one would be received by a
ll
others. And even [* 50]
if the same or any other court, in a subsequent case,
should b
e
in doubt concerning the correctness o
f
the decision
which has been made, there are consequences o
f
a very grave
character to b
e contemplated and weighed before the experiment
o
f disregarding it should be ventured upon. That state of things,
when judicial decisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a
loss in regard to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil;
1 Burrill v. West, 2 N. H. 190;
Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6
;
Jackson
v
. Vedder, 3 Johns. 8
;
Case v. Reeve,
1
4 Johns. 79; Alexander v Taylor, 4
Denio, 302; Van Bokkelin v. Inger
soll, 5 Wend. 315; Smith v. Ballan
tyne, 10 Paige, 101; Orphan House
v
. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas v.
Hubbell, 15 N
.
Y. 405; Wood v. Ste
phen, 1 Serg. & R
.
175; Peterson v.
Lothrop, 34 Penn. St. 223; Twambly
v
. Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong,
2 Ohio, 401; Cowles v. Harts, 3 Conn.
516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361;
Riggins's Ex’rs v. Brown, 12 Geo.
271; Persons v. Jones, 12 Geo. 371 ;
Robinson's Practice, Vol. VII. 134 to
156; Bigelow on Estoppel, 46 et seq.
* Van Alstine v. Railroad Co., 34
Barb. 28; Taylor v. McCracken, 2
Blackf. 260; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B
.
Monr. 284. See, for a discussion o
f
this doctrine, its meaning and extent,
Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Wt. 98, and the
very full and exhaustive discussion in
Robinson's Practice, Vol. VII.
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and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in
future controversies resting upon analogous facts, and brought
within the same reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents,
therefore, become important, and counsel are allowed and ex
pected to call the attention of the court to them, not as conclud
ing controversies, but as guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor
Kent says: “A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in
any given case becomes an authority in a like case, because it is
the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to
the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so
long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law
was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a
decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature delib
eration, the presumption is in favor of it
s correctness, and the
community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or ex
position o
f
the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts
by it
. It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the pub
lic if precedents were not duly regarded, and implicitly followed.
It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional
men can give safe advice to those who consult them, and people
in general can venture to buy and trust, and to deal with each
other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we
should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks o
f property.
When a rule has once been deliberately adopted and declared, it
ought not to be disturbed unless b
y
a court o
f appeal o
r review,
and never b
y
the same court, except for very urgent reasons, and
upon a clear manifestation o
f error; and if the practice were
otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty as
to the law.” "
1 1 Kent, 475. And see Cro. Jac. 1 Yerg. 378 ; Palmer v. Lawrence,
527; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King
v
. Younger, 5 T
.
R
. 450; Goodtitle v.
Otway, 7 T
.
R
. 416; Selby v. Bar
dons, 3 B
.
& Ad. 17 : Fletcher v.
Lord Somers, 3 Bing. 588 ; Hammond
v
. Anderson, 4 Bos. & P
. 69; Lewis
v
. Thornton, 6 Munf. 94 ; Dugan v.
Hollins, 13 Md. 149; Anderson v.
Jackson, 16 Johns. 402; Goodell
v
. Jackson, 20 Johns 722; Bates v.
Releyea, 23 Wend. 340; Emerson v.
Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Nelson v. Allen,
5 N
.
Y
. 389; Kneeland v. Milwaukee,
15 Wis. 458; Boon v. Bowers, 30
Miss. 246; Frink v. Darst, 14 Ill.
311 : Broom's Maxims, 109. Dr.
Lieber thinks the doctrine of the
precedent especially valuable in a free
country. “Liberty and steady pro
gression require the principle o
f
the
precedent in a
ll spheres. It is one o
f
the roots with which the tree of lib
erty fastens in the soil o
f
real life,
and through which it receives the sap
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* The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applica- [* 51]
ble, in it
s
full force, within the territorial jurisdiction o
f
the courts making * the decisions, since there alone can [* 52]
o
f
fresh existence. It is the weapon
by which interference is warded off.
The principle o
f
the precedent is emi
nently philosophical. The English
Constitution would not have devel
oped itself without it
.
What is called
the English Constitution consists o
f
the fundamentals o
f
the British pol
ity, laid down in custom, precedent,
decisions, and statutes; and the com
mon law in it is a far greater portion
than the statute law. The English
Constitution is chiefly a common-law
constitution ; and this reflex o
f
a con
tinuous society in a continuous law
is more truly philosophical than the
theoretic and systematic, but lifeless,
constitutions of recent France.”
Civ. Lib. and Self-Gov. See also his
chapter on precedents in the Her
meneutics. In Nelson v. Allen, 1
Yerg. 376, where the constitution
ality o
f
the “Betterment Law'” came
under consideration, the court (White,
J.) say: “Whatever might be my
own opinion upon this question, not
to assent to its settlement now, after
two solemn decisions o
f
this court,
the last made upwards o
f
fourteen
years ago, and not only no opposing
decision, but no attempt even b
y any
case, during all this time, to call the
point again in controversy, forming
a complete acquiescence, would be,
a
t
the least, inconsistent, perhaps
mischievous, and uncalled for b
y
a
correct discharge o
f
official duty.
Much respect has always been paid
to the contemporaneous construction
o
f statutes, and a forbidding caution
hath always accompanied any ap
proach towards unsettling it
,
dictated
no doubt by easily foreseen conse
quences attending a sudden change
o
f
a rule o
f property, necessarily in
troductory at least o
f confusion, in
creased litigation, and the disturbance
o
f
the peace o
f society. The most
able judges and the greatest names
on the bench have held this view of
the subject, and occasionally ex
pressed themselves to that effect,
either tacitly o
r openly, intimating
that if they had held a part in the
first construction they would have
been o
f
a different opinion ; but the
construction having been made, they
give their assent thereto. Thus Lord
Ellenborough, in 2 East, 302, re
marks : “I think it is better to abide
by that determination, than to intro
duce uncertainty into this branch o
f
the law, it being often more impor
tant to have the rule settled, than to
determine what it shall be. I am
not, however, convinced by the rea
soning in this case, and if the point
were new I should think otherwise.”
Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burr. 419, says:
‘Where solemn determinations ac
quiesced under had settled precise
cases, and a rule o
f property, they
ought, for the sake o
f certainty, to
b
e observed, a
s if they had originally
formed a part o
f
the text o
f
the
statute.” And Sir James Mansfield,
in 4 B
.
& P
. 69, says: ‘I do not know
how to distinguish this from the case
before decided in the court. It is of
greater consequence that the law
should be as uniform as possible,
than that the equitable claim o
f
an
individual should be attended to.’”
And see People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich.
283.
How far a judgment rendered by a
court concludes, notwithstanding it was
one given under the law o
f necessity,
in consequence o
f
a
n equal division o
f
the court, see Durant c. Essex Co., 7
Wall. 107; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y.
281; and the cases collected in North
ern R
.
R
.
v
. Concord R
. R., 50 N. H.
176.
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such decisions be regarded as having established any rules.
Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may be
cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to
be accepted as guides, except in so far as those reasons commend
themselves to the judicial mind." Great Britain and the thirteen
original States had each substantially the same system of common
law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of
Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is
certainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not
necessarily to be accepted as binding authority any more than the
decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It
gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is
,
but its
force as an authoritative declaration must be confined to the coun
try for which the court sits and judges. But an English decision
before the Revolution is in the direct line o
f authority; and where
a particular statute o
r
clause o
f
the constitution has been adopted
in one State from the statutes o
r
constitution o
f another, after a
judicial construction had been put upon it in such last-mentioned
State, it is but just to regard the construction as having been
adopted, as well as the words; and a
ll
the mischiefs o
f disregard
ing precedents would follow as legitimately here as in any other
case.”
* Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77;
Kaontz v. Nabb, 16 Md. 549; Nel
son v. Goree, 34 Ala 565; Jamison
v
. Burton, 43 Iowa, 282.
* Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472;
Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154;
Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray,
450; Turnpike Co. v. People, 9 Barb.
167; Campbell v. Quinlin, 3 Scam.
288; Little v. Smith, 4 Scam. 402;
Riggs v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15; Tyler v.
Tyler, 19 Ill. 151; Fisher v. Deering,
6
0 Ill. 114: Langdon v. Applegate, 5
Ind. 327 ; Clark v. Jeffersonville, &c.
R
.
R
. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Fall v. Haz
elrigg, 45 Ind. 576; Ingraham v.
Regan, 23 Miss. 213: Adams v. Field,
2
1 Vt. 266; Drennan v. People, 10
Mich. 169; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich.
32: Harrison v. Sayer, 27 Mich. 476;
Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546;
Attorney-General v. Brunst, 3 Wis.
787; Poertner v. Russell, 33 Wis.
193; Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Me. 9
;
People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Bemis
v
. Becker, 1 Kan. 226 ; Walker v.
Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, N
.
s. 14 ; Hess
v
. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Freeze v. Tripp,
70 Ill. 496; In re Tuller, 79 Ill. 99;
Ex parte Mathews, 52 Ala. 51; Dan
ville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1. But it does
not necessarily follow that the prior
decision construing the law must be
inflexibly followed, since the circum
stances in the State adopting it may
be so different as to require a differ
ent construction. Little v. Sinith,
4 Scam. 402: Lessee o
f Gray v.
Askew, 3 Ohio, 479; Jamison v.
Burton, 43 Iowa, 282. It has very
properly been held that the legislature,
by enacting, without material altera
tion, a statute which had been gradu
ally expounded by the highest court
o
f
the State, must be presumed to
have intended that the same words
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It will of course sometimes happen that a court will find a
former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deduc
tions, or so mischievous in it
s consequences, as to feel compelled
to disregard it
.
Before doing so, however, it will be well to con
sider whether the point involved is such as to have become a
rule o
f property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance
upon it
,
and vested rights will be disturbed b
y
any change ; for in
such a case it may be better that the correction of the error
b
e left to the legislature, which can control its action so * as [* 53]
to make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust con
sequences."
Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have
been made are to be accepted as law, and followed b
y
the courts
in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be fol
lowed by other departments o
f
the government also.
should be received in the new statute
in the sense which have been attrib
uted to them in the old. Grace v.
McElroy, 1 Allen, 563; Cronan v.
Cotting, 104 Mass. 245; Low v. Blan
chard, 116 Mass. 272.
1 “After an erroneous decision
touching rights o
f property has been
followed thirty o
r forty years, and
even a much less time, the courts
cannot retrace their steps without
committing a new error nearly as
great as the one a
t
the first.” Bron
son, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1
N. Y. 260. See also Emerson v. At
water, 7 Mich. 12; Rothschild v. Grix,
31 Mich. 150; Loeb v. Mathis, 37
Ind. 306. “It is true that when a
principle o
f law, doubtful in it
s
char
acter o
r
uncertain in the subject
matter o
f
its application, has been
settled b
y
a series o
f judicial deci
sions, and acquiesced in for a con
siderable time, and important rights
and interests have become established
under such decisions, courts will hesi
tate long before they will attempt to
overturn the result so long established.
But when it is apparently indifferent
which o
f
two o
r
more rules is adopted,
the one which shall have been adopted
by judicial sanction will be adhered
Indeed, in
to, though it may not, at the moment,
appear to be the preferable rule. But
when a question involving important
public o
r private rights, extending
through all coming time, has been
passed upon o
n
a single occasion, and
which decision can in no just sense be
said to have been acquiesced in, it is
not only the right, but the duty o
f
the
court, when properly called upon, to
re-examine the questions involved,
and again subject them to judicial
scrutiny. We are by no means un
mindful o
f
the salutary tendency o
f
the rule stare decisis, but a
t
the same
time we cannot be unmindful of the
lessons furnished by our own con
sciousness, a
s well as b
y judicial his
tory, o
f
the liability to error and the
advantages o
f
review.” Per Smith,
J., Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 609. And
see Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis.
458; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49;
Bellows v. Parsons, 13 N
.
H
. 256;
Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Day
v
. Munson, 14 Ohio, N
.
s. 488; Green
Castle, &c. Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382 ;
Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469 ; Mead
v
. McGraw, 19 Ohio, N
.
s. 6
2 ; Linn
v
. Minor, 4 Nev. 462; Willis v. Owen,
4
3 Tex. 41, 48; Ram on Legal Judg
ment, c. 14, § 3.
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the great majority of cases, the officers of other departments have
no option; for the courts possess the power to enforce their con
struction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to
accept and follow it in one case would only create necessity for
new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are ex
ceptions to this rule which embrace a
ll
those cases where new
action is asked o
f
another department, which that department is
a
t liberty to grant o
r
refuse for any reasons which it may regard
a
s sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have
declared an expiring corporation to have been constitutionally
created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or
the executive to sign a
n
act for that purpose, if doubtful of the
constitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons
existed." In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon
its own reasons; mixed motives o
f power, justice, and policy in
fluence its action; and it is always justifiable and laudable to lean
against a violation o
f
the constitution. Indeed, cases must some
times occur when a court should refrain from declaring a
[* 54] statute * unconstitutional, because not clearly satisfied
that it is so, though, if the judges were to act as legislators
upon the question o
f
it
s enactment, they ought with the same
views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that sub
ject. The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions
may control in one which do not exist in the other. But those
cases where new legislation is sought stand b
y
themselves, and
are not precedents for those which involve only considerations
concerning the constitutional validity o
f existing enactments.
The general acceptance o
f judicial decisions as authoritative, by
each and all, can alone prevent confusion, doubt, and uncer
tainty, and any other course is incompatible with a true govern
ment of law.
1 In the celebrated case o
f
the ap
plication of the Bank o
f
the United
States for a new charter, President
Jackson felt himself a
t liberty to act
upon his own view o
f
constitutional
power, in opposition to that pre
viously declared b
y
the Supreme
Court, and President Lincoln ex
pressed similar views regarding the
conclusiveness o
f
the Dred Scott de
cision upon executive and legislative
action. See Story on Const. (4th ed.)
§ 375, note. It is notorious that while
the reconstruction o
f
States was go
ing on, after the late civil war, Con
gress took especial pains in some
cases to so shape it
s legislation that
the federal Supreme Court should
have n
o opportunity to question and
deny it
s validity.
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Construction to be Uniform.
A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that
they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their
practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to
be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some sub
sequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as
perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A
principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to
bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is
with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and
with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond
their control, that these instruments are framed ; and there can
be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as in
heres in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent
maxims of the common law which guard person and property
have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than
they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, particular, and
pervading in their protections; and we may conſidently look for
ward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of
improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such changes,
and the courts recognize them ; but a court or legislature which
should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in
giving to a written constitution a construction not warranted by
the intention of it
s founders, would be justly chargeable with
reckless disregard o
f
official oath and public duty; and if it
s
course could become a precedent, these instruments would
b
e o
f “little avail. The violence of public passion is [* 55]
quite as likely to be in the direction o
f oppression as in
any other; and the necessity for bills o
f rights in our fundamen
tal laws lies mainly in the danger that the legislature will be
influenced b
y
temporary excitements and passions among the
people to adopt oppressive enactments. What a court is to do,
therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people
themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may
require." The meaning o
f
the constitution is fixed when it is
i People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584; v. Taylor, 42 N
.
Y
. 259; Slack v.
Newell v. People, 7 N
.
Y
.
109; Hyatt Jacobs, 8 W. Va. 612, 650.
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adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a
court has occasion to pass upon it."
The Intent to govern.
The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,
is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it
. In the
case o
f
all written laws, it is the intent o
f
the law-giver that is
to be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument
itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed with
sufficient precision to convey it
,
and unless examination demon
strates that the presumption does not hold good in the particular
case, nothing will remain except to enforce it
.
“Where a law is
plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or
limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what
they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is
left for construction.” ”
* Campbell, J.
,
in People v. Blodgett,
13 Mich. 138; Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. 393.
* United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch,
399; Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B
.
Monr. 89; Sturgis v. Crowninshield,
4
. Wheat. 202; Schooner Paulina's
Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch, 60;
Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C
.
C
.
584;
United States v. Ragsdale, 1 Hemp.
497; Southwark Bank v. Common
wealth, 26 Penn. St. 446; Ingalls v.
Cole, 47 Me. 530; McCluskey v.
Cromwell, 11 N
.
Y
.
593; Furman
v
. New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v.
People, 7 N
.
Y
.
83; People v. N
.
Y
.
Central R
.
R
. Co., 24 N. Y. 492;
Bidwell v. Whittaker, 1 Mich. 479;
Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471;
Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Ma. 215; Case
v
. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 51; Spencer v.
State, 5 Ind. 49; Putnam v. Flint,
10 Pick. 504; Heirs o
f
Ludlow v.
Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Town
ship v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Patti
son v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v.
Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; In re Murphy,
3 Zab. 180; Attorney-General v. De
troit and Erin P. R
. Co., Walk. Ch.
Possible o
r
even probable meanings,
394; Smith v. Thursby, 28 Md. 244;
State v. Bladsdel, 4 Nev. 241; State v.
Doron, 5 Nev. 399; Hyatt v. Taylor,
42 N. Y. 259; Johnson v. Hudson
R
.
R
. Co., 49 N. Y. 455; Beardstown
v
. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34; St Louis, &c.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Clark, 53 Mo. 214; Mundt
v
. Sheboygan, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 31 Wis.
45; Slack v. Jacobs, 8 W. Va. 612;
Hawbecker v. Hawbecker, 43 Md. 516.
The remarks of Mr. Justice Bronson
in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35, are
very forcible in showing the impolicy
and danger o
f looking beyond the
instrument itself to ascertain its mean
ing, when the terms employed are
positive and free from all ambiguity.
“It is said that the Constitution does
not extend to public corporations, and
therefore a majority vote was suffi
cient. I do not so read the Constitu
tion. The language of the clause is:
“The assent of two-thirds of the mem
bers elected to each branch of the
legislature shall be requisite to every
bill creating, continuing, altering, or
renewing any body politic o
r cor
porate.” These words are as broad
in their signification as any which
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when one is “plainly declared in the instrument itself, the [* 56]
courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.
could have been selected for the occa
sion from our vocabulary, and there
is not a syllable in the whole instru
ment tending in the slightest degree
to limit or qualify the universality of
the language. If the clause can be so
construed that it shall not extend alike
to all corporations, whether public or
private, it may then, I think, be set
down as an established fact that the
English language is too poor for the
framing of fundamental laws which
shall limit the powers of the legisla
tive branch of the government. No
one has, I believe, pretended that the
Constitution, looking at that alone,
can be restricted to any particular
class or description of corporations.
But it is said that we may look be
yond the instrument for the purpose
of ascertaining the mischief against
which the clause was directed, and
thus restrict its operation. But who
shall tell us what that mischief was?
Although most men in public life are
old enough to remember the time
when the Constitution was framed
and adopted, they are not agreed
concerning the particular evils against
which this clause was directed. Some
suppose the clause was intended to
guard against legislative corruption,
and others that it was aimed at mo
nopolies. Some are of opinion that
it only extends to private without
touching public corporations, while
others suppose that it only restricts
the power of the legislature when cre
ating a single corporation, and not
when they are made by the hundred.
In this way a solemn instrument—
for so I think the Constitution should
be considered — is made to mean one
thing by one man and something else
by another, until, in the end, it is in
danger of being rendered a mere dead
letter; and that, too, where the lan
guage is so plain and explicit that it
is impossible to mean more than one
thing, unless we first lose sight of the
instrument itself, and allow ourselves
to roam at large in the boundless
fields of speculation. For one, I
dare not venture upon such a course.
Written constitutions of government
will soon come to be regarded as of
little value if their injunctions may
be thus lightly overlooked ; and the
experiment of setting a boundary to
power will prove a failure. We are
not at liberty to presume that the
framers of the Constitution, or the
people who adopted it
,
did not under
stand the force o
f language.” See
also same case, 4 Hill, 384, and State
v
. King, 44 Mo. 285. Another court
has said: “This power of construc
tion in courts is a mighty one, and,
unrestrained b
y
settled rules, would
tend to throw a painful uncertainty
over the effect that might be given
to the most plainly worded statutes,
and render courts, in reality, the leg
islative power o
f
the State. Instances
are not wanting to confirm this.
Judge-made law has overrode the
legislative department. It was the
boast o
f
Chief Justice Pemberton, one
o
f
the judges o
f
the despot Charles II.,
and not the worst even o
f
those times,
that he had entirely outdone the Par
liament in making law. We think
that system o
f jurisprudence best and
safest which controls most b
y
fixed
rules, and leaves least to the discretion
o
f
the judge; a doctrine constituting
one o
f
the points o
f superiority in the
common law over that system which
has been administered in France,
where authorities had no force, and
the law of each case was what the
judge o
f
the case saw fi
t
to make it
.
We admit that the exercise of an un
limited discretion may, in a particular
instance, be attended with a salutary
result; still history informs us that
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[• 57] *“Whether we are considering an agreement between
parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its in
terpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it
expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in al
l
cases is to the
natural signification o
f
the words employed, in the order o
f gram
matical arrangement in which the framers o
f
the instrument have
placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite
meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction
between different parts o
f
the same writing, then that meaning,
apparent o
n
the face o
f
the instrument, is the one which alone we
are a
t liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a
case there is no room for construction. That which the words
declare is the meaning o
f
the instrument, and neither courts nor
legislatures have a right to add to or take away from that mean
ing.”"
The whole Instrument to be examined.
Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion o
f
a written law
is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in it
s
construction.
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,
standing by itself, might seem o
f
doubtful import, may yet be
made plain b
y
comparison with other clauses or portions o
f
the
same law. It is therefore a very proper rule of construction, that
the whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true inten
tion o
f
each part ; and this Sir Edward Coke regards the most
natural and genuine method o
f expounding a statute.” “If any
section [of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper
it has often been the case that the
arbitrary discretion o
f
a judge was
the law o
f
a tyrant, and warns u
s
that
it may be so again.” Perkins, J., in
Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41, 46.
“Judge-made law,” as the phrase is
here employed, is that made b
y judi
cial decisions which construe away
the meaning o
f statutes, o
r
find mean
ings in them the legislature never
held. The phrase is sometimes used
a
s meaning, simply, the law that be
comes established by precedent. The
uses and necessity o
f judicial legisla
tion are considered and explained a
t
length by Mr. Austin, in his Province
o
f Jurisprudence.
1 Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9
,
97.
per Johnson, J. And see Den v.
Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Greencastle Town
ship v. Black, 5 Ind. 569; Bartlett v.
Morris, 9 Port. 266; Leonard v. Wise
man, 31 Md. 204, per Bartol, Ch. J. ;
Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406; McAdoo
v
. Benbow, 63 N. C
.
464; Hawkins v.
Carrol, 50 Miss. 735; Cearfoss v. State,
42 Ma. 403; Douglas v. Freeholders,
&c., 38 N. J. 214; Broom's Maxims
(5th Am. ed.), 551, marg.
* Co. Lit. 381 a.
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mode of discovering it
s
true meaning is b
y
comparing it with the
other sections, and finding out the sense o
f
one clause b
y
the
words or obvious intent o
f
another.”” And in making this
comparison it is not to be supposed that any words have been em
ployed without occasion, or without intent that they should
have effect as part o
f
* the law. The rule applicable here [* 58]
is
,
that effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instru
ment, and to every section and clause. If different portions seem
to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor o
f
a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make some idle and
nugatory.”
This rule is applicable with special force to written constitu
tions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed
themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with
the immense importance o
f
the powers delegated, leaving a
s little
a
s possible to implication.” It is scarcely conceivable that a case
can arise where a court would be justifiable in declaring any portion
o
f
a written constitution nugatory because o
f ambiguity. One
part may qualify another so as to restrict it
s operation, o
r apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood
by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand
together.”
* Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd.
365; Chance v. Marion County, 64 Ill.
66; Broom's Maxims, 521.
* Attorney-General v. Detroit and
Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138;
People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; District
Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262;
Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135: Parkinson
r. State, 14 Md. 184: Belleville Rail
road Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Ogden
v
. Strong, 2 Paine, C
.
C
.
584; Ryegate
r. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 746: Brooks v.
Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala.
227; Den v. Dubois, 16 N. J. 285;
Den v. Schenck, 8 N
. J. 34; Bigelow
v
. W. Wisconsin R
. R., 27 Wis. 478;
Gas Company v. Wheeling, 8 W. Va.
320.
* Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49;
People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36, per
Bronson, J.; Greencastle Township v.
Black, 5 Ind. 557; Green v. Weller,
2 Miss. 650.
* It is a general rule, in the con
struction o
f writings, that, a general
intent appearing, it shall control the
particular intent; but this rule must
sometimes give way, and effect must
b
e given to a particular intent plainly
expressed in one part o
f
a constitu
tion, though apparently opposed to a
general intent deduced from other
parts. Warren v. Sherman, 5 Tex.
441. In Quick v. Whitewater Town
ship, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if
two provisions o
f
a written constitu
tion are irreconcilably repugnant, that
which is last in order of time and in
local position is to be preferred.
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In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been
employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. Says Marshall,
Ch. J.: “The framers of the Constitution, and the people who
adopted it
,
must b
e
understood to have employed words in their
natural sense, and to have understood what they meant.”" This
is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put
upon their language; and it seems so obvious a truism
that one * expects to see it universally accepted without
question; but the attempt is made so often b
y
interested
subtlety and ingenious refinement to induce the courts to force
from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held,
that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamen
[* 59]
tal maxim.”
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
188. See Settle v. Wan Enrea, 49
N. Y
. 281; Jenkins v. Ervin, 8 Heisk.
456: Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406; Stuart
v
. Hamilton, 66 Ill. 253; Hale v.
Everett, 53 N. H. 1.
* State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Manly
v
. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller,
3
2 Miss. 650; Greencastle Township
v
. Black, 5 Ind. 570; People v. N. Y
.
Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 137,
and 24 N
.
Y
.
488; Story on Const.
§ 453. “The true sense in which
words are used in a statute is to be
ascertained generally b
y taking them
in their ordinary and popular signifi
cation, or, if they be terms of art, in
their technical signification. But it
is also a cardinal rule o
f exposition,
that the intention is to be deduced
from the whole and every part o
f
the statute, taken and compared to
gether, from the words o
f
the context,
and such a construction adopted as
will best effectuate the intention of
the law-giver. One part is referred
to in order to help the construction o
f
another, and the intent o
f
the legis
lature is not to be collected from any
particular expression, but from a
general view o
f
the whole act.
Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, 703. And
when it appears that the framers
have used a word in a particular sense
generally in the act, it will be pre
Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when
sumed that it was intended to be used
in the same sense throughout the act,
unless a
n intention to give it a dif
ferent signification plainly appears in
the particular part o
f
the act alleged
to be an exception to the general
meaning indicated. Dwarris, 704 et
seq. When words are used to which
the legislature has given a plain and
definite import in the act, it would
b
e dangerous to put upon them a
construction which would amount to
holding that the legislature did not
mean what it has expressed. It fol
lows from these principles that the
statute itself furnishes the best means
o
f
it
s
own exposition; and if the
sense in which words were intended
to be used can be clearly ascertained
from all its parts and provisions, the
intention thus indicated shall prevail,
without resorting to other means o
f
aiding in the construction. And
these familiar rules of construction
apply with a
t
least a
s much force
to the construction of written con
stitutions as to statutes; the former
being presumed to be framed with
much greater care and consideration
than the latter.” Green v. Weller,
3
2 Miss. 678. The argument ab
inconvenienti cannot be suffered to
influence the courts by construction
to prevent the evident intention.
Chance v. Marion County, 64 Ill. 66.
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it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people
themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which
every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the lead
ing principles of government.
But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions,
that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of
the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions declaratory
of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-understood mean
ing, which the people must be supposed to have had in view in
adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless
we understand their history; and when we find them
expressed in * technical words, and words of art, we must [* 60]
suppose these words to be employed in their technical
sense. When the constitution speaks of an er post facto law, it
means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning
of the phrase having become defined in the history of constitu
tional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not neces
sary to employ language of a more popular character to designate
it
.
The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly un
derstood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal
and constitutional history where they have been employed for the
protection o
f popular rights."
* It is quite possible, however, in
applying constitutional maxims, to
liament. She was represented by the
members for the county o
f Kent, o
f
overlook entirely the reason upon
which they rest, and “considering
merely the letter, go but skin deep
into the meaning.” On the great
debate on the motion for withdrawing
the confidence of Parliament from
the ministers, after the surrender o
f
Cornwallis, – a debate which called
out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt
a
s
well as o
f
the ministry, and nec
essarily led to the discussion o
f
the
primary principle in free government,
that taxation and representation shall
go together, — Sir James Mariott
rose, and with great gravity pro
ceeded to say, that if taxation and
representation were to g
o
hand in
hand, then Britain had an undoubted
right to tax America, because she
was represented in the British Par
which the thirteen provinces were a
part and parcel; for in their charters
they were to hold o
f
the manor o
f
Greenwich in Kent, o
f
which manor
they were b
y
charter to be parcel !
The opinion, it is said, “raised a
very loud laugh,” but Sir James con
tinued to support it
,
and concluded
by declaring that he would give the
motion a hearty negative. Thus
would he have settled a great princi
ple o
f
constitutional right, for which
a seven years' bloody war had been
waged, by putting it in the form o
f
a meaningless legal fiction. Han
sard's Debates, Vol. XXII. p
.
1184.
Lord Mahon, following Lord Camp
bell, refers the origin o
f
this won
derful argument to Mr. Hardinge, a
Welsh judge, and nephew o
f Lord
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The Common Law to be kept in View.
It is also a very reasonable rule that a State constitution shall
be understood and construed in the light and by the assistance of
the common law, and with the fact in view that its rules are still
left in force. By this we do not mean that the common law is to
control the constitution, or that the latter is to be warped and
perverted in its meaning in order that no inroads, or as few as
possible, may be made in the system of common-law rules, but
only that for its definitions we are to draw from that great
[* 61] fountain, and that, in judging what it means, we “are to
keep in mind that it is not the beginning of law for the
State, but that it assumes the existence of a well-understood
system, which is still to remain in force and be administered, but
under such limitations and restrictions as that instrument imposes.
It is a maxim with the courts that statutes in derogation of the
common law shall be construed strictly ; a maxim which we
fear is sometimes perverted to the overthrow of the legislative
intent; but there can seldom be either propriety or safety in
applying this maxim to constitutions. When these instruments
assume to make any change in the common law, the change
designed is generally a radical one ; but as they do not go min
utely into particulars, as do statutes, it will sometimes be easy to
defeat a provision, if courts are at liberty to say that they will
presume against any intention to alter the common law further
than is expressly declared. A reasonable construction is what
such an instrument demands and should receive ; and the real
question is
,
what the people meant, and not how meaningless their
words can be made by the application o
f arbitrary rules.”
Camden; 7 Mahon's Hist. 139. He
was said to have been a good lawyer,
but must have read the history o
f
his
country to little purpose.
* Broom's Maxims, 33; Sedg. on
.Stat. & Const. Law, 313. See Har
rison v. Leach, 4 W. Va. 383.
* Under a clause of the constitu
tion o
f Michigan which provided that
“the real and personal estate of every
female acquired before marriage, and
all property to which she may after
wards become entitled, b
y gift, grant,
inheritance, or devise, shall be and
remain the estate and property o
f
such female, and shall not be liable
for the debts, obligations, or engage
ments o
f
her husband, and may be
devised o
r bequeathed by her as if
she were unmarried,” it was held that
a married woman could not sell her
personal property without the consent
o
f
her husband, inasmuch as the
power to do so was not expressly
conferred, and the clause, being in
derogation o
f
the common law, was
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*As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same [* 62]
word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a
constitution.” Here again, however, great caution must be ob
served in applying an arbitrary rule ; for, as Mr. Justice Story
has well observed, “It does not follow, either logically or gram
matically, that because a word is found in one connection in the
Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same sense is to
be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This
would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of
single-words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and
objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing
has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this
narrow and mischievous criticism.” Men of ingenious and subtle
minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having
found in the Constitution a word used in some sense, which falls
in with their favorite theory of interpreting it
,
have made that the
standard by which to measure its use in every other part o
f
the
instrument. They have thus stretched it
,
a
s it were, on the bed
o
f Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large
for their purposes, and extending it when it seemed too short.
They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and
crippled where they have sought only to adjust it
s proportions
not to be extended by construction.
Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. The
danger o
f applying arbitrary rules
in the construction of constitutional
principles might well, as it seems to
us, be illustrated by this case. For
while on the one hand it might be
contended that, as a provision in
derogation o
f
the common law, the
one quoted should receive a strict
construction, on the other hand it
might be insisted with perhaps equal
reason that, as a remedial provision,
in furtherance o
f
natural right and
justice, it should be liberally con
strued, to effect the beneficial pur
pose had in view. Thus arbitrary
rules, o
f directly opposite tendency
and force, would be contending for
the mastery in the same case. The
subsequent decisions under the same
provision do not appear to have fol
lowed this lead. See White v. Zane,
1
0 Mich. 333; McKee v. Wilcox,
1
1 Mich. 358; Farr v. Sherman, 11
Mich. 33; Watson v. Thurber, 11
Mich. 457; Burdeno v. Amperse,
1
4 Mich. 91; Tong v. Marvin, 15
Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton,
1
5 Mich. 447; Devries v. Conklin, 22
Mich. 255; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich.
195. The common law is certainly
to be kept in view in the interpre
tation o
f
such a clause, since other
wise we do not ascertain the evil
designed to b
e remedied, and perhaps
are not able to fully understand and
explain the terms employed; but it
is to be looked at with a view to the
real intent, rather than for the pur
pose o
f arbitrarily restraining it
.
See
Bishop, Law o
f
Married Women,
§§ 18–20 and cases cited.
1 Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14.
* See remarks o
f Johnson, J., in
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.
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according to their own opinions.” . And he gives many instances
where, in the national Constitution, it is very manifest the same
word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule
may be sound as one of presumption merely, it
s
force is but slight,
and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in
the instrument.
Where a constitution is revised or amended, the new provisions
come into operation a
t
the same moment that those they take the
place o
f
cease to b
e o
f force; and if the new instrument re-en
acts in the same words provisions which it supersedes, it is a rea
sonable presumption that the purpose was not to change the law
in those particulars, but to continue it in uninterrupted opera
tion. This is the rule in the case of statutes,” and it sometimes
becomes important, where rights had accrued before the revision
o
r
amendment took place. Its application to the case of an
amended o
r
revised constitution would seem to be unquestionable.
Operation to be Prospective.
We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution
should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show
a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. This
is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is “one of such obvious
convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the
construction o
f statutes, unless there is something on the face o
f
the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant
it to operate retrospectively.” Retrospective legislation,
[* 63] except * when designed to cure formal defects, or other
wise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in
principle, and apt to result in injustice; and it is a sound rule o
f
construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact it
.
And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legislation
which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitutions.”
* Story on Const. § 454. And
see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5
Broom's Maxims, 28; post, p
.
*370
and note.
Pet. 19.
* Laude v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
33 Wis. 640; Blackwood v. Van Vleit,
30 Mich. 118.
8 Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22.
See Dash v. Wan Kleek, 7 Johns.
477; Brown v. Wilcox, 14 S. & M.
127; Price v. Mott, 52 Penn. St. 315;
* In Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio,
N
.
s. 588, a question arose under the
provision o
f
the constitution that “all
laws o
f
a general nature shall have a
uniform operation throughout the
State.” Another clause provided
that all laws then in force, not incon
sistent with the constitution, should
CH. Iv.] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 77
Implications.
The implications from the provisions of a constitution are some
times exceedingly important, and have large influence upon its
construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States
the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is con
ferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is also con
ferred.” The same rule has been applied to the State constitu
tion, with an important modification, by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. “That other powers than those expressly granted may
be, and often are, conferred by implication, is too well
settled to be * doubted. Under every constitution impli
cation must be resorted to, in order to carry out the gen
eral grants of power. A constitution cannot from its very nature
enter into a minute specification of all the minor powers naturally
and obviously included in and flowing from the great and impor
tant ones which are expressly granted. It is therefore established
as a general rule, that when a constitution gives a general power,
or enjoins a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular
[* 64]
continue in force until amended or
repealed. Allbyer was convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment under a
crimes act previously in force, ap
plicable to Hamilton County only,
and the question was, whether that
act was not inconsistent with the
provision above quoted, and therefore
repealed by it
.
The court held that
the provision quoted evidently had
regard to future and not to past leg
islation, and therefore was not re
pealed. A similar decision was made
in State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258. See
also State v. Thompson, 2 Kan.
432; Slack v. Maysville, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
1
3 B
.
Monr. 1
;
State v. Macon County
Court, 41 Mo. 453; N. C
.
Coal Co. v.
G
.
C
.
Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 557.
In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank,
2
1 N
.
Y
.
12, Denio, J., says: “The
rule laid down in Dash v. Van Kleek,
7 Johns. 477, and other cases of that
class, by which the courts are admon
ished to avoid, if possible, such an
interpretation as would give a statute
a retrospective operation, has but a
limited application, if any, to the con
struction o
f
a constitution. When,
therefore, we read in the provision
under consideration, that the stock
holders o
f every banking corporation
shall be subject to a certain liability,
we are to attribute to the language its
natural meaning, without inquiring
whether private interests may not be
prejudiced by such a sweeping man
date.” The remark was obiter, as it
was found that enough appeared in
the constitution to show clearly that
it was intended to apply to existing,
a
s well as to subsequently created,
banking institutions.
* Story on Const. § 430. See
also United States v. Fisher, 2
Cranch, 358; McCulloch v. Maryland,
4
. Wheat. 428; North-western Fertil
izing Co. v. Hyde Park, 70 Ill. 634.
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power necessary for the exercise of the one or the enjoyment of
the other. The implication under this rule, however, must be a
necessary, not a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is
further modified by another rule, that where the means for the
exercise of a granted power are given, no other or different means
can be implied, as being more effective or convenient.”" The
rule applies to the exercise of power by a
ll departments and all
officers, and will be touched upon incidentally hereafter.
Akin to this is the rule that “where a power is granted in
general terms, the power is to be construed as coextensive with
the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [ex
pressly o
r by implication] from the context.” ” This rule has been
so frequently applied as a restraint upon legislative encroachment
upon the grant o
f power to the judiciary, that we shall content
ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases collected upon
this subject and given in another chapter.”
Another rule o
f
construction is
,
that when the constitution
defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised
o
r
a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition
against legislative interference, to add to the condition, o
r
to
extend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been
held by the Supreme Court o
f Maryland, that where the consti
tution defines the qualifications o
f
a
n officer, it is not in the power
o
f
the legislature to change o
r superadd to them, unless the power
to do so is expressly or b
y
necessary implication conferred b
y
the
constitution itself." Other cases recognizing the same principle
are referred to in the note."
1 Field v. People, 2 Scam. 83. See
Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
* Story on Const. §§ 424–426. See
Du Page County v. Jenks, 65 Ill. 275.
* See post, pp. * 87–116.
* Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189.
And see Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686;
Matter o
f Dorsey, 7 Port. 293.
* The legislature cannot add to the
constitutional qualifications o
f
voters:
Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph,
&c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Buchanan County
Court, 39 Mo 485; State v. Williams,
5 Wis. 308; State v. Baker, 38 Wis.
71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N
.
s.
665; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148;
State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243; Davies
v
. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty
v
. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109; Quin c.
State, 35 Md. 485; Clayton v. Harris,
7 Nev. 64; Randolph v. Good, 3 W.
Va. 551; nor shorten the constitu
tional term of an office: Howard v.
State, 10 Ind. 99; Cotten r. Ellis, 7
Jones, Law, 545; and see post, p
.
* 276,
note; nor extend the constitutional
term: People v. Bull, 46 N
.
Y
. 57;
Goodin v. Thoman, 10 Kan. 191;
nor add to the constitutional grounds
for removing an officer: Lowe v. Com
monwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 237; Brown
v
. Grover, 6 Bush, 1
;
nor change the
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* The Light which the Purpose to be accomplished may [* 65]
afford in Construction.
The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no
regard to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of
which we seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from
an examination of the words employed. It is possible, how
ever, that after we shall have made use of a
ll
the lights which
the instrument itself affords, there may still be doubts to clear
up and ambiguities to explain. Then, and only then, are we
warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid. We are not to import
difficulties into a constitution, b
y
a consideration o
f
extrinsic
facts, when none appear upon it
s
face. If
,
however, a difficulty
really exists, which an examination o
f every part o
f
the instru
ment does not enable us to remove, there are certain extrinsic
aids which may be resorted to, and which are more or less satis
factory in the light they afford. Among these aids is a contem
plation o
f
the object to be accomplished o
r
the mischief designed to
b
e remedied o
r guarded against b
y
the clause in which the ambigu
ity is met with.” “When we once know the reason which alone
determines the will o
f
the law-makers, we ought to interpret and
apply the words used in a manner suitable and consonant to that
reason, and as will be best calculated to effectuate the intent.
Great caution should always be observed in the application o
f
this rule to particular given cases; that is
,
we ought always to be
certain that we d
o know, and have actually ascertained, the true
and only reason which induced the act. It is never allowable to
compensation prescribed b
y
the con
stitution: King v. Hunter, 65 N
.
C
.
603; nor provide for the choice o
f
officers a different mode from that
prescribed by the constitution: Peo
ple v
. Raymond, 37 N
.
Y
.
428; De
voy v. New York, 35 Barb. 264; 22
How. Pr. 226; People v. Blake, 49
Barb. 9
;
People v. Albertson, 55 N.
Y
.
5
0 ; Opinions o
f Justices, 117 Mass.
603; State v. Goldspecker, 40 is
.
124; nor confer the characteristic
duties o
f
a
n
officer upon another:
Warner v. People, 2 1)enio, 272; Peo
ple v
. Albertson, supra; post, p
.
* 277,
note. A legislative extension of an
elective office is void as applied to
incumbents. People v. McKinney, 52
N. Y. 374.
It is not unconstitutional to allow
the governor to supply temporary
vacancies in offices which under the
constitution are elective. Sprague v.
Brown, 40 Wis. 612.
* Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md.
71; District Township v. Dubuque,
7 Iowa, 262. See Smith v. People,
4
7 N. Y
.
3:30; People v. Potter, 47 N.
Y. 375; Ball v. Chadwick, 46 Ill. 28;
Sawyer v. Insurance Co., 46 Wt. 697.
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indulge in vague and uncertain conjecture, or in supposed rea
sons and views of the framers of an act, where there are none
known with any degree of certainty.”" The prior state of the
law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real meaning of the
ambiguous provision,” and it is especially important to look into
it if the constitution is the successor to another, and in the par
ticular in question essential changes have apparently been made.”
[* 66] * Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.
When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief de
signed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished
by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the pro
ceedings of the convention which framed the instrument.*
Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the pro
vision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the
question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive
from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation.
Every member of such a convention acts upon such motives and
reasons as influence him personally, and the motions and debates
do not necessarily indicate the purpose of a majority of a conven
tion in adopting a particular clause. It is quite possible for a clause
to appear so clear and unambiguous to the members of a con
vention as to require neither discussion nor illustration; and the
few remarks made concerning it in the convention might have a
plain tendency to lead directly away from the meaning in the
minds of the majority. It is equally possible for a part of the
members to accept a clause in one sense and a part in another.
And even if we were certain we had attained to the meaning of
the convention, it is by no means to be allowed a controlling force,
especially if that meaning appears not to be the one which the
* Smith on Stat. and Const. Con
struction, 634. See also remarks of
Bronson, J., in Purdy v. People, 2
Hill, 35–37.
* Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376;
Henry v. Tilson, 19 Vt. 447; Hamil
ton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo.
30; People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Ser
vis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Bandel v.
Isaac, 13 Md. 302; Story on Const.
§ 428.
* People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127,
147.
* Per Walworth, Chancellor, Cou
tant v. People, 11 Wend. 518, and
Clark v. People, 26 Wend. 602; per
Bronson, J., Purdy v. People, 2 Hill,
37; People v. N. Y. Central Railroad
Co., 24 N. Y. 496. See State v. Ken
non, 7 Ohio, N. S. 563.
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words would most naturally and obviously convey." For as
the constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed, but from the people who ratified it
,
the intent to
b
e arrived at is that o
f
the people, and it is not to be supposed
that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the
words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified
the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to
b
e conveyed.” These proceedings therefore are less conclusive
o
f
the proper construction o
f
the instrument than are legislative
proceedings o
f
the proper construction o
f
a statute; since
in the latter case it is the intent of the "legislature we [*67]
seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive a
t
the intent o
f
the people through the discussions and deliberations
o
f
their representatives. The history o
f
the calling o
f
the con
vention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues
before the people a
t
the time o
f
the election o
f
the delegates, will
sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to
b
e gathered from the proceedings o
f
the convention.
Contemporaneous and Practical Construction.
An important question which now suggests itself is this: How
far the contemporaneous interpretation, or the subsequent practi
cal construction o
f any particular provision o
f
the constitution, is
to have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a
judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous interpre
tation may indicate merely the understanding with which the
people received it at the time, or it may be accompanied b
y
acts
done in putting the instrument in operation, and which neces
sarily assume that it is to be construed in a particular way. In
the first case it can have very little force, because the evidences
o
f
the public understanding, when nothing has been done under
the provision in question, must always o
f necessity be vague and
indecisive. But where there has been a practical construction,
which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period, consider
ations in favor o
f adhering to this construction sometimes present
1 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 126. * State v. Mace, 5 Md. 348; Manly
And see Eakin v. Racob, 12 S. & R
.
v
. State, 7 Md. 147; Hills v. Chicago,
352; Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1
;
6
0 Ill. 86; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76
State v
. Doron, 5 Nev. 399. Ill. 34.
-
6
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themselves to the courts with a plausibility and force which it is
not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular construction has
been generally accepted as correct, and especially when this has
occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution,
and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of
the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption
exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention. And
where this has been given by officers in the discharge of their
official duty, and rights have accrued in reliance upon it
,
which
would be divested by a decision that the construction was erro
neous, the argument ab inconvenienti is sometimes allowed to have
very great weight.
The Supreme Court o
f
the United States has had frequent
occasion to consider this question. In Stuart v. Laird,' decided
in 1803, that court sustained the authority o
f
its members to sit
a
s circuit judges on the ground o
f
a practical construction,
[*68] * commencing with the organization of the government.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,” Justice Story, after hold
ing that the appellate power o
f
the United States extends to cases
pending in the State courts, and that the 25th section o
f
the
Judiciary Act, which authorized its exercise, was supported by
the letter and spirit o
f
the Constitution, proceeds to say: “Strong
a
s this conclusion stands upon the general language o
f
the Con
stitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an
historical fact, that this exposition o
f
the Constitution, extending
it
s appellate power to State courts, was, previous to it
s adoption,
uniformly and publicly avowed by it
s friends, and admitted by
it
s enemies, as the basis o
f
their respective reasonings both in and
out o
f
the State conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the
time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations
o
f
the First Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men o
f
great learning and ability, but o
f
men who had acted a principal
part in framing, supporting, o
r opposing that Constitution, the
same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted b
y
the
friends and b
y
the opponents o
f
that system. It is an historical
fact, that the Supreme Court o
f
the United States have from time
to time sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety o
f
cases, brought from the tribunals o
f many o
f
the most important
1 1 Cranch, 299.
* 1 Wheat. 351. See Story on Const. §§ 405–408.
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States in the Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breathed
a judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate
of the Supreme Court until the present occasion. This weight of
contemporaneous exposition by a
ll parties, this acquiescence by
enlightened State courts, and these judicial decisions b
y
the Su
preme Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place the
doctrine upon a foundation o
f authority which cannot be shaken
without delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable
doubts.” The same doctrine was subsequently supported by
Chief Justice Marshall in a case involving the same point, and
in which he says that “great weight has always been attached,
and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition.” "
In Bank of United States v. Halstead” the question was made,
whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts o
f
the Union so to alter the form o
f process of execution used in the
Supreme Courts o
f
the States in September, 1789, as to
subject to * execution lands and other property not thus [* 69]
subject b
y
the State laws in force at that time, were con
stitutional ; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that
o
f
Chief Justice Marshall in the preceding case, says: “If any
doubt existed whether the act o
f
1792 vests such power in the
courts, o
r
with respect to its constitutionality, the practical con
struction given to it ought to have great weight in determining
both questions.” And Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for
this in a subsequent case: “Every candid mind will admit that
this is a very different thing from contending that the frequent
repetition o
f wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the
presumption that the contemporaries o
f
the Constitution have
claims to our deference on the question o
f right, because they
had the best opportunities o
f informing themselves o
f
the under
standing o
f
the framers o
f
the Constitution, and o
f
the sense put
upon it b
y
the people when it was adopted b
y
them.” ” Like
views have been expressed b
y
Chief Justice Waite in a recent
decision.”
Great deference has been paid in a
ll
cases to the action o
f
the
1 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418. * Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
* 10 Wheat. 63. 162. And see Collins v. Henderson,
* Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 11 Bush, 74, 92.
290. See Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 499;
State v
. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.
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executive department, where its officers have been called upon,
under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a
new system, and where it is to be presumed they have carefully
and conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored
to keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If
the question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their
judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that
may result from disregarding it
,
is fairly entitled to turn the scale
in the judicial mind."
Where, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, we
think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court
should confine its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic
circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain.
To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be
to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident pur
[*70] pose of the * law-makers. “Contemporary construction
. . . can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter
away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limita
tions; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.” While we
conceive this to b
e
the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged
to confess that some o
f
the cases appear, o
n first reading, not to
have observed these limitations. In the case of Stuart v. Laird,”
above referred to, the practical construction was regarded as con
clusive. To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court
had n
o right to si
t
a
s circuit judges, the court say: “It is suffi
cient to observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a
* Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge,
2
1 How. 66; Edward's Lessee v.
Darby, 12 Wheat. 210; Hughes v.
Hughes, 4 T
.
B
.
Monr. 42; Chambers
v
. Fisk, 22 Tex. 504; Britton v.
Ferry, 14 Mich. 66; Bay City v. State
Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499; Plummer v.
Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Burgess v.
Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State v. Mayhew,
2 Gill, 487; Coutant v. People, 11
Wend. 511; People v. Dayton, 55 N.
Y. 367; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
376; Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank
v
. Smith, 3 S
.
& R
. 63; Norris v. Cly
mer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Moers v. City
o
f Reading, 21 Penn. St. 188; Wash
ington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Surgett v.
Lapice, 8 How. 68; Bissell v. Penrose,
8 How. 336; Troup v. Haight, Hopk.
267; United States v. Gilmore, 8
Wall. 330; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64
N. C
. 652; Lafayette, &c. R
.
R
.
Co.
v
. Geiger, 34 Ind. 203; Bunn v. Peo
ple, 45 Ill. 397; Scanlan v. Childs, 33
Wis. 663; Fairbault v. Misener, 20
Minn. 396.
* Story on Const. § 407. And see
Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St. 116;
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311;
Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth,
6 Mass. 417; Union Pacific R
.
R. Co.
v
. United States, 10 Ct. o
f
Cl. Rep.
548; s. c. in error, 91 U
.
S
. Rep. 72.
* 1 Cranch, 299.
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period of several years, commencing with the organization of the
judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed
the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most
forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obsti
nate to be shaken or controlled. Of course the question is at rest,
and ought not now to be disturbed.” This is certainly very strong
language; but that very similar in character was used by the Su
preme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and valu
able estates depended upon a particular construction of a statute,
and very great mischief would follow from changing it
.
The court
said that, “although if it were now res integra, it might be very
difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argu
ment ab inconvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot shake
a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively pre
vailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the error is now so
common that it must have the force of law. The legal ground on
which this provision is now supported is
,
that long and continued
usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must pre
vail over the mere technical import o
f
the words.” Language
nearly as strong was also used b
y
the Supreme Court of Maryland,
where the point involved was the possession o
f
a certain power by
the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy
years.”
It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an examina
tion o
f
the Constitution left in the minds o
f
the judges
sufficient * doubt upon the question o
f
it
s
violation to [* 71]
warrant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation,
and that the cases are not in conflict with the general rule as
above laid down. Acquiescence for no length o
f
time can legalize
a clear usurpation o
f power, where the people have plainly ex
pressed their will in the Constitution, and appointed judical tri
bunals to enforce it
.
A power is frequently yielded to merely
* Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478.
See also Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind.
576; Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis. 663.
* State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487.
In Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen,
389, the Supreme Court o
f Massa
chusetts expressed the opinion that
the constitutionality o
f
the acts o
f
Congress making treasury notes a
legal tender ought not to be treated
by a State court as open to discussion
after the notes had practically con
stituted the currency o
f
the country
for five years. At a still later day,
however, the judges o
f
the Supreme
Court of the United States held these
acts void, though they afterwards
receded from this position.
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because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period,
in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief
which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing,
or without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject to
raise the question; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to
sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution." We think we
allow to contemporary and practical construction it
s
full legitimate
force when we suffer it
,
where it is clear and uniform, to solve in
its own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument
to be construed.”
* See further, on this subject, the
case o
f
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala.
311, 334; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y.
384.
* There are cases which clearly go
further than any we have quoted, and
which sustain legislative action which
they hold to be usurpation, on the sole
ground o
f long acquiescence. Thus
in Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446,
the question was, Has the legislature
power to grant divorces? The court
say: “Our legislature have assumed
and exercised this power for a period
o
f
more than forty years, although a
clear and palpable assumption o
f
power, and an encroachment upon
the judicial department, in violation
o
f
the Constitution. To deny this
long-exercised power, and declare all
the consequences resulting from it
void, is pregnant with fearful conse
quences. If it affected only the rights
o
f property, we should not hesitate;
but second marriages have been con
tracted and children born, and it
would bastardize a
ll these, although
born under the sanction o
f
a
n apparent
wedlock, authorized b
y
a
n act o
f
the
legislature before they were born, and
in consequence of which the relation
was formed which gave them birth.
On account o
f
these children, and for
them only, we hesitate. And in view
o
f this, we are constrained to content
ourselves with simply declaring that
the exercise o
f
the power o
f granting
divorces, on the part o
f
the legislature,
is unwarranted and unconstitutional,
a
n encroachment upon the duties o
f
the judiciary, and a striking down o
f
the dearest rights o
f individuals, with
out authority o
f
law. We trust we
have said enough to vindicate the
Constitution, and feel confident that
no department o
f
state has any dis
position to violate it
,
and that the evil
will cease.” So in Johnson v. Joliet,
and Chicago Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 207,
the question was whether railroad
corporations could be created by
special law, without a special declara
tion b
y
way o
f preamble that the ob
ject to be accomplished could not be
attained b
y
general law. The court
say: “It is now too late to make this
objection, since by the action o
f
the
general assembly under this clause,
special acts have been so long the
order o
f
the day and the ruling pas
sion with every legislature which has
convened under the Constitution, until
their acts o
f
this description fill a huge
and misshapen volume, and important
and valuable rights are claimed under
them. The clause has been wholly
disregarded, and it would now pro
duce far-spread ruin to declare such
acts unconstitutional and void. It is
now safer and more just to a
ll parties,
to declare that it must be understood,
that in the opinion o
f
the general
assembly, a
t
the time o
f passing the
special act, its object could not be
attained under the general law, and
this without any recital by way o
f
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.
º
* Unjust Provisions. I-12)
We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute cannot
be declared void on the ground solely that it is repugnant
to a supposed general intent or * spirit which it is thought [*73]
pervades or lies concealed in the Constitution, but wholly
preamble, as in the act to incorporate
the Central Railroad Company. That
preamble was placed there by the
writer of this opinion, and a strict
compliance with this clause of the
Constitution would have rendered it
necessary in every subsequent act.
But the legislature, in their wisdom,
have thought differently, and have
acted differently, until now our special
legislation and its mischiefs are be
yond recovery or remedy.” These
cases certainly presented very strong
motives for declaring the law to be
what it was not; but it would have
been interesting and useful if either
of these learned courts had enumer
ated the evils that must be placed in
the opposite scale when the question
is whether a constitutional rule shall
be disregarded; not the least of which
is
,
the encouragement o
f
a disposition
on the part o
f legislative bodies to set
aside constitutional restrictions, in the
belief that, if the unconstitutional law
can once b
e put in force, and large
interests enlisted under it
,
the courts
will not venture to declare it void,
but will submit to the usurpation, no
matter how gross and daring. We
agree with the Supreme Court o
f
Indiana, that in construing constitu
tions, courts have nothing to do with
the argument ab inconvenienti, and
should not “bend the Constitution
to suit the law of the hour.” Green
castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 565;
and with Bronson, Ch. J., in what he
says in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N
.
Y
.
568: “It is highly probable that in
conveniences will result from follow
ing the Constitution as it is written.
But that consideration can have no
force with me. It is not for us, but
for those who made the instrument,
to supply it
s
defects. If the legisla
ture o
r
the courts may take that office
upon themselves, or if
,
under color o
f
construction, o
r upon any other spe
cious ground, they may depart from
that which is plainly declared, the
people may well despair o
f
ever being
able to set any boundary to the powers
o
f
the government. Written consti
tutions will be more than useless.
Believing as I do that the success of
free institutions depends upon a rigid
adherence to the fundamental law, I
have never yielded to considerations o
f
expediency in expounding it
.
There
is always some plausible reason for
latitudinarian constructions which are
resorted to for the purpose o
f acquir
ing power; some evil to be avoided
o
r
some good to b
e attained b
y push
ing the powers o
f
the government
beyond their legitimate boundary. It
is b
y
yielding to such influences that
constitutions are gradually under
mined and finally overthrown. My
rule has ever been to follow the fun
damental law as it is written, regard
less o
f consequences. If the law does
not work well, the people can amend
it; and inconveniences can be borne
long enough to await that process.
But if the legislature or the courts
undertake to cure defects b
y
forced
and unnatural constructions, they in
flict a wound upon the Constitution
which nothing can heal. One step
taken b
y
the legislature o
r
the judi
ciary, in enlarging the powers of the
government, opens the door for an
other which will be sure to follow ;
and so the process goes o
n until all
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unexpressed, or because, in the opinion of the court, it violates
fundamental rights or principles, if it was passed in the exercise
of a power which the Constitution confers." Still less will the
injustice of a constitutional provision authorize the courts to dis
regard it
,
o
r indirectly to annul it b
y
construing it away. It is
quite possible that the people may, under the influence o
f tempo
rary prejudice, or a mistaken view o
f public policy, incorporate
provisions in their charter o
f government, infringing upon the
proper rights o
f
individual citizens or upon principles which ought
ever to b
e regarded as sacred and fundamental in republican
government; and it is also possible that obnoxious classes may be
unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for such injustice must be
found in the action o
f
the people themselves, through a
n amend
ment o
f
their work when better counsels prevail. Such provi
sions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction
aS any other. We do not say, however, that if a clause should be
found in a constitution which should appear at first blush to
demand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd conse
quences, it might not be the duty o
f
the court to question and
cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it
,
if possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general
purposes and aims o
f
these instruments. When such a case arises,
it will be time to consider it.”
Duty in Case o
f
Doubt.
But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the mean
ing o
f
the Constitution have been made use of, it may still happen
that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a
case it seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in
respect for the fundamental law is
lost, and the powers o
f
the govern
ment are just what those in authority
please to call them.” See also
Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272.
Whether there may not be circum
stances under which the State can be
held justly estopped from alleging the
invalidity of its own action in appor
tioning the political divisions of the
State, and imposing burdens on citi
zens, where such action has been ac
quiesced in for a considerable period,
and rights have been acquired through
bearing the burdens under it
,
see
Ramsey v. People, 19 N
.
Y
. 41; Peo
ple v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470; Knee
land v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
* See post, p
.
* 171, and cases re
ferred to in notes.
* McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Tex. 34.
See Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111; Walker
v
. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, N
.
s. 14; Bailey
v
. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 688.
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his * opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful [*74]
constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain
from acting. Whoever derives power from the Constitution to
perform any public function is disloyal to that instrument, and
grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably
satisfied the Constitution permits. Whether the power be legisla
tive, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitu
tional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to
observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot
say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of
the constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should
in any case be reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it ; and, if
legislators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which
are based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very
many cases will cease to be of force.
Directory and Mandatory Provisions.
The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we
are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the
Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as
will leave it optional with the department or officer to which it
is addressed to obey it or not as he shall see fit. In respect to
statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be
regarded as directory merely; by which is meant that they are to
be considered as giving directions which ought to be followed, but
not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions
are given that it cannot effectually be exercised without observing
them. The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be
readily assented to by all; while others are sometimes thought to
go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in essen
tial particulars. It is not our purpose to examine the several
cases critically, or to attempt — what we deem impossible — to
reconcile them all ; but we shall content ourselves with quoting
from a few, with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some line
of principle upon which they can be classified.
There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as
merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing
or failing to employ negative words plainly importing that the
act should be done in a particular manner or time, and not
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[*75] * otherwise." The use of such words is often very con
clusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their
absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was
not designed to be mandatory.” Lord Mansfield would have the
question whether mandatory or not depend upon whether that
which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the
thing required.” The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion
afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule
as one settled by authority, that “statutes directing the mode of
proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not regarded as
essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be
so declared in the statute.” “ This rule strikes us as very general,
and as likely to include within it
s scope, in many cases, things
which are o
f
the very essence o
f
the proceeding. The questions
in that case were questions o
f irregularity under election laws, not
in any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the
electors; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the
election was not to be avoided for a failure in the officers appointed
for it
s
conduct to comply in a
ll respects with the directions o
f
the statute there in question. The same court in another case
say: “Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they
relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter
o
f
convenience rather than o
f
substance.”" The Supreme Court
o
f Michigan, in a case involving the validity o
f proceedings on the
* Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144;
King v. Inhabitants of St. Gregory,
2 Ad. & El. 99; King v. Inhabitants
o
f Hipswell, 8 B
.
& C
.
466.
* District Township v. Dubuque,
7 Iowa, 284.
* Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr. 447.
* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290;
S
.
C
.
8 N. Y. 67.
* People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb.
558. If a statute imposes a duty and
gives the means o
f performing that
duty, it must be held to be mandatory.
Veazie v. China, 50 Me. 518. “It
would not perhaps be easy to lay
down any general rule as to when
the provisions o
f
a statute are merely
directory, and when mandatory o
r
imperative. Where the words are
affirmative, and relate to the manner
in which power o
r jurisdiction vested
in a public officer o
r body is to be
exercised, and not to the limits o
f
the
power o
r jurisdiction itself, they may
and often have been construed to be
directory; but negative words, which
g
o
to the power o
r jurisdiction itself,
have never, that I am aware of, been
brought within that category. “A
clause is directory,’ says Taunton, J.,
‘when the provisions contain mere
matters o
f
direction and no more; but
not so when they are followed by
words o
f positive prohibition.” Pearse
v
. Morrice, 2 Ad. & El. 96.” Per
Sharswood, J., in Bladen v. Philadel
phia, 60 Penn. St. 464, 466. And see
Pittsburg v. Coursin, 74 Penn. St. 400.
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sale of land for taxes, laid down the rule that “what the law
requires to be done for the protection of the tax-payer is mandatory,
and cannot be regarded as directory merely.” A similar rule was
recognized in a recent case in Illinois. Commissioners had been
appointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due
to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of
the persons benefited by a certain local improvement, in proportion
as nearly as might be to the benefits resulting to each. By the
statute, when the assessment was completed, the com
missioners were to sign and return the same to the * city [* 76]
council within forty days of their appointment. This
provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards,
and the question was raised as to it
s validity when thus made.
In the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided
b
y
ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, o
r right
destroyed, o
r
benefit sacrificed, either to the public or to any
individual, by holding the provision directory. After remarking
that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law,
returned after the time appointed b
y law, as void, because the
person assessed would lose the benefit o
f
a
n appeal from the
assessment,” they say o
f
the statute before the court: “There are
n
o negative words used declaring that the functions o
f
the com
missioners shall cease after the expiration o
f
the forty days, o
r
that they shall not make their return after that time; nor have
we been able to discover the least right, benefit, or advantage which
the property owner could derive from having the return made
within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made
dependent o
n
that time, within which the owner o
f
the property
may apply to have the assessment reviewed o
r
corrected. The
next section requires the clerk to give ten days' notice that the
assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections
may b
e
made to the assessment before the common council by
parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to
day; and the common council is empowered in it
s
discretion
to confirm o
r
annul the assessment altogether, o
r
to refer it back to
1 Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 154. ought to be taxed in proportion to its
See also Shawnee County v. Carter, value " is a prohibition against its
2 Kan. 115. In Life Association v. being taxed in any other mode, and
Board o
f Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, it the word ought is mandatory.
is held that a constitutional provision * Marsh v. Chestnut, 1
4 Ill. 223.
that “all property subject to taxation
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the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed.
As the property owner has the same time and opportunity to
prepare himself to object to the assessment and have it corrected,
whether the return be made before or after the expiration of the
forty days, the case differs from that of Chestnut v. Marsh," at
the very point on which that case turned. Nor is there any other
portion of the chapter which we have discovered, bringing it
within the principle of that case, which is the well-recognized
rule in all the books.” ”
The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief Justice
Shaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,” which was also a tax case.
[* 77] “In " considering the various statutes regulating the as
sessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto,
it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent
to the legality and validity of the tax, and which are directory
merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain
and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the
security of the citizen, for insuring equality of taxation, and to
enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls
and for what real estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are
liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent; and if they
are not observed, he is not legally taxed ; and he may resist it in
any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of
the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for
the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote
1 14 Ill. 223.
* Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 108.
* 21 Pick. 67. We commend in
the same connection the views of
Lewis, Ch. J., in Corbett v. Bradley,
7 Nev. 108: “When any requirement
of a statute is held to be directory,
and therefore not material to be fol
lowed, it is upon the assumption that
the legislature itself so considered it
,
and did not make the right conferred
dependent upon a compliance with the
form prescribed for securing it
. It is
upon this principle that the courts
often hold the time designated in a
statute, where a thing is to be done,
to be directory. No court certainly
has the right to hold any requirement
o
f
a law unnecessary to be complied
with, unless it be manifest the legisla
ture did not intend to impose the con
sequence which would naturally fol
low from a non-compliance, o
r
which
would result from holding the re
quirement mandatory o
r indispensa
ble. If it be clear that no penalty
was intended to be imposed for a
non-compliance, then, as a matter o
f
course, it is but carrying out the will
o
f
the legislature to declare the statute
in that respect to be simply directory.
But, if there be any thing to indicate
the contrary, a full compliance with it
must be enforced.” See also Hart
ford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336.
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method, system, and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, a
compliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect
affect the rights of tax-paying citizens. These may be consid
ered directory. Officers may be liable to legal animadversion,
perhaps to punishment, for not observing them ; but yet their
observance is not a condition precedent to the validity of the
tax.”
We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this
point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the va
lidity of a statute not published within the time required by law,
“understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this:
that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done
might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no
presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an
injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating
to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not
intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than
not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was,
that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done
afterwards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the
limit is established.” "
These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any
of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of
in determining whether the provisions of a statute are mandatory
or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the
thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely
* to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the busi- [* 78]
ness, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those
interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded
as mandatory; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or
in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that
which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.”
1 State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 292. See
further, for the views of this court on
the subject here discussed, Wendel v.
Durbin, 26 Wis. 390. The general
doctrine of the cases above quoted is
approved and followed in French v.
Edwards, 13 Wall. 506. In Low v.
Dunham, 61 Me. 566, a statute is said
to be mandatory where public interests
or rights are concerned, and the pub
lic o
r
third persons have a claim de
jure that the power shall be exercised.
And see Wiley v. Flournoy, 30 Ark.
609.
* The following, in addition to
those cited, are some o
f
the cases in
this country in which statutes have
been declared directory only: Pond v.
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But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in
the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the
doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as
directed. Even as thus laid down and restricted, the doctrine is
one to be applied with much circumspection; for it is not to be
denied that the courts have sometimes, in their anxiety to sustain
the proceedings of careless or incompetent officers, gone very far
in substituting a judicial view of what was essential for that
declared by the legislature."
But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they
venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and manda
tory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do
not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, ex
cept when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to
be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limita
tions upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an
instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish
those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules,
[*79] by which al
l
" departments o
f
the government must a
t all
times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescrib
Negus, 3 Mass. 230; Williams v.
School District, 21 Pick. 75; City o
f
Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180; Holland
v
. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280; Corliss v. Cor
liss, 8 Wt. 373; People v. Allen, 6
Wend. 486; Marchant v. Langworthy,
6 Hill, 646; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill,
43; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. 481;
Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker
v
. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9
;
People v. Peck,
1
1 Wend. 604; Matter o
f
Mohawk and
Hudson Railroad Co., 19 Wend. 143;
People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale
v
. Mead, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty v.
Hope, 3 Denio, 252; Elmendorf v.
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 25 Wend.
696; Thames Manufacturing Co. v.
Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550; Colt v. Eves,
1
2 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich.
451; Parks v. Goodwin, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 56; Hickey v. Hinsdale,
8 Mich. 267; People v. Hartwell,
1
2 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley,
4 Ind. 7
;
Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind.
144; New Orleans v. S
t Rowes, 9
La. An. 573; Edwards v. James, 13
Tex. 52; State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26;
Savage v
. Walshe, 26 Ala. 620;
Sorchan v. Brooklyn, 62 N
.
Y
. 339;
People v. Tompkins, 64 N
.
Y
. 53;
Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala.
433; Webster v. French, 12 Ill. 302;
McKim v. Weller, 11 Cal. 47; State
v
. Co. Commissioners o
f Baltimore,
2
9 Md. 516; Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio,
N
.
s. 25; Whalin v. Macomb, 76 Ill.
49; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336;
Lackawana Iron Co. v. Little Wolf,
38 Wis. 152; Green v. Warren Co.,
1
0 Bush, 711; Grant v. Spencer,
1 Montana, 136. The list might
easily be largely increased.
See upon this subject the remarks
o
f
Mr. Sedgwick in his work on
Statutory and Constitutional Law,
p
.
375, and those o
f Hubbard, J., in
Briggs v. Georgia, 15 Wt. 72. Also
see Dryfuss r. Dridges, 45 Miss. 247.
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iº
ing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the
proper dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper
province of ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect
to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting
it
,
have not regarded as o
f high importance, and worthy to be
embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control
alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard
b
y
which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as
well b
y
the delegate as b
y
the sovereign people themselves. If
directions are given respecting the times o
r
modes o
f proceeding
in which a power should be exercised, there is a
t
least a strong
presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in
that time and mode only ; * and we impute to the people a want o
f
due appreciation o
f
the purpose and proper province o
f
such a
n
instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any
other end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but
fair to presume that the people in their constitution have ex
pressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding
with the immense importance o
f
the powers delegated, and with
a view to leave as little as possible to implication.”
There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory
statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions; but they
are so plainly at variance with the weight o
f authority upon the
precise points considered that we feel warranted in saying that
the judicial decisions as they now stand do not sanction the ap
plication. In delivering the opinion o
f
the New York Court o
f
Appeals in one case, Mr. Justice Willard had occasion to con
sider the constitutional provision, that o
n
the final passage o
f
a
bill the question shall be taken b
y
ayes and noes, which shall b
e
duly entered upon the journals; and he expressed the opinion that
it was only directory to the legislature.” The remark was obiter
* See State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. law being restrictive upon the powers
281. o
f
the several departments o
f govern
* Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49;
per Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy,
2 Hill, 36; Greencastle Township v.
Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinions o
f Judges,
6 Shep. 458. See People v. Law
rence, 36 Barb. 177; State v. John
son, 26 Ark. 281. “The essential
nature and object o
f
constitutional
ment, it is difficult to comprehend
how its provisions can be regarded as
merely directory.” Nicholson, Ch. J.,
in Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504,
517.
* People v
. Supervisors o
f Che
nango, 8 N
.
Y
.
328.
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dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had
been fully complied with ; and those familiar with the reasons
which have induced the insertion of this clause in our
[* 80] * constitutions will not readily concede that it
s
sole design
was to establish a mere rule o
f
order for legislative pro
ceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief
Justice Thurman, o
f Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion o
f
the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed
o
n
the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed b
y
the constitution. “By the term mode,” he says, “I do not mean
to include the authority in which the law-making power resides, o
r
the number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That
the power to make laws is vested in the assembly alone, and that
n
o
act has any force that was not passed b
y
the number o
f
votes
required b
y
the constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident
propositions. These essentials relate to the authority b
y which,
rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now
to secure the careful exercise o
f
this power, and for other good
reasons, the constitution prescribes o
r recognizes certain things to
b
e
done in the enactment o
f laws, which things form a course
o
r
mode o
f legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the
provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on
three different days, unless, in case o
f urgency, three-fourths o
f
the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this
rule. This is an important provision without doubt, but, never
theless, there is much reason for saying that it is merely directory
in it
s character, and that its observance b
y
the assembly is
secured b
y
their sense o
f duty and official oaths, and not b
y
any
supervisory power o
f
the courts. Any other construction, we
incline to think, would lead to very absurd and alarming conse
quences. If it is in the power of every court (and if one has the
power, every one has it
)
to inquire whether a bill that passed the
assembly was ‘fully' and ‘distinctly read three times in each
house, and to hold it invalid if
,
upon any reading, a word was acci
dentally omitted, o
r
the reading was indistinct, it would obviously
b
e impossible to know what is the statute law o
f
the State.
Now the requisition that bills shall be fully and distinctly read is
just as imperative as that requiring them to be read three times;
and as both relate to the mode o
f procedure merely, it would be
difficult to find any sufficient reason why a violation o
f
one o
f
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them would be less fatal to an act than a violation of the
other.” I
A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly,
whether * mandatory or directory, is
,
from the very na- [* 81]
ture o
f
the case, addressed to the judgment o
f
the legis
lative body, whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently
distinct to be a compliance cannot be subject to review. But in
the absence o
f authority to the contrary, we should not have
supposed that the requirement o
f
three successive readings on
different days stood upon the same footing.” To this extent a
definite and certain rule is capable o
f being, and has been, laid
down, which can be literally obeyed; and the legislative body
cannot suppose o
r adjudge it to have been done if the fact is oth
erwise. The requirement has an important purpose, in making
legislators proceed in their action with caution and deliberation;
and there cannot often be difficulty in ascertaining from the leg
islative records themselves if the constitution has been violated
in this particular. There is
,
therefore, n
o
inherent difficulty in
the question being reached and passed upon by the courts in the
ordinary mode, if it is decided that the constitution intends
legislation shall be reached through the three readings, and not
otherwise.
The opinion above quoted was recognized as law b
y
the Su
preme Court o
f
Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case
the court proceed to say: “The . . . provision . . . that no bill
shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly ex
pressed in it
s title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduc
tion and passage of bills through the houses. The subject of the
bill is required to be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose
o
f advising members of its subject, when voting in cases in which
the reading has been dispensed with b
y
a two-thirds vote. The
provision that a bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent
combinations b
y
which various and distinct matters o
f legislation
should gain a support which they could notif presented separately.
1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 483. * See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm.
The provision for three readings on 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432;
separate days does not apply to Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504;
amendments made in the progress o
f Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Peo
the bill through the houses. People ple v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; Ryan v.
v
. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160.
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As a rule of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly
an important one. But if it was intended to effect any practical
object for the benefit of the people in the examination, construc
tion, or operation of acts passed and published, we are unable to
perceive it
.
The title o
f
a
n
act may indicate to the reader it
s
subject, and under the rule each act would contain one subject.
To suppose that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention
adopted the rule under consideration, would impute to them a
most minute provision for a very imperfect heading o
f
the
[* 82] chapters of laws and their subdivision. This “provision
being intended to operate upon bills in their progress
through the General Assembly, it must be held to be directory
only. It relates to bills, and not to acts. It would be most mis
chievous in practice to make the validity o
f every law depend upon
the judgment o
f every judicial tribunal o
f
the State, as to whether
a
n
act o
r
a bill contained more than one subject, o
r
whether this
one subject was clearly expressed in the title o
f
the act o
r bill.
Such a question would be decided according to the mental precision
and mental discipline o
f
each justice o
f
the peace and judge. No
practical benefit could arise from such inquiries. We are there
fore o
f opinion that in general the only safeguard against the
violation o
f
these rules o
f
the houses is their regard for, and their
oath to support, the constitution o
f
the State. We say, in gen
eral, the only safeguard; for whether a manifestly gross and
fraudulent violation o
f
these rules might authorize the court to
pronounce a law unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to determine.
It is to be presumed no such case will ever occur.” "
1 Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N
.
S
.
179. See also the case o
f Washing
ton v. Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar
views. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss.
618, a provision requiring o
f
a
ll offi
cers a
n
oath to support the constitu
tion, was held not to invalidate the
acts o
f
officials who had neglected
to take such an oath. And in Mc
Pherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the
provision that the style o
f
a
ll
laws
shall be, “Be it enacted by the Gen
eral Assembly o
f Maryland,” was
held directory. Similar rulings were
made in Cape Girardeau v. Riley,
5
2 Mo. 424; St. Louis v. Foster, 52
Mo. 513; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268.
Directly the opposite has been held
in Nevada. State v. Rogers, 10 Nev.
250. So a requirement that indict
ments shall conclude “ against the
peace and dignity o
f
the people o
f
West Virginia,” was held in Lemons
v
. People, 4 W. Va. 755, s. c. 1
Green Cr. R
.
666, to be mandatory,
and an indictment which complied
with it
,
except in abbreviating the
name o
f
the State, was held bad.
A statute which is passed in obe
dience to a constitutional requirement
must be held mandatory. State v.
Pierce, 35 Wis. 93, 99.
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If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this
decision, it might become important to consider whether the object
of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a
character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute.
But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we
shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest
judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar
provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And
we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot in speak
ing of this very provision, that “it will be found upon full con
sideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as
merely directory and not imperative.”" And with what is said
by Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: “It has
been suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of
the first article of the constitution, “Nor shall any law or ordi
nance pass containing any matter different from what is expressed
in the title thereof,” is directory only to the legislative and execu
tive or law-making departments of the government. But we do
not so understand it
.
On the contrary, we consider it as
much a *matter of judicial cognizance as any other pro- [* 83]
vision in that instrument. If the courts would refuse to
execute a law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the pub
lic safety did not require it
,
a law violatory o
f
the freedom o
f
the
press, o
r trial b
y jury, neither would they enforce a statute which
contained matter different from what was expressed in the title
thereof.” ”
Self-executing Provisions.
But although al
l
the provisions o
f
a constitution are to be re
garded as mandatory, there are some which, from the nature o
f
the case, are as incapable o
f compulsory enforcement as are direc
tory provisions in general. The reason is that, while the purpose
may b
e
to establish rights o
r
to impose duties, they do not in and
o
f
themselves constitute a sufficient rule by means o
f
which such
right may be protected o
r
such duty enforced. In such cases,
* People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186. 7 Ind. 683; People v. Starne, 35 Ill.
2 Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36. See 121; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495;
also Opinions o
f Judges, 18 Me. 458; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224;
Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65.
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before the constitutional provision can be made effectual, supple
mental legislation must be had ; and the provision is in it
s
nature
mandatory to the legislature to enact the needful legislation,
though back o
f it there lies no authority to enforce the com
mand. Sometimes the constitution in terms requires the legisla
ture to enact laws on a particular subject; and here it is obvious
that the requirement has only a moral force: the legislature ought
to obey it ; but the right intended to be given is only assured
when the legislation is voluntarily enacted. Illustrations may be
found in constitutional provisions requiring the legislature to
provide b
y
law uniform and just rules for the assessment and
collection o
f taxes; these must lie dormant until the legislation
is had ; they d
o
not displace the law previously in force, though
the purpose may be manifest to d
o away with it by the legislation
required.” So, however plainly the constitution may recognize the
right to appropriate private property for the general benefit,
the appropriation cannot b
e
made until the law has pointed out
the cases, and given the means by which compensation may be
assured.” A different illustration is afforded by the new amend
ments to the federal Constitution. Thus, the fifteenth amend
ment provides that “the right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged b
y
the United States, o
r
by any State, on account o
f race, color, or previous condition o
f
servitude.” To this extent it is self-executing, and of its own
force it abolishes a
ll
distinctions in suffrage based on the particu
lars enumerated. But when it further provides that “Congress
shall have power to enforce this article b
y
appropriate legislation,”
it indicates the possibility that the rule may not be found suffi
ciently comprehensive or particular to protect fully this right to
equal suffrage, and that legislation may be found necessary for
that purpose.” Other provisions are fully self-executing, and
* Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. Buchanan County, 62 Mo. 444;
560; People v. Lake Co., 33 Cal. 487;
Bowie v. Lott, 24 La. Ann. 214.
* Moore, J.. in Supervisors of
Doddridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703,
705; Cahoon r. Commonwealth, 20
Gratt 733; Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower
Macungie, 81 Penn. St. 482.
* Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio, N
.
s. 167.
See St. Joseph School Board v.
Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; Gillen
water v. Mississippi, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 13
Ill. 1. -
* United States v. Reese, 92 U. S.
Rep. 214. Any constitutional pro
vision is self-executing to this extent,
that every thing done in violation o
f
it is void. Brien v. Williamson, 8
Miss. 14.
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manifestly contemplate no legislation whatever to give them full
force and operation."
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if
it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given
may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be en
forced; and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates
principles, without laying down rules by means of which those
principles may be given the force of law. Thus, a constitution
may very clearly require county and town government; but if it
fails to indicate it
s range, and to provide proper machinery, it is
not in this particular self-executing, and legislation is essential.”
Rights in such a case may lie dormant until statutes shall provide
for them, though, in so far as any distinct provision is made which
b
y
itself is capable o
f enforcement, it is law, and al
l
supplemen
tary legislation must be in harmony with it
.
The provisions exempting homesteads from forced sale for the
satisfaction o
f
debts furnish many illustrations o
f self-executing
provisions, and also o
f
those which are not self-executing.
Where, as in California, the constitution declares that “the
legislature shall protect b
y
law from forced sale a certain portion
o
f
the homestead and other property o
f
all heads o
f families,”
the dependence o
f
the provision o
n subsequent legislative action
is manifest. But where, as in some other States, the constitution
defines the extent, in acres o
r amount, that shall be deemed to
constitute a homestead, and expressly exempts from any forced
sale what is thus defined, a rule is prescribed which is capable o
f
enforcement. Perhaps even in such cases legislation may be de
sirable, by way o
f providing convenient remedies for the protec
tion o
f
the right secured, or o
f regulating the claim o
f
the right
so that its exact limits may be known and understood; but all
such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provi
sion and in furtherance o
f
it
s purpose, and must not in any par
ticular attempt to narrow or embarrass it
.
The provision o
f
a
constitution which defines a homestead and exempts it from
* See People v. Bradley, 60 Ill. * Wall, Er parte, 48 Cal. 279; At
390; People v. McRoberts, 62 Ill. torney-General v. Common Council of
38; Mitchell v. Illinois, &c. Coal Co., Detroit, 29 Mich. 108.
6
8 Ill. 286; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich.
488; People v
. Rumsey, 64 Ill. 41.
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forced sale is self-executing, at least to this extent, that, though
it may admit of supplementary legislation in particulars where in
itself it is not as complete as may be desirable, it will override
and nullify whatever legislation, either prior or subsequent,
would defeat or limit the homestead which is thus defined and
secured. -
We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are
to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be
perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to
dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is
sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of
practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion
that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts
to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with
a view to make that instrument express its real intent. All ex
ternal aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instru
ments of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and
we do not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have
had occasion already to say in the course of this chapter, that
they are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much
circumspection."
1 See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y.
360, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. Mead,
4 Vt. 540, per Williams, J.; People
v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 291. “In con
struing so important an instrument
as a constitution, especially those
parts which affect the vital principle
of republican government, the elective
franchise, or the manner of exercising
it, we are not, on the one hand, to
indulge ingenious speculations which
may lead us wide from the true sense
and spirit of the instrument, nor, on
the other, to apply to it such narrow
and constrained views as may exclude
the real object and intent of those
who framed it
.
We are to suppose
that the authors of such an instru
ment had a thorough knowledge o
f
the force and extent o
f
the words they
employ ; that they had a bene
ficial end and purpose in view; and
that, more especially in any appar
ent restriction upon the mode o
f ex
ercising the right o
f suffrage, there
was some existing or anticipated evil
which it was their purpose to avoid.
If an enlarged sense of any particular
form o
f expression should be neces
sary to accomplish so great an object
as a convenient exercise of the fun
damental privilege o
r right, — that
o
f election, — such sense must be at
tributed. We are to suppose that
those who were delegated to the great
business o
f distributing the powers
which emanated from the sovereignty
o
f
the people, and to the establish
ment o
f
the rules for the perpetual
security o
f
the rights o
f person and
property, had the wisdom to adapt
their language to future as well as
existing emergencies, so that words
competent to the then existing state
o
f
the community, and a
t
the same
time capable o
f
being expanded to
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embrace more extensive relations,
should not be restrained to their more
obvious and immediate sense, if, con
sistently with the general object of
the authors and the true principles
of the compact, they can be extended
to other relations and circumstances
which an improved state of society
may produce. Qui haret in litera
haeret in cortice is a familiar maxim of
the law. The letter killeth, but the
spirit maketh alive, is the more forci
ble expression of Scripture.” Parker,
Ch. J., in Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick.
316. There are some very pertinent and
forcible remarks by Mr. Justice Mil
ler on this general subject in Wood
son v. Murdock, 22 Wall. 351, 381.
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[* 85] * CHAPTER V.
OF THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY
EXERCISE.
IN considering the powers which may be exercised by the legis
lative department of one of the American States, it is natural that
we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great
Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have
been modelled, and from which we derive our legislative usages
and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the prece
dents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country
has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to
measure the power of the legislative department in America by
the power of the like department in Britain ; and to concede
without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country
from which we derive our laws can do, may also be done by the
department created for the exercise of legislative authority in
this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison
between the two, we must bear in mind the important distinction
already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically
the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise al
l
the
powers o
f
the government if it wills so to do; while on the other
hand the legislatures o
f
the American States are not the sovereign
authority, and, though vested with the exercise o
f
one branch o
f
the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it
,
hedged in
o
n a
ll
sides b
y
important limitations, some o
f
which are imposed
in express terms, and others b
y
implications which are equally
imperative.
“The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward
Coke," is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be con
fined, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. And of
this high court it may truly be said: “Si antiquitatem spectes,
1 4 Inst. 36.
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est vetustissima ; si dignitatem, est honoratissima ; si jurisdic
tionem, est capacissima.’ It hath sovereign and uncontrolled
authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abro
gating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or
temporal, “civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this [* 86]
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the
constitution of these kingdoms. All mischief and grievances,
operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of
the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It
can regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was
done in the reign of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter
the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of
instances, in the reign of King Henry VIII. and his three children.
It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the king
dom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of
Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elec
tions. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally im
possible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it
s power,
b
y
a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence o
f
Parliament.
True it is
,
that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon
earth can undo ; so that it is a matter most essential to the
liberties o
f
this kingdom that such members be delegated to this
important trust as are most eminent for their probity, their forti
tude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the
great Lord Treasurer, Burleigh, “that England could never be
ruined but b
y
a Parliament; ' and as Sir Matthew Hale observes :
‘This being the highest and greatest court, over which none other
can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a mis
government should fall upon it
,
the subjects o
f
this kingdom are
left without all manner o
f remedy.’” "
The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction o
f
Parliament is here described is certainly inapplicable to any
authority in the American States, unless it be to the people of
the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation
o
f
their fundamental law ; and even then there rest upon them
* 1 Bl. Com. 160. See Austin o
n power is unknown. Loan Association
Jurisprudence, Lec. 6. In the Amer- v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 663.
ican system such a thing as unlimited
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the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which
bind them as absolutely as they do the governments which they
create. It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain in what re
spect the State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the powers
they exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison with
out losing sight of the fundamental ideas and principles of the
American system.
[*87] * The first and most notable difference is that to which
we have already alluded, and which springs from the dif
ferent theory on which the British Constitution rests. So long
as the Parliament is recognized as rightfully exercising the sov
ereign authority of the country, it is evident that the resemblance
between it and American legislatures in regard to their ultimate
powers cannot be traced very far. The American legislatures
only exercise a certain portion of the sovereign power. The
sovereignty is in the people; and the legislatures which they have
created are only to discharge a trust of which they have been
made a depository, but which has been placed in their hands with
well-defined restrictions.
Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament,
to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one
of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law is
the care which has been taken to separate legislative, executive,
and judicial functions. It has evidently been the intention of the
people in every State that the exercise of each should rest with a
separate department. The different classes of power have been
apportioned to different departments; and as all derive their
authority from the same instrument, there is an implied exclusion
of each department from exercising the functions conferred upon
the others.
There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the
extent of the legislative authority in the States: —
1. In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it
the legislative power, the people must be understood to have
conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may
be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject
only to such restrictions as they may have seen fi
t
to impose,
and to the limitations which are contained in the Constitution
o
f
the United States. The legislative department is not made a
special agency, for the exercise o
f specifically defined legislative
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powers, but is intrusted with the general authority to make laws
at discretion.
2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative
power does not sanction the exercise of executive or judicial func
tions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage,
where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of
legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in specified
cases, may expressly permit it." Executive power is so intimately
connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of
separation; but the grant of the judicial power to the
department * created for the purpose of exercising it must [* 88]
be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole
power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions
impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.”
While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the
legislative powers which the Parliament of Great Britain wields,
except as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time ex
cluded from other functions which may be, and sometimes habit
ually are, exercised by the Parliament.
“The people in framing the constitution,” says Denio, Ch. J.,
“committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of
the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold.
Plenary power in the legislature, for a
ll purposes o
f
civil govern
ment, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is
a
n exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is
constitutional, it is for those who question it
s validity to show that
it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly
inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legis
lative power contained in the instrument. The first article lays
down the ancient limitations which have always been considered
essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchical o
r
popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few
other provisions in restraint o
f legislative authority. But the
affirmative prescriptions and the general arrangements o
f
the
constitution are far more fruitful o
f
restraints upon the legisla
ture. Every positive direction contains an implication against
every thing contrary to it
,
o
r
which would frustrate o
r disappoint
the purpose o
f
that provision. The frame of the government, the
grant o
f legislative power itself, the organization o
f
the executive
* See post, pp. *87 to *114, *372. * See post, p
. *90, note.
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authority, the erection of the principal courts of justice, create
implied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as
though a negative was expressed in each instance; but indepen
dently of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within
the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the
legislature.”"
“It has never been questioned, so far as I know,” says Redfield,
Ch. J.
,
“that the American legislatures have the same unlimited
power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parlia
ment, except where they are restrained b
y
written consti
[* 89] tutions. * That must be conceded, I think, to be a
fundamental principle in the political organization o
f
the
American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon prin
ciple, it should be otherwise. The people must, o
f course, possess
a
ll legislative power originally. They have committed this in the
most general and unlimited manner to the several State legis
latures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Con
stitution o
f
the United States, or o
f
the particular State in
question.” ”
“I entertain no doubt,” says Comstock, J., “that aside from
the special limitations o
f
the constitution, the legislature cannot
exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial o
r
executive. These are, by the constitution, distributed to other
departments o
f
the government. It is only the ‘legislative power’
which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where the con
stitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation o
f
the powers
distributed to other departments, I think there would be great
difficulty and great danger in attempting to define the limits o
f
this power. Chief Justice Marshall said: “How far the power o
f
giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the
constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be,
definitely stated.’” That very eminent judge felt the difficulty;
1 People v. Draper, 15 N
.
Y
.
543.
* Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington
Railroad Co., 27 Wt. 142. See also
Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445;
Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend.
365; People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563;
Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251 ; Beach
amp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Mason
v
. Wait, 4 Scam. 134; People v. Su
pervisors o
f Orange, 27 Barb. 593;
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 144, per
Bronson, J.; Andrews v. State, 3
Heisk. 165; Lewis's Appeal, 67 Penn.
St. 153; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21
Ohio, N
.
s. 14; People v. Wright, 70
Ill. 388.
* Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136.
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but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theo
ries, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,
but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government,
attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and when too
much reverence for government and law is certainly among the
least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am
reluctant to enter upon this field of inquiry, satisfied, as I am,
that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the
germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and
speculation a license to oppose themselves to the just and legiti
mate powers of government.” "
Other judicial opinions in great number might be cited in
support of the same general doctrine ; but as there will
be "occasion to refer to them elsewhere when the circum- [*90]
stances under which a statute may be declared uncon
stitutional are considered, we shall refrain from further references
in this place.” Nor shall we enter upon a discussion of the ques
tion suggested by Chief Justice Marshall as above quoted ; * since,
however interesting it may be as an abstract question, it is made
practically unimportant by the careful separation of duties between
the several departments of the government which has been made
by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been
made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have
devolved upon the department vested with the general authority
* Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y.
391.
* See post, p. * 168, and cases cited
in notes.
* The power to distribute the judi
cial power, except so far as that has
been done by the constitution, rests
with the legislature: Commonwealth
r. Hipple, 69 Penn. St. 9; but when
the constitution has conferred it upon
certain specified courts, this must be
understood to embrace the whole ju
cial power, and the legislature can
not vest any portion of it elsewhere.
Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn.
St. 489; State v. Maynard, 14 Ill.
420; Gibson v. Emerson, 2 Eng. 173;
Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409; Suc
cession of Tanner, 22 La. Ann. 91;
Gough v. Dorsey, 27 Wis. 130; Van
Slyke v. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 390; s. c.
20 Am. Rep. 50: Alexander v. Ben
nett, 60 N. Y. 204; People v. Young,
72 Ill. 411. But a general provision
in the constitution for the distribution
of the judicial power, not referring
to courts-martial, would not be held
to forbid such courts by implication.
People v. Daniel, 50 N. Y. 274. Nor
would it be held to embrace adminis
trative functions of a quasi judicial
nature, such as the assessment of
property for taxation. State v. Com
missioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev.
392, and cases cited. See Auditor of
State v. Atchison, &c. R. R. Co., 6
Kan. 500; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 575.
110 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. v.
to make laws;" but assuming them to be apportioned already, we
are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to
that of the Parliament, when it confines its action to an exercise
of legislative functions; and such authority as is in it
s
nature
either executive o
r judicial is beyond it
s
constitutional powers,
with the few exceptions to which we have already referred.
It will be important therefore to consider those cases where
legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial
authority; and to this end it may be useful, at the outset, to
endeavor to define legislative and judicial power respectively, that
we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line o
f dis
tinction when questions arise in their practical application to ac
tual cases.
The legislative power we understand to be the authority, under
the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
Laws, in the sense in which the word is here employed, are rules
o
f
civil conduct, or statutes, which the legislative will has pre
scribed. “The laws of a State,” observes Mr. Justice Story,
“are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments
promulgated b
y
the legislative authority thereof, or long
[*91] established local customs having * the force of laws.” ”
“The difference between the departments undoubtedly
is
,
that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the
judiciary construes, the law.” ” And it is said that that which
distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is
,
that the one is a
determination o
f
what the existing law is in relation to some
existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a
predetermination o
f
what the law shall be for the regulation o
f
a
ll
future cases falling under it
s provisions.” And in another
case it is said: “The legislative power extends only to the
making o
f laws, and in it
s
exercise it is limited and restrained
b
y
the paramount authority o
f
the federal and State constitutions.
It cannot directly reach the property or vested rights of the
citizen b
y providing for their forfeiture o
r
transfer to another,
1 Calder v. Bull, 2 Root, 350, and * Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman
3 Dall. 386; Ross v. Whitman, 6 Cal. v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; per Gib
361; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; son, Ch. J., in Greenough v. Green
per Patterson, J., in Cooper v. Tel- ough, 11 Penn. St. 494. See State r.
fair, 4 Dall. 19 ; Martin v. Hunter's Gleason, 12 Fla. 190; Hawkins e.
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304. Governor, 1 Ark. 570.
* Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18. * Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.
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without trial and judgment in the courts; for to do so would be
the exercise of a power which belongs to another branch of the
government, and is forbidden to the legislative.” “That is not
legislation which adjudicates in a particular case, prescribes the
rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be enforced.
Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic rule than
any other attribute of government.”
On the other hand, to adjudicate upon, and protect, the rights
and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe
and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial depart
ment.” “No particular definition of judicial power,” says Wood
bury, J., “is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and,
considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be
expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all im
portant words were employed would have swollen into volumes;
and when those words possessed a customary signification, a defi
nition of them would have been useless. But ‘powers
judicial,’ ‘‘judiciary powers, and ‘judicatures’ are al
l
[*92]
phrases used in the constitution; and though not particu
larly defined, are still so used to designate with clearness that
department o
f government which it was intended should inter
pret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore,
those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are
peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial
acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a
marked difference exists between the employment o
f judicial and
legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality o
f
claims and conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in con
nection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded.
It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon
existing cases. In fine, the law is applied by the one, and made
b
y
the other. To do the first, therefore, — to compare the claims
o
f parties with the law o
f
the land before established, – is in its
* Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 382. N
.
s. 81. See also King v. Dedham
* Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. Bank, 15 Mass. 454; Gordon r. In
266. See also Greenough v. Green- graham, 1 Grant's Cases, 152; People
ough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Dechas- v. Supervisors o
f
New York, 16 N
.
tellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Y
. 432; Beebe w. State, 6 Ind. 515;
Trustees, &c. v
. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238. Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn.
* Cincinnati, &c. Railroad Co. v. St. 494; Taylor v. Place, 4 R
.
I. 324.
Commissioners o
f
Clinton Co., 1 Ohio,
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nature a judicial act. But to do the last — to pass new rules for
the regulation of new controversies —is in it
s
nature a legislative
act; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and
d
o
not look wholly to the future, they violate the definition o
f
a
law as “a rule o
f
civil conduct; ” because no rule of conduct can
with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself
was promulgated.
-
“It is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private
disputes between o
r concerning persons; but o
f legislative power
to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and
welfare o
f
the State. Nor does the passage o
f private statutes
conflict with these principles; because such statutes, when lawful,
are enacted o
n petition, or b
y
the consent o
f
a
ll
concerned ; o
r
else they forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested
rights.”
With these definitions and explanations, we shall now proceed
to consider some o
f
the cases in which the courts have attempted
to draw the line o
f
distinction between the proper functions o
f
the
legislative and judicial departments, in cases where it has been
claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power b
y
invad
ing the domain o
f judicial authority.
[* 93] * Declaratory Statutes.
Legislation is either introductory o
f
new rules, o
r it is declar
atory o
f existing rules. “A declaratory statute is one which
is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the com
mon law, or the meaning o
f
another statute, and which declares
what it is and ever has been.” ” Such a statute, therefore, is always
in a certain sense retrospective ;
* 1 Bl. Comm. 44. The distinc
tion between legislative and judicial
power lies between a rule and a sen
tence. Shrader, Er parte, 33 Cal. 279.
See Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich.
451; Supervisors o
f Election, 114
Mass. 247. The legislature cannot
empower election boards to decide
whether one by duelling has forfeited
his right to vote o
r
hold office.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush,
because it assumes to determine
725; Burkett v. McCurty, 10 Bush,
758.
* Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H.
204. See Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg.
69: Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 144;
Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272;
Dash v. Wan Kleek, 7 Johns. 498;
Wilkinson r. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Le
land c. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 297.
* Bouv. Law Dict. “Statute; ”
Austin on Jurisprudence, Lec. 37.
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what the law was before it was passed; and as a declaratory statute
is important only in those cases where doubts have already arisen,
the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be
different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the
courts. Thus Mr. Fox's Libel Act declared that, by the law of
England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for libel; it
did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule
already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of this
act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these cases
were only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of
the innuendoes; and whether the publication was libellous or not
was a question of law which addressed itself exclusively to the
court. It would appear, therefore, that the legislature declared
the law to be what the courts had declared it was not. So in the
State of New York, after the courts had held that insurance com
panies were taxable to a certain extent under an existing statute,
the legislature passed another act, declaring that such companies
were only taxable at a certain other rate; and it was thereby
declared that such was the intention and true construction of the
original statute." In these cases it will be perceived that the courts,
in the due exercise of their authority as interpreters of the laws,
have declared what the rule established by the common law or by
statute is
,
and that the legislature has then interposed, put it
s
own
construction upon the existing law, and in effect declared the
judicial interpretation to be unfounded and unwarrantable. The
courts in these cases have clearly kept within the proper limits o
f
their jurisdiction, and if they have erred, the error has been one
o
f judgment only, and has not extended to usurpation o
f power.
Was the legislature also within the limits o
f
it
s authority when it
passed the declaratory statute 2
*The decision of this question must depend perhaps [*94]
upon the purpose which was in the mind o
f
the legisla
ture in passing the declaratory statute; whether the design was
to give to the rule now declared a retrospective operation, or, on
the other hand, merely to establish a construction o
f
the doubtful
law for the determination o
f
cases that may arise in the future.
It is always competent to change an existing law by a declaratory
statute; and where the statute is only to operate upon future
* People v. Supervisors o
f
New York, 16 N
.
Y
.
424.
8
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cases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to
have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the
future." But the legislative action cannot be made to retroact
upon past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts,
in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made ; for this
would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be
its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since
the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which
parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the
courts.”
1 Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss.
327.
* In several different cases the
courts of Pennsylvania had decided
that a testator's mark to his name,
at the foot of a testamentary paper,
but without proof that the name was
written by his express direction, was
not the signature required by the
statute, and the legislature, to use
the language of Chief Justice Gibson,
‘‘ declared, in order to overrule it
,
that every last will and testament
heretofore made, o
r
hereafter to be
made, except such as may have been
fully adjudicated prior to the passage
o
f
this act, to which the testator's
name is subscribed b
y
his direction,
or to which the testator has made his
mark o
r cross, shall be deemed and
taken to be valid. How this man
date to the courts to establish a
particular interpretation o
f
a particu
lar statute can be taken for any thing
else than an exercise o
f judicial power
in settling a question o
f interpreta
tion, I know not. The judiciary had
certainly recognized a legislative in
terpretation o
f
a statute before it had
itself acted, and consequently before
a purchaser had been misled b
y
its
judgment; but he might have paid
for a title on the unmistakable mean
ing o
f plain words; and for the legis
lature subsequently to distort o
r
pervert it
,
and to enact that white
meant black, or that black meant
white, would in the same degree b
e
an exercise o
f arbitrary and uncon
stitutional power.” Greenough r.
Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. The
act in this case was held void so far
a
s its operation was retrospective, but
valid as to future cases. And see
Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn.
St. 137. The constitution o
f Georgia
entitled the head o
f
a family to enter
a homestead, and the courts decided
that a single person, having no others
dependent upon him, could not be
regarded the head o
f
a family, though
keeping house with servants. After
wards, the legislature passed an act,
declaring that any single person living
habitually as housekeeper to himself
should be regarded as the head o
f
a
family. Held void as an exercise o
f
judicial power. Calhoun v. McLen
don, 42 Geo. 405. The fact that the
courts had previously given a con
struction to the law may show more
clearly a purpose in the legislature
to exercise judicial authority, but it
would not be essential to that end.
As is well said in Haley v. Philadel
phia, 68 Penn. St. 45: “It would be
monstrous to maintain that when the
words and intention of an act were so
plain that no court had ever been
appealed to for the purpose o
f declar
ing their meaning, it was therefore in
the power o
f
the legislature, b
y
a ret
rospective law, to put a construction
upon them contrary to the obvious
letter and spirit. Reiser v. William
Tell Fund Association, 39 Penn. St.
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As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law
already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel
the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law
which the legislature permits to remain in force. “To declare
what the law is
,
o
r
has been, is a judicial power; to declare what
the law shall be, is legislative. One o
f
the fundamental principles
o
f
a
ll
our governments is
,
that the legislative power
* shall be separate from the judicial.” If the legislature [*95]
would prescribe a different rule for the future from that
which the courts enforce, it must be done b
y
statute, and cannot b
e
done b
y
a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged,
but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it
,
not ac
cording to the judicial, but according to the legislative judgment.”
But in any case the substance of the legislative action should
b
e regarded rather than the form; and if it appears to be the
intention to establish b
y
declaratory statute a rule o
f
conduct for
the future, the courts should accept and act upon it
,
without too
nicely inquiring whether the mode b
y
which the new rule is estab
lished is or is not the best, most decorous, and suitable that could
have been adopted.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts, by requiring o
f
them a construction o
f
the law according
to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, b
y
set
137, is an authority in point against
such a doctrine. An expository act
o
f assembly is destitute o
f
retroactive
force, because it is an act o
f judicial
power, and is in contravention o
f
the
ninth section of the ninth article
o
f
the constitution, which declares
that no man can be deprived of his
property unless b
y
the judgment o
f
his peers o
r
the law o
f
the land.’”
See 8 Am. Rep. 155,156. And on the
force and effect o
f declaratory laws in
general, see Salters v. Tobias, 3
Paige, 388 ; Postmaster-General v.
Early, 12 Wheat. 148; Union Iron
Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Planters'
Bank v. Black, 19 Miss. 43; Gough
v
. Pratt, 9 Md. 526.
* Dash v. Wan Kleek, 7 Johns.
498, per Thompson, J. ; Ogden v.
Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272; Lambert
son v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25; Seibert
v
. Linton, 5 W. Va. 57; Arnold v.
Kelley, 5 W. Va. 448; McDaniel v.
Correll, 19 Ill. 226. A legislative act
directing the levy and collection o
f
a
tax which has already been declared
illegal by the judiciary, is void, as an
attempted reversal o
f judicial action.
Mayor, &c. v. Horn, 26 Md. 194;
Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw,
26 Mich. 25. This doctrine, however,
would not prevent the correction o
f
mere errors in taxation by legislation
o
f
a retrospective character. See
post, p
.
* 371.
* Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph.
165; People v
. Supervisors, &c., 16
N. Y
.
424; Reiser v. Tell Association,
39 Penn. St. 137; O'Conner v. War
ner, 4 W. & S. 227; Lambertson v.
Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.
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ting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders,” or directing what particu
lar steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.”
* Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Dur
ham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140; Atkin
son v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Bates v.
Kimball, 2 Chip. 77; Staniford v.
Barry, 1 Aik. 314; Merrill v. Sher
burne, 1 N. H. 199; Opinion of
Judges in Matter of Dorr, 3 R. I.
299; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324;
Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn.
St. 18; Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind.
301; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 515;
Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann. 175;
Mayor, &c. v. Horn, 26 Md. 194;
Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224;
Saunders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173;
Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59; Sydnor
v. Palmer, 32 Wis. 409; People v.
Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135; Lawson v. Jef
fries, 47 Miss. 686; s. c. 12 Am. Rep.
342. And see post, pp. *391—“393 and
notes. It is not competent by legis
lation to authorize the court of final
resort to reopen and rehear cases pre
viously decided. Dorsey v. Dorsey,
37 Md. 64; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 528.
The legislature may control remedies,
&c., but, when the matter has pro
ceeded to judgment, it has passed
beyond legislative control. Oliver
v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Griffin's
Executor v. Cunningham, 20 Gratt.
31; Teel v. Yancey, 23 Gratt. 691;
Hooker v. Hooker, 18 Miss. 599.
* In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph.
152, a legislative resolve that “no
fine, forfeiture, or imprisonment,
should be imposed or recovered under
the act of 1837 [then in force], and
that a
ll
causes pending in any o
f
the
courts for such offence should be
dismissed,” was held void as an
invasion o
f judicial authority. The
legislature cannot declare a forfeiture
o
f
a right to act as curators o
f
a
college. State v. Adams, 44 Mo.
570. Nor can it authorize the gov
ernor o
r any other State officer to
pass upon the validity o
f
State grants
and correct errors therein; this being
judicial. Hilliard v. Connelly, 7 Geo.
172. Nor, where a corporate charter
provides that it shall not be repealed
“unless it shall be made to appear
to the legislature that there has been
a violation by the company o
f
some o
f
its provisions,” can there be a repeal
before a judicial inquiry into the
violation. Flint, &c. Plank Road Co.
v
. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99. A legis
lative act cannot turn divorces nisi
into absolute divorces, o
f
its own
force. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116
Mass. 315. But to take away by
statute a statutory right o
f appeal is
not an exercise o
f judicial authority.
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.
And it has been held that a statute
allowing an appeal in a particular
case was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2
Gill, 147; State v. Northern Central
R. R. Co., 18 Md. 193. A retro
active statute, giving the right of
appeal in cases in which it had pre
viously been lost b
y
lapse o
f time,
was sustained in Page v. Mathews's
Adm’r, 40 Ala. 547. But in Carleton
v
. Goodwin's Ex’r, 41 Ala. 153, an
act the effect o
f
which would have
been to revive discontinued appeals
was held void as an exercise o
f judi
cial authority. See cases cited in
next note.
* Opinions o
f Judges on the Dorr
Case, 3 R. I. 299. In the case of
Picquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 64, the
judge o
f probate had ordered letters
o
f
administration to issue to an ap
plicant therefor, on his giving bond
in the penal sum o
f $50,000, with
sureties within the Commonwealth,
for the faithful performance o
f
his
duties. He was unable to give the
bond, and applied to the legislature
for relief. Thereupon a resolve was
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*And as a court must act as an organized body of judges, [*96]
and, where differences of opinion arise, they can only
decide by majorities, it has been held that it would not be in the
power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies,
the opinion of the minority of a court, vested with power by the
constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court in
such cases should be rendered against the judgment of it
s
mem
bers."
Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals b
y
a recital o
f
facts in a statute, to be used as evidence against the
parties interested. A recital of facts in the preamble of a statute
passed “empowering ” the judge of
probate to grant the letters o
f ad
ministration, provided the petitioner
should give bond with his brother,
a resident o
f Paris, France, as surety,
and “ that such bond should be in
lieu o
f any and all bond or bonds b
y
any law o
r
statute in this Common
wealth now in force required,” &c.
The judge of probate refused to
grant the letters on the terms speci
fied in this resolve, and the Supreme
Court, while holding that it was not
compulsory upon him, also declared
their opinion that, if it were so, it
would be inoperative and void. In
Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it
was decided that the legislature had
no power to revive a commission for
proving claims against an estate after
it had once expired. See also Bagg's
Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 512; Trustees v.
Bailey, 10 Fla. 238. In Hill v. Sun
derland, 3 Wt. 507, and Burch v.
Newberry, 10 N
.
Y
.
374, it was held
that the legislature had no power to
grant to parties a right to appeal
after it was gone under the general
law. In Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark.
91, it was held that the granting of
continuances o
f pending cases was
the exercise o
f judicial authority, and
a legislative act assuming to do this
was void. And where, by the gen
eral law, the courts have no authority
to grant a divorce for a given cause,
the legislature cannot confer the au
thority in a particular case. Sim
monds v. Simmonds, 103 Mass. 572;
s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 576. And see post,
pp. *110, note, "392 and note.
1 In Clapp v. Ely, 3 Dutch. 622,
it was held that a statute which pro
vided that no judgment o
f
the Su
preme Court should be reversed by
the Court o
f
Errors and Appeals,
unless a majority o
f
those members
o
f
the court who were competent to
sit on the hearing and decision should
concur in the reversal, was unconsti
tutional. Its effect would be, if the
court were not full, to make the
opinion o
f
the minority in favor o
f
affirmance control that o
f
the majority
in favor o
f reversal, unless the latter
were a majority o
f
the whole court.
Such a provision in the constitution
might be proper and unexceptionable;
but if the constitution has created a
court o
f appeals, without any re
striction o
f
this character, the ruling
o
f
this case is that the legislature
cannot impose it
.
The court was
nearly equally divided, standing
seven to six. A statute authoriz
ing an unofficial person to sit in the
place o
f
a judge who is disqualified,
was held void in Van Slyke v. Insur
ance Co., 39 Wis. 390; s. c. 20 Am.
Rep. 50. That judicial power can
not be delegated, see Cohen v. Hoff,
3 Brev. 500.
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may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public
nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the
country;' but where the facts concern the rights of individuals,
the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes
are generally obtained on the application of some party interested,
and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion
from being made evidence against any other party would result
from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could
have no force, except as a judicial finding of facts; and that such
finding is not within the legislative province.”
[*97] *We come now to a class of cases in regard to which
there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing
from the fact, perhaps, that the purpose sought to be accomplishd
by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so
that if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial author
ity, they at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy
under general laws conferring the jurisdiction upon them. We
refer to
Statutes empowering Guardians and other Trustees to sell Lands.
Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of
a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other
incompetent person for the same purpose, or for future support,
or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture,
or for the most profitable investment of the proceeds, or of ten
ants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will
probably be found in every State that some court is vested with
jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts after a
hearing of the parties in interest seem to render it important.
The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are
facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible
that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent
to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be in
quired into and guarded ; and as the proceeding will usually be
ea parte, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud
upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which
1 Rex r. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532. 80; Lothrop v. Steadman, 42 Conn.
* Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 3 Litt. 583, 592.
478; Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill
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grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore,
that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for
these cases, and that such laws should require notice to all
proper parties, and afford an opportunity for the presentation of
any facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the
applications.
But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided
for these cases are not applicable to some which arise; or, if appli
cable, that they do not accomplish fully all that in some cases
seems desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some
others without similar excuse, it has not been unusual for legis
lative authority to intervene, and by special statute to grant
the permission which, under the general law, would be.
granted by the courts. The * power to pass such statutes [*98]
has often been disputed, and it may be well to see upon
what basis of authority as well as of reason it rests.
If in fact the inquiry which precedes the grant of authority is
in its nature judicial, it would seem clear that such statutes must
be ineffectual and void. But if judicial inquiry is not essential,
and the legislature may confer the power of sale in such a case
upon an er parte presentation of evidence, or upon the represen
tations of the parties without any proof whatever, then we must
consider the general laws to be passed, not because the cases fall
necessarily within the province of judicial action, but because
the courts can more conveniently consider, and more properly,
safely, and inexpensively pass upon such cases, than the legislative
body, to which the power primarily belongs."
The rule upon this subject, which appears to be deducible
from the authorities, is this: If the party standing in position of
trustee applies for permission to convert by a sale the real prop
erty into personal, in order to effectuate the purposes of the
trust, and to accomplish objects in the interest of the cestui que
trust not otherwise attainable, there is nothing in the granting of
1 There are constitutional provi- persons under legal disability. Per
sions in Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri,
Oregon, Nevada, Indiana, Maryland,
New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, Illi
nois, Wisconsin, Texas, West Vir
ginia, Michigan, and Colorado,
forbidding special laws licensing the
sale of the lands of minors and other
haps the general provision in some
other constitutions, forbidding special
laws in cases where a general law
could be made applicable, might also
be held to exclude such special au
thorization.
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permission which is in its nature judicial. To grant permission is
merely to enlarge the sphere of the judiciary authority, the better
to accomplish the purpose for which the trusteeship exists; and
while it would be entirely proper to make the questions which
might arise assume a judicial form, by referring them to some
proper court for consideration and decision, there is no usurpation
of power if the legislature shall, by direct action, grant the per
mission.
In the case of Rice v. Parkman,” certain minors having become
entitled to real estate by descent from their mother, the legisla
ture passed a special statute empowering their father as guardian
for them, and, after giving bond to the judge of probate, to sell
and convey the lands, and put the proceeds at interest on good
security for the benefit of the minor owners. A sale was made
accordingly; but the children, after coming of age, brought suit
against the party claiming under the sale, insisting that the
special statute was void. There was in force at the time this
special statute was passed a general statute, under which license
might have been granted by the courts; but it was held that
this general law did not deprive the legislature of that
[*99] full * and complete control over such cases which it would
have possessed had no such statute existed. “If,” say
the court, “the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in
this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very
clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature with
out violating an express provision of the constitution. But it
does not seem to us to be of this description of power; for it was
not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there
any decree or judgment affecting the title to property. The
only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to trans
mute real into personal estate, for purposes beneficial to all who
were interested therein. This is a power frequently exercised by
the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution,
and by the legislature of the province and of the colony, while
under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power
exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects, time out
of mind. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary for the interest of
those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from dis
posing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of
1 16 Mass. 326.
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converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might
suffer, although having property; it not being in a condition to yield
an income. This power must rest in the legislature, in this Com
monwealth; that body being alone competent to act as the general
guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for them
selves.
“It was undoubtedly wise to delegate this authority to other
bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant, and whose struc
ture may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the
particular application brought before them. But it does not fol
low that, because the power has been delegated by the legislature
to courts of law, it is judicial in it
s
character. For aught we see,
the same authority might have been given to the selectmen o
f
each town, o
r
to the clerks o
r registers o
f
the counties, it being
a mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and some
times knowledge o
f law, for it
s
due exercise, but still partaking
in n
o degree o
f
the characteristics o
f judicial power. It is doubt
less included in the general authority granted b
y
the people to
the legislature b
y
the constitution. For full power and authority
is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all
manner o
f
wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, stat
utes, "and ordinances, directions, and restrictions (so as [*100]
the same b
e
not repugnant o
r contrary to the constitu
tion), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare o
f
the
Commonwealth, and o
f
the subjects thereof. No one imagines
that, under this general authority, the legislature could deprive a
citizen o
f
his estate, o
r impair any valuable contract in which h
e
might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt
that, upon his application, o
r
the application o
f
those who properly
represent him, if disabled from acting himself, a beneficial change
o
f
his estate, o
r
a sale o
f it for purposes necessary and convenient
for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise
o
f
that authority. It is
,
in fact, protecting him in his property,
which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive
subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might
otherwise be wholly useless during that period o
f
life when it
might be most beneficially employed.
“If this be not true, then the general laws, under which so
many estates o
f minors, persons non compos mentis, and others,
have been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by
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the constitution, and void. For the courts derive their authority
from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the
legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any
other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from
actual distress who had unproductive property, and were disabled
from conveying it themselves, it would seem that one of the
most essential objects of government—that of providing for the
welfare of the citizens—would be lost. But the argument which
has most weight on the part of the defendants is
,
that the legisla
ture has exercised its power over this subject in the only consti
tutional way, by establishing a general provision; and that, having
done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to
interfere in particular cases. And if the question were one of
expediency only, we should perhaps be convinced b
y
the argu
ment, that it would be better for al
l
such applications to be made
to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question
o
f right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he
has delegated a
n authority without an interest, may do the act
himself which he has authorized another to do; and especially
when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited b
y
the constitution from exercising the authority. Indeed,
[*101] the * whole authority might be revoked, and the legisla
ture resume the burden o
f
the business to itself, if in its
wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required
it
. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules,
but the use o
f
a parental o
r tutorial power, for purposes o
f kind
ness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights o
f any but
those who apply for specific relief. The title o
f strangers is not
in any degree affected b
y
such a
n interposition.” "
* In Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. subject,
75 Ill. 152.
Galesburg v. Hawkinson,
451, the distinction between judicial
and administrative power is pointed
out, and it is held that the question o
f
incorporating territory as a village
cannot be made a judicial question.
A like decision is made b
y
Chancellor
Cooper, in Er parte Burns, 1 Tenn.
Ch. R
.
83, though it is said in that
case that the organization o
f cor
porations which are created b
y leg
islative authority may be referred
to the courts. See, on the same
Compare Burlington v.
Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252. In Super
visors o
f Election, 114 Mass. 247,
s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 341, it is decided
that the courts cannot be vested with
authority to appoint inspectors o
f
election. For the distinction between
political and judicial power, see fur
ther, Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill. 261;
Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush,
725. And see post, p
.
* 106 and notes.
In Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Penn. St.
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A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction
of Errors in New York. “It is clearly,” says the Chancellor,
“within the powers of the legislature, as parens patriae, to prescribe
such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superin
tendence, disposition, and management of the property and effects
of infants, lunatics, and other persons who are incapable of manag
ing their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally
be so far extended as to transfer the beneficial use of the property
to another person, except in those cases where it can legally be
presumed the owner of the property would himself have given the
use of his property to the other, if he had been in a situation to
act for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an
infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other
near relative.”"
503, the power of the legislature to
authorize a trustee to sell the lands of
parties who were sui juris, and might
act on their own behalf, was denied,
and the case was distinguished from
Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277,
and others which had followed it.
* Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend.
373. See the same case in the Su
preme Court, sub nom. Clarke v. Van
Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also
Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427;
Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723;
Heirs of Holinan v. Bank of Norfolk,
12 Ala. 369; Florentine v. Barton,
2 Wall. 2.0. In Brevoort v. Grace,
53 N. Y. 245, the power of the legis
lature to authorize the sale of lands
of infants by special statute was held
to extend to the future contingent
interests of those not in being, but
not to the interests of non-consenting
adults, competent to act on their own
behalf. In Opinions of the Judges,
4 N. H. 572, the validity of such a
special statute, under the constitution
of New Hampshire, was denied. The
judges say: “The objection to the
exercise of such a power by the legis
lature is, that it is in its nature both
legislative and judicial. It is the
province of the legislature to pre
scribe the rule of law, but to apply it
to particular cases is the business of
the courts of law. And the thirty
eighth article in the Bill of Rights
declares that “in the government of
the State the three essential powers
thereof, to wit, the legislative, execu
tive, and judicial, ought to be kept as
separate from, and independent of,
each other as the nature of a free
government will admit, or as consist
ent with that chain of connection
that binds the whole fabric of the
constitution in one indissoluble bond
of union and amity.’ The exercise
of such a power by the legislature
can never be necessary. By the ex
isting laws, judges of probate have
very extensive jurisdiction to license
the sale of real estate of minors by
their guardians. If the jurisdiction
of the judges of probate be not suffi
ciently extensive to reach all proper
cases, it may be a good reason why
that jurisdiction should be extended,
but can hardly be deemed a sufficient
reason for the particular interposition
of the legislature in an individual case.
If there be a defect in the laws, they
should be amended. Under our in
stitutions all men are viewed as equal,
entitled to enjoy equal privileges, and
to be governed by equal laws. If it
be fi
t
and proper that license should
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[* 102] * The same ruling has often been made in analogous
cases. In Ohio, a special act of the legislature author
izing commissioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by
devisees under a will, in order to cut off the entailment and
effect a partition between them, - the statute being applied for
by the mother of the devisees and the executor of the will, and
on behalf of the devisees, – was held not obnoxious to consti
tutional objection, and to be sustainable on immemorial legislative
usage, and on the same ground which would support general laws
for the same purpose." In a case in the Supreme Court of the
United States, where an executrix who had proved a will in New
Hampshire made sale of lands without authority in Rhode Island,
for the purpose of satisfying debts against the estate, a
[*103] subsequent act of the Rhode Island legislature, * con
firming the sale, was held not an encroachment upon
be given to one guardian, under par
ticular circumstances, to sell the estate
of his ward, it is fi
t
and proper that
all other guardians should, under
similar circumstances, have the same
license. This is the very genius and
spirit of our institutions. And we
are o
f opinion that an act o
f
the leg
islature to authorize the sale of the
land o
f
a particular minor b
y
his
guardian cannot be easily reconciled
with the spirit o
f
the article in the
Bill of Rights which we have just
cited. It is true that the grant of
such a license b
y
the legislature to
the guardian is intended as a privi
lege and a benefit to the ward. But
by the law o
f
the land no minor is
capable o
f assenting to a sale o
f
his
real estate in such a manner as to
bind himself. And no guardian is
permitted by the same law to deter
mine when the estate of his ward
ought and when it ought not to be
sold. In the contemplation o
f
the
law, the one has not sufficient discrº
tion to judge o
f
the propriety and
expediency o
f
a sale o
f
his estate, and
the other is not to be intrusted with
the power o
f judging. Such being the
general law o
f
the land, it is pre
sumable that the legislature would be
unwilling to rest the justification o
f
a
n
act authorizing the sale o
f
a mi
nor's estate upon any assent which
the guardian or the minor could give
in the proceeding. The question then
is, as it seems to us, Can a ward be
deprived o
f
his inheritance without
his consent b
y
a
n act o
f
the legisla
ture which is intended to apply to no
other individual? The fifteenth ar
ticle o
f
the Bill of Rights declares
that no subject shall be deprived o
f
his property but b
y
the judgment o
f
his peers or the law o
f
the land. Can
an act o
f
the legislature, intended to
authorize one man to sell the land of
another without his consent be “the
law o
f
the land’ in a free country?
If the question proposed to us can be
resolved into these questions, as it
appears to u
s it may, we feel entirely
confident that the representatives o
f
the people o
f
this State will agree
with us in the opinion we feel our
selves bound to express on the
question submitted to us, that the
legislature cannot authorize a guar
dian o
f minors, by a special act o
r
resolve, to make a valid conveyance
of the real estate of his wards.”
1 Carroll v. Lessee o
f Olmsted,
1
6 Ohio, 251.
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the judicial power. The land, it was said, descended to the
heirs subject to a lien for the payment of debts, and there is
nothing in the nature of the act of authorizing a sale to satisfy
the lien, which requires that it should be performed by a judicial
tribunal, or that it should be performed by a delegate rather than
by the legislature itself. It is remedial in its nature, to give
effect to existing rights." The case showed the actual existence
o
f debts, and indeed a judicial license for the sale of lands to
satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire before the sale
was made. The decision was afterwards followed in a carefully
considered case in the same court.” In each of these cases it is
assumed that the legislature does not b
y
the special statute de
termine the existence o
r
amount o
f
the debts, and disputes con
cerning them would be determinable in the usual modes. Many
other decisions have been made to the same effect.”
This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called pre
rogative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights;
it deprives no one of his property. It simply authorizes one's
real estate to be turned into personal, on the application o
f
the
person representing his interest, and under such circumstances
that the consent o
f
the owner, if capable o
f giving it
,
would b
e
presumed. It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one
* Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 660.
Compare Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y.
Grace, 53 N. Y. 245; Gannett v.
Leonard, 47 Mo. 205; Kibby v. Chet
245. wood's Adm'rs, 4 T
.
B
.
Monr. 94;
* Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, Shehan's Heirs v. Barnett's Heirs,
16 Pet. 25–60. See also Florentine 6 T
.
B
.
Monr. 594; Davis v. State
v
. Barton, 2 Wall. 210; Doe v. Doug
lass, 8 Blackf. 10. Monson, 22 Conn 98; Ward v. New
* Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R
.
I. England, &c. Co., 1 Cliff. 565; Sohier
296, 302; Williamson v. Williamson, v. Massachusetts, &c. Hospital, 3
3 S
.
& M. 715; McComb v. Gilkey, Cush. 483; Lobrano v. Nelligan, 9
29 Miss. 146; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Wall. 295. Contra, Brenham v. Story,
Miss. 246; Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 39 Cal. 179. In Moore v. Maxwell,
13; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S
.
& R
.
1
8 Ark. 469, a special statute author
435; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 2 Green, izing the administrator o
f
one who
Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Richardson v.
Ch. 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G
.
& J.
87; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St.
277; Sergeant v. Kuhn, 2 Penn. St.
393; Kerr. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St 433 ;
Coleman v. Carr, Walker, 258; Davi
son v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 388; Towle
v
. Forney, 14 N
.
Y
. 423; Leggett
v
. Hunter, 19 N. Y
. 445; Brevoort v.
held the mere naked legal title to
convey to the owner o
f
the equitable
title was held valid. In Stanley v.
Colt, 5 Wall. 119, an act permitting
the sale of real estate which had been
devised to charitable uses was sus
tained, – no diversion of the gift being
made.
126 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. v.
person, which at the same time affects injuriously the rights of
no other."
But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes
to authorize a person who does not occupy a fiduciary
[*104] relation to * the owner, to make sale of real estate, to
satisfy demands which he asserts, but which are not
judicially determined, or for any other purpose not connected
with the convenience or necessity of the owner himself. An act
of the legislature of Illinois undertook to empower a party who
had applied for it to make sale of the lands pertaining to the
estate of a deceased person, in order to raise a certain specified
sum of money which the legislature assumed to be due to him
and another person, for moneys by them advanced and liabilities
incurred on behalf of the estate, and to apply the same to the
extinguishment of their claims. Now it is evident that this act
was in the nature of a judicial decree, passed on the application
of parties adverse in interest to the estate, and in effect adjudg
ing a certain amount to be due them, and ordering lands to be
sold for it
s
satisfaction. As was well said b
y
the Supreme Court
o
f Illinois, in adjudging the act void : “If this is not the exercise
o
f
a power o
f inquiry into, and a determination o
f facts, between
debtor and creditor, and that, too, ex parte and summary in its
character, we are a
t
a loss to understand the meaning o
f terms;
nay, that it is adjudging and directing the application o
f
one per
son's property to another, on a claim o
f indebtedness, without
notice to, o
r hearing of, the parties whose estate is divested by
the act. That the exercise o
f
such power is in it
s
nature clearly
judicial, we think too apparent to need argument to illustrate its
truth. It is so self-evident from the facts disclosed that it proves
itself.” 2
* It would be equally competent of the testator to pay debts against
for the legislature to authorize a per
son under legal disability — e. g
.
an
infant — to convey his estate, as to
authorize it to be conveyed by guar
dian. McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss.
146.
* Lane v. Dorman, 4 Ill. 242. In
Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486,
Judge Pope assumes that the case o
f
Lane v. Dorman decides a special act,
authorizing an executor to sell lands
his estate would be unconstitutional.
We do not so understand that decision.
On the contrary, another case in the
same volume, Edwards v. Pope, p
.
465, fully sustains the cases before
decided, distinguishing them from
Lane v. Dorman. But that indeed is
also done in the principal case, where
the court, after referring to similar
cases in Kentucky, say: “These cases
are clearly distinguished from the case
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* A case in harmony with the one last referred to was [*105]
decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Under the
act of Congress “for the relief of citizens of towns upon the
lands of the United States, under certain circumstances,” ap
proved May 23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under
said act should be conducted under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State,” &c.,
the legislature passed an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds
to a person named therein, and those claiming under him ; thus
undertaking to dispose of the whole trust to the person thus
named and his grantees, and authorizing no one else to be con
sidered or to receive any relief. This was very plainly an at
tempted adjudication upon the rights of the parties concerned ;
it did not establish regulations for the administration of the
trust, but it adjudged the trust property to certain claimants
exclusively, in disregard of any rights which might exist in
others; and it was therefore declared to be void."
at bar. The acts were for the benefit
of a
ll
the creditors o
f
the estates,
without distinction; and in one case,
in addition, for the purpose o
f per
fecting titles contracted to be made
b
y
the intestate. The claims o
f
the
creditors of the intestate were to be
established b
y
judicial o
r
other satis
factory legal proceedings, and, in
truth, in the case last cited, the com
missioners were nothing more than
special commissioners. The legisla
tive department, in passing these acts,
investigated nothing, nor did an act
which could be deemed a judicial in
quiry. It neither examined proof,
nor determined the nature or extent
o
f claims; it merely authorized the
application o
f
the real estate to the
payment o
f
debts generally, discrimi
nating in favor o
f
no one creditor,
and giving no one a preference over
another. Not so in the case before
us; the amount is investigated and
ascertained, and the sale is directed
for the benefit o
f
two persons exclu
sively. The proceeds are to be applied
to the payment o
f
such claims and
none other, for liabilities said to be
And it has
incurred but not liquidated o
r satis
fied; and those, too, created after the
death of the intestate.” See also
Mason v. Wait, 5 Ill. 127–134; Dav
enport v. Young, 16 Ill. 551; Rozier
v
. Fagan, 46 Ill. 404. The case of
Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S
.
& R
.
435,
would seem to be more open to ques
tion on this point than any o
f
the
others before cited. It was the case
o
f
a special statute, authorizing the
guardian o
f
infant heirs to convey
their lands in satisfaction of a con
tract made by their ancestor; and
which was sustained. Compare this
with Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59,
where an act authorizing a guardian
to sell lands to pay the ancestor's
debts was held void.
1 Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193.
The case o
f
Powers v. Bergen, 6 N
.
Y
.
358, is perhaps to be referred to
another principle than that o
f en
croachment upon judicial authority.
That was a case where the legislature,
by special act, had undertaken to
authorize the sale o
f property, not
for the purpose o
f satisfying liens
upon it
,
o
r
o
f meeting o
r
in any way
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[*106] also been held that, whether a * corporation has been
guilty of abuse of authority under its charter, so as justly
to subject it to forfeiture," and whether a widow is entitled to
providing for the necessities or wants
of the owners, but solely, after pay
ing expenses, for the investment of
the proceeds. It appears from that
case that the executors under the will
of the former owner held the lands in
trust for a daughter of the testator
during her natural life, with a vested
remainder in fee in her two children.
The special act assumed to empower
them to sell and convey the complete
fee, and apply the proceeds, first,
to the payment of their commis
sions, costs, and expenses; second,
to the discharge of assessments, liens,
charges, and incumbrances on the
land, of which, however, none were
shown to exist; and, third, to invest
the proceeds and pay over the income,
after deducting taxes and charges, to
the daughter during her life, and
after her decease to convey, assign,
or pay over the same to the persons
who would be entitled under the will.
The court regarded this as an un
authorized interference with private
property upon no necessity, and alto
gether void, as depriving the owners
of their property contrary to the
“law of the land.” At the same time
the authority of those cases, where it
has been held that the legislature, act
ing as the guardian and protector of
those who are disabled to act for
themselves by reason of infancy, lu
macy, or other like cause, may con
stitutionally pass either general or
private laws, under which an effectual
disposition of their property might
be made, was not questioned. The
court cite, with apparent approval,
the cases, among others, of Rice v.
Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Cochran v.
Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; and
Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657.
The case of Ervine's Appeal, 16
Penn. St. 256, was similar, in the
principles involved, to Powers v. Ber
gen, and was decided in the same
way. See also Kneass's Appeal, 31
Penn. St. 87, and compare with Ker
v. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St. 438; Mar
tin's Appeal, 23 Penn. 437; Hegarty's
Appeal, 75 Penn. St. 503; Tharp r.
Fleming, 1 Houston, 592.
-
1 State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189;
Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How.
(Miss.) 661; Canal Co. v. Railroad
Co., 4 G. & J. 122; Regents of Uni
versity v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365.
In Miners' Bank of Dubuque v. United
States, 1 Morris, 482, a clause in a
charter authorizing the legislature to
repeal it for any abuse or misuser of
corporate privileges was held to refer
the question of abuse to the legisla
tive judgment. In Erie & North East
R. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287,
on the other hand, it was held that
the legislature could not conclude the
corporation by its repealing act, but
that the question of abuse of corpo
rate authority would be one of fact
to be passed upon, if denied, by a
jury, so that the act would be valid
or void as the jury should find.
Compare Flint & Fentonville P. R.
Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, in
which it was held that the reservation
of a power to repeal a charter for
violation of its provisions necessarily
presented a judicial question, and the
repeal must be preceded by a proper
judicial finding. In Carey v. Giles, 9
Geo. 253, the appointment by the
legislature of a receiver for an insolvent
bank was sustained; and in Hindman
v. Piper, 50 Mo. 292, a legislative
appointment of a trustee was also
sustained in a peculiar case. In
Lothrop v. Steadman, 42 Conn. 583,
the power of the legislature as an
administrative measure to appoint a
trustee to take charge of and manage
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dower in a specified parcel of land," are judicial questions which
cannot be decided by the legislature. In these cases there are
necessarily adverse parties; the questions that would arise are
essentially judicial, and over them the courts possess jurisdiction
at the common law; and it is presumable that legislative acts of
this character must have been adopted carelessly, and without a
due consideration of the proper boundaries which mark the sep
aration of legislative from judicial duties.” As well might the
legislature proceed to declare that one man is indebted to another
in a sum specified, and establish by enactment a conclusive de
mand against him.”
* We have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where [*107]
statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated
legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them.”
These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as
to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they refer to such
proceedings, they may at first seem like an interference with
judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceed
the affairs of a corporation whose char
te
r
had been repealed, was affirmed.
For a similar principle, see Albertson
t. Landon, 42 Conn. 209. And see
post, p
.
* 365.
| Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465.
* The unjust and dangerous char
acter o
f legislation o
f
this description
is well stated b
y
the Supreme Court
o
f Pennsylvania: “When, in the exer
cise o
f proper legislative powers, gen
eral laws are enacted which bear, or
may bear, o
n
the whole community,
if they are unjust and against the
spirit o
f
the constitution, the whole
community will beinterested to procure
their repeal by a voice potential. And
that is the great security for just and
fair legislation. But when individuals
are selected from the mass, and laws are
enacted affecting their property, with
out summons o
r notice, a
t
the instiga
tion o
f
a
n
interested party, who is
to stand up for them, thus isolated
from the mass, in injury and injustice,
o
r
where are they to seek relief from
such acts o
f despotic power? They
have no refuge but in the courts, the
only secure place for determining
conflicting rights by due course o
f
law. But if the judiciary give way,
and, in the language o
f
the Chief
Justice in Greenough v. Greenough,
in 11 Penn. St. 494, ‘confesses itself
too weak to stand against the antag
onism o
f
the legislature and the bar,'
one independent co-ordinate branch
o
f
the government will become the
subservient handmaid o
f
the other,
and a quiet, insidious revolution will
be effected in the administration of
the government, whilst its form on
paper remains the same.” Ervine's
Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 268.
* A statute is void which under
takes to make railroad companies
liable for the expense o
f
coroners’
inquests and o
f
the burial o
f persons
dying on the cars, o
r
killed b
y
collision
o
r
other accident occurring to the cars,
irrespective o
f any question o
f negli
gence. Ohio & M. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Lackey,
7
8 Ill. 55; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 259.
* See post, pp. *371—" 381.
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ings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking
advantage of errors which do not affect their substantial rights,
they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power.
The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the
judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so, it may
dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to
the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with
by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dis
pense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the
court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would
not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to pro
ceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving
them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same rea
son, it would be incompetent for it
,
b
y
retrospective legislation, to
make valid proceedings which had been had in the courts, but
which were void for want o
f jurisdiction over the parties. Such a
legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: first, as an
exercise o
f judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being
void, it would be the statute alone which would constitute an
adjudication upon the rights o
f
the parties; and, second, because,
in a
ll judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity
to defend are essential, - both of which they would be de
prived o
f
in such a case." And for like reasons a statute vali
1 In McDaniel v. Correll, 19 Ill.
226, it appeared that a statute had
been passed to make valid certain
legal proceedings b
y
which an alleged
will was adjudged void, and which
were had against non-resident de
fendants, over whom the courts had
obtained no jurisdiction. The court
say: “If it was competent for the
legislature to make a void proceeding
valid, then it has been done in this
case. Upon this question we cannot
for a moment doubt or hesitate. They
can n
o
more impart a binding efficacy
to a void proceeding, than they can
take one man's property from him
and give it to another. Indeed, to
do the one is to accomplish the other.
By the decree in this case the will in
question was declared void, and, con
sequently, if effect be given to the
decree, the legacies given to those
absent defendants by the will are
taken from them and given to others,
according to our statute o
f
descents.
Until the passage of the act in ques
tion, they were not bound by the
verdict o
f
the jury in this case, and
it could not form the basis of a valid
decree. Had the decree been ren
dered before the passage o
f
the act, it
would have been as competent to make
that valid as it was to validate the an
tecedent proceedings upon which alone
the decree could rest. The want of
jurisdiction over the defendants was
a
s fatal to the one as it could be to
the other. If we assume the act to
b
e valid, then the legacies which be
fore belonged to the legatees have now
ceased to be theirs, and this result has
been brought about by the legislative
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;
dating proceedings "had before an intruder into a judicial [*108]
office, before whom no one is authorized or required to
appear, and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor
of the subject-matter, would also be void."
act alone. The effect of the act upon
them is precisely the same as if it had
declared in direct terms that the leg
acies bequeathed by this will to these
defendants should not go to them,
but should descend to the heirs-at-law
of the testator, according to our law
of descents. This it will not be pre
tended that they could do directly,
and they had no more authority to
do it indirectly, by making proceed
ings binding upon them which were
void in law.” See, to the same effect,
Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St. 248;
Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388; s. c.
19 Am. Rep. 656; Lane v. Nelson,
79 Penn. St. 407; Shonk v. Brown, 61
Penn. S
t. 320; Spragg v. Shriver, 25
Penn. St. 282.
* In Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen,
361, a judge in insolvency had made
certain orders in a case pending in
another jurisdiction, and which the
courts subsequently declared to b
e
void. The legislature then passed an
act declaring that they “are hereby
confirmed, and the same shall be taken
and deemed good and valid in law, to
a
ll
intents and purposes whatsoever.”
On the question o
f
the validity o
f
this
act the court say: “The precise ques
tion is, whether it can be held to
operate so a
s
to confer a jurisdiction
over parties and proceedings which
it has been judicially determined
does not exist, and give validity to
acts and processes which have been
adjudged void. The statement of this
question seems to u
s
to suggest the
obvious and decisive objection to any
construction of the statute which
would lead to such a conclusion. It
would b
e
a direct exercise b
y
the legis
lature o
f
a power in it
s
nature clearly
judicial, from the use o
f
which it is
expressly prohibited b
y
the thirtieth
article o
f
the Declaration o
f Rights.
The line which marks and separates
judicial from legislative duties and
functions is often indistinct and un
certain, and it is sometimes difficult
to decide within which of the two
classes a particular subject falls. All
statutes o
f
a declaratory nature, which
are designed to interpret o
r give a
meaning to previous enactments, o
r
to confirm the rights o
f parties either
under their own contracts o
r growing
out o
f
the proceedings o
f
courts o
r
public bodies, which lack legal valid
ity, involve in a certain sense the
exercise o
f
a judicial power. They
operate upon subjects which might
properly come within the cognizance
of the courts and form the basis of
judicial consideration and judgment.
But they may, nevertheless, be sup
ported as being within the legitimate
sphere o
f legislative action, on the
ground that they do not declare o
r
determine, but only confirm rights;
that they give effect to the acts o
f
parties according to their intent; that
they furnish new and more efficacious
remedies, or create a more beneficial
interest o
r tenure, or, by supplying
defects and curing informalities in
the proceedings o
f courts, o
r
o
f pub
lic officers acting within the scope
o
f
their authority, they give effect to
acts to which there was the express
o
r implied assent o
f
the parties in
terested. Statutes which are intended
to accomplish such purposes do not
necessarily invade the province, o
r
directly interfere with the action o
f
judicial tribunals. But if we adopt
the broadest and most comprehensive
view o
f
the power o
f
the legislature,
we must place some limit beyond
which the authority o
f
the legisla
ture cannot go without trenching on
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[• 109] * Legislative Divorces.
There is another class of cases in which it would seem that
action ought to be referred exclusively to the judicial tribunals,
but in respect to which the prevailing doctrine seems to
[*110] be, that the legislature * has complete control unless spe
cially restrained by the State constitution. The granting
of divorces from the bonds of matrimony was not confided to the
courts in England, and from the earliest days the Colonial and
State legislatures in this country have assumed to possess the same
power over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and
the clear and well-defined boundaries
of judicial power.” “Although it
may be difficult, if not impossible,
to lay down any general rule which
may serve to determine, in all cases,
whether the limits of constitutional
restraint are overstepped by the ex
ercise by one branch of the govern
ment of powers exclusively delegated
to another, it certainly is practicable
to apply to each case as it arises some
test by which to ascertain whether
this fundamental principle is violated.
If
,
for example, the practical operation
of a statute is to determine adver
sary suits pending between party and
party, by substituting in place o
f
the
well-settled rules o
f
law the arbitrary
will of the legislature, and thereby
controlling the action o
f
the tribunal
before which the suits are pending,
no one can doubt that it would be an
unauthorized act o
f legislation, be
cause it directly infringes on the
peculiar and appropriate functions o
f
the judiciary. It is the exclusive
province o
f
the courts o
f justice to
apply established principles to cases
within their jurisdiction, and to en
force their jurisdiction by render
ing judgments and executing them
b
y
suitable process. The legislature
have n
o power to interfere with this
jurisdiction in such manner as to
change the decision o
f
cases pending
before courts, o
r
to impair o
r
set
aside their judgments, o
r
to take
cases out of the settled course of
judicial proceeding. It is on this
principle that it has been held, that
the legislature have no power to grant
a new trial o
r
direct a rehearing of a
cause which has been once judicially
settled. The right to a review, o
r
to
try anew facts which have been de
termined by a verdict o
r decree,
depends o
n fixed and well-settled
principles, which it is the duty o
f
the court to apply in the exercise
o
f
a sound judgment and discretion.
These cannot be regulated o
r gov
erned b
y
legislative action. Taylor
v
. Place, 4 R
.
I. 324, 337; Lewis r.
Webb, 3 Me. 326; Dechastellux v.
Fairchild, 15 Penn. St 18. A fortiori,
a
n act o
f
the legislature cannot set
aside o
r
amend final judgments o
r
decrees.” The court further con
sider the general subject a
t length,
and adjudge the particular enactment
under consideration void, both as an
exercise o
f judicial authority, and
also because, in declaring valid the
void proceedings in insolvency against
the debtor, under which assignees had
been appointed, it took away from
the debtor his property, “not by due
process o
f
law o
r
the law o
f
the land,
but by an arbitrary exercise o
f legis
lative will.” See, further, Griffin's
Executor v. Cunningham, 20 Grat.
109; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504.
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from time to time they have passed special laws declaring a disso
lution of the bonds of matrimony in special cases. Now it is clear
that “the question of divorce involves investigations which are
properly of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces
ought to be confined exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under
the limitations to be prescribed by law ; ”’ and so strong is the
general conviction of this fact, that the people in framing their
constitutions, in a majority of the States, have positively forbidden
any such special laws.”
* 2 Kent, 106. See Levins v. Slea
tor, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607.
* The following are constitutional
provisions:– Alabama: Divorces from
the bonds of matrimony shall not be
granted but in the cases by law pro
vided for, and by suit in chancery;
but decrees in chancery for divorce
shall be final, unless appealed from
in the manner prescribed by law,
within three months from the date
of the enrolment thereof. Arkansas :
The General Assembly shall not have
power to pass any bill of divorce, but
may prescribe by law the manner in
which such cases may be investigated
in the courts of justice, and divorces
granted. California: No divorce shall
be granted by the legislature. The
provision is the same or similar in
Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, Nebraska, Ore
gon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wis
consin. Florida: Divorces from the
bonds of matrimony shall not be
allowed but by the judgment of a
court, as shall be prescribed by law.
Georgia: The Superior Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
of divorce, both total and partial.
Illinois: The General Assembly shall
not pass . . . special laws . . . for
granting divorces. Kansas: And
power to grant divorces is vested
in the District Courts subject to
regulations by law. Kentucky: The
General Assembly shall have no
power to grant divorces, . . . but
by general laws shall confer such
powers on the courts of justice.
Louisiana: The legislature may enact
general laws regulating the . . . grant
ing of divorce; but no special laws
shall be enacted relating to particular
or individual cases. Massachusetts:
All causes of marriage, divorce, and
alimony . . . shall be heard and de
termined by the Governor and Coun
cil, until the legislature shall by law
make other provision. Mississippi:
Divorces from the bonds of matri
mony shall not be granted but in
cases provided for by law, and by
suit in chancery. New Hampshire :
All causes of marriage, divorce, and
alimony . . . shall be heard and tried
by the Superior Court, until the leg
islature shall by law make other pro
vision. New York: . . . nor shall any
divorce be granted otherwise than by
due judicial proceedings. North Car
olina : The General Assembly shall
have power to pass general laws
regulating divorce and alimony, but
shall not have power to grant a
divorce or secure alimony in any
particular case. Ohio: The General
Assembly shall grant no divorce, nor
exercise any judicial power, not herein
expressly conferred. Pennsylvania :
The legislature shall not have power
to enact laws annulling the contract
of marriage in any case where by law
the courts of this Commonwealth are,
or hereafter may be, empowered to
decree a divorce. Tennessee: The
legislature shall have no power to
grant divorces, but may authorize
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[*111] * Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative
power over divorces there seem to be three classes o
f
cases.
The doctrine o
f
the first class seems to be this: The granting o
f
a
divorce may be either a legislative o
r
a judicial act, according as
the legislature shall refer it
s
consideration to the courts, o
r
reserve
it to itself. The legislature has the same full control over the sta
tus o
f
husband and wife which it possesses over the other domestic
relations, and may permit or prohibit it according to it
s
own views
o
f
what is for the interest o
f
the parties o
r
the good o
f
the public.
In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it
seem sufficient; and if inquiry is made into the facts of the past,
it is no more than is needful when any change o
f
the law is con
templated, with a view to the establishment o
f
more salutary rules
for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in it
s nature,
and it is not essential that there be any particular finding o
f mis
conduct or unfitness in the parties. As in other cases of legisla
tive action, the reasons or the motives o
f
the legislature cannot be
inquired into ; the relation which the law permitted before is now
forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations grow
ing out o
f
that relation which continued so long as the relation
existed, but which necessarily cease with it
s
termination. Mar
riage is not a contract, but a status ; the parties cannot have vested
the courts o
f justice to grant them
for such causes as may be specified
by law; but such laws shall be gen
eral and uniform in their operation
throughout the State. Virginia: The
legislature shall confer on the courts
the power to grant divorces, . . . but
shall not b
y
special legislation grant
relief in such cases. West Virginia:
The Circuit Courts shall have power
under such general regulations as may
b
e prescribed by law, to grant di
vorces, . . . but relief shall not be
granted by special legislation in such
cases. Missouri: The General As
sembly shall not pass any local o
r
special law . . . granting divorces. In
Colorado the provision is the same.
Under the Constitution o
f Michigan
it was held that, as the legislature was
prohibited from granting divorces,
they could pass no special act author
izing the courts to divorce for a cause
which was not a legal cause for divorce
under the general laws. Teft v. Teft,
3 Mich. 67. See also Clark v. Clark,
1
0 N
.
H
. 387; Simonds v. Simonds,
103 Mass. 572; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 576.
The case o
f White v. White, 105
Mass. 325, was peculiar. A woman
procured a divorce from her husband,
and b
y
the law then in force h
e was
prohibited from marrying again ex
cept upon leave procured from the
court. He did marry again, however,
and the legislature passed a special
act to affirm this marriage. In pur
suance o
f
a requirement o
f
the con
stitution, jurisdiction o
f
a
ll
cases o
f
marriage and divorce had previously
been vested b
y
law in the courts.
Held, that this took from the legis
lature all power to act upon the sub
ject in special cases, and the attempt
to validate the marriage was conse
quently ineffectual.
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rights of property in a domestic relation; therefore the legislative
act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties
of "rights contrary to the law of the land, but, as in other [*112]
cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the
legislative will must be regarded as sufficient reason for the rule
which it promulgates."
* The leading case on this subject
is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. On
the question whether a divorce is
necessarily a judicial act, the court
say: “A further objection is urged
against this act; viz., that by the new
constitution of 1818, there is an entire
separation of the legislative and ju
dicial departments, and that the
legislature can now pass no act or
resolution not clearly warranted by
that constitution; that the constitu
tion is a grant of power, and not a
limitation of powers already possessed;
and, in short, that there is no reserved
power in the legislature since the
adoption of this constitution. Pre
cisely the opposite of this is true.
From the settlement of the State
there have been certain fundamental
rules by which power has been ex
ercised. These rules were embodied
in an instrument called by some a
constitution, by others a charter. All
agree that it was the first constitution
ever made in Connecticut, and made,
too, by the people themselves. It
gave very extensive powers to the
legislature, and left too much (for it
left every thing almost) to their will.
The constitution of 1818 proposed to,
and in fact did, limit that will. It
adopted certain general principles by
a preamble called a Declaration of
Rights; provided for the election and
appointment of certain organs of the
government, such as the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments;
and imposed upon them certain re
straints. It found the State sovereign
and independent, with a legislative
power capable of making all laws
necessary for the good of the people,
not forbidden by the Constitution of
the United States, nor opposed to the
sound maxims of legislation; and it
left them in the same condition, ex
cept so far as limitations were pro
vided. There is now and has been a
law in force on the subject of divorces.
The law was passed a hundred and
thirty years ago. It provides for
divorces a vinculo matrimonii in four
cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent con
tract, wilful desertion, and seven
years' absence unheard of. The law
has remained in substance the same
as it was when enacted in 1667.
During a
ll
this period the legislature
has interfered like the Parliament of
Great Britain, and passed special acts
o
f
divorce a vinculo matrimonii, and
a
t almost every session since the Con
stitution o
f
the United States went
into operation, now forty-two years,
and for the thirteen years o
f
the ex
istence o
f
the Constitution of Con
necticut, such acts have been, in
multiplied cases, passed and sanc
tioned b
y
the constituted authorities
o
f
our State. We are not at liberty
to inquire into the wisdom o
f
our
existing law upon this subject; nor
into the expediency o
f
such frequent
interference o
f
the legislature. We
can only inquire into the constitu
tionality o
f
the act under considera
tion. The power is not prohibited
either b
y
the Constitution o
f
the Unit
e
d
States o
r b
y
that o
f
this State.
In view o
f
the appalling consequences
o
f declaring the general law o
f
the
State, o
r
the repeated acts o
f
our
legislature, unconstitutional and void,
consequences easily perceived, but not
easily expressed, – such as bastardiz
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[*113] "The second class of cases to which we have alluded
hold that divorce is a judicial act in those cases upon
which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate;
and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass
special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will
leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes
as shall appear to it
s
wisdom to justify them."
A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these
special legislative enactments, and declare the act o
f
divorce to
b
e
in it
s
nature judicial, and not properly within the province o
f
the legislative power.” The most o
f
these decisions, however,
lay more o
r
less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other
than those which in general terms separate the legislative and
judicial functions, and some o
f
them would perhaps have been
differently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to
say, that the general sentiment in the legal profession is against
the rightfulness o
f special legislative divorces; and it is believed
that, if the question could originally have been considered by the
courts, unembarrassed b
y
any considerations o
f long acquiescence,
and o
f
the serious consequences
ing the issue and subjecting the parties
to punishment for adultery, - the
court should come to the result only
on a solemn conviction that their
oaths of office and these constitutions
imperiously demand it
. Feeling my
self no such conviction. I cannot pro
nounce the act void.” Per Daggett, J.,
Hosmer, Ch. J., and Bissell, J., con
curring. Peters, J., dissented. Upon
the same subject, see Crane v. Me
ginnis, 1 G
.
& J. 463; Wright v.
Wright, 2 Md. 429; Gaines v. Gaines,
9 B
.
Monr. 295; Cabell v. Cabell,
1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dick
son, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet's Appeal,
1
7 Penn. St. 449; Cronise v. Cronise,
54 Penn. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer,
5
1 Me. 480; Townsend v. Griffin, 4
Harr. 440; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37;
and the examination o
f
the whole
subject by Mr. Bishop, in his work
o
n Marriage and Divorce.
* Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene
(Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges,
which must result from affirming
1
6 Me. 479; Adams v. Palmer, 51
Me. 480. See also Townsend v.
Griffin, 4 Harr. 440. In a well-rea
soned case in Kentucky, it was held
that a legislative divorce obtained on
the application o
f
one o
f
the parties
while suit for divorce was pending in
a court o
f competent jurisdiction,
would not affect the rights to property
o
f
the other, growing out o
f
the rela
tion. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B
.
Monr.
295. a
* Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445;
Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder
v
. Graham, 4 Flor. 23; State v. Fry,
4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12
Mo. 498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo.
590; Same v. Same, 44 Mo. 232.
See also Jones v. Jones, 12 Penn. St.
353, 354. Under the Constitution o
f
Massachusetts, the power o
f
the leg
islature to grant divorces is denied.
Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass.
315. See clause in constitution, ante,
p
.
*110, note.
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their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new
relations formed, it is highly probable that these enactments would
have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we
should have been spared the necessity for the special constitu
tional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately
these provisions render the question now discussed of little prac
tical importance; at the same time that they refer the
decision * upon applications for divorce to those tribunals [*114]
which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn
without a hearing."
The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be confined
to a dissolution of the relation; it can only be justified on the
ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties
to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire
into the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences
against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself
can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of
alimony, for that would be a judgment;” it cannot adjudge upon
conflicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave
a
ll questions o
f
this character to the courts. Those rights o
f
property which depend upon the continued existence o
f
the rela
tion will be terminated b
y
the dissolution, but only as in any other
case rights in the future may be incidentally affected b
y
a change
in the law.”
* If marriage is a matter of right,
then it would seem that any particu
lar marriage that parties might law
fully form they must have a lawful
right to continue in, unless b
y
mis
behavior they subject themselves to
a forfeiture o
f
the right. And if the
legislature can annul the relation in
one case, without any finding that a
breach o
f
the marriage contract has
been committed, then it would seem
that they might annul it in every case,
and even prohibit a
ll parties from
entering into the same relation in the
future. The recognition o
f
a full and
complete control o
f
the relation in the
legislature, to b
e
exercised a
t
it
s will,
leads inevitably to this conclusion;
so that, under the “rightful powers
o
f legislation ” which our constitu
tions confer upon the legislative de
partment, a relation essential to
organized civil society might be ab
rogated entirely. Single legislative
divorces are but single steps towards
this barbarism which the application
o
f
the same principle to every indi
vidual case, by a general law, would
necessarily bring upon us. See what
is said by the Supreme Court o
f Mis
souri in Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo.
593, 594.
* Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G
.
& J.
463; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes,
486; post, p. * 405, note.
* Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 545.
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Legislative Encroachments upon Executive Power.
If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which sep
arates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to
discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legis
lative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that
makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means
through which they shall be executed ; and the perform
[*115] ance of * many duties which they may provide for by law,
they may refer either to the chief executive of the State,
or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or
even to a person specially named for the duty." What can be
definitely said on this subject is this: That such powers as
are specially conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or
upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or
authorize to be performed by any other officer or authority; and
from those duties which the constitution requires of him he can
not be excused by law.” But other powers or duties the executive
* This is affirmed in the recent case
of Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va.
562. The constitution of that State
provides that the governor shall nomi
nate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate appoint, all
officers whose offices are established
by the constitution, or shall be created
by law, and whose appointment or
election is not otherwise provided for,
and that no such officers shall be
appointed or elected by the legis
lature. The court decided that this
did not preclude the legislature from
creating a board of public works
of which the State officers should be
er officio the members. And see
State v. Covington, 29 Ohio, N. s.
102.
* Attorney-General v. Brown, 1
Wis. 522. “Whatever power or duty
is expressly given to, or imposed
upon, the executive department, is
altogether free from the interference
of the other branches of the govern
ment. Especially is this the case
where the subject is committed to the
discretion of the chief executive offi
cer, either by the constitution or by
the laws. So long as the power is
vested in him, it is to be by him
exercised, and no other branch of the
government can control it
s
exercise.”
Under the Constitution of Ohio,
which forbids the exercise o
f any
appointing power b
y
the legislature,
except as therein authorized, it was
held that the legislature could not, by
law, constitute certain designated per
sons a State board, with power to ap
point commissioners of the State House,
and directors o
f
the penitentiary, and
to remove such directors for cause.
State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio, N. s. 546.
And see Davis v. State, 7 Md. 161;
also Bridges v. Shallcross and State
v
. Covington, referred to in preceding
note. As to what are public officers,
see State v. Stanley, 66 N
.
C
.
59;
s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 488. An appoint
ment to office was said, in Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 404,
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cannot exercise or assume except by legislative authority, and the
power which in its discretion it confers it may also in its dis
cretion withhold, or confide to other hands.” Whether in those
cases where power is given by the constitution to the governor,
the legislature have the same authority to make rules for the
exercise of the power that they have to make rules to govern
the proceedings in the courts, may perhaps be a question.” It
to be intrinsically an executive act.
In a certain sense this is doubtless so,
but it would not follow that the
legislature could exercise no appoint
ing power, or could confer none on
others than the chief executive of the
State. Where the constitution con
tains no negative words to limit the
legislative authority in this regard,
the legislature in enacting a law must
decide for itself what are the suitable,
convenient, or necessary agencies for
it
s execution, and the authority o
f
the executive must be limited to tak
ing care that the law is executed by
such agencies. See Baltimore v.
State, 15 Mol. 376.
Where the governor has power to
remove an officer for neglect o
f duty,
h
e is the sole judge whether the duty
has been neglected. State v. Doherty,
2
5 La. Ann. 119; s. c. 13 Am. Rep.
131. See, a
s
to discretionary powers,
ante, p
. *41, note.
The executive, it has been decided,
has power to pardon for contempt
o
f court. State v. Sauvinet, 24 La.
Ann. 119; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 115. A
general power to pardon may be exer
cised before as well as after conviction.
• Lapeyre v
. United States, 17 Wall.
191; Dominick v. Bowdoin, 44 Geo.
457; Grubb v. Bullock, 44 Geo. 379.
The President's power to pardon does
not extend to the restoration o
f prop
erty which has been judicially for
feited. Knote v. United States, (Ct.
o
f Cl.) 14 Am. Law Reg. N
.
s. 369;
Osborn v
. United States, 91 U. S.
Rep. 474. The pardon may be
granted b
y
general proclamation.
Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall.
147; Lapeyre v. United States, 17
Wall. 191. One receiving a full
pardon from the President cannot
afterwards be required by law to
establish loyalty as a condition to
the assertion o
f legal rights. Car
lisle v. United States, 16 Wall.
147.
1 “In deciding this question [as
to the authority o
f
the governor], re
currence must be had to the constitu
tion. That furnishes the only rule
b
y
which the court can be governed.
That is the charter of the governor's
authority. All the powers delegated
to him b
y
o
r
in accordance with that
instrument, he is entitled to exercise,
and no others. The constitution is a
limitation upon the powers o
f
the
legislative department o
f
the govern
ment, but it is to be regarded as a
grant o
f powers to the other depart
ments. Neither the executive nor
the judiciary, therefore, can exercise
any authority o
r power except such
a
s is clearly granted by the constitu
tion.” Field v. People, 2 Scam. 80.
* Whether the legislature can con
stitutionally remit a fine, when the
pardoning power is vested in the
governor by the constitution, has
been made a question ; and the cases
o
f Haley v. Clarke, 26 Ala. 439, and
People v. Bircham, 12 Cal. 50, are
opposed to each other upon the point.
If the fine is payable to the State,
perhaps the legislature should be con
sidered a
s having the same right to
discharge it that they would have to
release any other debtor to the State
from his obligation. In Morgan v.
Buffington, 21 Mo. 549, it was held
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[*116] would seem * that this must depend generally upon the
nature of the power, and upon the question whether the
constitution, in conferring it
,
has furnished a sufficient rule for
its exercise. Where complete power to pardon is conferred upon
the executive, it may be doubted if the legislature can impose
restrictions under the name o
f
rules o
r regulations; but where
the governor is made commander-in-chief o
f
the military forces
o
f
the State, it is obvious that his authority must be exercised
under such proper rules as the legislature may prescribe, because
the military forces are themselves under the control o
f
the legis
lature, and military law is prescribed by that department. There
would be this clear limitation upon the power o
f
the legislature
to prescribe rules for the executive department; that they must
not be such as, under pretence o
f regulation, divest the executive
of, or preclude his exercising, any o
f
his constitutional prerog
that the State auditor was not
obliged to accept as conclusive the
certificate from the Speaker o
f
the
House as to the sum due a member
o
f
the House for attendance upon it
,
but that he might lawfully inquire
whether the amount had been actually
earned by attendance o
r
not. The
legislative rule, therefore, cannot go
to the extent o
f compelling an execu
tive officer to do something else than
his duty, under any pretence o
f regu
lation. The power to pardon offen
ders is vested by the several State
constitutions in the governor. It is
not, however, a power which neces
sarily inheres in the executive. State
v
. Dunning, 9 Ind. 22. And several
o
f
the State constitutions have pro
vided that it shall be exercised under
such regulations as shall be prescribed
by law. There are provisions more
o
r
less broad to this purport in those
o
f Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Ar
kansas, Texas, Mississippi, Oregon,
Indiana, Iowa, and Virginia. In
State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act
o
f
the legislature requiring the ap
plicant for the remission of a fine or
forfeiture to forward to the governor,
with his application, the opinion o
f
certain county officers as to the pro
priety o
f
the remission, was sustained
a
s
a
n act within the power conferred
by the constitution upon the legis
lature to prescribe regulations in
these cases. And see Branham v.
Lange, 16 Ind. 500. The power to
reprieve is not included in the power
to pardon. Ex parte Howard, 17
N. H. 545. It has been decided that
to give parties who have been con
victed and fined the benefit of the
insolvent laws is not an exercise of
the pardoning power. Ex parte Scott,
1
9 Ohio, N
.
s. 581. And where the
constitution provided that “In all
criminal and penal cases, except those
o
f
treason and impeachment, [the
governor] shall have power to grant
pardons after conviction, and remit •
fines and forfeitures,” &c., it was
held that this did not preclude the
legislature from passing an act o
f
pardon and amnesty for parties liable
to prosecution, but not yet convicted.
State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 600. Pardons may be
made conditional, and forfeited if the
condition is not observed. State v.
Smith, 1 Bailey, 283; Lee v. Murphy,
22 Gratt. 789.
ch
.
v
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atives o
r powers. Those matters which the constitution specifi
cally confides to him the legislature cannot directly or indirectly
take from his control.
It may be proper to say here, that the executive, in the proper
discharge o
f
his duties under the constitution, is as independent
o
f
the courts as h
e
is o
f
the legislature."
Delegating Legislative Power.
One o
f
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated b
y
that department to any other body o
r authority.
Where the sovereign power o
f
the State has located the authority,
there it must remain ; and b
y
the constitutional agency
alone * the laws must be made until the constitution [*117]
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wis
dom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted
cannot relieve itself o
f
the responsibility b
y
choosing other agen
cies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substi
tute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism o
f any other body
for those to which alone the people have seen fi
t
to confide this
sovereign trust.”
* It has been a disputed question
whether the writ o
f
mandamus will lie
to compel the performance o
f execu
tive duties. In the following cases the
power has either been expressly af
firmed, o
r it has been exercised
without being questioned. State v.
Moffitt, 5 Ohio, 358; State v. Gov
ernor, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 529; Coltin v.
Ellis, 7 Jones, 545; Chamberlain v.
Sibley, 4 Minn. 309; Magruder v. Gov
ernor, 25 Md. 173; Groove v. Gwinn,
4
3 Md. 572; Tennessee, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v
. Moore, 36 Ala. 371 ; Middle
ton v
. Lowe, 30 Cal. 596; Harpen
ding v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189; s. c. 2
Am. Rep. 432; Chumasero v. Potts, 2
Montana, 242. In the following cases
the power has been denied : Haw
kins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570; Low
v
. Towns, 8 Geo. 360; State v. Kirk
wood, 1
4 Iowa, 162; Dennett, Peti
tioner, 3
2 Me. 510; People v. Bissell,
1
9 Ill. 229; People v. Gates, 40 Ill.
126; State v. Governor, 25 N
. J. 331;
Mauran v. Smith, 8 R
.
I. 192; State
v
. Warmoth, 22 La. Ann. 1
;
s. c.
2 Am. Rep. 712; Same v. Same, 24
La. Ann. 351; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 126;
People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320;
s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 89; State v. Gov
ernor, 39 Mo. 388.
* “These are the bounds which
the trust that is put in them by the
society, and the law o
f
God and
nature, have set to the legislative
power o
f every Commonwealth, in all
forms o
f government: —
“First. They are to govern by
promulgated established laws, not to
be varied in particular cases, but to
have one rule for rich and poor, for
the favorite at court and the coun
tryman a
t plough.
“Secon aly. These laws also ought
to be designed for no other end
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But it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a
completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at
the time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A
statute may be conditional, and it
s taking effect may be made to
depend upon some subsequent event." Affirmative legislation
may in some cases b
e adopted, o
f
which the parties interested
are a
t liberty to avail themselves or not a
t
their option. A private
act o
f incorporation cannot be forced upon the corporators; they
may refuse the franchise if they so choose.” In these
[*118] cases the legislative * act is regarded as complete when it
has passed through the constitutional formalities necessary
ultimately but the good of the
people.
“Thirdly. They must not raise
taxes on the property o
f
the people
without the consent o
f
the people,
given by themselves o
r
their deputies.
And this properly concerns only such
governments where the legislative is
always in being, o
r
a
t
least where the
people have not reserved any part o
f
the legislative to deputies, to be from
time to time chosen by themselves.
“Fourthly. The legislative neither
must nor can transfer the power o
f
making laws to anybody else, o
r place
it anywhere but where the people
have.” Locke on Civil Government,
§ 142.
That legislative power cannot be
delegated, see Thorne v. Cramer, 15
Barb. 1.12; Bradley v. Baxter, 15
Barb. 122; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N
.
Y.
483; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349;
Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo v.
State, 2 Iowa, 165; Geebrick v. State,
5 Iowa, 491; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa,
203; State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134;
s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 115; People v.
Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Railroad Com
pany v. Commissioners o
f
Clinton
County, 1 Ohio, N
.
s. 77; Parker v.
Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507;
Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11
Penn. St. 61; Maize v. State, 4 Ind.
342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482;
State v. Parker, 26 Wt. 362; State v.
Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; State v. Cope
land, 3 R
.
I. 33; State v. Wilcox, 45
Mo. 458; Commonwealth v. Locke,
7
2 Penn. St. 491; Er parte Wall, 48
Cal. 279; Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex.
41; Farnsworth v. Lisbon, 62 Me.
451; Brewer v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62;
State v. Hudson County, 37 N
. J.
12.
1 Brig Aurora v. United States,
7 Cranch, 382; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat.
78; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357 ;
Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio, N
.
S
. 271;
State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Walton
v
. Greenwood, 60 Me. 356; Baltimore
v
. Clunet, 23 Md. 449. It is not a
delegation o
f legislative power to
make the repeal o
f
a charter depend
upon the failure o
f
the corporation to
make u
p
a deficiency which is to b
e
ascertained and determined by a tri
bunal provided b
y
the repealing act.
Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583.
See Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 334,
344. Nor to refer the question o
f ex
tending municipal boundaries to a
court where issues may be formed
and disputed facts tried. Burlington
v
. Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252. It is com
petent to make an act take effect o
n
condition that those applying for it
shall erect a station a
t
a place named.
State v. New Haven, &c. Co., 43
Conn. 351.
* Angell and Ames on Corp. § 81.
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to perfected legislation, notwithstanding it
s actually going into
operation as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance.
We have elsewhere spoken o
f municipal corporations, and o
f
the
powers o
f legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed
upon them, and the bestowal o
f
which is not to be considered as
trenching upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be del
egated, since that maxim is to be understood in the light o
f
the
immemorial practice o
f
this country and o
f England, which has
always recognized the propriety o
f vesting in the municipal or
ganizations certain powers o
f
local regulation, in respect to which
the parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed more
competent to judge o
f
their needs than any central authority.
As municipal organizations are mere auxiliaries o
f
the State gov
ernment in the important business o
f municipal rule, the legis
lature may create them a
t will from it
s
own views o
f propriety
o
r necessity, and without consulting the parties interested; and
it also possesses the like power to abolish them, without stopping
to inquire what may be the desire o
f
the corporators on that sub
ject."
-
Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special and peculiar
interest in the terms and conditions o
f
the charter, in the powers
conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general ques
tion whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incor
porated a
t all or not, and as the burdens o
f municipal government
must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as b
y becoming
incorporated they are held, in law, to undertake to discharge the
duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their
voice should be heard o
n
the question o
f
their incorporation, and
that their decision should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons -
o
f
State policy o
r
local necessity, it should seem important for the
State to overrule the opinion o
f
the local majority. The right to
refer any legislation o
f
this character to the people peculiarly
interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is
b
y
n
o
means unusual.”
* City o
f
Patterson v. Society, &c.,
2
4 N
. J. 385; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B.
Monr. 330; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N.
H
.
266. The question o
f
a levee tax
may lawfully be referred to the voters
o
f
the district o
f territory over which
it is proposed to spread the tax,
regardless o
f municipal divisions. Al
corn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652. And
see, in general, Angell and Ames on
Corp., § 31 and note; also post, pp.
* 190—#192,
* Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Corn
ing v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Morford
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[*119] * For the like reasons the question whether a county or
township shall be divided and a new one formed," or two
townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,” or a city
charter be revised,” or a county seat located at a particular place,
or after its location removed elsewhere,” or the municipality con
tract particular debts, or engage in a particular improvement,” is
v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Patter
son v. Society, &c., 24 N. J. 385;
Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58;
Commonwealth v. Judges of Quarter
Sessions, 8 Penn. St. 391; Common
wealth r. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214;
Call v. Chadbourne, 46 Me. 206; State
v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. Wilcox,
45 Mo. 458; Hobart v. Supervisors,
&c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank of Chenango
v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Steward v.
Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v.
Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Lafayette, &c. R. R.
Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185. The right
to refer to the people of several mu
nicipalities the question of their con
solidation was disputed in Smith v.
McCarthy, 56 Penn. St. 359, but
sustained by the court. And see
Smyth c. Titcomb, 31 Me. 272; Erlin
ger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; Lammert v.
Lidwell, 62 Mo. 188; State v. Wilcox,
45 Mo. 458; Brunswick v. Finney, 54
Geo. 317; Response to House Reso
lution, 55 Mo. 295.
* State v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1.
See State v. McNiell, 24 Wis. 149.
Response to House Resolution, 55
Mo. 295. For other cases on the same
general subject, see People v. Nally,
49 Cal. 478; Pike County v. Barnes, 51
Miss. 305; Brunswick v. Finney, 54
Geo. 317. The question whether a
general school law shall be accepted in
a particular municipality may be re
ferred to its voters. State r. Wilcox,
45 Mo. 458.
* Commonwealth v. Judges, &c.,
8 Penn. St. 391; Call v. Chadbourne,
46 Me. 206; People v. Nally, 49 Cal.
478; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94.
* Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Geo. 317.
* Commonwealth v. Painter, 10
Penn. St. 214. See People v. Salo
mon, 51 Ill. 37; Slinger v. Henneman,
38 Wis. 504; post, pp. * 124–- 125.
* There are many cases in which
municipal subscriptions to works of
internal improvement, under statutes
empowering them to be made, have
been sustained; among others, Goddin
v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport
v. Housatonic Railroad Co., 15 Conn.
475; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442,
and 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Rome
v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38;
Prettyman r. Supervisors, &c., 19 Ill.
406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill.
451 ; Johnson v. Stack, 24 Ill. 75;
Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; Clark
v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Stein
v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of
Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 65.1;
Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Bland
ing v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Hobart v.
Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Taylor
v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Cald
well v. Justices of Burke, 4 Jones Eq.
323; Louisville, &c. Railroad Co. v.
Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol v.
Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252;
Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of
Clinton Co., 1 Ohio, N. s. 77; Trus
tees of Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s.
564; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, N. s.
607; State v. Commissioners of Clin
ton Co., 6 Ohio, N. s. 280; State v.
Van Horne, 7 Ohio, N. s. 327; State
v. Trustees of Union, 8 Ohio, N. s.
394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12
Ohio, N. s. 624; State v. Commissioners
of Hancock, 12 Ohio, N. s. 596; Powers
v. Dougherty Co., 23 Geo. 65; San
Antonio v. Jones, 28 Texas, 19;
Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11
Penn. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c.
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always a question which may with propriety be referred to the
voters of the municipality for decision.
The question then arises, whether that which may be
done in * reference to any municipal organization within [*120]
the State may not also be done in reference to the State
at large 2 May not any law framed for the State at large be made
conditional on an acceptance by the people at large, declared
through the ballot-box” If it is not unconstitutional to delegate
to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed
by a particular charter, must it not quite as clearly be within the
power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom
a
ll power is derived, the decision upon any proposed statute affect
ing the whole State 2 And can that be called a delegation o
f power
which consists only in the agent o
r
trustee referring back to the
principal the final decision in a case where the principal is the
party concerned, and where perhaps there are questions o
f policy
and propriety involved which n
o authority can decide so satis
factorily and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are
referred ?
If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight
o
f judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that
there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection o
f
a general
law to the people o
f
the State, any more than there is to refer it to
any other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears
to be, that, except in those cases where, b
y
the constitution, the
2
1 Penn. St. 147; Moers v. Reading,
2
1 Penn. St. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9
B
.
Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co.,
1
3 B
.
Monr. 1
; City o
f
St. Louis v.
Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City o
f
Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; Cotton
r. Commissioners o
f Leon, 6 Fla.
610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.
491; Commissioners o
f
Knox County
v
. Aspinwall, 21 IIow. 539, and 24
How. 326; Same v. Wallace, 21 How.
547; Zabriske v. Railroad Co., 23
How. 381; Amey v. Mayor, &c., 24
How. 365; Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1
Wall. 175; Thompson r. Lee County,
3 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burlington,
3 Wall. 654; Gibbons v. Mobile &
Great Northern Railroad Co., 36 Ala.
410; St. Joseph, &c. Railroad Co.
v
. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485;
State v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504;
Stewart v. Supervisors of Polk Co.,
30 Iowa, 9
;
John v. C
.
R
.
& F. W.
R. R
. Co., 35 Ind. 539; Leavenworth
County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; Walker
v
. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, N
.
s. 14; Er
parte Selma, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 45 Ala.
696; S
.
& W
.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Stockton,
41 Cal. 149. In several of them the
power to authorize the municipalities
to decide upon such subscriptions has
been contested a
s
a delegation o
f
legislative authority, but the courts —
even those which hold the subscriptions
void on other grounds — do not look
upon these cases as being obnoxious
to the constitutional principle referred
to in the text.
10
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people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision,
the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the
extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideration. “The exercise of this power by the people in
other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the constitu
tion, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication.
The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with
the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power,
with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of
it to themselves [with that exception], and can therefore exercise
it in no other case.” It is therefore held that the legislature have
no power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the
people power to bind each other by acting upon it
. They
voluntarily surrendered that power when they adopted the
constitution. The government o
f
the State is democratic, but
it is a representative democracy, and in passing general laws
the people act only through their representatives in the legis
lature."
*Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as
legislation o
f
a conditional character, whose force is to
depend upon the happening o
f
some future event, or upon some
future change o
f
circumstances. “The event or change of circum
stances o
n which a law may be made to take effect must be such
as, in the judgment o
f
the legislature, affects the question o
f the
[*121]
* Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v.
Himrod, 8 N
.
Y
.
489. It is worthy
many other cases. The representative
in these cases has fulfilled precisely
o
f consideration, however, whether
there is any thing in the reference
o
f
a statute to the people for accept
ance o
r rejection which is inconsistent
with the representative system o
f
government. To refer it to the peo
ple to frame and agree upon a statute
for themselves would be equally im
practicable and inconsistent with the
representative system; but to take the
opinion o
f
the people upon a bill
already framed by representatives
and submitted to them, is not only
practicable, but is in precise accord
ance with the mode in which the con
stitution o
f
the State is adopted, and
with the action which is taken in
those functions which the people as a
democracy could not fulfil; and where
the case has reached a stage when the
body o
f
the people can act without
confusion, the representative has
stepped aside to allow their opinion
to be expressed. The legislature is
not attempting in such a case to dele
gate it
s authority to a new agency,
but the trustee, vested with a large
discretionary authority, is taking the
opinion o
f
the principal upon the neces
sity, policy, o
r propriety o
f
a
n act
which is to govern the principal him
self. See Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis.
291; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; s. c.
2
0 Am. Rep. 83.
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expediency of the law ; an event on which the expediency of the
law in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question
of expediency, the legislature must exercise its own judgment
definitively and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon
the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declare
the law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient
if it should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge
for them in relation to its present or future expediency. They
exercise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which
the constitution imposes upon them.” But it was held that in the
case of the submission of a proposed free-school law to the people,
no such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency
of the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency
of the School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the
vote of the people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that
vote was taken, it was equally so afterwards. The event on which
the act was to take effect was nothing else than the vote of the
people on the identical question which the constitution makes
it the duty of the legislature itself to decide. The legislature
has no power to make a statute dependent on such a
* contingency, because it would be confiding to others [*122]
that legislative discretion which they are bound to exer
cise themselves, and which they cannot delegate or commit to
any other man or men to be exercised."
* Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v.
Himrod, 8 N. Y. 490. And see
Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State
v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v.
Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; State v. Field,
17 Mo. 529: Bank of Chenango v.
Brown, 26 N. Y. 470 ; People v.
Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State v. Wilcox,
45 Mo. 458; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal.
279, 313; Brown v. Fleischner, 4
Oreg. 132. But upon this point
there is great force in what is said by
Redfield, Ch. J., in State v. Parker,
26 Vt. 357: “If the operation of a
law may fairly be made to depend
upon a future contingency, then, in
my apprehension, it makes no essen
tial difference what is the nature of
the contingency, so it be an equal
and fair one, a moral and legal one,
not opposed to sound policy, and so
far connected with the object and
purpose of the statute as not to be
a mere idle and arbitrary one. And
to us the contingency, upon which the
present statute was to be suspended
until another legislature should meet
and have opportunity of reconsidering
it
,
was not only proper and legal, and
just and moral, but highly commend
able and creditable to the legislature
who passed the statute; for at the
very threshold o
f inquiry into the
expediency o
f
such a law lies the
other and more important inquiry,
Are the people prepared for such a
law? Can it be successfully enforced?
These questions being answered in
the affirmative, he must b
e
a bold
man who would even vote against the
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[* 123] * The same reasons which preclude the original enact
ment of a law from being referred to the people would
law; and something more must he be
who would, after it had been passed
with that assurance, be willing to em
barrass it
s operation o
r rejoice at its
defeat.
“After a full examination of the
arguments by which it is attempted
to be sustained that statutes made
dependent upon such contingencies
are not valid laws, and a good deal
o
f study and reflection, I must declare
that I am fully convinced — although
a
t first, without much examination,
somewhat inclined to the same opin
ion — that the opinion is the result of
false analogies, and so founded upon
a latent fallacy. It seems to me that
the distinction attempted between the
contingency o
f
a popular vote and
other future contingencies is without
a
ll just foundation in sound policy o
r
sound reasoning, and that it has too
often been made more from necessity
than choice, —rather to escape from
a
n overwhelming analogy than from
any obvious difference in principle in
the two classes o
f cases; for . . . one
may find any number o
f
cases in the
legislation o
f Congress, where statutes
have been made dependent upon the
shifting character of the revenue laws,
o
r
the navigation laws, o
r
commercial
rules, edicts, o
r
restrictions o
f
other
countries. In some, perhaps, these
laws are made by representative
bodies, or, it may be, b
y
the people
o
f
these States, and in others by the
lords o
f
the treasury, o
r
the boards
o
f trade, or b
y
the proclamation o
f
the sovereign; and in all these cases
no question can be made o
f
the per
fect legality o
f
our acts o
f Congress
being made dependent upon such con
tingencies. It is
,
in fact, the only
possible mode o
f meeting them, un
less Congress is kept constantly in
session. The same is true of acts of
Congress b
y
which power is vested in
the President to levy troops o
r draw
money from the public treasury, upon
the contingency o
f
a declaration or an
act o
f
war committed by some foreign
state, empire, kingdom, prince, or
potentate. If these illustrations are
not sufficient to show the fallacy o
f
the argument, more would not avail.”
See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292;
Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Johnson
v
. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Rey
nolds, 5 Gilm. 1
;
Robinson v. Bid
well, 22 Cal. 349. In the recent case
o
f
Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291,
Chief Justice Dixon discusses this
subject in the following language:
“But it is said that the act is void,
o
r
a
t
least so much o
f it as pertains
to the taxation of shares in national
banks, because it was submitted to a
vote o
f
the people, o
r provided that it
should take effect only after approval
by a majority o
f
the electors voting
o
n
the subject at the next general
election. This was no more than pro
viding that the act should take effect
on the happening o
f
a certain future
contingency, that contingency being
a popular vote in its favor. No one
doubts the general power o
f
the legis
lature to make such regulations and
conditions as it pleases with regard to
the taking effect o
r operation o
f laws.
They may be absolute, o
r conditional
and contingent; aud if the latter, they
may take effect on the happening of
any event which is future and un
certain. Instances of this kind of
legislation are not unfrequent. The
law o
f Congress suspending the writ
o
f
habeas corpus during the late re
bellion is one, and several others are
referred to in the case In re Richard
Oliver, 17 Wis. 681. It being con
ceded that the legislature possesses
this general power, the only question
here would seem to be, whether a vote
o
f
the people in favor o
f
a law is to
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render it equally incompetent to refer to their decision the ques
tion, whether an existing law should be repealed. If the one is
“a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power,” so
also is the other." It would seem, however, that if a legislative
act is
,
b
y
its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not
unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend
upon the event o
f
a popular vote being for o
r against it
,
— the
time o
f
it
s going into operation being postponed to a later day in
the latter contingency.” It would also seem that if the question
o
f
the acceptance o
r rejection o
f
a municipal charter can be
referred to the voters o
f
the locality specially interested, it would
b
e equally competent to refer to them the question whether a
State law establishing a particular police regulation should be o
f
force in such locality or not.
be excluded from the number of those
future contingent events upon which
it may be provided that it shall take
effect. A similar question was before
this court in a late case (State e
r
rel.
Attorney-General v. O'Neill, Mayor,
&c., 2
4 Wis. 149), and was very elab
orately discussed. We came unani
mously to the conclusion in that case
that a provision for a vote o
f
the
electors o
f
the city o
f
Milwaukee in
favor o
f
a
n
act o
f
the legislature, be
fore it should take effect, was a lawful
contingency, and that the act was
valid. That was a law affecting the
people o
f
Milwaukee particularly,
while this was one affecting the peo
ple o
f
the whole State. There the
law was submitted to the voters of
that city, and here it was submitted
to those o
f
the State a
t large. What
is the difference between the two
cases? It is manifest, on principle,
that there cannot be any. The whole
reasoning o
f
that case goes to show
that this act must be valid, and so it
has been held in the best-considered
cases, a
s will be seen by reference to
that opinion. We are constrained to
hold, therefore, that this act is and
was in a
ll respects valid from the time
it took effect, in November, 1866; and
consequently that there was no want
Municipal charters refer most
o
f authority for the levy and collec
tion o
f
the taxes in question.” This
decision, though opposed to many
others, appears to u
s entirely sound
and reasonable.
* Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491;
Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 492; Parker
v
. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.
The case in 5 Iowa was followed in
State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134; s. c.
1
1 Am. Rep. 115.
2 State v
. Parker, 26 Vt. 357.
The act under consideration in that
case was, b
y
its terms, to take effect
on the second Tuesday o
f
March
after its passage, unless the people to
whose votes it was submitted, should
declare against it
,
in which case it
should take effect in the following
December. The case was distin
guished from Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.
Y. 483, and the act sustained. At
the same time the court express their
dissent from the reasoning upon
which the New York case rests. In
People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, the
court was equally divided in a case
similar to that in Vermont, except
that in the Michigan case the law
which was passed and submitted to
the people in 1853 was not to go into
effect until 1870, if the vote of the
people was against it
.
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questions of local government, including police regulations, to the
local authorities; on the supposition that they are better able to
decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of
their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are
therefore more competent to judge what local regulations are
important, and also how far the local sentiment will assist in their
enforcement. The same reasons would apply in favor of permit
ting the people of the locality to accept or reject for themselves a
particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less
extensive powers of local government than a municipal charter
would confer; and the fact that the rule of law on that sub
[*124] ject might be different in different *localities, according as
the people accepted or rejected the regulation, would not
seem to affect the principle, when the same result is brought about
by the different regulations which municipal corporations establish
for themselves in the exercise of an undisputed authority." It
is not to be denied, however, that there is considerable authority
against the right of legislative delegation in these cases.
The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize
the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by bal
lot whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be per
* In New Hampshire an act was billiard-rooms, bowling-alleys, and
passed declaring bowling-alleys, sit
uate within twenty-five rods of a
dwelling-house, nuisances, but the
statute was to be in force only in
those towns in which it should be
adopted in town meeting. In State
v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 293, this act was
held to be constitutional. “Assum
ing,” say the court, “that the legis
lature has the right to confer the
power of local regulation upon cities
and towns, that is
,
the power to pass
ordinances and by-laws, in such terms
and with such provisions, in the classes
o
f
cases to which the power extends,
a
s they may think proper, it seems to
u
s hardly possible seriously to con
tend that the legislature may not con
fer the power to adopt within such
municipality a law drawn up and
framed b
y
themselves. If they may
pass a law authorizing towns to make
ordinances to punish the keeping o
f
other places o
f gambling, they may
surely pass laws to punish the same
acts, subject to be adopted by the
town before they can be o
f
force in
it.” And it seems to us difficult to
answer this reasoning, if it be con
fined to such laws as fall within the
proper province o
f
local government,
and which are therefore usually re
ferred to the judgment o
f
the munici
pal authorities or their constituency.
A similar question arose in Smith r.
Village o
f Adrian, 1 Mich. 495, but
was not decided. In Bank of Che
nango v. Brown, 26 N
.
Y
.
467, it was
held competent to authorize the elec
tors o
f
a
n incorporated village to de
termine for themselves what sections
o
f
the general act for the incorpora
tion o
f villages should apply to their
village. See, further, People v. Salo
mon, 51 Ill. 37; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill,
11; Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541.
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mitted. By this act a general election was to be held; and if a
majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it
should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicat
ing liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast
in favor of license, then licenses might be granted in the county
so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act
prescribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held
this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws,
and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited,
where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the
State for approval a law of general application.” The same de
cision was made near the same time by the Supreme
* Court of Pennsylvania,” followed afterwards in an elabo- [*125]
rate opinion by the Supreme Court of Iowa.” But the
case in Pennsylvania has since been overruled.*
By statute in Indiana it was enacted that no person should retail
spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, mechanical, chemical,
medicinal, or culinary purposes, without the consent of the
majority of the legal voters of the proper township who might
cast their votes for license at the April election, nor without filing
with the county auditor a bond as therein provided ; upon the fil
ing of which the auditor was to issue to the person filing the same
a license to retail spirituous liquors, which was to be good for one
year from the day of the election. This act was held void upon
similar reasons to those above quoted.” This case follows the
previous decisions in Pennsylvania and Delaware,” and it has since
* Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
Compare this with the recent case of
* Parker v. Commonwealth, 6
Penn. St. 507.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass.
27, which is contra, and which is
placed upon what seems to us the
impregnable grounds, that “the sub
ject, although not embraced within
the ordinary power to make by-laws
and ordinances, falls within the class
of police regulations which may be
intrusted by the legislature by express
enactment to municipal authority.”
See also Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt.
456. A local option law concerning
the running at large of beasts has
recently been held unconstitutional in
Missouri. Lammert v. Lidwell, 62
Mo. 188.
* Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 495.
See State v. Wier, 33 Iowa, 134; s. c.
11 Am. Rep. 115.
* Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn. St.
491; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 716.
* Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342.
Compare Groesch v. State, 42 Ind.
547, 558.
* Parker v. Commonwealth, 6
Penn. St. 507; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr.
479. See also State v. Field, 17 Mo.
529; Commonwealth v. McWilliams,
11 Penn. St. 61; State v. Copeland,
3 R. I. 33; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal.
279.
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been followed by another decision of the Supreme Court of that
State, except that while in the first case only that portion of the
statute which provided for submission to the people was held
void, in the later case that unconstitutional provision was held
to affect the whole statute with infirmity, and render the whole
invalid." But we think that at this time the clear weight of
authority is in support of legislation of this nature commonly
known as local option laws.”
Irrepealable Laws.
Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department
of the State from delegating it
s authority will also forbid it
s pass
ing any irrepealable law. The constitution, in conferring the leg
islative authority, has prescribed to it
s
exercise any limitations
which the people saw fi
t
to impose; and no other power than the
people can superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature
may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very
constitution from which it derives its authority; since, in so far as
one legislature could bind a subsequent one b
y
it
s enactments, it
could in the same degree reduce the legislative power o
f
it
s suc
cessors; and the process might be repeated, until, one b
y
one,
the subjects o
f legislation would be excluded altogether from
their control, and the constitutional provision, that the
[* 126] *legislative power shall be vested in two houses, would
b
e
to a greater o
r
less degree rendered ineffectual.”
1 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484.
* Supporting such laws in addition
to cases already cited are State v.
Morris County, 36 N
. J. 72; s. c.
1
3 Am. Rep. 422; State v. Wilcox,
4
2 Conn. 364; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 536;
Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71; s. c. 20
Am. Rep. 83; Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; Common
wealth v. Dean, 110 Mass. 357; Com
monwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Mass.
199; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547.
In Locke's Appeal, supra, it is said,
after an admission that the legislature
cannot delegate the power to make
laws, “but it can make a law to dele
gate the power to determine some
fact o
r
state o
f things upon which
the law makes or intends to make its
own action depend. To deny that
would be to stop the wheels o
f gov
ernment.” And see Slinger v. Henne
man, 38 Wis. 504; Erlinger v. Boneau,
51 Ill. 94.
* “ Unlike the decision of a court,
a legislative act does not bind a sub
sequent legislature. Each body pos
sesses the same power, and has a
right to exercise the same discretion.
Measures, though often rejected, may
receive legislative sanction. There is
no mode b
y
which a legislative act
can b
e
made irrepealable, except it
assume the form and substance of a
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“Acts of Parliament,” says Blackstone, “derogatory to the
power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not ; so the statute 11
Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a king
de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or
otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for
high treason, but it will not restrain or clog any parliamentary
attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign
power, is always of equal, and always of absolute authority; it
acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature
must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent Par
liament. And upon the same principle, Cicero, in his letters to
Atticus, treats with a proper contempt those restraining clauses
which endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures.
“When you repeal the law itself,’ says he, “you at the same time
repeal the prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.’”
Although this reasoning does not in al
l
it
s particulars apply to
the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case
is the same. There is a modification o
f
the principle, however, by
an important provision o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States,
forbidding the States passing any laws impairing the obliga
tion o
f
contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance
contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some
right under them, and they are not the less under the protection
o
f
the clause quoted because o
f having assumed this form. Char
ters o
f incorporation, except those of a municipal character, —
and which, as we have already seen, create mere agencies
o
f government, — "are held to be contracts between the [*127]
State and the corporators, and not subject to modification
o
r change by the act of the State alone, except as may be author
ized by the terms o
f
the charters themselves.”
contract. If in any line of legislation
a permanent character could be given
to acts, the most injurious conse
quences would result to the country.
Its policy would become fixed and
unchangeable on great national inter
ests, which might retard, if not de
stroy, the public prosperity. Every
legislative body, unless restricted by
the constitution, may modify or
abolish the acts of its predecessors;
whether it would be wise to do so,
is a matter for legislative discretion.”
And it now seems
Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 161.
See this subject considered in Wall v.
State, 23 Ind. 150, and State v. Os
kins, 28 Ind. 364; Oleson v. Green
Bay, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 36 Wis. 383.
In Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623,
it was held that one legislature could
not bind a future one to a particular
mode o
f appeal.
1 1 Bl. Com. 90.
* Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
4
. Wheat. 518; Planters' Bank v.
Sharp, 6 How. 301.
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to be settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that a State, by contract to that effect, based upon a con
sideration, may exempt the property of an individual or corpora
tion from taxation for any specified period, or even permanently.
And it is also settled, by the same decisions, that where a charter
containing an exemption from taxes, or an agreement that the
taxes shall be to a specified amount only, is accepted by the cor
porators, the exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient con
sideration, and consequently binding upon the State."
Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority.
The legislative authority of every State must spend its
[* 128] force " within the territorial limits of the State. The
legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people
1 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,
3 How. 133; New Jersey v. Wilson,
7 Cranch, 164; Piqua Branch Bank
v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life
Ins. and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How.
416, 432; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How.
331; Mechanics’ and Traders' Bank
v. Debolt, 18 How. 381; Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436;
Erie R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21
Wall. 492. See also Hunsaker v.
Wright, 30 Ill. 146; Morgan v. Cree,
46 Vt. 773; Spooner v. McConnell, 1
McLean, 347; post, p. *280. The right
of a State legislature to grant away
the right of taxation, which is one of
the essential attributes of sovereignty,
has been strenuously denied. See
Debolt c. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust
Co., 1 Ohio, N. s. 563: Mechanics'
and Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio,
N. s. 591; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H.
143; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. And see Thorpe
v. Rutland and B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt.
146; post, p. *280 and note. In Brick
Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c.
of New York, 5 Cow. 538, it was held
that a municipal corporation had no
power, as a party, to make a contract
which should control or embarrass its
discharge of legislative duties. And
see post, p. *206. In Coats v. Mayor,
&c. of New York, 7 Cow. 585, it was
decided that though a municipal cor
poration grant lands for cemetery
purposes, and covenant for their
quiet enjoyment, it will not thereby
be estopped afterwards to forbid the
use of the land by by-law, for that
purpose, when such use becomes or is
likely to become a nuisance. See
also, on the same subject, Morgan v.
Smith, 4 Minn. 104; Kincaid's Ap
peal, 66 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am.
Rep. 377; Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Geo.
56, where it was held that the legis
lature could not bind its successors
not to remove a county seat; Bass v.
Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698; Shaw v.
Macon, 21 Geo. 280; Regents of
University v. Williams, 9 G. & J.
390; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 30 Penn. St. 9. In Bank of
Republic v. Hamilton, 21 Ill. 53, it
was held that, in construing a statute,
it will not be intended that the legis
lature designed to abandon its right
as to taxation. This subject is con
sidered further, post, pp. *280–"2S4.
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outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may
have occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides,
or to deal with property situated within the State. It can have no
authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is
the point of contact with other nations, and all international ques
tions belong to the national government." It cannot provide for
the punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State
boundary, because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences
against the sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.”
But if the consequences of an unlawful act committed outside
the State have reached their ultimate and injurious result within
it
,
it seems that the perpetrator may be punished as an offender
against such State.”
Other Limitations o
f Legislative Authority.
Besides the limitations o
f legislative authority to which we
have referred, others exist which do not seem to call for
special remark. Some o
f
these are prescribed by constitutions,”
* 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120.
* State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109;
People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R
. 590;
Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler
v
. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v.
People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v.
People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main,
1
6 Wis. 398; Watson’s Case, 36 Miss.
593.
* In Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320,
it was held constitutional to punish in
Michigan a homicide committed b
y
a
mortal blow in Canadian waters, from
which death resulted in the State.
In Morrissey v. People, 11 Mich. 327,
the court was divided on the question
whether the State could lawfully
provide for the punishment o
f per
sons who, having committed larceny
abroad, brought the stolen property
within the State. The power was
sustained in People v. Williams, 24
Mich. 156, where the larceny was in
another State. And see State v.
Main, 16 Wis. 398; Regina v. Hen
nessy, 35 Upper Canada R
.
603.
* The restrictions upon State leg
islative authority are much more ex
tensive in some constitutions than in
others. The Constitution of Missouri
o
f
1865 had the following provision:
“The General Assembly shall not
pass special laws divorcing any named
parties, o
r declaring any named per
son o
f age, o
r authorizing any named
minor to sell, lease, o
r
encumber his
o
r
her property, o
r providing for the
sale o
f
the real estate o
f any named
minor o
r
other person laboring under
legal disability, by any executor, ad
ministrator, guardian, trustee, or other
person, o
r establishing, locating, alter
ing the course, o
r effecting the con
struction o
f roads, o
r
the building o
r
repairing o
f bridges, o
r establishing,
altering, o
r vacating any street, ave
nue, o
r alley in any city o
r town, o
r
extending the time for the assessment
o
r
collection o
f taxes, or otherwise
relieving any assessor o
r
collector o
f
taxes from the due performance o
f
his
official duties, o
r giving effect to in
156 [CH. v.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*129] but * others spring from the very nature of free govern
ment. The latter must depend for their enforcement upon
legislative wisdom, discretion, and conscience." The legislature
is to make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of
formal or invalid wills or deeds, or
legalizing, except as against the State,
the unauthorized or invalid acts of
any officer, or granting to any indi
vidual or company the right to lay
down railroad tracks in the streets of
any city or town, or exempting any
property of any named person or cor
poration from taxation. The General
Assembly shall pass no special law for
any case for which provision can be
made by a general law, but shall pass
general laws providing, so far as it
may deem necessary, for the cases
enumerated in this section, and for all
other cases where a general law can
be made applicable.” Art. 4, § 27.
We should suppose that so stringent
a provision would, in some of these
cases, lead to the passage of general
laws of doubtful utility in order to
remedy the hardships of particular
cases; but the constitution adopted
in 1875 is still more restrictive. Art.
4, § 53. As to when a general law
can be made applicable, see Thomas
v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4;
State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; John
son v. Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 202. In
State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178, it
was held that the constitutional pro
vision, that “in all cases where a
general law can be made applicable,
no special law shall be enacted,” left
a discretion with the legislature to
determine the cases in which special
laws should be passed. See to the
same effect Gentile v. State, 29 Ind.
409, and Marks v. Trustees of Pardue
University, 37 Ind. 163; State v.
Tucker, 46 Ind. 355, overruling
Thomas v. Board of Commissioners,
supra. To the same effect is State v.
County Court of Boone, 50 Mo. 317;
s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 415; State v.
Robbins, 51 Mo. 82; Hall v. Bray,
51 Mo. 288; St. Louis v. Shields, 62
Mo. 247. Compare Hess v. Pegg,
7 Nev. 23; Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan.
592; Ex parte Pritz, 9 Iowa, 30.
Where the legislature is forbidden to
pass special or local laws regulating
county or township business, a special
act allowing and ordering payment of
a particular claim is void, even though
the claim, being merely an equitable
one, cannot be audited by any existing
board. Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev.
68. See Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan.
592. An act creating a criminal
court for a particular county is not in
conflict with the constitutional pro
hibition of special legislation. Eitel
v. State, 33 Ind. 201. See Matter of
Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. A constitutional
provision that requires a
ll
laws o
f
a
general nature to have uniform oper
ation throughout the State is com
plied with in a statute applicable to
all cities o
f
a certain class having less
than one hundred thousand inhabi
tants, though in fact there be but one
city in the State o
f
that class. Welker
v
. Potter, 18 Ohio, N
.
s. 85. See
further, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal.
162; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366;
McAurich v. Mississippi, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State,
3 Kan. 141; Jackson v. Shawl, 29
Cal. 267; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind.
409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15;
Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450;
People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680. So
where the legislature, for urgent rea
sons, may suspend the rules and allow
a bill to be read twice on the same
day, what constitutes a case o
f ur
gency is a question for the legislative
discretion. Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503.
1 Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio,
N
.
S
. 14, 41.
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individuals. It has control of the public moneys, and should
provide for disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes
should only be levied for those purposes which properly constitute
a public burden. But what is for the public good, and what are
public purposes, and what does properly constitute a public
burden, are questions which the legislature must decide upon its
own judgment, and in respect to which it is vested with a large
discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts, except, per
haps, where it
s
action is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence
o
f
a lawful authority, it has assumed to exercise one that is un
lawful. Where the power which is exercised is legislative in its
character, the courts can enforce only those limitations which the
constitution imposes; not those implied restrictions which, rest
ing in theory only, the people have been satisfied to leave to the
judgment, patriotism, and sense o
f justice o
f
their representa
tives."
1 State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 211, 212.
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[*180] * CHAPTER VI.
OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAws.
WHEN the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single
man, or by a single body of men, any discussion in the courts of
the rules which should be observed in the enactment of laws
must generally be without practical value, and in fact impertinent;
for, whenever the unfettered sovereign power of any country ex
presses it
s
will in the promulgation o
f
a rule o
f law, the expression
must be conclusive, though proper and suitable forms may have
been wholly omitted in declaring it
. It is a necessary attribute of
sovereignty that the expressed will o
f
the sovereign is law; and
while w
e
may question and cross-question the words employed,
to make certain o
f
the real meaning, and may hesitate and doubt
concerning it
,
yet, when the intent is made out, it must govern,
and it is idle to talk of forms that should have surrounded the
expression, but do not. But when the legislative power o
f
a State
is to be exercised b
y
a department composed o
f
two branches, or,
a
s in most o
f
the American States, o
f
three branches, and these
branches have their several duties marked out and prescribed b
y
the law to which they owe their origin, and which provides for
the exercise o
f
their powers in certain modes and under certain
forms, there are other questions to arise than those o
f
the mere
intent o
f
the law-makers, and sometimes forms become o
f
the last
importance. For in such case not only is it important that the
will of the law-makers be clearly expressed, but it is also essential
that it be expressed in due form of law; since nothing becomes
law simply and solely because men who possess the legislative
power will that it shall be, unless they express their determina
tion to that effect, in the mode pointed out b
y
the instrument
which invests them with the power, and under a
ll
the forms which
that instrument has rendered essential." And if
,
when the con
* A bill becomes a law only when made necessary by the constitution to
it has gone through all the forms give it validity. Jones v. Hutchinson,
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stitution was adopted, there were known and settled rules and
usages, forming a part of the law of the country, in reference to
which the constitution has evidently been framed, and these rules
and usages required the observance of particular forms, the con
stitution itself must also be understood as requiring them,
because in assuming their existence, and being * framed [*131]
with reference to them, it has in effect adopted them as a
part of itself, as much as if they were expressly incorporated in
its provisions. Where, for an instance, the legislative power is
to be exercised by two houses, and by settled and well-under
stood parliamentary law, these two houses are to hold separate
sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one
upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determi
nation of the other, the constitution, in providing for two houses,
has evidently spoken in reference to this settled custom, incor
porating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation; so that it
would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two houses from
combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the vote of a
majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials of
law-making must be observed and followed ; and it is only the
customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative
body are always understood to be under it
s control, and subject to
constant change at it
s will, that the constitution can be understood
to have left as matters o
f discretion, to be established, modified,
o
r
abolished b
y
the bodies for whose government in non-essential
matters they exist.
Of the two Houses of the Legislature."
In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are
o
f equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which
43 Ala. 721; State v. Platt, 2 S. C.
N
.
s. 150; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 647;
People v. Commissioners of High
ways, 54 N
.
Y
. 276; Moody v. State,
48 Ala. 115; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 28;
Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. 303.
* The wisdom of a division of the
legislative department has been demon
strated b
y
the leading writers on con
stitutional law, as well as b
y
general
experience. See De Lolme, Const. o
f
England, b. 2
,
c. 3
;
Federalist, No.
22; 1 Kent, 208; Story on Const.
§§ 545–570. The early experiments in
Pennsylvania and Georgia, based on
Franklin's views, for which see his
Works, Vol. V
.
p
.
165, were the only
ones made by any o
f
the original
States with a single house. The first
Constitution o
f
Vermont also provided
for a single legislative body.
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result in laws may originate indifferently in either. This is the
general rule; but as one body is more numerous than the other
and more directly represents the people, and in many of the
States is renewed by more frequent elections, the power to origi
nate all money bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left
exclusively, by the constitutions of some of the States, with this
body, in accordance with the custom in England, which does not
permit bills of this character to originate with the House
[*132] of Lords." To these * bills, however, the other house may
propose alterations, and they require the assent of that
house to their passage, the same as other bills. The time for
the meeting of the legislature will be such time as is fixed by the
constitution or by statute; but it may be called together by the
executive in special session as the constitution may prescribe, and
the two houses may also adjourn any general session to a time
fixed by them for the holding of a special session, if an agreement
to that effect can be arrived at ; and if not, power is conferred by
a majority of the constitutions upon the executive to prorogue
and adjourn them. And if the executive in any case undertake
to exercise this power to prorogue and adjourn, on the assumption
that a disagreement exists between the two houses which warrants
his interference, and his action is acquiesced in by those bodies,
who thereupon cease to hold their regular sessions, the legislature
must be held in law to have adjourned, and no inquiry can be
entered upon as to the rightfulness of the governor's assumption
that such a disagreement existed.”
* There are provisions in the Con
stitutions of Massachusetts, Delaware,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp
shire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Vermont, Indiana,
Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ala
bama, Arkansas, Georgia, Virginia,
Maine, and Colorado requiring revenue
bills to originate in the more popular
branch of the legislature, but allowing
the Senate the power of amendment
usual in other cases. During the
second session of the forty-first Con
gress, the House of Representatives
by their vote denied the right of the
Senate under the Constitution to orig
inate a bill repealing a law imposing
taxes; but the Senate did not assent
to this conclusion. In England the
Lords are not allowed to amend money
bills, and by resolutions of 5th and
6th July, 1860, the Commons deny
their right even to reject them.
* This question became important,
and was passed upon in People v.
Hatch, 33 Ill. 9. The Senate had
passed a resolution for an adjourn
ment of the session sine die on a day
named, which was amended by the
House by fixing a different day. The
Senate refused to concur, and the
House then passed a resolution ex
pressing a desire to recede from its
action in amending the resolution, and
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*There are certain matters which each house deter- [*183]
mines for itself, and in respect to which it
s
decision is
conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, b
y
consti
tution o
r statute, other provision is made ; it determines its own
rules o
f proceeding; it decides upon the election and qualification
o
f
it
s
own members." These powers it is obviously proper should
rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it
to enter upon and proceed with it
s legislative functions, without
liability to interruption and confusion. In determining questions
concerning contested seats, the house will exercise judicial power,
but generally in accordance with a course o
f practice which has
sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is
a
t liberty to interfere.
Each house has also the power to punish members for disor
derly behavior, and other contempts o
f
it
s authority, as well as to
requesting a return o
f
the resolution
b
y
the Senate. While matters stood
thus, the governor, assuming that
such a disagreement existed as em
powered him to interfere, sent in his
proclamation, declaring the legislature
adjourned to a day named, and which
was a
t
the very end o
f
the official term
o
f
the members. The message created
excitement; it does not seem to have
been a
t
once acquiesced in, and a pro
test against the governor's authority
was entered upon the journal; but for
eleven days in one house and twelve
in the other no entries were made
upon their journals, and it was un
questionable that practically they had
acquiesced in the action o
f
the gov
ernor, and adjourned. At the expira
tion o
f
the twelve days, a portion o
f
the members came together again,
and it was claimed by them that the
message o
f
the governor was without
authority, and the two houses must
b
e
considered a
s having been, in point
o
f law, in session during the inter
vening period, and that consequently
any bills which had before been passed
b
y
them and sent to the governor for
his approval, and which he had not
returned within ten days, Sundays
excepted, had become laws under the
constitution. The Supreme Court
held that, as the two houses had
practically acquiesced in the action o
f
the governor, the session had come to
an end, and that the members had
no power to reconvene o
n their own
motion, as had been attempted. The
case is a very full and valuable one on
several points pertaining to legislative
proceedings and authority. As to the
governor's discretion in calling an
extra session and revoking the call,
see ante, p
.
*115, note.
* In People r. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
481, it was held that the correctness
o
f
a decision by one o
f
the houses,
that certain persons had been chosen
members, could not b
e inquired into
by the courts. In that case a law was
assailed a
s void, on the ground that a
portion o
f
the members who voted for
it, and without whose votes it would
not have had the requisite majority,
had been given their seats in the
house in defiance o
f law, and to the
exclusion o
f
others who had a majority
o
f legal votes. See the same principle
in State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See
also Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 336;
Opinion o
f Justices, 50 N
.
H
.
570.
11
162 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. V
I.
expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render
it unfit that he continue to occupy one o
f
it
s
seats. This power
is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which
the two houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in that
instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or
not. It is “a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house
to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of
the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be phys
ically, mentally, o
r morally wholly unfit; he may be affected with
a contagious disease, o
r insane, o
r noisy, violent, and disorderly,
o
r
in the habit o
f using profane, obscene, and abusive language.”
And, “independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our
legislative houses have the power to protect themselves b
y
the
punishment and expulsion o
f
a member; ” and the courts cannot
inquire into the justice o
f
the decision, o
r
even so much as examine
the proceedings to see whether o
r not the proper opportunity for
defence was furnished."
* Each house may also punish contempts o
f
it
s authority
b
y
other persons, where they are committed in it
s presence,
o
r
where they tend directly to embarrass or obstruct it
s legisla
tive proceedings; and it requires for the purpose no express pro
vision o
f
the constitution conferring the authority.” It is not
very well settled what are the limits to this power; and in the
leading case in this country the speaker's warrant for the arrest
o
f
the person adjudged guilty o
f contempt was sustained, though
it did not show in what the alleged contempt consisted.” In the
leading English case a libellous publication concerning the house
was treated as a contempt; 4 and punishment has sometimes been
inflicted for assaults upon members o
f
the house, not committed
in or near the place o
f sitting, and for the arrest o
f
members in
disregard o
f
their constitutional privilege.” Where imprisonment
[*134]
* Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468.
And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
204.
* Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
204; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1
;
Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226;
State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450. See
post, p
.
*458, note.
* Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
And see Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B.
451; Stewart v. Blaine, 1 McArthur,
453. -
* Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1.
* Mr. Potter discusses such a case
in his edition o
f
Dwarris on Statutes,
c. 18, and Mr. Robinson deals with
the case of an arrest for a criminal
act, not committed in the presence o
f
the house, in the preface to the sixth
volume of his Practice. As to the
general right o
f
Parliament to punish
for contempt, see Gosset v. Howard,
1
0 Q. B
.
411.
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is imposed as a punishment, it must terminate with the final
adjournment of the house, and if the prisoner be not then dis
charged by it
s order, h
e may b
e
released o
n
habeas corpus."
By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature
are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session o
f
that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable
them to go to and return from the same. By the constitutions o
f
some o
f
the States this privilege has been enlarged, so as to
exempt the persons o
f legislators from any service o
f
civil pro
cess,” and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for
some prescribed period.” For any arrest contrary to the parlia
mentary law or to these provisions, the house o
f
which the person
arrested is a member may give summary relief b
y
ordering his
discharge, and if the order is not complied with, b
y punishing
the persons concerned in the arrest as for a contempt o
f
it
s au
thority. The remedy o
f
the member, however, is not confined to
this mode o
f
relief. His privilege is not the privilege o
f
the house
merely, but o
f
the people, and is conferred to enable him to dis
charge the trust confided to him by his constituents; * and if the
house neglect to interfere, the court from which the process issued
should set it aside on the facts being represented, and any court
o
r
officer having authority to issue writs o
f
habeas corpus
may also "inquire into the case, and release the party [*135]
from the unlawful imprisonment.”
Each house must also be allowed to proceed in it
s
own way in
1 Jefferson's Manual, § 18; Prich
ard's Case, 1 Lev. 165; 1 Sid. 245; T
.
Raym. 120.
* “Senators and representatives
shall, in a
ll
cases except treason, fel
ony, o
r
breach o
f
the peace, be privi
leged from arrest. They shall not be
subject to any civil process during the
session o
f
the legislature, o
r for fifteen
days next before the commencement
and after the termination of each ses
sion.” Const. of Mich. art. 4
,
§ 7.
A like exemption from civil process is
found in the Constitutions o
f Kansas,
Nebraska, Alabama, Arkansas, Cali
fornia, Missouri, Mississippi, Wiscon
sin, Indiana, Oregon, and Colorado.
Exemption from arrest is not violated
by the service o
f
citations o
r
declara
tions in civil cases. Gentry v. Grif
fith, 27 Tex. 461; Case v. Rorabacker,
15 Mich. 537.
* The Constitution of Rhode Island
provides that “the person of every
member o
f
the General Assembly
shall be exempt from arrest, and his
estate from attachment, in any civil
action, during the session o
f
the Gen
eral Assembly, and two days before
the commencement and two days after
the termination thereof, and a
ll pro
cess served contrary hereto shall be
void.” Art. 4
,
§ 5
.
* Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27.
* On this subject, Cushing on Law
and Practice o
f Parliamentary Assem
blies, §§ 546–597, will be consulted
with profit.
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the collection o
f
such information as may seem important to a
proper discharge o
f
its functions," and whenever it is deemed
desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and
authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with
any such powers short o
f
final legislative o
r judicial action as
may seem necessary o
r expedient in the particular case. Such a
committee has no authority to sit during a recess o
f
the house
which has appointed it
,
without its permission to that effect; but
the house is a
t liberty to confer such authority if it see fit.” A
refusal to appear o
r
to testify before such committee, o
r
to pro
duce books o
r papers, would be a contempt o
f
the house; * but
the committee cannot punish for contempts; it can only report
the conduct o
f
the offending party to the house for it
s
action.
The power o
f
the committee will terminate with the final dissolu
tion o
f
the house appointing it
.
Each house keeps a journal o
f
it
s proceedings, which is a public
record, and o
f
which the courts are a
t liberty to take judicial
notice.* If it should appear from these journals that any act did
1 See Tillinghast v. Carr, 4 Mc
Cord, 152.
* Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497;
Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. See
also parliamentary cases, 5 Gray, 374;
9 Gray, 350; 1 Chandler, 50.
* In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630; Burn
ham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226. But
the privilege o
f
a witness to be exempt
from a compulsory disclosure o
f
his
own criminal conduct is the same
when examined by a legislative body
or committee as when sworn in court.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172. In the
Matter o
f Kilbourn (May, 1876),
Chief Justice Carter, o
f
the Supreme
Court o
f
the District o
f Columbia,
discharged on habeas corpus a person
committed b
y
the House o
f Represen
tatives for a contempt in refusing to
testify; holding that as the refusal
was an indictable offence by statute,
a trial therefor must be in the courts,
and not elsewhere. If this is correct,
the necessities o
f legislation will re
quire a repeal o
f
the statute; for if
,
in political cases, the question o
f pun
ishment for failure to give informa
tion must be left to a jury, few
convictions are to be expected, and no
wholesome fear o
f
the consequences o
f
a refusal. On questions o
f conflict
between the legislature and the courts
in matters o
f contempt, the great case
o
f
Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El.
1
,
s. c. 3 Per. & Dav. 330, is o
f
the
highest interest. See May, Const.
Hist. c. 7.
* Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297 ;
Turley v. Logan Co., 17 Ill. 151; Jones
v
. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721; State v.
Moffit, 5 Ohio, 358; Miller v. State,
3 Ohio, N
.
s. 475; Fordyce v. God
man, 20 Ohio, N
.
s. 1
;
People v. Su
pervisors o
f Chenango, 8 N
.
Y
. 317;
People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 4S1;
Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth,
2 Penn. St. 446; McCulloch v. State,
1
1 Ind. 430; Osborn v. Staley, 5 W.
Va. 85; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 28; State
v
. Platt, 2 S
.
C
.
N
.
s. 150; s. c.
1
6 Am. Rep. 647; Moody v. State,
48 Ala. 115; Gardner v. The Col
lector, 6 Wall. 499; South Ottawa
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not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the leg
islature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that
in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted,
the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute
void.” But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance
of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made
in favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be pre
sumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that
either house has exceeded it
s authority, or disregarded a
*constitutional requirement in the passage o
f legislative [*136]
acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required
the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it
requires the yeas and nays to be entered.”
The law also seeks to cast it
s protection around legislative ses
sions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences,
v
. Perkins, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 260.
The presumption always is
,
when
the act, as signed and enrolled, does
not show the contrary, that it has
gone through all necessary formal
ities ; but this presumption may be
overthrown by the journals. Berry
v
. Baltimore, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 41 Md.
446: s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 69; Green v.
Weller, 32 Miss. 650. And see Opin
ions o
f Justices, 52 N. H. 622; Hen
soldt v. Petersburg, 63 Ill. 157;
Larrison v. Peoria, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
7
7 Ill. 12; People v. Commissioners
o
f Highways, 54 N.Y. 276; English
v
. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317; State v. Swift,
10 Nev. 176. In a few States the
ruling is contra. See Sherman v.
Story, 30 Cal. 253; People v. Burt,
4
3 Cal. 560; Louisiana Lottery Co. v.
Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 743; s. c. 8
Am. Rep. 602; Blessing v. Galveston,
42 Tex. 641. It has been held that
where the constitution requires pre
vious notice of an application for a
private act, the courts cannot go
behind the act to inquire whether
the notice was given. Brodnax v.
Groom, 64 N
.
C
.
244. See People v
.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; Day v. Stet
son. 8 Me. 365.
* See cases cited in preceding note ;
also Prescott v. Trustees, &c., 19 Ill.
324.
* Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N
.
s.
475; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424;
Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181.
But where a statute can only be
enacted by a certain majority, e. g
.
two-thirds, it must affirmatively ap
pear by the printed statute o
r
the act
on file that such a vote was had.
People v. Commissioners o
f High
ways, 54 N
.
Y
.
276. It seems that, in
Illinois, if one claims that a supposed
law was never passed, and relies upon
the records to show it
,
h
e must prove
them. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v.
Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Grob v. Cushman,
45 Ill. 119: Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91.
The court will not act upon the
admission o
f parties that an act was
not passed in the constitutional man
ner. Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166.
The Constitution o
f Alabama, art.
4
,
§ 27, requires the presiding officer
o
f
each house, in the presence o
f
the
house, to sign them “after the titles
have been publicly read immediately
before signing, and the fact o
f sign
ing shall be entered on the journal.”
This seems a very imperative require
ment.
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*
by making void all contracts which have for their object to influ
ence legislation in any other manner than by such open and pub
lic presentation of facts, arguments and appeals to reason as
are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies.
While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons
in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass
upon it
,
o
r
to any o
f
it
s
committees empowered to collect facts
and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract
to pay for this service," yet to secretly approach the members o
f
such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and
in a manner that do not allow the presentation o
f opposite views,
is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract
to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be en
forced by the law.”
1 See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273;
Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Brown
v
. Brown, 34 Barb. 533; Russell v.
Burton, 66 Barb. 539.
* This whole subject was very fully
considered in the case of Frost v.
Inhabitants o
f Belmont, 6 Allen, 152,
which was a bill filed to restrain the
payment by the town o
f
demands to
the amount o
f nearly $9,000, which
the town had voted to pay as expenses
in obtaining their act o
f incorporation.
By the court, Chapman, J. : “It is to
b
e regretted that any persons should
have attempted to procure an act o
f
legislation in this Commonwealth, by
such means as some of these items
indicate. By the regular course o
f leg
islation, organs are provided through
which any parties may fairly and
openly approach the legislature, and
be heard with proofs and arguments
respecting any legislative acts which
they may be interested in, whether
public o
r private. These organs are
the various committees appointed to
consider and report upon the matters
to be acted upon by the whole body.
When private interests are to be
affected, notice is given o
f
the hear
ings before these committees; and
thus opportunity is given to adverse
parties to meet face to face and
obtain a fair and open hearing. And
though these committees properly dis
pense with many o
f
the rules which
regulate hearings before judicial tribu
nals, yet common fairness requires
that neither party shall be permitted
to have secret consultations, and exer
cise secret influences that are kept
from the knowledge o
f
the other
party. The business of ‘lobby mem
bers' is not to go fairly and openly
before the committees, and present
statements, proofs, and arguments
that the other side has an opportunity
to meet and refute, if they are wrong,
but to go secretly to the members and
ply them with statements and argu
ments that the other side cannot
openly meet, however erroneous they
may be, and to bring illegitimate in
fluences to bear upon them. If the
“lobby member' is selected because
o
f
his political o
r personal influence,
it aggravates the wrong. If his busi
ness is to unite various interests by
means o
f projects that are called “ log
rolling,” it is still worse. The prac
tice o
f procuring members o
f
the legis
lature to act under the influence of
what they have eaten and drank at
houses o
f entertainment, tends to
render those who yield to such in
fluences wholly unfit to act in such
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* The Introduction and Passage of Bills. [*137]
Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he
belongs, in accordance with it
s rules; and this he may do
cases. They are disqualified from
acting fairly towards interested par
ties o
r towards the public. The ten
dency and object o
f
these influences
are to obtain by corruption what it is
supposed cannot b
e obtained fairly.
“It is a well-established principle,
that all contracts which are opposed
to public policy, and to open, upright,
and fair dealing, are illegal and void.
The principle was fully discussed in
Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In
several other States it has been ap
plied to cases quite analogous to the
present case.
“In Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aik.
264, it was held in Vermont that an
agreement, o
n the part o
f
a corpora
tion, to grant to individuals certain
privileges in consideration that they
would withdraw their opposition to
the passage o
f
a legislative act touch
ing the interests o
f
the corporation, is
against sound policy, prejudicial to
just and correct legislation, and void.
In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87, it was
decided in New Jersey that a contract
which contravenes a
n act o
f Congress,
and tends to defraud the United
States, is void. A
.
had agreed to
give B
. $100, on condition that B
.
would forbear to propose o
r
offer
himself to the Postmaster-General to
carry the mail on a certain mail
route, and it was held that the con
tract was against public policy and
void. The general principle as to
contracts contravening public policy
was discussed in that case at much
length. In Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana,
866, the defendant had employed the
plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a
legislative act in Kentucky legalizing
his divorce from a former wife, and
h
is marriage with his present wife.
The court say: ‘A lawyer may be
entitled to compensation for writing a
petition, o
r
even for making a public
argument before the legislature o
r
a
committee thereof; but the law should
not hold him o
r any other person to a
recompense for exercising any personal
influence in any way, in any act o
f
legislation. It is certainly important
to just and wise legislation, and
therefore to the most essential inter
ests o
f
the public, that the legislature
should be perfectly free from any
extraneous influence which may either
corrupt o
r
deceive the members, o
r
any o
f
them.”
“In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5
Watts & S. 315, it was decided in
Pennsylvania that a contract to pro
cure o
r
endeavor to procure the pas
sage o
f
a
n
act o
f
the legislature by
using personal influence with the
members, o
r by any sinister means,
was void, as being inconsistent with
public policy and the integrity o
f
our
political institutions. And an agree
ment for a contingent fee to be paid
o
n
the passage o
f
a legislative act was
held to b
e illegal and void, because it
would be a strong incentive to the
exercise o
f personal and sinister in
fluences to effect the object.
“The subject has been twice adju
dicated upon in New York. In Har
ris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme
Court held that one could not recover
for services performed in going to see
individual members o
f
the house, to
get them to aid in voting for a pri
vate claim, the services not being per
formed before the house as a body
nor before its authorized committees.
In Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan,
289, the court o
f appeals held the
same doctrine, and stated it
s proper
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[* 138] at any " time when the house is in session, unless the
constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.
limits. Selden, J., makes the follow
ing comments on the case of Harris v.
Roof: ‘Now the court did not mean
by this decision to hold that one who
has a claim against the State may not
employ competent persons to aid him
in properly presenting such claim to
the legislature, and in supporting it
with the necessary proofs and argu
ments. Mr. Justice Hand, who de
livered the opinion of the court, very
justly distinguishes between services
of the nature of those rendered in
that case, and the procuring and pre
paring the necessary documents in
support of a claim, or acting as coun
sel before the legislature or some
committee appointed by that body.
Persons may, no doubt, be employed
to conduct an application to the legis
lature, as well as to conduct a suit at
law; and may contract for and receive
pay for their services in preparing
documents, collecting evidence, mak
ing statements of facts, or preparing
and making oral or written argu
ments, provided all these are used or
designed to be used before the legis
lature or some committee thereof as
a body; but they cannot, with pro
priety, be employed to exert their
personal influence with individual
members, or to labor in any form
privately with such members out of
the legislative halls. Whatever is
laid before the legislature in writing,
or spoken openly or publicly in its
presence or that of a committee, if
false in fact, may be disproved, or if
wrong in argument may be refuted;
but that which is whispered into the
private ear of individual members is
frequently beyond the reach of cor
rection. The point of objection in
this class of cases then is
,
the per
sonal and private nature o
f
the ser
vices to be rendered.’
“In Fuller v. Dame, cited above,
Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the well
established right to contract and pay
for professional services when the
promisee is to act as attorney and
counsel, but remarks that “the fact
appearing that persons do so act pre
vents any injurious effects from such
proceeding. Such counsel is consid
ered a
s standing in the place o
f
his
principal, and his arguments and rep
resentations are weighed and consid
ered accordingly.” He also admits
the right o
f
disinterested persons to
volunteer advice; as when a person
is about to make a will, one may
represent to him the propriety and
expediency o
f making a bequest to a
particular person; and so may one
volunteer advice to another to marry
another person; but a promise to pay
for such service is void.
“Applying the principles stated
in these cases to the bills which the
town voted to pay, it is manifest that
some o
f
the money was expended for
objects that are contrary to public
policy, and o
f
a most reprehensible
character, and which could not, there
fore, form a legal consideration for a
contract.”
See, further, a full discussion o
f
the
same subject, and reaching the same
conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co., 16 How. 314. A sale of a town
office, though by the town itself, can
not be the consideration for a con
tract. Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H.
517 ; see Carleton v. Whitcher, 5
N
.
H
.
196; Eddy v. Capron, 4 R
. I.
394. A town cannot incur expenses
in opposing before a legislative com
mittee a division of the territorial
limits : Westbrook v. Deering, 63
Me. 231; o
r
to pay the expenses o
f
a committee to procure the annexa
tion of the town to another : Minot
v
. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1
;
s. c.
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The Constitution of Michigan" provides that no new bill [*139]
shall be introduced into either house of the legislature
after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired;" and the
Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in
either house within the last ten days of the session.” The purpose
of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation,
and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that
result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the
affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always
be done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of
adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority,
put immediately upon their passage.”
17 Am. Rep. 52. And any contract
the purpose of which is to influence a
public officer or body to favor persons
in the performance of his public duty
is void, on grounds of public policy.
Ordineal v. Barry, 24 Miss. 9. The
same general principle will be found
applied in the following cases :
Swayze v. Hull, 8 N. J. 54; Wood
v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Hatzfield v.
Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Gil v. Davis,
12 La. Ann. 219; Powers v. Skinner,
34 Vt. 274; Frankfort v. Winterport,
54 Me. 250 ; Rose v. Lonax, 21 Barb.
361 ; Devlin v. Brady, 32 Barb. 518.
A contract to assist by money and
influence to secure the election of a
candidate to a public office in consid
eration of a share of its emoluments,
in the event of election, is void as
opposed to public policy, and if vol
untarily rescinded by the parties a
recovery cannot be had of the moneys
advanced under it
.
Martin v. Wade,
37 Cal. 168. ‘So is a contract to
resign a
n
office that another may be
appointed. Eddy v. Capron, 4 R
. I.
394.
1 Art. 4
,
§ 28.
* Art. 3
,
§ 26. In Arkansas there
is a similar provision, limiting the
time to three days. Art. 5
,
§ 24.
* A practice has sprung up of
evading these constitutional provi
sions b
y introducing a new bill after
the time has expired when it may
constitutionally be done, as an amend
ment to some pending bill, the whole
o
f which, except the enacting clause,
is struck out to make way for it
.
Thus, the member who thinks he
may possibly have occasion for the
introduction of a new bill after the con
stitutional period has expired, takes
care to introduce sham bills in due
season which he can use as stocks to
graft upon, and which he uses irre
spective o
f
their character o
r
contents.
The sham bill is perhaps a bill to
incorporate the city o
f
Siam. One o
f
the member's constituents applies to
him for legislative permission to con
struct a dam across the Wild Cat
River. Forthwith, by amendment,
the bill entitled a bill to incorporate
the city o
f
Siam has a
ll
after the
enacting clause stricken out, and it is
made to provide, as its sole object,
that John Doe may construct a dam
across the Wild Cat. With this title
and in this form it is passed ; but the
house then considerately amends the
title to correspond with the purpose
o
f
the bill, and the law is passed, and
the constitution at the same time
saved'. This trick is so transparent,
and so clearly in violation o
f
the con
stitution, and the evidence at the
same time is so fully spread upon
the record, that it is a matter o
f sur
prise to find it so often resorted to.
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For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several
of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three
several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed
thereon ; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other
specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense
with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of it
s pro
ceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not;
but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided by
the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the gen
eral rule which presumes the proper discharge o
f
official
[*140] duty.' * In the reading of a bill, it seems to be sufficient
to read the written document that is adopted b
y
the two
houses; even though something else becomes law in consequence
o
f
its passage, and b
y
reason o
f being referred to in it.” Thus, a
statute which incorporated a military company by reference to
its constitution and by-laws, was held valid notwithstanding the
constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the force o
f
law
by it
s passage, were not read in the two houses as a part o
f
it.”
* Supervisors o
f Schuyler Co. v.
People, 25 Ill. 181; Miller v. State,
3 Ohio, N
.
s. 480. In People v.
Starne, 35 Ill. 121, it is said the
courts should not enforce a legisla
tive act unless there is record evi
dence, from the journals o
f
the two
houses, that every material require
ment of the constitution has been
satisfied. And see Ryan v. Lynch,
68 Ill. 160. The clause in the Con
stitution o
f
Ohio is
: “Every bill
shall be fully and distinctly read on
three different days, unless, in case
o
f urgency, three-fourths o
f
the house
in which it shall be pending shall dis
pense with this rule; ” and in Miller
v
. State, 3 Ohio, N
.
S
. 481, and Pim
v
. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N
.
s. 178, this
provision was held to be merely di
rectory. The distinctness with which
any bill must be read cannot possibly
be defined by any law; and it must al
ways, from the necessity o
f
the case,
rest with the house to determine finally
whether in this particular the consti
tution has been complied with o
r not;
but the rule respecting three several
readings on different days is specific,
and capable o
f being precisely com
plied with, and we do not see how,
even under the rules applied to stat
utes, it can be regarded as directory
merely, provided it has a purpose
beyond the mere regular and orderly
transaction of business. That it has
such a purpose, that it is designed to
prevent hasty and improvident legis
lation, and is therefore not a mere
rule o
f order, but one o
f protection
to the public interests and to the
citizens a
t large, is very clear; and
independent o
f
the question whether
definite constitutional principles can
b
e dispensed with in any case on the
ground o
f
their being merely direc
tory, we cannot see how this can be
treated a
s any thing but mandatory.
See People v. Campbell, 8 Ill. 466;
McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424.
* Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala.
466.
* Bibb County Loan Association
v
. Richards, 21 Geo. 592. And see
Pulford v. Fire Department, 31 Mich.
458.
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But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose, to which
this ruling would be applicable.
It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States that,
on the final passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered
on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important
purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as
to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation; and also in
furnishing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has
been passed by the requisite majority or not. “The constitution
prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the
requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office
of the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and
authenticate and preserve the same. It must appear on the face
of the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority.
These directions are a
ll clearly imperative. They are
* expressly enjoined b
y
the fundamental law as matters [*141]
o
f substance, and cannot be dispensed with b
y
the legis
lature.” "
For the vote required in the passage of any particular law
the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A sim
ple majority o
f
a quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution
establishes some other rule; and where, b
y
the constitution, a two
thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage o
f any
particular class o
f bills, two-thirds or three-fourths o
f
a quorum
will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate
that this proportion o
f
all the members, or o
f
all those elected, is
intended.”
* Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297;
Supervisors o
f Schuyler Co. v. People,
25 Ill. 183; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill.
160; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22
Mich. 104; People v. Commissioners
o
f Highways, 54 N
.
Y
.
276. For a
peculiar case see Division o
f
Howard
County, 15 Kan. 194. There have
been cases, a
s
we happen to know, in
which several bills have been put on
their passage together, the yeas and
nays being once called for them all,
though the journal is made to state
falsely a separate vote on each. We
need hardly say that this is a mani
fest violation o
f
the constitution,
which requires separate action in
every case, and that when resorted
to, it is usually for the purpose o
f
avoiding another provision o
f
the
constitution which seeks to preclude
“ log-rolling ” legislation, b
y
forbid
ding the incorporation o
f
distinct
measures in one and the same statute.
* Southworth v. Palmyra & Jack
sonburg R
.
R
. Co., 2 Mich. 287;
State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303. By
most o
f
the constitutions either all
the laws, o
r
laws on some particular
subjects, are required to be adopted
b
y
a majority vote o
r
some other pro
portion o
f “all the members elected,”
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The Title of a Statute.
The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and
although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law
makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect
ambiguous or doubtful," yet it could not enlarge or restrain the
provisions of the act itself,” and the latter might therefore be
good when that and the title were in conflict. The reason for this
was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when after
wards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by
the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted
but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk's
understanding of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than
that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as
furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles
to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come
to possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional pro
visions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate
the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to
control, and exclude everything from effect and operation as law
which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the
purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the
note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great
change in the law.”
or of “the whole representation.”
These and similar phrases require all
the members to be taken into account
whether present or not. Where a
majority of all the members elected is
required in the passage of a law, an
ineligible person is not on that ac
count to be excluded in the count.
Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal.
314.
* United States v. Palmer, 3
Wheat. 610 ; Burgett v. Burgett,
1 Ohio, 480; Mundt v. Sheboygan,
&c. R. R. Co., 31 Wis. 451; Eastman
v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen v.
Barrett, 5 Call, 195; Garrigas v. Board
of Com’rs, 39 Ind. 66. See Dwarris
on Statutes, 502.
* Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall.
107. Compare United States v. Union
Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. Rep. 72.
* The Constitutions of Minnesota,
Kansas, Maryland, Kentucky, Ne
braska, and Ohio, provide that “no
law shall embrace more than one
subject, which shall be expressed in
its title.” Those of Michigan, New
Jersey, Louisiana, and Texas are
similar, substituting the word object
for subject. The Constitutions of
South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee,
Arkansas, and California contain sim
ilar provisions. The Constitution of
New Jersey provides that, “to avoid
improper influences which may result
from intermixing in one and the same
act such things as have no proper
relation to each other, every law shall
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* In considering these provisions it is important to [*142]
regard, – -
1. The evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of New
Jersey refers to these as “the improper influences which may
result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as
have no proper relation to each other.” In the language of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the former practice:
“The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents. Im
portant general principles were found placed in acts private or
local in their operation; provisions concerning matters of practice
or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in the same
statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result of which
was that on many important subjects the statute law had become
almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been to examine
or act under it can well testify. To prevent any further accu
mulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional
provision under consideration.” "
embrace but one object, and that shall
be expressed in the title.” The Con
stitution of Missouri contains the
following provision : “No bill (ex
cept general appropriation bills, which
may embrace the various subjects and
accounts for and on account of which
moneys are appropriated, and except
bills passed under the third sub
division of section 44 of this article)
shall contain more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in it
s
title.” The exception secondly re
ferred to is to bills for free public
school purposes. The Constitutions
o
f Indiana, Oregon, and Iowa provide
that “every act shall embrace but
one subject, and matters properly
connected there with, which subject
shall be expressed in the title. But
if any subject shall be embraced in an
act which shall not be expressed in
the title, such act shall be void only
as to so much thereof as shall not be
expressed in the title.” The Consti
tution o
f
Nevada provides that “every
law enacted by the legislature shall
embrace but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be briefly expressed in
The Supreme Court of Michigan
the title.” The Constitutions of New
York and Wisconsin provide that “no
private o
r
local bill which may be
passed b
y
the legislature shall embrace
more than one subject, and that shall
b
e expressed in the title.” The Con
stitution o
f
Illinois is similar to that
o
f Ohio, with the addition o
f
the sav
ing clause found in the Constitution
o
f
Indiana. The provision in the
Constitution o
f
Colorado is similar to
that o
f
Missouri. In Pennsylvania
the provision is that “no bill except
general appropriation bills shall be
passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly ex
pressed in it
s
title.” Const. of 1853.
Whether the word object is to have
any different construction from the
word subject, as used in these provi
sions, is a question which may some
time require discussion; but as it is
evidently employed for precisely the
same purpose, it would seem that it
ought not to have. Compare Hingle
v
. State, 24 Ind. 28, and People v.
Lawrence, 36 Barb. 192.
1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann.
298. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark.
298. -
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say: “The history and purpose of this constitutional pro
[*143] vision are too well understood to require any "elucidation
at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one
bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary con
nection with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all,
and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which
could succeed upon it
s
own merits, was one both corruptive o
f
the
legislator and dangerous to the State. It was scarcely more so,
however, than another practice, also intended to b
e
remedied b
y
this provision, b
y which, through dexterous management, clauses
were inserted in bills o
f
which the titles gave no intimation, and
their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members
were not generally aware o
f
their intention and effect. There was
no design b
y
this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws
unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus
multiplying their number; but the framers o
f
the constitution
meant to put an end to legislation o
f
the vicious character referred
to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to re
quire that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon
it
s
own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied
o
f
it
s design when required to pass upon it.”" The Court of
Appeals o
f
New York declare the object of this provision to be
“that neither the members of the legislature nor the people should
b
e
misled b
y
the title.” The Supreme Court of Iowa say: “The
intent o
f
this provision o
f
the constitution was, to prevent the
union, in the same act, o
f incongruous matters, and o
f objects
* People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
494. And see Board of Supervisors
v
. Heenan, 2 Minn. 336; Davis v.
Bank o
f Fulton, 31 Geo. 69; St. Louis
v
. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. The Constitu
tion o
f Georgia provided that “no
law o
r
ordinance shall pass containing
any matter different from what is
expressed in the title thereof.” In
Mayor, &c. o
f
Savannah v. State,
4 Geo. 38, Lumpkin, J., says: “I
would observe that the traditionary
history o
f
this clause is that it was
inserted in the constitution o
f
1798
at the instance of General James
Jackson, and that its necessity was
suggested by the Yazoo act. That
memorable measure o
f
the 17th of
January, 1795, as is well known, was
smuggled through the legislature
under the caption o
f
a
n act “for the
payment o
f
the late State troops,”
and a declaration in its title o
f
the
right of the State to the unappro
priated territory thereof “for the pro
tection and support o
f
the frontier
settlements.” The Yazoo act made
a large grant o
f
lands to a company
o
f speculators. It constituted a prom
inent subject o
f controversy in State
politics for many years.
* Sun Mutual Insurance Co. p
.
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 8 N
.
Y
.
253.
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having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed
to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature
embraced in a bill whose title expressed another.”” And similar
expressions will be found in many other reported cases.” It may
therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of these provi
sions was: first, to prevent hodge-podge, or “log-rolling” legis
lation ; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
* gave no intimation, and which might therefore be over- [* 144]
looked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,
third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire.
-
2. The particularity required in stating the object. The gen
eral purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has
but one general object, which is fairly indicated by it
s
title. To
require every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishment o
f
this general object to be provided for b
y
a
separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreason
able, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has
accordingly been held that the title o
f “an act to establish a
police government for the city o
f Detroit,” was not objectionable
for its generality, and that al
l
matters properly connected with
the establishment and efficiency o
f
such a government, including
taxation for it
s support, and courts for the examination and trial
o
f offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under
this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, “the
police government o
f
a city could not be organized without a dis
tinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it
,
and these
could not be passed until a multitude o
f
other statutes had taken
the same duties from other officers before performing them. And
these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be,
* State v. County Judge of Davis
Co., 2 Iowa, 282. See State v. Sil
ver, 9 Nev. 227.
* See Conner v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis v.
State, 7 Md. 151. The Supreme
Court of Indiana also understand the
provision in the constitution o
f
that
State to be designed, among other
things, to assist in the codification o
f
the laws. Indiana Central Railroad
Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle v.
State, 24 Ind. 28. See People v. In
stitution, &c., 71 Ill. 229.
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would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent diffi
culty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such
narrow bounds.” 1 The generality of a title is therefore no objec
tion to it
,
so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongru
ous in itself, and which b
y
n
o fair intendment can be considered
a
s having a necessary o
r proper connection.” The legislature must
determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the
object o
f
a statute, and how much particularity shall be em
ployed in the title in defining it.”
1 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
495. See also Morford v. Unger,
8 Iowa, 82, and Whiting v. Mount
Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright p.
McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223; Mayor, &c.
o
f Annapolis v. State, 30 Ma. 112 ;
State v
. Union, 33 N
. J. 350 ; Hum
boldt County v. Churchill Co. Com
missioners, 6 Nev. 30; State v. Silver,
9 Nev. 227.
* Indiana Central Railroad Co. v.
Potts, 7 Ind. 681; People v. Briggs,
5
0 N
.
Y. 553; People v. Wands, 23
Mich. 385; Washington Co. v. Frank
lin R
.
R
. Co., 34 Md. 159.
* Woodson v. Murdock, 22 Wall.
351. In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195,
an act came under consideration, the
title to which was, “An act to amend
the first section of an act entitled “An
act concerning licenses to vend foreign
merchandise, to exhibit any caravan,
menagerie, circus, rope and wire danc
ing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,”
approved June 15, 1852, and for the
encouragement o
f agriculture, and
concerning the licensing o
f
stock and
exchange brokers.” It was held that
the subject o
f
the act was licenses,
and that it was not unconstitutional
a
s containing more than one subject.
But it was held also that, as the
licenses which it authorized and re
quired were specified in the title, the
act could embrace no others, and
consequently a provision in the act
requiring concerts to be licensed was
void. In State v. County Judge of
Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in
One thing, however, is very
question was entitled “An act in
relation to certain State roads therein
named.” It contained sixty-six sec
tions, in which it established some
forty-six roads, vacated some, and
provided for the re-location o
f
others.
The court sustained the act. “The
object o
f
a
n act may be broader o
r
narrower, more o
r
less extensive; and
the broader it is
,
the more particulars
will it embrace. . . . There is un
doubtedly great objection to uniting
so many particulars in one act, but so
long as they are o
f
the same nature,
and come legitimately under one gen
eral determination or object, we cannot
say that the act is unconstitutional.”
P
.
284. Upon this subject see Indiana
Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind.
684, where it is considered at length.
Also Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N
.
Y
.
116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304;
People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182;
Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Penn.
St. 433. An act entitled “An act
fixing the time and mode of electing
State printer, defining his duties, fix
ing compensation, and repealing all
laws coming in conflict with this act,”
was sustained in Walker v. Dunham,
1
7 Ind. 483. In the State v. Young,
4
7 Ind. 150, the somewhat strict ruling
was made, that provisions punishing
intoxication could not be embraced in
a
n
act entitled “To regulate the sale
o
f intoxicating liquors.” In Kurtz
v
. People, 33 Mich. 279, the constitu
tional provision is said to be “a very
wise and wholesome provision, in
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* plain; that the use of the words “other purposes,” which [*145]
has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a
view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with the
main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any
avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme
Court of New York in a case where these words had been made
use of in the title to a local bill: “The words “for other purposes’
must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and
amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional require
ment. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them
can be brought in by their aid.” "
3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a
given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subject
matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a
repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding
the title is silent on that subject.” So an act to incorpo
rate a railroad" company, it has been held, may authorize [*146]
counties to subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the
construction of the road.”
tended to prevent legislators from
being entrapped into the careless pas
sage of bills on matters foreign to the
ostensible purpose of the statute as
entitled. But it is not designed to
require the body of the bill to be a
mere repetition of the title. Neither
is it intended to prevent including in
the bill such means as are reasonably
adapted to secure the objects indi
cated by the title.” And see Mor
ton v. The Controller, 4 S. C. N. s.
430.
1 Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill and
Beekman Plank Road Co., 22 Barb.
642. See, to the same effect, Ryer
son v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis
v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. An act entitled
“An act to repeal certain acts therein
named,” is void. People v. Mellen,
32 Ill. 181. An act, having for its
sole object to legalize certain proceed
ings of the Common Council of Janes
ville, but entitled merely “An act to
legalize and authorize the assessment
of street improvements and assess
So an act to incorporate the Firemen's
ments,” was held not to express the
subject, because failing to specify the
locality. Durkee v. Janesville, 26
Wis. 697.
* Gabbert p. Railroad Co., 11 Ind.
365. The constitution under which
this decision was made required the
law to contain but one subject, and
matters properly connected there with :
but the same decision was made under
the New York Constitution, which
omits the words here italicized; and
it may well be doubted whether the
legal effect of the provision is varied
by the addition of those words. See
Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.
* Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 Ill.
181. So a provision for the costs on
appeal from a justice, is properly con
nected with the subject of an act
entitled “of the election and qualifi
cation of justices of the peace, and
defining their jurisdiction, powers, and
duties in civil cases.” Robinson v.
Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311.
12
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Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title pro
visions for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance
companies, at the place of its location, for the benefit of the corpo
ration." So an act to provide a homestead for widows and children
was held valid, though what it provided for was the pecuniary
means sufficient to purchase a homestead.” So an act “to regulate
proceedings in the county court” was held to properly embrace
a provision giving an appeal to the District Court, and regulating
the proceedings therein on the appeal.” So an act entitled “An act
for the more uniform doing of township business” may properly
provide for the organization of townships.” So it is held that the
changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly
connected with the subject of forming new counties out of those
existing.” So a provision for the organization and sitting of courts
in new counties is properly connected with the subject of the
formation of such counties, and may be included in “an act to
authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county
boundaries.”" Many other cases are referred to in the note which
will further illustrate the views of the courts upon this subject.
There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional
provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a con
struction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of
the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted."
* Firemen's Association v. Louns
bury, 21 Ill. 511.
* Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La.
Ann. 329.
* Murphey v. Menard, 11 Tex.
673.
* Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295.
* Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind.
299. And see Duncombe v. Prindle,
12 Iowa, 1.
* Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197.
In this case, and also in State v.
Bowers, 14 Ind. 198, it was held that
if the title to an original act is suffi
cient to embrace the matters covered
by the provisions of an act amenda
tory thereof, it is unnecessary to
inquire whether the title of an amend
atory act would, of itself, be sufficient.
And see Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
* Green v. Mayor, &c., R. M.
Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6
Geo. 21; Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36;
Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill v.
Commissioners, 22 Geo. 203; Jones
v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham
v. Holeman, 26 Geo. 182; Allen v.
Tison, 50 Geo. 374; Ex parte Conner,
51 Geo. 571; Brieswick v. Mayor, &c.
of Brunswick, 51 Geo. 639; People
v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58 ; Williams
v. People, 24 N. Y. 405; People v.
Allen, 42 N. Y. 404; Huber v. People,
49 N. Y. 132; People v. Rochester,
50 N. Y. 525; Wenzler v. People, 58
N. Y. 516; People v. Dudley, 58
N. Y. 323; People v. Quigg, 59
N. Y. 83 ; Harris v. People, 59 N. Y.
599 ; In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398;
People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507 ;
Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind.
217 ; Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100;
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•4. The effect if the title embrace more than one object. [*147]
Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision
Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gillespie
v. State, 9 Ind. 380; Mewherter v.
Price, 11 Ind. 199; Reed v. State,
12 Ind. 641; Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind.
250; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239; Stur
geon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer
v. State, 22 Ind. 461; Central Plank
Road Co. v. Hannaman, 22 Ind. 484;
Garrigus v. Board of Commissioners,
39 Ind. 66 ; McCaslin v. State, 44
Ind. 151 ; Williams v. State, 48 Ind.
306 ; Jackson v. Reeves, 53 Ind. 231;
Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20;
Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury,
21 Ill. 511; Ottowa v. People, 48 Ill.
233; Prescott v. City of Chicago, 60
Ill. 121 ; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill.
423; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c.
R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State v.
Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Chiles v. Drake,
2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Phillips v. Bridge
Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 222; Johnson v. Hig
gins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; Louisville,
&c. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 165;
Phillips v. Covington, &c. Co., 2 Met.
(Ky.) 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met.
(Ky.) 72; Hind v. Rice, 10 Bush,
528 ; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex.
184 ; Battle v. Howard, 13 Tex. 345;
Robinson v. State, 15 Tex. 311 ;
Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49 ;
Ex parte Hogg, 36 Tex. 14; State
v. Shadle, 41 Tex. 404; State v.
McCracken, 42 Tex. 383 ; Laefon
v. Dufoe, 9 La. Ann. 329; State v.
Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722 ; Bosier
v. Steele, 13 La. Ann. 433 ; Williams
v. Payson, 14 La Ann. 7: Wisners v.
Monroe, 25 La. Ann. 598; Whited
v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568 ; State
v. Lafayette County Court, 41 Mo.
221; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495 ;
Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; State
v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341 ; Stuart v. Kin
sella, 14 Minn. 524 ; Mills v. Charle
ton, 29 Wis. 400; Evans v. Sharpe,
29 Wis. 564; Single v. Supervisors
of Marathon, 38 Wis. 363; People v.
McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; Smails v.
White, 4 Neb. 353; Cutlip v. The
Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588; Shields r.
Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74 ; Tuscaloosa
Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9;
Weaver v. Lapsely, 43 Ala. 224;
Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234; Lock
hart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579 ; Walker v.
State, 49 Ala. 329; Simpson v.
Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Pope v. Phi
fer, 3 Heisk. 682 ; Cannon v. Mathes,
8 Heisk. 504; State v. Newark, 34
N. J. 264; Gifford v. R. R. Co., 10 .
N. J. Eq. 171 : Keller v. State, 11
Md. 525 ; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md.
184; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269;
People v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349; .
People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44;
Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich. 279; Dor
sey's Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 192; Alle
gheny County Home's Case, 77 Penn.
St. 77 ; Morton v. Comptroller-Gen
eral, 4 S. C. N. s. 430; State v.
Gurney, 4 S. C. N. s. 520; Norman
v. Curry, 27 Ark. 440; Division of
Howard County, 15 Kan. 194; Com
monwealth v. Drewey, 15 Grat. 1.
In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa,
104, an act entitled “An act for
revising and consolidating the laws
incorporating the city of Dubuque,
and to establish a city court therein,”
was held to express by its title but
one object, which was, the revising
and consolidating the laws incorporat
ing the city; and the city court, not
being an unusual tribunal in such a
municipality, might be provided for
by the act, whether mentioned in the
title or not. “An act to enable the
supervisors of the city and county of
New York to raise money by tax,”
provided for raising money to pay
judgments then existing, and also.
any thereafter to be recovered; and
it also contained the further pro
vision, that whenever the controller
of the city should have reason to
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[* 148] is limited * in it
s operation to private and local bills, it
might be held that an act was not void for embracing two
o
r
more objects which were indicated b
y
it
s title, provided one
o
f
them only was of a private and local nature. It has been held in
New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general
provisions also ;" and if they may constitutionally be embraced in
the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced
in the title. But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the
act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the consti
tution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated
believe that any judgment then o
f
record or thereafter obtained had
been obtained b
y
collusion, o
r
was
founded in fraud, he should take the
proper and necessary means to open
and reverse the same, &c. This pro
vision was held constitutional, as
properly connected with the subject
indicated by the title, and necessary
to confine the payments o
f
the tax to
the objects for which the moneys
were intended to be raised. Sharp
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 31 Barb.
572. In O’Leary v. Cook Co., 28 Ill.
534, it was held that a clause in an
act incorporating a college, prohibit
ing the sale o
f
ardent spirits within
a distance o
f
four miles, was so ger
mane to the primary object o
f
the
charter as to be properly included
within it
. By the first section of
“an act for the relief of the creditors
o
f
the Lockport and Niagara Falls
Railroad Company,” it was made the
duty o
f
the president o
f
the corpora
tion, o
r
one o
f
the directors to be
appointed b
y
the president, to adver
tise and sell the real and personal
estate, including the franchise o
f
the
company, a
t public auction to the
highest bidder. It was then declared
that the sale should be absolute, and
that it should vest in the purchaser
o
r purchasers o
f
the property, real o
r
personal, o
f
the company, a
ll
the
franchise, rights, and privileges o
f
the corporation, as fully and as abso
lutely as the same were then pos
sessed b
y
the company. The money
arising from the sale, after paying
costs, was to be applied, first, to the
payment o
f
a certain judgment, and
then to other liens according to pri
ority ; and the surplus, if any, was
to be divided ratably among the other
creditors, and then if there should be
a
n overplus, it was to be divided
ratably among the then stockholders.
By the second section of the act, it
was declared that the purchaser o
r
purchasers should have the right to
sell and distribute stock to the full
amount which was authorized b
y
the
act o
f incorporation, and the several
amendments thereto ; and to appoint
an election, choose directors, and
organize a corporation anew, with
the same powers as the existing
company. There was then a proviso,
that nothing in the act should impair
o
r
affect the subscriptions for new
stock, or the obligations o
r
liabilities
o
f
the company which had been made
or incurred in the extension of the
road from Lockport to Rochester, &c.
The whole act was held to be consti
tutional. Mosier v. Hilton, 15 Barb.
657. And see Mills v. Charleton, 29
Wis. 400, − a very liberal case; Er
linger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; State v.
Newark, 34 N
. J. 236; Smith v. Com
monwealth, 8 Bush, 108; State v.
St Louis Cathedral, 23 La. Ann. 720 ;
Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Neif
ing v. Pontiac, 56 Ill. 172.
1 People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58.
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as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing
between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and
void as to the other.”
5. The effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the
act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can
stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not
indicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions,
it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule; but
the declaration was unnecessary; as the general rule, that so much
of the act as is not in conflict with the constitution must be sus
tained, would have required the same declaration from the courts.
If by striking from the act all that relates to the object not
indicated by the title, that which is left is complete in itself,
sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of
that which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitu
tional. *The principal questions in each case will there- [*149]
fore be, whether the act is in truth broader than the title ;
and if so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately
connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the
act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a complete and
sensible enactment which is capable of being executed.”
As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as
they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as
to preclude many matters being included in the act which might
with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with
the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded
because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The
courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with
no dispensing power; the constitution has made the title the
conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have
operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been
made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen
fi
t
to make it so. Thus, “an act concerning promissory notes and
bills o
f exchange ’’ provided that all promissory notes, bills o
f
* Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; rectly, to the same subject, have a
State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383. natural connection, and are not for
All the cases recognize this doctrine. eign to the subject expressed in the
* People v. Briggs, 50 N
.
Y
.
566. title.” Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met.
“None of the provisions of a statute (Ky.) 222, approved, Smith v. Com
should be regarded as unconstitutional monwealth, 8 Bush, 112. See Er
where they a
ll relate, directly o
r
indi- parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234.
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exchange, or other instruments in writing, for the payment of money,
or for the delivery of specific articles, or to convey property, or
to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be
negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their
own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the
instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and
bills of exchange; 1 though it is obvious that it would have
been easy to frame a title to the act which would have embraced
them all, and which would have been unobjectionable. I has
also been held that an act for the preservation of the Musk gon
River Improvement could not lawfully provide for the levy and
collection of tolls for the payment of the expense of constructing
the improvement, as the operation of the act was carefully limited
by it
s
title to the future.” So also it has been held that “an act
to limit the numbers o
f grand jurors, and to point out the mode o
f
their selection, defining their jurisdiction, and repealing a
ll
laws
inconsistent there with,” could not constitutionally contain pro
visions which should authorize a defendant in a criminal case, on
a trial for any offence, to be found guilty of any lesser
[* 150] offence necessarily *included therein.” These cases must
suffice upon this point; though the cases before referred
to will furnish many similar illustrations.
In al
l
we have said upon this subject we have assumed the con
stitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view o
f
the courts almost without exception. In California, however, a
different view has been taken, the court saying: “We regard this
section o
f
the constitution as merely directory; and, if we were
inclined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent our
selves to a construction which must in effect obliterate almost
every law from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy
the labor o
f
the last three years. The first legislature that met
* Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199.
See also State v. Young, 47 Ind.
150 ; Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush,
394 : Rushing v. Sebree, 12 Bush, 198;
State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524.
* Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269.
See further Weaver v. Lapsley, 43
Ala. 229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v.
Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart v. Kin
sella, 14 Minn. 524. In Cutlip v.
Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588, it was held
that if an act embraces two objects,
only one o
f
which is specified in the
title, the whole is void ; but this is
opposed to the authorities generally.
* Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gil
lespie v. State, 9 Ind. 380. See also
Indiana Cent. Railroad Co. v. Potts,
7 Ind. 681; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa,
340; State v. Lafayette Co. Court, 41
Mo. 39; People v. Denahy, 20 Mich.
349.
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under the constitution seems to have considered this section as
directory; and almost every act of that and the subsequent ses
sions would be obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous
exposition of the first legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by
every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts,
taken in connection with the fact that rights have grown up under
it
,
so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our
decision.”’’ Similar views have also been expressed in the State
o
f
Ohio.” These cases, and especially what is said by the Califor
nia court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which cannot be
kept out o
f
view in considering this subject, and which has a very
important bearing upon the precise point which these decisions
cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can
b
e looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by
the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to
b
e therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is
directory seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying
that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be con
ceded ; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority
for saying. If
,
therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced
a
t all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legislature
habitually disregard it
,
it seems to us that there is al
l
the more
urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it
.
And it
also seems to u
s that there are few evils which * can be [*151]
inflicted b
y
a strict adherence to the law, so great as that
which is done by the habitual disregard, b
y
any department o
f
the government, o
f
a plain requirement o
f
that instrument from
which it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to
b
e scrupulously observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we
need only refer here to what we have said concerning it in an
other place.”
Amendatory Statute8.
It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to
provide by their constitutions, that “no act shall ever be revised
o
r
amended by mere reference to its title ; but the act revised o
r
' Washington v. Murray, 4 Cal. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N
.
s.
388. 177.
* Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N
.
s. * Ante, p
.
*74.
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section amended shall be set forth and published at full length.””
Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean
that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and
published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only
that it shall be set forth and published at full length as amended
or revised ?. Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the
purpose of the provision may throw some light. “The mischief
designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory stat
utes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were some
times deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the
difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison
failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An
amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to
substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was
only referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mis
lead the careless as to it
s effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes
drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion
was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely pro
hibited such legislation.”? If this is a correct view of the pur
pose o
f
the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to
it
s accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the
law as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old
law as will show for what the new law is substituted.
[*152] Nevertheless, * it has been decided in Louisiana that the
constitution requires the old law to be set forth and pub
1 This is the provision as it is
found in the Constitutions o
f Indiana,
Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.
In Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, Louis
iana, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Mary
land there are provisions o
f
similar
import. In Tennessee the provision
is : “All acts which revive, repeal,
o
r
amend former laws, shall recite, in
their caption o
r otherwise, the title o
r
substance o
f
the law repealed, revived,
o
r
amended.” Art. 1
,
§ 17. The
provision in Nebraska (Const... o
f
1875) is peculiar. “No law shall be
amended unless the new act contains
the section o
r
sections so amended,
and the section or sections so amended
shall be repealed.” Art. 3
,
§ 11.
In Texas it appears to be held that
the legislature may repeal a definite
portion o
f
a section without the re
enactment o
f
the section with such por
tion omitted. Chambers v. State, 25
Tex. 307. But quare of this. Any
portion o
f
a section amended which
is not contained in the amendatory
section as set forth and published is
repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis.
631. Further on this subject see
Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194;
People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388.
* People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 497.
See Mok v. Detroit, &c. Association,
30 Mich. 511.
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lished;" and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their
own constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the deci
sions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed
them as precedents.” It is believed, however, that the general
understanding of the provision in question is different, and that
it is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section
revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended,
and that any thing more only tends to render the statute unneces
sarily cumbrous.” It should be observed that statutes which
amend others by implication are not within this provision ; and
it is not essential that they even refer to the acts or sections
which by implication they amend.” But repeals by implication
are not favored; and the repugnancy between two statutes should
be very clear to warrant a court in holding that the later in time
repeals the other, when it does not in terms purport to do so.”
This rule has peculiar force in the case of laws of special and
local application, which are never to be deemed repealed by
general legislation except upon the most unequivocal manifesta
tion of intent to that effect.”
1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann.
297; Heirs of Duverge v. Salter, 5
La. Ann. 94. Contra, Shields v. Ben
nett, 8 W. Va. 74.
* Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind.
327; Rogers v. State, 6 Ind. 31.
These cases were overruled in Green
castle, &c. Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382.
* See Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v.
Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritch
ard, 21 Mich. 236; People v. Mc
Callum, 1 Neb. 182; State v. Draper,
47 Mo. 29; Booneville v. Trigg, 46
Mo. 288. Under such a constitutional
provision where a statute simply re
peals others, it is not necessary to set
them out. Falconer v. Robinson, 46
Ala. 340. Compare Bird v. Wasco
County, 3 Oreg. 282.
* Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41 ;
Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Peo
ple v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Leh
man v. McBride, 15 Ohio, N. s. 593.
* See cases cited in last note;
also Naylor v. Field, 29 N. J. 287;
State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney
General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 525; Dodge
v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 177; Hirn v.
State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 20; New Orleans
v. Southern Bank, 15 La. Ann. 89;
Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Water
Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364;
Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis
v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. The
Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; Somerset and
Stoystown Road, 74 Penn. St. 61;
McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; State
v. Cain, 8 W. Va. 720; Fleischner v.
Chadwick, 5 Oreg. 152; Covington v.
East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Iverson v.
State, 52 Ala. 170; Gohen v. Texas
Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 346;
State v. Commissioners, 37 N. J. 240;
Attorney-General v. Railroad Com
panies, 35 Wis. 425; Rounds v.
Waymart, 81 Penn. St. 395; Hender
son's Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652.
* Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, N. s. 607;
Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio, N. s.
472; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83;
Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494;
Oleson v. Green Bay, &c. R. R. Co.,
36 Wis. 383; Covington v. East St.
Louis, 78 Ill. 548.
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It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be
repealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause
permitting it was inserted in the statute itself; 1 but this rule
did not apply to repeals by implication,” and it is possibly not
recognized in this country at all, except where it is incorporated
in the State constitution.”
Signing of Bills.
When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the
signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional re
quirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be dis
pensed with ; * though, in the absence of any such requirement,
it would seem not to be essential.” And if
,
b
y
the con
[*153}stitution of * the State, the governor is a component part
o
f
the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for
his approval.
Approval o
f
Laws.
The qualified veto power o
f
the governor is regulated b
y
the
constitutions o
f
those States which allow it
,
and little need be
said here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for
information concerning them. It has been held that if the gov
ernor, b
y
statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the ad
journment o
f
the legislature, for the examination and approval
o
f laws, this is to be understood as a full day of twenty-four
hours, before the hour o
f
the
* Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. I. p
.
269; Sedgw. on Stat. and Const.
Law, 122; Smith on Stat. and Const.
Construction, 908.
* Ibid. And see Spencer v. State,
5 Ind. 41.
* Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41;
Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis.
513; Smith on Stat. and Const. Con
struction, 908; Mobile & Ohio Rail
road Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573.
* Moody v. State, 48 Ala. 115;
s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 28. The bill as
signed must be the same as it passed
the two houses. People v. Platt, 2
final adjournment." It has also
S
. C
.
N
.
s. 150; Legg v. Annapolis,
4
2 Md. 203; Brady v. West, 50 Miss.
68.
not mislead is to be overlooked. Peo
ple v. Supervisor o
f Onondaga, 16
Mich. 254. Compare Smith v. Hoyt,
14 Wis. 252, where the error was in
publication.
* Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22
Penn. St. 376.
* Hyde v. White, 24 Tex. 137.
The five days allowed in New Hamp
shire for the governor to return bills
which have not received his assent,
include days on which the legislature
But a clerical error that would -
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been held that, in the approval of laws, the governor is a compo
nent part of the legislature, and that unless the constitution allows
further time for the purpose, he must exercise his power of ap
proval before the two houses ad ourn, or his act will be void."
But under a provision of the Constitution of Minnesota, that the
governor may approve and sign “within three days of the adjourn
ment of the legislature any act passed during the last three days
of the session,” it has been held that Sundays were not to be
included as a part of the prescribed time; * and under the Con
stitution of New York, which provided that, “if any bill shall not
be returned by the governor within ten days, Sundays excepted,
after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law,
in like manner as if he had signed it
,
unless the legislature shall,
b
y
their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall
not b
e
a law,” it was held that the governor might sign a
bill after the adjournment, at any time within the ten days.”
The governor's approval is not complete until the bill has
is not in session, if it has not finally
adjourned. Opinions o
f Judges, 45
N
.
H
.
607. But the day of presenting
the bill to the governor should be
excluded. Opinions o
f Judges, 45
N. H. 607; Iron Mountain Co. v.
Haight, 39 Cal. 540. As to the
power o
f
the governor, derived from
long usage, to approve and sign bills
after the adjournment o
f
the legisla
ture, see Solomon v. Cartersville, 41
Geo. 157.
Neither house can, without the
consent o
f
the other, recall a bill
after its transmission to the governor.
People v. Devlin, 33 N
.
Y
.
269.
The delivery of a bill passed by
the two houses to the secretary o
f
the
commonwealth according to custom,
is not a presentation to the governor
for his approval, within the meaning
of the constitutional clause which lim
its him to a certain number o
f days
after the presentation o
f
the bill to
veto it
. Opinions o
f
the Justices, 99
Mass. 636.
1 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165.
The court also held in this case that,
notwithstanding an act purported to
have been approved before the actual
adjournment, it was competent to
show by parol evidence that the actual
approval was not until the next day.
In support of this ruling, People v.
Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was cited, where it
was held that the court might go
behind the statute-book and inquire
whether an act to which a two-thirds
vote was essential had constitutionally
passed. That, however, would not be
in direct contradiction o
f
the record,
but it would be inquiring into a fact.
concerning which the statute was
silent, and other records supplied the
needed information.
* Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366.
* People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24.
Where on the tenth day the governor
sent a bill with his objections to the
house with which it originated, but
the messenger, finding the house had
adjourned for the day, returned it to
the governor, who retained it
,
it was
held that to prevent the bill becoming
a law it should have been left with
the proper officer o
f
the house instead
o
f being retained by the governor.
Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189.
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[*154] passed beyond his control " by the constitutional and
customary mode of legislation ; and at any time prior to
that he may reconsider and retract any approval previously made."
His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in which
it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered, and
may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the constitu
tion prescribes.”
1 People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283. An
act apportioning the representatives
was passed by the legislature and
transmitted to the governor, who
signed his approval thereon by mis
take, supposing at the time that he
was subscribing one of several other
bills then lying before him, and claim
ing his official attention; his private
secretary thereupon reported the bill
to the legislature as approved, not by
the special direction of the governor,
nor with his knowledge or special
assent, but merely in his usual routine
of customary duty, the governor not
being conscious that he had placed
his signature to the bill until after
information was brought to him of
it
s having been reported approved;
whereupon he sent a message to the
speaker o
f
the house to which it was
reported, stating that it had been
inadvertently signed and not approved,
and on the same day completed a veto
message o
f
the bill which was par
tially written at the time o
f signing
his approval, and transmitted it to the
house where the bill originated, hav
ing first erased his signature and
approval. It was held that the bill
had not become a law. It had never
passed out o
f
the governor's posses
sion after it was received b
y
him until
after h
e
had erased his signature and
approval, and the court was o
f opin
ion that it did not pass from his con
trol until it had become a law b
y
the
lapse o
f
ten days under the constitu
tion, o
r by his depositing it with his
approval in the office o
f
the secretary
o
f
state. It had long been the prac
tice o
f
the governor to report, for
merly through the secretary o
f state,
but recently through his private secre
tary, to the house where bills orig
inated, his approval o
f them; but this
was only a matter o
f
formal courtesy,
and not a proceeding necessary to the
making o
r imparting vitality to the
law. By it no act could become a
law which without it would not be a
law. Had the governor returned the
bill itself to the house, with his mes
sage o
f approval, it would have passed
beyond his control, and the approval
could not have been retracted, unless
the bill had been withdrawn by con
sent o
f
the house; and the same result
would have followed his filing the bill
with the secretary o
f
state with his
approval subscribed.
The Constitution of Indiana pro
vides, art. 5
,
§ 14, that, “if any bill
shall not be returned by the governor
within three days, Sundays excepted,
after it shall have been presented to
him, it shall be a law without his
signature, unless the general adjourn
ment shall prevent its return; in
which case it shall be a law unless the
governor, within five days next after
the adjournment, shall file such bill
with his objections thereto, in the
office o
f
the secretary o
f state,” &c.
Under this provision it was held that
where the governor, on the day o
f
the
final adjournment o
f
the legislature,
and after the adjournment, filed a bill
received that day, in the office o
f
the
secretary o
f state, without approval
o
r objections thereto, it thereby be
came a law, and he could not file
objections afterwards. Tarlton v.
Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.
* A bill which, as approved and
signed, differs in important particu
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* Other Powers of the Governor. [* 155]
The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative depart
ment is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As
executive, he communicates to the two houses information con
cerning the condition of the State, and may recommend measures
to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills.
He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extraor
dinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their powers when
convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to
which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message,
and they may legislate on any subject as at the regular sessions."
An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by
the express terms of the constitution, it is provided that when
convened in extra session the legislature shall consider no subject
lars from the one signed, is no law.
Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721.
If the governor sends back a bill
which has been submitted to him,
stating that he cannot act upon it
because of some supposed informality
in its passage, this is in effect an
objection to the bill, and it can only
become a law by further action of the
legislature, even though the governor
may have been mistaken as to the
supposed informality. Birdsall v. Car
rick, 3 Nev. 154.
In practice the veto power, al
though very great and exceedingly
important in this country, is obsolete
in Great Britain, and no king now
ventures to resort to it. As the Min
istry must at all times be in accord
with the House of Commons, – except
where the responsibility is taken of
dissolving the Parliament and appeal
ing to the people, – it must follow
that any bill which the two houses
have passed must be approved by the
monarch. The approval has become
a matter of course, and the governing
power in Great Britain is substantially
in the House of Commons. 1 Bl.
Com. 184–185, and notes.
1 The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4,
§ 11, provides that the governor
“may, on extraordinary occasions,
convene the General Assembly by
proclamation, and shall state to both
houses, when assembled, the purpose
for which they have been convened.”
It was held in Morford v. Unger,
8 Iowa, 82, that the General Assem
bly, when thus convened, were not
confined in their legislation to the
purposes specified in the message.
“When lawfully convened, whether
in virtue of the provision in the
constitution or the governor's proc
lamation, it is the ‘General As
sembly’ of the State, in which the
full and exclusive legislative author
ity of the State is vested. Where
its business at such session is not
restricted by some constitutional pro
vision, the General Assembly may
enact any law at a special or extra
session that it might at a regular
session. Its powers, not being de
rived from the governor's proclama
tion, are not confined to the special
purpose for which it may have been
convened by him.”
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except that for which they were specially called together, or which
may have been submitted to them by special message of the gov
ernor."
When Acts are to take Effect.
The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took
effect from the first day of the session on which they were
[*156] passed; * * but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon
no good reason, and frequently working very serious in
justice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the
time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete
under the constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless
there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which
prescribes otherwise.” By the Constitution of Mississippi,” “no
law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be en
forced until sixty days after the passage thereof.” By the Con
stitution of Illinois,” no act of the General Assembly shall take
effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless in
case o
f emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the
1 Provisions to this effect will be
found in the Constitutions o
f Illinois,
Michigan, Missouri, and Nevada; per
haps in some others.
* 1 Lev. 91; Latless v. Holmes, 4
T. R. 660; Smith v. Smith, Mart.
(N. C.) 26; Hamlet v. Taylor, 5
Jones, L. 36. This is changed b
y
3
3
Geo. III. c. 13, by which statutes
since passed take effect from the day
when they receive the royal assent,
unless otherwise ordered therein.
* Mathews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 164;
Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312;
Branch Bank o
f
Mobile v. Murphy, 8
Ala. 119; Heard v. Heard, 8 Geo.
380; Goodsell v. Boynton, 2 Ill.
555; Dyer v. State, Meigs, 237; Par
kinson v. State, 14 Md. 184. An
early Virginia case decides that “from
and after the passing o
f
this act”
would exclude the day on which it
was passed. King v. Moore, Jeffer
son, 9. On the other hand, it is held
in some cases that a statute which
takes effect from and after its passage,
has relation to the first moment of
that day. In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653;
Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Met. (Ky.) 53;
Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641. Others
hold that it has effect from the mo
ment o
f
it
s approval b
y
the governor.
People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406. See
In re Wynne, Chase, Dec. 227.
* Art. 7
,
§ 6.
* Art. 3
,
§ 23. The intention that
an act shall take effect sooner must
b
e expressed clearly and unequivo
cally; it is not to be gathered by
intendment and inference. Wheeler
v
. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361. See Hen
drickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13.
Where an act is b
y
its express
terms to take effect after publication
in a specified newspaper, every one is
bound to take, notice o
f
this fact; and
if before such publication negotiable
paper is issued under it
,
the pur
chasers o
f
such paper can acquire no
rights thereby. McClure v. Oxford,
9
4 U
.
S
. Rep. 429; following George
v
. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72.
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preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall, by a
vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, oth
erwise direct. By the Constitution of Michigan, no public act
shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety days
from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless
the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the
members elected to each house. These and similar provisions are
designed to secure, as far as possible, the public promulgation of
the law before parties are bound to take notice of and act under
it
,
and to obviate the injustice o
f
a rule which should compel
parties a
t
their peril to know and obey a law o
f which, in the
nature o
f things, they could not possibly have heard; they give
to all parties the full constitutional period in which to become
acquainted with the terms o
f
the statutes which are passed,
except when the legislature has otherwise directed ; and no one
is bound to govern his conduct b
y
the new law until that period
has elapsed.” And the fact that, by the terms o
f
the statute,
something is to be done under it before the expiration of the con
stitutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legis
lative direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the
act itself is silent as to the period when it shall g
o
into opera
tion.”
*The Constitution of Indiana provides" that “no act [* 157]
shall take effect until the same shall have been published
and circulated in the several counties o
f
this State, by authority,
except in case o
f emergency; which emergency shall be declared
* Art. 4
,
§ 20. time it should take effect, and it was
* Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich 318, therefore held that it would not take
See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22
Pick. 430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn.
153. Compare State v. Bond, 4 Jones,
L. 9. Where a law has failed to take
effect for want of publication, all
parties are chargeable with notice o
f
that fact. Clark v. Janesville, 10
Wis. 136.
* Supervisors o
f Iroquois Co. v.
Keady, 34 Ill. 293. An act for the
removal o
f
a county seat provided
for taking the vote o
f
the electors o
f
the county upon it on the 17th of
March, 1863, at which time the legis
lature had not adjourned. It was not
expressly declared in the act a
t
what
effect until sixty days from the end o
f
the session, and a vote o
f
the electors
taken on the 17th of March was void.
See also Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich.
125; Rogers v. Wass, 6 Iowa, 405.
And it was also held in the case first
named, and in Wheeler v. Chubbuck,
16, Ill. 361, that “the direction must
be made in a clear, distinct, and un
equivocal provision, and could not be
helped out b
y
any sort o
f
intendment
o
r implication,” and that the act
must all take effect at once, and not
by piecemeal.
* Art. 4
,
§ 28.
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in the preamble, or in the body of the law.” Unless the emer
gency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take earlier
effect." But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the mode
of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in
a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the statute on
that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be held suffi
cient, notwithstanding a failure to comply with some of the direc
tory provisions of the statute on the subject of publication.”
The Constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides *
that “no general law shall be in force until published; ” thus
leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone
upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publi
cation. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be
left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however,
that a general law was to be regarded as published although
printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of
public laws as the statute of the State would require.” But an
unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the in
corporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State
paper— is no publication in the constitutional sense.” The Con
stitution of Louisiana does not in terms require laws to be pub
lished, though it provides that when they are promulgated, it
shall be in the English language. There is a provision in the
Civil Code that al
l
laws shall be considered promulgated a
t
the
place where the State gazette is published, the day after the pub
* Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7
Blackf. 415; Hendrickson v. Hen
drickson, 7 Ind. 13; Mark v. State,
1
5 Ind. 98. The legislature must
necessarily in these cases be judge o
f
the existence o
f
the emergency. Car
penter v. Montgomery, supra. The
Constitution o
f
Tennessee provides
that “No law of a general nature
shall take effect until forty days after
its passage, unless the same, o
r
the
caption, shall state that the public
welfare requires that it should take
effect sooner.” Art. 1, § 20.
* State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See
further, as to this constitutional pro
vision, Jones v. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.
* Art. 7
,
§ 21.
* Matter o
f Boyle, 9 Wis. 264.
Under this provision it has been de
cided that a law establishing a munic
ipal court in a city is a general law.
Matter o
f Boyle, supra. See Eitel v.
State, 33 Ind. 201. Also a statute
for the removal o
f
a county seat.
State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. Also a
statute incorporating a municipality,
o
r authorizing it to issue bonds in aid
o
f
a railroad. Clark v. Janesville,
1
0 Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark,
1 Iowa, 70. An inaccuracy in the
publication o
f
a statute, which does
not change its substance o
r legal effect,
will not invalidate the publication.
Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252.
* Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.
See, further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20
Wis. 50.
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lication of such laws in the State gazette, and in a
ll
other parts
o
f
the State thirty days after the publication. With these pro
visions in view, it has been held that “the promulgation of laws
is a
n
executive function. The mode o
f promulgation may be
prescribed b
y
the legislature, and differs in different countries and
a
t different times. . . . Promulgation is the extrinsic act which
gives a law, perfect in itself, executory force. Unless the law
prescribes that it shall be executory from it
s passage, o
r
from a
certain date, it is presumed to be executory only from it
s promul
gation.”” But it is competent for the legislature to provide in
a
n
act that it shall take effect from and after it
s passage; and the
act will have operation accordingly, though not published in the
official gazette.” In Pennsylvania, whose constitution then in
force also failed to require publication o
f laws, the publication
was nevertheless held to b
e necessary before the act could come
into operation; but, as the doings o
f
the legislature were public,
and the journals published regularly, it was held that every en
actment must b
e
deemed to b
e published in the sense necessary,
and the neglect to publish one in the pamphlet edition o
f
the
laws would not destroy its validity.”
* The Constitution o
f
Iowa provides that “no law of [*158]
the General Assembly, passed at a regular session, o
f
a
public nature, shall take effect until the fourth day o
f July next
after the passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall
take effect ninety days after the adjournment o
f
the General As
sembly b
y
which they were passed. If the General Assembly
shall deem any law o
f
immediate importance, they may provide
that the same shall take effect b
y publication in newspapers in
the State.” “ Under this section it is not competent for the leg
islature to confer upon the governor the discretionary power which
the constitution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the
law to take effect.”
* State v. Ellis, 17 La. Ann. 390, 432. A joint resolution of a general
392. nature requires the same publication
* State v. Judge, 14 La. Ann. 486; as any other law. State v. School
Thomas v. Scott, 23 La. Ann. 689. Board Fund, 4 Kan. 261.
In Maryland a similar conclusion is * Art. 3
,
§ 26. See Hunt v. Murray,
reached. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 17 Iowa, 313.
184. * Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey
* Peterman v. Huling, 31 Penn. St. v. Gleason, 1 Iowa, 522.
13
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[*159] * CHAPTER VII.
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACT
MENT MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
WE have now examined somewhat briefly the legislative power
of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication
are set to it
,
and also some o
f
the conditions necessary to it
s proper
and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that,
under some circumstances, it may become the duty o
f
the courts
to declare that what the legislature has assumed to enact is void,
either from want o
f
constitutional power to enact it
,
o
r
because
the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed.
In the further examination of our subject, it will be important to
consider what the circumstances are under which the courts will
feel impelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precau
tions should be observed before assuming to do so.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a leg
islative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious o
f
the
fallibility o
f
the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in
any case where h
e
can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative
and judicial are co-ordinate departments o
f
the government, o
f
equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper
functions, and cannot directly o
r indirectly, while acting within
the limits o
f
its authority, be subjected to the control or super
vision o
f
the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that
other o
f power which, by the constitution, is not conferred upon
it
.
The constitution apportions the powers o
f government, but it
does not make any one o
f
the three departments subordinate to
another, when exercising the trust committed to it." The courts
may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in
1 Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77; 1 H
.
& J. 236; Hawkins v. Governor,
Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 1 Ark. 570; People v. Governor, 29
4 Harr. 402; Whittington v. Polk, Mich. 320; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 89.
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some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in
degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare
what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must
enforce the constitution as the paramount law, whenever
a legislative * enactment comes in conflict with it." But [*160]
the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative ac
tion, but to enforce the legislative will; and it is only where they
find that the legislature has failed to keep within it
s
constitutional
limits, that they are at liberty to disregard it
s action; and in doing
so, they only d
o
what every private citizen may d
o
in respect to
the mandates o
f
the courts when the judges assume to act and to
render judgments o
r
decrees without jurisdiction. “In exercising
this high authority, the judges claim n
o judicial supremacy; they
are only the administrators o
f
the public will. If an act of the
legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any con
trol over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden
by the constitution, and because the will of the people, which is
therein declared, is paramount to that o
f
their representatives
expressed in any law.””
Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must
necessarily cover the same ground which has already been cov
ered b
y
the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety
o
f enacting the law, and they must indirectly overrule the deci
sion o
f
that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a
delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and
hesitation. It is a solemn act in any case to declare that that
body o
f
men to whom the people have committed the sovereign
function o
f making the laws for the commonwealth, have delib
erately disregarded the limitations imposed upon this delegated
authority, and usurped power which the people have been careful
to withhold ; and it is almost equally so when the act which is
adjudged to be unconstitutional appears to be chargeable rather
to careless and improvident action, or error in judgment, than to
intentional disregard o
f obligation. But the duty to do this in a
proper case, though at one time doubted, and b
y
some persons
persistently denied, it is now generally agreed that the courts
cannot properly decline, and in it
s performance they seldom fail
* Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 334 ; Blood- * Lindsay v. Commissioners, &c.,
good r. Mohawk and Hudson Railroad 2 Bay, 61.
Co., 18 Wend. 53.
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of proper support if they proceed with due caution and circum
spection, and under a proper sense as well of their own respon
sibility, as of the respect due to the action and judgment of the
law-makers."
* There are at least two cases in
American judicial history where
judges have been impeached as crim
inals for refusing to enforce uncon
stitutional enactments. One of these
— the case of Trevett v. Weedon,
decided by the Superior Court of
Rhode Island in 1786—is particularly
interesting as being the first case in
which a legislative enactment was
declared unconstitutional and void on
the ground of incompatibility with
the State constitution. Mr. Arnold,
in his History of Rhode Island, Vol. II.
c. 24, gives an account of this case;
and the printed brief in opposition to
the law, and in defence of the im
peached judges, is in possession of the
present writer. The act in question
was one which imposed a heavy pen
alty on any one who should refuse to
receive on the same terms as specie
the bills of a bank chartered by the
State, or who should in any way dis
courage the circulation of such bills.
The penalty was made collectible on
summary conviction, without jury
trial; and the act was held void on
the ground that jury trial was ex
pressly given by the colonial charter,
which then constituted the constitu
tion of the State. Although the
judges were not removed on impeach
ment, the legislature refused to re
elect them when their terms expired
at the end of the year, and supplanted
them by more pliant tools, by whose
assistance the paper money was forced
into circulation, and public and pri
vate debts extinguished by means of
it
. Concerning the other case, we
copy from the Western Law Monthly,
“Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease,” Vol.
V. p
.
3
, June, 1863: “The first ses
sion o
f
the Supreme Court [of Ohio]
under the constitution was held at
Warren, Trumbull County, on the
first Tuesday o
f June, 1803. The
State was divided into three circuits.
. . . The third circuit of the State
was composed o
f
the counties o
f
Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Co
lumbiana, and Trumbull. At this
session o
f
the legislature, Mr. Pease
was appointed President Judge of the
Third Circuit in April, 1803, and
though nearly twenty-seven years old,
h
e
was very youthful in his appear
ance. He held the office until March
4
,
1810, when he sent his resignation
to Governor Huntingdon. . . . Dur
ing his term o
f
service upon the bench
many interesting questions were pre
sented for decision, and among them
the constitutionality o
f
some portion
o
f
the act o
f 1805, defining the duties
o
f justices of the peace; and he de
cided that so much of the fifth section
a
s gave justices o
f
the peace jurisdic
tion exceeding $20, and so much o
f
the twenty-ninth section as prevented
plaintiffs from recovering costs in ac
tions commenced by original writs in
the Court o
f
Common Pleas, for sums
between $20 and $50, were repugnant
to the Constitution of the United
States and o
f
the State o
f Ohio, and
therefore null and void. . . . The
clamor and abuse to which this deci
sion gave rise was not in the least
mitigated o
r
diminished by the cir
cumstance that it was concurred in by
a majority o
f
the judges o
f
the Su
preme Court, Messrs. Huntingdon and
Tod. . . . At the session of the legis
lature o
f 1807–8, steps were taken to
impeach him and the judges o
f
the
Supreme Court who concurred with
him; but the resolutions introduced
into the house were not acted upon
during the session. But the scheme
was not abandoned. At an early day
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*I. In view of the considerations which have been sug- [*161]
gested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they
will not * decide a legislative act to be unconstitutional [*162]
by a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only,-
less than a majority of all,- but will instead postpone the argu
ment until the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper
precaution to be observed before entering upon questions so deli
cate and so important. The benefit of the wisdom and delibera
tion of every judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave.
Something more than private rights are involved ; the funda
mental law of the State is in question, as well as the correctness
of legislative action ; and considerations of courtesy, as well as
the importance of the question involved, should lead the court to
decline to act at all, where they cannot sustain the legislative
of the next session, and with almost
indecent haste, a committee was ap
pointed to inquire into the conduct of
the offending judges, and with leave
to exhibit articles of impeachment, or
report otherwise, as the facts might
justify. The committee without de
lay reported articles of impeachment
against Messrs. Pease and Tod, but
not against Huntingdon, who in the
mean time had been elected governor
of the State. . . . The articles of im
peachment were preferred by the
House of Representatives on the 23d
day of December, 1808. He was sum
moned at once to appear before the
Senate as a high court of impeach
ment, and he promptly obeyed the
summons. The managers of the pros
ecution on the part of the House
were Thomas Morris, afterwards sen
ator in Congress from Ohio, Joseph
Sharp, James Pritchard, Samuel Mar
rett, and Othniel Tooker. . . . Sev
eral days were consumed in the
investigation, but the trial resulted
in the acquittal of the respondent.”
Sketch of Hon. George Tod, August
number of same volume : “At the
session of the legislature of 1808-9,
he was impeached for concurring in
decisions made by Judge Pease, in
the counties of Trumbull and Jeffer
son, that certain provisions of the act
of the legislature, passed in 1805,
defining the duties of justices of the
peace, were in conflict with the Con
stitution of the United States and of
the State of Ohio, and therefore void.
These decisions of the courts of Com
mon Pleas and of the Supreme Court,
it was insisted, were not only an
assault upon the wisdom and dignity,
but also upon the supremacy of the
legislature, which passed the act in
question. This could not be endured;
and the popular fury against the
judges rose to a very high pitch, and
the senator from the county of Trum
bull in the legislature at that time,
Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to
soothe the offended dignity of the
members of that body, or their sym
pathizing constituents, but pressed a
contrary line of conduct. The judges
must be brought to justice, he insisted
vehemently, and be punished, so that
others might be terrified by the ex
ample, and deterred from committing
similar offences in the future. The
charges against Mr. Tod were sub
stantially the same as those against
Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was first tried,
and acquitted. The managers of the
impeachment, as well as the result,
were the same in both cases.”
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action, until a full bench has been consulted, and its deliberate
opinion is found to be against it
.
But this is a rule o
f propriety,
not o
f
constitutional obligation; and though generally adopted
and observed, each court will regulate, in it
s
own discretion, its
practice in this particular.”
* II
.
Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon
a constitutional question, and decide a statute to be in
valid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary
to the determination of the cause. “While the courts cannot
shun the discussion o
f
constitutional questions when fairly pre
sented, they will not g
o
out o
f
their way to find such topics.
They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally,
[*163]
nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more respect
ful to a co-ordinate department to discuss constitutional questions
only when that is the very lis mota.
* Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank
o
f Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118. It has been
intimated that inferior courts should
not presume to pass upon constitu
tional questions, but ought in all cases
to treat statutes as valid. Ortman v.
Greenman, 4 Mich. 291. But no tri
bunal can exercise judicial power,
unless it is to decide according to its
judgment; and it is difficult to dis
cover any principle o
f justice which
can require a magistrate to enter upon
the execution of a statute when he
believes it to be invalid, especially
when he must thereby subject himself
to prosecution, without any indemnity
in the law if it proves to be invalid.
Undoubtedly when the highest courts
in the land hesitate to declare a law
unconstitutional, and allow much
weight to the legislative judgment,
the inferior courts should be still
more reluctant to exercise this power,
and a becoming modesty would a
t
least b
e expected o
f
those judicial
officers who have not been trained to
the investigation o
f legal and consti
tutional questions. But in any case
a judge o
r justice, being free from
doubt in his own mind, and unfet
tered b
y
any judicial decision properly
binding upon him, must follow his
Thus presented and deter
own sense o
f duty upon constitutional
a
s well as upon any other questions.
See Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N
.
s. 483;
Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N
.
s. 180;
Mayberry v. Kelly, 1 Kan. 116. In
the case last cited it is said: “It is
claimed b
y
counsel for the plaintiff in
error, that the point raised by the
instruction is, that inferior courts and
ministerial officers have no right to
judge o
f
the constitutionality o
f
a
law passed b
y
a legislature. But is
this law? If so, a court created to
interpret the law must disregard the
constitution in forming its opinions.
The constitution is law, - the funda
mental law,- and must as much be
taken into consideration b
y
a justice
o
f
the peace a
s b
y
any other tribunal.
When two laws apparently conflict, it
is the duty o
f
all courts to construe
them. If the conflict is irreconcilable,
they must decide which is to prevail;
and the constitution is not an excep
tion to this rule o
f
construction. If
a law were passed in open, flagrant
violation o
f
the constitution, should a
justice o
f
the peace regard the law,
and pay n
o
attention to the constitu
tional provision? If that is his duty
in a plain case, is it less so when the
construction becomes more difficult?”
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mined, the decision carries a weight with it to which no extra
judicial disquisition is entitled.”” In any case, therefore, where
a constitutional question is raised, though it may be legitimately
presented by the record, yet if the record also presents some
other and clear ground upon which the court may rest it
s judg
ment, and thereby render the constitutional question immaterial
to the case, that course will be adopted, and the question of con
stitutional power will be left for consideration until a case arises
which cannot be disposed o
f
without considering it
,
and when
consequently a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.”
III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the consti
tutionality o
f
a
n
act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and
who has therefore no interest in defeating it
.
On this ground
it has been held that the objection that a legislative act was
unconstitutional, because divesting the rights o
f remainder-men,
against their will, could not be successfully urged by the owner
o
f
the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf
* o
f
the remainder-men themselves.” And a party who [*164]
has assented to his property being taken under a statute
cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation o
f
a pro
vision in the constitution designed for the protection o
f private
property.” The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one
complains whose rights it invades. “Prima facie, and on the
face o
f
the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that
the act is not valid; and it is only when some person attempts to
resist its operation, and calls in the aid o
f
the judicial power to
pronounce it void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the
objection o
f unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained.
Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs with well-estab
lished principles o
f
law in the conclusion that such an act is not
void, but voidable only ; and it follows, as a necessary legal infer
1 Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 287; Ire
land v. Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio, N
.
s.
373; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 277.
* Ez parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447;
Frees v. Ford, 6 N
.
Y
.
177, 178;
Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bar
ren Co. Court, 10 Bush, 564; White
v
. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; Mobile and
Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala.
73.
* Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543.
See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn.
St. 359; Antoni v. Wright, 22 Grat.
857; Marshall v. Donovon, 10 Bush,
681.
* Embury v. Conner, 3 N
.
Y
.
511;
Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Mobile
and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29
Ala. 586; Haskell v. New Bedford,
108 Mass. 208.
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ence from this position, that this ground of avoidance can be taken
advantage of by those only who have a right to question the
validity of the act, and not by strangers. To this extent only is
it necessary to go, in order to secure and protect the rights of all
persons against the unwarranted exercise of legislative power,
and to this extent only, therefore, are courts of justice called on
to interpose.””
IV. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and
void, solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or
because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political
rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is
prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the consti
tution. It is true there are some reported cases, in which judges
have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what
is here asserted; but it will generally be found, on an examination
of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and
illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon consti
tutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the
objectionable character then in question, and to induce a more
cautious and patient examination of the statute, with a
[*165] view to * discover in it
,
if possible, some more just and
reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule
by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their
own judgment and sense o
f justice and propriety, the extent o
f
legislative power in directions in which the constitution had im
posed n
o
restraint. Mr. Justice Story, in one case, in examining
the extent o
f power granted by the charter o
f
Rhode Island,
which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most
ample manner, “so as such laws, &c., be not contrary and repug
nant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws o
f Eng
land, considering the nature and constitution o
f
the place and
people there,” expresses himself thus: “What is the true extent
o
f
the power thus granted must be open to explanation as well by
usage a
s b
y
construction o
f
the terms in which it is given. In
a government professing to regard the great rights o
f personal
1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. Heyward v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
96. And see Hingham, &c. Turnpike 8 Barb. 489; Matter of Albany St.,
Co. v. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 353; 11 Wend. 149; Williamson v. Carl
De Jarnette v. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; ton, 51 Me. 449; State v. Rich, 20
Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543, 579; Miss. 393; Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540.
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liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in sub
ordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly
be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be
disregarded, or that the estates of it
s subjects were liable to be
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.
Even if such authority could be deemed to have been confided by
the charter to the General Assembly o
f
Rhode Island, as an exer
cise o
f
transcendental sovereignty before the Revolution, it can
scarcely b
e imagined that that great event could have left the
people o
f
that State subjected to it
s
uncontrolled and arbitrary
exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,
where the rights o
f property are left solely dependent upon the
will o
f
a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims o
f
a free government seem to require that the rights o
f
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At
least n
o
court o
f justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them — a power
so repugnant to the common principles o
f justice and civil liberty
—lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or
ought to be implied from any general expressions o
f
the will of the
people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights
so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and
direct expressions o
f
such a
n intention.” “We know of no case in
which a legislative act to transfer the property o
f A
.
to B., without
his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise o
f
legislative power in any State in * the Union. On the [*166]
contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent
with just principles, b
y
every judicial tribunal in which it has
been attempted to b
e enforced.”" The question discussed b
y
the
1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657.
See also what is said by the same
judge in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch,
43. “It is clear that statutes passed
against plain and obvious principles
o
f
common right and common reason
are absolutely null and void, so far as
they are calculated to operate against
those principles.” Ham v. McClaws,
1 Bay, 98. But the question in that
case was one o
f construction; whether
the court should give to a statute a
construction which would make it
operate against common right and
common reason. In Bowman v. Mid
dleton, 1 Bay, 282, the court held a
n
act which divested a man of his free
hold and passed it over to another, to
b
e void “as against common right as
well as against Magna Charta.” In
Regents o
f University v. Williams,
9 Gill & J. 365, it was said that an
act was void as opposed to funda
mental principles o
f right and justice
inherent in the nature and spirit o
f
the social compact. But the court
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learned judge in this case is perceived to have been, What is the
scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity
with the laws of England 2 Whatever he says is pertinent to that
question; and the considerations he suggests are by way of argu
ment to show that the power to do certain unjust and oppressive
acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power. It is not
intimated that if they were within the grant, they would be im
pliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive.
In another case decided in the Supreme Court of New York,
one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New
York to certain corporate property, used this language: “The
inhabitants of the city of New York have a vested right in the
City Hall, markets, water-works, ferries, and other public prop
erty, which cannot be taken from them any more than their indi
vidual dwellings or storehouses. Their rights, in this respect,
rest not merely upon the constitution, but upon the great principles
of eternal justice which lie at the foundation o
f
all free govern
ments.” The great principles of eternal justice which affected
the particular case had been incorporated in the constitution; and
it therefore became unnecessary to consider what would otherwise
have been the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimat
ing any opinion upon that subject. It was sufficient for
[*167] the case, to find * that the principles of right and justice
had been recognized and protected b
y
the constitution,
and that the people had not assumed to confer upon the legisla
ture a power to deprive the city o
f rights which did not come
from the constitution, but from principles antecedent to and rec
ognized by it
.
S
o it is said b
y
Hosmer, Ch. J., in a Connecticut case: “With
those judges who assert the omnipotence o
f
the legislature in
all cases where the constitution has not interposed an explicit re
straint, I cannot agree. Should there exist — what I know is not
only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbability —
a case o
f
direct infraction o
f
vested rights, too palpable to b
e ques
tioned and too unjust to admit o
f vindication, I could not avoid
considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the
had already decided that the act &c. o
f
Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
was opposed, not only to the consti- 376.
tution o
f
the State, but to that o
f
1 Benson v. Mayor, &c. o
f New
the United States also. See Mayor, York, 10 Barb. 244.
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control of the judiciary. If
,
for example, a law were made with
out any cause to deprive a person o
f
his property, o
r
to subject him
to imprisonment, who would not question it
s legality, and who
would aid in carrying it into effect? On the other hand, I cannot
harmonize with those who deny the power o
f
the legislature, in
any case, to pass laws which, with entire justice, operate on ante
cedent legal rights. A retrospective law may be just and rea
sonable, and the right o
f
the legislature to enact one o
f
this
description I am not speculatist enough to question.” ". The cases
here supposed o
f unjust and tyrannical enactments would probably
b
e held not to be within the power o
f any legislative body in the
Union. One o
f
them would be clearly a bill o
f
attainder ; the
other, unless it was in the nature of remedial legislation, and sus
ceptible o
f being defended on that theory, would be an exercise o
f
judicial power, and therefore in excess o
f legislative authority,
because not included in the apportionment o
f power made to that
department. No question o
f implied prohibition would arise in
either o
f
these cases; but if the grant of power had covered them,
and there had been n
o express limitation, there would, as it seems
to us, b
e very great probability o
f unpleasant and dangerous con
flict o
f authority if the courts were to deny validity to legislative
action o
n subjects within their control, on the assumption that
the legislature had disregarded justice o
r
sound policy. The
moment a court ventures to substitute it
s
own judgment for that
o
f
the legislature, in any case where the constitution has vested
the legislature with power over the subject, that moment
it enters * upon a field where it is impossible to set limits [*168]
to it
s authority, and where it
s
discretion alone will meas
ure the extent of its interference.”
* Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
225.
* “If the legislature should pass
a law in plain and unequivocal lan
guage, within the general scope o
f
their constitutional powers, I know of
n
o authority in this government to
pronounce such a
n act void, merely
because, in the opinion o
f
the judicial
tribunals, it was contrary to the prin
ciples o
f
natural justice; for this would
b
e vesting in the court a latitudina
rian authority which might be abused,
and would necessarily lead to colli
sions between the legislative and judi
cial departments, dangerous to the
well-being o
f society, o
r
a
t
least not
in harmony with the structure o
f
our
ideas o
f
natural government.” Per
Rogers, J., in Commonwealth v.
McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 374. “All the
courts can do with odious statutes is
to chasten their hardness by con
struction. Such is the imperfection
o
f
the best human institutions, that,
mould them as we may, a large dis
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The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except
where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative
power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it
operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case.
The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the
State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional
provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protec
tion against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional
bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and hatriotism of the repre
sentatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign
capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their
rights." The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute
when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of
opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law
making power.” Any legislative act which does not encroach upon
the powers apportioned to the other departments of the govern
ment, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions
upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the constitu
tion, and the case shown to come within them.”
cretion must at last be reposed some
where. The best and in many cases
the only security is in the wisdom and
integrity of public servants, and their
identity with the people. Govern
ments cannot be administered without
committing powers in trust and con
fidence.” Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528,
per Stuart, J. And see Johnston v.
Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 603; Flint
River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo.
194; State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev.
178; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio,
N. s. 14; Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86.
* Bennett v. Bull, Baldw. 74;
Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, N. s.
14. “If the act itself is within the
scope of their authority, it must stand,
and we are bound to make it stand,
if it will upon any intendment. It is
its effect, not it
s purpose, which must
determine its validity. Nothing but
tive department unconstitutional and
void.” Pennsylvania R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164, 169. See
Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Penn. St. 370;
Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Smith, 62
Ill. 268; People v. Albertson, 55
N. Y. 50; per Allen, J., Martin v.
Dix, 52 Miss. 52, 64; per Chalmers,
J., Bennett v. Boggs, Baldw. 60:MA;
United States v. Brown, 1 Deddy,
566; Commonwealth v. Moore,
Grat. 951; Danville v. Pace, 25 Grat.
1
, 8
;
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U
.
S
. Rep.
113.
* Perkins, J., in Madison and In
dianapolis Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck,
8 Ind. 222; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 98,
per Lee, J.
* Sill v. Village of Corning, 15
N. Y
.
303; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige,
137; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20
Wend. , 365; Morris v. People, 3
25
a clear violation o
f
the constitution —- DeMio,881; Wynehamer v. People, 13
a clear usurpation o
f power prohibited N
.
Y
.
430; People v. Supervisors o
f
— will justify the judicial department Orange, 17 N
.
Y
.
235; Dow v. Norris,
in pronouncing an act o
f
the legisla- 4 N
.
H
.
16; Derby Turnpike Co. v.
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* V. If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes [*169]
void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither
can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to
violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless
it shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legisla
tive encroachment by the constitution. The principles of repub
lican government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active
in the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to
variation and modification from motives of policy and public
necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience
has demonstrated any departure from the settled practice to work
injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of
them in the constitution in such form as to make them definite
rules of action under al
l
circumstances. It is undoubtedly a
maxim o
f republican government, as we understand it
,
that taxa
tion and representation should be inseparable; but where the
legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxa
tion b
y
a municipal corporation for local purposes, it is evident
Parks, 10 Conn. 522, 543; Hartford
Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29
Conn. 210; Holden v. James, 11 Mass.
396 ; Norwich v. County Commission
ers, 13 Pick. 60; Dawson v. Shaver,
1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp v. State, 6
Blackf. 305; Doe v. Douglass, 8
Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind.
342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528; Newland
v
. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384; Chicago,
&c. R. R
.
Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268;
Gutman v. Virginia Iron Co., 5 W. Va.
22; Osborn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85;
Yancy v. Yancy, 5 Heisk. 353; Bliss
v
. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State
v
. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell v.
Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 672;
Tate's Ex'r v. Bell, 4 Yerg. 206;
Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165; S. C.
8 Am. Rep. 8
;
Whittington v. Polk,
1 Harr. & J. 236 ; Norris v. Abingdon
Academy, 7 Gill & J. 7
;
Harrison v.
State, 22 Md. 491; State v. Lyles,
1 McCord, 238; Myers v. English, 9
Cal. 341; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal.
502; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal.
23; Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6
Rand. 245; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me.
326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140;
Lunt's Case, 6 Me. 412; Scott v.
Smart's Ex’rs, 1 Mich. 306; Wil
liams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler
v
. People, 8 Mich. 320; Weimer v.
Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Cotton v.
Commissioners o
f
Leon County, 6
Fla. 610; State v. Robinson, 1 Kan.
27; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Mor
rison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304; Stod
dart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355; Moore v.
Houston, 3 S. & R
. 169; Braddee v.
Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271; Harvey
v
. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63; Common
wealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St. 456;
Lewis's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 153;
Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St. 448;
Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and
Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 13
Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v.
Wood, 14 Geo. 80; Boston v. Cum
mins, 16 Geo. 102; Wan Horne v.
Dorrance, 2 Dall. 309; Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall.
18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128.
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that this maxim is applied in the case in a much restricted
[*170) and very imperfect sense only, since the * representation
of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing
the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the
protest of the local representative, but against the general opposi
tion of the municipality. The property of women is taxable,
notwithstanding they are not allowed a voice in choosing repre
sentatives." The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases,
but it
s application in the particular case, and the determination
how far it can properly and justly be made to yield to considera
tions o
f policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the
law-making power, in the absence o
f any definite constitutional
provisions so embodying the maxim as to make it a limitation
upon legislative authority.” It is also a maxim of republican gov
ernment that local concerns shall be managed in the local dis
tricts, which shall choose their own administrative and police
officers, and establish for themselves police regulations; but this
maxim is subject to such exceptions as the legislative power o
f
the State shall see fi
t
to make ; and when made, it must be pre
sumed that the public interest, convenience, and protection are
subserved thereby.” The State may interfere to establish new
regulations against the will o
f
the local constituency; and if it
shall think proper in any case to assume to itself those powers o
f
local police which should be executed b
y
the people immediately
concerned, we must suppose it has been done because the local
1 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 558;
Smith v. Macon, 20 Ark. 17.
* “There are undoubtedly funda
mental principles o
f morality and
impolitic. Considerations o
f
that sort
must in general be addressed to the
legislature. Questions o
f policy there
are concluded here.” Chase, Ch. J.,
justice which no legislature is a
t lib
erty to disregard, but it is equally
undoubted that no court, except in
the clearest cases, can properly im
pute the disregard o
f
those princi
ples to the legislature. . . . This
court can know nothing o
f public
policy except from the constitution
and the laws, and the course o
f ad
ministration and decision. It has no
legislative powers. It cannot amend
o
r modify any legislative acts. It
cannot examine questions as expe
dient o
r inexpedient, as politic o
r
in License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 469.
“All mere questions of expediency,
and all questions respecting the just
operations o
f
the law within the limits
prescribed b
y
the constitution, were
settled b
y
the legislature when it was
enacted.” Ladd, J., in Perry r.
Keene, 56 N. H. 514, 530. And see
remarks o
f Ryan, Ch. J., in Attorney
General v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
35 Wis. 425, 580.
* People v
. Draper, 15 N
.
Y
.
547.
See post, pp. *191, *192.
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administration has proved imperfect and inefficient, and a regard
to the general well-being has demanded the change. In these
cases the maxims which have prevailed in the government address
themselves to the wisdom of the legislature, and to adhere to them
as far as possible is doubtless to keep in the path of wisdom ;
but they do not constitute restrictions so as to warrant the other
departments in treating the exceptions which are made as uncon
stitutional.”
* In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
500, where the Metropolitan Police
Act of Detroit was claimed to be un
constitutional on various grounds, the
court say: “Besides the specific ob
jections made to the act as opposed to
the provisions of the constitution,
the counsel for respondent attacks it
on ‘general principles,” and especially
because violating fundamental prin
ciples in our system, that governments
exist by consent of the governed, and
that taxation and representation go
together. The taxation under the
act, it is said, is really in the hands
of a police board, a body in the choice
of which the people of Detroit have
no voice. This argument is one which
might be pressed upon the legislative
department with great force, if it
were true in point of fact. But as the
people of Detroit are really repre
sented throughout, the difficulty sug
gested can hardly be regarded as
fundamental. They were represented
in the legislature which passed the
act, and had the same proportionate
voice there with the other municipali
ties in the State, all of which receive
from that body their powers of local
government, and such only as its
wisdom shall prescribe within the con
stitutional limit. They were repre
sented in that body when the present
police board were appointed by it
,
and
the governor, who is hereafter to fill
vacancies, will be chosen b
y
the State
a
t large, including their city. There
is nothing in the maxim that taxation
and representation go together which
requires that the body paying the tax
shall alone be consulted in its assess
ment; and if there were, we should
find it violated at every turn in our
system. The State legislature not
only has a control in this respect over
inferior municipalities, which it exer
cises b
y
general laws, but it some
times finds it necessary to interpose
its power in special cases to prevent
unjust o
r
burdensome taxation, as
well as to compel the performance o
f
a clear duty. The constitution itself,
by one o
f
the clauses referred to,
requires the legislature to exercise its
control over the taxation o
f municipal
corporations, by restricting it to what
that body may regard as proper
bounds. And municipal bodies are
frequently compelled most unwillingly
to levy taxes for the payment o
f
claims, by the judgments o
r man
dates o
f
courts in which their repre
sentation is quite as remote as that o
f
the people o
f
Detroit in this police
board. It cannot therefore be said
that the maxims referred to have been
entirely disregarded by the legislature
in the passage o
f
this act. But as
counsel do not claim that, in so far as
they have been departed from, the
constitution has been violated, we
cannot, with propriety, be asked to
declare an act void on any such gen
eral objection.” And see Wynehamer
v
. People, 13 N
.
Y
.
429, per Selden,
J.; Benson v. Mayor, &c. of Albany,
2
4 Barb. 256 et seq.; Baltimore v.
State, 15 Md. 376; People v. Draper,
1
5 N
.
Y
.
532; White v. Stamford, 37
Conn. 587.
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[*171] * VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act
void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit
supposed to pervade the constitution, but not expressed in words.
“When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or
by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the
legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of
having discovered something in the spirit of the constitution
which is not even mentioned in the instrument.”.” “It is diffi
cult,” says Mr. Senator Verplanck, “upon any general principles,
to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by
judicial interposition, except so far as the express words of a
written constitution give that authority. There are indeed many
dicta and some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the
first principles of right are void. The principle is un
[*172] questionably * sound as the governing rule of a legislature
in relation to it
s
own acts, o
r
even those o
f
a preceding
legislature. It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts,
in the interpretation o
f
laws admitting o
f any doubtful construc
tion, to presume that the legislature could not have intended an
unequal and unjust operation o
f
its statutes. Such a construc
tion ought never to be given to legislative language if it be sus
ceptible o
f any other more conformable to justice; but if the
words b
e positive and without ambiguity, I can find no authority
for a court to vacate o
r repeal a statute on that ground alone.
But it is only in express constitutional provisions, limiting legis
lative power and controlling the temporary will of a majority, by
a permanent and paramount law, settled b
y
the deliberate wisdom
o
f
the nation, that I can find a safe and solid ground for the
authority o
f
courts o
f justice to declare void any legislative enact
ment. Any assumption of authority beyond this would be to
place in the hands o
f
the judiciary powers too great and too un
defined either for it
s
own security o
r
the protection o
f private
rights. It is therefore a most gratifying circumstance to the
friends o
f regulated liberty, that in every change in their consti
tutional polity which has yet taken place here, whilst political
power has been more widely diffused among the people, stronger
and better-defined guards have been given to the rights o
f prop
erty.” And after quoting certain express limitations, he pro
* People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Walker
v
. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, N
.
s. 14.
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ceeds: “Believing that we are to rely upon these and similar
provisions as the best safeguards of our rights, as well as the
safest authorities for judicial direction, I cannot bring myself to
approve of the power of courts to annul any law solemnly passed,
either on an assumed ground of it
s being contrary to natural
equity, o
r
from a broad, loose, and vague interpretation o
f
a con
stitutional provision beyond its natural and obvious sense.””
The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: In
every sovereign State there resides a
n
absolute and uncontrolled
power o
f legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests
in the Parliament: in the American States it resides in the people
themselves as a
n organized body politic. But the people,
b
y
* creating the Constitution o
f
the United States, have [*173]
delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under
certain restrictions to the Congress o
f
the Union; and that por
tion they cannot resume, except as it may be done through
amendment of the national Constitution. For the exercise of the
legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, b
y
their
State constitution, a legislative department upon which they con
fer it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood
to grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except
so far as a
t
the same time they saw fi
t
to impose restrictions.
While, therefore, the Parliament o
f
Britain possesses completely
the absolute and uncontrolled power o
f legislation, the legislative
bodies o
f
the American States possess the same power, except,
first, a
s it may have been limited b
y
the Constitution o
f
the United
States; and, second, as it may have been limited b
y
the constitu
tion o
f
the State. A legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared
void, unless its conflict with one o
f
these two instruments can be
pointed out.”
It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad dif
ference between the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions o
f
the States as regards the powers which may be
exercised under them. The government o
f
the United States
* Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend.
381-383. See also People v. Galla
gher, 4 Mich. 244; Benson v. Mayor,
&c. o
f Albany, 24 Barb. 252 et seq.;
Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232;
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N
.
Y
.
391,
per Comstock, J.; 13 N. Y. 453, per
Selden, J.; 13 N. Y. 477, per John
son, J.
* People v. New York Central Rail
road Co., 34 Barb. 138; Gentry v. Grif
fith, 27 Tex. 461; Danville v. Pace, 25
Grat. 1
;
s. c. 1
8 Am. Rep. 663. And see
the cases cited, ante, p
.
*168, note 3.
14
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is one of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are
possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a law
of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitu
tion to see if the grant of specified powers is broad enough to em
brace it ; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground,
it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a con
clusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of
the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look
in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative
power, but in the constitution of the State to ascertain if any
limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with
which the legislative department of the State was vested in it
s
creation. Congress can pass n
o
laws but such as the Constitution
authorizes either expressly o
r b
y
clear implication ; while the
State legislature has jurisdiction o
f
a
ll subjects on which its leg
islation is not prohibited.” “The law-making power of
[*174] the * State,” it is said in one case, “recognizes no re
straints, and is bound by none, except such as are im
posed b
y
the constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed
a legislative act b
y
the people themselves in their sovereign capac
ity, and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant
legislative power, but to confine and restrain it
.
Without the con
stitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be absolute.
These limitations are created and imposed by express words, o
r
arise by necessary implication. The leading feature o
f
the con
stitution is the separation and distribution o
f
the powers o
f
the
government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative,
and judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive
can do n
o legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act,
and neither can exercise judicial authority.” ”
It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts,
before they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in
the constitution some specific inhibition which has been disre
1 Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 La. Ann. 190; Walpole v. Elliott, 18
N
.
Y
.
303; People v. Supervisors o
f
Ind. 258; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal.
Orange, 27 Barb. 593; People v. 547; Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17
Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Penn. St. 119; Kirby v. Shaw, 19
Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257; People v. New Penn. St. 260; Weister v. Hade, 52
York Central Railroad Co., 24 N
.
Y
.
Penn. St. 477; Danville v. Pace, 25
497, 504; People v. Toynbee, 2 Park. Grat. 1
, 9
;
s. c. 1
8 Am. Rep. 663.
Cr. R
. 490; State v. Gutierrez, 15 * Sill v. Corning, 15 N
.
Y
.
303.
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garded, or some express command which has been disobeyed.”
Prohibitions are only important where they are in the na
ture of exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the
authority to do an act has not been granted by the sovereign to
its representative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit it
s being
done. If in one department was vested the whole power of the
government, it might be essential for the people, in the instru
ment delegating this complete authority, to make careful and
particular exception o
f
all those cases which it was intended to
exclude from it
s cognizance; for without such exception the
government might do whatever the people themselves, when met
in their sovereign capacity, would have power to do. But when
only the legislative power is delegated to one department, and the
judicial to another, it is not important that the one should be
expressly forbidden to try causes, o
r
the other to make laws. The
assumption o
f judicial power by the legislature in such a case is
unconstitutional, because, though not expressly forbid
den, it is nevertheless * inconsistent with the provisions [*175]
which have conferred upon another department the power
the legislature is seeking to exercise.” And for similar reasons a
legislative act which should undertake to make a judge the arbiter
in his own controversies would be void, because, though in form
a provision for the exercise o
f judicial power, in substance it
would be the creation o
f
a
n arbitrary and irresponsible authority,
neither legislative, executive, nor judicial, and wholly unknown
to constitutional government.” It could not be necessary to for
bid the judiciary to render judgment without suffering the party
to make defence; because it is implied in judicial authority that
there shall be a hearing before condemnation." Taxation cannot
b
e arbitrary, because its very definition includes apportionment,
nor can it be for a purpose not public, because that would be a
* A remarkable case of evasion to * Ante, pp. *87—"114, and cases
avoid the purpose o
f
the constitution,
and still keep within its terms, was
considered in People v. Albertson, 55
N. Y
.
50. In Taylor v. Commis
sioners o
f
Ross County, 23 Ohio, N
.
s.
22, the Supreme Court o
f
Ohio found
itself under the necessity o
f declaring
that that which was forbidden b
y
the constitution could no more be
done indirectly than directly.
cited.
* Post, pp. *410–"413, and cases
cited.
* Post, pp. *353–"354. On this sub
ject in general, reference is made to
those very complete recent works,
Bigelow on Estoppel and Freeman on
Judgments.
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contradiction in terms." The right of local self-government can
not be taken away, because all our constitutions assume its
continuance as the undoubted right of the people, and as an
inseparable incident to republican government.” The bills of
rights in the American constitutions forbid that parties shall be
deprived of property except by the law of the land; but if the
prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one
man's property over to another would nevertheless be void. If
the act proceeded upon the assumption that such other person
was justly entitled to the estate, and therefore it was transferred,
it would be void, because judicial in its nature; and if it pro
ceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither
legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat.” There is no
difficulty in saying that any such act, which under pretence of
exercising one power is usurping another, is opposed to the con
stitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if
they have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The
maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the inter
preters of constitutional grants of power, and those acts which
by those maxims the several departments of government are for
bidden to do cannot be considered within any grant or apportion
ment of power which the people in general terms have made to
those departments. The Parliament of Great Britain,
[*176] indeed, as possessing the sovereignty” of the country, has
the power to disregard fundamental principles, and pass
arbitrary and unjust enactments; but it cannot do this rightfully,
and it has the power to do so simply because there is no written
* Post, ch. 14. And see Curtis v.
Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Tyson v.
School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9;
Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575;
Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590;
People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128;
Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454.
* People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago,
51 Ill. 31; People v. Hurlbut, 24
Mich. 44.
* Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay,
252; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2. Pet.
657; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43;
Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266.
“It is now considered an universal and
fundamental proposition in every well
regulated and properly administered
government, whether embodied in a
constitutional form or not, that pri
vate property cannot be taken for a
strictly private purpose at all, nor for
public without a just compensation;
and that the obligation of contracts
cannot be abrogated or essentially
impaired. These and other vested
rights of the citizen are held sacred
and inviolable, even against the pleni
tude of power in the legislative de
partment.” Nelson, J., in People v.
Morris, 13 Wend. 328. See Bank of
Michigan v. Williams, 5 Wend. 486.
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constitution from which it
s authority springs or on which it
depends, and b
y
which the courts can test the validity o
f
it
s
declared will. The rules which confine the discretion of Parlia
ment within the ancient landmarks are rules for the construction
o
f
the powers o
f
the American legislatures; and however proper
and prudent it may be expressly to prohibit those things which
are not understood to be within the proper attributes o
f legislative
power, such prohibition can never be regarded as essential, when
the extent o
f
the power apportioned to the legislative department
is found upon examination not to be broad enough to cover the
obnoxious authority. The absence o
f
such prohibition cannot,
by implication, confer power.
Nor, where fundamental rights are declared b
y
the constitu
tion, is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in
express terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself
a prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express
purpose o
f operating as a restriction upon legislative power."
Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights
to be found in the American constitutions, are not, and from the
very nature o
f
the case cannot be, so certain and definite in
character as to form rules for judicial decisions; and they are
declared rather as guides to the legislative judgment than as
marking an absolute limitation o
f power. The nature of the
declaration will generally enable us to determine without diffi
culty whether it is the one thing or the other. If it is declared
that all men are free, and no man can be slave to another, a
definite and certain rule o
f
action is laid down, which the courts
can administer; but if it be said that “the blessings of a free
government can only be maintained b
y
a firm adherence to jus
tice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue,” we should
not be likely to commit the mistake of supposing that this decla
ration would authorize the courts to substitute their own view of
justice for that which may have impelled the legislature to pass
a particular law, o
r
to inquire into the moderation, temperance,
frugality, and virtue o
f
its members, with a view to set aside
their action, if it should appear to have been influenced
by the opposite qualities. It is plain that "what in [*177]
the one case is a rule, in the other is an admonition ad
1 Beebe v
. State, 6 Ind. 518. This principle is very often acted upon when
not expressly declared.
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dressed to the judgment and the conscience of a
ll persons in
authority, as well as o
f
the people themselves.
S
o
the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature
o
f
limitations upon it
s authority. The constitutional provisions
which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the
legislative power shall b
e
exercised under these forms, and shall
not be exercised under any other. A statute which does not
observe them will plainly be ineffectual."
Statutes unconstitutional in Part.
It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is
opposed in some o
f
its provisions to the constitution, while oth
ers, standing b
y
themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the
forms observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the
purposes sought to b
e accomplished b
y it
,
but insufficient for
others. In any such case the portion which conflicts with the
constitution, o
r
in regard to which the necessary conditions have
not been observed, must be treated as a nullity. Whether the
other parts o
f
the statute must also be adjudged void because o
f
the association must depend upon a consideration o
f
the object o
f
the law, and in what manner and to what extent the unconstitu
tional portion affects the remainder. A statute, it has been said,
is judicially held to be unconstitutional, because it is not within
the scope o
f legislative authority; it may either propose to ac
complish something prohibited by the constitution, or to accom
plish some lawful, and even laudable object, b
y
means repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States or of the State.” A stat
ute may contain some such provisions, and yet the same act, hav
ing received the sanction o
f
a
ll
branches o
f
the legislature, and
being in the form o
f law, may contain other useful and salutary
provisions, not obnoxious to any just constitutional exception.
It would be inconsistent with al
l
just principles o
f
constitutional
law to adjudge these enactments void, because they are associated
in the same act, but not connected with or dependent on others
* See ante, p
.
*130 et seq.
* Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray,
100. “A law that is unconstitutional
is so because it is either an assump
tion o
f power not legislative in its
nature, o
r
because it is inconsistent
with some provision o
f
the federal o
r
State constitution.” Woodworth, J.,
in Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27
Penn. St. 456.
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which are unconstitutional." Where, therefore, a part of
a * statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not author- [*178]
ize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless
all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on
each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise
so connected together in meaning, that it cannot be presumed the
legislature would have passed the one without the other.” The
constitutional and unconstitutional provisions may even be con
tained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and sep
arable, so that the first may stand though the last fall. The point
is not whether they are contained in the same section; for the
distribution into sections is purely artificial; but whether they
are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.” If
,
when
the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains
is complete in itself, and capable o
f being executed in accordance
* Commonwealth v. Clapp. 5 Gray,
100. See, to the same effect, Fisher
v
. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1
;
Warren v.
Mayor, &c. of Charlestown, 2 Gray,
84; Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick.
95 ; Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5
Gray, 482; Commonwealth v. Pome
roy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland,
3 R. I. 33; State v. Snow, 3 R. I. 64;
Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374;
Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 248 ; Mc
Culloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432; People
v
. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop v. Mills,
1
9 Cal. 513; Rood v. McCargar, 49
Cal. 117; Supervisors of Knox Co.
v
. Davis, 63 Ill. 405; Myers v. People,
67 Ill. 503; Thomson v. Grand Gulf
Railroad Co., 3 How. (Miss.) 240;
Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How.
(Miss.) 625; Mobile and Ohio Railroad
Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Santo v.
State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3
Eng. 436; Mayor, &c. of Savannah v.
State, 4 Geo. 26; Exchange Bank v.
Hines, 3 Ohio, N. s. 1
;
Robinson v.
Bank of Darien, 18 Geo. 65; State
v
. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; People
v
. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 190; Wil
liams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. 7
;
Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh.
70 ; Davis v. State, 7 Ma. 151;
State v. Commissioners of Balti
more, 29 Md. 521; Hagerstown v.
Dechert, 32 Md. 369; Berry v. Balti
more, &c. R
.
R. Co., 41 Md. 446;
s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 69: State v. Clark,
5
4 Mo. 17; Lowndes Co. v. Hunter, 49
Ala. 507; Isom v. Mississippi, &c.
R
.
R
. Co., 36. Miss. 300 ; Bank o
f
Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet.
526. “To the extent of the collision
and repugnancy, the law o
f
the State
must yield; and to that extent, and no
further, it is rendered b
y
such repug
nancy inoperative and void.” Com
monwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 361,
per Shaw, Ch. J.; Norris v. Boston,
4 Met. 288; Eckhart v. State, 5 W.
Va. 515.
* Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5
Gray, 485. See People v. Briggs, 50
N
.
Y
.
566. Although a proviso is
ineffectual because unconstitutional,
it cannot be disregarded when the
intention o
f
the legislature is in ques
tion. Commonwealth v. Potts, 79
Penn. St. 164.
* Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5
Gray, 485; Willard v. People, 5 Ill.
470; Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 512; Rob
inson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; State
v
. Easterbrook, 3 Nev. 173; Hagers
town v. Dechert, 32 Ma. 369.
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with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that
which was rejected, it must be sustained. The difficulty is in
determining whether the good and bad parts of the statute are
capable of being separated within the meaning of this rule. If
a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and is void
as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to
the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object
only, and some o
f
it
s provisions are void, the whole must fail
unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid o
f
the invalid portion.” And if they are so mutually connected
1 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. But
perhaps the doctrine o
f sustaining one
part o
f
a statute when the other is
void was carried to an extreme in this
case. A prohibitory liquor law had
been passed which was not objection
able on constitutional grounds, except
that the last section provided that
“the question of prohibiting the sale
and manufacture o
f intoxicating
liquor” should be submitted to the
electors of the State, and if it should
appear “ that a majority of the votes
cast a
s aforesaid, upon said question
o
f prohibition, shall be for the pro
hibitory liquor law, then this act shall
take effect on the first day o
f July,
1855.” The court held this to be an
attempt by the legislature to shift the
exercise o
f legislative power from
themselves to the people, and there
fore void; but they also held that the
remainder o
f
the act was complete
without this section, and must there
fore be sustained on the rule above
given. The reasoning o
f
the court by
which they are brought to this conclu
sion is ingenious; but one cannot
avoid feeling, especially after reading
the dissenting opinion o
f
Chief Justice
Wright, that b
y
the decision the court
gave effect to an act which the legis
lature did not design should take
effect unless the result of the uncon
stitutional submission to the people
was in its favor. See also Weir v.
Cram, 37 Iowa, 649. For a similar
ruling, see Maize v. State, 4 Ind.
342; overruled in Meshmeier v. State,
11 Ind. 482. And see State v. Dom
baugh, 20 Ohio, N
.
s. 173, where it
was held competent to construe a part
o
f
a
n
act held to be valid by an
other part adjudged unconstitutional,
though the court considered it “quite
probable" that if the legislature had
supposed they were without power to
adopt the void part o
f
the act, they
would have made an essentially differ
ent provision b
y
the other. See also
People v. Bull, 46 N
.
Y
. 68, where
part o
f
a
n act was sustained which
probably would not have been adopted
b
y
the legislature separately. It must
b
e obvious in any case where part o
f
an act is set aside as unconstitutional,
that it is unsafe to indulge in the same
extreme presumptions in support o
f
the remainder that are allowable in
support o
f
a complete act when some
cause o
f invalidity is suggested to the
whole o
f
it
.
In the latter case, we
know the legislature designed the
whole act to have effect, and we
should sustain it if possible; in the
former, we do not know that the leg
islature would have been willing that
a part o
f
the act should be sustained
if the remainder were held void, and
there is generally a presumption more
o
r
less strong to the contrary. While,
therefore, in the one case the act should
b
e sustained unless the invalidity is
clear, in the other the whole should
fall unless it is manifest the portion
not opposed to the constitution can
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with and * dependent on each other, as conditions, con- [*179]
siderations, or compensations for each other, as to war
rant the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole,
and if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would
not pass the residue independently, then if some parts are uncon
stitutional, a
ll
the provisions which are thus dependent, condi
tional, or connected must fall with them."
It has accordingly been held where a statute submitted to the
voters o
f
a county the question o
f
the removal o
f
their county
seat, and one section imposed the forfeiture o
f
certain vested
rights in case the vote was against the removal, that this portion
o
f
the act being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole
was submitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened
forfeiture would naturally affect the result o
f
the vote.”
And, where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain
lands previously in the township o
f Racine, but contained an
express provision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a
different and less rate than other lands in the city; the latter
provision being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the
whole statute must fail, inasmuch as such provision was clearly
intended as a compensation for the annexation.”
And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six
persons, * provided for the summoning o
f
twelve jurors, [*180]
from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under
the constitution the jury must consist of twelve, it was held that
the provision for reducing the number to six could not be re
jected and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be
giving to it a construction and effect different from that the legis
lature designed ; and would deprive the parties of the means of
obtaining impartial jurors which the statute had intended to give.*
stand by itself, and that in the legis
lative intent it was not to be controlled
or modified in its construction and
effect by the part which was void.
1 Warren v Mayor, &c o
f Charles
town, 2 Gray, 99; State v. Commis
sioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N
.
s.
507; Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398;
Allen County Commissioners v. Sil
vers, 22 Ind. 491; Garrard Co. Court v.
Navigation Co., 10 Am. Law Reg.
N. s. 160; Eckhart v. State, 5 W.
Va. 515.
* State v. Commissioners o
f Perry
County, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 507. And see
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 338; Mon
roe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N
.
s. 666,
684; Taylor v. Commissioners o
f
Ross County, 23 Ohio, N
.
s. 22, 84.
* Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398,
followed in State v. Dousman, 28
Wis. 547.
* Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich.
272. See Commonwealth v. Potts,
79 Penn. St. 164,
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On the other hand, -to illustrate how intimately the valid and
invalid portions of a statute may be associated, -a section of
the criminal code of Illinois provided that “if any person shall
harbor or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the
same being a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other
persons, whether they reside in this State or in any other State,
or Territory, or district, within the limits and under the jurisdic
tion of the United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent
the lawful owner or owners of such slaves or servants from re
taking them in a lawful manner, every person so offending shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,” &c., and it was held that,
although the latter portion of the section was void within the
decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,' yet that the first portion,
being a police regulation for the preservation of order in the
State, and important to it
s well-being, and capable o
f being
enforced without reference to the rest, was not affected by the
invalidity o
f
the rest.”
A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of
cases, and clearly void as to others. A general law for the pun
ishment o
f offences, which should endeavor to reach, by its
retroactive operation, acts before committed, as well as to pre
scribe a rule o
f
conduct for the citizen in the future, would be
void so far as it was retrospective, but such invalidity would not
affect the operation o
f
the law in regard to the cases which were
within the legislative control. A law might be void as violating
the obligation o
f existing contracts, but valid as to a
ll
contracts
which should be entered into subsequent to its passage, and
which therefore would have no legal force except such as the
law itself would allow.” In any such case the unconstitutional law
must operate as far as it can,” and it will not be held invalid on
1 16 Pet. 539.
* Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 470;
Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 512. See Hag
erstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369.
* Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68;
Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369. In
People v. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525,
certain commissioners were appointed
to take for a city hall, either lands
belonging to the city or lands o
f indi
viduals. The act made no provision
for compensation. The commissioners
elected to take lands belonging to the
city. Held, that the act was not
wholly void for the omission to pro
vide compensation in case the lands o
f
individuals had been selected.
* Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.
The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34
Ala. 333, appears to be opposed to
this principle, but it also appears to
u
s
to be based upon cases which are
not applicable.
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the objection * of a party whose interests are not affected [*181]
by it in a manner which the constitution forbids. If
there are any exceptions to this rule, they must be of cases only
where it is evident, from a contemplation of the statute and of
the purpose to be accomplished by it
,
that it would not have
been passed at all, except as an entirety, and that the general
purpose o
f
the legislature will be defeated if it shall be held
valid as to some cases and void as to others.
Waiving a Constitutional Objection.
There are cases where a law in its application to a particular
case must b
e sustained, because the party who makes objection
has, by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against
it
.
Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protec
tion solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent
for him to waive the protection, and to consent to such action as
would be invalid if taken against his will. On this ground it has
been held that an act appropriating the private property o
f
one
person for the private purposes o
f another, on compensation
made, was valid if he whose property was taken assented thereto;
and that he did assent and waive the constitutional privilege, if
he received the compensation awarded, o
r brought an action to
recover it." So if an act providing for the appropriation of prop
erty for a public use shall authorize more to be taken than the
use requires, although such act would be void without the
owner's assent, yet with it al
l
objection o
n
the ground o
f un
constitutionality is removed.” And where parties were author
ized by statute to erect a dam across a river, provided they should
first execute a bond to the people conditioned to pay such dam
ages a
s
each and every person might sustain in consequence o
f
the erection o
f
the dam, the damages to be assessed b
y
a justice
o
f
the peace, and the dam was erected and damages assessed as
provided by the statute, it was held, in an action on the bond to
recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and who
1 Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47. Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala.
* Embury v. Conner, 3 N
.
Y
.
511. 586; Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y.
And see Heyward v. Mayor, &c. of 318.
New York, 8 Barb. 489; Mobile and
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had received the benefit of the statute, was precluded by his
action from contesting it
s validity, and could not insist upon his
right to a common-law trial b
y jury." In these and the
[*182] like cases the statute must be read with * an implied
proviso that the party to be affected shall assent thereto;
and such consent removes all obstacle, and lets the statute in to
operate the same as if it had in terms contained the condition.”
In criminal cases, however, the doctrine that a constitutional
privilege may be waived must be true to a very limited extent
only. A party may consent to waive rights of property, but the
trial and punishment for public offences are not within the prov
ince o
f
individual consent or agreement.
Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions.
It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are
called upon to pronounce the invalidity o
f
a
n act o
f legislation,
passed with a
ll
the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the
force o
f law, they will approach the question with great caution,
examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as
deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon
the subject, and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity
and invalidity o
f
the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond
reasonable doubt.” A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor
o
f
the legislative action, and the act b
e
sustained.”
1 People v. Murray, 5 Hill, 468.
See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 339.
* Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y
.
518.
And see Matter of Albany St., 11
Wend. 149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3
Mich. 448; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich.
488; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v.
State, 29 Ala. 586; Detmold r. Drake,
46 N. Y. 318; Haskell v. New Bed
ford, 108 Mass. 208.
* Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick.
95, per Shaw, Ch. J. See Brown v.
Buzan, 24 Ind. 194. If an act may
be valid o
r
not according to the cir
cumstances, a court would be bound
to presume that such circumstances
existed as would render it valid. Tal
bot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
* Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18;
Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint
River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo.
194; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon
and Western Railroad Co. v. Davis,
1
3
Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v.
Wood, 14 Geo. 80; Kendall v. Kings
ton, 5 Mass. 524; Foster v. Essex
Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Norwich v.
County Commissioners o
f Hampshire,
1
3 Pick. 61; Hartford Bridge Co. v
.
Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 227; Rich
v
. Flanders, 39 N. H. 312; Eason v.
State, 6 Eng. 481; Hedley v. Com
missioners o
f Franklin Co., 4 Blackf.
116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;
La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 79; Ez
parte McCollum, 1 Cow. 564; Coutant
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“The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to
the constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which
ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubt
ful case. The court when impelled by duty to render such a
judgment would be unworthy of it
s
station could it be
unmindful " o
f
the solemn obligation which that station [*183]
imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague
conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have tran
scended it
s powers, and it
s
acts to be considered as void. The
opposition between the constitution and the law should be such
that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction o
f
their incom
patibility with each other.”” Mr. Justice Washington gives a
reason for this rule, which has been repeatedly recognized in
other cases which we have cited. After expressing the opinion
that the particular question there presented, and which regarded
the constitutionality o
f
a State law, was involved in difficulty
and doubt, he says: “But if I could rest my opinion in favor of
the constitutionality o
f
the law on which the question arises, on
n
o
other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that
alone would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory vindication o
f
it
.
It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and
the patriotism o
f
the legislative body b
y
which any law is passed,
to presume in favor o
f
its validity, until it
s
violation o
f
the con
stitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.””
The constitutionality o
f
a law, then, is to be presumed, because
the legislature, which was first required to pass upon the ques
tion, acting, as they must b
e
deemed to have acted, with integ
rity, and with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid
v
. People, 11 Wend. 511; Clark v.
People, 26 Wend. 606; Morris v.
People, 3 Denio, 381; N
. Y., &c.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N
.
Y
. 473;
Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Cot
ton v. Commissioners o
f
Leon Co., 6
Fla. 610; Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla.
587; Lane v. Dorman, 4 Ill. 238;
Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 381; Far
mers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith,
3 S
.
& R
. 63; Weister v. Hade, 52
Penn. St. 477; Sears v. Cottrell, 5
Mich. 251; People v. Tyler, 8 Mich.
320; Allen County Commissioners v.
Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Robin
son, 1 Kan. 17; Eyre v. Jacob, 14
Grat. 426 ; Gormley v. Taylor, 44
Geo. 76; State v. Cape Girardeau, &c.
R. R
. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Oleson v.
Railroad Co., 36 Wis. 383; Newsom v.
Cocke, 44 Miss. 352; Slack v. Jacob,
8 W. Va. 612; Commonwealth v.
Moore, 25 Grat. 951.
1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128,
per Marshall, Ch. J.
* Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
270. See Kellogg v. State Treasurer, 44
Vt. 356, 359; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va.
612.
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by the constitution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so.
They are a co-ordinate department of the government with the
judiciary, invested with very high and responsible duties, as to
some of which their acts are not subject to judicial scrutiny, and
they legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is
not to be supposed they will disregard. It must, therefore, be
supposed that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their
action have been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the
courts may with some confidence repose upon their conclusion,
as one based upon their best judgment. For although it is plain,
upon the authorities, that the courts should sustain legislative
action when not clearly satisfied of it
s invalidity, it is equally
plain in reason that the legislature should abstain from adopting
such action if not fully assured of their authority to do so.
Respect for the instrument under which they exercise
[*184] their power should impel the "legislature in every case
to solve their doubts in its favor, and it is only because
we are to presume they do so, that courts are warranted in giving
weight in any case to their decision. If it were understood that
legislators refrained from exercising their judgment, or that, in
cases o
f doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in favor o
f
the
action they desired to accomplish, the foundation for the cases
we have cited would be altogether taken away."
As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act,
we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs
from a
n
endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation o
f
the con
stitution, or from a consideration o
f
the law after the meaning o
f
the constitution has been judicially determined. It has some
times been supposed that it was the duty of the court, first, to
interpret the constitution, placing upon it a construction that
must remain unvarying, and then test the law in question by it;
and that any other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions,
if the legislature should put one interpretation upon the consti
tution at one time and a different one at another. But the de
cided cases d
o
not sanction this rule,” and the difficulty suggested
is rather imaginary than real, since it is but reasonable to expect
* See upon this subject what is New York, 5 Sandf. 14; Clark r.
said in Osbourn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. People, 26 Wend. 606; Baltimore
85. v
. State, 15 Md. 457.
* Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v.
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that, where a construction has once been placed upon a con
stitutional provision, it will be followed afterwards, even though
it
s original adoption may have sprung from deference to legisla
tive action rather than from settled convictions in the judicial
mind."
The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict
between it and the constitution is not clear, and the implication
which must always exist that no violation has been intended by
the legislature, may require it in some cases, where the meaning
o
f
the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a
construction o
f
the statute as might not at first view seem most
obvious and natural. For as a conflict between the statute and
the constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow,
where the meaning o
f
the constitution is clear, that the court, if
possible, must give the statute such a construction as will enable it to
have effect. This is only saying, in another form of words, that
the court must construe the statute in accordance with
the legislative * intent; since it is always to be pre- [*185]
sumed the legislature designed the statute to take effect,
and not to be a nullity.
The rule upon this subject is thus stated b
y
the Supreme
Court o
f
Illinois: “Whenever an act o
f
the legislature can be so
construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution
and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by
the courts. Therefore, acts o
f
the legislature, in terms retro
spective, and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and
destroy vested rights, are upheld b
y giving them prospective op
eration only ; for, applied t
o
,
and operating upon, future acts and
transactions only, they are rules o
f property under and subject to
which the citizen acquires property rights, and are obnoxious to
no constitutional limitation ; but as retroactive laws, they reach
to and destroy existing rights, through force o
f
the legislative will,
without a hearing or judgment o
f
law. S
o will acts o
f
the legis
lature, having elements o
f limitation, and capable o
f being so
applied and administered, although the words are broad enough
to, and do, literally read, strike at the right itself, be construed
to limit and control the remedy; for as such they are valid, but
a
s weapons destructive o
f
vested rights they are void ; and such
1 People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 162.
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force only will be given the acts as the legislature could impart
to them.” "
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, a similar question
being involved, recognizing their obligation “so to construe every
act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be possible,
with the provisions of the constitution,” proceed to the examina
tion of a statute by the same rule, “without stopping to inquire
what construction might be warranted by the natural import of
the language used.””
And it is said by Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the ma
jority of the Court of Appeals of New York: “A legislative act
is not to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation
between the legislative and the judicial power. Before proceed
ing to annul, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the
law-making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot
be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable
[*186] presumption.” And this after al
l
is only * the applica
tion o
f
the familiar rule, that in the exposition o
f
a stat
ute it is the duty of the court to seek to ascertain and carry out
the intention o
f
the legislature in it
s enactment, and to give full
effect to such intention; and they are bound so to construe the
statute, if practicable, as to give it force and validity, rather than
to avoid it
,
o
r
render it nugatory.*
The rule is not different when the question is whether any
portion o
f
a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The
excess o
f power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is
not to be applied in any instance.
And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing
clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts,
the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding
the invalidity o
f
the rest.” But other cases hold that such repeal
ing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal a
ll conflicting
provisions, in order that those o
f
the new statute can have effect;
and that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conflict with it
,
and
1 Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 384.
See also Bigelow v. West Wisconsin
R
.
R
. Co., 27 Wis. 478; Attorney
General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400.
* Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17. See
Dubuque v. Illinois Cent R
.
R
. Co.,
39 Iowa, 56.
* People v. Supervisors o
f Orange,
17 N. Y. 241.
* Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb.
471. See Marshall v. Grimes, 41
Miss. 27.
* Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 489;
Ely v. Thompson, 3 A
.
K
.
Marsh. 70.
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therefore nothing is repealed." Great caution is necessary in some
cases, or the rule which was designed to ascertain and effectuate
the legislative intent will be pressed to the extreme of giving
effect to part of a statute exclusively, when the legislative intent
was that the part should not stand except as a component part of
, the whole.
Inquiry into Legislative Motives.
From what examination has been given to this subject, it
appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always
a question of power; that is
,
a question whether the legislature
in the particular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act,
the manner in which it
s object is to b
e accomplished, and the
mode o
f enacting it
,
has kept within the constitutional limits and
observed the constitutional conditions. In any case in which this
question is answered in the affirmative, the courts are not at lib
erty to inquire into the proper exercise of the power. They must
assume that legislative discretion has been properly exer
cised.” “If evidence was required, it must be supposed [*187]
that it was before the legislature when the act was passed;”
and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of
the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself
might be held equivalent to such finding.” And although it has
1 Shepardson v. Milwaukee and
Beloit Railroad Co., 6 Wis. 605;
State v. Judge of County Court, 11
Wis. 50 ; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165;
Sullivan v. Adams, 3 Gray, 476 ; De
voy v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 35
Barb. 264; Campau v. Detroit, 14
Mich. 276 ; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa,
261 ; Harbeck v. New York, 10 Bosw.
366.
2 People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb.
193 ; People v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 137; Balti
more v. State, 15 Md. 376; Goddin
v
. Crump, 8 Leigh, 154.
* De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb.
81 ; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11.
* Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago
Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 207. The Con
stitution of Illinois provided that
“corporations not possessing banking
powers o
r privileges may be formed
under general laws, but shall not be
created b
y
special acts, except for
municipal purposes, and in cases
where, in the judgment o
f
the Gen
eral Assembly, the objects o
f
the
corporation cannot be attained under
general laws.” A special charter
being passed without any legislative
declaration that its object could not
b
e attained under a general law, the
Supreme Court sustained it
,
but
placed their decision mainly on the
ground that the clause had been
wholly disregarded, “and it would
now produce far-spread ruin to de
clare such acts unconstitutional and
void.” It is very clearly intimated in
the opinion, that the legislative prac
15
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sometimes been urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire
into the motives of the legislature where fraud and corruption were
alleged, and annul their action if the allegation were established,
the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and
they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon."
tice, and this decision sustaining it
,
did violence to the intent of the con
stitution. A provision in the Consti
tution of Indiana that “no act shall
take effect until the same shall have
been published and circulated in the
several counties o
f
this State, by au
thority, except in case of emergency,”
adds the words, “which emergency
shall be declared in the preamble, o
r
in the body o
f
the law; ” thus clearly
making the legislative declaration
necessary. Carpenter v. Montgomery,
7 Blackf. 415; Mark v. State, 15 Ind.
98; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7
Ind. 13.
1 Sunbury and Erie Railroad Co.
v
. Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278 ; Ex parte
Newman, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore v.
State, 15 Md. 376; Johnson v. Hig
gins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566. “The courts
cannot impute to the legislature any
other but public motives for their
acts.” People v. Draper, 15 N. Y
.
545, per Denio, Ch. J. “We are not
made judges o
f
the motives o
f
the
legislature, and the court will not
usurp the inquisitorial office o
f in
quiry into the bona fides of that body
in discharging its duties.” Shank
land, J., in the same case, p. 555.
“The powers of the three depart
ments are not merely equal; they are
exclusive in respect to the duties as
signed to each. They are absolutely
independent o
f
each other. It is now
proposed that one o
f
the three powers
shall institute an inquiry into the
conduct o
f
another department, and
form an issue to try b
y
what motives
the legislature were governed in the
enactment o
f
a law. If this may be
done, we may also inquire b
y
what
motives the executive is induced to
The
approve a bill or withhold his ap
proval, and in case o
f withholding it
corruptly, by our mandate compel its
approval. To institute the proposed
inquiry would be a direct attack upon
the independence o
f
the legislature,
and a usurpation o
f power subversive
o
f
the constitution.” Wright v.
Defrees, 8 Ind. 302, per Gookins, J.
“We are not at liberty to inquire
into the motives o
f
the legislature.
We can only examine into its power
under the constitution.” Per Chase,
Ch. J., in Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.
514. The same doctrine is restated
by Mr. Justice Hunt, in Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U
.
S
. Rep.
535; Albany Law Journal, Vol. XV.
p
.
267. And see McCulloch v. State,
1
1 Ind. 431; Bradshaw v. Omaha,
1 Neb. 16; Lyon v. Norris, 15 Geo.
480; People v. Flagg, 46 N
.
Y. 401 ;
Slack v. Jacob, 8 W.Va. 612, 635;
State v. Cardozo, 5 S
.
C
.
N
.
s. 297;
Humboldt County v. Churchill County
Comm’rs, 6 Nev. 30 ; Flint, &c.
Plank Road Co. v. Woodhull, 25
Mich. 103; State v. Fagan, 22 La.
Ann. 545; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 607.
In Jones v. Jones, 12 Penn. St. 350,
the general principle was recognized,
and it was decided not to be compe
tent to declare a legislative divorce
void for fraud. It was nevertheless
held competent to annul it
,
on the
ground that it had been granted (as
shown b
y
parol evidence) for a cause
which gave the legislature no juris
diction. The legislature was regarded
a
s being for the purpose a court o
f
limited jurisdiction. In Attorney
General v. Supervisors o
f
Lake Co.,
3
3 Mich. 11, it is decided that when
supervisors and people, having full
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reasons are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into
the motives of the governor in the exercise of a discretion vested
in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case
not to the courts, but to the people."
* Consequences if a Statute is Void. [*188]
When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it
had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts
which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it consti
tutes a protection to no one who has acted under it
,
and n
o
one
can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the
decision was made.” And what is true of an act void in toto is
true also as to any part o
f
a
n
act which is found to b
e unconsti
tutional, and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having
never, at any time, been possessed o
f any legal force.
authority over the subject, have acted
upon the question of removal o
f
a
county seat, no question of motive
can be gone into to invalidate their
action.
* Attorney-General v. Brown, 1
Wis. 522; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind.
302.
* Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348;
Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;
Woolsey v. Commercial Bank, 6 Mc
Lean, 142; Detroit v. Martin, 34
Mich. 170; Hoover v Barkhoof, 44
N. Y. 113; Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y.
528 ; Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341;
Meagher v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244.
But one acting as an officer under an
unconstitutional law was held in
Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Penn.
St. 436, to be an officer de facto.
This could hardly be so, however, if
the law creating the office was un
constitutional. There can be no
officer d
e facto when there is no office.
See Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250.
In People v. Salomon, 54 Ill. 46, a
ministerial officer was severely cen
sured for presuming to disregard a
law as unconstitutional. The court
found it to be valid, but if they had
held the contrary, the officer cer
tainly could not have been punished
for anticipating their decision in his
own action. In Texas it is held that
an act held unconstitutional must be
deemed to have the force of law for
the protection o
f
officers acting under
it up to the time of the decision de
claring it void. Sessums v. Botts,
3
4 Tex. 335. If a decision adjudging
a statute unconstitutional is after
wards overruled, the statute is to be
considered as having been in force for
the whole period. Pierce v. Pierce,
46 Ind. 86.
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[*189] * CHAPTER VIII.
THE SEVERAL
GRADEs OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
IN the examination of American constitutional law, we shall
not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring
the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible
to the subjects upon which the power is to operate.
In contradistinction to those governments where power is con
centrated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose
supervision and active control extends to all the objects of gov
ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the American
system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital
idea of which is
,
that local affairs shall be managed b
y
local au
thorities, and general affairs only b
y
the central authority. It
was under the control of this idea that a national constitution
was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the na
tional government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over exter
nal affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters
o
f
internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union,
strength, and harmony, and without which the purpose in organ
izing the national authority might have been defeated. It is
this, also, that impels the several States, as if b
y
common arrange
ment, to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road and
school districts, and to confer upon each powers o
f
local legisla
tion, and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages where
ever a dense population renders different rules important from
those which are needful for the rural districts.
The system is one which almost seems a part o
f
the very nature
o
f
the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the
realm for the purposes o
f municipal government has existed in
England from the earliest ages; and in America, the first settlers,
* Crabbe's History o
f English Law, Waughan's Revolutions in English
c. 2
;
1 Bl. Com. 114; Hallam's Mid- History, b. 2
,
c. 8
;
Frothingham's
dle Ages, c. 8
, pt. 1
;
2 Kent, 278; Rise of the Republic, 14, 15.
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as if instinctively, adopted it in their frame of govern
ment, and * no other has ever supplanted it
,
o
r
even found [*190]
advocates. In most of the colonies the central power
created and provided for the organization o
f
the towns;" in one
a
t
least the towns preceded and created the central authority;”
but in all, the final result was substantially the same, that towns,
villages, boroughs, cities, and counties exercised the powers o
f
local government, and the Colony or State the powers o
f
a more
general nature.”
* For an interesting history of the
legislation in Connecticut on this sub
ject, see Webster v. Harwinton, 32
Conn. 131. In New Hampshire, see
Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N H
.
351.
The learned note to Commonwealth
v
. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 503, will give
similar information concerning the
organization and authority o
f
towns
in the Massachusetts provinces. And
see People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 98.
Mr. Elliott well says: “The prime
strength o
f
New England and o
f
the
whole republic was and is in the munic
ipal governments and in the homes.”
And he adds, that among the earliest
things decided in Massachusetts was,
“ that trivial things should be ended
in towns.” (1635.) Elliott's New
England, Vol. I. p
.
182.
* Rhode Island; see Arnold's His
tory, c. 7. It is remarked by this
author that, when the charter o
f
Rhode Island was suspended to bring
the Colony under the dominion o
f
Andros, “the American system o
f
town
gorernments, which necessity had com
pelled Rhode Island to initiate fifty
years before, became the means o
f
preserving the individual liberty o
f
the citizen when that of the State or
Colony was crushed.” Arnold, Vol.
I. p
.
487.
* “The townships,” says De
Tocqueville, “are only subordinate
to the State in those interests which
I shall term social, as they are com
mon to all o
f
the citizens. They are
independent in all that concerns them
selves, and among the inhabitants o
f
New England I believe that not a man
is to be found who would acknowl
edge that the State has any right to
interfere in their local interests. The
towns o
f
New England buy and sell,
prosecute o
r
are indicted, augment
o
r
diminish their rates, without the
slightest opposition on the part o
f
the
administrative authority o
f
the State.
They are bound, however, to comply
with the demands o
f
the community.
If a State is in need of money, a town
can neither give nor withhold the
supplies. If a State projects a road,
the township cannot refuse to let it
cross its territory; if a police regula
tion is made by the State, it must be
enforced by the town. A uniform
system o
f
instruction is organized all
over the country, and every town is
bound to establish the schools which
the law ordains. . . . Strict as this
obligation is
,
the government o
f
the
State imposes it in principle only, and
in its performance the township as
sumes all its independent rights.
Thus taxes are voted by the State,
but they are assessed and collected
by the township; the existence o
f
a
school is obligatory, but the township
builds, pays, and superintends it
.
In
France, the State collector receives
the local imposts: in America, the
town collector receives the taxes of
the State. Thus the French govern
ment lends its agents to the commune;
in America, the township is the agent
o
f
the government. The fact alone
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The several State constitutions have been framed with this
system in view, and the delegations of power which they make,
and the express and implied restraints which they impose there
upon, can only be correctly understood and construed by keeping
in view it
s present existence and anticipated continuance. There
are few o
f
the general rules o
f
constitutional law that are not
more o
r
less affected b
y
the fact that the powers o
f government,
instead o
f being concentrated in one body o
f men, are carefully
distributed, with a view to being exercised with intelli
[*191] gence, * economy, and facility, and as far as possible by
the persons most directly and immediately interested.
It has already been seen that the legislature cannot delegate its
power to make laws; but fundamental as this maxim is
,
it is so
qualified by the customs o
f
our race, and b
y
other maxims which
regard local government, that the right o
f
the legislature, in the
entire absence o
f
authorization o
r prohibition, to create towns and
other inferior municipal organizations, and to confer upon them
the powers o
f
local government, and especially o
f
local taxation
and police regulation usual with such corporations, would always
pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded
a
s delegating it
s authority, because the regulation o
f
such local
affairs as are commonly left to local boards and officers is not un
derstood to belong properly to the State; and when it interferes,
a
s
sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local action,
there should b
e
reasons o
f
'State policy or dangers o
f
local abuse
to warrant the interposition."
shows the extent o
f
the differences
which exist between the two nations.”
Democracy in America, c. 5. See
Frothingham's Rise o
f
the Republic,
14–28.
* “It seems to be generally con
ceded that powers o
f
local legislation
may be granted to cities, towns, and
other municipal corporations. And
it would require strong reasons to
satisfy us that it could have been the
design o
f
the framers o
f
our constitu
tion to take from the legislature a
power which has been exercised in
Europe b
y
governments o
f all classes
from the earliest history, and the
exercise o
f
which has probably done
more to promote civilization than all
other causes combined ; which has
been constantly exercised in every
part o
f
our country from it
s
earliest
settlement, and which has raised up
among us many o
f
our most valuable
institutions.” State v. Noyes, 10
Fost. 292, per Bell, J. See also Tan
ner v. Trustees o
f Albion, 5 Hill, 121;
Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228; State
v
. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v.
McKee, 8 B
.
Monr. 433; Smith v.
Levinus, 8 N
.
Y. 472; People v. Dra
per, 15 N
.
Y
. 532; Burgess v. Pue,
2 Gill, 11; New Orleans v. Turpin,
1
3 La. Ann. 56; Gilkeson v. The
Frederick Justices, 13 Grat. 577;
CH. VIII.] THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. 231
The people of the municipalities, however, do not define for
themselves their own rights, privileges, and powers, nor is there
any common law which draws a definite line of distinction be
tween the powers which may be exercised by the State, and those
which must be left to the local governments." The municipalities
must look to the State for such charters of government as the
legislature shall see fi
t
to provide ; and they cannot prescribe for
themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that
those charters will be granted with a recognition o
f
the
general “principles with which we are familiar. The [*192]
charter, o
r
the general law under which they exercise
their powers, is their constitution, in which they must be able to
show authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have T
n
o inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations o
f
government; they are governments o
f
enumerated powers, act
ing by a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature
may exercise such powers o
f government coming within a proper
designation o
f legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly
prohibited, the local authorities can exercise those only which
are expressly o
r impliedly conferred, and subject to such regula
tions o
r
restrictions as are annexed to the grant.”
The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring
upon them o
f
certain powers and subjecting them to correspond
ing duties, does not deprive the legislature o
f
the State o
f
that
general control over their citizens which was before possessed.
J.
Mayor, &c. of New York v. Ryan, 2
E
.
D
. Smith, 368; St. Louis v. Rus
sell, 9 Mo. 503; Bliss v. Kraus, 16
Ohio, N
.
s. 55; Trigally v. Memphis,
6 Cold 382; Durach's Appeal, 63
Penn. St. 491; State v. Wilcox, 45
Mo. 458; Jones v. Richmond, 18
Grat. 517; State v. Neill, 24 Wis.
149; Bradley v. M'Atee, 7 Bush, 667;
s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309; Burckholter v.
M’Connellsville, 20 Ohio, 308; People
v
. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 108; s. c. 9 Am.
Rep. 103; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.
415; Commonwealth v. Coyningham,
65 Penn. St. 76; People v. Kelsey, 34
Cal. 470; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill.
405; Manley v. Raleigh, 4 Jones Eq.
370; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass.
214; Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn.
164; Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50
Ala. 486; Cross v. Hopkins, 6 W. Va.
323.
* As to the common law affecting
these corporate existences, and the
effect o
f usage, see 2 Kent, 278, 279.
* Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass.
272; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn.
254; Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29
Conn. 363; Baldwin v. North Bran
ford, 32 Conn. 47; Webster v. Har
winton, 32 Conn. 131 ; Douglass v.
Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lackland v.
Northern Missouri Railroad Co., 31
Mo. 180; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,
N
.
s. 268; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen,
152: Hess v
. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Ould
v
. Richmond, 23 Grat. 464; Young
blood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406.
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It still has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish
their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two
or more into one, overrule their legislative action whenever it is
deemed unwise, impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them alto
gether in the legislative discretion, and substitute those which are
different."
* St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400;
Coles v. Madison Co., Breese, 115;
Richland County v. Lawrence County,
12 Ill. 1; Trustees of Schools v. Tat
man, 13 Ill. 27; Robertson v. Rock
ford, 21 Ill. 1; People v. Power, 25
Ill. 187; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo.
503; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330;
McKim v. Odorn, 3 Bland, 407;
Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416;
Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat.
247; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen,
27; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361 ;
Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Lang
worthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271 ;
Weeks r. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242;
State r. Branin, 23 N. J. 484; Pat
terson v. Society, &c., 24 N. J. 385;
Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124;
City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo.
94; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532;
Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 76 Penn.
St. 151; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y.
202; Barnes v. District of Columbia,
91 U. S. Rep. 540; Laramie Co. v.
Albany Co., 92 U. S. Rep. 307;
Aspinwall v. Commissioners, &c., 22
How. 364; Howard v. McDiamid, 26
Ark. 100; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64
Penn. St. 169 ; Bradshaw v. Omaha,
1 Neb. 16; Kuhn v. Board of Educa
tion, 4 W. Wa. 499; Sinton v. Ash
bury, 41 Cal. 530; Hess v. Pegg, 7
Nev. 23; Hagerstown v. Schuer, 37
Md. 180; San Francisco v. Canavan,
42 Cal. 541 : State v. Jennings, 27
Ark. 419; Division of Howard Co.,
15 Kan. 194; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss.
53; Goff v. Frederick, 44 Md. 67 ;
Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641.
The legislature may in its discretion
recall to itself and exercise so much
of such powers as it has conferred
The rights and franchises of such a corporation,
upon municipal corporations as is not
secured to them by the constitution.
People v. Pinkney, 32 N. Y. 377.
The creditors of a county cannot pre
vent the legislature reducing its limits,
notwithstanding their security may be
diminished thereby. Wade v. Rich
mond, 18 Grat. 583. Compare Milner
v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 632, and
Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152;
Rader v. Road District, 36 N. J. 273.
This power is not defeated or affected
by the circumstance that the munic
ipal corporation was by it
s
charter
made the trustee o
f
a charity; and in
such case, if the corporation is abol
ished, the Court o
f Chancery may be
empowered and directed b
y
the repeal
ing act to appoint a new trustee to
take charge o
f
the property and exe
cute the trust. Montpelier v. East
Montpelier, 29 Wt. 12. And see Har
rison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Mont
pelier Academy v. George, 14 La. Ann.
406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann.
162; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La.
Ann. 665; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64
Penn. St. 180; Weymouth and Brain
tree Fire Commissioners r. County
Commissioners, 108 Mass. 142. As to
extent o
f power to hold property in
trust, see Hatheway v. Sackett, 32
Mich. 97. But neither the identity o
f
a corporation, nor its right to take
property by devise, is destroyed by a
change in its name, o
r enlargement o
f
its area, o
r
an increase in the number
o
f
its corporators. Girard v. Phila
delphia, 7 Wall. 1. Changing a bor
ough into a city does not o
f itself
abolish o
r
affect the existing borough
ordinances. Trustees of Erie Acad
emy v. City of Erie, 31 Penn. St. 515.
CH. v1.1L] THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. 233
being granted for the purposes of government, can never
* become such vested rights as against the State that they [*193]
cannot be taken away; nor does the charter constitute
a contract in the sense of the constitutional provision which
prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated." Restraints
on the legislative power of control must be found in the consti
tution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative
discretion.”
Nor will it affect the indebtedness of
the corporation, which will continue
to be its indebtedness under its new
organization. Olney v. Harvey, 50
Ill. 453. A general statute, contain
ing a clause repealing a
ll
statutes con
trary to it
s provisions, does not repeal
a clause in a municipal charter on the
same subject. State v. Branin, 23
N. J. 484.
1 This principle was recognized by
the several judges in Dartmouth Col
lege v
. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.
And see People v. Morris, 13 Wend.
331; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507;
Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt.
12; Trustees o
f
Schools v. Tatman,
1
3 Ill. 30; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2
Allen, 27; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La.
Ann. 162; Police Jury v. Shreveport,
5 La. Ann. 665; Mt. Carmel v. Wabash
County, 50 Ill. 69; Lake View v. Rose
Hill Cemetery, 70 Ill. 191; Zitske v.
Goldberg, 38 Wis. 216; Dillon, Mun.
Corp. §§ 24, 30, 37.
* See ante, p
. *35; post, pp. *230,
*233. “Where a corporation is the
mere creature o
f legislative will, es
tablished for the general good and en
dowed b
y
the State alone, the legisla
ture may, a
t pleasure, modify the law
b
y
which it was created. For in that
case there would be but one party ef
fected, - the government itself, -and
therefore not a contract within the
meaning o
f
the constitution. The trus
tees o
f
such a corporation would be the
mere mandatories o
f
the State, hav
ing n
o personal interest involved,
and could not complain o
f any law
If the legislative action in these cases operates inju
that might abridge o
r destroy their
agency.” Montpelier Academy v.
George, 14 La. Ann. 406. In Trustees
o
f
Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30, the
court say: “Public corporations are
but parts o
f
the machinery employed
in carrying on the affairs of the State;
and they are subject to be changed,
modified, o
r destroyed, as the exigen
cies o
f
the public may demand. The
State may exercise a general superin
tendence and control over them and
their rights and effects, so that their
property is not diverted from the uses
and objects for which it was given or
purchased.” It is a lawful exercise
o
f legislative authority upon the di
vision o
f counties, towns, &c., to con
fer a part o
f
the corporate property o
f
the old corporation upon the new,
and to direct the old body to pay it
over to the new. Harrison v. Bridge
ton, 16 Mass. 16; Salem Turnpike v.
Essex Co., 100 Mass. 282; Whitney v.
Stow, 111 Mass. 368; Stove v. Charles
town, 114 Mass. 214; Sedgwich Co.
v
. Banker, 14 Kan. 498; Portwood
v
. Montgomery, 52 Miss. 523 ; Bris
tol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Mil
waukee Town v. Milwaukee City, 12
Wis. 93 ; Marshall Co. Court v.
Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93.
But it seems that an apportionment
o
f property can only be made at the
time of the division. Windham v.
Portland, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v.
Franklin, 16 Mass. 76. See Richland
v
. Lawrence, 12 Ill. 8
;
Bowdoinham
v
. Richmond, 6 Me. 112. In the
latter case, it was held that the ap
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riously to the municipalities or to individuals, the remedy is not
with the courts. The courts have no power to interfere, and the
people must be looked to, to right through the ballot-box all
these wrongs." This is the general rule; and the exceptions to
it are not numerous, and will be indicated hereafter.
portionment of debts between an old
town and one created from it was in
the nature of a contract; and it was
not in the power of the legislature
afterwards to release the new town
ship from payment of it
s
share a
s
thus determined. But the case of
Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann.
515, is contra. See also Borough o
f
Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 374,
which in principle seems to accord
with the Louisiana case. In Burns v.
Clarion County. 62 Penn. St. 422, it
was held the legislature had the power
to open a settlement made b
y
county
auditors with the county treasurer,
and to compel them to settle with
him on principles o
f equity. See
further, Cambridge v. Lexington, 17
Pick. 222; Attorney-General v. Cam
bridge, 16 Gray, 247; Clark v. Cam
bridge, &c. Bridge Proprietors, 104
Mass. 236. The legislature has power
to lay out a road through several
towns, and apportion the expense
between them. Waterville v. Kenne
beck County, 59 Me. 80; Common
wealth v. Newburyport, 103 Mass.
129. And it may change the law
and redistribute the burden after
wards, if from a change of circum
stances or other reasons it is deemed
just and proper to do so. Scituate
v
. Weymouth, 108 Mass. 131, and
cases cited. A statute abolishing
school districts is not void on grounds
like the following: that it takes the
property o
f
the districts without com
pensation; that the taxes imposed
will not be proportional and reason
able, or that contracts will be effected.
Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40.
See Weymouth, &c. Fire District v.
County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 142.
! “The correction of these abuses
is as readily attained a
t
the ballot-box
a
s it would be by subjecting it to
judicial revision. A citizen or a num
ber o
f
citizens may be subtracted
from a county free from debt, having
no taxation for county purposes, and
added to a
n adjacent one, whose debts
are heavy, and whose taxing powers
are exercised to the utmost extent
allowed by law, and this, too, without
consulting their wishes. It is done
every day. Perhaps a majority o
f
the
people, thus annexed to an adjacent
o
r
thrown into a new county b
y
the
division o
f
an old one, may have
petitioned the legislature for this
change; but this is no relief to the
outvoted minority, o
r
the individual
who deems himself oppressed and
vexed by the change. Must we,
then, to prevent such occasional hard
ships, deny the power entirely?
“It must be borne in mind that these
corporations, whether established over
cities, counties, o
r townships (where
such incorporated subdivisions exist),
are never intrusted and can never be
intrusted with any legislative power
inconsistent o
r conflicting with the
general laws o
f
the land, o
r deroga
tory to those rights either o
f person
o
r property which the constitution
and the general laws guarantee. They
are strictly subordinate to the general
laws, and merely created to carry out
the purposes o
f
those laws with more
certainty and efficiency. They may
be and sometimes are intrusted with
powers which properly appertain to
private corporations, and in such mat
ters their power as mere municipal
corporations ceases.” City o
f
St.
Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 414.
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* Powers of Public Corporations. [*194]
The powers of these corporations are either express or implied.
The former are those which the legislative act under which they
exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are neces
sary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and
which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the
intention of the legislative grant." Certain powers are also inci
dental to corporations, and will be possessed unless expressly or
by implication prohibited. Of these an English writer has said:
“A municipal corporation has at common law few powers beyond
those of electing, governing, and removing it
s members, and
regulating its franchises and property. The power o
f
it
s govern
ing officers can only extend to the administration o
f
the by-laws
and other ordinances by which the body is regulated.”” But
without being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and
be sued; may have a common seal; may purchase and
hold lands and other “property for corporate purposes, [*195]
and convey the same ; may make by-laws whenever
necessary to accomplish the design o
f
the incorporation, and
enforce the same by penalties; and may enter into contracts to
effectuate the corporate purposes.” Except as to these incidental
powers, and which need not be, though they usually are, men
tioned in the charter, the charter itself, o
r
the general law under
which they exist, is the measure o
f
the authority to be exercised.
And the general disposition of the courts in this country has
been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict con
struction o
f
the grants o
f powers in their charters will assign to
them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied
1 2 Kent, 278, note; Halstead v.
Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 N
.
Y
.
433; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 112;
New London v. Brainerd, 22 Conn.
552; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H
.
424;
McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311;
La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark
v
. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; State v.
Morristown, 33 N. J. 63; Beaty v.
Knowler, 4 Pet. 162; Mills v. Gleason,
11 Wis. 470. In this last case, it was
held that these corporations had im
plied power to borrow money for
corporate purposes. And see also
Ketcham v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356.
* Willcock on Municipal Corpora
tions, tit. 769.
* Angell & Ames on Corp. §§ 111,
239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102; State v.
Ferguson, 33 N
.
H. 430. See Dillon,
Mun. Corp., for an examination, in
the light o
f
the authorities, o
f
the
several powers here mentioned.
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to charters of private incorporation." The reasonable presump
tion is that the State has granted in clear and unmistakable
terms a
ll
it has designed to grant at all.
1 Under a city charter which au
thorized the common council to ap
point assessors for the purpose o
f
awarding damages to those through
whose property a street might be
opened, and to assess such damages
on the property benefited, it was de
cided that the council were not em
powered to levy a tax to pay for the
other expenses o
f opening the street.
Reed c. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a
power to enact by-laws and ordinances
to abate and remove nuisances will
not authorize the passing o
f
an ordi
nance to prevent nuisances, o
r
to im
pose penalties for the creation thereof.
Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559.
A power to impose penalties for ob
structions to streets would not author
ize the like penalties for encroachments
upon streets, where, under the general
laws o
f
the State, the offences are
recognized a
s different and distinct.
Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich.
54. Authority to levy a tax on real
and personal estate would not warrant
a
n
income tax, especially when such
a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor
o
f
Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Geo. 23.
It will appear, therefore, that powers
near akin to those expressly conferred
are not, for that reason, to be taken
by implication. And see Common
wealth v. Erie and N. E. Railroad
Co., 27 Penn. St. 339. This rule
has often been applied where author
ity has been asserted on behalf of a
municipal corporation to loan its credit
to corporations formed to construct
works o
f
internal improvement. See
La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. A
power to pass ordinances to prohibit
the sale or giving away o
f intoxicating
liquors in certain special cases is an
implied exclusion o
f
the power to pro
hibit the sale or giving away in other
cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N
.
H
.
424. In Dunham v. Rochester, 5
Cow. 465, it is said: “For all the
purposes o
f jurisdiction, corporations
are like the inferior courts, and must
show the power given them in every
case. If this be wanting, their pro
ceedings must beholden void whenever
they come in question, even collater
ally; for they are not judicial and
subject to direct review on certiorari.
2 Kyd on Corp. 104–107.” The power
to create indebtedness does not by
implication carry with it a power to
tax for it
s payment. Jeffries v. Law
rence, 42 Iowa, 498. The approving
vote o
f
the citizens cannot give an
authority the law has not conferred.
McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48.
See Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37
N
. J. 191. The power “to enact
ordinances necessary for government”
does not authorize the grant o
f
the
franchise o
f
a toll-bridge. Williams v.
Davidson, 43 Tex. 1. In Nashville
v
. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, four o
f
the
eight justices o
f
the Supreme Court
denied the power o
f municipal corpo
rations to borrow money o
r
issue secu
rities unless expressly authorized. Says
Bradley, J.: “Such a power does not
belong to a municipal corporation a
s
an incident o
f
its creation. To be
possessed it must be conferred by
legislation, either express or implied.
It does not belong, as a mere matter
o
f course, to local government to raise
loans. Such governments are not
created for any such purpose. Their
powers are prescribed b
y
their char
ters, and those charters provide the
means for exercising the powers; and
the creation o
f specific means excludes
others.” Compare Bank o
f Chilli
cothe v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, 353; Clark
v
. School District, 3 R. I. 199; State
v
. Common Council o
f Madison, 7
Wis. 688; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis.
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* It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to [*196]
deal with a corporation on the supposition that it pos
sesses powers which it does not, or to contract in any other
manner than is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed,
notwithstanding he may have complied with the undertaking on
his part, to maintain a suit against the corporation based upon
its unauthorized action. Even where a party is induced to enter
upon work for a corporation by the false representations of cor
porate officers, in regard to the existence of facts on which by
law the power of the corporation to enter upon the work depends,
these false representations cannot have the effect to give a power
which in the particular case was wanting, or to validate a con
tract otherwise void, and therefore can afford no ground of action
against the corporation; but every party contracting with it must
take notice of any want of authority which the public records
would show."
470; Hamlin v. Meadville (Sup. Ct.
Nebraska), 2 Western Jurist, 596. See
also Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468;
Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28
Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Doug
lass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount
Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399;
Hooper c. Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor,
&c. of Macon v. Macon and Western
R. R. Co., 7 Geo. 224; Hopple v.
Brown, 13 Ohio, N. s. 311; Lackland
v. Northern Missouri Railroad Co.,
31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal.
524; Bennett v. Borough of Birming
ham, 31 Penn. St. 15; Tucker v.
Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20; Leaven
worth v. Norton, 1 Kan. 432; Kyle
v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Johnson v. Phila
delphia, 60 Penn. St. 451; Kniper v.
Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; Johnston v.
Louisville, 11 Bush, 527; Williams v.
1Javidson, 43 Tex. 1; Burrit v. New
Haven, 42 Conn. 174; Logan c. Payne,
43 Iowa, 524; Field v. Des Moines,
39 Iowa, 575; Vance v. Little Rock, 30
Ark. 435; English v. Chicot County,
26 Ark. 454; Pullen v. Raleigh, 68
N. C. 451; Chisholm v. Montgomery,
2 Woods, 584.
1 The common council of Williams
This is the general rule, and the cases of unau
burg had power to open, regulate,
grade, and pave streets, but only upon
petition signed by one-third of the
persons owning lands within the assess
ment limits. A party entered into a
contract with the corporation for im
proving a street upon the false repre
sentations of the council that such a
petition had been presented. Held,
that the provision of the law being
public, and a
ll
the proceedings leading
to a determination by the council to
make a particular improvement being
matters o
f record, a
ll persons were
chargeable with notice o
f
the law and
such proceedings; and that, notwith
standing the false representations, no
action would lie against the city for
work done under the contract. Swift
v
. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427. “If
the plaintiff can recover on the state
o
f
facts he has stated in his complaint,
the restrictions and limitations which
the legislature sought to impose upon
the powers o
f
the common council
will g
o
for nothing. And yet these
provisions are matters o
f substance,
and were designed to be o
f
some ser
vice to the constituents of the coin
mon council. They were intended to
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thorized action which may bind the corporation are exceptional,
and will be referred to further on.
protect the owners of lands and the
tax-payers of the city, as well against
the frauds and impositions of the con
tractors who might be employed to
make local improvements, as against
the illegal acts of the common council
themselves in employing the contrac
tors. But if the plaintiff can recover
in this action, of what value or effect
are all these safeguards? If the com
mon council desire to make a local
improvement, which the persons to be
benefited thereby, and to be assessed
therefor, are unwilling to have made,
the consent of the owners may be
wholly dispensed with, according to
the plaintiff’s theory. The common
council have only to represent that
the proper petition has been presented
and the proper proceedings have been
taken, to warrant the improvement.
They then enter into the contract.
The improvement is made. Those
other safeguards for an assessment of
the expenses and for reviewing the
proceedings may or may not be taken.
But when the work is completed and
is to be paid for, it is found that the
common council have no authority to
lay any assessment or collect a dollar
from the property benefited by the
improvement. The contractor then
brings his action, and recovers from
the city the damages he has sustained
by the failure of the city to pay him
the contract price. The ground of
his action is the falsity of the repre
sentations made to him. But the
truth or falsity of such representations
might have been ascertained by the
party with the use of the most ordi
nary care and diligence. The existence
of the proper petition, and the taking
of the necessary initiatory steps to
warrant the improvement, were doubt
less referred to and recited in the con
tract made with the plaintiff. And
he thus became again directly charge
able with notice of the contents of all
these papers. It is obvious that the
restrictions and limitations imposed
by the law cannot be thus evaded.
The consent of the parties interested
in such improvements cannot be dis
pensed with; the responsibility, which
the conditions precedent created by
the statute impose, cannot be thrown
off in this manner. For the effect of
doing so is to shift entirely the burden
of making these local improvements,
to relieve those on whom the law
sought to impose the expense, and
to throw it on others who are not
liable either in law or morals.”
So where the charter of Detroit
provided that no public work should
be contracted for or commenced until
an assessment had been levied to de
fray the expense, and that no such
work should be paid or contracted to
be paid for, except out of the proceeds
of the tax thus levied, it was held,
that the city corporation had no power
to make itself responsible for the price
of any public work, and that such
work could only be paid for by funds
actually in the hands of the city treas
urer, provided for the specific pur
pose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich.
279. But if the city receives the
fund and misappropriates it
,
it will
b
e liable. Lansing v. Van Gorder,
24 Mich. 456.
Parties dealing with the agents
o
r
officers o
f municipal corporations
must, a
t
their own peril, take notice
o
f
the limits o
f
the powers both o
f
the municipal corporation, and o
f
those assuming to act o
n
its behalf.
State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Gould
v
. Sterling, 23 N
.
Y
. 464; Clark v.
Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209; Veeder v.
Lima, 19 Wis. 280; East Oakland
v
. Skinner, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 255; Dillon,
Mun. Corp. § 381.
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* Corporations by Prescription and Implication. [*197]
The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and
enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than
probable that in some instances they had no better foundation
than an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other
cases the royal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time,
and the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively
upon reputation, or upon the inference to be drawn from the
exercise of corporate functions. In all these cases it seems to be
the law that the corporate existence may be maintained on the
ground of prescription ; that is to say, the exercise of corporate
rights for a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary is sufficient evidence that such rights were once granted
by competent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right
and not by usurpation." And this presumption concludes the
crown, notwithstanding the maxim that the crown shall lose no
rights by lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a
grant might be predicated, a jury is bound to presume a grant
from that prescription.” In this particular the claim to a cor
porate franchise stands on the same ground as any claim of pri
vate right which requires a grant for it
s support, and is to be
sustained under the same circumstances of continuous assertion
and enjoyment.” And even the grant o
f
a charter b
y
the crown
will not preclude the claim to corporate rights b
y
prescription ;
for a new charter does not extinguish old privileges.”
A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evi
dence that a charter has been granted within the time o
f memory.
Such evidence is addressed to a jury, and, though not conclusive
upon them, yet if it reasonably satisfies their minds, it will justify
1 Introduction to Willcock on Mu
nicipal Corporations; The King v.
Mayor, &c. of Stratford upon Avon,
14 East, 360; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35
Barb. 326. See Londonderry v. An
dover, 28 Vt. 416.
* Mayor o
f Hull v. Horner, Cowp.
108, per Lord Mansfield. Compare
People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470;
State v. Bunker, 59 Me. 366.
* 2 Kent, 277; Angell & Ames
on Corp. § 70; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14.
* Hadduck's Case, T
. Raym. 439;
The King v. Mayor, &c. of Stratford
upon Avon, 14 East, 360; Bow v.
Allenstown, 34 N. H. 366. See Jame
son v. People, 16 Ill. 259.
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them in a verdict finding the corporate existence. “There is a
great difference,” says Lord Mansfield, “between length of time
which operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is only used
by way of evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time
that operates as a bar; as where the Statute of Limitations is
pleaded in bar to a debt; though the jury is satisfied that the
debt is due and unpaid, it is still a bar. So in the case of pre
scription. If it be time out of mind, a jury is bound to conclude
the right from that prescription, if there could be a legal com
mencement of the right. But any written evidence, showing
that there was a time when the prescription did not exist, is an
answer to a claim founded on prescription. But length of time
used merely by way of evidence may be left to the consideration
of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw their inference
one way or the other according to circumstances.”" The same
ruling has been had in several cases in the courts of this country,
where corporate powers had been exercised, but no charter could
be produced. In one of these cases, common reputation that a
charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the jury;
the court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great fires
in the capital of the colony had destroyed many of the public
records.” In other cases there was evidence of various acts
which could only lawfully and properly be done by a corporation,
covering a period of thirty, forty, or fifty years, and done with
the knowledge of the State and without question.” The infer
ence of corporate powers, however, is not one of law ; but is to
be drawn as a fact by the jury.”
Wherever a corporation is found to exist by prescription, the
same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend,
[*198] would apply as in other cases. * The presumption as to
the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the
usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage
did not warrant.
1 Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp.
108, 109; citing, among other cases,
Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co. 5.
* Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 552.
And see Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H.
351; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487.
* Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge,
12 Mass. 400; New Boston v. Dun
barton, 13 N. H. 409, and 15 N. H.
201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H.
351; Trott v. Warren, 2 Fairf. 227.
* New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15
N. H. 201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34
N. H. 351; Mayor of Hull v. Horner,
14 East, 102.
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Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication.
When that power in the State which can create corporations
grants to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or im
poses upon them such burdens, as can only be properly held,
enjoyed, continued, or borne, according to the terms of the grant,
by a corporate entity, the intention to create such corporate entity
is to be presumed, and corporate capacity is held to be conferred
so far as is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or
burden. On this subject it will be sufficient for our purpose to
refer to authorities named in the note." In these cases the rule
of strict construction of corporate powers applies with unusual
force.
Municipal By-Laws.
The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited
in various ways.
1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the United States and
of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, and
which directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally
upon a
ll
the instruments o
f government created b
y
the State. If
a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli
gation o
f contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under
the State with delegated authority.” By-laws, therefore, which in
their operation would be ea post facto, or violate contracts, are
not within the power o
f municipal corporations;..and whatever
1 Dyer, 400, cited by Lord Kenyon,
in Russell v. Men o
f Devon, 2 T. R.
672, and in 2 Kent, 276; Viner’s Abr.
tit. “Corporation; ” Conservators of
River Tone v. Ash, 10 B
.
& C
. 349;
s. c. 10 B
.
& C
.
383, citing case o
f
Sutton Hospital, 10 Co. 28; per Kent,
Chancellor, in Denton v. Jackson, 2
Johns. Ch. 325; Coburn v. Ellen
wood, 4 N. H. 101; Atkinson v.
Bemis, 11 N. H
. 46; North Hemp
stead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109;
Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9
;
per
Shaw, Ch. J., in Stebbins v. Jennings,
1
0 Pick. 188; Mahony v. Bank o
f
the
State, 4 Ark. 620.
* Angell & Ames on Corporations,
§ 332; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn
Central Railroad Co. v. Brooklyn City
Railroad Co., 32 Barb. 358; Illinois
Conference Female College v. Cooper,
25 Ill. 148. The last was a case
where a by-law o
f
a
n educational cor
poration was held void, as violating
the obligation o
f
a contract previously
entered into by the corporation in a
certificate o
f scholarship which it had
issued. See also Davenport, &c. Co.
v
. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving
Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St.
175; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo.
404.
16
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the people by the State constitution have prohibited the State
government from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local
governments.
2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general
laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal char
ter. Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law
must give way." The charter, however, may expressly or by
necessary implication exclude the general laws of the State on
any particular subject, and allow the corporation to pass local
laws at discretion, which may differ from the rule in force else
where.” But in these cases the control of the State is not ex
cluded if the legislature afterward see fit to exercise it;
[*199] nor will conferring a power upon a "corporation to pass
by-laws and impose penalties for the regulation o
f any
specified subject necessarily supersede the State law on the same
subject, but the State law and the by-law may both stand together
if not inconsistent.” Indeed, an act may be a penal offence under
the laws o
f
the State, and further penalties, under proper legisla
tive authority, be imposed for it
s
commission b
y
municipal by
laws, and the enforcement o
f
the one would not preclude the
enforcement of the other.”
1 Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 428;
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York v. Nichols,
4 Hill, 209; Petersburg v. Metzker,
2
1 Ill. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23
Conn. 128; Andrews v. Insurance
Co., 37 Me. 256; Canton v. Nist, 9
Ohio, N
.
s. 439; Carr v. St. Louis, 9
Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie and
Northeast Railroad Co., 27 Penn. St.
339; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa,
59; Conwell v. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419;
March v. Commonwealth, 12 B
.
Monr.
25. See Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo.
410; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb.
48; State v. Georgia Medical Society,
38 Geo. 629; Pesterfield v. Vickers,
3 Cold. 205; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1
Ohio, N
.
s. 268; Wirth v. Wilming
ton, 68 N. C
.
24.
* State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. 54; State
v
. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512; Covington
v
. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 518; Coulter
ville v. Gillen, 72 Ill. 599. Peculiar
and exceptional regulations may even
b
e
made applicable to particular por
tions o
f
a city only, and yet not be in
valid. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick.
504; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97
Mass. 222, per Hoar, J.; St. Louis v.
Weber, 44 Mo. 547.
* City o
f
St. Louis v. Bentz, 11
Mo. 61; City of St. Louis v. Cafferata,
2
4 Mo. 97; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend.
261; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281;
Mayor, &c. o
f
Mobile v. Allaire, 14
Ala. 400.
* Such is the clear weight o
f au
thority, though the decisions are not
uniform. In Rogers v. Jones, 1
Wend. 261, it is said: “But it is said
that the by-law o
f
a town o
r corpora
tion is void, if the legislature have
regulated the subject by law. If the
legislature have passed a law regulat
ing as to certain things in a city, I
apprehend the corporation are not
thereby restricted from making fur
ther regulations. Cases o
f
this kind
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* 3. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. When- [*200]
ever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a mat
have occurred and never been ques
tioned on that ground; it is only to
notice a case or two out of many.
The legislature have imposed a pen
alty of one dollar for servile labor on
Sunday; the corporation of New York
have passed a by-law imposing the
penalty of five dollars for the same
offence. As to storing gunpowder in
New York, the legislature and corpo
ration have each imposed the same
penalty. Suits to recover the penalty
have been sustained under the corpo
ration law. It is believed that the
ground has never been taken that
there was a conflict with the State
law. One of these cases is reported
in 12 Johns. 122. The question was
open for discussion, but not noticed.”
In Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Allaire,
14 Ala. 400, the validity of a munici
pal by-law imposing a fine of fifty
dollars, for an assault and battery com
mitted within the city, was brought
in question. Collier, Ch. J., says, p.
403: “The object of the power con
ferred by the charter, and the pur
pose of the ordinance itself, was not
to punish for an offence against the
criminal justice of the country, but
to provide a mere police regulation, for
the enforcement of good order and
quiet within the limits of the corpo
ration. So far as an offence has been
committed against the public peace
and morals, the corporate authorities
have no power to inflict punishment,
and we are not informed that they
have attempted to arrogate it
.
It
is altogether immaterial whether the
State tribunal has interfered and ex
ercised its powers in bringing the
defendant before it to answer for the
assault and battery; for whether he
has there been punished or acquitted
is alike unimportant. The offence
against the corporation and the State
we have seen are distinguishable and
wholly disconnected, and the prosecu.
tion at the suit o
f
each proceeds upon
a different hypothesis; the one con
templates the observance o
f
the peace
and good order o
f
the city; the other
has a more enlarged object in view,
the maintenance o
f
the peace and
dignity o
f
the State.” See also
Mayor, &c. o
f
Mobile v. Rouse, 8
Ala. 515; Intendant, &c. of Greens
boro’ v. Mullins, 13 Ala. 341; Mayor,
&c. o
f
New York v. Hyatt, 3 E
.
D
.
Smith, 156; People v. Stevens, 13
Wend. 341; Blatchley v. Moser, 15
Wend. 215; Levy v. State, 6 Ind.
281; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351;
Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337;
Amboy v. Sleeper, 31 lll. 499; St.
Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis
v
. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; Shafer v.
Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Brownville v.
Cook, 4 Neb. 101; State v. Ludwig,
2
1 Minn. 202. On the other hand, it
was held in State v. Cowan, 29 Mo.
330, that where a municipal corpora
tion was authorized to take cogni
zance o
f
and punish an act as an
offence against its ordinances which
was also an offence against the gen
eral laws o
f
the State, and this power
was exercised and the party punished,
h
e could not afterwards be proceeded
against under the State law. “The
constitution,” say the court, “forbids
that a person shall be twice punished
for the same offence. To hold that
a party can be prosecuted for an act
under the State laws, after he has
been punished for the same act b
y
the
municipal corporation within whose
limits the act was done, would be to
overthrow the power o
f
the General
Assembly to create corporations to
aid in the management o
f
the affairs
o
f
the State. For a power in the
State to punish, after a punishment
had been inflicted b
y
the corporate
authorities, could only find a support
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ter of law, declare them void.” To render them reasonable, they
should tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the
[* 201] objects for which the corporation * was created and its
powers conferred. A by-law, that persons chosen annu
in the assumption that all the proceed
ings on the part of the corporation
were null and void. The circum
stance that the municipal authorities
have not exclusive jurisdiction over
the acts which constitute offences
within their limits does not affect the
question. It is enough that their
jurisdiction is not excluded. If it
exists, – although it may be concur
rent, — if it is exercised, it is valid
and binding so long as it is a consti
tutional principle that no man may be
punished twice for the same offence.”
This case seems to be supported by
State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 216, and
the case of Slaughter v. People, cited
below, goes still further. Those
which hold that the party may be
punished under both the State and
the municipal law are within the prin
ciple of Fox v. State, 5 How. 410;
Moore v. People, 14 How 13. And
see Phillips v. People, 55 Ill. 429. In
Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo.
692, it was held that authority to a
municipal corporation to “regulate
the police of the city” gave it no
power to pass an ordinance for the
punishment of indictable offences.
And in Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug.
(Mich.) 334, it was held not compe
tent to punish, under city by-laws, an
indictable offence.
Where an act is expressly or by
implication permitted by the State
law, it cannot be forbidden by the
corporation. Thus, the statutes of
New York established certain regula
tions for the putting up and marking
of pressed hay, and provided that such
hay might be sold without deduction
for tare, and by the weight as marked,
or any other standard weight that
should be agreed upon. It was held
that the city of New York had no
power to prohibit under a penalty the
sale of such hay without inspection;
this being obviously inconsistent with
the statute which gave a right to sell
if its regulations were complied with.
Mayor, &c. of New York v. Nichols,
4 Hill, 209.
* 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107;
Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587;
Chamberlain of London v. Compton,
7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Cren, 9
B. & C. 52; Gosling v. Veley, 12
Q. B. 347; Dunham v. Rochester, 5
Cow. 462; Mayor, &c. of Memphis v.
Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v.
Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Waters v. Leech,
3 Ark. 110; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan,
364; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461;
Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Austin
v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Godard,
Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Common
wealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462;
Commissioners v. Gas Co., 12 Penn.
St. 318; State v. Jersey City, 29
N. J. 170; Gallatin v. Bradford, 1
Bibb, 209; Carew v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 15 Mich. 525; State
v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Pedrick
v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161; St. Louis v.
Weber, 44 Mo. 550. But where the
question of the reasonableness of a
by-law depends upon evidence, and it
relates to a subject within the juris
diction of the corporation, the court
will presume it to be reasonable until
the contrary is shown. Common
wealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. And
see St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 550.
To be reasonable, by-laws should be
equal in their operation. Tugman v.
Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Bailing v. West,
29 Wis. 307.
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ally as stewards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a
dinner on election day to the freemen of the society, - the free
men not being the electors nor required to attend, and the office
of steward being for no other purpose but that of giving the din
ner, — was held not connected with the business of the corporation,
and not tending to promote it
s objects, and therefore unreasonable
and void." And where a statute permitted a municipal corpora
tion to license the sale o
f intoxicating drinks and to charge a
license fee therefor, a by-law requiring the payment o
f
a license
fee o
f
one thousand dollars was held void a
s
not advancing the
purpose o
f
the law, but as being in it
s
nature prohibitory.” And
if a corporation has power to prohibit the carrying on of danger
ous occupations within it
s limits, a by-law which should permit
one person to carry on such an occupation and prohibit another,
who had an equal right, from pursuing the same business; o
r
which should allow the business to be carried on in existing
buildings, but prohibit the erection o
f
others for it
,
would be
unreasonable.” And a right to license an employment does not
imply a right to charge a license fee therefor with a view to reve
nue, unless such seems to be the manifest purpose o
f
the power;
but the authority of the corporation will be limited to such a
charge for the license as will cover the necessary expenses o
f issu
ing it
,
and the additional labor o
f
officers and other expenses
thereby imposed. A license is issued under the police power;
but the exaction of a license fee with a view to revenue would
be an exercise o
f
the power o
f
taxation ; and the charter must
* Society o
f
Scriveners v. Brook
ing, 3 Q
.
B
.
95. See, o
n this general
subject, Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 251–
264.
* Ez parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461 ;
Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728. A
by-law declaring the keeping on hand
of intoxicating liquors a nuisance was
held unreasonable and void in Sulli
van v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242. That
which is not a nuisance in fact cannot
be made such by municipal ordi
nance. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Joliet, 79 Ill. 25; Wreford v. People,
14 Mich. 41.
* Mayor, &c. o
f
Hudson v. Thorne,
7 Paige, 261. A power to prevent
and regulate the carrying on o
f man
ufactures dangerous in causing o
r
promoting fires does not authorize an
ordinance prohibiting the erection o
f
wooden buildings within the city, o
r
to limit the size of buildings which
individuals shall be permitted to erect
o
n their own premises. Ibid. An
ordinance for the destruction of
property as a nuisance without a
judicial hearing is void. Darst v.
People, 51 Ill. 286. An ordinance
for the arrest and imprisonment with
out warrant o
f
a person refusing to
assist in extinguishing a fire is void.
Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431.
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plainly show an intent to confer that power, or the municipal
corporation cannot assume it."
* A by-law to be reasonable should be certain. If it
affixes a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such
penalty should be a fixed and certain sum, and not left to the
discretion of the officer or court which is to impose it on convic
tion ; though a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain
sum has been held not to be void for uncertainty.”
So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the
general principles of the common law. If it is in general re
straint of trade, – like the by-law that no person shall exercise
the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the
company of painters, – it will be void on this ground.” To take
ſ' 202
* State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & J.
506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s.
268; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio,
625; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Halst.
64; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298;
Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham,
31 Penn. St. 15 ; Commonwealth v.
Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v.
People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor, &c. of
Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144 ; John
son v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451;
State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Mayor,
&c. of New York v. Second Avenue
R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; Home Ins.
Co. v. Augusta, 50 Geo. 530. Nev
ertheless, the courts will not inquire
very closely into the expense of a
license with a view to adjudge it a
tax, where it does not appear to be
unreasonable in amount in view of its
purpose as a regulation. Ash v.
People, 11 Mich. 347; Johnson v.
Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451; Bur
lington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa,
102. And in some cases it has been
held that license fees might be im
posed under the police power with a
view to operate as a restriction upon
the business or thing licensed. Carter
v. Dow, 16 Wis. 299; Tenney v. Lenz,
16 Wis. 567, See State v. Cassidy,
22 Minn. 312. But in such cases,
where the right to impose such license
fees can be fairly deduced from the
charter, it would perhaps be safer and
less liable to lead to confusion and
difficulty to refer the corporate au
thority to the taxing power, rather
than exclusively to the power of
regulation. See Dunham v. Trustees
of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the
extent of the police power. Fees
which are imposed under the inspec
tion laws of the State are akin to
license fees, and if exacted not for
revenue, but to meet the expenses
of regulation, are to be referred to
the police power. Cincinnati Gas
Light Co. v. State, “18 Ohio, N. s.
243. On this subject in general, see
Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 291–308.
* Mayor, &c. of Huntsville v.
Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor,
&c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144.
And see Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. &
W. 624.
* Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52;
Chamberlain of London v. Compton,
7 D. & R. 597. Compare Hayden
v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Willard v.
Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247. But a
by-law is not void, as in restraint of
trade, which requires loaves of bread
baked for sale to be of specified
weight and properly stamped, or
which requires bakers to be licensed.
Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3
Ala. 137.
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an illustration from a private corporation: It has been held that
a by-law of a bank, that a
ll payments made or received b
y
the bank
must be examined a
t
the time, and mistakes corrected before the
dealer leaves, was unreasonable and invalid, and that a recovery
might be had against the bank for an over-payment discovered
afterwards, notwithstanding the by-law." So a by-law o
f
a town,
which, under pretence o
f regulating the fishery o
f
clams and
oysters within its limits, prohibits a
ll persons except the inhabi
tants o
f
the town from taking shell-fish in a navigable
river, is void as in contravention o
f
common right.” "And [*203]
for like reasons a by-law is void which abridges the rights
and privileges conferred b
y
the general laws o
f
the State, unless
express authority therefor can be pointed out in the corporate
charter.” And a by-law which assumes to be a police regulation,
but deprives a party o
f
the use o
f
his property without regard to
the public good, under the pretence o
f
the preservation o
f health,
when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose o
f
the
regulation, will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement o
f
the right o
f property without any compensating advantages.”
1 Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank v.
Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin v.
Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209. Although
these are cases o
f private corpora
tions, they are cited here because the
rules governing the authority to make
by-laws are the same with both classes
o
f corporations.
* Hayden r. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391.
As it had been previously held that
every person has a common-law right
to fish in a navigable river o
r
arm o
f
the sea, until b
y
some legal mode o
f
appropriation this common right was
extinguished, - Peck v. Lockwood,
5 Day, 22, — the by-law in effect
deprived every citizen, except resi
dents o
f
the township, o
f rights which
were rested, so far as from the nature
o
f
the case a right could be vested.
See also Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio,
427. That a right to regulate does
not include a right to prohibit, see
also Er parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461;
Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. And
see Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435,
28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.
* Dunham v. Trustees of Roches
ter, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. See
Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301.
* By a by-law o
f
the town o
f
Charlestown a
ll persons were pro
hibited, without license from the
selectmen, from burying any dead
body brought into town on any part
o
f
their own premises o
r
elsewhere
within the town. By the court,
Wilde, J. : “A by-law to be valid
must be reasonable ; it must be legi,
fidei, rationi consona. Now if this
regulation o
r prohibition had been
limited to the populous part o
f
the
town, and were made in good faith
for the purpose of preserving the
health o
f
the inhabitants, which may
b
e in some degree exposed to danger
by the allowance o
f
interments in the
midst o
f
a dense population, it would
have been a very reasonable regula
tion. But it cannot be pretended
that this by-law was made for the
preservation o
f
the health o
f
the in
habitants. Its restraints extend many
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[*204] * Delegation of Municipal Powers.
Another and very important limitation which rests upon mu
nicipal powers is that they shall be executed by the municipality
miles into the country, to the utmost
limits of the town. Now such an
unnecessary restraint upon the right
of interring the dead we think essen
tially unreasonable. If Charlestown
may lawfully make such a by-law as
this, all the towns adjoining Boston
may impose similar restraints, and
consequently a
ll
those who die in
Boston must o
f
necessity b
e interred
within the precincts o
f
the city. That
this would be prejudicial to the health
o
f
the inhabitants, especially in the
hot seasons o
f
the year, and when
epidemic diseases prevail, seems to
b
e
a well-established opinion. Inter
ments, therefore, in cities and large
populous towns, ought to be discoun
tenanced, and no obstacles should be
permitted to the establishment o
f
cemeteries a
t
suitable places in the
vicinity. The by-law in question is
therefore an unreasonable restraint
upon many o
f
the citizens o
f Boston,
who are desirous o
f burying their
dead without the city, and for that
reason void. And this by-law would
seem to be void for another reason.
A by-law for the total restraint of
one's right is void; as if a man be
barred of the use of his land. Com.
Dig. By-Law, c. 4. The land where
the bodies were interred was the land
o
f
the Catholic Bishop o
f Boston, pur
chased b
y
him in 1830, and then con
secrated a
s
a Catholic burying-ground,
and has ever since been used as such,
for the interment of Catholics dying
in Charlestown and Boston. It is true
the by-law does not operate to the
total restraint o
r deprivation o
f
the
bishop's right, but it is a total re
straint o
f
the right o
f
the burying
the dead in Boston, for which a part
o
f
the burying-ground was appropri
ated. The illegality of the by-law is
the same, whether it may deprive one
o
f
the use o
f
a part o
r
the whole o
f
his property; no one can be so de
prived, unless the public good re
quires it
.
And the law will not allow
the right o
f private property to be in
vaded under the guise o
f
a police reg
ulation for the preservation of health,
when it is manifest that such is not
the object and purpose o
f
the regula
tion. Now we think this is manifest
from the case stated in regard to the
by-law in question. It is a clear and
direct infringement o
f
the right o
f
property, without any compensating
advantages, and not a police regula
tion made in good faith for the pres
ervation o
f
health. It interdicts, or
in its operation necessarily intercepts,
the sacred use to which the Catholic
burying-ground was appropriated and
consecrated, according to the forms o
f
the Catholic religion; and such an in
terference, we are constrained to say,
is wholly unauthorized and most un
reasonable.” Austin v. Murray, 16
Pick. 125. So in Wreford v. People,
14 Mich. 41, the common council o
f
Detroit, under a power granted by
statute to compel the owners and occu
pants o
f slaughter-houses to cleanse
and abate them whenever necessary
for the health of the inhabitants, as
sumed to pass an ordinance altogether
prohibiting the slaughtering o
f ani
mals within certain limits in the city:
and it was held void. See further
State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170.
Upon the whole subject o
f municipal
by-laws, see Angell & Ames o
n Corp.
c. 10; Grant on Corp. 76 et seq.
See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.)
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itself, or by such agencies or officers as the statute has pointed
out. So far as it
s
functions are legislative, they rest in the dis
cretion and judgment o
f
the municipal body intrusted with them,
and that body cannot refer the exercise o
f
the power to the dis
cretion and judgment o
f
it
s
subordinates o
r o
f any other author
ity. So strictly is this rule applied, that when a city charter
authorized the common council o
f
the city to make by-laws and
ordinances ordering and directing any o
f
the streets to b
e pitched,
levelled, paved, flagged, &c., o
r
for the altering or repair
ing the * same, “within such time and in such manner as [*205]
they may prescribe under the superintendence and direc
tion o
f
the city superintendent,” and the common council passed
a
n
ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, levelled,
and flagged, “in such manner as the city superintendent, under
the direction o
f
the committee on roads o
f
the common council,
shall direct and require,” the ordinance was held void, because
it left to the city superintendent and the committee of the com
mon council the decision which, under the law, must be made by
the council itself. The trust was an important and delicate one,
a
s
the expenses o
f
the improvement were, b
y
the statute, to b
e
paid by the owners o
f
the property in front o
f
which it was
made. It was in effect a power of taxation ; and taxation is the
exercise o
f sovereign authority; and nothing short o
f
the most
positive and explicit language could justify the court in holding
that the legislature intended to confer such a power, or permit it
to be conferred, on a city officer or committee. The statute in
question not only contained no such language, but, on the con
Vol. I. p
. 88; Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 12.
The subject of the reasonableness of
by-laws was considered at some length
in People v. Medical Society of Erie,
24 Barb. 570, and Same v. Same, 32
N. Y. 187. In the first case, it was
held that a regulation subjecting a
member o
f
the County Medical Society
to expulsion, for charging less than
the established fees, was unreasonable
and void. In the second, it was de
cided that where a party had the pre
scribed qualifications for admission to
the society, he could not be refused
admission, on the ground o
f
his having
previous to that time failed to observe
the code o
f
medical ethics prescribed
by the society for it
s
members. Mu
nicipal by-laws may impose penalties
o
n parties guilty o
f
a violation thereof,
but they cannot impose forfeiture o
f
property o
r rights, without express
legislative authority. State v. Fer
guson, 33 N
.
H
.
430; Phillips v. Allen,
41 Penn. St. 481. See also Kirk v.
Nowell, 1 T
.
R
.
124; White v. Tall
man, 2 Dutch. 67; Hart v. Albany, 9
Wend. 588 ; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29
Ill. 317; St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn.
41.
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trary, clearly expressed the intention of confining the exercise of
this power to the common council, the members of which were
elected by and responsible to those whose property they were
thus allowed to tax."
This restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests
upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the
same reasons. The people in the one case in creating the legis
lative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring
the corporate powers, have selected the depository of the power
which they have designed should be exercised, and in confiding
it to such depository have impliedly prohibited its being exercised
by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose
cannot be assignable at the will
* Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6
N. Y. 92. See also Smith v. Morse, 2
Cal. 524; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13
Cal. 540; Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan,
364; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50
Ill. 28; Rogers v. Collier, 43 Mo. 359;
State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 309;
Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; Lyon v.
Jerome, 26 Wend. 485; State v. Pat
terson, 34 N. J. 168; State v. Fiske,
9 R. I. 94; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72
Ill. 462; Davis v. Reed, 65 N. Y. 566;
Supervisors of Jackson v. Brush, 77
Ill. 59; Thomson v. Booneville, 61
Mo. 282; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 60.
* The charter of Washington gave
the corporation authority “to author
ize the drawing of lotteries, for effect
ing any important improvement in
the city, which the ordinary funds or
revenue thereof will not accomplish;
provided that the amount raised in
each year shall not exceed ten thou
sand dollars. And provided also that
the object for which the money is
intended to be raised shall be first
submitted to the President of the
United States, and shall be approved
by him.” Marshall, Ch. J., speaking
of this authority, says: “There is
great weight in the argument that it
is a trust, and an important trust,
confided to the corporation itself, for
the purpose of effecting important
of the trustee.”
improvements in the city, and ought,
therefore, to be executed under the
immediate authority and inspection
of the corporation. It is reasonable
to suppose that Congress, when grant
ing a power to authorize gaming,
would feel some solicitude respecting
the fairness with which the power
should be used, and would take as
many precautions against its abuse as
was compatible with it
s
beneficial ex
ercise. Accordingly, we find a limi
tation upon the amount to be raised,
and on the object for which the lottery
may be authorized. It is to be for
any important improvement in the
city, which the ordinary funds o
r
revenue thereof will not accomplish ;
and it is subjected to the judgment
of the President of the United States.
The power thus cautiously granted is
deposited with the corporation itself,
without an indication that it is assign
able. It is to be exercised like other
corporate powers, by the agents o
f
the corporation under it
s
control.
While it remains where Congress has
placed it
,
the character o
f
the corpo
ration affords some security against
its abuse, – some security that no
other mischief will result from it than
is inseparable from the thing itself.
But if the management, control, and
responsibility may be transferred to
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* Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and [*206]
these municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall
adopt no irrepealable legislation. No legislative body can so
part with it
s powers by any proceeding as not to be able to con
tinue the exercise of them. It can and should exercise them
again and again, as often as the public interests require." Such
a body has n
o power, even b
y contract, to control and embarrass
it
s legislative powers and duties. On this ground it has been
held, that a grant o
f
land b
y
a municipal corporation, for the
purposes o
f
a cemetery, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment by
the grantee, could not preclude the corporation, in the exercise
o
f
its police powers, from prohibiting any further use o
f
the land
for cemetery purposes, when the advance o
f population threat
ened to make such use a public nuisance.” So when “a lot is
granted a
s
a place o
f deposit for gunpowder, o
r
other purpose
innocent in itself at the time; it is devoted to that purpose till,
in the progress o
f population, it becomes dangerous to the prop
erty, the safety, or the lives o
f hundreds; it cannot be that the
mere form o
f
the grant, because the parties choose to make it
particular instead o
f general and absolute, should prevent the
use to which it is limited being regarded and treated as a nui
sance, when it becomes so in fact. In this way the legislative
powers essential to the comfort and preservation o
f
populous communities might be frittered away into “per- [*207]
fect insignificance. To allow rights thus to be par
celled out and secured beyond control would fix a principle by
which our cities and villages might be broken up. Nuisances
might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to an intolerable
extent.” "
And on the same ground it is held, that a municipal corpora
tion, having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets,
any adventurer who will purchase, all 32 N
. Y. 261. Compare Kincaid's
the security for fairness which is fur
nished b
y
character and responsibility
is lost.” Clark v. Washington, 12
Wheat. 54.
* East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 10 How. 535; Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§ 61. -
* Brick Presbyterian Church v.
City of New York, 5 Cow. 540; New
York v. Second Avenue R
.
R
. Co.,
Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5
Am. Rep. 377.
* Coats v. Mayor, &c. of New
York, 7 Cow. 605. See also Davis
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 14 N
.
Y
.
506; Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c.
o
f
New York, 3 Duer, 119 ; State v.
Graves, 19 Md. 51; Gozzle v. George
town, 6 Wheat. 597; Louisville City
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.
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does not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from
changing it as the public needs or interest may seem to require,
notwithstanding the incidental injury which must result to
those individuals who have erected buildings with reference
to the first grade.” So a corporation having power under the
charter to establish and regulate streets cannot under this au
thority, without explicit legislative consent, permit individuals to
lay down a railway in one of it
s streets, and confer privileges
exclusive in their character and designed to be perpetual in
duration. In a case where this was attempted, it has been said
b
y
the court: “The corporation has the exclusive right to con
trol and regulate the use o
f
the streets o
f
the city. In this
respect, it is endowed with legislative sovereignty. The exercise
o
f
that sovereignty has n
o limit, so long as it is within the ob
jects and trusts for which the power is conferred. . An ordinance
regulating a street is a legislative act, entirely beyond the control
o
f
the judicial power o
f
the State. But the resolution in ques
tion is not such an act. Though it relates to a street, and very
materially affects the mode in which that street is to be used, yet
* Calendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417;
Griggs v. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Rad
cliffe's Executors v. Brooklyn, 4 N
.
Y
.
195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466;
O'Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St.
187; Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Penn.
St. 233; Shinner v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 29 Conn. 523; Snyder v. Rock
port, 6 Ind. 237; La Fayette v. Bush,
1
9 Ind. 326; La Fayette v. Fowler,
34 Ind. 140; Keal v. Keokuk, 4
Greene (Iowa), 47; Cole v. Muscatine,
1
4 Iowa, 296; Russell v. Burlington,
3
0 Iowa, 262; Roberts r. Chicago, 26
Ill. 249: Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Ill.
279; Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231;
Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R
.
I. 154;
Rome v. Omberg, 28 Geo. 46; Roll v.
Augusta, 34 Geo. 326; Reynolds v.
Shreveport, 13 La. Ann. 426; White
v
. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Humes
v
. Mayor, &c., 1 Humph. 403; St. Louis
v
. Gumo, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor v. St.
Louis, 14 Mo. 20; Keasy v. Louisville,
4 Dana, 154; Smith v. Washington,
2
0 How. 135; Blount v. Janesville,
3
1 Wis. 648; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill.
502; Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich.
164: Wegmann v. Jefferson, 61 Mo.
55. Compare Louisville v. Rolling
Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416. The law
would seem to be otherwise declared
in Ohio. See Rhodes v. Cincinnati,
1
0 Ohio, 159; McCombs v. Akron, 15
Ohio, 474; s. c. 18 Ohio, 229; Craw
ford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N
.
S
. 459.
Compare Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16
Wis. 256. Courts will not undertake
to control municipal discretion in the
matter o
f improving streets. Dun
ham v. Hyde Park, 75 Ill. 371; Brush
v
. Carbondale, 78 Ill. 74. The owner
o
f
a lot on a city street acquires n
o
prescriptive right to collateral support
for his buildings which can render
the city liable for injuries caused b
y
grading the street. Mitchell v. Rome,
49 Geo. 19; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 669;
Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231; s. c. 20
Am. Rep. 243. But the failure to
use due care and prudence in grading
may render the city liable. Bloom
ington v. Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194.
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in its essential features it is a contract. Privileges exclusive in
their nature and designed to be perpetual in their duration are
conferred. Instead o
f regulating the use o
f
the street, the use
itself to the extent specified in the resolution is granted to the
associates. For what has been deemed an adequate considera
tion, the corporation has assumed to surrender a portion o
f
their
municipal authority, and has in legal effect agreed with the de
fendants that, so far as they may have occasion to use the street
for the purpose o
f constructing and operating their rail
road, the right to regulate * and control the use o
f
that [*208]
street shall not be exercised. . . . It cannot be that
powers vested in the corporation as an important public trust can
thus be frittered away, or parcelled out to individuals o
r joint
stock associations, and secured to them beyond control.” "
So it has been held, that the city of Philadelphia exercised a
portion o
f
the public right o
f
eminent domain in respect to the
streets within its limits, subject only to the higher control o
f
the
State and the use o
f
the people ; and therefore a written license
granted b
y
the city, though upon a valuable consideration, au
thorizing the holder to connect his property with the city railway
b
y
a turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent
the city from abandoning o
r removing the railway whenever, in
the opinion o
f
the city authorities, such action would tend to the
benefit o
f
it
s police.”
Thus hedged in b
y
the limitations which control the legislative
power o
f
the State, these corporations are also entitled to the
same protection which surrounds the exercise o
f
State legislative
power. One o
f
these is
,
that no right o
f
action shall arise in
favor o
f
a
n individual for incidental injury suffered b
y
him in
consequence o
f
their adopting
1 Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435;
s. c. 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.
See also Davis v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 14 N. Y. 506; State v. Mayor,
&c., 3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19
Md. 351. Compare Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. People, 73 Ill. 541. The con
sent o
f
the legislature in any such
case would relieve it of all difficulty,
except so far as questions might arise
concerning the right o
f
individuals to
compensation, as to which see post,
o
r failing to adopt legislative
c. 15. In Milhau v. Sharp, supra, it
was also held that a corporation, with
authority “from time to time to regu
late the rates o
f
fare to be charged
for the carriage of persons,” could
not by resolution divest itself thereof
a
s to the carriages employed on a
street-railway.
* Bryson v. Philadelphia, 47 Penn.
St. 329. Compare Louisville City
R. R
.
Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415.
254 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. VIII.
action." Another is
,
that the same presumption that they have
proceeded upon sufficient information and with correct motives
shall support their legislative action which supports the statutes
o
f
the State, and precludes judicial inquiry on these points.”
These rules, however, must be confined to those cases
[*209] where the corporation * is exercising a discretionary
power, and where the reasons which are to determine
whether it shall act or not, and if it does, what the action shall
be, are addressed to the municipal body exclusively. If the
corporation is in the position o
f
trustee o
f property for other
persons, it is subject to the same supervision and control with
other trustees, and where a specific act is required b
y
law to be
done, exact performance may be compelled a
s in other cases.
Among the implied powers o
f
such a
n organization appears to
b
e
the power to defend and indemnify it
s
officers where they have
incurred liability in the bona fide discharge o
f
their duty. It has
been decided in a case where irregularities had occurred in the
assessment o
f
a tax, in consequence o
f
which the tax was void,
and the assessors had refunded to the persons taxed the moneys
which had been collected and paid into the town, county, and
State treasuries, that the town had authority to vote to raise a sum
1 Radcliffe's Ex’rs v. Mayor, &c.
o
f Brooklyn, 4 N
.
Y
. 195; Duke v.
Mayor, &c. of Rome, 20 Geo. 635;
Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich.
88; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich.
125; Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark.
572; Tate v. M. K. & T
.
R
.
R
. Co.,
6
4 Mo. 149; St. Louis v. Gurno, 12
Mo. 414; Griffin v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 9 N. Y. 456; Mills v.
Brooklyn, 32 N
.
Y
. 489; Hines v.
Lockport, 50 N
.
Y
. 236; Davenport
v
. Stevenson, 34 Iowa, 225; Bennett
v
. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 120;
Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,
39; Western College v. Cleveland,
1
2 Ohio, N
.
s. 375; Barton v. Syra
cuse, 37 Barb. 292; Wheeler v. Cin
cinnati, 19 Ohio, N
.
s. 19; s. c. 2 Am.
Rep. 368; Hewson v. New Haven,
3
7 Conn. 475; Murtagh v. St. Louis,
44 Mo. 480; Commissioners v. Duck
ett, 20 Md. 468; Carr v. Northern
Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324; Grant v.
Erie, 69 Penn. St. 420; s. c. 8 Am.
Rep. 272; Sparhawk v. Salem, 1
Allen, 30; Randall v. Eastern R
.
Corp., 106 Mass. 276; s. c. 8 Am.
Rep. 326; Hughes v. Baltimore,
Taney, 243. But this doctrine does
not deprive an individual o
f remedy
when b
y
reason o
f
the negligent con
struction o
f
a public work his property
is injured, o
r
when the necessary
result o
f
its construction is to flood or
otherwise injure his property in a man
ner that would render a private individ
ual liable. See Van Pelt v. Davenport,
2
0 Am. Rep. 622, and note thereto,
p
.
626; Merrifield v. Worcester, 110
Mass. 216; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 592;
Wegmann v. Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55;
Union v. Durkes, 38 N. J. 21.
* Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193;
New York and Harlaem Railroad Co.
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 1 Hilton,
562; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282;
Freeport v. Marks, 59 Penn. St. 253.
Compare State v. Cincinnati Gas Co.,
1
8 Ohio, N
.
S
. 262.
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of money in order to refund to the assessors what had been so
paid by them, and that such vote was a legal promise to pay, on
which the assessors might maintain action against the town. “The
general purpose of this vote,” it was said, “was just and wise.
The inhabitants, finding that three of their townsmen, who had
been elected by themselves to an office, which they could not, with
out incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently and inad
vertently committed an error which, in strictness of law, annulled
their proceedings, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to the whole
extent of their property, if al
l
the inhabitants individually should
avail themselves o
f
their strict legal rights, – finding also that the
treasury o
f
the town had been supplied b
y
the very money which
these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund from their
own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the very per
sons who had rigorously exacted it from the assessors, or who were
about to do it
,
had themselves shared in due proportion the benefits
and use o
f
the money which had been paid into the treasury, in
the shape o
f schools, highways, and various other objects which
the necessities of a municipal institution call for, – concluded to
reassess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in a manner
which would have produced perfect justice to every individual of
the corporation, and would have protected the assessors from the
effects of their inadvertence in the assessment which was found to
be invalid. The inhabitants o
f
the town had a perfect right to
make this reassessment, if they had a right to raise the money
originally. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a town can
not be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode of ap
portioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be
incurred, duties must be performed, b
y
every town; * the [*210]
safety o
f
each individual depends upon the execution o
f
the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be an inherent
power in every town to bring the money necessary for the pur
poses o
f
it
s
creation into the treasury; and if it
s
course is obstructed
by the ignorance or mistakes of it
s agents, they may proceed to
enforce the end and object b
y correcting the means; and whether
this be done b
y
resorting to their original power o
f voting to raise
money a second time for the same purposes, or b
y directing to re
assess the sum before raised b
y
vote, is immaterial; perhaps the
latter mode is best, at least it is equally good.”"
1 Per Parker, Ch. J., in Nelson v. v. Windham, 13 Me. 74; Fuller v.
Milford, 7 Pick. 23. See also Baker Groton, 11 Gray, 340; Board of
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It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money
to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defend
ing an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by
them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been ren
dered in their favor." And although it should appear that the
officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet if he has
acted in good faith in an attempt to perform his duty, the town has
the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify
[*211] him.” “And perhaps the legislature may even have power
Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. by the committee. By the court :
Rep. 108; State v. Hammonton, 38
N. J. 430; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 404.
The duty, however, must have been
one authorized by law, and the matter
one in which the corporation had an
interest. Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41
Conn. 76 ; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 485.
In Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123,
it appeared that a township treas
urer had been robbed of town moneys,
but had accounted to the township
therefor. An act of the legislature
was then obtained for refunding this
sum to him by tax. Held, not justi
fied by the constitution of the State,
which forbids the allowance of de
mands against the public by the legis
lature. See People v. Supervisor of
Onondaga, 16 Mich. 254.
A municipal corporation, it is said,
may offer rewards for the detection of
offenders within its limits; but its
promise to reward an officer for that
which, without such reward, it was
his duty to do, is void. Dillon, Mun.
Corp. § 91, and cases cited. And see
note, p. 212, supra.
* Fuller v. Inhabitants of Groton,
11 Gray, 340. See also Hadsell v.
Inhabitants of Hancock, 3 Gray, 526;
Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. 278.
* A surveyor of highways cut a
drain for the purpose of raising a legal
question as to the bounds of the high
way, and the town appointed a com
mittee to defend an action brought
against the surveyor therefor, and
voted to defray the expenses incurred
“It is the duty of a town to repair all
highways within its bounds, at the
expense of the inhabitants, so that
the same may be safe and convenient
for travellers ; and we think it has the
power, as incident to this duty, to
indemnify the surveyor, or other
agent, against any charge or liability
he may incur in the bona fide dis
charge of this duty, although it may
turn out on investigation that he mis
took his legal rights and authority.
The act by which the surveyor in
curred a liability was the digging a
ditch, as a drain for the security of
the highway; and if it was done for
the purpose of raising a legal question
as to the bounds of the highway, as
the defendants offered to prove at the
trial, the town had, nevertheless, a
right to adopt the act, for they were
interested in the subject, being bound
to keep the highway in repair. They
had, therefore, a right to determine
whether they would defend the sur
veyor or not; and having determined
the question, and appointed the plain
tiffs a committee to carry on the de
fence, they cannot now be allowed to
deny their liability, after the com
mittee have paid the charges incurred
under the authority of the town. The
town had a right to act on the sub
ject-matter which was within their
jurisdiction; and their votes are bind
ing and create a legal obligation,
although they were under no previous
obligation to indemnify the surveyor.
CH. viii.] THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. 257
to compel the town, in such a case, to reimburse its officers the
expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken discharge
of what they believed to be their
by vote, has refused to do so."
duty, notwithstanding the town,
Construction of Municipal Powers.
The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed
with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies
of the State in local government.”
That towns have an authority to de
fend and indemnify their agents who
may incur a liability by an inadver
tent error, or in the performance of
their duties imposed on them by law,
is fully maintained by the case of
Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18.”
Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 568.
And see Briggs v. Whipple, 6 Vt. 95;
Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431.
* Guilford v. Supervisors of Che
nango, 13 N. Y. 143. See this case
commented upon by Lyon, J., in
State v. Tappen, 29 Wis. 674, 680.
On the page last mentioned it is said,
“We have seen no case except in the
courts of New York, which holds that
such moral obligation gives the legis
lature power to compel payment.”
And see Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich.
123. Where officers make themselves
liable to penalties for refusal to per
form duty, the corporation has no
authority to indemnify them. Hal
stead v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
3 N. Y. 430; Merrill v. Plainfield,
45 N. H. 126. See Frost v. Belmont,
6 Allen, 152; People v. Lawrence, 6
Hill, 244; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12
Cush. 105.
* A somewhat peculiar question
was involved in the case of Jones v.
Richmond, 18 Grat. 517. In antici
pation of the evacuation of the city of
Richmond by the Confederate author
ities, and under the apprehension that
scenes of disorder might follow which
The State can create them for
would be aggravated by the opportu
nity to obtain intoxicating liquors,
the common council ordered the seiz
ure and destruction of all such liquors
within the city, and pledged the faith
of the city to the payment of the
value. The Court of Appeals of
Virginia afterwards decided that the
city might be held liable on the pledge
in an action of assumpsit. Rices, J.,
says: “By its charter the council is
specially empowered to ‘pass a
ll by
laws, rules, and regulations which
they shall deem necessary for the
peace, comfort, convenience, good
order, good morals, health, o
r safety
o
f
said city, o
r
o
f
the people o
r prop
erty therein.” It is hard to conceive
o
f larger terms for the grant of sover
eign legislative powers to the specified
end than those thus employed in the
charter; and they must be taken b
y
necessary and unavoidable intendment
to comprise the powers o
f
eminent
domain within these limits o
f pre
scribed jurisdiction. There were two
modes open to the council: first, to
direct the destruction o
f
these stores,
leaving the question o
f
the city's
liability therefor to be afterwards liti
gated and determined; or, secondly,
assuming their liability, to contract
for the values destroyed under their
orders. Had they pursued the first
mode, the corporation would have
been liable in an action o
f trespass
for the damages; but they thought
17
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no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no
other end, without at once coming in conflict with the constitu
tional maxim, that legislative power cannot be delegated, or with
other maxims designed to confine all the agencies of government
to the exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the
municipality shall attempt to exercise powers not within the
proper province of local self-government, whether the right to do
so be claimed under express legislative grant, or by implication
from the charter, the act must be considered as altogether ultra
vires, and therefore void.
A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best
illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of
Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its
citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for
that purpose entered into contract with a hotel keeper to provide
the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The
entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was
brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority, under
it
s charter, to raise and expend moneys for various specified pur
poses, and also “to defray the contingent and other expenses of
the city.” But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no
part o
f municipal self-government, and it has never been
[*212] considered, * where the common law has prevailed, that
the power to d
o
so pertained to the government in any o
f
its departments. The contract was therefore held void, as not
within the province o
f
the city government."
proper to adopt the latter mode, make
it a matter of contract, and approach
their citizens, not as trespassers, but
with the amicable proffer o
f
a formal
receipt and the plighted faith o
f
the
city for the payment. In this they
seem to me to be well justified.”
Judge Dillon doubts the soundness o
f
this decision. Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§ 371, note. The case seems to us
analogous in principle to that o
f
the
destruction o
f buildings to stop the
progress o
f
a fire. In each case pri
vate property is destroyed to antici
pate and prevent an impending public
calamity. See post, pp. *526, *594.
* Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110.
See also the case of New London v.
Brainard, 22 Conn. 552, which fol
lows and approves this case. The
cases differ in this only : that in the
first suit was brought to enforce
the illegal contract, while in the
second the city was enjoined from
paying over moneys which it had
appropriated for the purposes o
f
the
celebration. The cases of Tash v.
Adams, 10 Cush. 252, and Hood v.
Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, are to the same
effect. A town, it has been held,
cannot lawfully be assessed to pay a
reward offered by a vote o
f
the town
for the apprehension and conviction
o
f
a person supposed to have com
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The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a
duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally
for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal, and
judgment recovered. The board of supervisors then assumed, on
behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgments,
together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts
to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts.
It was held, that these drafts upon the public treasury to indem
nify officers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted
and void, and that it made no difference that the officers had
acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in
the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitu
tional. The city had no interest in the suits against the super
visors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments
and costs was not within either the express or implied powers
conferred upon the board." It was in fact appropriating the pub
lic money for private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must
consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the
right of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In
a recent case in Iowa it is said: “No instance occurs to us in
which it would be competent for [a municipal corporation] to
loan its credit or make its accommodation paper for the bene
fi
t
o
f
citizens to enable them to execute private enterprises; ””
and where it cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it
mitted murder therein. Gale v. South * Halstead v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
Berwick, 51 Me. 174. Nor, under its
general authority to raise money for
“necessary town charges,” is a town
authorized to raise and expend moneys
to send lobbyists to the legislature.
Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250.
Or, under like authority, to furnish
a uniform for a volunteer military
company. Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4
Gray, 502. Where a municipal cor
poration enters into a contract ultra
vires, no implied contract arises to
compensate the contractor for any
thing he may have done under it
,
not
withstanding the corporation may
have reaped a benefit therefrom.
McSpedon v. New York, 7 Bosw.
601; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20
Cal. 96.
York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar
case in People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill,
244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis,
12 Mo. 444; Vincent v. Nantucket,
1
2 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11
Pick. 396; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45
N. H. 126.
* Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
224; Carter v. Dubuque, 35 Iowa,
416. See Tyson v. School Directors,
5
1 Penn. St. 9
;
Freeland v. Hastings,
1
0 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston,
5
9 Me. 545; Kelly v. Marshall, 69
Penn. St. 319; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me.
124; s. c. Am. Law Reg., Aug. 1873,
with note by Judge Redfield; s. c.
1
1 Am. Rep. 185.
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[*213] is equally without * power to appropriate the moneys in its
treasury, o
r by the conduct o
f
it
s
officers to subject itself
to implied obligations."
The powers conferred upon the municipal governments must
also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial
limits embraced within the municipality; and the fact that these
powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exer
cise except within those limits. A general power “to purchase,
hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use " of
the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corpo
rate limits for that purpose.” Without some special provision
they cannot, as o
f course, possess any control or rights over lands
lying outside ; * and the taxes they levy o
f
their own authority
and the moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.”
But the question is a very different one how far the legislature
o
f
the State may authorize the corporation to extend it
s
action to
objects outside the city limits, and to engage in enterprises of a
public nature which may be expected to benefit the citizens o
f
the municipality in common with the people o
f
the State a
t large,
and also in some special and peculiar manner, but which never
theless are not under the control o
f
the corporation, and are so
* “In determining whether the
subject-matter is within the legiti
mate authority o
f
the town, one o
f
the tests is to ascertain whether the
expenses were incurred in relation to
a subject specially placed b
y
law in
other hands. . . . It is a decisive
test against the validity o
f
a
ll grants
o
f
money by towns for objects liable
to that objection, but it does not
settle questions arising upon expendi
tures for objects not specially provided
for. In such cases the question will
still recur, whether the expenditure
was within the jurisdiction o
f
the
town. It may be safely assumed that,
if the subject of the expenditure be in
furtherance o
f
some duty enjoined by
statute, o
r
in exoneration o
f
the citi
zens o
f
the town from a liability to a
common burden, a contract made in
reference to it will be valid and bind
ing upon the town.” Allen v. Taun
ton, 19 Pick. 487. See Tucker v.
Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20. It is no
objection to the validity o
f
an act
which authorizes an expenditure for
a town-hall that rooms to be rented
for stores are contained in it. White
v
. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578.
* Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y
.
64.
See Tucker v. Coldwater, 36 Mich.
* Per Kent, Chancellor, 1)enton v.
Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 336. And see
Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171;
Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N
.
s. 564;
North Hempstead v. Hempstead,
Hopk. 294; Concord v. Boscawen, 17
N. H
. 465; Tucker v. Coldwater, 36
Mich.
* In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick.
396, the action o
f
a town appropri
ating money in aid o
f
the construction
o
f
a county road, was held void and
no protection to the officers who had
expended it
.
See also Concord v.
Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465.
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far aside from the ordinary purposes of local governments that
assistance by the municipality in such enterprises would not
be warranted under any general grant of power for municipal
government. For a few years past the sessions of the legisla
tive bodies of the several States have been prolific in
* legislation which has resulted in flooding the country [*214]
with municipal securities issued in aid of works of public
improvement, to be owned, controlled, and operated by private
parties, or by corporations created for the purpose; the works
themselves being designed for the convenience of the people of
the State at large, but being nevertheless supposed to be specially
beneficial to certain localities because running near or through
them, and therefore justifying, it is supposed, the imposition of a
special burden by taxation upon such localities to aid in their
construction." We have elsewhere * referred to cases in which
it has been held that the legislature may constitutionally author
ize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to the stock of
railroad companies, or to loan them their credit, and to tax their
citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or other securities
issued as loans, where a peculiar benefit to the municipality was
anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in these cases,
if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows such munici
palities to impose burdens upon their citizens to construct local
streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the ground
that “the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected
with the [municipality] and it
s
interests as to conduce obviously
and in a special manner to their prosperity and advancement.” "
* In Merrick v. Inhabitants of Am- 44. It seems not inappropriate to
herst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held com
petent for the legislature to authorize
a town to raise money by taxation for
a State agricultural college, to be lo
cated therein. The case, however, we
think, stands on different reasons
from those where aid has been voted
by municipalities to public improve.
ments. See it explained in Jenkins
v
. Andover, 103 Mass. 94. And see
similar cases referred to, post, p
.
*230, note.
* Ante, p
.
*119.
* Talbot v. Dent, 9 B
.
Monr. 526.
See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
remark in this place that the three
authors who have treated so ably
o
f municipal constitutional law (Mr.
Sedgwick, Stat. & Const. Law, 464),
o
f railway law (Judge Redfield), and
o
f municipal corporations (Judge Dil
lon) have all united in condemning
this legislation as unsound and un
warranted by the principles o
f consti
tutional law. See the views of the
two writers last named in note to the
case o
f People v. Township Board o
f
Salem, 9 Am. Law Reg. 487. And
Judge Dillon well remarks in his
Treatise on Municipal Corporations
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But there are authorities which dispute their soundness, and it
cannot be denied that this species of legislation has been exceed
(§ 104) that, “regarded in the light
of its effects, there is little hesitation
in affirming that this invention to aid
private enterprises has proved itself
baneful in the last degree.”
If we trace the beginning of this
legislation, we shall find it originating
at a time when there had been little
occasion to consider with care the lim
itations to the functions of municipal
government, because as yet those
functions had been employed with
general caution and prudence, and no
disposition had been manifested to
stretch their powers to make them
embrace matters not usually recog
nized as properly and legitimately
falling within them, or to make use of
the municipal machinery to further
private ends. Nor did the earliest
decisions attract much attention, for
they referred to matters somewhat
local, and the spirit of speculation
was not as yet rife. When the con
struction of railways and canals was
first entered upon by an expenditure
of public funds to any considerable
extent, the States themselves took
them in charge, and for a time appro
priated large sums and incurred in
mense debts in enterprises, some of
which were of high importance and
others of little value, the cost and
management of which threatened them
at length with financial disaster, bank
ruptcy, and possible repudiation. No
long experience was required to dem
onstrate that railways and canals could
not be profitably, prudently, or safely
managed by the shifting administra
tions of State government; and many
of the States not only made provision
for disposing of their interest in works
of public improvement, but, in view
of a bitter experience of the evils
already developed in undertaking to
construct and control them, they
amended their constitutions so as to
prohibit the State, when again the
fever of speculation should prevail,
from engaging anew in such under
takings.
All experience shows, however, that
men are abundant who do not scruple to
evade a constitutional provision which
they find opposed to their desires, if
they can possibly assign a plausible
reason for doing so; and in the case
of the provisions before referred to, it
was not long before persons began
to question their phraseology very
closely, not that they might arrive at
the actual purpose, – which indeed
was obvious enough, – but to dis
cover whether that purpose might not
be defeated without a violation of the
express terms. The purpose clearly
was to remand all such undertakings
to private enterprise, and to protect
the citizens of the State from being
taxed to aid them; but while the
State was forbidden to engage in such
works, it was unfortunately not ex
pressly declared that the several mem
bers of the State, in their corporate
capacity, were also forbidden to do so.
The conclusion sought and reached
was that the agencies of the State
were at liberty to do what was for
bidden to the State itself, and the
burden of debt which the State might
not directly impose upon it
s citizens,
it might indirectly place upon their
shoulders b
y
the aid o
f municipal
action.
The legislation adopted under this
construction some of the courts felt
compelled to sustain, upon the ac
cepted principle o
f
constitutional law
that no legislative authority is for
bidden to the legislature unless for
bidden in terms; and the voting o
f
municipal aid to railroads became
almost a matter of course wherever a
plausible scheme could be presented
b
y
interested parties to invite it
.
In
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ingly mischievous in it
s results, that it has created a great burden
o
f public debt, for which in a large number o
f
cases the antici
some localities, it is true, vigorous
protest was made; but as the hand
ling o
f
a large amount o
f public
money was usually expected to make
the fortune o
f
the projectors, whether
the enterprise proved successful o
r
not, means either fair or unfair were
generally found to overcome all oppo
sition. Towns sometimes voted large
sums to railroads on the ground o
f
local benefit where the actual and
inevitable result was local injury, and
the projectors o
f
one scheme succeeded
in obtaining and negotiating the bonds
o
f
one municipality to the amount o
f
a quarter o
f
a million dollars, which
are now being enforced, though the
work they were to aid was never
seriously begun. A very large per
centage o
f
all the aid voted was paid
to “work up the aid,” sacrificed in
discounts to purchasers o
f bonds, ex
pended in worthless undertakings, o
r
otherwise lost to the tax-payers; and
the cases might almost be said to be
exceptional in which municipalities,
when afterwards they were called upon
to meet their obligations, could do so
with a feeling o
f having received the
expected consideration. Some State
and territorial governors did noble
work in endeavoring to stay this reck
less legislative and municipal action,
and some o
f
the States a
t length ren
dered such action impossible by con
stitutional provisions so plain and
positive that the most ingenious mind
was unable to misunderstand o
r per
vert them.
When the United States entered
upon a scheme o
f
internal improve
ment, the Cumberland road was the
first important project for which its
revenues were demanded. The prom
ises o
f
this enterprise were o
f
conti
mental magnificence and importance,
but they ended after heavy national
expenditures in a road no more na
tional than a thousand others which
the road-masters in the several States
have constructed with the local taxes;
and it was finally abandoned to the
States a
s
a common highway. When
next a great national scheme was
broached, the aid o
f
the general gov
ernment was demanded b
y
way o
f
subsidies to private corporations, who
presented schemes o
f
works o
f great
public convenience and utility, which
were to open up the new territories
to improvement and settlement sooner
than the business o
f
the country
would be likely to induce unaided
private capital to do it
,
and which
consequently appealed to the imagina
tion rather than to facts to demon
strate their importance, and afforded
abundant opportunity for sharp opera
tors to call to their assistance the
national sentiment, then peculiarly
strong and active by reason o
f
the
attempt recently made to overthrow
the government, in favor o
f projects
whose national importance in many
cases the imagination alone could dis
cover. The general result was the
giving away o
f
immense bodies o
f
land, and in some cases the granting
o
f pecuniary aid, with a recklessness
and often with an appearance o
f cor
ruption that a
t length startled the
people, and aroused a public spirit
before which the active spirits in Con
gress who had promoted these grants,
and sometimes even demanded them
in the name o
f
the poor settler in the
wilderness who was unable to get his
crops to market, were compelled to
give way. The scandalous frauds
connected with the Pacific Railway,
which disgraced the nation in the face
o
f
the world, and the great and dis
astrous financial panic o
f 1873, were
legitimate results o
f
such subsidies;
but the pioneer in the wilderness had
long before discovered that land grants
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pated benefit was never received, and that, as is likely to be the
case where municipal governments take part in projects foreign
were not always sought or taken with
a view to an immediate appropriation
to the roads for the construction of
which they were nominally made, but
that the result in many cases was, that
large tracts were thereby kept out of
market and from taxation which
otherwise would have been purchased
and occupied by settlers who would
have lessened his taxes by contribut
ing their share to the public burdens.
The grants, therefore, in such cases,
instead of being at once devoted to
improvements for the benefit of set
tlers, were in fact kept in a state of
nature by the speculators who had
secured them, until the improvements
of settlers in their vicinity could make
the grantees wealthy by the increase
in value which such improvements
gave to the land near them. In say
ing this the admission is freely made
that in many cases the grants were
promptly and honestly appropriated
in accordance with their nominal pur
pose; but the general verdict now is
that the system was necessarily cor
ruptive and tended to invite fraud,
and that some persons of influence
managed to accumulate great wealth
by grants indirectly secured to them
selves under the unfounded pretence
of a desire to aid and encourage the
pioneers in the wilderness.
Some States also have recently in
their corporate capacity again engaged
in issuing bonds to subsidize private
corporations, with the natural result
of serious State scandals, State insol
vency, public discontent, and in some
cases it would seem almost inevita
ble repudiation. Their governments,
amid the disorders of the times, have
fallen into the hands of strangers and
novices, and the hobby of public im
provement has been ridden furiously
under the spur of individual greed.
It has often been well remarked
that the abuse of a power furnishes
no argument against its existence; but
a system so open to abuses may well
challenge attention to it
s
foundations.
And when those foundations are ex
amined, it is not easy to find for them
any sound support in the municipal
constitutional law o
f
this country.
The same reasons which justify sub
sidies to the business of common car
riers by railway will support taxation
in aid o
f any private business what
soever.
It is sometimes loosely said that
railway companies are public corpora
tions, but the law does not so regard
them. It is the settled doctrine of
the law that, like banks, mining com
panies, and manufacturing companies,
they are mere private corporations,
supposed to be organized for the
benefit o
f
the individual corporators,
and subject to no other public super
vision o
r
control than any other
private association for business pur
poses to which corporate powers have
been granted. Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668; Buonaparte
v
. Camden and Amboy R
.
R
. Co.,
Baldw. 205; Eustis v. Parker, 1 N.
H. 237; Ohio, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Ridge, 5 Blackf. 78; Cox v. Louisville
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 48 Ind. 178, 189;
Roanoke, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Davis, 2
Dev. & Bat. 451; Dearborn v. Boston
& M. R. R
. Co., 4 Fost. 179; Trus
tees, &c. v
. Auborn, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
3 Hill, 570; Tinsman v. Belvidere,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 2 Dutch. 148; Thorpe
v
. Rutland, &c. R. R
. Co., 27 Wt.
155; Alabama R
.
R
.
Co. v. Kidd, 29
Ala. 221; Turnpike Co. v. Wallace,
8 Watts, 316; Seymour v. Turnpike
Co., 10 Ohio, 476; Ten Eyck v. D
.
&
R. Canal, 3 Harr. 200; Atlantic, &c.
Telegraph Co. v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 6 Biss. 158; A. & A
.
o
n Corp.
§§ 30–36; Redf. on Railw. c. 3
,
§ 1
;
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to the purposes of their creation, it has furnished unusual facili
ties for fraud and public plunder, and led almost inevitably, at
Pierce on Railroads, 19, 20. Taxation
to subsidize them cannot therefore be
justified on the ground of any public
character they possess, any more than
to subsidize banks or mining compa
nies. It is truly said that it has long
been the settled doctrine that the
right of eminent domain may be em
ployed in their behalf, and it has
sometimes been insisted with much
earnestness that wherever the State
may aid an enterprise under the right
of eminent domain, it may assist it by
taxation also. But the right of tax
ation and the right of eminent domain
are by no means coextensive, and do
not rest wholly upon like reasons.
The former compels the citizen to
contribute his proportion of the pub
lic burden; the latter compels him to
part with nothing for which he is not
to receive pecuniary compensation.
The tax in the one case is an exac
tion, the appropriation in the other is
only a forced sale. To take money
for private purposes under pretence
of taxation is, as has been often said,
but robbery and plunder; to appro
priate under the right of eminent
domain for a private corporation robs
no one, because the corporation pays
for what is taken, and in some cases,
important to the welfare and pros
perity of the community, and where
a public convenience is to be provided,
— as in the case of a grist mill, -it
has long been held competent to ex
ercise the one power, while the other
was conceded to be inadmissible.
Few persons would attempt to justify
a tax in aid of a mill-owner, on the
ground that laws appropriating lands
for his benefit, but at his expense,
have been supported.
The truth is
,
the right to tax in
favor o
f private corporations of any
description must rest upon the broad
ground that the power o
f
the legis
lature, subject only to the express
restrictions o
f
the constitution, is
supreme, and that, in the language o
f
some o
f
the cases, “if there be the
least possibility that making the gift
will be promotive in any degree o
f
the public welfare, it becomes a ques
tion o
f policy, and not o
f
natural
justice, and the determination o
f
the
legislature is conclusive.” (Post, p
.
*489.) But nothing is better settled
on authority than that this strong
language, though entirely true when
it refers to the making provision for
those things which it falls within the
province o
f government to provide for
its citizens, o
r
to the payment for
services performed for the State, o
r
the satisfaction o
f legal, equitable,
o
r
moral obligations resting upon it
,
is wholly inadmissible when the pur
pose is to impose a burden upon one
man for the benefit o
f
another. Many
such cases might be suggested in
which there would not only be a
“possibility,” but even a strong
probability, that a small burden im
posed upon the public to set an in
dividual up in business, o
r
to build
him a house, o
r
otherwise make him
comfortable, would be promotive o
f
the public welfare; but in law the
purpose o
f any such burden is deemed
private, and the incidental benefit to
the public is not recognized as an ad
missible basis of taxation.
In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60
Me. 124, s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 185, it
became necessary to reaffirm a doc
trine, often declared by the courts,
that however great was the power to
tax, it was exceeded, and the legis
lature was attempting the exercise o
f
a power not legislative in its character,
when it undertook to impose a bur
den o
n
the public for a private pur
pose. And it was also held that the
raising o
f money b
y
tax in order to
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last, to discontent; sometimes even to disorder and violence. In
some of the recent revisions of State constitutions, the legislature
has been expressly prohibited from permitting the municipalities
to levy taxes or incur debts in aid of works of public improve
ment, or to become stockholders in private corporations."
loan the same to private parties to
enable them to erect mills and manu
factories in such town, was raising it
for a private purpose, and therefore
illegal. Appleton, Ch. J., most truly
remarks in that case, that “all se
curity of private rights, all protection
of private property, is at an end, when
one is compelled to raise money to
loan at the will of others for their
own use and benefit, when the power
is given to a majority to lend or give
away the property of an unwilling
minority.” And yet how plain it is
that the benefit of the local public
might possibly have been promoted
by the proposed erections! See to
the same effect Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, where the
whole subject is carefully considered
and presented with clearness and force
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller;
also Commercial Bank v. Iola, 2 Dill.
C. C. 353; s. c. 9 Kan. 700; Weis
mer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; s. c.
21 Am. Rep. 586.
These cases are not singular: they
are representative cases; and they
are cited only because they are among
the most recent expressions of judi
cial opinion on the subject. With
them may be placed Lowell v. Boston,
111 Mass. 454, in which the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, after the
great fire of 1872 in Boston, denied
the power of the Commonwealth to
permit taxation in order to loan the
moneys out to the persons who had
suffered by the fire. A like decision
is found in State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan.
418. These decisions of eminent tri
bunals indicate a limit to legislative
power in the matter of taxation, and
hold, what has been decided very
many times before, that it is not
necessary the constitution should for
bid expressly the taxing for private
purposes, since it is implied in the
very idea of taxation that the purpose
must be public, and a taking for any
other purpose is unlawful confiscation.
Cooley on Taxation, 67 et seq.
One difference there undoubtedly
is between the case of a railroad cor
poration and a manufacturing corpo
ration; that there are precedents in
favor of taxing for the one and not
for the other. But if the precedents
are a departure from sound principle,
then, as in every other case where
principle is departed from, evils were
to have been expected. A catalogue
of these would include the squander
ing of the public domain; the enrich
ment of schemers whose policy it has
been, first, to obtain all they can by
fair promises, and then avoid as far
and as long as possible the fulfilment
of the promises; the corruption of
legislation; the loss of State credit;
great public debts recklessly con
tracted for moneys often recklessly
expended; public discontent because
the enterprises fostered from the
public treasury and on the pretence
of public benefit are not believed to
be managed in the public interest;
and, finally, great financial panic,
collapse, and disaster. At such a
cost has the strong expression of dis
sent which all the while has accompa
nied these precedents been disregarded
and set aside.
* The following States have such
provisions in their constitutions: Col
orado, Connecticut, Illinois, Missis
sippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire.
Many of the State constitutions ex
pressly forbid State aid to private
corporations of any sort, and it is
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*Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities [*215]
may be authorized, the first requisite to their validity
would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make
or issue them ; an authority which does not reside in the general
words in which the powers of local self-government are usually
conferred,' and one also which must be carefully followed by the
municipality in a
ll
essential particulars, o
r
the subscription o
r
security will be void.” And while mere irregularities of action,
not going to the essentials o
f
the power, would not prevent par
ties who had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them,
yet as the doings of these corporations are matters o
f public rec
ord, and they have no general power to issue negotiable securi
ties,” any one who becomes holder o
f
such securities, even though
probable that their provisions are
broad enough in some cases to pro
hibit aid by the municipalities also.
* Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.)
171. A general power to borrow
money or incur indebtedness to aid
in the construction o
f “any road or
bridge '’ must be understood to have
reference only to the roads or bridges
within the municipality. Stokes v.
Scott County, 10 Iowa, 173; State v.
Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388; La
fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. There
are decisions in the Supreme Court
o
f
the United States which appear to
b
e to the contrary. The city charter
of Muscatine conferred in detail the
usual powers, and then authorized
the city “to borrow money for any
object in its discretion,” after a vote
o
f
the city in favor o
f
the loan. In
Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, the
court seem to have construed this
clause as authorizing a loan for any
object whatever; though such phrases
are understood usually to be confined
in their scope to the specific objects
before enumerated; o
r
a
t
least to
those embraced within the ordinary
functions o
f municipal governments.
See Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. The
case in 1 Wallace was followed in
Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654,
four justices dissenting. See also
Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270.
A municipal corporation having power
to borrow money, it is held, may make
it
s obligations payable wherever it
shall agree. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1
Wall. 384; Lynde v. County, 16
Wall. 6. But some cases hold that
such obligations can only be made
payable at the corporation treasury,
unless there is express legislative au
thority to make them payable else
where. People v. Tazewell County, 22
Ill. 147; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529.
Such corporations cannot give their
obligations all the qualities of negoti
able paper, without express legislative
permission. Dively v. Cedar Falls,
2
1 Iowa, 565. See Thomas v. Rich
mond, 12 Wall. 349; Dillon, Mun.
Corp. §§ 406, 407.
* See Harding v. Rockford, &c.
R. R
. Co., 65 Ill. 90; Dunnovan v.
Green, 57 Ill. 63; Springfield, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Cold Spring, 72 Ill. 603; People
v
. County Board o
f Cass, 77 Ill. 438;
Cairo, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Sparta, 77
Ill. 505; George v. Oxford, 16 Kan.
72; Hamlin v. Meadville (Sup. Ct.
Neb.), 2 West. Jurist, 596.
* Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
327; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall.
566; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N
.
Y
. 447;
People v. Supervisors o
f E
l Dorado,
1
1 Cal. 170; Diveley v. Cedar Falls,
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they be negotiable in form, will take them with constructive
notice of any want of power in the corporation to issue them,
and cannot enforce them when their issue was unauthorized."
21 Iowa, 566; Smith v. Cheshire, 13
Gray, 318; People v. Gray, 23 Cal.
128; 23 Cal. 447. Compare Emery
v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 315; Sherrard
v. Lafayette Co., 3 Dillon, 236.
* There is consideral confusion in
the cases on this subject. If the cor
poration has no authority to issue
negotiable paper, or if the officers who
assume to do so have no power under
the charter for that purpose, there
can be no doubt that the defence of
want of power may be made by the
corporation in any suit brought on
the securities. Smith v. Cheshire,
13 Gray, 318; Gould v. Sterling, 23
N. Y. 458; Andover v. Grafton, 7
N. H. 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19
Iowa, 209; M'Pherson v. Foster, 43
Iowa, 48; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64
Ill. 249; Big Grove v. Wells, 65 Ill.
263; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S.
Rep. 289; Concord v. Portsmouth
Savings Bank, 92 U. S. Rep. 625;
St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644;
Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297;
Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676;
East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S.
Rep. 255; South Ottowa v. Perkins,
94 U. S. Rep. 260; McClure v. Ox
ford, 94 U. S. Rep. 429. And in
any case, if the holder has received
the securities with notice of any valid
defence, he takes them subject thereto.
But where the corporation has power
to issue negotiable paper in some
cases, and its officers have assumed
to do so in cases not within the char
ter, whether a bona fide holder would
be chargeable with notice of the want
of authority in the particular case, or,
on the other hand, would be entitled
to rely on the securities themselves as
sufficient evidence that they were prop
erly issued when nothing appeared
on their face to apprise him of the
contrary, is a question still open to
some dispute.
In Stoney v. American Life Insur
ance Co., 11 Paige, 635, it was held
that a negotiable security of a corpo
ration which upon its face appears to
have been duly issued by such cor
poration, and in conformity with the
provisions of it
s charter, is valid in
the hands o
f
a bona fide holder thereof
without notice, although such security
was in fact issued for a purpose, and
a
t
a place not authorized b
y
the char
ter o
f
the company, and in violation
of the laws of the State where it was
actually issued. In Gelpecke v. Du
buque, 1 Wall. 203, the law is stated
a
s follows: “Where a corporation has
power, under any circumstances, to
issue negotiable securities, the bona
fide holder has a right to presume
they were issued under the circum
stances which give the requisite au
thority, and they are no more liable
to be impeached for any infirmity in
the hands o
f
such holder than any
other commercial paper.” See also
Commissioners o
f Knox Co. v. Aspin
wall, 21 How. 539; Russell v. Jeffer
sonville, 24 How. 287; Lexington v.
Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Thorn c. Com
missioners o
f Miami Co., 2 Black,
722; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Grat.
338; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex.
405. In Farmers' and Mechanics'
Bank v. The Butchers' and Drovers’
Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, it is said: “A
citizen who deals directly with a cor
poration, o
r
who takes it
s negotiable
paper, is presumed to know the extent
o
f
it
s corporate powers. But when
the paper is
,
upon it
s face, in all
respects such a
s
the corporation has
authority to issue, and its only defect
consists in some extrinsic fact, — such
a
s
the purpose o
r object for which it
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* In some of the cases involving the validity of the [* 216]
subscriptions made or bonds issued by municipal cor
was issued, – to hold that the person
taking the paper must inquire as to
such extraneous fact, of the existence
of which he is in no way apprised,
would obviously conflict with the
whole policy of the law in regard
to negotiable paper.” In Madison
and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. The
Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind. 461,
this doctrine is approved, and a dis
tinction made, in the earlier case of
Smead v. Indianapolis, &c. Railroad
Co., 11 Ind. 104, between paper ex
ecuted ultra vires and that executed
within the power of the corporation,
but, by an abuse of the power in that
particular instance, was repudiated.
In St. Joseph r. Rogers, 16 Wall.
644, it was decided that where power
is conferred to issue bonds, but only
in a particular manner, or subject to
certain regulations, conditions, or
qualifications, and the bonds are
actually issued with recitals showing
compliance with the law, the proof
that any of the recitals are incorrect
will not constitute a defence to a suit
on the bonds, “if it appears that it
was the sole province of the municipal
officers who executed the bonds to
decide whether or not there had been
an antecedent compliance with the
regulation, condition, or qualification
which it is alleged was not fulfilled.”
And see Moran v. Commissioners of
Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; Pendleton
Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297; Chute c.
Winegar, 15 Wall. 355; Venice v.
Murdoch, 92 U. S. Rep. 494; Marcy
v. Oswego, 92 U. S. Rep. 637; Hum
boldt v. Long, 92 U. S. Rep. 642;
Douglas Co. v. Bolles, 94 U. S. Rep.
104; Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U.
S. Rep. 202; Deming v. Houlton, 64
Me. 254; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 253;
Carpenter v. Lathrop, 51 Mo. 483;
Vicksburg v. Lombard, 51 Miss. 111;
Pollard v. Pleasant Hill, 3 Dillon,
195; Davis v. Kendallville, 5 Biss.
280. That neither irregularities in
issuing bonds nor fraud in obtaining
them will be a defence in the hands
of bona fide holders, see foregoing
cases, and also Maxcy v. Williamson
Co., 72 Ill. 207; Nicolay v. St. Clair,
3 Dillon, 163; East Lincoln v. Daven
port, 94 U. S. Rep. 801. In Halstead
v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 Barb.
218, action was brought upon war
rants drawn by the corporation of
New York upon its treasurer, not in
the course of its proper and legitimate
business. It was held that the cor
poration under its charter had no gen
eral power to issue negotiable paper,
though, not being prohibited by law,
it might do so for any debt contracted
in the course of it
s proper legitimate
business. But it was also held that
any negotiable securities not issued by
the defendants in their proper and
legitimate business, are void in the
hands o
f
the plaintiff, although re
ceived b
y
him without actual notice
of their consideration. This deci
sion was affirmed in 3 N. Y. 430.
In Gould v. Town of Stirling, 23 N.Y.
464, it was held that where a town
had issued negotiable bonds, which
could only be issued when the written
assent of two-thirds of the resident
persons taxed in the town had been
obtained and filed in the county clerk's
office, the bonds issued without such
assent were invalid, and that the pur
chaser o
f
them could not rely upon
the recital in the bonds that such
assent had been obtained, but must
ascertain for himself at his peril. Say
the court: “One who takes a negoti
able promissory note o
r bill of ex
change, purporting to be made b
y
a
n
agent, is bound to inquire as to the
power o
f
the agent. Where the agent
is appointed and the power conferred,
but the right to exercise the power
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[*217] porations in aid of internal "improvements, there has
been occasion to consider clauses in the State constitu
has been made to depend upon the
existence of facts of which the agent
may be supposed to be in an especial
manner cognizant, the bona fide holder
is protected; because he is presumed
to have taken the paper upon the faith
of the representation as to those facts.
The mere fact of executing the note
or bill amounts in itself, in such a
case, to a representation by the agent
to every person who may take the
paper that the requisite facts exist.
But the holder has no such protection
in regard to the existence of the power
itself. In that respect the subsequent
bona fide holder is in no better situation
than the payee, except in so far as the
latter would appear of necessity to
have had cognizance of facts which
the other cannot [must?] be presumed
to have known.” And the case is dis
tinguished from that of the Farmers'
and Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' and
Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, where
the extrinsic fact affecting the author
ity related to the state of accounts
between the bank and one of its cus
tomers, which could only be known
to the teller and other officers of the
bank. See also Brady v. Mayor, &c.
of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple
v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio, N. s.
311; Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280.
The subject is reviewed in Clark
v. Des Moines, 12 Iowa, 209. The
action was brought upon city war
rants, negotiable in form, and of
which the plaintiff claimed to be bona
ſide assignee, without notice of any
defects. The city offered to show
that the warrants were issued without
any authority from the city council,
and without any vote of the council
authorizing the same. It was held
that the evidence should have been
admitted, and that it would consti
tute a complete defence. See further
Head v. Providence, &c. Co., 2
Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v.
Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327; Knox
County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544;
Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
287; Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 N. H.
254; Alleghany City v. McClurkan,
14 Penn. St. 83; Morris Canal and
Banking Co. v. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667;
Clapp v. Cedar Co., 5 Iowa, 15;
Commissioners, &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind.
403; Madison and Indianapolis R. R.
Co. v. Norwalk Savings Society, 24
Ind. 457; Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass.
494. It is of course impossible to
reconcile these authorities; but the
doctrine in the case of Gould v. Town
of Stirling appears to us to be sound,
and that, wherever a want of power
exists, a purchaser of the securities is
chargeable with notice of it
,
if the
defect is disclosed by the corporate
records, or, as in that case, by other
records, where the power is required
to be shown. See Fish v. Kenosha,
26 Wis. 24, and McClure v. Oxford, 94
U
.
S
. Rep. 429. That the powers o
f
the agents o
f municipal corporations
are matters o
f record, and the cor
poration not liable for an unauthor
ized act, see further Baltimore v.
Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson v.
Common Council, 16 Ind. 227. That
bonds voted to one railroad company
and issued to another are void, see
Big Grove v. Wells, 65 Ill. 263.
Those who deal with a corporation
must take notice of the restrictions in
its charter, o
r
in the general law,
regarding the making o
f
contracts.
Brady v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York,
2 Bosw. 173; s. c. 20 N. Y
. 312;
Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427;
Zabriskie v. Cleveland, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 23 How. 381; Hull v. Marshall
County, 12 Iowa, 142; Clark v. Des
Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; McPherson v.
Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; Marsh v. Super
visors o
f Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676.
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tions designed to limit the power of the "legislature [*218]
to incur indebtedness on behalf of the State, and which
clauses, it has been urged, were equally imperative in restraining
indebtedness on behalf of the several political divisions of the
State. The Constitution of Kentucky prohibited any act of
the legislature authorizing any debt to be contracted on behalf
of the Commonwealth, except for certain specified purposes,
unless provision should be made in such act for an annual tax
sufficient to pay such debt within thirty years; and the act was
not to have effect unless approved by the people. It was con
tended that this provision was not to apply to the Commonwealth
as a mere ideal abstraction, unconnected with her citizens and
her soil, but to the Commonwealth as composed of her people,
and their territorial organizations of towns, cities, and counties,
which make up the State, and that it embraced in principle every
legislative act which authorized a debt to be contracted by any
of the local organizations of which the Commonwealth was
composed. The courts of that State held otherwise. “The
clause in question,” they say, “applies in terms to a debt con
tracted on behalf the Commonwealth as a distinct corporate
body; and the distinction between a debt on behalf of the Com
monwealth, and a debt or debts on behalf of one county, or of
any number of counties, is too broad and palpable to
admit of the supposition that the latter class of * debts [*219]
was intended to be embraced by terms specifically desig
nating the former only.” The same view has been taken by
the courts of Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Kansas, of the pro
visions in the constitutions of those States restricting the power
If they are not valid, no subsequent and obligation of such paper will not
ratification by the corporation can be suffered to be impaired by subse
make them so. Leavenworth v. Ran- quent action of the courts overruling
kin, 2 Kan. 357. If bonds are voted their former conclusions. See Steines
upon a condition, and issued before v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167;
the condition is complied with, this, as Osage, &c. R. R. Co. v. Morgan
to bona fide holders, is a waiver of the County, 53 Mo. 156; Smith v. Clark
condition. Chiniquy v. People, 78 Co., 54 Mo. 58; State v. Sutterfield,
Ill. 570. Compare Supervisors of 54 Mo. 391; Columbia Co. v. King,
Jackson v. Brush, 77 Ill. 59. 13 Fla. 421; Same v. Davidson, 13
In some States, after paper has Fla. 482.
been put afloat under laws which the * Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B.
courts of the State have sustained, Monr. 16.
it is very justly held that the validity
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of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in aid
of internal improvements; * but the decisions of the first-named
State have since been doubted,” and those in Illinois, it would
seem, overruled.” In Michigan it has been held that they were
inapplicable to a constitution adopted with a clear purpose to
preclude taxation for such enterprises.”
* Dubuque County v. Railroad
Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v.
Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark
v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell
v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; Prettyman v.
Supervisors, 19 Ill. 406; Robertson
v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451; Johnson v.
Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v.
Lewis, 24 Ill. 208; Butler v. Dunham,
27 Ill. 474; Leavenworth Co. v. Mil
ler, 7 Kan. 479.
* State v. Wapello County, 13
Iowa, 388. And see People v. Su
pervisor, &c., 16 Mich. 254.
* In People v. Mayor, &c. of
Chicago, 51 Ill. 34, it is held expressly
that the provision of the State consti
tution prohibiting the State from cre
ating a debt exceeding fifty thousand
dollars without the consent of the
people manifested at a general elec
tion, would preclude the State from
creating a like debt against a mu
nicipal corporation, except upon the
like conditions. And it was perti
nently said: “The protection of the
whole implies necessarily the protec
tion of all its organized parts, and the
whole cannot be secure while all or
any of it
s parts are exposed to danger.
What is the real value of this pro
vision of the constitution if the
legislature, inhibited from incurring
a debt beyond fifty thousand dollars
on behalf o
f
the State, may force a
debt tenfold or one hundred-fold
greater — for there is no limit to the
power — upon al
l
the cities o
f
the
State? We can perceive none.” We
do not see how this can be reconciled
with the earlier Illinois cases, and it
is so manifestly right, it is hoped the
learned court will never make the
attempt.
* The following extract from the
opinion in Bay City v. State Treas
urer, 23 Mich. 504, is upon this point:
“Our State had had a bitter experi
ence o
f
the evils o
f
the government
connecting itself with works o
f public
improvement. In a time o
f
inflation
and imagined prosperity, the State
had contracted a large debt for the
construction o
f
a system o
f railroads,
and the people were oppressed with
heavy taxation in consequence. More
over, for a portion o
f
this debt they
had not received what they bargained
for, and they did not recognize their
legal o
r
moral obligation to pay for
it
.
The good name and fame of the
State suffered in consequence. The
result of it all was that a settled
conviction fastened itself upon the
minds o
f
our people, that works o
f
internal improvement should be pri
vate enterprises; that it was not in
the proper province o
f government to
connect itself with their construction
o
r management, and that an impera
tive State policy demanded that no
burdens should be imposed upon the
people b
y
State authority, for any
such purpose. Under this conviction
they incorporated in the constitution
o
f
1850, under the significant title
o
f ‘Finance and Taxation,' several
provisions expressly prohibiting the
State from being a party to, o
r inter
ested in, any work o
f
internal im
provement, o
r engaged in carrying on
any such work, except in the expendi
ture o
f grants made to it
;
and also
from subscribing to, o
r being inter
CH. viii.) THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. 273
Another class of legislation, which has recently demanded the
attention of the courts, has been little less troublesome, from the
ested in, the stock of any company,
association, or corporation, or loaning
its credit in aid of any person, asso
ciation, or corporation. Art. XIV.
§§ 9, 8, and 7.
“All these provisions were in
corporated by the people on the con
stitution, as precautions against
injudicious action by themselves, if
in another time of inflation and ex
citement they should be tempted to
incur the like burdensome taxation
in order to accomplish public im
provements in cases where they were
not content to wait the result of pri
vate enterprise. The people meant
to erect such effectual barriers that
if the temptation should return, the
means of inflicting the like injury
upon the credit, reputation, and
prosperity of the State, should not
be within the reach of the authori
ties. They believed these clauses of
the constitution accomplished this
purpose perfectly, and none of its
provisions had more influence in
recommending that instrument to the
hearty good-will of the people.
“In process of time, however, a
majority in the legislature were found
willing, against the solemn warning
of the executive, to resort again to
the power of taxation in aid of inter
nal improvement. It was discovered
that though “the State ’’ was ex
pressly inhibited from giving such aid
in any form, except in the disposition
of grants made to it
,
the subdivisions
o
f
which the State was composed were
not under the like ban. Decisions in
other States were found which were
supposed to sanction the doctrine
that, under such circumstances, the
State might do indirectly through its
subdivisions what directly it was for
bidden to do. Thus a way was
opened by which the whole purpose
o
f
the constitutional provisions quoted
might be defeated. The State could
not aid a private corporation with its
credit, but it might require each of
its townships, cities, and villages to
do so. The State could not load
down its people with taxes for the
construction o
f
a public improvement,
but it might compel the municipal
authorities, which were its mere
creatures, and which held their whole
authority and their life a
t
its will, to
enforce such taxes, one b
y
one, until
the whole people were bent to the
burden.
“Now, whatever might be the just
and proper construction o
f
similar
provisions in the constitutions o
f
States whose history has not been the
same with our own, the majority o
f
this court thought when the previous
case was before us, and they still
think, that these provisions in our
constitution do preclude the State
from loaning the public credit to pri
vate corporations, and from imposing
taxation upon its citizens o
r any por
tion thereof in aid o
f
the construction
o
f
railroads. S
o
the people supposed
when the constitution was adopted.
Constitutions do not change with the
varying tides o
f public opinion and
desire; the will of the people therein
recorded is the same inflexible law
until changed b
y
their own delibera
tive action; and it cannot be permis
sible to the courts that in order to aid
evasions and circumventions, they
shall subject these instruments, which
in the main only undertake to lay
down broad general principles, to a
literal and technical construction, as
if they were great public enemies
standing in the way o
f progress, and
the duty o
f every good citizen was to
get around their provisions whenever
practicable, and give them a dam
aging thrust whenever convenient.
They must construe them, as the
18
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new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in rela
tion to municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements.
As the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations
rests in the national government, and that government is vested
with unlimited control of a
ll
the resources o
f
the country for
those purposes, the duty o
f
national defence, and, consequently,
the duty to defend a
ll
the citizens as well as a
ll
the property o
f
all
the municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the
national authorities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified
degree, also, and, subordinate to the national government, a like
duty rests doubtless upon the State governments, which may
employ the means and services o
f
their citizens for the purpose.
But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as
such, to raise men o
r money for warlike operations, nor have they
any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose
upon their people any burden b
y
way o
f
taxation for any such
purpose." Nevertheless, when a war arises which taxes all the
energies o
f
the nation, which makes it necessary to put into the
field a large proportion o
f
a
ll
the able-bodied men o
f
the country,
and which renders imperative a resort to all available means for
filling the ranks o
f
the army, recruiting the navy, and
[* 220] replenishing the national treasury, the question * becomes
a momentous one, whether the local organizations —
those which are managed most immediately by the people them
selves—may not be made important auxiliaries to the national
and State governments in accomplishing the great object in
which all alike are interested so vitally; and if they are capable
o
f rendering important assistance, whether there is any constitu
tional principle which would be violated by making use o
f
these
organizations in a case where failure on the part o
f
the central
authority would precipitate general dismay and ruin. Indeed,
a
s the general government, with a view to convenience, economy,
people did in their adoption, if the
means o
f arriving a
t
that construction
are within their power. In these cases
47; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn.
131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton,
4 Gray, 502; Cover v. Baytown, 12
we thought we could arrive a
t it from
the public history o
f
the times.”
1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass.
272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N
.
H
. 545;
Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N
.
H
. 9
;
Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn.
Minn. 124; Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R. I.
438; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me. 446;
People v. Supervisors o
f Columbia,
4
3 N
.
Y. 130; Walschlager v. Lib
erty, 23 Wis. 362; Burril v. Boston,
2 Cliff. 590.
CH. VIII.] THE GRADEs of MUNICIPAL Gover NMENT. 275
and promptness of action, will be very likely to adopt, for any
purposes of conscription, the existing municipal divisions of the
States, and its demand for men to recruit its armies will assume
a form seeming to impose on the people whose municipal organi
zation embraces the territory covered by the demand, the duty of
meeting it
,
the question we have stated may appear to be one
rather o
f
form than o
f substance, inasmuch as it would be diffi
cult to assign reasons why a duty resting upon the citizens o
f
a
municipality may not be considered as resting upon the corpora
tion itself o
f
which they are the constituents, and if so, why it
may not be assumed by the municipality itself, and then be dis
charged in like manner as any other municipal burden, if the
legislature shall grant permission for that purpose.
One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doc
trine is
,
that, by the existing law o
f
the land, able-bodied men
between certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned
to the performance o
f military duty; and if the obligation is
assumed b
y
the municipal organizations o
f
the State, and dis
charged by the payment o
f money or the procurement o
f sub
stitutes, the taxation required for this purpose can be claimed,
with some show o
f reason, to be taxation o
f
the whole community
for the particular benefit o
f
that class upon whom b
y
the statutes
the obligation rests. When the public funds are used for the
purpose, it will be insisted that they are appropriated to discharge
the liabilities o
f private individuals. Those who are already
past the legal age o
f service, and who have stood their chance
o
f being called into the field, or perhaps have actually rendered
the required service, will be able to urge with considerable force
that the State can no longer honorably and justly require them
to contribute to the public defence, but ought to insist that those
within the legal ages should perform their legal duty; and if any
upon whom that duty rests shall actually have enrolled them
selves in the army with a view to discharge it
,
such persons may
claim, with even greater reason, that every consideration
o
f "equality and justice demands that the property they [*221]
leave behind them shall not be taxed to relieve others
from a duty equally imperative.
Much may be said on both sides o
f
this subject, but the judicial
decisions are clear, that the people o
f any municipal corporation
o
r political division of a State have such a general interest in
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relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to
the performance of military duty, as will support taxation or
render valid indebtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying
their places, or of filling any call of the national authorities for
men, with volunteers who shall be willing to enter the ranks
for such pecuniary inducements as may be offered them. The
duty of national defence, it is held, rests upon every person
under the protection of the government who is able to contribute
to it
,
and not solely upon those who are within the legal ages.
The statute which has prescribed those ages has fo
r
it
s
basis the
presumption that those between the limits fixed are best able to
discharge the burden o
f military service to the public benefit,
but others are not absolved from being summoned to the duty,
if at any time the public exigency should seem to demand it
.
Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather than a right,
and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled a
t any time
when reasons o
f public policy or necessity seem to demand the
recall." Moreover, there is no valid reason, in the nature of
things, why those who are incapable o
f performing military ser
vice, b
y
reason o
f age, physical infirmity, or other cause, should
not contribute, in proportion to their ability, to the public de
fence b
y
such means a
s
are within their power; and it may well
happen that taxation, for the purpose o
f recruiting the armies o
f
the nation, will distribute the burden more equally and justly
among a
ll
the citizens than any other mode which could be de
vised. Whether it will be just and proper to allow it in any
instance must rest with the legislature to determine; but it is
unquestionably competent, with legislative permission, for towns,
cities, and counties to raise money b
y
loans o
r b
y
taxation to pay
bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer to fill any call
made upon such towns, cities, o
r
counties to supply men for the
national armies.”
* See post, p
. *383, and cases cited
in note.
* “The power to create a public
debt, and liquidate it b
y taxation, is
too clear for dispute. The question
is
,
therefore, narrowed to a single
point: Is the purpose in this instance
a public one? Does it concern the
common welfare and interest of the
municipality? Let us see? Civil war
was raging, and congress provided in
the second section of the act of 24th
February, 1864, that the quota o
f the
troops o
f
each ward o
f
a city, town,
township, precinct, &c., should be as
nearly as possible in proportion to the
number of men resident therein liable
to render military service. Section
three provided that all volunteers who
may enlist after a draft shall be or
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* Relief of the community from an impending or pos- [*222]
sible draft is not, however, the sole consideration which
will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State
to raise money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers.
Gratitude to those who have entered the military service, whether
as volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others
who were drafted or were * liable to be, is a considera- [*223]
dered shall be deducted from the num
ber ordered to be drafted in such ward,
town, &c. Volunteers are therefore
by law to be accepted in relief of the
municipality from a compulsory ser
vice to be determined by lot or chance.
Does the relief involve the public
welfare or interest? The answer rises
spontaneously in the breast of every
one in the community liable to the
military burden. It is given, not by
the voice of him alone who owes the
service, but swells into a chorus from
his whole family, relatives, and friends.
Military service is the highest duty
and burden the citizen is called to
obey or to bear. It involves life,
limb, and health, and is therefore a
greater ‘burden' than the taxation of
property. The loss or the injury is
not confined to the individual himself,
but extends to all the relations he
sustains. It embraces those bound to
him in the ties of consanguinity,
friendship, and interest; to the com
munity which must furnish support to
his family, if he cannot, and which
loses in him a member whose labor,
industry, and property contribute to
its wealth and its resources ; who
assists to bear its burdens, and whose
knowledge, skill, and public spirit con
tribute to the general good. Clearly
the loss of that part of the population
upon whom the greatest number de
pend, and who contribute most to the
public welfare, by their industry, skill,
and property, and good conduct, is a
common loss, and therefore a general
injury. These are alike subject to
the draft. The blind and relentless
lot respects no age, condition, or rank
'Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159.
in life. It is
,
therefore, clearly the
interest o
f
the community that those
should serve who are willing, whose
loss will sever the fewest ties, and
produce the least injury.
“The bounty is not a private trans
action in which the individual alone is
benefited. It benefits the public by
inducing and enabling those to go
who feel they can best be spared. It
is not voluntary in those who pay it
.
The community is subject to the
draft, and it is paid to relieve it from
a burden of war. It is not a mere
gift or reward, but a consideration for
services. It is therefore not a confis
cation o
f
one man's property for an
other's use, but it is a contribution
from the public treasury for a general
good. In short, it is simply taxation
to relieve the municipality from the
stern demands o
f war, and avert a
public injury in the loss of those who
contribute most to the public wel
fare.” Speer v. School Directors of
See
also Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn. 363;
Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 33 Conn.
408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;
Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Wash
ington County v. Berwick, 56 Penn.
St. 466; Trustees o
f
Cass v. Dillon,
16 Ohio, N
.
s. 38; State v. Wilkes
barre, 20 Ohio, N
.
s. 292. Also Opin
ions o
f Justices, 52 Me. 595, in which
the view is expressed that towns can
not, under the power to raise money
for “necessary town charges,” raise
and pay commutation moneys to re
lieve persons drafted into the military
service of the United States.
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tion which the State may well recognize, and it may com
pensate the service either by the payment of bounty moneys
directly to such persons, or by provision for the support of those
dependent upon them while they shall be absent from their homes.
Whether we regard such persons as public benefactors, who, hav
ing taken upon themselves the most severe and dangerous duty
a citizen is ever called upon to perform, have thereby entitled
themselves to public reward as an incentive to fidelity and cour
age, or as persons who, having engaged in the public service for
a compensation inadequate to the toil, privation, and danger in
curred, are deserving of the bounty as a further recognition on
the part of the community of the worth of their services, there
seems in either case to be no sufficient reason to question the
right of the legislature to authorize the municipal divisions of
the State to raise moneys in any of the usual modes, for the
purpose of paying bounties to them or their families,
[* 224] in recognition of such services." *And if a municipal
corporation shall have voted moneys for such purpose
without legislative authority, it is competent for the
[*225] * legislature afterwards to legalize their action if it shall
so choose.”
1 The act under which the Penn
sylvania case, cited in the preceding
note, was decided, authorized the
borough to contract a debt for the
payment of three hundred dollars to
each non-commissioned officer and
private who might thereafter volun
teer and enter the service of the
United States, and be credited upon
the quota of the borough under an
impending draft. The whole purpose,
therefore, was to relieve the commu
nity from the threatened conscription.
But in the case of Brodhead v. Mil
waukee, 19 Wis. 652, it was held
constitutional, not only to provide for
the future by such municipal taxation,
but also to raise moneys to pay boun
ties to volunteers previously enlisted,
and even to those who should there
after procure substitutes for them
selves, and have them credited on the
municipal quota.
* Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32
Conn. 118; Bartholomew v. Harwin
ton, 33 Conn. 408; Crowell v. Hop
kinton, 45 N. H. 9; Shackford v.
Newington, 46 N. H. 415; Lowell v.
Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ahl v. Gleim,
52 Penn. St. 432; Weister v. Hade,
52 Penn. St. 474; Coffman v. Keight
ley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Commis
sioners v. Brearss, 25 Ind. 110; Connor
v. Fulsom, 13 Minn. 219; State v.
Demorest, 32 N. J. 528; Taylor v.
Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Barbour v. Cam
den, 51 Me. 608 ; Hart v. Holden, 55
Me. 572; Burnham v. Chelsea, 43 Vt.
69; Butler v. Pultney, 43 Vt. 481.
In State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450, a
statute authorizing a town to raise
money by tax to relieve it
s inhabi
tants from the burden of a draft under
a law o
f Congress, was held void a
s
tending to defeat the purpose o
f
such
law. The decision was made by a
bare majority o
f
a bench o
f
eleven
judges. Compare O'Hara v. Carpen
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* The cases to which we have referred in the notes [*226]
assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State
might properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, the legis
lature would also have power to apportion and impose the duty,
or confer the power of assuming it upon the towns and other
municipal or political divisions. And the rule laid down is one
which opens a broad field to legislative discretion, allow
ing as it does the raising and * appropriation of moneys, [*227]
whenever, in the somewhat extravagant words of one of
the cases, there is “the least possibility that it will be promotive
in any degree of the public welfare.”" The same rule, substan
tially, has been recognized by the Court of Appeals of New York.
“The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the pub
lic moneys, o
r
o
f
the sums to b
e
raised b
y
taxation in favor o
f
individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the
State. It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice
in the largest sense o
f
these terms, o
r
in gratitude or charity.
Independently o
f express constitutional restrictions, it can make
appropriations o
f money whenever the public well-being requires
o
r will be promoted b
y it
,
and it is the judge of what is for the
public good. It can, moreover, under the power to levy taxes,
apportion the public burdens among a
ll
the tax-paying citizens
o
f
the State, o
r among those o
f
a particular section or political
division.” And where citizens have voluntarily advanced mon
eys for the purpose o
f paying bounties to recruits who fill the
quota o
f
a municipal corporation, on an understanding, based
upon informal corporate action, that the moneys should be re
funded when a law should be passed permitting it
,
a subsequent
act o
f
the legislature authorizing taxation for this purpose is
valid.”
However broad are the terms employed in describing the legis
ter, 23 Mich. 410, in which a contract
o
f
insurance against a military draft
was held void on grounds o
f public
Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. St.
174, following Cheaney v. Hooser,
9 B. Monr. 345.
policy.
1 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn.
128, per Butler, J. “To make a tax
law unconstitutional on this ground, it
must be apparent a
t
first blush that
the community taxed can have no
possible interest in the purpose to
which their money is to be applied.”
* Guilford v. Supervisors o
f Che
nango, 13 N
.
Y
.
149.
* Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St.
474. And see People v. Sullivan, 43
Ill. 413; Johnson v. Campbell, 49 Ill.
316. Compare Susquehanna Depot
v
. Barry, 61 Penn. St. 317.
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lative power over taxation in these cases, it is believed that no
one of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appro
priation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals
moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an
impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any
public purpose, from motives purely personal to themselves, with
out any reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any
municipal corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circum
stances are not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude.
Taxation in such a case, where no obligation, honorary or other
wise, rests upon the public, would be nothing else than a naked
case of appropriating the property of the tax-payer for private
purposes, and that, too, without reference to anticipated public
benefits."
* Tyson v. School Directors, &c.,
51 Penn. St. 9. A meeting of persons
liable to draft under the law of the
United States was called, and an asso
ciation formed, called the Halifax
Bounty Association, which levied an
assessment of thirty dollars on each
person liable to military duty in the
township, and solicited contributions
from others. Afterwards, an act was
passed by the legislature, with a pre
amble reciting that certain citizens of
Halifax township, associated as the
Halifax Bounty Association, for free
ing the said township from the late
drafts, advanced moneys, which were
expended in paying bounties to vol
unteers to fill the quota of the town
ship. The act then authorized and
required the school directors to bor
row such sums of money as would
fully reimburse the said Halifax
Bounty Association for moneys ad
vanced to free said township from
the draft, and then further authorized
the school directors to levy and collect
a tax to repay the sums borrowed.
The court say: “We are bound to
regard the statute as an authority to
reimburse what was intended by the
Association as advances made to the
township with the intent or under
standing to be reimbursed or returned
to those contributing. This was the
light in which the learned judge below
regarded the terms used; and unless
this appears in support of the present
levy by the school directors, they are
acting without authority. But the
learned judge, if I properly compre
hend his meaning, did not give suffi
cient importance to these terms, and
hence, I apprehend, he fell into error.
He does not seem to have considered
it essential whether the Association
paid its money voluntarily in aid of
its own members, or expressly to aid
the township in saving it
s people from
a draft, with the understanding that
it was advanced in the character of a
loan if the legislature chose to direct
its repayment, and the school directors
chose to act on the authority con
ferred. This we cannot agree to.
Such an enactment would not be
legislation a
t
all. It would be in the
nature o
f judicial action, it is true;
but wanting the justice o
f
notice to
the parties to be affected by the hear
ing, trial, and all that gives sanction
and force to regular judicial proceed
ings, it would much more resemble
a
n imperial rescript than constitu
tional legislation : first, in declaring
a
n obligation where none was created
o
r previously existed; and next, in
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* But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Mas- [*228]
sachusetts that towns might be authorized by the legis
lature to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding
sums contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to
fill the quota of such towns under a call of the President, not
withstanding such moneys might have been contributed without
promise or expectation of reimbursement. The court
were of opinion that such contributions *might well be [*229]
considered as advancements to a public object, and, being
such, the legislature might properly recognize the obligation and
permit the towns to provide for it
s discharge.”
* On a preceding page we have spoken in strong terms [*230]
o
f
the complete control which is possessed by the legis
lative authority o
f
the State over the municipal corporations.
There are nevertheless some limits to it
s power in this regard, as
there are in various other directions limits to the legislative
power o
f
the State. Some o
f
these are expressly defined; others
spring from the usages, customs, and maxims o
f
our people; they
are a part o
f
it
s history, a part o
f
the system o
f
local self-govern
ment in view o
f
the continuance and perpetuity o
f
which all our
constitutions are framed, and o
f
the right to which the people can
never be deprived except through express renunciation on their
part.
decreeing payment by directing the
money o
r property o
f
the people to
be sequestered to make the payment.
The legislature can exercise no such
despotic functions; and as it is not
apparent in the act that they at
tempted to do so, we are not to pre
sume that they did. They evidently
intended the advancements to be reim
bursed to be only such as were made
on the faith that they were to be
returned.” See also Crowell v. Hop
kinton, 45 N
.
H
. 9
;
Miller v. Grandy,
13 Mich. 540; Pease v. Chicago, 21
Ill. 508 ; Ferguson v. Landraw, 5
Bush, 230; Esty v. Westminster, 97
Mass. 324 ; Cole v. Bedford, 97 Mass.
326; Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn.
567; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315;
Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me. 545;
Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St. 319.
One undoubted right o
f
the people is to choose, directly
In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen,
570, it was held that the legislature
could not empower towns to raise
money b
y
taxation for the purpose
o
f refunding what had been paid by
individuals for substitutes in military
service. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio,
N
.
s. 38, it was held that taxes to
refund bounties previously and volun
tarily paid might be authorized. Sée
also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio, N
.
s.
608. The Supreme Court of Wis
consin, in the well-reasoned case o
f
State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, deny
the power o
f
the State to compel a
municipal corporation to pay boun
ties where it has not voted to do so.
* Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen,
585. And see Hilbish v. Catherman,
6
4 Penn. St. 154, and compare Tyson
v
. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9.
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or indirectly, under the forms and restrictions prescribed by the
legislature for reasons of general State policy, the officers of local
administration, and the board that is to make the local laws.
This is a right which of late has sometimes been encroached upon
under various plausible pretences, but almost always with the
result which reasonable men should have anticipated from the
experiment of a body at a distance attempting to govern a local
community of whose affairs or needs they could know but little,
except as they should derive information from sources likely to
have interested reasons for misleading." Another is the right of
the local community to determine what pecuniary burdens it shall
take upon its shoulders. But here from the very nature of the
case there must be some limitations. The municipalities do not
exist wholly for the benefit of their corporators, but as a part of
the machinery of State government, and they cannot be permitted
to decline a performance of their duties or a discharge of their
obligations as such. They cannot abolish local government ;
they cannot refuse to provide the conveniences for it
s adminis
tration ; they cannot decline to raise the necessary taxes for the
purpose ; they cannot repudiate pecuniary obligations that justly
rest upon them as a local government. Over these matters the
legislature o
f
the State must have control, o
r
confusion would
inevitably be introduced into the whole system. But beyond
this it is not often legitimate for the State to g
o
except in mould
ing and shaping the local powers, and perhaps permitting the
1 On this subject reference is made
to what is said by Campbell, Ch. J.,
in People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 87
e
t seq. See also p
.
97. Much has
been said concerning the necessity o
f
legislative interference in some cases
where bad men were coming into
power through universal suffrage in
cities, but the recent experience o
f
the country shows that this has
oftener been said to pave the way
for bad men to obtain office or grants
o
f
unusual powers from the legisla
ture than with any purpose to effect
local reforms. And the great munici
pal scandals and frauds that have
prevailed, like those which were so
notorious in New York City, have
been made possible and then nursed
and fostered by illegitimate interfer
ence a
t
the seat o
f
State government.
Some officers, usually o
f
local appoint
ment, are undoubtedly to be regarded
a
s State officers whose choice may be
confided to a State authority without
any invasion o
f
local right; such as
militia officers, officers of police, and
those who have charge o
f
the execu
tion o
f
the criminal laws; but those
who are to administer the corporate
funds and have the control of the
corporate property, those who make
the local laws and those who execute
them, cannot rightfully be chosen by
the central authority. Dillon, Mun.
Corp. § 33. See People v. Com.
Council o
f Detroit, 28 Mich. 228.
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local authorities to do certain things for the benefit of their
citizens which under the general grants of power would be in
admissible."
On this general subject we shall venture to lay down the fol
lowing propositions as the result of the authorities: —
1. That the legislature has undoubted power to compel the
municipal bodies to perform their functions as local governments
under their charters, and to recognize, meet, and discharge the
duties and obligations properly resting upon them as such, whether
they be legal, or merely equitable or moral; and for this purpose
it may require them to exercise the power of taxation whenever
and wherever it may be deemed necessary or expedient.”
* This subject is discussed with
some fulness in Cooley on Taxation,
ch. xxi.
* In support of this, we refer to
the very strong case of Guilford v.
Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb.
615, s. c. 13 N. Y. 143, where a
town was compelled by the legislative
authority of the State to reimburse its
officers the expenses incurred by them
in the honest but mistaken endeavor
to discharge what they believed to be
their duty; also to Sinton r. Ashbury,
41 Cal. 530, in which it is said by
Crocket, J., that “It is established
by an overwhelming weight of author
ity, and I believe is conceded on all
sides, that the legislature has the con
stitutional power to direct and control
the affairs and property of a munic
ipal corporation for municipal pur
poses, provided it does not impair the
obligation of a contract, and by ap
propriate legislation may so control
its affairs as ultimately to compel it
,
out of the funds in its treasury, or by
taxation to be imposed for that pur
pose, to pay a demand when properly
established, which in good conscience
it ought to pay, even though there be
no legal liability to pay it’’ (citing
Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Beals
v
.
Almador Co., 35 Cal. 624; People
v
. Supervisors o
f
San Francisco, 11
Cal. 206; Sharp v. Contra Costa Co.,
3
4 Cal. 284; People v. McCreery, 34
Cal. 432; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal.
641, and holding that a city might b
e
compelled to pay the claim o
f persons
who had acted as commissioners in
the extension o
f
certain o
f
its streets);
also to Borough o
f
Dunmore's Appeal,
5
2 Penn. St. 374, in which the legis
lature assumed the right o
f apportion
ing the indebtedness o
f
a town among
the boroughs carved out o
f it ; sup
ported b
y
Layton v. New Orleans, 12
La. Ann. 515; People v. Alameda,
26 Cal. 641; and Burns v. Clarion
County, 62 Penn. St. 423; also to
People v. Flagg, 46 N
.
Y
.
401, in
which the legislative power to direct
the construction o
f
a public road, and
to compel the creation o
f
a town debt
for the purpose, was fully sustained;
to People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187;
Waterville v. County Commissioners,
5
9 Me. 80 ; and to numerous other
cases cited, ante, p
.
*193, note, and
which we will not occupy space by
repeating here. In Creighton v. San
Francisco, 42 Cal. 446, it is said that
the power o
f
the legislature to appro
priate the money o
f municipal corpo
rations in payment o
f equitable claims
to individuals, not enforceable in the
courts, depends on the legislative con
science, and the judiciary will not
interfere unless in exceptional cases.
Unquestionably the legislature may
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2. That in some cases, in view of the twofold character of such
bodies, as being on the one hand agencies of State government,
and on the other, corporations endowed with capacities and per
mitted to hold property and enjoy peculiar privileges for the ben
efit of their corporators exclusively, the legislature may permit
the incurring of expense, the contracting of obligations, and the
levy of taxes which are unusual, and which would not be admissible
under the powers usually conferred. Instances of the kind may
be mentioned in the offer of military bounties, and the payment of
a disproportionate share of a State burden in consideration of
peculiar local benefits which are to spring from it."
[* 231] * 3. But it is believed the legislature has no power,
against the will of a municipal corporation, to compel it
decide what taxes shall be levied for
proper purposes of local government.
Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406.
* The subject of military bounties
has been sufficiently referred to al
ready. As to the right to permit a
municipal corporation to burden itself
with a local tax for a State object, we
refer to Merrick p. Amherst, 12 Allen,
500; Marks v. Trustees of Pardue
University, 37 Ind. 155; Hasbrouck
v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37. The first
was a case in which, in consideration
of the local benefits expected from
the location of the State agricultural
college in a certain town, the town
was permitted to levy a large local
tax in addition to its proportion of
the State burden for the erection of
the necessary buildings. The second
case was of a similar nature. The
third was the case of permission to
levy a city tax to improve the city
harbor; a work usually done by the
general government. There are cases
which go further than these, and hold
that the legislature may compel a
municipal corporation to do what it
may thus permit. Thus, in Kirby v.
Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, it appeared
that by an act of April 3, 1848, the
commissioners of Bradford County
were required to add $500 annually,
until 1857, to the usual county rates
and levies of the borough of Towanda
in said county, for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of the court
house and jail, then in process of
erection in that borough. The act
was held constitutional on the princi
ple of assessment of benefits. In Gor
don v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, a law
was sustained which “authorized and
required ”the village of Brockport to
levy a tax for the erection of a State
normal school building at that place.
It is to be said of this case, however,
that there was to be in the building a
grammar school free to all the chil
dren of proper acquirements in the
village; so that the village was to
receive a peculiar and direct benefit
from it, besides those which would be
merely incidental to the location of
the normal school in the place. But
for this circumstance it would be dis
tinctly in conflict with State v. Haben,
22 Wis. 660, where it was held incom
petent for the legislature to appro
priate the school moneys of a city to
the purchase of a site for a State
normal school; and also with other
cases cited in the next note. It must
be conceded, however, that there are
other cases which support it
.
And
see, a
s supporting the last case, Liv
ingston County v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427;
Burr v. Carbondall, 76 Ill. 455.
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to contract debts for local purposes in which the State has no
concern, or to assume obligations not within the ordinary func
tions of municipal government. Such matters are to be disposed
of in view of the interests of the corporators exclusively, and
they have the same right to determine them for themselves
which the associates in private corporations have to determine
for themselves the questions which arise for their corporate action.
The State in such cases may remove restrictions and permit
action, but it cannot compel it."
* There are undoubtedly some cases
which go to the extent of holding that
municipal corporations and organiza
tions are so completely under the
legislative control, that whatever the
legislature may permit them to do, it
may compel them to do, whether the
corporators are willing or not. A
leading case is Thomas v. Leland, 24
Wend. 67. In that case it appeared
that certain citizens of Utica had given
their bond to the people of the State
of New York, conditioned for the
payment into the canal fund of the
sum of $38,615, the estimated differ
ence between the cost of connecting
the Chenango Canal with the Erie at
Utica, instead of at Whitesborough,
as the canal commissioners had con
templated; and it was held within the
constitutional powers of the legisla
ture to require this sum to be assessed
upon the taxable property of the city
of Utica, supposed to be benefited by
the canal connection. The court treat
the case as “the ordinary one of local
taxation to make or improve a public
highway,” and dismiss it with few
words. If it could be considered as
merely a case of the apportionment
between a number of municipalities
of the expense of a public highway
running through them, it would have
the support of Waterville v. County
Commissioners, 59 Me. 80; Common
wealth v. Newburyport, 103 Mass.
129; and also what is said in Bay
City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 503,
where it is admitted that over the
matter of the construction of such a
highway, as well as the apportion
ment of expense, the State authority
must necessarily be complete. It has
been considered in subsequent New
York cases as a case of apportionment
merely. See People v. Brooklyn, 4
N. Y. 437; Howell v. Buffalo, 37
N. Y. 271. The cases of Kirby v.
Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258, and Gordon
v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, referred to
in the preceding note, it will be per
ceived, were also treated as cases
merely of apportionment. How that
can be called a case of apportionment,
however, which singles out a particu
lar town, and taxes it for benefits to
be expected from a highway running
across the State, without doing the
same by any other town in the State,
it is not easy to perceive. In Com
missioners of Revenue v. The State,
45 Ala. 399, it appeared that the leg
islature had created a local board
consisting of the president of the
county commissioners of revenue of
Mobile County, the mayor of Mobile,
the president of the Bank of Mobile,
the president of the Mobile Chamber
of Commerce, and one citizen of Mo
bile, appointed by the governor, as a
board for the improvement of the
river, harbor, and bay of Mobile, and
required the commissioners of revenue
of Mobile County to issue to them
for that purpose county bonds to the
amount of $1,000,000, and to levy a
tax to pay them. Here was an ap
pointment by the State of local offi
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[*232] *4. And there is much good reason for assenting also
to what several respectable authorities have held, that
cers to make at the expense of the
locality an improvement which it has
been customary for the general gov
ernment to take in charge as one of
national concern; but the Supreme
Court of the State sustained the act,
going farther, as we think, in doing
so, than has been gone in any other
case. In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13
Wis. 37, approved and defended in
an able opinion in Mills v. Charleton,
29 Wis. 413, the power of the legisla
ture to compel the city of Milwaukee
to issue bonds or levy a tax for the
improvement of its harbor was dis
tinctly denied, though it was conceded
that permission might be given, which
the city could lawfully act upon.
Compare also Knapp v. Grant, 27
Wis. 147; State v. Tappan, 29 Wis.
664; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Wt. 226.
In People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128,
the Court of Appeals, through an able
and lucid opinion by Grover, J., de
nied the validity of a mandatory stat
ute compelling a town to take stock
in a railroad corporation, and to issue
its bonds in exchange therefor. The
authority to permit the town to do
this was not discussed, but, taking
that as admitted, it is declared that
municipal corporations, in the making
or refusing to make arrangements of
the nature of that attempted to be
forced upon the town in question,
were entitled to the same freedom of
action precisely which individual citi
zens might claim. This opinion re
views the prior decisions in the same
State, and finds nothing conflicting
with the views expressed. In People
v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 Ill. 17,
s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 278, it was denied,
in an opinion of great force and abil
ity delivered by Chief Justice Breese,
that the State could empower a board
of park commissioners of State ap
pointment to contract a debt for the
city of Chicago for the purposes of a
public park for that city, and with
out the consent of its citizens. The
learned judge says (p. 31): “Whilst
it is conceded that municipal corpora
tions, which exist only for public pur
poses, are subject at all times to the
control of the legislature creating
them, and have in their franchises no
vested rights, and whose powers and
privileges the creating power may al
ter, modify, or abolish at pleasure, as
they are but parts of the machinery
employed to carry on the affairs of the
State, over which and their rights and
effects the State may exercise a gen
eral superintendence and control, -
Richland County v. Lawrence County,
12 Ill. 8; Trustees of Schools v. Tal
man, 13 Ill. 30, - we are not of the
opinion that that power, vast as it is
,
can b
e
so used a
s to compel any one
o
f
our many cities to issue its bonds
against its will, to erect a park, or for
any other improvement, to force it to
create a debt o
f millions; in effect, to
compel every property owner in the
city to give his bond to pay a debt thus
forced upon the city. It will hardly
be contended that the legislature can
compel a holder o
f property in Chicago
to execute his individual bond as se
curity for the payment o
f
a debt so
ordered to be contracted. A city is
made up o
f
individuals owning prop
erty within it
s limits, the lots and
blocks which compose it
,
and the
structures which adorn them. What
would be the universal judgment,
should the legislature, sua sponte, pro
ject magnificent and costly structures
within one o
f
our cities, – triumphal
arches, splendid columns, and per
petual fountains, – and require in the
act creating them that every owner o
f
property within the city limits should
give his individual obligation for his
proportion o
f
the cost, and impose
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where a demand is asserted against a municipality, though of a
nature that the legislature would have a right to require
it to incur and * discharge, yet if its legal and equitable [*233]
such cost as a lien upon his property
for ever. What would be the public
judgment o
f
such an act, and wherein
would it differ from the act under
consideration?” And again : “Here,
then, is a case where taxes may be
assessed, not b
y
any corporate author
ity o
f
the city, but b
y
commissioners,
to whom is intrusted the erection,
embellishment, and control o
f
this
park, and this without consent of the
property owners.
“We do not think it within the
constitutional competency o
f
the leg
islature to delegate this power to these
commissioners. If the principle be
admitted that the legislature can, un
invited, o
f
their mere will, impose
such a burden as this upon the city
o
f Chicago, then one much heavier
and more onerous can be imposed;
in short, no limit can be assigned to
legislative power in this regard. If
this power is possessed, then it must
b
e
conceded that the property o
f every
citizen within it is held at the pleasure
and will of the legislature. Can it
be that the General Assembly o
f
the
State, just and honest as its members
may be, is the depository o
f
the rights
o
f property of the citizens? Would
there be any sufficient security for
property if such a power was con
ceded? No well-regulated mind can
entertain the idea that it is within
the constitutional competency o
f
the
legislature to subject the earnings o
f
any portion o
f
our people to the
hazards o
f any such legislation.”
This case should be read in con
nection with the following in the saine
State, and all in the same direction.
People v. Common Council o
f Chi
cago, 51 Ill. 58; Lovingston v. Wider,
53 Ill. 302; People v. Canty, 55 Ill.
33; Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 Ill.
133; Gage v. Graham, 57 Ill. 144;
East St. Louis v. Witts, 59 Ill. 155;
Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218; Cairo,
&c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505.
See also People v. Common Council
o
f Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. That the
legislature may compel a municipality
to levy a tax for a local road, see
Wilcox v. Deer Lodge Co., 2 Mon
tana, 574.
The case of People v. Batchellor,
5
3 N
.
Y
.
128, seems to us clearly
inconsistent with Thomas v. Leland,
supra, and should be regarded as
overruling it
. But, on the other hand,
the case o
f Duanesburgh v. Jenkins,
5
7 N. Y
.
177, goes to the full extent
o
f holding that a subscription o
f
a
town to a railroad, made on condition
o
f subsequent assent o
f
the town
thereto, may be relieved o
f
the con
dition by the legislature and enforced
against the town, though the original
subscription was by a commissioner
which the town did not choose. It is
a little difficult, therefore, to deter
mine what the law of New York now
is on this subject, especially as in
New York, &c. R. R. Co. v. Van
Horn, 57 N
.
Y. 473, the power of the
legislature to make valid an ineffect
ual individual contract is denied. But
leaving out o
f
view the New York
cases, and a few others which were
decided o
n
the ground o
f
a
n appor
tionment o
f
local benefits, we think
the case in Alabama will stand sub
stantially alone. Before that decision
the Supreme Court o
f Illinois were
able to say, in a case calling for a
careful and thorough examination o
f
the authorities, that counsel had
“failed to find a case wherein it has
been held that the legislature can
compel a city against its will to incur
a debt b
y
the issue o
f
it
s
bonds for
a local improvement.” People v.
Mayor, &c., 51 Ill. 33.
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obligation is disputed, the corporation has the right to have the
dispute settled by the courts, and cannot be bound by a legisla
tive allowance of the claim.”
* It was held in People v. Hawes,
37 Barb. 440, that the legislature had
no right to direct a municipal cor
poration to satisfy a claim made
against it for damages for breach of
contract, out of the funds or property
of such corporation. In citing the
cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of
Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143, and People
v. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb.
114, a distinction is drawn by which
the cases are supposed to be reconciled
with the one then under decision.
“Those cases and many others,” say
the court, p. 455, “related not to the
right or power of the legislature to
compel an individual or corporation
to pay a debt or claim, but to the
power of the legislature to raise
money by tax, and apply such money,
when so raised, to the payment there
of. We could not, under the deci
sions of the courts on this point, made
in these and other cases, now hold
that the legislature had not authority
to impose a tax to pay any claim, or
to pay it out of the State treasury;
and for this purpose to impose a tax
upon the property of the State, or
upon any portion of the State. This
was fully settled in People v. Mayor,
&c. of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; but
neither that case nor the case in 13
N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a
warrant for the opinion, that the
legislature had a right to direct a
municipal corporation to pay a claim
for damages for breach of a contract,
out of the funds or property of the
corporation, without a submission of
such claim to a judicial tribunal.”
If by this is meant that the legis
lature has power to compel a cor
poration to tax it
s
citizens for the
payment o
f
a demand, but has not
the authority to make it a charge
against the corporation in any other
mode, the distinction seems to be one
of form rather than of substance.
It is no protection to the rights or
property o
f
a municipal corporation
to hold that the legislature cannot
determine upon a claim against it
,
if
a
t
the same time the corporation may
be compelled by statute to assume
and discharge the obligation through
the levy o
f
a tax for its satisfaction.
But if it is only meant to declare that
the legislature cannot adjudicate upon
disputed claims, there can be no good
reason to find fault with the decision.
It is one thing to determine that the
nature of a claim is such as to make
it proper to satisfy it by taxation, and
another to adjudge how much is justly
due upon it
.
The one is the exercise
o
f legislative power, the other o
f ju
dicial. See Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn.
273; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh,
3
4 Penn. St. 496; Plimpton v. Som
erset, 3
3 Vt. 283; Gage v. Graham,
5
7 Ill. 144. But the power to decide
upon the breach o
f
a contract b
y
a
corporation, and the extent o
f
the
damages which have resulted, is less
objectionable and less likely to lead
to oppression, than the power to im
pose through taxation a claim upon
a corporation which it never was con
cerned in creating, against which it
protests, and which is unconnected
with the ordinary functions and pur
poses o
f municipal government. In
Borough o
f
Dunmore's Appeal, 52
Penn. St. 374, a decision was made
which seems to conflict with that in
People v. Hawes, supra; and with the
subsequent case o
f
Baldwin v. Mayor,
&c. o
f
New York, 42 Barb. 549. The
Pennsylvania court decided that the
constitutional guaranty o
f
the right
to jury trial had no application to
municipal corporations, and a com
mission might be created b
y
the
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Having concisely stated these general views, we add
merely, that “those cases which hold that the State may [*234]
raise bounty moneys by taxation, to be paid to persons
in the military service, we think stand by themselves, and are
supported by different principles from any which can fairly be
summoned to the aid of some of the other cases which we have
cited. The burden of the public defence unquestionably rests
upon the whole community; and the legislature may
properly provide for its apportionment and * discharge in [*235]
such manner as its wisdom may prescribe. But those
cases which hold it competent for the legislature to give its con
sent to a municipal corporation engaging in works of public
improvement outside it
s
territorial limits, and becoming a stock
holder in a private corporation, must be conceded on all hands to
have gone to the very limit o
f
constitutional power in this direc
tion; and to hold that the legislature may go even further, and,
under its power to control the taxation o
f
the political divisions
and organizations o
f
the State, may compel them, without the
consent o
f
their citizens, to raise money for such or any other
unusual purposes, o
r
to contract debts therefor, seems to us to be
introducing new principles into our system o
f
local self-govern
ment, and to b
e sanctioning a centralization o
f power not within
the contemplation o
f
the makers o
f
the American constitutions.
We think where any such forced taxation is resisted by the
municipal organization, it will be very difficult to defend it as a
proper exercise o
f legislative authority in a government where
power is distributed on the principles which prevail here.
Legislative Control o
f Corporate Property.
The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the
-
property o
f
the State. How far it may also control and dispose
o
f
the property of those agencies o
f government which it has
legislature to adjust the demands be- in a county between a city therein
tween them. See also In re Penn- and the remainder of the county, and
sylvania Hall, 5 Penn. St. 204; that the county revenues “must
Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. necessarily be within the control o
f
515. In People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187, the legislature for political purposes.”
it was held competent for the legisla- And see Portwood v. Montgomery
ture to apportion the taxes collected Co., 52 Miss. 523.
19
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created and endowed with corporate powers is a question which
happily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the courts.
Being created as an agency of government, it is evident that the
municipality cannot in itself have that complete and absolute
control and power of disposition of it
s property which is pos
sessed by natural persons and private corporations in respect to
their several possessions. For it can hold and own property only
for corporate purposes, and its powers are liable at any time to
b
e
so modified b
y legislation as to render the property no longer
available. Moreover, the charter rights may be altogether taken
away; and in that case the legislature has deprived the corpora
tion o
f
its property b
y depriving it o
f corporate capacity to hold
it
.
And in many ways, while the corporation holds and enjoys
property, the legislature must possess power to interfere with its
control, at least incidentally; for the mere fact that the corpora
tion possesses property cannot deprive the State o
f
its
[*236] complete authority to mould and change * the corporate
organization, and enlarge o
r
diminish the powers which
it possessed before. But whether the State can directly inter
vene and take away the corporate property, o
r
convert it to other
uses than those for which it was procured, or whether, on repeal
ing a charter o
f incorporation, it can take to itself the corporate
property, and dispose o
f
it at it
s discretion, are different ques
tions from any raised by the indirect and incidental interference
referred to.
In the leading case, in which it was decided b
y
the Supreme
Court o
f
the United States that a private charter o
f incorpora
tion, granted by a State, was a contract between the State and
the corporators, not subject to modification o
r repeal, except in
pursuance o
f
a right expressly reserved, but that the charter o
f
a
municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same
time declared, a
s
the opinion o
f
the judges, that the legislature
could not deprive such municipal corporations o
f
their vested
rights in property. “It may be admitted,” says one of the
judges, “that corporations for mere public government, such as
towns, cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to
legislative control. But it will hardly be contended, that even
in respect to such corporations the legislative power is so tran
scendent that it may, at it
s will, take away the private property
o
f
the corporation, o
r change the uses o
f
it
s private funds ac
CH. VIII.] THE GRADEs of MUNICIPAL GovKRNMENT. 291
quired under the public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to
its own use the private funds which a municipal corporation
holds under it
s charter, without any default o
r
consent o
f
the
corporators? If a municipal corporation be capable of holding
devises and legacies to charitable uses, as many municipal cor
porations are, does the legislature, under our forms o
f
limited
government, possess the authority to seize upon those funds and
appropriate them to other uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure,
against the will o
f
the donors and donees? From the very na
ture o
f
our government, the public faith is pledged the other
way, and that pledge constitutes a valid compact; and that com
pact is subject only to judicial inquiry, construction, and abroga
tion.”” “The government has no power to revoke a grant, even
o
f
its own funds, when given to a private person o
r corporation
for special uses. It cannot recall its own endowments, granted
to any hospital o
r college, or city or town, for the use o
f
such corporations. *The only authority remaining to [*237]
the government is judicial, to ascertain the validity o
f
the grant, to enforce it
s proper uses, to suppress frauds, and,
if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular administration
through the means o
f equitable tribunals, in cases where there
would otherwise be a failure o
f justice.” ”
“In respect to public corporations,” says another judge,
“which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c.,
the legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify,
enlarge, o
r
restrain them, securing, however, the property for the
use o
f
those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased.””
These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding
cases.” They draw a distinction between the political rights and
privileges conferred on corporations and which are not vested
rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and such
rights in property as the corporation acquires, and which in the
* Story, J., in Dartmouth College
v
. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694, 695.
* Story, J., in Dartmouth College
v
. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 698.
* Washington, J., Dartmouth Col
lege v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 663.
* Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43;
Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch,
292. See also State v. Haben, 22 Wis.
660, referred to, ante, pp. *230–"231,
note; Aberdeen v. Saunderson, 16
Miss. 663. In People v. Common
Council o
f Detroit, 28 Mich. 228,
this subject was largely considered,
and the court denied the right o
f
the
State to compel a municipal corpora
tion to contract a debt for a mere
local object; for example, a city
park. Compare People v. Board o
f
Supervisors, 50 Cal. 561.
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view of these decisions are protected by the same reasons which
shield similar rights in individuals."
When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are
changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one, or
one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses the
power to make such disposition of the corporate property as
natural equity would require in view of the altered condition of
things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled
to the benefits springing from the use of specific property for
public purposes, will now be deprived of that benefit, cannot
affect the validity of the legislative act, which is supposed in some
other way to compensate them for the incidental loss.”
[* 238] And in many “other cases the legislature properly exer
cises a similar power of control in respect to the cor
porate property, and may direct its partition and appropriation,
in order to accommodate most justly and effectually, in view of
new circumstances, the purposes for which it was acquired.
The rule upon the subject we take to be this: when corporate
powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the
State and the corporators that the property which they are given
the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their charter
shall not be taken from them and appropriated to other uses.” If
the State grants property to the corporation, the grant is an
executed contract, which cannot be revoked. The rights ac
quired, either by such grants or by any other legitimate mode in
1 “It is an unsound and even ab do the same.” Nelson, J., in People
surd proposition that political power v. Morris, 13 Wend. 331. And see
conferred by the legislature can be
come a vested right, as against the
government, in any individual or body
of men. It is repugnant to the genius
of our institutions, and the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution ; for by
that fundamental law, all political
rights not there defined and taken
out of the exercise of legislative dis
cretion were intended to be left sub
ject to its regulation. If corporations
can set up a vested right as against
the government to the exercise of this
species of power, because it has been
conferred upon them by the bounty
of the legislature, so may any and
every officer under the government
Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 532;
Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
10 Barb. 244.
2 Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H.
533. And see ante, pp. *232—"234,
notes.
* If land is dedicated as a public
square, and accepted as such, a law
devoting it to other uses is void, be
cause violating the obligation of con
tracts. Warren v. Lyons City, 22
Iowa, 351. As there was no attempt
in that case to appropriate the land to
such other uses under the right of
eminent domain, the question of the
power to do so was not considered.
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which such a corporation can acquire property, are vested rights,
and cannot be taken away. Nevertheless if the corporate powers
should be repealed, the corporate ownership would necessarily
cease, and even when not repealed, a modification of those
powers, or a change in corporate bounds, might seriously affect,
if not altogether divest, the rights of individual corporators, so
far as they can be said to have any rights in public property.
And in other ways, incidentally as well as by direct intervention,
the State may exercise authority and control over the disposition
and use of corporate property, according to the legislative view
of what is proper for the public interest and just to the corpora
tors, subject only — as we think — to this restriction, that the
purpose for which the property was originally acquired shall be
kept in view, so far as the circumstances will admit, in any
disposition that may be made of it."
1 See North Yarmouth v. Skillings,
45 Me. 133. “That the State may
make a contract with, or a grant to,
a public municipal corporation, which
it could not subsequently impair or
resume, is not denied ; but in such a
case the corporation is to be regarded
as a private company. A grant may
be made to a public corporation for
purposes of private advantage; and
although the public may also derive
a common benefit therefrom, yet the
corporation stands on the same foot
ing, as respects such grant, as would
any body of persons upon whom like
privileges were conferred. Public
or municipal corporations, however,
which exist only for public purposes,
and possess no powers except such as
are bestowed upon them for public
political purposes, are subject at all
times to the control of the legisla
ture, which may alter, modify, or
abolish them at pleasure.” Trumbull,
J., in Richland County v. Lawrence
County, 12 Ill. 8. “Public corpora
tions are but parts of the machinery
employed in carrying on the affairs
of the State ; and they are subject to
be changed, modified, or destroyed,
as the exigencies of the public may
demand. The State may exercise a
general superintendence and control
over them and their rights and effects,
so that their property is not diverted
from the uses and objects for which
it was given or purchased.” Trustees
of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30, per
Treat, Ch. J. And see Harrison v.
Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier
v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704; Same
v. Same, 29 Vt. 19; Benson v. Mayor,
&c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223.
See also City of Louisville v. Univer
sity, 15 B. Monr. 642 ; Weymouth
and Braintree Fire District v. County
Commissioners, 108 Mass. 142. In
State v. St. Louis County Court, 34
Mo. 572, the following remarks are
made by the court, in considering the
cause shown by the county in answer
to an application to compel it to meet
a requisition for the police board of
St. Louis : “As to the second cause
shown in the return, it is understood
to mean, not that there is in fact no
money in the treasury to pay this
requisition, but that as a matter of
law all the money which is in the
treasury was collected for specific
purposes from which it cannot be
diverted. The specific purposes for
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[*239] * This restriction is not the less applicable where cor
porate powers are abolished than it is in other cases; and
whatever might be the nature of the public property which the
corporation had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the ac
quisition, the legislature, when by taking away the corporate
authority it became vested with the control of the property,
would be under obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to
give the original corporators the benefit thereof by putting it
to the use designed, if still practicable, or to some kindred or
equally beneficial use having reference to the altered condition
of things. The obligation is one which, from the very nature of
the case, must rest for it
s
enforcement in great measure upon
which the money was collected were
those heretofore directed by the legis
lature ; and this act, being a later
expression o
f
the will o
f
the legisla
ture, controls the subject, and so far
a
s it conflicts with previous acts re
peals them. The county is not a
private corporation, but an agency
o
f
the State government ; and though
a
s
a public corporation it holds prop
erty, such holding is subject to a
large extent to the will of the legis
lature. Whilst the legislature cannot
take away from a county it
s property,
it has full power to direct the mode
in which the property shall be used
for the benefit o
f
the county.” For
like views see Palmer v. Fitts, 51 Ala.
489, 492. Compare People v. Maha
ney, 13 Mich. 433. In Darlington v.
New York, 31 N. Y. 164, the com
plete control o
f
the legislature over
the corporate property o
f
cities was
asserted, and it was held competent
to subject the city to liability for
property destroyed by a riot. It will
b
e
observed that the strong expres
sion o
f legislative power is generally
to be found in cases where the thing
actually done was clearly and unques
tionably competent. In Payne v.
Treadwell, 16 Cal. 233, this language
is used : “The agents of the corpora
tion can sell o
r dispose o
f
the property
o
f
the corporation only in the way
recting the use,
and according to the order o
f
the
legislature ; and therefore the legis
lature may b
y
law operating immedi
ately upon the subject dispose o
f
this
property, o
r give effect to any pre
vious disposition o
r attempted dispo
sition. The property itself is a trust,
and the legislature is the prime and
controlling power, managing and di
disposition, and
direction o
f it.” Quoted and ap
proved in San Francisco v. Canavan,
4
2 Cal. 558. These strong and gen
eral expressions should be compared
with what is said in Grogan v. San
Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, in which the
right of municipal corporations to
constitutional protection in their
property is asserted fully. The same
right is asserted in People v. Batchel
lor, 53 N
.
Y
. 128; People v. Mayor,
&c. o
f Chicago, 51 Ill. 17; People
v
. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; People v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; and very many
others. See Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 39
e
t seq., and cases referred to in notes.
And see Hewison v. New Haven, 37
Conn. 483; New Orleans, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 517,
a
s
to the distinction between the pub
lic or governmental character of mu
nicipal corporations, and their private
character as respects the ownership
and management o
f
their own prop
erty.
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the legislative good faith and sense of justice; and it could only
be in those cases where there had been a clear disregard of
the rights of the original corporators, in the use attempted to
be made of the property, that relief could be had through
judicial action. -
No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in
regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to
municipal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which
are granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in
effecting the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the
corporate powers, must be understood to be granted during
pleasure."
* Towns and Counties. [*240]
Thus far we have been considering general rules, applicable
to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate
powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the
duties which they impose defined. In regard to some of these
organizations, however, there are other and peculiar rules which
require separate mention. Some of them are so feebly endowed
with corporate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and
directed in the exercise of the functions which are conferred
upon them, that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in
character, and as occupying a position somewhere between that
of a corporation and a mere voluntary association of citizens.
* East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 10 How. 535. On this subject,
see ch. ix., post. The case of Trustees
of Aberdeen Academy v. Mayor, &c.
of Aberdeen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears
to be contra. By the charter of the
town of Aberdeen in 1837, the legis
lature granted to it the sole power to
grant licenses to sell vinous and
spirituous liquors within the corpo
rate limits thereof, and to appropri
ate the money arising therefrom to
city purposes. In 1848 an act was
passed giving these moneys to the
Aberdeen Female Academy. The
act was held void, on the ground that
the original grant was of a franchise
which constituted property, and it
could not be transferred to another,
though it might be repealed. The
case cites Bailey v. Mayor, &c., 3
Hill, 541, and St. Louis v. Russell,
9 Mo. 507, which seem to have little
relevancy; also 4 Wheat. 663, 698,
699, and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the
general rule protecting municipal cor
porations in their vested rights to
property. The case of Benson v.
Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb.
223, also holds the grant of a ferry
franchise to a municipal corporation
to be irrevocable, but the authorities
generally will not sustain this view.
See post, p. *283 and note.
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Counties, townships, school districts, and road districts do not
usually possess corporate powers under special charters; but they
exist under general laws of the State, which apportion the terri
tory of the State into political divisions for convenience of gov
ernment, and require of the people residing within those divisions
the performance of certain public duties as a part of the ma
chinery of the State; and, in order that they may be able to
perform these duties, vest them with certain corporate powers.
Whether they shall assume those duties or exercise those powers,
the people of the political divisions are not allowed the privilege
of choice; the legislature assumes this division of the State to
be essential in republican government, and the duties are imposed
as a part of the proper and necessary burden which the citizens
must bear in maintaining and perpetuating constitutional liberty."
Usually their functions are wholly of a public nature, and there
is no room to imply any contract between them and the State,
in their organization as corporate bodies, except that which
springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and which requires
that the property they shall acquire, by local taxation or other
wise, for the purposes of their organization, shall not be
[*241] seized by the State, and appropriated *in other ways.
They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corporations,”
to distinguish them from the corporations in general, which pos
sess more completely the functions of an artificial entity. Chief
Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, in speaking of school districts,
has said: “That they are not bodies politic and corporate, with
the general powers of corporations, must be admitted; and the
reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.
The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies;
which, although recognized by various statutes, and by immemo
rial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise
duties which may be enforced, and privileges which may be
maintained by suits at law, yet are deficient in many of the
* Granger v. Pulaski County, 26 Johns. Ch. 325; Beardsley v. Smith,
Ark. 37; Scales v. Chattahoochee 16 Conn. 367; Eastman v. Meredith,
County, 41 Geo. 225; Palmer v. 36 N. H. 296; Hopple v. Brown, 13
Fitts, 51 Ala. 489. Ohio, N. s. 311; Commissioners of
* Riddle v. Proprietors, &c., 7 Mass. Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio,
186, 187; School District v. Wood, 13 N. s. 109; Ray County v. Bentley, 49
Mass. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, Mo. 236.
1 Greenl. 361; Denton v. Jackson, 2
CH. VIII.] THE GRADEs of MUNICIPAL Gover NMENT. 297
*
powers incident to the general character of corporations. They
may be considered, under our institutions, as quasi corporations,
with limited powers, coextensive with the duties imposed upon
them by statute or usage, but restrained from the general use of
authority which belongs to these metaphysical persons by the
common law. The same may be said of all the numerous cor
porations which have been from time to time created by various
acts of the legislature; all of them enjoying the power which is
expressly bestowed upon them, and perhaps, in a
ll
instances
where the act is silent, possessing, by necessary implication, the
authority which is requisite to execute the purposes o
f
their
creation.” “It will not do to apply the strict principles of law
respecting corporations in all cases to these aggregate bodies
which are created b
y
statute in this Commonwealth. By the
several statutes which have been passed respecting school dis
tricts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed that a
division o
f towns, for the purpose o
f maintaining schools, will
promote the important object o
f general education; and this
valuable object o
f legislative care seems to require, in construing
their acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be
effected.”" Following out this view, the courts o
f
the New
England States have held, that when judgments are recovered
against towns, parishes, and school districts, any o
f
the
property o
f private owners within * the municipal divi- [*242.]
sion is liable to be taken for their discharge. The rea
sons for this doctrine, and the custom upon which it is founded,
are thus stated by the Supreme Court o
f
Connecticut: —
“We know that the relation in which the members of munici
pal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in
respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has
elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have
treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceed
ings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged
in their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have
been holden to be parties to suits by o
r against the corporation,
and individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not
been doubted a
s
to the inhabitants o
f towns, located ecclesiastical
societies, and school districts.
“From a recurrence to a history of the law on this subject, we
1 School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
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are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and
followed, in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns
and communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And
whether they were considered as a part of the common law of
England, or originated here, as necessary to our state of society,
it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the
principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was opera
tive and applied in the mother country, especially in cases where
a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had no cor
porate funds. The same reason and necessity for the application
of such a principle and practice existed in both countries. Such
corporations are of a public and political character; they exercise
a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes impose
upon them important public duties. In the performance of these,
they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only be dis
charged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or execution.
Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the voluntary
action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent will of
the majority of the corporators, and upon their tardy and uncer
tain action. It affords no security to creditors, because they have
no power over it
.
Such reasons as these probably operated with
our ancestors in adopting the more efficient and certain remedy
b
y
execution, which has been resorted to in the present case, and
which they had seen to some extent in operation in the country
whose laws were their inheritance.
[*243] * “The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or
quasi corporations the close principles applicable to private
corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking,
corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds,
it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law
o
f corporations."
“The individual liability of the members o
f quasi corporations,
though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in
the case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.” It was alluded to as
a known principle in the case o
f
the Attorney-General v. The
City of Exeter,” applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and
parishes. That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are
considered as the real parties to suits against the parish is now
1 School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192. * 2 Term Rep. 660.
* 2 Russ. 45.
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supposed to be well settled; and so it was decided in the case of
The King v. The Inhabitants of Woburn,' and The King v. The
Inhabitants of Hardwick.” And, in support of this principle,
reference was made to the form of the proceedings; as that they
are entitled ‘against the inhabitants,’ &c.
“In the State of Massachusetts, from whose early institutions
we have borrowed many valuable specimens, the individual re
sponsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long
been established. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Mer
chants' Bank v. Cook,” referring to municipal bodies, say: “For a
century past the practical construction of the bar has been that,
in an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corpo
ration is a party in the suit.” In several other cases in that
State the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v.
The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River,”
Parsons, Ch. J., in an allusion to this private responsibility of
corporators, remarks: “And the sound reason is
,
that having no
corporate fund, and no legal means o
f obtaining one, each cor
porator is liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the
corporation.” So in Brewer v. Inhabitants o
f
New Gloucester,”
the court say: “As the law provides that, when judgment is re
covered against the inhabitants o
f
a town, execution may b
e
levied upon the property o
f any inhabitant, each inhabitant must
b
e
considered as a party.” In the case before referred to
o
f
the Merchants' Bank v. Cook, "Parker, Ch. J., ex-[*244]
presses the opinion o
f
the court upon this point thus:
‘Towns, parishes, precincts, &c., are but a collection of individ
uals, with certain corporate powers for political and civil pur
poses, without any corporate fund, from which a judgment can
b
e satisfied; but each member o
f
the community is liable, in his
person and estate, to the execution which may issue against the
body; each individual, therefore, may be well thought to be a
party to a suit brought against them b
y
their collective name.
In regard to banks, turnpikes, and other corporations, the case is
different.” The counsel concerned in the case of Mower v.
Leicester," without contradiction, speak o
f
this practice o
f sub
jecting individuals as one o
f daily occurrence. The law on this
subject was very much considered in the case o
f
Chase v. The
1 1
0 East, 395. 2 11 East, 577. 8 4 Pick. 405.
* 7 Mass. 187. * 14 Mass. 216. * 9 Mass. 247.
t
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Merrimack Bank, and was applied and enforced against the
members of a territorial parish. “The question is,’ say the court,
‘whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or
estate of any inhabitant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it
.
This
question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series
o
f decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open
question.” The State o
f Maine, when separated from Massachu
setts, retained most o
f
it
s
laws and usages, as they had been
recognized in the parent State; and, among others, the one in
question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,” Mellen, Ch. J., says:
“It is well known that all judgments against quasi corporations
may be satisfied out o
f
the property o
f any individual inhabitant.’
“The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of
any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as
one o
f
common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to
towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical
societies and school districts. The forms o
f
our process against
these communities have always corresponded with this view o
f
the law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants o
f towns,
societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our
jurisprudence as 1805, a statute was enacted authorizing commu
nities, such as towns, societies, &c., to prosecute and defend suits,
and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents, o
r
attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as par
ties individually, and liable to the consequences o
f judgments
against such communities as parties, there would have
[*245] been a glaring * impropriety in permitting them to ap
pear and defend by themselves; but, if parties, such a
right was necessary and indispensable. Of course this privilege
has been and may be exercised.”
“Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that
the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collec
tors of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the
further proceedings against the collectors and the selectmen
authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection o
f
the tax,
the law directs that then the treasurer shall issue his execution
against the inhabitants o
f
such town. Such an execution may
b
e
levied upon the estate o
f
the inhabitants; and this provision
o
f
the law was not considered as introducing a new principle, o
r
1 19 Pick. 564. 2 1 Greenl. 361. * 1 Swift's System, 227.
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enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in conformity with
the well-known usage in other cases. The levy of an execution
under this statute produced the case of Beers v. Botsford." There
the execution, which had been issued against the town of New
town by the treasurer of the State, had been levied upon the
property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that town, and he had
thus been compelled to pay the balance of a State tax due from
the town. He sued the town of Newtown for the recovery of
the money so paid by him. The most distinguished professional
gentlemen in the State were engaged as counsel in that case ;
and it did not occur, either to them or to the court, that the
plaintiff's property had been taken without right: on the con
trary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded principle
of our common law, that the levy was properly made upon the
estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff could not
have recovered of the town, but must have resorted to his action
against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Fuller v.
Hampton,” Peters, J., remarked that, if costs are recovered against
a town, the writ of execution to collect them must have been
issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town ; and
this is the invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. Wood
bridge * also grew out of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical
society of Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodbridge
for it
s moneys at interest, and the warrant for the collection o
f
the tax had been levied upon the property o
f
the plaintiff, and
the tax had thus been collected o
f him, who was an inhabitant
o
f
the located society o
f Bethany. Brainerd, J., who
drew up the * opinion o
f
the court, referring to this pro- [*246]
ceeding, said: “This practice, with regard to towns, has
prevailed in New England, so far as I have been able to investi
gate the subject, from a
n early period, - from its first settlement,
— a practice brought by our forefathers from England, which had
there obtained in corporations similar to the towns incorporated
in New England.’ It will here be seen that the principle is con
sidered as applicable to territorial societies as to towns, because
the object to be obtained was the same in both, – ‘that the town
o
r society should be brought to a sense of duty, and make pro
vision for payment and indemnity;” a very good reason, and very
applicable to the case we are considering.
* 3 Day, 159. * 5 Conn. 417. 8 6 Conn. 223.
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“The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out and
considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby," in
which this well-known practice, as it had been applied to towns
and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and sanctioned as to
school districts; else it would be breaking in upon the analogies
of the law.’ ‘They are communities for different purposes, but
essentially of the same character.” And no doubt can remain,
since the decision of this case, but that the real principle, in all
of the cases on this subject, has been, and is
,
that the inhabitants
o
f quasi corporations are parties individually, as well as in their
corporate capacities, to a
ll
the actions in which the corporation is
a party. And to the same effect is the language of the elemen
tary writers.””
So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organiza
tions have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by
which demands against them can be enforced, it cannot be con
sidered applicable in those States where express provision is made
b
y
law for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered
against the corporate body, - the duty of levying the tax being
imposed upon some officer, who may be compelled by mandamus
to perform it
.
Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown
up in any o
f
the newer States, like that which had so
[*247] early an origin in New England. * More just, conven
ient, and inexpensive modes o
f enforcing such demands
have been established by statute, and the rules concerning them
are conformed more closely to those which are established for
other corporations.
On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not
liable to a private action, at the suit o
f
a party injured b
y
a neg
lect o
f
it
s
officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action
is given by statute. This doctrine has been frequently applied
where suits have been brought against towns, o
r
the highway
officers o
f towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence
o
f
defects in the public ways. The common law gives no such
1 10 Conn. 390–395. extend the same principle to incor
* Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. porated cities; and an act o
f
the leg
375, citing 2 Kent, 221; Angell & islature permitting the enforcement
Ames on Corp. 371; 1 Swift's Dig. o
f city debts in the same mode was
72, 794; 5 Dane's Abr. 158. And sustained. For a more recent case
see Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 1. It was in Massachusetts than these cited, see
held competent in the above case to Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met. 551.
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action, and it is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given by
statute." A distinction is made between those corporations which
are created as exceptions, and receive special grants of power for
the peculiar convenience and benefit of the corporators, on the one
hand, and the incorporated inhabitants of a district, who are by
statute invested with particular powers, without their consent, on
the other. In the latter case, the State may impose corporate
duties, and compel their performance, under penalties; but the
corporators, who are made such whether they will or no, cannot
be considered in the light of persons who have voluntarily, and
for a consideration, assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to
every person interested in the performance.”
The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability
to private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obliga
tions, does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities,
which accept special * charters from the State. The [*248]
grant of the corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually
* This rule, however, has no ap
plication to the case of neglect to
perform those obligations which are
incurred by the political subdivisions
of the State when special duties are
imposed on them by law. Hannon
v. St. Louis Co. Court, 62 Mo. 313.
* Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 250;
Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439;
Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392;
Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Me. 361;
Baxter v. Winooski Turnpike, 22 Vt.
123; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn.
375; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475;
Young v. Commissioners, &c., 2 N.
& McC. 537; Commissioners of High
ways v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Morey
v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Lorillard
v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392: Galen v.
Clyde and Rose Plank Road Co., 27
Barb. 543; Reardon v. St. Louis, 36
Mo. 555; Sherburne v. Yuba Co., 21
Cal. 113; State v. County of Hudson,
30 N. J. 137; Hedges v. Madison
Co., 1 Gilm. 567; Granger v. Pulaski
Co., 26 Ark. 37; Weightman v. Wash
ington, 1 Black, 39; Ball v. Win
chester, 32 N. H. 443; Eastman v.
Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Waltham v.
Kemper, 55 Ill. 346; Sutton v. Board,
41 Miss. 236; Cooley v. Freeholders,
27 N. J. 415; Bigelow v. Randolph,
14 Gray, 541; Symonds v. Clay Co.,
71 Ill. 355; People v. Young, 72 Ill.
411. These cases follow the leading
English case of Russell v. Men of
Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In the very
carefully considered case of Eastman
v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, it was
decided, on the principle above stated,
that if a building erected by a town
for a town-house is so imperfectly
constructed that the flooring gives
way at the annual town-meeting, and
an inhabitant and legal voter, in attend
ance on the meeting, receives thereby
a bodily injury, he cannot maintain
an action against the town to recover
damages for this injury. The case
is carefully distinguished from those
where corporations have been held
liable for the negligent use of their
own property by means of which
others are injured. The familiar
maxim that one shall so use his own
as not to injure that which belongs to
another is of general application.
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made only at the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and
it is justly assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable
privilege. This privilege is a consideration for the duties which
the charter imposes. Larger powers of self-government are
given than are confided to towns or counties; larger privileges
in the acquisition and control of corporate property; and special
authority is conferred to make use of the public highways for
the special and peculiar convenience of the citizens of the munici
pality in various modes not permissible elsewhere. The grant
by the State to the municipality of a portion of its sovereign
powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial purposes, is
regarded as raising an implied promise, on the part of the cor
poration, to perform the corporate duties, and as imposing the
duty of performance, not for the benefit of the State merely, but
for the benefit of every individual interested in it
s performance."
* Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport,
1
6 N. Y
.
161, note. See also Mayor
o
f Lyme v. Turner, Cowp. 86; Hen
ley v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; Same
case in error, 3 B
.
& Adol. 77, and 1
Bing. N
.
C
. 222; Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; Rochester
White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y.
464; Hutson v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 9 N
.
Y
.
163; Conrad v. Ithaca,
1
6 N
.
Y
. 158; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32
N. Y
. 489; Barton v. Syracuse, 36
N
.
Y
. 54; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N
.
Y. 442; Clark v. Washington, 12
Wheat. 40; Riddle v. Proprietors o
f
Locks, &c., 7 Mass. 183; Bigelow v.
Inhabitants o
f Randolph, 14 Gray,
541; Mears v. Commissioners o
f Wil
mington, 9 Ired. 73; Browning v.
Springfield, 17 Ill. 143; Bloomington
v
. Bay, 42 Ill. 503; Springfield v.
LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476; Peru v. French,
5
5 Ill. 318; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22
Penn. St. 54; Jones v. New Haven,
3
4 Conn. 1
;
Stackhouse v. Lafayette,
2
6 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer v. Evans
ville, 29 Ind. 187; Sawyer v. Corse,
1
7 Grat. 241; Richmond v. Long, 17
Grat. 375; Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo.
569; Scott v. Mayor, &c. o
f
Manches
ter, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 495; Smoot v.
Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Detroit v.
Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Rusch v. Daven
port, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissioners v.
Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Covington v.
Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Weightman
v
. Washington, 1 Black, 41; Chicago
v
. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Nebraska v.
Campbell, 2 Black, 590. In the recent
case o
f
Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich.
84, this whole subject is considered
a
t length; and the court (one judge
dissenting) deny the soundness o
f
the
principle stated in the text, and hold
that municipal corporations existing
under special charters are not liable
to individuals for injuries caused by
neglect to perform corporate duties,
unless expressly made so by statute.
This case is referred to and dissented
from in Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill.
347. In Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44
Mo. 480, Currier, J., says: “The
general result o
f
the adjudications
seems to be this: When the officer
o
r
servant o
f
a municipal corporation
is in the exercise of a power conferred
upon the corporation for its private
benefit, and injury ensues from the
negligence o
r
misfeasance o
f
such
officer o
r servant, the corporation is
liable, as in the case of private corpo
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In this respect these corporations are looked upon as occupying
the same position as private corporations, which, having accepted
a valuable franchise, on condition of the performance of certain
public duties, are held by the acceptance to contract for the per
formance of those duties. In the case of public corporations,
however, the liability is contingent on the law affording the
means of performing the duty, which, in some cases, by reason
of restrictions upon the power of taxation, they might not pos
sess. But assuming the corporation to be clothed with sufficient
power by the charter to that end, the liability of a city or village,
vested with control of its streets, for any neglect to keep them
in repair, or for any improper construction, has been determined
in many cases." And a similar liability would exist in other cases
where the same reasons would be applicable.
*But if the ground of the action is the omission by [*249]
rations or parties; but when the acts
or omissions complained of were done
or omitted in the exercise of a corpo
rate franchise conferred upon the cor
poration for the public good, and not
for the private corporate advantage,
then the corporation is not liable for
the consequences of such acts or omis
sions.” Citing Bailey v. New York, 3
Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill,
550; Richmond v. Long's Adm’r, 17
Grat. 375; Sherburne v. Yuba Co., 21
Cal. 113; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala.
469; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La.
Ann. 461; Prother v. Lexington, 13
B. Monr. 559. And as to exemption
from liability in the exercise or failure
to exercise legislative authority, see
ante, p. *208 and note. As to who
are to be regarded as municipal officers,
see Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y.
160; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 468, and cases
there cited.
1 Weet p. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161,
note; Hickok v. Plattsburg, 16 N. Y.
158; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645;
Browning v. Springfield, 17 Ill. 143;
Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385;
Lloyd v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5
N. Y. 369; Rusch v. Davenport, 6
Iowa, 433. And see Dillon, Mun.
Corp. c. 18, and the cases cited in the
preceding note. The cases of Weet
v. Brockport, and Hickok v. Platts
burg, were criticised by Mr. Justice
Marvin, in the case of Peck v. Batavia,
32 Barb. 634, where, as well as in
Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he held
that a village merely authorized to
make and repair sidewalks, but not
in terms absolutely and imperatively
required to do so, had a discretion
conferred upon it in respect to such
walks, and was not responsible for a
refusal to enact ordinances or by-laws
in relation thereto; nor, if it enacted
such ordinances or by-laws was it lia
ble for damages arising from a neglect
to enforce them. The doctrine that
a power thus conferred is discretion
ary does not seem consistent with the
ruling in some of the other cases cited,
and is criticised in Hyatt v. Rondout,
44 Barb. 392. But see ante, p. *208
and note. Calling public meetings for
political or philanthropic purposes is
no part of the business of a municipal
corporation, and it is not liable to one
who, in lawfully passing by where the
meeting is held, is injured by the dis
charge of a cannon fired by persons
concerned in the meeting. Boyland
v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 1 Sandf.
27.
20
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the corporation to repair a defect, it would seem that notice
of the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to
officers charged with some duty respecting the streets, or that
facts should appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance,
it must have been known." On the other hand, if the injury has
happened in consequence of defective construction, notice is not
essential, as the facts must be supposed to have been known
from the first.”
In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the
corporation, not for the benefit of the general public, but of the
corporators, – such as the power to construct works to supply a
city with water, or gas-works, or sewers, and the like, – the cor
poration is held to a still more strict liability, and is made to
respond in damages to the parties injured by the negligent man
ner in which the work is constructed, or guarded, even though,
under its charter, the agents for the construction are not chosen
or controlled by the corporation, and even where the work is
required by law to be let to the lowest responsible bidder.
In Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York,” an action was brought
against the city by one who had been injured in his property by
the careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of
supplying the city with water. The work was constructed under
the control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the
city had no voice; and upon this ground, among others, and
also on the ground that the city officers were acting in a public
capacity, and, like other public agents, not responsible
[*250] for the misconduct of * those necessarily appointed by
them, it was insisted the city could not be held liable.
Nelson, Ch. J., examining the position that, “admitting the water
commissioners to be the appointed agents of the defendants, still
the latter are not liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for
the State in prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are
not responsible for the conduct of those necessarily employed by
* Hart v. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226; Y. 639; Springfield v. Doyle, 76 Ill.
Dewey v. City of Detroit, 15 Mich. 202; Rosenburg v. Des Moines, 41
309; Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. Iowa, 415.
497; McGinity v. Mayor, &c. of New * Alexander v. Mt. Sterling, 71
York, 5 Duer, 674; Decatur v. Fisher, Ill. 366.
53 Ill. 407; Chicago v. McCarthy, 75 * 3 Hill, 531; s. c. in error, 2
Ill. 602; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Denio, 433. -
Y. 129; Hume v. New York, 47 N.
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them for that purpose,” says: “We admit, if the defendants are
to be regarded as occupying this relation, and are not chargeable
with any want of diligence in the selection of agents, the con
clusion contended for would seem to follow. They would then
be entitled to a
ll
the immunities o
f public officers charged with
a duty which, from its nature, could not be executed, without
availing themselves o
f
the services o
f others; and the doctrine
o
f respondeat superior does not apply to such cases. If a public
officer authorize the doing o
f
a
n act not within the scope o
f
his
authority, or if he be guilty of negligence in the discharge of
duties to be performed b
y
himself, h
e will be held responsible;
but not for the misconduct or malfeasance o
f
such persons a
s
h
e
is obliged to employ. But this view cannot be maintained on
the facts before us. The powers conferred by the several acts o
f
the legislature, authorizing the execution o
f
this great work, are
not, strictly and legally speaking, conferred for the benefit o
f
the
public ; the grant is a special, private franchise, made as well for
the private emolument and advantage o
f
the city as for public
good. The State, in it
s sovereign character, has no interest in it
.
It owns no part of the work. The whole investment, under the
law, and the revenue and profits to be derived therefrom, are a
part o
f
the private property o
f
the city, as much so as the lands
and houses belonging to it situate within it
s corporate limits.
“The argument of the defendants' counsel confounds the
powers in question with those belonging to the defendants in
their character as a municipal or public body, — such as are
granted exclusively for public purposes to counties, cities, towns,
and villages, where the corporations have, if I may so speak, no
private estate or interest in the grant.
“As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of
these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those con
ferred for private advantage and emolument with those already
possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty,
I * admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly [*251]
distinguishing the one class from the other, so as to
distribute the responsibility attaching to the exercise o
f
each.
“But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the
process o
f separation practicable. To this end, regard should be
had, not so much to the nature and character o
f
the various
powers conferred, as to the object and purpose o
f
the legislature
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in conferring them. If granted for public purposes exclusively,
they belong to the corporate body in it
s public, political, o
r mu
nicipal character. But, if the grant was for purposes of private
advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a
common benefit therefrom, the corporation quo a
d
hoc is to b
e
regarded as a private company. It stands on the same footing
a
s would any individual o
r body o
f persons upon whom the like
special franchises had been conferred."
“Suppose the legislature, instead o
f
the franchise in question,
had conferred upon the defendants banking powers, or a charter
for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which
such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be
doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and
b
e subject to the same duties and liabilities 2 It cannot be
doubted but they would. These powers, in the eye o
f
the law,
would be entirely distinct and separate from those appertaining
to the defendants as a municipal body. So far as related to the
charter thus conferred, they would be regarded as a private
company, and be subject to the responsibilities attaching to that
class o
f
institutions. The distinction is well stated by the Mas
ter o
f
the Rolls, in Moodalay v. East India Co.,” in answer to an
objection made b
y
counsel. There the plaintiff had taken a lease
from the company, granting him permission to supply the inhab
itants o
f
Madras with tobacco for ten years. Before the expira
tion o
f
that period, the company dispossessed him, and granted
the privilege to another. The plaintiff, preparatory to bringing
a
n
action against the company, filed a bill o
f discovery.
[*252] One of the objections * taken b
y
the defendant was,
that the removal o
f
the plaintiff was incident to their
Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453;
Richmond v. Long, 17 Grat. 375; At
kins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; Small
1 Citing Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668, 672;
Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 8
;
2
T
.
R
.
352, s. c.; Allen v. McKeen,
1 Sumn. 297 ; People v. Morris, 13
Wend. 331–338; 2 Kent's Com. 275
(4th ed.); United States Bank v.
Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark
v
. Corp. o
f Washington, 12 Wheat.
40; Moodalay v. East India Co., 1
Brown's Ch. R
.
469. See, in addition
to the cases cited by the court,
Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal. 307;
v
. Danville, 51 Me. 359; Oliver v.
Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Philadel
phia v. Fox, 64 Penn. St. 180; Detroit
v
. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; People v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; Western Col
lege v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, N
.
s. 375;
Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn.
475; People v. Batchellor, 53 N
.
Y
.
128.
* 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.
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character as a sovereign power, the exercise of which could not
be questioned in a bill or suit at law. The Master of the Rolls
admitted that no suit would lie against a sovereign power for any
thing done in that capacity; but he denied that the defendants
came within the rule. “They have rights,” he observed, “as a
sovereign power; they have also duties as individuals; if they
enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be recovered
here. So in this case, as a private company, they have entered
into a private contract, to which they must be liable. It is upon
the like distinction that municipal corporations, in their private
character as owners and occupiers o
f
lands and houses, are re
garded in the same light as individual owners and occupiers,
and dealt with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair
bridges, highways, and churches; are liable to poor rates; and,
in a word, to the discharge of any other duty or obligation to
which an individual owner would be subject.” "
In Storrs v. City of Utica,” it was held that a city, owing to the
public the duty o
f keeping it
s
streets in a safe condition for travel,
was liable to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep
proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which
had been made for the construction o
f
a sewer, notwithstanding
it had contracted for all proper precautions with the persons
executing the work. And in the City o
f
Detroit v. Corey & the
corporation was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding
the work was required by the charter to be let to the lowest
bidder.
* 2 Inst. 703; Thursfield v. Jones,
Sir T. Jones, 187; Rex v. Gardner,
Cowp. 79; Mayor o
f Lyme v. Turner,
Cowp. 87; Henley v. Mayor o
f Lyme,
5 Bing. 91; 1 Bing. N
.
C
.
222, s. c.
in House o
f
Lords. See also Lloyd
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 5 N. Y
.
369; Commissioners r. Duckett, 20
Md. 468. “The corporation of the
city of New York possesses two kinds
o
f powers, – one governmental and
public, and, to the extent they are
held and exercised, is clothed with
sovereignty; the other private, and,
to the extent they are held and ex
ercised. is a legal individual. The
former are given and used for public
Manning, J.
,
in speaking to the point whether the con
purposes, the latter for private pur
poses. While in the exercise of the
former, the corporation is a municipal
government, and while in the exercise
o
f
the latter is a corporate, legal in
dividual.” Ibid. per Foot, J. See
upon this point also Western Fund ,
Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31
Penn. St. 175; Louisville v. Common
wealth, 1 Duvall, 295; People v.
Common Council o
f Detroit, 28
Mich. 228; ante, p
.
*230 and note.
2 17 N. Y. 104.
* 9 Mich. 165. Compare Mills v.
Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Jones v.
New Haven, 34 Conn. 1.
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tractors were to be considered as the agents of the city, so that
the maxim respondeat superior should apply, says: “It is
[*253] to be observed that the * power under which they acted,
and which made that lawful which would otherwise have
been unlawful, was not a power given to the city for govern
mental purposes, or a public municipal duty imposed on the city,
as to keep it
s
streets in repair, or the like, but a special legislative
grant to the city for private purposes. The sewers o
f
the city,
like its works for supplying the city with water, are the private
property o
f
the city; they belong to the city. The corporation
and it
s corporators, the citizens, are alone interested in them;
the outside public o
r people o
f
the State a
t large have no inter
est in them, as they have in the streets o
f
the city, which are
public highways.
“The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an indi
vidual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding — for
such are the requirements o
f
the law in the execution o
f
the
power — that it shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to
interfere with the rights o
f
the public, and that a
ll
needful and
proper measures will be taken, in the execution of it
,
to guard
against accidents to persons lawfully using the highway at the
time. He is individually bound for the performance o
f
these
obligations; he cannot accept the power divested o
f them, o
r
rid
himself o
f
their performance by executing them through a third
person as his agent. He may stipulate with the contractor for
their performance, as was done by the city in the present case,
but he cannot thereby relieve himself o
f
his personal liability, o
r
compel a
n injured party to look to his agent, instead o
f himself,
for damages.” And in answer to the objection that the contract
was let to the lowest bidder, as the law required, it is shown that
the provision o
f
law to that effect was introduced for the benefit
o
f
the city, to protect it against frauds, and that it should not,
therefore, relieve it from any liability."
* See also Rochester White Lead v. Syracuse, 37 Barb. 292; Storrs v.
Co. v. City o
f Rochester, 3 N
.
Y
.
463; Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41
Barb. 381; City o
f
Buffalo v. Hollo
way, 14 Barb. 101, and 7 N
.
Y
.
493;
Lloyd v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5
N. Y
. 369; Delmonico v. Mayor, &c.
o
f
New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton- - - ,
Utica, 17 N. Y
. 104; Springfield c.
LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476; Blake v. St.
Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Baltimore v.
Pendleton, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul v.
Leitz, 3 Minn. 297; also numerous
cases collected and classified in Dillon
o
n Municipal Corporations. A mu
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* We have not deemed it important, in considering [*254]
the subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the
various questions which might be suggested in regard to the va
lidity of the proceedings by which it is assumed in any case that
a municipal corporation has become constituted. These ques
nicipal corporation is not liable for
neglect to devise and construct a
proper system of drainage. Carr v.
Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324.
See ante, p. *208 and note. Cities are
not liable for the illegal conduct of
officials in the discharge of duty.
Dillon, $$ 774–778, and cases cited ;
Grumbine v. Washington, 2 Mc
Arthur, 578.
The following are some of the
more recent cases in which the lia
bility of municipal corporations for
neglect of public duties has been
considered:—
For nuisance in highway, sewer,
&c.: Todd v. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506;
Masterton v. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y.
391; Merrifield v. Worcester, 110
Mass. 216; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 592;
Woodward v. Worcester, 121 Mass.
245; Chicago v. Brophy, 79 Ill. 277;
Chicago v. O’Brennan, 65 Ill. 160.
For invasion of private right or
property: Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, 24
Mich. 383; Babcock v. Buffalo, 56
N. Y. 268; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N.
Y. 442; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47.Geo.
260; Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark.
569; Kobs v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn.
159. For negligent construction of
sewers: Nims v. Troy, 59 N. Y. 500;
Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa,
308; Rowe v. Portsmouth, 56 N. H.
291; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35
Mich. 296; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 628,
note. For negligence in construction
and improvement of streets: Pekin
v. Winkel, 77 Ill. 56; Bloomington v.
Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194; Pekin v. Brere
ton, 67 Ill. 477; Chicago v. Langlass,
66 Ill. 361; Mead v. Derby, 40 Conn.
205; Milledgeville v. Cooley, 55 Geo.
17; Prentiss v. Boston, 112 Mass. 43;
Saltmarsh v. Bow, 56 N. H. 428;
Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511;
Kentworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis.
647; Hoyt v. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105.
For defective sidewalk: Springfield
v. Doyle, 76 Ill. 202; Champaign v.
Pattison, 50 Ill. 62; Townsend v. Des
Moines, 42 Iowa, 657; Rice v. Des
Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; McAuley v.
Boston, 113 Mass. 503; Harriman
v. Boston, 114 Mass. 241; Morse v.
Boston, 109 Mass. 446; McLaughlin
v. Correy, 77 Penn. St. 109; Boucher
v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456; Cong
don v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414; Stew
art v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Chapman
v. Macon, 55 Geo. 566; Moore v.
Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 300; Furnell
v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Omaha v.
Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; Higert v.
Green Castle, 43 Ind. 574; Providence
v. Clapp, 17 How. 161 ; Smith v.
Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81; Atchison
v. King, 9 Kan. 550. For injury by
limb falling from tree overhanging
street: Jones v. New Haven, 34
Conn. 1. For failure to keep street
in repair: Gorham v. Cooperstown,
59 N. Y. 236; Hines v. Lockport, 50
N. Y. 236; Bell v. West Point, 51
Miss. 262; Chicago v. McGiven,
78 Ill. 347; Alton v. Hope. 68 Ill.
167; Centralia v. Scott, 59 Ill. 129;
Winbigler v. Los Angelos, 45 Cal. 36;
Market v. St. Louis, 56 Mo. 189; Wil
ley v. Belfast, 61 Me. 434; Bill v.
Norwich, 39 Conn. 222; Lindholm v.
St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245; Shartel
v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308; Leary
v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65; Griffin v.
Williamstown, 6 W. Wa. 312. For
failure to keep sewers in repair:
Munn v. Pittsburg, 40 Penn. St. 364.
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tions are generally questions between the corporators and the
State, with which private individuals are supposed to have no
concern. In proceedings where the question whether a corpora
tion exists or not arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its
corporate character to be questioned, if it appear to be acting
under color of law, and recognized by the State as such. Such
a question should be raised by the State itself, by quo warranto
or other direct proceeding." And the rule, we apprehend, would
be no different, if the constitution itself prescribed the manner
of incorporation. Even in such a case, proof that the corpora
tion was acting as such, under legislative action, would be suffi
cient evidence of right, except as against the State; and private
parties could not enter upon any question of regularity. And
the State itself may justly be precluded, on the principle of
estoppel, from raising such an objection, where there has been
long acquiescence and recognition.”
1 State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367; Pres
ident, &c. of Mendota v. Thompson,
20 Ill. 200; Hamilton v. President, &c.
of Carthage, 24 Ill. 22. These were
prosecutions by municipal corpora
tions for recovery of penalties imposed
by by-laws, and where the plea of
nul tiel corporation was interposed
and overruled. See also Kayser v.
Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Kettering v.
Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; Bird v. Per
kins, 33 Mich. 28.
* In People v. Maynard, 15 Mich.
470, where the invalidity of an act
organizing a county, passed several
years before, was suggested on con
stitutional grounds, Campbell, J., says:
“If this question had been raised im
mediately, we are not prepared to say
that it would have been altogether free
from difficulty. But inasmuch as the
arrangement there indicated had been
acted upon for ten years before the
recent legislation, and had been recog
nized as valid by a
ll parties interested,
it cannot now be disturbed. Even in
private associations the acts o
f par
ties interested may often estop them
from relying on legal objections, which
might have availed them if not waived.
But in public affairs, where the peo
ple have organized themselves under
color o
f
law into the ordinary munic
ipal bodies, and have gone on year
after year raising taxes, making im
provements, and exercising their usual
franchises, their rights are properly
regarded a
s depending quite as much
on the acquiescence as on the regu
larity o
f
their origin, and no e
r post
facto inquiry can be permitted to undo
their corporate existence. Whatever
may be the rights o
f
individuals before
such general acquiescence, the cor
porate standing o
f
the community can
no longer be open to question. See
Rumsey v. People, 19 N
.
Y. 41; and
Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 N
.
Y
. 474,
where the effect o
f
the invalidity o
f
an
original county organization is very
well considered in its public and pri
vate bearings. There have been di
rect legislative recognitions o
f
the new
division on several occasions. The
exercise o
f jurisdiction being noto
rious and open in all such cases, the
State as well as county and town taxes
being all levied under it
,
there is no
principle which could justify any court,
a
t
this late day, in going back to in
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quire into the regularity of the law of
1857.” A similar doctrine has been
applied in support of the official char
acter of persons who, without author
ity of law, have been named for
municipal officers by State legislation,
and whose action in such offices has
been acquiesced in by the citizens or
authorities of the municipality. See
People v. Salomon, 54 Ill. 51 ; People
v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235. Compare
Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151. But
such acquiescence could not make
them local officers and representatives
of the people for new and enlarged
powers subsequently attempted to be
given by the legislature. People v.
Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich.
228. Nor in respect to powers not
purely local. People v. Springwells,
25 Mich. 153. And see People v. Al
bertson, 55 N. Y. 50,
-
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[*256] * CHAPTER IX.
PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITU
TION OF THE UNITED STATES.
As the government of the United States was one of enumerated
powers, it was not deemed important by the framers of it
s Con
stitution that a bill o
f rights should be incorporated among its
provisions. If
,
among the powers conferred, there was none
which would authorize or empower the government to deprive
the citizen o
f any o
f
those fundamental rights which it is the
object and the duty o
f government to protect and defend, and to
insure which is the sole purpose o
f
bills o
f rights, it was thought
to be a
t
least unimportant to insert negative clauses in that
instrument, inhibiting the government from assuming any such
powers, since the mere failure to confer them would leave all
such powers beyond the sphere o
f
it
s
constitutional authority.
And, as Mr. Hamilton argued, it might seem even dangerous to
d
o
so. “For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is n
o power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty o
f
the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given b
y
which restrictions may be imposed ? I will not
contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power;
but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp,
a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They might urge,
with a semblance o
f reason, that the Constitution ought not to
b
e charged with the absurdity o
f providing against the abuse of
a
n authority which was not given, and that the provision against
restraining the liberty o
f
the press afforded a clear implication
that a right to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was
intended to b
e
vested in the national government. This may
serve as a specimen o
f
the numerous handles which would be
given to the doctrine o
f
constructive powers, b
y
the indulgence
o
f
a
n injudicious zeal for bills o
f rights.” "
1 Federalist, No. 84.
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It was also thought that bills of rights, however im
portant * under a monarchical government, were of no [*257]
moment in a constitution of government framed by the
people for themselves, and under which public affairs were to
be managed by means of agencies selected by the popular
choice, and subject to frequent change by popular action. “It
has been several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are,
in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,
abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of
rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was Magna Charta,
obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such
were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding
princes. Such was the Petition of Right, assented to by Charles
the First, in the beginning of his reign. Such also was the Dec
laration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the
Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form
of an act of Parliament, called the Bill of Rights. It is evident,
therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they
have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon
the power of the people, and executed by their immediate repre
sentatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender
nothing; and, as they retain every thing, they have no need of
particular reservations. “WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.’ This is a better recognition of popular
rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal
figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would
sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution
of government.” "
Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to
many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that
“the purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our
rights to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions
of right not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective
government, and which experience has nevertheless proved they
will be constantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that
there are also certain fences which experience has proved pecul
iarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right,
1 Federalist, No. 84, by Hamilton.
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which yet the governing powers have ever shown a disposition
to weaken and remove.”" And these governing powers
[*258] will be no less disposed * to be aggressive when chosen
by majorities than when selected by the accident of birth,
or at the will of privileged classes. Indeed if
,
during the long
struggle for constitutional liberty in England, covering the whole
o
f
the seventeenth century, importance was justly attached to a
distinct declaration and enumeration o
f
individual rights on the
part o
f
the government, when it was still in the power o
f
the
governing authorities to infringe upon or to abrogate them a
t
any time, and when, consequently, the declaration could possess
only a moral force, a similar declaration would appear to be o
f
even more value in the Constitution o
f
the United States, where
it would constitute authoritative law, and be subject to no modi
fication o
r repeal, except by the people themselves whose rights
it was designed to protect, nor even b
y
them except in the
manner by the Constitution provided.”
* Jefferson’s Works, Vol. III. 201.
* Mr. Jefferson sums u
p
the ob
jections to a bill of rights in the Con
stitution o
f
the United States, and
answers them as follows : “1. That
the rights in question are reserved b
y
the manner in which the federal
powers are granted. Answer: A con
stitutive act may certainly be so formed
a
s to need no declaration o
f rights.
The act itself has the force of a
declaration, as far as it goes; and if
it goes to al
l
material points, nothing
more is wanting. In the draft of a con
stitution which I had once a thought
o
f proposing in Virginia, and printed
afterwards, I endeavored to reach all
the great objects o
f public liberty,
and did not mean to add a declaration
o
f rights. Probably the object was
imperfectly executed; but the defi
ciencies would have been supplied by
others in the course of discussion.
But in a constitutive act which leaves
some precious articles unnoticed, and
raises implications against others, a
declaration o
f rights becomes neces
sary by way o
f supplement. This is
the case of our new federal Constitu
tion. This instrument forms us into
one State, as to certain objects, and
gives u
s
a legislative and executive
body for those objects. It should
therefore guard us against their abuses
o
f power, within the field submitted
to them. 2. A positive declaration of
some essential rights could not be
obtained in the requisite latitude. An
swer: Half a loaf is better than no
bread. If we cannot secure all our
rights, let us secure what we can.
3
. The limited powers of the federal
government, and jealousy o
f
the sub
ordinate governments, afford a secu
rity, which exists in no other instance.
Answer: The first member of this
seems resolvable into the first objec
tion before stated. The jealousy of
the subordinate governments is a pre
cious reliance. But observe that those
governments are only agents. They
must have principles furnished them
whereon to found their opposition.
The declaration of rights will be the
text whereby they will try all the acts
o
f
the federal government. In this
view it is necessary to the federal
government also; as by the same text
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* The want of a bill of rights was, therefore, made the [*259]
ground of a decided, earnest, and formidable opposition
to the confirmation of the national Constitution by the people;
and it
s adoption was only secured in some o
f
the leading States
in connection with the recommendation of amendments which
should cover the ground."
The clauses inserted in the original instrument, for the protec
tion o
f person and property, had reference mainly to the action
o
f
the State governments, and were made limitations upon their
power. The exceptions embraced a few cases only, in respect to
which the experience o
f
both English and American history had
forcibly demonstrated the tendency o
f power to abuse, not when
wielded b
y
a prince only, but also when administered b
y
the
agencies o
f
the people themselves.
Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the
Congress” or by the legislatures o
f
the several States.” Attainder,
in a strict sense, means an extinction of civil and political rights
and capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of course,
on conviction and sentence to death for treason; and, in greater
o
r
less degree, o
n conviction and sentence for the different classes
o
f felony.
A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged
they may try the opposition o
f
the worse. The executive, in our govern
subordinate governments. 4. Expe
rience proves the inefficacy o
f
a bill of
rights. True. But though it is not
absolutely efficacious, under all cir
cumstances, it is of great potency
always, and rarely inefficacious. A
brace the more will often keep u
p
the
building which would have fallen with
that brace the less. There is a re
markable difference between the char
acters of the inconveniences which
attend a declaration o
f rights, and
those which attend the want of it.
The inconveniences of the declaration
are, that it may cramp government in
its useful exertions. But the evil of
this is short-lived, moderate, and rep
arable. The inconveniences of the
want o
f
a declaration are permanent,
afflictive, and irreparable. They are
in constant progression from bad to
ments, is not the sole, it is scarcely
the principal, object o
f my jealousy.
The tyranny of the legislatures is the
most formidable dread at present, and
will be for many years. That of the
executive will come in its turn; but it
will be at a remote period.” Letter
to Madison, March 15, 1789, 3 Jeffer
son's Works, p
.
4
.
See also same
volume, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II
. pp.
329, 358.
* For the various recommendations
by Massachusetts, South Carolina,
New Hampshire, Virginia, New York,
North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see
1 Elliott's Debates, 322–334.
* Constitution o
f
United States,
art. 1
,
§ 9.
* Constitution o
f
United States,
art. 1
,
§ 10.
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crime, with judgment of death. Such convictions have not been
uncommon under other governments, and the power to pass these
bills has been exercised by the Parliament of England at some
periods in it
s history, under the most oppressive and
[*260] unjustifiable * circumstances, greatly aggravated b
y
a
n
arbitrary course o
f procedure, which had few o
f
the
incidents o
f
a judicial investigation into alleged crime. For
some time before the American Revolution, however, no one
had attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise o
f power;
and if it would be unjustifiable anywhere, there were many rea
sons why it would be specially obnoxious under a free govern
ment, and why consequently it
s prohibition, under the existing
circumstances o
f
our country, would be a matter o
f
more than
ordinary importance. Every one must concede that a legislative
body, from its numbers and organization, and from the very
intimate dependence o
f
its members upon the people, which
renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor,
is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and
impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which
the popular feeling is strongly excited, – the very class of cases
most likely to be prosecuted b
y
this mode. And although it
would be conceded that, if such bills were allowable, they should
properly be presented only for offences against the general laws
o
f
the land, and be proceeded with on the same full opportunity
for investigation and defence which is afforded in the courts o
f
the common law, yet it was remembered that in practice they
were often resorted to because a
n
obnoxious person was not
subject to punishment under the general law," or because, in
proceeding against him b
y
this mode, some rule o
f
the common
* Cases o
f
this description were liament o
f
James II., assembled in
most numerous during the reign o
f
Henry VIII., and among the victims
was Cromwell, who is said to have
first advised that monarch to resort to
this objectionable proceeding. Even
the dead were attainted, as in the case
o
f
Richard III., and later, of the
heroes of the Commonwealth. The
most atrocious instance in history,
however, only relieved by its weak
ness and futility, was the great act o
f
attainder passed in 1688 b
y
the Par
Dublin, by which between two and
three thousand persons were attainted,
their property confiscated, and them
selves sentenced to death if they failed
to appear a
t
a time named. And, to
render the whole proceeding as horri
ble in barbarity as possible, the list
o
f
the proscribed was carefully kept
secret until after the time fixed for
their appearance 1 Macaulay's His
tory o
f England, c. 12.
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law requiring a particular species or degree of evidence might
be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that a jury would
not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal presumption of
innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served
with process; what degree or species of evidence should
be required; whether the rules of law should be * fol-[*261]
lowed, either in determining what constituted a crime,
or in dealing with the accused after conviction, — were all ques
tions which would necessarily address themselves to the legisla
tive discretion and sense of justice; and the very qualities which
are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them
against popular clamor, or the hate of those in power, were pre
cisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the
legislative body at such a time." And what could be more
obnoxious in a free government than the exercise of such a power
by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the
contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most
favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adver
saries, and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure
party ends?
Nor were legislative punishments of this severe character the
only ones known to parliamentary history; there were others of
a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that the conse
quences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions which
imposed punishments less than that of death were called bills of
pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but
the constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubt
edly aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment
for criminal or supposed criminal offences; and the term “bill of
attainder" is used in a generic sense, which would include bills
of pains and penalties also.”
* This was equally true, whether
the attainder was at the command of
the king, as in the case of Cardinal
Pole's mother, or at the instigation of
the populace, as in the case of Went
worth, Earl of Strafford. The last
infliction of capital punishment in
England, under a bill of attainder,
was upon Sir John Fenwick, in the
reign of William and Mary. It is
worthy of note that in the preceding
reign Sir John had been prominent in
the attainder of the unhappy Mon
mouth. Macaulay's History of Eng
land, c. 5.
• 2 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138;
Story on Constitution, $ 1344; Cum
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Drehman
v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 595, 601. “I think
it will be found that the following
comprise those essential elements of
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[*262] *The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the
acts of the American States during the Revolutionary
period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if
the still more monitory history of the English attainders had not
been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for
the forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those
British subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction because
not satisfied that grievances existed sufficiently serious to justify
the last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons
not satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investi
gation provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others
mentioned particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of
adhering to the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inflict
punishment upon them, so far as the presence of property within
the Commonwealth would enable the government to do so."
These were the resorts of a time of extreme peril; and if possi
ble to justify them in a period of revolution, when every thing
was staked on success, and when the public safety would not
permit too much weight to scruples concerning the private rights
of those who were not aiding the popular cause, the power to
repeat such acts under any conceivable circumstances in which
the country could be placed again was felt to be too dangerous
1 See Belknap's History of New
Hampshire, c. 26: 2 Ramsay's His
tory of South Carolina, 351; 8 Rhode
Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Ar
bills of attainder, in addition to those
I have already mentioned [which were
that they declared certain persons at
tainted and their blood corrupted, so
that it had lost al
l
heritable property],
which distinguish them from other
legislation, and which made them so
obnoxious to the statesmen who organ
ized our government: 1. They were
convictions and sentences pronounced
by the legislative department o
f
the
government, instead o
f
the judicial.
2
. The sentence pronounced and the
punishment inflicted were determined
by no previous law o
r
fixed rule. 3.
The investigation into the guilt o
f
the
accused, if any such were made, was
not necessarily or generally conducted
in his presence o
r
that o
f
his counsel,
and n
o recognized rule o
f
evidence
governed the inquiry.” Per Miller,
J., in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 388.
nold's History o
f
Rhode Island, 360,
449; Thompson v. Carr, 5 N
.
H
.
510;
Sleght v. Kane, 2 Johns. Cas. 236;
Story on Const. (4th ed.) $1344, note.
On the general subject o
f
bills o
f
attainder, one would do well to con
sult, in addition to the cases in 4
Wallace, those o
f
Blair v. Ridgeley,
4
1 Mo. 63 (where it was very elab
orately examined b
y
able counsel);
State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 248; Ran
dolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551; Er
parte Law, decided by Judge Erskine,
in the United States District Court of
Georgia, May term, 1866; State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Beirne v. Brown,
4 W. Va. 72; Peerce v. Carskadon,
4 W. Wa. 234.
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to be left in the legislative hands. So far as proceedings had
been completed under those acts, before the treaty of 1783, by
the actual transfer of property, they remained valid and effectual
afterwards; but so far as they were then incomplete, they were
put an end to by that treaty."
The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision
has been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in
legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently
arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the
government of the United States, in which the Supreme
Court of * the United States has adjudged certain action [*263]
of Congress to be in violation of this provision and con
sequently void.”
* Jackson v. Munson, 3 Caines,
137.
* On the 2d of July, 1862, Con
gress, by “an act to prescribe an oath
of office, and for other purposes,”
enacted that “hereafter every person
elected or appointed to any office of
honor or profit under the government
of the United States, either in the
civil, military, or naval departments
of the public service, excepting the
President of the United States, shall,
before entering upon the duties of
such office, take and subscribe the
following oath or affirmation: I, A B,
do solemnly swear or affirm that I have
never voluntarily borne arms against
the United States since I have been
a citizen thereof; that I have volun
tarily given no aid, countenance,
counsel, or encouragement to persons
engaged in armed hostility thereto;
that I have neither sought nor ac
cepted, nor attempted to exercise, the
functions of any office whatever, under
any authority or pretended authority
in hostility to the United States; that
I have not yielded a voluntary support
to any pretended government, author
ity, power, or constitution within the
United States, hostile or inimical
thereto. And I do further swear or
affirm that, to the best of my knowl
edge and ability, I will support and
The action referred to was designed to exclude
defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic: that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that
I take this obligation freely, without
any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that I will well and
faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter,
so help me God.” On the 24th of
January, 1865, Congress passed a
supplementary act as follows: “No
person after the date of this act shall
be admitted to the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, or at any
time after the 4th of March next shall
be admitted to the bar of any Circuit
or District Court of the United States,
or of the Court of Claims, as an at
torney or counsellor of such court,
or shall be allowed to appear and to
be heard in any such court, by virtue
of any previous admission, or any
special power of attorney, unless he
shall have first taken and subscribed
the oath’’ aforesaid. False swearing,
under each of the acts, was made per
jury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502;
13 Statutes at Large, 424. In 12x
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, a ma
jority of the court held the second of
these acts void, as partaking of the
nature of a bill of pains and penalties,
and also as being an ex post facto
21
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from practice in the United States courts a
ll persons who had
taken u
p
arms against the government during the recent rebel
lion, or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to it
s
enemies; and the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to
require o
f
all persons, before they should be admitted to the bar
o
r
allowed to practise, a
n
oath negativing any such disloyal action.
This decision was not at first universally accepted as sound; and
the Supreme Courts o
f
West Virginia and o
f
the District o
f Co
lumbia declined to follow it
,
insisting that permission to practise
in the courts is not a right, but a privilege, and that the
[*264] withholding “it for any reason of State policy or personal
unfitness could not be regarded as the infliction o
f crimi
nal punishment."
The Supreme Court o
f
the United States have also, upon the
same reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution o
f Missouri,
which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen
from practising o
r teaching unless they should first take a similar
oath o
f loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a decision o
f
the Supreme Court o
f
that State.”
law. The act was looked upon as in
flicting a punishment for past conduct;
the exaction o
f
the oath being the mode
provided for ascertaining the parties
upon whom the act was intended to
operate. See Drehman v. Stifle, 8
Wall. 595. The conclusion declared
b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
the United
States in Ex parte Garland had been
previously reached b
y Judge Trigg,
o
f
the United States Circuit Court,
in Matter o
f Baxter; by Judge Bus
teed, o
f
the District Court o
f Alabama,
in Matter o
f
Shorter et al.; and by
Judge Erskine, of the District Court
o
f Georgia, in Ex parte Law. An
elector cannot be excluded from the
right to vote on the ground o
f being
a deserter who has never been tried
and convicted as such. Huber v.
Reily, 53 Penn. St
.
112; McCafferty
v
. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109; State v.
Symonds, 57 Me. 148. See ante, p
.
*64, note.
1 See the cases o
f Ex parte Magru
der, American Law Register, Vol.
VI. N. s. p
.
292; and Ex parte Hunter,
American Law Register, Vol. VI.N. s.
410; 2 W. Va. 122; Ex parte Quar
rier, 4 W. Wa. 210. See also Cohen
v
. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Er parte
Yale, 24 Cal. 241.
* Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277. See also the case of State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570, in which it was
held that a legislative act declaring
that the board o
f
curators of St.
Charles College had forfeited their
office, was o
f
the nature o
f
a bill of
attainder and void. The Missouri
oath o
f loyalty was a very stringent
one, and applied to electors, State,
county, city, and town officers, officers
in any corporation, public o
r private,
professors and teachers in educational
institutions, attorneys and counsellors,
bishops, priests, deacons, ministers,
elders, or other clergymen o
f any de
nomination. The Supreme Court of
Missouri had held this provision valid
in the following cases: State v. Gar
esche, 3
6 Mo. 256, case o
f
an attorney;
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Ez post facto laws are also, by the same provisions of the
national Constitution already cited,' forbidden to be passed,
either by the States or by Congress.
At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in
opposition to what might seem the more natural and obvious
meaning of the term ea post facto, that in their scope and purpose
these provisions were confined to laws respecting criminal punish
ments, and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation
of any other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly
held, that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do
not come in conflict with the national Constitution, unless obnox
ious to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective
character.
“The prohibition in the letter,” says Chase, J., in the leading
case,” “is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but
the plain and obvious meaning and intention o
f
the prohibition is
this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws
after a fact done by a subject o
r citizen, which shall have relation
to such fact, and punish him for having done it
.
The
prohibition, * considered in this light, is an additional [*265]
bulwark in favor o
f
the personal security o
f
the subject,
to protect his person from punishment b
y
legislative acts having
a retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted to
secure the citizen in his private rights o
f
either property o
r con
tracts. The prohibitions not to make any thing but gold and sil
ver coin a tender in payment o
f debts, and not to pass any law
impairing the obligation o
f contracts, were inserted to secure pri
vate rights; but the restriction not to pass any ea post facto law
State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, case
o
f
a minister, reversed as above stated;
State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, case
o
f
the recorder o
f
St. Louis; State v.
McAdoo, 36 Mo. 452, where it is held
that a certificate of election issued to
one who failed to take the oath as
required b
y
the constitution was void.
In Beirne v. Brown, 4 W. Wa. 72,
and Peerce v. Carskadon, 4 W. Va.
234, a
n
act excluding persons from
the privilege o
f sustaining suits in the
courts o
f
the State, o
r
from proceed
ings for a rehearing, except upon
their taking an oath that they had
never been engaged in hostile meas
ures against the government, was
sustained. And see State v. Neal,
4
2 Mo. 119. Contra, Kyle v. Jenkins,
6 W. Wa. 371; Lynch v. Hoffman, 7
W. Wa. 553. The case of Peerce v.
Carskadon was reversed in 16 Wall.
234, being held covered b
y
the case o
f
Cummings v. Missouri
* Constitution o
f
United States,
art. 1
,
§§ 9 and 10.
* Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390.
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was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment,
in consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making
er post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from
being affected or injured by such law, and the prohibition is suf
ficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have
enumerated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both
of them are retrospective.
“I will state what laws I consider ea post facto laws, within
the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was when committed. 8d. Every law that changes the punish
ment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are
manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true dis
tinction is between ea post facto laws and retrospective laws.
Every ea post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but
every retrospective law is not an ea post facto law; the former
only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights
vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is gener
ally unjust, and may be oppressive ; and there is a good general
rule, that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in
which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and
also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commence
ment; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly
retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts
committed. But I do not consider any law er post facto, within
the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal
[*266] law ; but * only those that create or aggravate the crime,
or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evi
dence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have
an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an
antecedent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations,
or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed,
and the like, is retrospective. But such acts may be proper and
necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent
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difference between making an unlawful act lawful, and the mak
ing an innocent act criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The
expressions ex post facto are technical ; they had been in use long
before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning,
by legislators, lawyers, and authors.””
Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to
be correct, —and it has been accepted and followed as correct by
the courts ever since,—it would seem that little need be said
relative to the first, second, and fourth classes of ex post facto
laws, as enumerated in the opinion quoted. It is not essential,
however, in order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that
it should expressly assume the action to which it relates to be
criminal, or provide for it
s punishment on that ground. If it
shall subject an individual to a pecuniary penalty for an act
which, when done, involved no responsibility,” o
r if it deprives a
party o
f any valuable right — like the right to follow a lawful
calling — for acts which were innocent, or at least not punishable
by law when committed,” the law will be er post facto in the con
stitutional sense, notwithstanding it does not in terms declare the
acts to which the penalty is attached criminal.” But how far a
law may change the punishment for a criminal offence, and make
the change applicable to past offences, is certainly a ques
tion o
f great * difficulty, which has been increased by the [*267]
decisions made concerning it
. As the constitutional pro
vision is enacted for the protection and security o
f
accused parties
* See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 266; Satterlee p. Mathewson,
2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet.
110; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 421; Carpenter v.
Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463; Cum
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Er
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Baugher
v
. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Woart v.
Winnick, 3 N. H. 475; Locke v.
Dane, 9 Mass. 363; Dash v. Van
Kleek, 7 Johns. 497; Evans v. Mont
gomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Tucker v.
Harris, 13 Geo. 1
;
Perry's Case, 3
Grat. 632; Municipality No. 1 r.
Wheeler, 10 La. Ann. 745; New Or
leans v. Poutz, 14 La. Ann. 853;
Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 115;
Wilson v. Ohio, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 64
Ill. 542.
* Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean,
212; Wilson v. Ohio, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
64 Ill 542.
* Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277; Er parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.
But a divorce is not a punishment,
and it may therefore be authorized
for causes happening previous to the
passage o
f
the divorce act. Carson
v
. Carson, 40 Miss. 349.
* The repeal of an amnesty law by
a constitutional convention was held
in State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140, to be
e
r post facto as to the cases covered
by the law. An act to validate an
invalid conviction would be ea post
facto. In re Murphy, 1 Woolw. 141.
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against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action, it is evident
that any change in the law which goes in mitigation of the pun
ishment is not liable to this objection." But what does go in miti
gation of the punishment? If the law makes a fine less in amount,
or imprisonment shorter in point of duration, or relieves it from
some oppressive incident, or if it dispenses with some severable
portion of the legal penalty, no embarrassment would be experi
enced in reaching a conclusion that the law was favorable to the
accused, and therefore not ea post facto. But who shall say, when
the nature of the punishment is altogether changed, and a fine is
substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment for whipping, or im
prisonment at hard labor for life for the death penalty, that the
punishment is diminished, or at least not increased by the change
made 2 What test of severity does the law or reason furnish in
these cases 2 and must the judge decide upon his own view of
the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually at
tending the punishment 2 or may he take into view the peculiar
condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in
his particular case, the punishment prescribed by the new law is
more severe than that under the old or not ?
In State v. Arlin,” the respondent was charged with a robbery,
which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed,
was subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceed
ing six months, and confinement for life at hard labor in the State
prison. As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled
by the same law to have counsel assigned him by the government,
to process to compel the attendance of witnesses, to a copy of his
indictment, a list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before
he was brought to trial, the punishment for the offence was re
duced to solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and
confinement at hard labor in the State prison for not less than
seven nor more than thirty years. By the new act, the court, if
they thought proper, were to assign the respondent coun
[*268] sel, and “furnish him with process to compel the attend
ance of witnesses in his behalf; and, acting under this
discretion, the court assigned the respondent counsel, but declined
1 Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193; 261; Maul v. State, 25 Tex. 166.
Keen v. State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston To provide an alternative punishment
v. Cummins, 16 Geo. 102; Woart v. of a milder form is not er post facto.
Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; State v. Arlin, Turner v. State, 40 Ala. 21.
39 N. H. 180; Clarke v. State, 23 Miss. 2 39 N. H. 179.
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to do more ; while the respondent insisted that he was entitled
to a
ll
the privileges to which he would have been entitled had
the law remained unchanged. The court held this claim to be
unfounded in the law. “It is contended,” they say, “that, not
withstanding the severity o
f
the respondent's punishment was
mitigated b
y
the alteration o
f
the statute, he is entitled to the
privileges demanded, as incidents to the offence with which he is
charged, a
t
the date o
f
its commission ; in other words, it seems
to be claimed, that, b
y
committing the alleged offence, the re
spondent acquired a vested right to have counsel assigned him, to
b
e furnished with process to procure the attendance o
f witnesses,
and to enjoy all the other privileges to which he would have been
entitled if tried under laws subjecting him to imprisonment for
life upon conviction. This position appears to us wholly untena
ble. We have no doubt the privileges the respondent claims were
designed and created solely as incidents o
f
the severe punishment
to which his offence formerly subjected him, and not as incidents
o
f
the offence. When the punishment was abolished, it
s
incidents'
fell with it; and he might as well claim the right to be punished
under the former law as to be entitled to the privileges connected
with a trial under it.” "
In Strong v. State,” the plaintiff in error was indicted
and convicted * o
f perjury, which, under the law as it [*269]
existed a
t
the time it was committed, was punishable by
not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this pun
* With great deference it may be
suggested whether this case does not
overlook the important circumstance,
that the new law, b
y taking from the
accused that absolute right to defence
by counsel, and to the other privi
leges by which the old law surrounded
the trial,— all of which were designed
a
s securities against unjust convic
tions, – was directly calculated to
increase the party's peril, and was in
consequence brought within the rea
son of the rule which holds a law er
post facto which changes the rules o
f
evidence after the fact, so as to make
a less amount or degree sufficient.
Could a law be void as ex post facto
which made a party liable to convic
tion for perjury in a previous oath on
the testimony o
f
a single witness, and
another law unobjectionable on this
score which deprived a party, when
put on trial for a previous act, o
f
all
the usual opportunities o
f exhibiting
the facts and establishing his inno
cence? Undoubtedly, if the party
accused was always guilty, and certain
to be convicted, the new law must be
regarded as mitigating the offence;
but, assuming every man to be inno
cent until he is proved to be guilty,
could such a law be looked upon as
“mollifying the rigor” of the prior
law, o
r
a
s favorable to the accused,
when its mollifying circumstance is
more than counterbalanced b
y
others
o
f
a contrary character.
* 1 Blackf. 193.
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ishment was changed to imprisonment in the
exceeding seven years. The court held this
not to be ea post facto, as applied to the case. “The words er
post facto have a definite, technical signification. The plain and
obvious meaning of this prohibition is
,
that the legislature shall
not pass any law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have
relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent
when done, o
r
to add to the punishment o
f
that which was crim
inal, or to increase the malignity o
f
a crime, o
r
to retrench the
rules o
f
evidence so as to make conviction more easy.” “Apply
this definition to the act under consideration. Does this statute
make a new offence? It does not. Does it increase the malig
nity o
f
that which was an offence before ? It does not. Does
it so change the rules of evidence as to make conviction more
easy 2 This cannot be alleged. Does it then increase the pun
ishment of that which was criminal before its enactment? We
think not.” "
So in Texas it has been held that the infliction of stripes, from
the peculiarly degrading character o
f
the punishment, was worse
than the death penalty. “Among al
l
nations o
f
civilized man,
from the earliest ages, the infliction o
f stripes has been considered
more degrading than death itself.”” While, on the other hand,
in South Carolina, where, a
t
the time o
f
the commission o
f
a
forgery, the punishment was death, but it was changed before
final judgment to fine, whipping, and imprisonment, the new
penitentiary not
amendatory law
law was applied to the case in passing the sentence.”
1 Mr. Bishop says of this decision:
“But certainly the court went far in
this case.” 1 Bishop, Crim. Law,
§ 219 (108).
2 Herber v. State, 7 Tex. 69.
* State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418.
In Clark v. State, 23 Miss. 261, de
fendant was convicted o
f
a mayhem.
Between the commission of the act
and his conviction, a statute had been
passed, changing the punishment for
this offence from the pillory and a
fine to imprisonment in the peniten
tiary, but providing further, that “no
offence committed, and no penalty
and forfeiture incurred previous to
the time when this act shall take
These
effect shall be affected by this act,
except that when any punishment,
forfeiture, o
r penalty should have
been mitigated b
y it
,
its provisions
should be applied to the judgment to
b
e pronounced for offences committed
before its adoption.” In regard to
this statute the court say: “We think
that in every case o
f
offence commit
ted before the adoption o
f
the peni
tentiary code, the prisoner has the
option o
f selecting the punishment
prescribed in that code in lieu o
f
that
to which he was liable before its
enactment.” But inasmuch as the
record did not show that the defend
ant claimed a commutation of his
CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. 329
cases illustrate * the difficulty of laying down any rule [*270]
which will be readily and universally accepted as to what
is a mitigation of punishment, where its character is changed,
and when from the very nature of the case there can be no
common standard, by which all minds, however educated, can
measure the relative severity and ignominy.
In Hartung v. People, the law providing for the infliction of
capital punishment had been so changed as to require the party
liable to this penalty to be sentenced to confinement at hard
labor in the State prison until the punishment of death should be
inflicted; and it further provided that such punishment should
not be inflicted under one year, nor until the governor should
issue his warrant for the purpose. The act was evidently de
signed for the benefit of parties convicted, and, among other
things, to enable advantage to be taken, for their benefit, of any
circumstances subsequently coming to light which might show
the injustice of the judgment, or throw any more favorable light
on the action of the accused. Nevertheless, the court held the
act inoperative as to offences before committed. “In my opin
ion,” says Denio, J., “it would be perfectly competent for the
legislature, by a general law, to remit any separable portion of
the prescribed punishment. For instance, if the punishment
were fine and imprisonment, a law which should dispense with
either the fine or the imprisonment might, I think, be lawfully
applied to existing offences; and so, in my opinion, the term
of imprisonment might be reduced, or the number of stripes
diminished, in cases punishable in that manner. Anything which,
if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly fall within the
idea of a remission of a part of the sentence, would not be liable
to objection. And any change which should be referable to prison
discipline or penal administration as it
s primary object might also
b
e made to take effect upon past as well as future offences; as
changes in the manner o
r
kind o
f employment o
f
convicts sen
tenced to hard labor, the system o
f supervision, the means o
f
restraint, o
r
the like. Changes o
f
this "sort might operate [*271]
to increase o
r mitigate the severity o
f
the punishment o
f
punishment, the court confirmed a State, 2 Tex. 363; Dawson v. State,
sentence imposed according to the 6 Tex. 347.
terms of the old law. On this sub- 1 22 N. Y. 105.
ject, see further the cases o
f
Holt v.
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the convict, but would not raise any question under the constitu
tional provision we are considering. The change wrought by the
act of 1860, in the punishment of existing offences of murder,
does not fall within either of these exceptions. If it is to be con
strued to vest in the governor a discretion to determine whether
the convict should be executed or remain a perpetual prisoner at
hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he might do
under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can, under
the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses the
pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If he
grants it
,
his jurisdiction o
f
the case ends. The act in question
places the convict at the mercy o
f
the governor in office a
t
the
expiration o
f
one year from the time o
f
the conviction, and o
f
all o
f
his successors during the lifetime o
f
the convict. He may
b
e
ordered to execution a
t any time, upon any notice, o
r without
notice. Under one o
f
the repealed sections o
f
the Revised Stat
utes, it was required that a period should intervene between the
sentence and execution o
f
not less than four, nor more than eight
weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the statute is
between a
n
execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by
the court, or a pardon o
r
commutation o
f
the sentence during
that period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict a
t
the
mercy o
f
the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors,
to be executed a
t
his pleasure a
t any time after one year, on the
other. The sword is indefinitely suspended over his head, ready
to fall at any time. It is not enough to say, if even that can be
said, that most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the
former capital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within
the condemnation o
f
the Constitution, that it changes the punish
ment after the commission o
f
the offence, b
y substituting for the
prescribed penalty a different one. We have no means of saying
whether one or the other would be the most severe in a given
case. That would depend upon the disposition and temperament
o
f
the convict. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon
the criminal law. The law, moreover, prescribes one year's im
prisonment, a
t
hard labor in the State prison, in addition to the
punishment o
f
death. In every case o
f
the execution o
f
a capital
sentence, it must be preceded b
y
the year's imprisonment a
t hard
labor. True, the concluding part o
f
the punishment
[*272] cannot be executed * unless the governor concurs by
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ordering the execution. But as both parts may, in any given
case, be inflicted, and as the convict is consequently, under
this law, exposed to the double infliction, it is
,
within both the
definitions which have been mentioned, an ex post facto law.
It changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment
than that which the law annexed to the crime when committed.
It is enough, in my opinion, that it changes it in any manner
except b
y
dispensing with divisible portions o
f it; but upon
the other definition announced by Judge Chase, where it is
implied that the change must be from a less to a greater pun
ishment, this act cannot be sustained.” This decision has since
been several times followed in the State o
f
New York," and
it must now be regarded as the settled law of that State, that
“a law changing the punishment for offences committed before
its passage is ex post facto and void, under the Constitution,
unless the change consists in the remission o
f
some separable
part o
f
the punishment before prescribed, o
r
is referable to prison
discipline or penal administration as it
s primary object.” And
this rule seems to us a sound and sensible one, with perhaps
this single qualification, — that the substitution of any other
punishment for that o
f
death must b
e regarded as a mitigation o
f
the penalty.”
But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party
has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist
that his case shall be disposed o
f
under the law in force when
the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Rem
edies must always be under the control o
f
the legislature, and it
would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case
was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules o
f prac
tice, and heard only b
y
the courts, in existence when its facts
arose. The legislature may abolish courts and create new ones,
and it may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in
it
s discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing,
dispense with any o
f
those substantial protections with which the
existing law surrounds the person accused o
f
crime. Statutes
1 Shepherd v. People, 25 N
.
Y
. People, 29 N. Y
.
124. See Miles v.
406; Ratzky v. People, 29 N
.
Y
.
124; State, 40 Ala. 39.
Kuckler v. People, 5 Park. Cr. Rep. * See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219
212. (108).
* Per Davies, J., in Ratzky v.
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giving the government additional challenges," and others
[*273] which authorized “the amendment of indictments,” have
been sustained and applied to past transactions, as doubt
less would be any similar statute, calculated merely to improve
the remedy, and in it
s operation working no injustice to the
defendant, and depriving him o
f
n
o
substantial right.
And a law is not objectionable as ea post facto which, in pro
viding for the punishment o
f
future offences, authorizes the
offender's conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and
the punishment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties
are often provided by law for a second or any subsequent offence
than for the first; and it has not been deemed objectionable that,
in providing for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction au
thorized to be taken into the account may have taken place
before the law was passed.”
* Walston v. Commonwealth, 16
B
.
Monr. 15; Jones v. State, 1 Kelly,
610; Warren v. Commonwealth, 37
Penn. St. 45; Walter v. People,
3
2 N
.
Y
.
147; State v. Ryan, 13
Minn. 370; State v. Wilson, 48 N
.
H.
398; Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103
Mass. 412.
* State v. Manning, 14 Tex. 402;
Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio, N
.
S
.
43.
See State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137.
The defendant in any case must be
proceeded against and punished under
the law in force when the proceeding
is had. State v. Williams, 2 Rich.
418; Keene v. State, 2 Chand. 109;
People v. Phelps, 5 Wend. 9
;
Rand
v
. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. A
law is not unconstitutional which pre
cludes a defendant in a criminal case
from taking advantage o
f
variances
which do not prejudice him. Com
monwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570;
Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio, N
.
S
. 43.
Nor one which reduces the number
o
f
the prisoner's peremptory chal
lenge. Dowling v. State, 5 S
.
& M.
664. Nor one which, though passed
after the commission o
f
the offence,
authorizes a change o
f
venue to
another county o
f
the judicial dis
In such case, it is the second or
trict. Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35. Nor
one which modifies the grounds o
f
challenge. Stokes v. People, 53 N
.
Y
.
164. Nor one which merely
modifies, simplifies, and reduces the
essential allegations in a criminal
indictment, retaining the charge o
f
a
distinct offence. State v. Learned,
4
7 Me. 426; State v. Corson, 59 Me.
137. And see People v. Mortimer,
46 Cal. 114. Nor one, it seems,
which requires an oath o
f past loyalty
o
f
voters. Blair v. Ridgeley, 41 Mo.
63; State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. Contra,
Green v. Shumway, 39 N
.
Y
.
418.
And see cases cited, ante, p
.
*64, note.
But a statute providing that the rule
o
f
law precluding a conviction o
n
the
uncorroborated testimony o
f
a
n ac
complice should not apply to cases o
f
misdemeanor, it was held could not
have retrospective operation. Hart
v
. State, 40 Ala. 32.
* Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat.
738; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165; People
v
. Butler, 3 Cow. 347; Er parte
Guiterrez, 45 Cal. 429. Extradition
treaties may provide for the surrender
o
f persons charged with offences pre
viously committed. In re Giacomo,
12 Blatch. 391.
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subsequent offence that is punished, not the first; and the stat
ute would be void if the offence to be actually punished under
it had been committed before it had taken effect, even though it
was after it
s
passage.”
Laws impairing the Obligation o
f
Contracts.
The Constitution of the United States also forbids the States
passing any law impairing the obligation o
f
contracts.” It is
remarkable that this very important clause was passed over
almost without comment during the discussions preceding the
adoption o
f
that instrument, though since it
s adoption no clause
which the Constitution contains has been more prolific o
f litiga
tion, o
r given rise to more animated and at times angry contro
versy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist;"
and though it
s great importance is assumed, it is evident that the
writer had no conception o
f
the prominence it was afterwards to
hold in constitutional discussions, o
r
o
f
the very numerous cases
to which it was to be applied in practice.
The first question that arises under this provision is
,
What is a "contract in the sense in which the word is [*274]
here employed 2 In the leading case upon this subject,
it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a grant of
land, but afterwards, on an allegation that the grant had been
obtained b
y fraud, a subsequent legislature had passed another
act annulling and rescinding the first conveyance, and asserting
the right o
f
the State to the land it covered. “A contract,” says
Ch. J. Marshall, “is a compact between two or more parties, and
is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in
which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing.
Such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the
governor. A contract executed is one in which the object of
the contract is performed ; and this, says Blackstone, differs in
nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the
purchasers was executed b
y
the grant. A contract executed, as
well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on
* Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. * Const. art. 1
,
§ 10.
738. * Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.
* Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 172. -
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the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extin
guishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not
to reassert that right. A party is
,
therefore, always estopped b
y
his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract exe
cuted, the obligation o
f
which still continues, and since the Con
stitution uses the general term ‘contract, without distinguishing
between those which are executory and those which are executed,
it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the
former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and
declaring that the grantors should stand seized o
f
their former
estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to
the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors o
f property
from the obligation o
f executing their contracts b
y
conveyances.
It would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the
Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected.
If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are com
prehended under the term ‘contracts,' is a grant from the State
excluded from the operation o
f
the provision ? Is the clause to
b
e
considered a
s inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation
o
f
contracts between two individuals, but as excluding from that
inhibition contracts made with itself 2 The words themselves
contain n
o
such distinction. They are general, and are applicable
to contracts o
f every description. If contracts made with the
State are to be exempted from their operations, the excep
[*275] tion must arise from the character of * the contracting
party, not from the words which are employed.” And
the court proceed to give reasons for their decision, that violence
should not “be done to the natural meaning of words, for the
purpose o
f leaving to the legislature the power o
f seizing, for
public use, the estate o
f
a
n individual, in the form o
f
a law
annulling the title b
y
which he holds that estate.” "
It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important
points: first, that an executed contract is within the provision,
and second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States
equally with those entered into between private individuals.”
1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 133.
* This decision has been repeatedly
followed. In the founding o
f
the Col
ony o
f Virginia, the religious estab
lishment o
f England was adopted, and
before the Revolution the churches of
that denomination had become vested,
by grants o
f
the Crown o
r Colony,
with large properties, which continued
in their possession after the consti
tution of the State had forbidden
the creation o
r
continuance o
f any
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And it has since been held that compacts between two States are
in like manner protected." These decisions, however, do
not fully * determine what under al
l
circumstances is to [*276]
b
e regarded as a contract. A grant of land b
y
a State is
a contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser
precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of convey
ance is any different, it is only because b
y
virtue o
f
its sovereignty,
it has power to convey by other modes than those which the
general law opens to private individuals. But many things done
b
y
the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals, which
religious establishment, possessed o
f
exclusive rights o
r privileges, or the
compelling the citizens to worship
under a stipulated form o
r discipline,
o
r
to pay taxes to those whose creed
they could not conscientiously believe.
By statute in 1801, the legislature
asserted their right to a
ll
the property
o
f
the Episcopal churches in the re
spective parishes o
f
the State; and,
among other things, directed and
authorized the overseers o
f
the poor
and their successors in each parish,
wherein any glebe land was vacant o
r
should become so, to sell the same
and appropriate the proceeds to the
use o
f
the poor o
f
the parish. By
this act, it will be seen, the State
sought in effect to resume grants
made by the sovereignty, - a prac
tice which had been common enough
in English history, and o
f
which pre
cedents were not wanting in the
history o
f
the American Colonies.
The Supreme Court o
f
the United
States held the grant not revocable,
and that the legislative act was there
fore unconstitutional and void. Ter
rett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43. See
also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9
Cranch, 335; People v. Platt, 17
Johns. 195; Montgomery v. Kasson,
1
6 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San Francisco,
1
8 Cal. 590; Rehoboth v. Hunt, 1
Pick. 224; Lowry v. Francis, 2 Yerg.
534; University o
f
North Carolina v.
Foy, 2 Hayw. 310; State r. Barker,
4 Kan. 379 and 435. The lien of a
bondholder, who has loaned money
to the State on a pledge o
f property
by legislative act, cannot be divested
o
r postponed by a subsequent legisla
tive act. Wabash, &c. Co. v. Beers,
2 Black, 448.
* On the separation o
f Kentucky
from Virginia, a compact was entered
into between the proposed new and
the old State, b
y
which it was agreed
“that all private grants and interests
o
f lands, within the said district, de
rived from the laws o
f Virginia, shall
remain valid and secure under the
laws o
f
the proposed State, and shall
b
e determined by the laws now exist
ing in this State.” After the admis
sion o
f
the new State to the Union,
“occupying claimant’’ laws were
passed b
y
its legislature, such as were
not in existence in Virginia, and by
the force o
f which, under certain
circumstances, the owner might be
deprived o
f
his title to land, unless
h
e would pay the value o
f lasting
improvements made upon it b
y
an
adverse claimant. These acts were
also held void; the compact was held
inviolable under the Constitution, and
it was deemed no objection to its
binding character, that its effect was
to restrict, in some directions, the
legislative power o
f
the State entering
into it
.
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1.
See also Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee,
5 Pet. 457.
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after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering the
legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon leave
it without the means of performing it
s
essential functions. The
State creates offices, and appoints persons to fill them ; it estab
lishes municipal corporations with large and valuable privileges
for it
s citizens; by it
s general laws it holds out inducements to
immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the encour
agement o
f
trade and agriculture; and under a
ll
these laws a
greater o
r
less number o
f
citizens expect to derive profit and emol
ument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts between
the State and the officers and corporations who are, o
r
the citizens
o
f
the State who expect to be, benefited by their passage, so as
to preclude their being repealed 2
On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty.
When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations
a
s the mere agencies o
f government, it must have the power to
discontinue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as no
longer important. “The framers of the Constitution did not
intend to restrain the States in the regulation o
f
their civil insti
tutions, adopted for internal government.”" They may, therefore,
discontinue offices and abolish o
r change the organization o
f mu
nicipal corporations a
t any time, according to the existing legisla
tive view o
f
state policy, unless forbidden b
y
their own
[*277] constitutions from doing so.” And * although municipal
* Dartmouth College v. Wood
ward, 4 Wheat. 629, per Marshall,
Ch. J.
* Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How.
402; Warner v. People, 2 Demio, 272;
Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355,
and 5 N
.
Y
.
285; People v. Green,
58 N. Y. 295; State v. Van Baum
bach, 12 Wis. 310; Coffin v. State, 7
Ind. 157; Benford v. Gibson, 15 Ala.
521; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103;
Evans v. Populus, 22 La. Ann. 121;
Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R
.
322; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. &
S
. 403, 418; Koontz v. Franklin Co., 76
Penn. St. 154; French v. Common
wealth, 78 Penn. St. 339; Augusta v.
Sweeney, 44 Geo. 463; County Com
missioners v. Jones, 18 Minn. 199;
People v. Lippincott, 67 Ill. 333; In
re Bulger, 45 Cal. 553; Opinions o
f
Justices, 117 Mass. 603; Kendall
v
. Canton, 53 Miss. 526; Williams v.
Newport, 12 Bush, 438; State v.
Douglass, 26 Wis. 428; Robinson
v
. White, 26 Ark. 139; Alexander v.
McKenzie, 2 S. C
.
N
.
s. 81. Com
pare People v. Bull, 46 N. Y
. 57;
s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 302. “Where an
office is created b
y statute, it is wholly
within the control o
f
the legislature.
The term, the mode o
f appointment,
and the compensation may be altered
a
t pleasure, and the latter may be
even taken away without abolishing
the office. Such extreme legislation
is not to be deemed probable in any
case. But we are now discussing the
legislative power, not its expediency
o
r propriety. Having the power, the
CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. 337
corporations, as respects the property which they hold, con
trol, and manage, for the benefit of their citizens, are governed
by the same rules and subject to the same liabilities as individ
uals, yet this property, so far as it has been derived from the
State, or obtained by the exercise of the ordinary powers of gov
ernment, must be held subject to control by the State, but under
the restriction only, that it is not to be appropriated to uses for
legislature will exercise it for the
public good, and it is the sole judge
of the exigency which demands its
interference.” Per Sandford, J.,
2 Sandf. 369. “The selection of
officers who are nothing more than
public agents for the effectuating of
public purposes is matter of public
convenience or necessity, and so, too,
are the periods for the appointment
of such agents; but neither the one
nor the other of these arrangements
can constitute any obligation to con
tinue such agents, or to reappoint
them, after the measures which
brought them into being shall have
been found useless, shall have been
fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated
as even detrimental to the well-being
of the public. The promised com
pensation for services actually per
formed and accepted, during the
continuance of the particular agency,
may undoubtedly be claimed, both
upon principles of compact and of
equity; but to insist beyond this
upon the perpetuation of a public
policy either useless or detrimental,
and upon a reward for acts neither
desired nor performed, would appear
to be reconcilable with neither com
mon justice nor common sense.”
Daniel, J., in 10 How. 416. See
also Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St.
49; Standiford v. Wingate, 2 Duv.
443; Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126;
Walker v. Peelle, 18 Ind. 264; People
v. Haskell, 5 Cal. 35.7; Dart v. Hous
ton, 22 Geo. 506; Williams v. New
port, 12 Bush, 438; Territory v. Pyle,
1 Oregon, 149; Bryan v. Cattell, 15
Iowa, 538. But if the term of an office
is fixed by the Constitution, the legis
lature cannot remove the officer, — ex
cept as that instrument may allow, -
either directly, or indirectly by abolish
ing the office. People v. Dubois, 23
Ill. 547; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis.
163; Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62
Penn. St. 343; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 422;
Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.)
240; State v. Wiltz, 11 La. Ann. 489;
Goodin v. Thoman, 10 Kan. 191; State
v. Draper, 50 Mo. 353. Compare
Christy v. Commissioners, 39 Cal. 3.
Nor can the legislature take from a con
stitutional officer a portion of the char
acteristic duties belonging to the office,
and devolve them upon an office of
its own creation. State v. Brunst,
26 Wis. 413; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 84,
disapproving State v. Dews, R. M.
Charl. 397. Compare People v. Ray
mond, 37 N. Y. 428; King v. Hunder,
65 N. C. 603; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 754.
Nor, where the office is elective, can
the legislature fill it
,
either directly, o
r
by extending the term o
f
the incum
bent. People v. Bull, 46 N. Y
. 57;
People v. McKinney, 52 N
.
Y
. 374;
ante, p
.
*64, note. Compare People v.
Flanagan, 66 N
.
Y
.
237. As to con
trol o
f municipal corporations, see
further Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio,
427; Bradford v. Cary, 5 Greenl. 339;
Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trus
tees, c. v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27; Peo
ple v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Mills
v
. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; People v.
Banvard, 27 Cal. 470; ante, ch. viii.
22
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eign to those for which it has been acquired. And the franchises
conferred upon such a corporation, for the benefit of it
s citizens,
must be liable to b
e
resumed a
t any time b
y
that authority which
may mould the corporate powers a
t
it
s will, or even revoke them
altogether.
1 In East Hartford v. Hartford
Bridge Co., 10 How. 533, Mr. Justice
Woodbury, in speaking o
f
the grant
o
f
a ferry franchise to a municipal
corporation, says: “Our opinion is
. . . that the parties to this grant
did not by their charter stand in the
attitude towards each other of mak
ing a contract by it
,
such a
s is con
templated by the Constitution, and
a
s could not be modified by subse
quent legislation. The legislature
was acting here on the one part, and
public municipal and political corpo
rations on the other. They were
acting, too, in relation to a public
object, being virtually a highway
across the river, over another high
way up and down the river. From
this standing and relation o
f
these
parties, and from the subject-matter
o
f
their action, we think that the
doings o
f
the legislature as to this
ferry must be considered rather as
public laws than as contracts. They
related to public interests. They
changed a
s
those interests demanded.
The grantees, likewise the towns,
being mere organizations for public
purposes, were liable to have their
public powers, rights, and duties,
modified o
r
abolished a
t any moment
by the legislature. They are incor
porated for public, and not private,
objects. They are allowed to hold
privileges o
r property only for public
purposes. The members are not
shareholders nor joint partners in any
corporate estate which they can sell
o
r
devise to others, or which can be
attached and levied on for their debts.
Hence, generally, the doings between
them and the legislature are in the
nature o
f legislation rather than com
The greater power will comprehend the less." If,
pact, and subject to all the legislative
conditions just named, and therefore
to be considered not violated by
subsequent legislative changes. It
is hardly possible to conceive the
grounds on which a different result
could be vindicated, without destroy
ing all legislative sovereignty, and
checking most legislative improve
ments, as well as supervision over its
subordinate public bodies.” A differ
ent doctrine was advanced by Mr.
Justice Barculo, in Benson v. Mayor,
&c. o
f
New York, 10 Barb. 234, who
cites in support o
f
his opinion – that
ferry grants to the city o
f
New York
could not be taken away by the legis
lature — what is said by Chancellor
Kent (2 Kent's Com. 275), that
“ public corporations . . . may be
empowered to take and hold private
property for municipal uses; and
such property is invested with the
security o
f
other private rights. So
corporate franchises attached to pub
lic corporations are legal estates,
coupled with an interest, and are
protected as private property.” This
is true in a general sense, and it is
also true that, in respect to such
property and franchises, the same
rules o
f responsibility are to be ap
plied as in the case o
f
individuals.
Bailey v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York,
3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow
that the legislature, under it
s power
to administer the government, o
f
which these agencies are a part, and
for the purposes for which the grant
has been made, may not a
t any time
modify the municipal powers and
privileges, b
y
transferring the grant
to some other agency, o
r revoking it
when it seems to have become unim
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however, a grant is made to a municipal corporation
* charged with a trust in favor of an individual, private [*278]
corporation, * or charity, the interest which the cestui [*279]
que trust has under the grant may sustain it against
legislative revocation; a vested equitable interest being prop
erty in the same sense and entitled to the same protection as
a legal."
Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted,
not as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the
private benefit or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a
portant. In People v. Power, 25 Ill.
190, Breese, J., in speaking of a law
which provided that three-fourths of
the taxes collected in the county of
Sangamon, with certain deductions,
should be paid over to the city of
Springfield, which is situated therein,
says : “While private corporations
are regarded as contracts which the
legislature cannot constitutionally im
pair, as the trustee of the public
interests it has the exclusive and
unrestrained control over public cor
porations; and as it may create, so it
may modify or destroy, as public
exigency requires or the public in
terests demand. Coles v. Madison
County, Breese, 115. Their whole
capacities, powers, and duties are
derived from the legislature, and
subordinate to that power. If
,
then,
the legislature can destroy a county,
they can destroy any o
f
its parts, and
take from it any one of its powers.
The revenues o
f
a county are not the
property o
f
the county, in the sense
in which revenue o
f
a private person
o
r corporation is regarded. The
whole State has an interest in the
revenue o
f
a county ; and for the
public good the legislature must
have the power to direct its applica
tion. The power conferred upon a
county to raise a revenue b
y
taxation
is a political power, and its applica
tion when collected must necessarily
b
e within the control o
f
the legisla
ture for political purposes. The act
o
f
the legislature nowhere proposes
to take from the county o
f Sangamon,
and give to the city o
f Springfield,
any property belonging to the county,
or revenues collected for the use of
the county. But, if it did, it would not
b
e objectionable. But, on the contrary,
it proposes alone to appropriate the
revenue which may be collected by
the county, by taxes levied on prop
erty both in the city and county, in
certain proportions ratably to the
city and county.” And see Bush v.
Shipman, 5 Ill. 190; Richland County
v
. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1
;
San
gamon Co. v. Springfield, 63 Ill. 66;
Borough o
f
Dunmore's Appeal, 52
Penn. St. 374; Guilford v. Supervi
sors o
f Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and
1
3 N
.
Y
.
143; ante, pp. *235–239,
and cases cited.
* See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9
Cranch, 292, and Terrett v. Taylor,
9 Cranch, 43. The municipal corpo
ration holding property o
r rights in
trust might even be abolished without
affecting the grant; but the Court of
Chancery might be empowered to
appoint a new trustee to take charge
o
f
the property, and to execute the
trust. Montpelier v. East Montpe
lier, 29 Vt. 12. It is held in People
v
. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y
.
1
,
that the
franchise to levy taxes b
y
a county
for county purposes was not exer
cised by the county as agent for the
State, but as principal.
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different footing, and are held to be contracts between the leg
islature and the corporators, having for their consideration the
liabilities and duties which the corporators assume by accepting
them ; and the grant of the franchise can no more be resumed
by the legislature, orits benefits diminished or impaired without
the consent of the grantees, than any other grant of property or
valuable thing, unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter
itself."
* Dartmouth College v. Wood
ward, 4 Wheat. 519; Trustees of
Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14
How. 268; Planters' Bank r. Sharp,
6 How. 301 ; Piqua Bank v. Knoop,
16 How. 369 ; Binghamton Bridge
Case, 3 Wall. 51; Norris v. Trustees
of Abingdon Academy, 7 G. & J. 7 ;
Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Wt.
632; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Penn. St.
86; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 389;
People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend.
351 ; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13
Penn. St. 133; Commercial Bank of
Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599 ;
Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 ;
Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1
Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co. v.
Hoboken Co., 2 Beas. 81 ; Miners’
Bank v. United States, 1 Greene
(Iowa), 553; Edwards v. Jagers, 19
Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me.
189 ; Bruffet v. G. W. R. R. Co.,
25 Ill. 353 ; People v. Jackson and
Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich.
285; Bank of the State v. Bank of
Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills v. Wil
liams, 11 Ired. 558 ; Hawthorne v.
Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Wales v. Stetson,
2 Mass. 146; Nichols v. Bertram, 3
Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank,
15 Mass. 447; State v. Tombeckbee
Bank, 2 Stew. 30 ; Central Bridge v.
Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Bank of the
Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Grat. 457;
Sloan v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo.
24; State v. Richmond, &c. R. R. Co.,
73 N. C. 527. The mere passage of
an act of incorporation, however,
does not make the contract; and it
may be repealed prior to a full accept
ance by the corporators Mississippi
Society v. Musgrove, 44 Miss. 820;
s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 723. It is under
the protection of the decision in the
Dartmouth College Case that the
most enormous and threatening pow
ers in our country have been created ;
some of the great and wealthy corpo
rations actually having greater influ
ence in the country at large, and upon
the legislation of the country, than
the States to which they owe their
corporate existence. Every privilege
granted or right conferred—no mat
ter by what means or on what pre
tence — being made inviolable by the
Constitution, the government is fre
quently found stripped of it
s
author
ity in very important particulars, by
unwise, careless, o
r corrupt legisla
tion; and a clause o
f
the federal
Constitution, whose purpose was to
preclude the repudiation o
f
debts and
just contracts, protects and perpetu
ates the evil. To guard against such
calamities in the future, it is custom
ary now for the people in framing
their constitutions to forbid the
granting o
f corporate powers, except
subject to amendment and repeal;
but the improvident grants o
f
an
early day are beyond their reach. On
the general subject o
f
the power o
f
the legislature, under its right re
served, to alter, amend, and repeal,
see" Worcester v. Norwich, &c. R. R.
Co., 109 Mass. 103, and cases cited;
Ames v. Lake Superior R
.
R
. Co., 21
Minn. 241; Railroad Commissioners
v
. Portland, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 63 Me. 269;
s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 208; Rodemacher v.
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* Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in [* 280]
this discussion is
,
whether it is competent for the legis
lature to so bind up it
s
own hands by a grant as to preclude it
from exercising for the future any o
f
the essential attributes o
f
sovereignty in regard to any o
f
the subjects within its jurisdic
tion ; whether, for instance, it can agree that it will not exercise
the power o
f taxation, o
r
the police power o
f
the State, o
r
the
right o
f
eminent domain, as to certain specified property o
r per
sons; and whether, if it shall undertake to do so, the agreement
is not void o
n
the general principle, that the legislature cannot
diminish the power o
f
it
s
successors b
y
irrepealable legislation,
and that any other rule might cripple and eventually destroy the
government itself. If the legislature has power to do this, it is
certainly a very dangerous power, exceedingly liable to abuse,
and may possibly come in time to make the constitutional provi
sion in question as prolific o
f
evil as it ever has been, or is likely
to be, o
f good.
So far as the power o
f
taxation is concerned, it has been so
Milwaukee, &c. R
.
R. Co., 41 Iowa,
297; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 592; Gorman
v
. Pacific R
.
R
. Co., 26 Mo. 441;
Railroad Commissioners v. Portland,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 63 Me. 269; s. c. 18
Am. Rep. 208; Gardner v. Hope Ins.
Co., 9 R
. I. 194; s. c. 11 Am. Rep.
238.
And as to the right to regulate
charges for transportation o
f persons
and property, see Parker v. Metropoli
tan R
.
R
. Co., 109 Mass. 506; Attorney
General v. Railroad Companies, 35
Wis. 425 ; Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co.
v
. Iowa, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 155.
In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 561,
Pearson, J., states the difference be
tween the acts o
f incorporation o
f
public and private corporations as
follows: “The substantial distinc
tion is this: Some corporations are
created by the mere will of the
legislature, there being no other
party interested o
r
concerned. To
this party a portion o
f
the power
o
f
the legislature is delegated, to be
exercised for the general good, and
subject at all times to be modified,
changed, o
r
annulled. Other corpo
rations are the result of contract.
The legislature is not the only party
interested; for, although it has a
public purpose to be accomplished, it
chooses to do it b
y
the instrumental
ity of a second party. These two
parties make a contract. The legis
lature, for and in consideration o
f
certain labor and outlay o
f money,
confers upon the party o
f
the second
part the privilege o
f being a corpora
tion, with certain powers and capaci
ties. The expectation of benefit to
the public is the moving consideration
o
n
one side; that o
f expected remu
neration for the outlay is the consider
ation on the other. It is a contract,
and therefore cannot be modified,
changed, o
r annulled, without the
consent o
f
both parties.” An incor
porated academy, whose endowment
comes exclusively from the public, is
a public corporation. Dart v. Hous
ton, 22 Geo. 506. Compare State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570.
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often decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though
not without remonstrance on the part of State courts," that an
agreement by a State, for a consideration received or supposed
to be received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall
be exempt from taxation, or be taxed only at a certain
[*281] * agreed rate, is a contract protected by the Constitution,
that the question can no longer be considered an open
one.” In any case, however, there must be a consideration, so
that the State can be supposed to have received a beneficial
equivalent ; for it is conceded on all sides that, if the exemption
is made as a privilege only, it may be revoked at any time.” And
1 Mechanics’ and Traders' Bank v.
Debolt, 1 Ohio, N. s. 591; Toledo
Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio, N. s. 622;
Knoop v. Piqua Bank, 1 Ohio, N. s.
603; Milan and R. Plank Road Co. v.
Husted, 3 Ohio, N. s. 578; Piscataqua
Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 69;
Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143;
Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 24;
Thorpe v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt.
140; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn.
410; Mott v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
30 Penn. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt
Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.
259; West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisor
of Trempeleau Co., 35 Wis. 257, 265;
Attorney-General v. Chicago, &c. R.
R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 572. See also
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Miller, in Washington University v.
Rouse, S Wall. 441, in which the Chief
Justice and Justice Field concurred.
Also, Raleigh, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid,
64 N. C. 155.
* New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch,
164: Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,
3 How. 133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop,
16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust
Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416: Dodge
v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics’
and Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 18 How.
380 ; Mechanics’ and Traders' Bank
v. Thomas, 18 How. 384 ; McGee v.
Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Home of the
Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430;
Washington University v. Rouse, 8
Wall. 431; Wilmington R. R. Co. v.
Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Raleigh and Gas
ton R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269;
Humphrey v. Peques, 16 Wall. 244;
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall.
36. See also Atwater v. Woodbridge,
6 Conn. 223; Osborne v. Humphrey,
7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redfield, 10
Conn. 495; Landon v. Litchfield, 11
Conn. 251; Herrick v. Randolph, 13
Wt. 525; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt.
751; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss.
386; St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Parcher, 14 Minn. 297; Grand Gulf
R. R. Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246; Cen
tral R. R. Co. v. State, 54 Geo. 401;
St. Louis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Loften,
30 Ark. 693.
* Christ's Church v. Philadelphia,
24 How. 300; Brainard v. Colchester,
31 Conn. 410. See also Common
wealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dole
v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387. If an
exemption from taxation exists in any
case, it must be the result of a de
liberate intention to relinquish this
prerogative of sovereignty, distinctly
manifested. Easton Bank v. Com
monwealth, 10 Penn. St. 450; Provi
dence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561 ;
Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24
How. 302; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2
Black, 513; Herrick v. Randolph, 13
Vt. 531 ; East Saginaw Salt Manuf.
Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259;
s. c. 13 Wall. 373; People v. Roper,
25 N. Y. 629; People v. Commis
sioners of Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501; Lord
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it is but reasonable that the exemption be construed with strict
ness."
The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from
exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided.
It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State may
grant exclusive franchises, – like the right to construct the only
railroad which shall be built between certain termini; or the only
bridge which shall be permitted over a river between specified
limits; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a cer
tain point,”—but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not pre
vent the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain
in respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value,
and in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this
power; and any of their incidents may be taken away, or them
selves altogether annihilated, by means of its exercise.” And it
is believed that an express agreement in the charter, that the
power of eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair
or affect the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement be
yond the power of the legislature to make, must be considered
as only a valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant,
and as such liable to be appropriated under the power of
eminent domain. The exclusiveness * of the grant, and [*282]
the agreement against interference with it
,
if valid, con
stitute elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing
compensation; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no
more violates the obligation o
f
the contract than does the appro
priation o
f
land which the State has granted under an express or
implied agreement for quiet enjoyment b
y
the grantee, but which
v
. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; s. c. 4
Am. Rep. 41; Erie Railway Co. v.
Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St. 84 ; s. c.
5 Am. Rep. 351; Bradley v. McAtee,
7 Bush, 667; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309;
North Missouri R
.
R
.
Co. v. Maguire,
4
9 Mo. 490; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 141;
Illinois Cent. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Irvin, 72
Ill. 452.
* See Cooley on Taxation, 146, and
cases cited.
* West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
1
6 Vt 446, and 6 How. 507; Bing
hamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51 ;
Shorter v. Smith, 9 Geo. 529; Piscat
aqua Bridge v. N. H
. Bridge, 7 N. H.
35; Boston Water Power Co. v. Bos
ton and Worcester R
.
R. Co., 23 Pick.
360; Boston and Lowell R. R
.
v
.
Salem and Lowell R
. R., 2 Gray, 9;
Costar v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628; Cali
fornia Telegraph Co. v. Alta Telegraph
Co., 22 Cal. 398.
* Matter o
f Kerr, 42 Barb. 119;
Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford
and N
.
H. R
.
R
. Co., 17 Conn. 40,
454; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
1
6 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507.
344 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. IX.
nevertheless may be taken when the public need requires." All
grants are subject to this implied condition; and it may well be
worthy of inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted
shall not afterwards be appropriated can have any other or greater
force than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but
which, notwithstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant
on making compensation.” The words of the grant are as much
in the way of the grant of a conflicting franchise in the one case
as in the other.
1 Alabama, &c. R. R. Co. v. Ken
ney, 39 Ala. 307; Baltimore, &c.
Turnpike Co. v. Union R. R. Co., 35
Md. 224; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Bos
ton, &c. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 125;
s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 13. That property
has been acquired by a corporation
under the right of eminent domain is
no reason against a further appropria
tion. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lake,
71 Ill. 333; Peoria, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Peoria, &c. Co., 66 Ill. 174; N. Y. Cen
tral, &c. R. R. Co. v. Gas Light Co.,
63 N. Y. 326; Eastern R. R. Co. v.
Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 125.
* Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his
edition of Cruise on Real Property,
Vol. II
. p. 67, says upon this subject:
“In regard to the position that the
grant o
f
the franchise o
f
a ferry,
bridge, turnpike, o
r railroad, is in its
nature exclusive, so that the State
cannot interfere with it by the crea
tion o
f
another similar franchise, tend
ing materially to impair its value, it
is with great deference submitted that
an important distinction should be ob
served between those powers o
f gov
ernment which are essential attributes
o
f sovereignty, indispensable to be
always preserved in full vigor, such as
the power to create revenues for the
public purposes, to provide for the
common defence, to provide safe and
convenient ways for the public neces
sity and convenience, and to take
private property for public uses, and
the like, and those powers which are
not thus essential, such as the power
to alienate the lands and other prop
erty o
f
the State, and to make con
tracts o
f service, and o
f purchase and
sale, o
r
the like. Powers o
f
the for
mer class are essential to the constitu
tion o
f society, as without them no
political community can well exist;
and necessity requires that they should
continue unimpaired. They are in
trusted to the legislature to be exer
cised, not to be bartered away; and
it is indispensable that each legislature
should assemble with the same meas
ure o
f sovereign power which was held
by its predecessors. Any act of the
legislature disabling itself from the
future exercise o
f powers intrusted to
it for the public good must be void,
being in effect a covenant to desert its
paramount duty to the whole people.
It is therefore deemed not competent
for a legislature to covenant that it
will not, under any circumstances,
open another avenue for the public
travel within certain limits, o
r
in a
certain term o
f time; such covenant
being an alienation o
f sovereign pow
ers, and a violation o
f public duty.”
See also Redfield on Railways (3d
ed.), Vol. I. p
.
258. That the inten
tion to relinquish the right o
f
eminent
domain is not to be presumed in any
legislative grant, see People v. Mayor,
&c. o
f
New York, 32 Barb. 113: Illi
nois and Michigan Canal v. Chicago
and Rock Island Railroad Co., 14 Ill.
321; Eastern R
.
R
.
Co. v. Boston, &c.
R. R
. Co., 111 Mass. 125; s. c. 15
Am. Rep. 13 ; Turnpike Co. v. Union
R. R
. Co., 35 Md. 324.
CH. IX.] FEDERAL PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. 345
It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that
the "police power of the State could not be alienated [*283]
even by express grant.” And this opinion is supported
by those cases where it has been held that licenses to make use
of property in certain modes may be revoked by the State, not
withstanding they may be connected with grants and based upon
a consideration.” But this subject we shall recur to hereafter.
It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one
* “We think the power of the leg
islature to control existing railways in
this respect may be found in the gen
eral control over the police of the
country, which resides in the law
making power in all free States, and
which is
,
by the fifth article o
f
the
Bill of Rights in this State, expressly
declared to reside perpetually and in
alienably in the legislature, which is
,
perhaps, no more than the enunciation
o
f
a general principle applicable to all
free States; and which cannot there
fore be violated so as to deprive the
legislature o
f
the power, even b
y
ex
press grant, to any mere public o
r
private corporation. And when the
regulation o
f
the police o
f
a city o
r
town, by general ordinances, is given
to such cities o
r towns, and the regu
lation o
f
their own internal police is
given to railroads, to be carried into
effect by their by-laws and other reg
ulations, it is
,
o
f course, always, in all
such cases, subject to the superior
control o
f
the legislature. That is a
responsibility which legislatures can
not divest themselves of, if they
would.” Thorpe v. R
.
& B
.
R
.
R
.
Co., 27 Wt. 149, per Redfield, Ch. J.
See also Indianapolis, &c. R
.
R
.
Co.
v
. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Ohio, &c.
R. R
.
Co. v. M'Clelland, 25 Ill. 140.
See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on
the same subject. In Bradley v. Mc
Atee, 7 Bush, 367; s. c. 3 Am. Rep.
309, it was decided that a provision in
a city charter that, after the first im
provement o
f a street, repairs should
b
e
made a
t
the expense o
f
the city,
was not a contract; and o
n
its repeal
a lot owner, who had paid for the
improvement, might have his lo
t
as
sessed for the repairs. Compare Ham
mett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St.
146; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 615.
* See, upon this subject, Brick
Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt v.
Adams, 7 Cow. 349; State v. Ster
ling, 8 Mo. 697; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio,
N
.
s. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray,
597; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass.
19. Whether a State, after granting
licenses to sell liquors, for which a fee
is received, can revoke them b
y
a gen
eral law forbidding sales, is in dispute
upon the authorities. See Freleigh v.
State, 8 Mo. 606; State v. Sterling, 8
Mo. 697; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray,
597; Metropolitan Board o
f
Excise v.
Barrie, 34 N. Y
. 657; Baltimore v.
Clunet, 23 Md. 449; Fell v. State, 42
Md. 71 ; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 83; and
Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass.
70, which hold that it may : and State
v
. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441 ; Adams v.
Hackett, 7 Fost. 294; and Boyd v.
State, 36 Ala. 329, which are contra.
See also State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389.
If it has the power, it would seem an
act o
f
bad faith to exercise it, without
refunding the money received for the
license. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N
.
s.
21. That the State cannot irrevoca
bly hamper itself in the exercise o
f
the police power, see Toledo, &c.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37.
As to the general power of the legis
lature to take away licenses, see Peo
ple v. Commissioners, 59 N
.
Y
.
92.
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based upon sound reason, that the State cannot barter away,
or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential
powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence
of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized
society; and that any contracts to that end, being without valid
ity, cannot be enforced because of any supposed conflict with the
provision of the national Constitution now under consideration.
If the tax cases are to be regarded as an exception to this state
ment, the exception is perhaps to be considered a nominal rather
than a real one, since taxation is for the purpose of providing the
State a revenue, and the State laws which have been enforced as
contracts in these cases have been supposed to be based
[*284] upon consideration, " by which the State receives the
benefit which would have accrued from an exercise of
the relinquished power in the ordinary mode.
Ecclusive Privileges. Under the rulings of the federal Supreme
Court, the grant of any exclusive privilege by a State, if lawfully
made, is a contract, and not subject to be recalled." As every
exclusive privilege is in the nature of a monopoly, it may at some
time become a question of interest, whether there are any, and if
so what, limits to the power of the State to grant them. In
former times, such grants were a favorite resort in England, not
only to raise money for the personal uses of the monarch, but to
reward favorites; and the abuse grew to such enormous magni
tude that Parliament in the time of Elizabeth, and again in the
time of James I.
,
interfered and prohibited them. What is more
important to us is
,
that in 1602 they were judicially declared to be
illegal.” These, however, were monopolies in the ordinary occupa
tions o
f life; and the decision upon them would not affect the spe
cial privileges most commonly granted. Where the grant is o
f
a franchise which would not otherwise exist, no question can be
made o
f
the right o
f
the State to make it exclusive, unless the
constitution o
f
the State forbids it; because, in contemplation of
law, no one is wronged when he is only excluded from that to
which he never had any right. An exclusive right to build and
maintain a toll bridge, or to set up a ferry, may therefore be
granted ; and the State may doubtless limit, b
y
the requirement
o
f
a license, number o
f persons who shall be allowed to
* Ante, p
.
*281, and cases cited; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74.
* Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84.
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engage in employments the entering upon which is not a matter
of common right, and which, because of their liability to abuse,
may require special and extraordinary police supervision. The
business of selling intoxicating drinks and of setting up a lot
tery are illustrations of such employments.) UBut the grant of a
monopoly in one of the ordinary and necessary avocations of life
must be as clearly illegal in this country as in England; and it
would be impossible to defend and sustain it
,
except upon the
broad ground that the legislature may control and regulate the
ordinary avocations o
f life, even to the extent o
f fixing the prices
of labor and of commodities.] As n
o
one pretends that the legis
lature possesses such a º and as its existence would bewholly inconsistent with reguláted º must follow thatlawful grants of special privileges must be confined to cases
where they will take from citizens, generally, nothing which be
fore pertained to them as o
f
common right."
Changes in the General Laws. We have said in another place
that citizens have no vested right in the existing general laws o
f
the State which can preclude their amendment or repeal, and
that there is no implied promise on the part of the State to pro
tect it
s
citizens against incidental injury occasioned b
y
changes
in the law. Nevertheless there may be laws which amount to
propositions o
n
the part o
f
the State, which, if accepted b
y
indi
viduals, will become binding contracts. Of this class are perhaps
to be considered bounty laws, b
y
which the State promises the
payment o
f
a gratuity to any one who will do any particular act
supposed to be for the State interest. Unquestionably the State
may repeal such a law at any time ; * but, when the proposition
has been accepted b
y
the performance o
f
the act before the law
is repealed, the contract would seem to be complete, and the
promised gratuity becomes a legal debt.” And where a State was
owner o
f
the stock o
f
a bank, and b
y
the law its bills and notes
were to b
e
received in payment o
f
a
ll
debts due to the State, it
* In Live Stock, &c. Association v.
Crescent City, &c. Co., commonly
known as the Slaughter-House Case,
1
6 Wall. 36, the grant of an exclusive
privilege in slaughtering cattle in the
vicinity o
f
New Orleans was upheld
a
s
a
n
exercise o
f
the police power.
* Christ Church v. Philadelphia,
2
4 How. 300; East Saginaw Salt
Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.
259; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13
Wall. 373.
* People v. Auditor-General, 9
Mich. 327. See Montgomery v. Kas
son, 16 Cal. 189; Adams v. Palmer,
51 Me. 480.
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was properly held that this law constituted a contract with those
who should receive the bills before its repeal, and that a repeal
of the law could not deprive these holders of the right which it
assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the bills under it
,
“comes within the definition of a contract. It is a contract
founded upon a good and valuable consideration, — a consideration
beneficial to the State; as it
s profits are increased b
y sustaining
the credit, and consequently extending the circulation, o
f
the
paper o
f
the bank.””
That laws permitting the dissolution o
f
the contract o
f mar
riage are not within the intention o
f
the clause o
f
the Constitution
under discussion, seems to be the prevailing opinion.” It has
been intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are con
cerned, the contract must stand on the same footing as any other,
and that a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in
the wife for her sole use, would be void, as impairing
[*285] the obligation of contracts.” “But certainly there is no
such contract embraced in the marriage as would prevent
the legislature changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely
all property which she should acquire thereafter; and, if the
property had already become vested in the husband, it would be
protected in him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other
grounds than the one here indicated.
“The obligation of a contract,” it is said, “consists in its bind
ing force on the party who makes it
.
This depends upon the
laws in existence when it is made ; these are necessarily referred
to in a
ll contracts, and forming a part o
f
them as the measure o
f
the obligation to perform them b
y
the one party, and the right
acquired b
y
the other. There can be no other standard b
y
which
to ascertain the extent o
f either, than that which the terms o
f
the contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning;
when it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the
right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and
gives the other a right to enforce the performance b
y
the remedies
then in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty,
* Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183;
190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Geo. Clark v. Clark, 10 N
.
H. 385; Cronise
190; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; v. Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; Carson
Antoni v. Wright, 22 Grat. 833. v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v.
* Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth Palmer, 51 Me. 480.
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629; * Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.
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or to impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the
contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence
any law which, in it
s operations, amounts to a denial or obstruc
tion o
f
the rights accruing b
y
a contract, though professing to act
only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition o
f
the
Constitution.” + “It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the
Constitution] is designed to reach ; that is
,
the obligation
which is recognized * by, and results from, the law o
f
the [*286]
State in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when
made is b
y
the law o
f
the place declared to b
e illegal, o
r
deemed
to be a nullity, o
r
a nude pact, it has no civil obligation; because
the law, in such cases, forbids it
s having any binding efficacy o
r
force.
* McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How.
612. “The obligation of a contract
..
. is the law which binds the par
ties to perform their agreement. The
law, then, which has this binding
obligation, must govern and control
the contract, in every shape in which
it is intended to bear upon it
,
whether
it affects its validity, construction, or
discharge. It is
,
then, the municipal
law o
f
the State, whether that be
written o
r unwritten, which is em
phatically the law o
f
the contract
made within the State, and must
govern it throughout, whenever its
performance is sought to be enforced.”
Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 259. “As I understand
it, the law of the contract forms its
obligation.” Thompson, J., ibid. 302.
“The obligation of the contract con
sists in the power and efficacy o
f
the
law which applies to, and enforces
performance of, the contract, o
r
the
payment o
f
a
n equivalent for non
performance. The obligation does
not inhere and subsist in the contract
itself, proprio vigore, but in the law
applicable to the contract. This is
the sense, I think, in which the Con
stitution uses the term “obligation.’”
Trimble, J., ibid. 318. And see Van
Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 577 ;
It confers no legal right on the one party, and no cor
respondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed
Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky).
566; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N
.
Y
.
1
.
Requirement o
f
a license tax for
permission to do what a contract with
the city gives authority to do, without
“let, molestation, or hindrance,” is
void. Stein v. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362;
20 Am. Rep. 283. But licenses in
general are subject to the taxing
power. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta,
9
3 U
.
S
. Rep. 116; Read v. Beall, 42
Miss. 472; Cooley on Taxation, 386,
and cases cited. That a constitu
tional convention has no more power
to violate the obligation o
f
contracts
than the legislature, see Oliver v.
Memphis, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 30 Ark. 128;
ante, p
. *33, and cases cited. A law
giving interest on debts, which bore
none when contracted, was held void
in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1 S. C
.
N
.
s. 40; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 273. The
legislature cannot authorize the com
pulsory extinction o
f ground rents, on
payment o
f
a sum in gross. Palairet's
Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 479; s. c. 5
Am. Rep. 450. A State law, discon
tinuing a public work, does not im
pair the obligation o
f contracts, the
contractor having his just claim for
damages. Lord v. Thomas, 64 N
.
Y.
107.
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or recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto mon
oritur actio. But, when it does not fall within the predicament
of being either illegal or void, it
s obligatory force is coextensive
with it
s stipulations.” "
Such being the obligation o
f
a contract, it is obvious that the
rights o
f
the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in
many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been
the intention o
f
the constitutional provision to preclude. “There
are few laws which concern the general police o
f
a State, o
r
the
government o
f
its citizens, in their intercourse with each other
o
r
with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the
contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form.
For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds,
and perjuries, laws o
f registration, and those which affect land
lord and tenant, sales at auction, acts o
f limitation, and those
which limit the fees o
f professional men, and the charges o
f tav
ern keepers, and a multitude o
f
others which crowd the codes o
f
every State, but laws which affect the validity, construction, o
r
duration, or discharge o
f contracts?” But the changes in
these laws are not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation
o
f
contracts. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy, may be
altered according to the will o
f
the State, provided the alteration
does not impair the obligation o
f
the contract; * and it does not
impair it
,
provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy,
according to the course o
f justice as it existed at the time the
contract was made.* *
* Story on Const. § 1380. Slave Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259. As to the
contracts, which were legal when made,
are not rendered invalid b
y
the aboli
tion o
f slavery ; nor can the States
make them void b
y
their constitu
tions, o
r deny remedies for their
enforcement. White v. Hart, 13
Wall. 649; Osborn v. Nicholson,
1
3 Wall. 653; Jacaway v. Denton,
2
5 Ark. 641. An act of indemnity
held not to relieve a sheriff from his
obligation on his official bond to ac
count for moneys which had been
paid away under military compulsion.
State v. Gatzweiler, 49 Mo. 17; s. c.
8 Am. Rep. 119.
* Washington, J., in Ogden v.
indirect modification o
f
contracts by
the operation o
f police laws, see post,
pp. *574–1584. The taxing power con
ferred upon a municipal corporation
is not a contract between it and the
State. Richmond v. Richmond, &c.
R. R
. Co., 21 Grat. 611.
* Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316,
per Taney, Ch. J.
* Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274;
Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 578;
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; Mc
Cracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608;
Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Wan
Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and
1
3 N
.
Y
. 299; Conkey v. Hart, 14
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* Changes in Remedies. It has accordingly been held [* 287]
that laws changing remedies for the enforcement of legal
contracts will be valid, even though the new remedy be less con
venient than the old, or less prompt and speedy."
“Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy
may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall
direct.” To take a strong instance; although the law at the
time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body
of his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right to
abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his
N. Y. 22; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb.
502; Story v. Furman, 25 N.Y. 214;
Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa),
455; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483;
Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550 ;
Maynes v. Moor, 16 Ind. 116; Smith
v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371 ; Grosvenor
v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369 ; Van Ren
selaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100 ; Van
Renselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68 ; Litch
field v. McComber, 42 Barb. 288;
Paschal v. Perez, 7 Tex. 365; Auld
v. Butcher, 2 Kan. 155; Kenyon v.
Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Clark v.
Martin, 49 Penn. St. 299; Rison
v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ; Oliver v. Mc
Clure, 28 Ark. 555; Holland v.
Dickerson, 41 Iowa, 367 ; Wales
v. Wales, 119 Mass. 89; Sanders v.
Hillsborough Insurance Co., 44 N. H.
238; Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant's
Cases, 243; Mechanics', &c. Bank
Appeal, 31 Conn. 63; Garland v.
Brown's Adm'r, 23 Grat. 173.
1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
270 ; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 359;
Bumgardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo.
50; Trapley v. Hamer, 17 Miss. 310 ;
Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128,
3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bron
son v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38;
Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm’rs, 2
Doug. (Mich.) 197; Evans v. Mont
gomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway v.
Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker
v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432 ; Smith v.
Packard, 12 Wis. 371 ; Porter v.
Mariner, 50 Mo. 364; Morse v. Goold,
11 N. Y. 281 ; Penrose v. Erie Canal
Co., 56 Penn. St. 46; Smith v. Van
Gilder, 26 Ark. 527; Coosa River
St. B. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120;
Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. 158;
Simpson v. Savings Bank, 56 N. H.
466.
* Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.
A statute allowing the defence of
want of consideration in a sealed in
strument previously given does not
violate the obligation of contracts.
Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251.
See further Parsons v. Casey, 28
Iowa, 436; Curtis v. Whitney, 13
Wall. 68; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y.
439. A statutory judgment lien may
be taken away. Watson v. N. Y.
Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157;
Woodbury v. Grimes, 1 Col. 100.
Contra, Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
It may be extended before it has
expired. Ellis v. Jones, 51 Mo. 180.
The obligation of the contract is not
impaired if a substantial remedy re
mains. Richmond v. Richmond, &c.
R. R. Co., 21 Grat. 611. Whether
the legislature may take away retro
spectively the liability of stockholders
for corporate debts, see Coffin v. Rich,
45 Me. 507; Sawyer v. Northfield, 7
Cush. 490. See further Baldwin v.
Newark, 38 N. J. 158; Augusta Bank
v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Thistle v.
Frostbury Coal Co., 10 Md. 129.
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remedy against property alone. “Confinement of the debtor
may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be
allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it
.
But the State
may refuse to inflict this punishment, o
r may withhold this means,
and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of
the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair
the obligation.” S
o
the exemption laws o
f
a State may be
modified from time to time, and the modifications made applica
ble to existing contracts, provided the exemptions are not so in
creased as to impair and lessen the value o
f
the contract itself.
The State “may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary
implements o
f agriculture, o
r
the tools o
f
the mechanic, o
r
articles o
f necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing
apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations
o
f
this description have always been considered, in every civ
ilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be
exercised o
r not, by every sovereignty, according to
[* 288] it
s
own views o
f policy and humanity. It * must re
side in every State to enable it to secure its citizens
from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them in
those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well
being o
f every community.””
1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.;
Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Bron
son v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38;
Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Geo. 531. A spec
ial act admitting a party imprisoned on
a judgment for tort to take the poor
debtors' oath was sustained in Matter
o
f Nichols, 8 R
.
I. 50.
* Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311,
per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell v. Hub
bell's Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197;
Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128,
3 Denio, 594, and 1 N
.
Y
. 129; Morse
v
. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Sprecker v.
Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Cusic v. Doug
las, 3 Kan. 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38
Geo. 531; Hardeman v. Downer, 39
Geo. 425; Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C
.
437; Farley v. Dowe, 45 Ala. 324;
Sneider v. Heidelberger, 45 Ala. 126;
In re Kennedy, 2 S. C. N
.
s. 216;
Gunn v. Barry, 44 Geo. 351. It has
been decided that a homestead ex
emption may be made applicable to
previously existing contracts. Harde
man v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425; Ladd v.
Adams, 66 N. C
.
164. Contra, Home
stead Cases, 22 Grat. 266; Edwards
v
. Kearsey, 96 U
.
S
. Rep. 595, which
must be regarded as settling the ques
tion. And see Gunn v. Barry, 15
Wall. 622; Kibbey v. Jones, 7 Bush,
243; Kennedy v. Stacey, 57 Tenn.
220; Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790.
“Statutes pertaining to the remedy
are merely such as relate to the course
and form o
f proceedings, but do not
affect the substance o
f
a judgment
when pronounced.” Per Merrick, Ch.
J., in Mortun v. Walentine, 15 La.
Ann. 150. See Watson v. N. Y.
Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157.
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And laws which change the rules of evidence relate to the
remedy only; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws
may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of ac
tion, so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such
application by the constitutional clause we are considering." And
it has been held that the legislature may even take away a com
mon-law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place,
if another and efficient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolishing
distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force
at it
s passage;” and it was also held that an express stipulation
in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not
prevent the legislature from abolishing it
,
because this was a
subject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to
contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In
the language o
f
the court: “If this is a subject on which parties
can contract, and if their contracts when made become b
y
virtue
o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United States superior to the power o
f
the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists
a
s part o
f
the machinery for the administration o
f justice may be
perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely
have been within the contemplation o
f
the makers o
f
the Con
stitution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave
inconveniences, is quite obvious. Every such stipulation is in its
own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance o
f
the process. The State is no party to * their contract. [* 289]
It is bound to afford adequate process for the enforce
ment o
f rights; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes
b
y
which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong
to the supreme power to prescribe; and their continuance is not
the subject o
f
contract between private parties. In truth, it is
not a
t a
ll probable that the parties made their agreement with
reference to the possible abolition o
f
distress for rent. The first
clause o
f
this special provision is
,
that the lessor may distrain,
sue, re-enter, o
r
resort to any other legal remedy, and the second
* Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Mc
Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; How
ard v. Moot, 64 N
.
Y
.
262; post, pp.
*367—"369. On this subject see the
discussions in the federal courts, Stur
ges v
. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122;
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213;
Cracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608;
Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.
* Van Rensselaer v. Synder, 9 Barb.
302, and 13 N
.
Y. 299; Guild v.
Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Conkey v. Hart,
14 N. Y. 22.
23
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is
,
that in cases o
f
distress the lessee waives the exemption o
f
certain property from the process, which b
y
law was exempted.
This waiver o
f exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing
which the parties had in view; but yet perhaps their language
cannot be confined to this object, and it may therefore be proper
to consider the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to
preserve their legal remedy, even if the legislature should think
fi
t
to abolish it
. In that aspect of it the contract was a subject
over which they had no control.” "
But a law which deprives a party of al
l
legal remedy must nec
essarily be void. “If the legislature of the State were to undertake
to make a law preventing the legal remedy upon a contract law
fully made, and binding on the party to it
,
there is n
o question
that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its legitimate
powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation o
f
the contract within the meaning o
f
the Constitution.” This
has been held in regard to those cases in which it was sought
to deprive certain classes o
f persons of the right to maintain
suits, because o
f
their having participated in rebellion against
the government.”
1 Conkey v. Hart, 14 N
.
Y
. 30;
citing Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend.
35; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370;
Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274 ; and
Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 13 N
.
Y
.
299. See Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 Miss.
361.
2 Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430.
See Osborne v. Nicholson, 13 Wall.
662; U
.
S
.
v
. Conway, Hempst. 313;
Johnson v. Bond, Hempst. 533; West
v
. Sansom, 44 Geo. 295. See Griffin
v
. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose v.
Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn. St. 46 ;
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 81 Penn.
St. 314; post, p
.
*361. An act with
drawing a
ll
the property o
f
a debtor
from the operation o
f legal process,
leaving only a barren right to sue, is
void. State v. Bank o
f
South Caro
lina, 1 S. C
.
N
.
s. 63.
8 Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ;
McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116;
Jackson v. Same, 8 Minn. 117. But
there is nothing to preclude the people
And where a statute does not leave a party
o
f
a State, in an amendment to their
constitution, taking away rights o
f
action, o
r
other rights, so long as they
abstain from impairing the obligation
o
f contracts, and from imposing pun
ishments. The power to do so has
been exercised with a view to the
quieting o
f
controversies and the res
toration o
f
domestic peace after the
late civil war. Thus, in Missouri and
some other States, a
ll rights o
f
action
for any thing done b
y
the State o
r
federal military authorities, during the
war, were taken away by constitu
tional provision ; and the authority to
do this was fully supported. Dreh
man v
. Stifel, 41 Mo. 184; s. c. in
error, 8 Wall. 595. And see Hess v.
Johnson, 3 W. Va. 645. A remedy
may also be denied to a party until
h
e
has performed his duty to the
State in respect to the demand in suit:
e.g. paid the tax upon the debt sued
for. Walker v. Whitehead, 43 Geo.
538; Garrett v. Cordell, 43 Geo. 366 ;
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a substantial remedy according to the course of justice as it
existed at the time the contract was made, but shows upon its
face an intention to clog, hamper, or embarrass the proceedings
to enforce the remedy, so as to destroy it entirely, and
thus impair the contract so far as it is in the * power of [* 290]
the legislature to do it
,
such statute cannot be regarded
a
s a mere regulation o
f
the remedy, but is void, because a sub
stantial denial o
f right."
It has also been held where a statute dividing a town and
incorporating a new one enacted that the new town should pay
it
s proportion towards the support o
f paupers then constituting
a charge against the old town, that a subsequent statute ex
onerating the new town from this liability was void as impair
ing the contract created by the first-mentioned statute; * but
there are cases which have reached a different conclusion, reason
ing from the general and almost unlimited control which the State
retains over it
s municipalities.” In any case the lawful repeal o
f
a statute cannot constitutionally be made to destroy contracts
which have been entered into under it; these being legal when
made, they remain valid notwithstanding the repeal.”
So where, b
y
it
s terms, a contract provides for the payment
o
f money by one party to another, and, b
y
the law then in force,
property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to
the highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such
contract, a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold
o
n
execution for less than two-thirds the valuation made by ap
praisers, pursuant to the directions contained in the law, though
professing to act only on the remedy, amounts to a denial o
r
obstruction o
f
the rights accruing b
y
the contract, and is directly
obnoxious to the prohibition o
f
the Constitution.” So a law which
Welborn v. Akin, 44 Geo.420. But this
is denied as regards contracts entered
into before the passage o
f
the law.
Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314.
1 Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 28.
As to control of remedies, see post, p
.
*361.
* Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Me.
112.
* See ante, p
.
*193, and cases cited
in note.
* Tuolumne Redemption Co. v.
Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515 ; McCauley
v
. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth
v
. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339;
State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; State v.
Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389.
5 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How.
608; Willard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug.
(Mich.) 172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21
Ind. 144. So a law which, as to ex
isting mortgages foreclosable by sale,
prohibits the sale for less than half
the appraised value o
f
the land, is
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takes away from mortgagees the right to possession under their
mortgages until after foreclosure is void, because depriving them
of the right to the rents and profits, which was a valuable portion
of the right secured by the contract. “By this act the mortgagee
is required to incur the additional expense of foreclosure, before
obtaining possession, and is deprived of the right to add to his
security, by the perception of the rents and profits of the premises,
during the time required to accomplish this and the time of re
demption, and during that time the rents and profits are given to
another, who may or may not appropriate them to the payment
of the debt, as he chooses, and the mortgagee in the
[*291] * mean time is subjected to the risk, often considerable,
of the depreciation in the value of the security.” So a
law is void which extends the time for the redemption of lands
sold on execution, or for delinquent taxes, after the sales have
been made ; for in such a case the contract with the purchaser,
and for which he has paid his money, is
,
that he shall have title
a
t
the time then provided by the law ; and to extend the time
for redemption is to alter the substance o
f
the contract, as much
a
s would be the extension o
f
the time for payment o
f
a promis
void for the same reason. Gantley's Paige, 484; James v. Stull, 9 Barb.
Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707; Bron
son v
. Kinzie, 1 How. 311. And a
law authorizing property to be turned
out in satisfaction of a contract is
void. Abercrombie v. Baxter, 44 Geo.
36. The “scaling laws,” so called,
under which contracts made while
Confederate notes were the only cur
rency, are allowed to be satisfied on
payment o
f
a sum equal to what the
sum called for by them in Confederate
notes was worth when they were made,
have been sustained, but this is on the
assumption that the contracts are en
forced as near as possible according to
the actual intent. Harmon v. Wal
lace, 2 S. C
.
N
.
s. 208 ; Robeson v.
Brown, 63 N. C
.
534 ; Hillard v.
Moore, 65 N. C
.
540 ; Pharis v. Dice,
2
1 Grat. 303 ; Thornington v. Smith,
8 Wall. 1.
1 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 76;
Blackwood v. Wanvleet, 11 Mich. 252.
Compare Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11
482; Cook v. Gray, 2 Houston, 455.
In the last case it was held that a
statute shortening the notice to be
given on foreclosure o
f
a mortgage
under the power o
f sale, from twenty
four to twelve weeks, was valid as
affecting the remedy only ; and that
a stipulation in a mortgage that on
default being made in payment the
mortgagee might sell “according to
law,” meant according to the law as
it should be when sale was made.
But see Ashuelot R
.
R
.
Co. v. Eliot,
52. N. H. 387, and what is said on
the general subject in Cochran v.
Darcy, 5 Rich. 125. In Bathold v.
Fox, 13 Minn. 501, it was decided
that in the case o
f
a mortgage given
while the law allowed the mortgagee
possession during the period allowed
for redemption after foreclosure, such
law might be so changed as to take
away this right. But quere.
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sory note.” So a law which shortens the time for redemption
from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken place, is void;
the rights of the party being fixed by the foreclosure and the law
then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under the law,
to possession of the land until the time of redemption expires.”
And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the State had
the right, upon the forfeiture of his contract of purchase for the
non-payment of the sum due upon it
,
to revive it at any time
before a public sale o
f
the lands, b
y
the payment o
f
a
ll
sums due
upon the contract, with a penalty o
f
five per cent, it was held that
this right could not be taken away b
y
a subsequent change in the
law which subjected the forfeited lands to private entry
and sale.” And a statute which * authorizes stay o
f
exe- [*292]
cution, for an unreasonable or indefinite period, on judg
ments rendered o
n pre-existing contracts, is void, as postponing
payment, and taking away a
ll remedy during the continuance o
f
the stay.” And a law is void on this ground which declares a for
1 Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341;
Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484 ;
Goenen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387.
But see Stone v. Basset, 4 Minn.
298; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483;
Freeborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277.
* Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369.
The contrary ruling was made in
Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by
analogy to the Statute o
f
Limitations.
The statute, it was said, was no more
in effect than saying : “Unless you
redeem within the shorter time pre
scribed, you shall have no action for
a recovery o
f
the land, nor shall your
defence against an action be allowed,
provided you get possession.” And
in Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 346,
the court, speaking o
f
a similar right
in a party, say: “So far as his right
o
f redemption was concerned, it was
not derived from any contract, but
was given b
y
the law only ; and the
time within which he might exercise
it might be shortened b
y
the legisla
ture, provided a reasonable time was
left in which to exercise it
,
without
impairing the obligation o
f any con
tract.” And see Smith v. Packard,
1
2 Wis. 371, to the same effect.
* State v. Commissioners o
f
School
and University lands, 4 Wis. 414.
* Chadwick v. Moore, 8 W. & S.
49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St.
441; Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo.
205; Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis.
296. In Breitenbach v. Bush, 44
Penn. St. 313, and Coxe v. Martin,
44 Penn. St. 322, it was held that an
act staying all civil process against
volunteers who had enlisted in the
national service for three years o
r
during the war was valid, - “during
the war ” being construed to mean
unless the war should sooner termi
nate. See also State v. Carew, 13
Rich. 498. A general law that all
suits pending should be continued
until peace between the Confederate
States and the United States, was
held void in Burt v. Williams, 24
Ark. 94. See also Taylor v. Stearns,
1
8 Grat. 244; Hudspeth v. Davis, 41
Ala. 389; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Geo.
124; Coffman v. Bank o
f Kentucky,
4
0 Miss. 29 ; Jacobs v. Smallwood,
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feiture of the charter of a corporation for acts or omissions which
constituted no cause of forfeiture at the time they occurred."
And it has been held that where a statute authorized a municipal
corporation to issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local tax
ation in order to pay them, and persons bought and paid value
for bonds issued accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the
contract, and cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied;
that an attempt to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that
unless the corporation imposes and collects the tax in a
ll respects
a
s if the subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be com
pelled to d
o
so b
y
mandamus.” And it has also been held that a
statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock o
f stock
holders in a corporation liable for it
s debts, was, in respect to
creditors existing a
t
the time o
f
the repeal, a law impairing the
obligation o
f
contracts.” In each o
f
these cases it is evi
[*293] dent that substantial rights * were affected; and so far as
the laws which were held void operated upon the remedy,
they either had a
n
effect equivalent to importing some new stipu
lation into the contract, o
r they failed to leave the party a sub
stantial remedy such as was assured to him b
y
the law in force
63 N. C
.
112 ; Cutts v. Hardee, 38
Geo. 350; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex.
688. A law permitting a year's stay
upon judgments where security is
given was held valid in Farnsworth
v
. Vance, 2 Cold. 108 ; but this de
cision was overruled in Webster v.
Rose, 6 Heisk. 93 ; s. c. 19 Am.
Rep. 583. A statute was held void
which stayed a
ll proceedings against
volunteers who had enlisted “during
the war,” this period being indefinite.
Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant's Cas. 393.
In Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.)
566, it was held that the act of the
Kentucky legislature o
f May 24, 1861,
which forbade the rendition in all
the courts o
f
the State, o
f any judg
ment from date till January 1st, 1862,
was valid. It related, it was said,
not to the remedy for enforcing a
contract, but to the courts which
administer the remedy; and those
courts, in a legal sense, constitute
no part o
f
the remedy. A law ex
empting soldiers from civil process
until thirty days after their discharge
from military service was held valid
a
s
to all contracts subsequently en
tered into, in Bruns v. Crawford, 34
Mo. 330. And see McCormick v.
Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127. A statute sus
pending limitation laws during the
existence o
f
civil war, and until the
State was restored to her proper re
lations to the Union, was sustained
in Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745.
Compare Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla.
393.
* People v. Jackson and Michigan
Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, per
Christiancy, J.; State v. Tombeckbee
Bank, 2 Stew. 30. See Ireland v.
Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio, N
.
s. 373.
* Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall.
535. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15
Wis. 30; Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis.
468.
8 Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10.
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when the contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held
that a statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in
which the debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional;"
but it seems to us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege
which the law gives as a matter of State policy cannot be bind
ing upon a party, unless the law itself provides for the waiver.”
Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a contract
cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his
liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites
to the legal validity of such act as it would be in any case to
prescribe the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made.
Thus, though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred
by the Statute of Limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule
may be changed by a statute making all such future promises
void unless in writing.” It is also equally true that where a legal
impediment exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties
have entered into, the constitutional provision in question will
not preclude the legislature from removing such impediment and
validating the contract. A statute of that description would not
impair the obligation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce
it.” And for similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not
impaired by continuing the charter of a corporation for a certain
period, in order to the proper closing it
s
business.”
State Insolvent Laws. In this connection some notice may
seem requisite o
f
the power o
f
the States to pass insolvent laws,
and the classes o
f
contracts to which they may be made to apply.
As this whole subject has been gone over very often and very
fully by the Supreme Court o
f
the United States, and the impor
tant questions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and moreover
a
s it is comparatively unimportant while a federal bank
rupt law exists, we shall "content ourselves with giving [*294]
what we understand to be the conclusions of the court.
1 Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St. * As where the defence o
f usury to
324; Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Penn. St. a contract is taken away by statute.
127. See Laucks' Appeal, 24 Penn. Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149;
426 ; Case v
. Dunmore, 23 Penn. 93; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y
.
9
. And
Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Penn. 225. see Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68,
* See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N
.
Y
.
and the cases cited, post, pp. *375,
30; Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35. *376.
* Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. * Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.
(Mich.) 373; Kingsley v. Cousins, 245.
47 Me. 91.
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1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of
bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to the authority
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uniform
system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is para
mount, and State enactments in conflict with those in Congress
upon the subject must give way."
2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the
property of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obliga
tion of the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to
contracts entered into before they were passed, but they may be
made applicable to such future contracts as can be considered as
having been made in reference to them.”
-
3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists,
between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in
reference to the law, and are subject to it
s provisions. But the
law cannot apply to a contract made in one State between a citi
zen thereof and a citizen o
f
another State,” nor to contracts not
made within the State, even though made between citizens o
f
the
same State,” except, perhaps, where they are citizens o
f
the State
passing the law.” And where the contract is made between a
citizen o
f
one State and a citizen o
f another, the circumstance
that the contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent
law exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged
under the law." If
,
however, the creditor in any o
f
these cases
makes himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he
will be bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceed
ings, and is not to b
e
heard afterwards to object that his debt
was excluded b
y
the Constitution from being affected b
y
the
law.7
New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection o
f
* Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 v. Moffat, 5 How. 310; Baldwin v.
Wheat. 122 : Farmers' and Mechan- Hale, 1 Wall. 231.
ics' Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131 ; * McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat.
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 ; 209.
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 229. * Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551.
* Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. • Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 ;
213. Baldwin v. Bank o
f Newberry, 1 Wall.
* Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 234; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall.
213; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story, 387; 409.
Boyle v Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Wood- 7 Clay v. Smith, 3 Pet. 411; Bald
hull v. Wagner, Baldw. 300; Suyd- win v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Gilman v.
ham v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 75; Cook Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409.
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the right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States; and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chap
ters." The most important clause in the fourteenth amendment
is that part of section 1 which declares that al
l
persons born o
r
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens o
f
the United States and o
f
the State wherein
they reside.” This provision very properly puts an end to any
question o
f
the title o
f
the freedmen and others o
f
their race to
the rights o
f citizenship; but Jit may be doubtful whether the
further provisions o
f
the same “Section surround the citizen with
any protections additional to those before possessed under the
State constitutions; though, as a principle o
f
State constitu
tional law has now been måde a part o
f
the Constitution o
f
the
United States,)the effect will be to make the Supreme Court of
the United St es the final arbiter of cases in which a violation
o
f
this principle b
y
State laws is complainedº as thedecisions of the State courts upon laws whic are supposed to
violate it will be subject to review in that court on appeal.”
* See ante, p
.
*11; post, pp. *299,
*397.
* The complete text of this section
is as follows: “Section 1. All per
sons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens o
f
the United
States, and o
f
the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or en
force any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities o
f
citizens
o
f
the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person o
f life, lib
erty, o
r property, without due process
o
f law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection o
f
the laws.”
* See ante, pp. “12–14. Notwith
standing this section, the protection
o
f
a
ll
citizens in their privileges and
immunities, and in their right to an
impartial administration o
f
the laws,
is just as much the business o
f
the
individual States as it was before.
This amendment of the Constitution
does not concentrate power in the
general government for any purpose o
f
police government within the States;
its object is to preclude legislation by
any State which shall “abridge the
privileges o
r
immunities o
f
citizens o
f
the United States,” o
r “deprive any
person o
f life, liberty, or property
without due process o
f law,” or
“deny to any person within its juris
diction the equal protection o
f
the
laws; ” and Congress is empowered to
pass a
ll
laws necessary to render such
unconstitutional State legislation in
effectual. This amendment has re
ceived a very full examination at the
hands o
f
the Supreme Court o
f
the
United States in the Slaughter-House
Case, 16 Wall. 36, and in United
States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U
.
S
. Rep.
542, with the conclusion above stated.
See Story o
n
Const. (4th ed.) App. to
Vol. II.
vº
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[*295] * CHAPTER X.
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.
ALTHOUGH the people from whom we derive our laws now
possess a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other
in Europe, there was a period in their history when a considera
ble proportion were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile
classes one portion were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to
the soil, and transferable with it
,
but not otherwise," while the
other portion were villeins in gross, whose condition resembled
that of the slaves known to modern law in America.” How these
people became reduced to this unhappy condition, it may not be
possible to determine a
t this distance o
f
time with entire accuracy;
but in regard to the first class, we may suppose that when a con
queror seized the territory upon which he found them living, he
seized also the people as a part o
f
the lawful prize o
f war, grant
ing them life on condition o
f
their cultivating the soil for his use;
and that the second were often persons whose lives had been
spared o
n
the field o
f battle, and whose ownership, in accordance
with the custom o
f
barbarous times, would pertain to the persons
o
f
their captors. Many other causes also contributed to reduce
persons to this condition.” At the beginning of the reign of John
1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92.
“They originally held lands of their
lords on condition o
f agricultural ser
vice, which in a certain sense was
servile, but in reality was not so, as the
actual work was done b
y
the theows,
o
r
slaves. . . . They did not pay rent,
and were not removable a
t pleasure;
they went with the land and rendered
services, uncertain in their nature,
and therefore opposed to rent. They
were the originals o
f copyholders.”
Note to Reeves, History o
f English
Law, Pt. I. c. 1.
* Litt. § 181 ; 2 Bl. Com. 92.
“These are the persons who are
described b
y
Sir William Temple as
“a sort o
f people who were in a con
dition o
f downright servitude, used
and employed in the most servile
works; and belonging, they and their
children and effects, to the lord o
f
the
soil, like the rest o
f
the stock o
r
cattle
upon it.’” Reeves, History of Eng
lish Law, Pt. I. c. 1.
* For a view of the condition of
the servile classes, see Wright, Do
mestic Manners and Sentiments, 101,
102; Crabbe, History o
f English Law
(ed. o
f 1829), pp. 8, 7.8, 365; Hallam,
Middle Ages, Pt. II
.
c. 2; Vaughan,
Revolutions in English History, Book
2
,
c. 8
;
Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.
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it has been estimated that one-half of the Anglo-Saxons were in
a condition of servitude, and if we go back to the time of the
Conquest, we find a still larger proportion of the people held as
the property of their lords, and incapable of acquiring and hold
ing any property as their own." Their treatment was such as
might have been expected from masters trained to war and vio
lence, accustomed to think lightly of human life and human
suffering, and who knew little of and cared less for any doctrine
of human rights which embraced within it
s scope others besides
the governing classes. -
It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible
steps b
y
* which involuntary servitude at length came to [*296]
a
n
end in England. It was never abolished by statute,”
and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot b
e accurately
determined.” The causes were a
t work silently for centuries;
the historian did not a
t
the time note them ; the statesman did
not observe them ; they were not the subject o
f agitation or con
troversy; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could
examine the laws and institutions o
f
his country, and declare
that slavery had ceased to be recognized, though a
t what precise
point in legal history the condition became unlawful h
e might
* Hume, History o
f England, Vol. more of this kind of servitude. And
I. App. 1.
* Barrington on the Statutes (3d
ed.) 272.
* Mr. Hargrave says, at the com
mencement o
f
the seventeenth century.
20 State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist.
c. 11. And Mr. Barrington (On Stat.
3
d
ed. p
.
278) cites from Rymer a
commission from Queen Elizabeth in
the year 1574, directed to Lord Burgh
ley and Sir Walter Mildmay, for in
quiring into the lands, tenements, and
other goods o
f
all her bondmen and
bond women in the counties o
f Corn
wall, Devonshire, Somerset, and Glou
cester, such as were by blood in a
slavish condition, by being born in
any o
f
her manors, and to compound
with any o
r
all o
f
such bondmen o
r
bond women for their manumission
and freedom. And this commission,
h
e says, in connection with other cir
cumstances, explains why we hear no
see Crabbe, History o
f English Law
(ed. o
f 1829), 574. This author says
that villeinage had disappeared by the
time o
f
Charles II
.
Hurd says in
1661. Law of Freedom and Bond
age, Vol. I. p
.
136. And see 2 Bl.
Com. 96. Lord Campbell's Lives o
f
the Chief Justices, c. 5
. Macaulay
says there were traces o
f slavery un
der the Stuarts. History of England,
c. 1. Hume (History o
f England,
c. 23) thinks there was no law recog
nizing it after the time of Henry VII.,
and that it had ceased before the
death o
f
Elizabeth. Froude (History
o
f England, c. 1) says in the reign o
f
Henry VIII. it had practically ceased.
Mr. Christian says the last claim o
f
villeinage which we find recorded in
our courts was in 15th James I. Noy,
27; 11 State Trials, 342. Note to
Blackstone, Book 2
,
p
.
96.
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not be able to determine. Among the causes of it
s abrogation
h
e might b
e
able to enumerate: 1. That the slaves were o
f
the
same race with their masters. There was therefore not only an
absence o
f
that antipathy which is often found existing when the
ruling and the ruled are o
f
different races, and especially o
f dif
ferent color, but instead thereof an active sympathy might often
b
e supposed to exist, which would lead to frequent emancipations.
2
. The common law presumed every man to be free until proved
to be otherwise; and this presumption, when the slave was o
f
the
same race as his master, and had n
o
natural badge o
f servitude,
must often have rendered it extremely difficult to recover the
fugitive who denied his thraldom. 3. A residence for a year and
a day in a corporate town rendered the villein legally free;"
[*297] so that to him the towns constituted cities of * refuge.
4
. The lord treating him as a freeman,—as b
y receiving
homage from him a
s tenant, o
r entering into a contract with
him under seal, - thereby emancipated him, by recognizing
in him a capacity to perform those acts which only a freeman
could perform. 5. Even the lax morals o
f
the times were
favorable to liberty, since the condition o
f
the child followed
that o
f
the father;” and in law the illegitimate child was nullius
filius, – had no father. And, 6. The influence of the priesthood
was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the
fugitive and influenced emancipations b
y
appeals to the conscience,
especially when the master was near the close o
f life, and the
conscience naturally most sensitive.” And with al
l
these influ
* Crabbe, History o
f English Law
(ed. o
f 1829), p. 79. But this was
only as to third persons. The claim
o
f
the lord might be made within
three years. Ibid. And see Mackin
tosh, History o
f England, c. 4.
* Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.),
276, note ; 2 Bl. Com. 93. But in
the very quaint account o
f “Villein
age and Niefty,” in Mirror o
f Jus
tices, § 28, it is said, among other
things, that “those are villeins who
are begotten o
f
a freeman and a nief,
and born out o
f matrimony.” The
ancient rule appears to have been that
the condition of the child followed
that o
f
the mother ; but this was
changed in the time o
f Henry I.
Crabbe, History o
f English Law (ed.
o
f
1829), p
. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages,
Pt. II. c. 2.
* In 1514, Henry VIII. manumitted
two o
f
his villeins in the following
words : “Whereas God created all
men free, but afterwards the laws and
customs o
f
nations subjected some
under the yoke o
f servitude, we think
it pious and meritorious with God to
manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and
John Herle, a husbandman, our na
tives, a
s being born within the manor
o
f
Stoke Clymercysland, in our county
o
f Cornwall, together with all their
issue born o
r
to b
e born, and all their
goods, lands, and chattels acquired,
so a
s
the said persons and their issue
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ences there should be noted the further circumstance, that a
class of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and
suffering, with whom they were in association, and between
whom and themselves there were frequent intermarriages," and
that from these to the highest order in the State there were suc
cessive grades; the children of the highest gradually finding
their way into those below them, and ways being open by which
the children of the lowest might advance themselves, by intelli
gence, energy, or thrift, through the successive grades above
them, until the descendants of dukes and earls were found cul
tivating the soil, and the man of obscure descent winning a place
among the aristocracy of the realm, through his successful exer
tions at the bar, or his services to the State. Inevitably
these influences must at length overthrow the "slavery [*298]
of white men which existed in England,” and no other
ever became established within the realm. Slavery was per
mitted, and indeed fostered, in the colonies; in part because a
profit was made of the trade, and in part also because it was
supposed that the peculiar products of some of them could not
be profitably cultivated with free labor;” and at times masters
brought their slaves with them to England and removed them
again without question, until in Sommersett's Case, in 1771, it
was ruled by Lord Mansfield that slavery was repugnant to the
common law, and to bring a slave into England was to emancipate
him.*
shall from henceforth by us be free
and of free condition.” Barrington
on Statutes (3d ed.), 275. See Mack
intosh, History of England, c. 4.
Compare this with a deed of manu
mission in Massachusetts, to be found
in Sumner's Speeches, II
. 289; Me
moir o
f
Chief Justice Parsons, b
y
his
son, 176, note.
* Wright, Domestic Manners and
Sentiments, p. 112.
* Macaulay (History of England,
c. 1
) says the chief instrument o
f
emancipation was the Christian relig
ion. Mackintosh (History of England,
c. 4
)
also attributes to the priesthood
great influence in this reform, not only
b
y
their direct appeals to the con
science, but b
y
the judges, who were
ecclesiastics, multiplying presump
tions and rules of evidence consonant
to the equal and humane spirit which
breathes throughout the morality o
f
the Gospel. Hume (History of Eng
land, c. 23) seems to think emancipa
tion was brought about by selfish con
siderations on the part o
f
the barons,
and from a conviction that the re
turns from their lands would be in
creased by changing villeinage into
socage tenures.
* Robertson, America, Book 9
;
Bancroft, United States, Vol. I. c. 5.
* Lofft, 18; 20 Howell State Trials,
1
;
Life of Granville Sharp, b
y Hoare,
c. 4; Hurd, Law of Freedom and
Bondage, Vol. I. p
.
189. The judg
ment of Lord Mansfield is said to
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The same opinion had been previously expressed by Lord Holt,
but without authoritative decision.”
In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later
period. The holding of negroes in slavery was indeed
[*299] held to be illegal * soon after the Sommersett Case; but
the salters and colliers did not acquire their freedom until
1799, nor without an act of Parliament.” A previous statute for
their enfranchisement through judicial proceedings had proved
ineffectual.”
The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to gen
eral history than to a work upon State constitutional law.
Throughout the land involuntary servitude is abolished by con
stitutional amendment, except as it may be imposed in the pun
ishment of crime.” Nor do we suppose the exception will permit
the convict to be subjected to other servitude than such as is
under the control and direction of the public authorities, in the
have been delivered with evident re
luctance. 20 State Trials, 79; per
Lord Stowell, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110;
Broom, Const. Law, 105. Of the
practice prior to the decision Lord
Stowell said: “The personal traffic in
slaves resident in England had been
as public and as authorized in London
as in any of our West India Islands.
They were sold on the Exchange, and
other places of public resort, by par
ties themselves resident in London,
and with as little reserve as they
would have been in any of our West
India possessions. Such a state of
things continued without impeach
ment from a very early period up to
nearly the end of the last century.”
The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105.
In this case it was decided that if a
slave, carried by his master into a
free country, voluntarily returned with
him to a country where slavery was
allowed by the local law, the status of
slave would still attach to him, and
the master's right to his service be
resumed. Mr. Broom collects the au
thorities on this subject in general, in
the notes to Sommersett's Case, Const.
Law, 105.
1 “As soon as a slave comes into
England, he becomes free; one may
be a villein in England, but not a
slave.” Holt, Ch. J., in Smith v.
Brown, 2 Salk. 666. See also Smith
v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; s. C. Salk.
666. There is a learned note in
Quincy's Rep. p. 94, collecting the
English authorities on the subject of
slavery.
* 39 Geo. III. c. 56.
* May's Const. Hist. c. 11.
* Amendments to Const. of U. S.
art. 13. See Story on the Constitu
tion (4th ed.), c. 46, for the history of
this article, and the decisions bearing
upon it
.
The Maryland act for the
apprenticing o
f
colored children, which
made important and invidious dis
tinctions between them and white
children, and gave the master prop
erty rights in their services not given
in other cases, was held void under
this article. Matter o
f Turner, 1 Abb.
U. S. 84. This thirteenth amend
ment conferred no political rights,
and left the negro under all his polit
ical disabilities. Marshall v. Donovon,
10 Bush, 681. See also United States
v
. Cruikshanks, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 542.
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manner heretofore customary. The laws of the several States
allow the letting of the services of the convicts, either singly or
in numbers, to contractors who are to employ them in mechanical
trades in or near the prison, and under the surveillance of it
s
officers; but it might well be doubted if a regulation which
should suffer the convict to be placed upon the auction block and
sold to the highest bidder, either for life or for a term o
f years,
would be in harmony with the constitutional prohibition. It is
certain that it would be open to very grave abuses, and it is so
inconsistent with the general sentiment in countries where slavery
does not exist, that it may well be believed not to have been
within the understanding o
f
the people in incorporating the
exception with the prohibitory amendment."
The common law o
f England permits the impressment o
f sea
faring men to man the royal navy;” but this species of servitude
was never recognized in the law o
f
America.” The citizen may
doubtless be compelled to serve his country in her wars; but the
common law as adopted by us has never allowed arbitrary dis
criminations for this purpose between persons o
f
different avo
cations.
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control o
f
the person is that maxim o
f
the common law which secures to the
citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes o
f
the gov
ernment, and protection in person, property, and papers, against
even the process o
f
the law, except in a few specified cases.
The maxim that “every man's house is his castle,” is made
* The State has no power to im
prison a child in a house o
f
correction
who has committed no crime, on a
mere allegation that he is “destitute
o
f proper parental care, and is grow
ing up in mendicancy, ignorance,
idleness, and vice.” People v. Tur
ner, 55 Ill 280; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.
645. Compare Prescott v. State, 19
Ohio, N
.
s. 184; s. c. 2 Am. Rep.
388.
* Broadfoot's Case, 18 State Tri
als, 1323; Fost. Cr. Law, 178; Rex
v
. Tubbs, Cowp. 512; Ez parte Fox,
5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419;
Broom, Const. Law, 116.
* There were cases o
f impressment
in America before the Revolution,
but they were never peaceably acqui
esced in b
y
the people. See Life and
Times o
f Warren, 55.
* Broom's Maxims, 321. The
eloquent passage in Chatham's speech
on General Warrants is familiar:
“The poorest man may, in his cot
tage, bid defiance to all the forces o
f
the Crown. It may be frail; it
s
roof
may shake ; the wind may blow
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[* 300] a "part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibit
ing unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always
been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.
If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for
these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the
abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion
of executive agents into the houses and among the private pa
pers of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offences
either committed or designed. The final overthrow of this prac
tice is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the
constitutional history of England that we cannot refrain from
copying the account in the note below."
through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the king of
England may not enter; a
ll
his force
dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement.” And see Lieber
on Civil Liberty and Self-Govern
ment, c. 6
.
* “Among the remnants of a
jurisprudence which had favored pre
rogative at the expense o
f liberty was
that o
f
the arrest o
f persons under
general warrants, without previous
evidence o
f
their guilt or identifica
tion o
f
their persons. This practice
survived the Revolution, and was
continued without question, on the
ground o
f usage, until the reign o
f
George III., when it received its
death-blow from the boldness of
Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord
Camden. This question was brought
to an issue by No. 45 o
f
the “North
Briton,” already so often mentioned.
There was a libel, but who was the
libeller? Ministers knew not, nor
waited to inquire, after the accus
tomed forms o
f law; but forth with
Lord Halifax, one of the secretaries
o
f
state, issued a warrant, directing
four messengers, taking with them a
constable, to search for the authors,
printers, and publishers; and to ap
prehend and seize them, together
with their papers, and bring them in
safe custody before him. No one
having been charged or even sus
pected, - no evidence of crime having
been offered, – no one was named in
this dread instrument. The offence
only was pointed at, not the offender.
The magistrate who should have
sought proofs o
f
crime deputed this
office to his messengers. Armed with
their roving commission, they set
forth in quest o
f
unknown offenders;
and, unable to take evidence, listened
to rumors, idle tales, and curious
guesses. They held in their hands
the liberty o
f every man whom they
were pleased to suspect. Nor were
they triflers in their work. In three
days they arrested no less than forty
nine persons on suspicion, — many as
innocent as Lord Halifax himself.
Among the number was Dryden
Leach, a printer, whom they took
from his bed a
t night. They seized
his papers, and even apprehended his
journeymen and servants. He had
printed one number o
f
the “North
Briton,” and was then reprinting some
other numbers; but as he happened
not to have printed No. 45, he was
released without being brought before
Lord Halifax. They succeeded, how
ever, in arresting Kearsley the pub
lisher, and Balfe the printer, o
f
the
obnoxious number, with all their
workmen. From them it was dis
covered that Wilkes was the culprit
CH. X.] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS, ETC. 369
* The history of this contro versy should be read in [* 301]
connection with that in America immediately previous to
of whom they were in search; but
the evidence was not on oath ; and
the messengers received verbal direc
tions to apprehend Wilkes under the
general warrant. Wilkes, far keener
than the crown lawyers, not seeing
his own name there, declared it “a
ridiculous warrant against the whole
English nation,” and refused to obey
it
.
But after being in custody o
f
the
messengers for some hours, in his own
house, he was taken away in a chair,
to appear before the secretaries o
f
state. No sooner had he been re
moved than the messengers, returning
to his house, proceeded to ransack his
drawers; and carried off all his pri
vate papers, including even his will
and his pocket-book. When brought
into the presence o
f Lord Halifax and
Lord Egremont, questions were put
to Wilkes which he refused to answer;
whereupon he was committed close
prisoner to the Tower, denied the use
o
f pen and paper, and interdicted
from receiving the visits o
f
his friends
o
r
even o
f
his professional advisers.
From this imprisonment, however,
h
e
was shortly released on a writ of
habeas corpus, b
y
reason o
f
his privi
lege a
s
a member o
f
the House o
f
Commons.
“Wilkes and the printers, sup
ported b
y
Lord Temple's liberality,
soon questioned the legality o
f
the
general warrant. First, several jour
neymen printers brought action
against the messengers. On the first
trial, Lord Chief Justice Pratt — not
allowing bad precedents to set aside
the sound principles o
f English law —
held that the general warrant was
illegal; that it was illegally executed;
and that the messengers were not in
demnified b
y
statute. The journey
men recovered three hundred pounds
damages; and the other plaintiffs also
obtained verdicts. In all these cases,
however, bills o
f exceptions were
tendered and allowed. Mr. Wilkes
himself brought an action against
Mr. Wood, under-secretary of state,
who had personally superintended the
execution of the warrant. At this
trial it was proved that Mr. Wood
and the messengers, after Wilkes's
removal in custody, had taken entire
possession o
f
his house, refusing ad
mission to his friends; had sent for a
blacksmith, who opened the drawers
o
f
his bureau; and having taken out
the papers, had carried them away in
a sack, without taking any list o
r in
ventory. All his private manuscripts
were seized, and his pocket-book filled
up the mouth o
f
the sack. Lord
Halifax was examined, and admitted
that the warrant had been made out
three days before he had received
evidence that Wilkes was the author
of the “North Briton.” Lord Chief
Justice Pratt thus spoke of the war
rant: “The defendant claimed a right,
under precedents, to force persons'
houses, break open escritoires, and
seize their papers upon a general
warrant, where no inventory is made
o
f
the things thus taken away, and
where no offenders' names are speci
fied in the warrant, and therefore a
discretionary power given to messen
gers to search wherever their suspi
cions may chance to fall. If such a
power is truly invested in a secretary
o
f state, and he can delegate this
power, it certainly may affect the
person and property o
f every man in
this kingdom, and is totally subversive
o
f
the liberty o
f
the subject.’ The
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff
with one thousand pounds damages.
“Four days after Wilkes had ob
tained his verdict against Mr. Wood,
Dryden Leach, the printer, gained
another verdict, with four hundred
pounds damages, against the messen
24
370 [CH. X.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[* 302] the American Revolution, * in regard to writs of assist
ance issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empow
gers. A bill of exceptions, however,
was tendered and received in this as
in other cases, and came on for hear
ing before the Court of King’s Bench
in 1765. After much argument and
the citing of precedents showing the
practice of the secretary of state's
office ever since the Revolution, Lord
Mansfield pronounced the warrant
illegal, saying: “It is not fit that the
judging o
f
the information should be
left to the discretion of the officer.
The magistrate should judge, and
give certain directions to the officer.’
The other three judges agreed that
the warrant was illegal and bad, ‘be
lieving that no degree o
f antiquity
can give sanction to an usage bad in
itself.” The judgment was therefore
affirmed.
“Wilkes had also brought actions
for false imprisonment against both
the secretaries o
f
state. Lord Egre
mont's death put an end to the action
against him ; and Lord Halifax, by
pleading privilege, and interposing
other delays unworthy o
f
his position
and character, contrived to put off
his appearance until after Wilkes had
been outlawed, when he appeared and
pleaded the outlawry. But a
t length,
in 1769, no further postponement
could be contrived ; the action was
tried, and Wilkes obtained no less
than four thousand pounds damages.
Not only in this action, but through
out the proceedings, in which persons
aggrieved by the general warrant had
sought redress, the government of
fered an obstinate and vexatious
resistance. The defendants were
harassed b
y
every obstacle which the
law permitted, and subjected to ru
inous costs. The expenses which
government itself incurred in these
various actions were said to have
amounted to one hundred thousand
pounds.
“The liberty of the subject was
further assured a
t
this period by
another remarkable judgment o
f Lord
Camden. In November, 1762, the
Earl of Halifax, as secretary of state,
had issued a warrant directing certain
messengers, taking a constable to
their assistance, to search for John
Entinck, clerk, the author or one
concerned in the writing o
f
several
numbers o
f
the ‘Monitor, or British
Freeholder.” and to seize him, together
with his books and papers, and bring
him in safe custody before the secre
tary o
f
state. In execution of this
warrant, the messengers apprehended
Mr. Entinck in his house, and
seized the books and papers in his
bureau, writing-desk, and drawers.
This case differed from that of
Wilkes, as the warrant specified the
name o
f
the person against whom it
was directed. In respect of the per
son, it was not a general warrant;
but as regards the papers, it was a
general search-warrant, — not speci
fying any particular papers to be
seized, but giving authority to the
messengers to take all his books and
papers according to their discretion.
“Mr. Entinck brought an action
o
f trespass against the messengers for
the seizure o
f
his papers, upon which
a jury found a special verdict, with
three hundred pounds damages. This
special verdict was twice learnedly
argued before the Court o
f
Common
Pleas, where, at length, in 1765,
Lord Camden pronounced an elabo
rate judgment. He even doubted the
right o
f
the secretary o
f
state to com
mit persons a
t all, except for high
treason; but in deference to prior
decisions, the court felt bound to
acknowledge the right. The main
question, however was the legality o
f
a search-warrant for papers. ‘If this
point should be determined in favor
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ering them, in their discretion, to search * suspected [*303]
places for smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced
“ the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book; ” since they placed “the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” All
these matters are now a long way in the past; but it has not
been deemed unwise to repeat in the State constitutions, as well
as in the Constitution of the United States,” the principles
of the jurisdiction,” said Lord Cam
den, “the secret cabinets and bureaus
of every subject in this kingdom will
be thrown open to the search and
inspection of a messenger, whenever
the secretary of state shall see fi
t
to
charge, o
r
even to suspect, a person
to b
e
the author, printer, o
r publisher,
o
f
a seditious libel.” This power, so
assumed by the secretary o
f state, is
a
n execution upon all the party's
papers in the first instance. His
house is rifled; his most valuable
papers are taken out o
f
his possession,
before the paper, for which he is
charged, is found to be criminal by
any competent jurisdiction, and be
fore he is convicted either o
f writing,
publishing, o
r being concerned in the
paper.” It had been found by the
special verdict that many such war
rants had been issued since the Revo
lution; but he wholly denied their
legality. He referred the origin o
f
the practice to the Star Chamber,
which in pursuit o
f
libels had given
search-warrants to their messenger o
f
the press; a practice which, after the
abolition o
f
the Star Chamber, had
been revived and authorized by the
licensing act o
f
Charles II., in the
person o
f
the secretary o
f
state. And
h
e conjectured that this practice had
been continued after the expiration o
f
that act, — a conjecture shared by
Lord Mansfield and the Court of
King's Bench. With the unanimous
concurrence o
f
the other judges o
f
his
court, this eminent magistrate now
finally condemned this dangerous and
unconstitutional practice.” May's
Constitutional History o
f England,
c. 11. See also Semayne's Case, 5
Coke, 91; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 183;
Entinck v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275,
and 19 State Trials, 1030; Note to
same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613;
Money v. Leach, Burr. 1742; Wilkes's
Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Tri
als, 1405. For debates in Parliament
on the same subject, see Hansard's
Debates, Vol. XV. p
.
1393–1418;
Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further
illustration o
f
the same subject, see
De Lolme on the English Constitu
tion, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901,
1902; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263;
Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.
1 Works o
f John Adams, Vol. II.
pp. 523, 524; 2 Hildreth's U
.
S
. 499;
4 Bancroft's U
.
S
. 414; Quincy,
Mass. Reports, 51. See also the
appendix to these reports, p
.
395, for
a history o
f
writs o
f
assistance. In
the case o
f People v. Smith, before
McAllister, J., at Chambers, reported
in Chicago Legal News, Vol. VI.
p
.
392, a statute was declared void
which permitted the issue o
f
criminal
warrants without a showing o
f proba
ble cause.
* U. S. Const. 4th Amendment.
The scope of this work does not call
for any discussion of the searches o
f
private premises, and seizures o
f
books and papers, which are made
under the authority, o
r
claim o
f au
thority, o
f
the revenue laws o
f
the
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already settled in the common law upon this vital point in civil
liberty.
For the service of criminal process, the houses of private par
ties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances
which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need
not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where search
warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be
protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species
of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not
to be resorted to except for very urgent and satisfactory reasons,
the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary
strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal pro
tection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.
* In the first place, they are only to be granted in the
cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in
such cases until after a showing made before a judicial officer,
under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party
complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the offender, or
the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime,
is concealed in some specified house or place.' And the law, in
requiring a showing of reasonable cause for suspicion, intends
that evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the
magistrate that the suspicion is well founded ; for the suspicion
itself is no ground for the warrant except as the facts justify it.”
In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues
must particularly specify the place to be searched, and the object
for which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched,
the name of the owner or occupant should be given ; * or, if not
occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the officer
will be left to no discretion in respect to the place; and a misde
[* 304]
United States. Perhaps, under no sees fi
t
to establish, however unrea
other laws are such liberties taken by
ministerial officers; and it would be
surprising to find oppressive action
o
n their part so often submitted to
without legal contest, if the facilities
they possess to embarrass, annoy, and
obstruct the merchant in his business
were not borne in mind. The federal
decisions, however, go very far to
establish the doctrine that, in matters
o
f
revenue, the regulations Congress
sonable they may seem, must prevail.
For a very striking case, see Hender
son's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44.
* 2 Hale, P
.
C
.
142; Bishop, Cr.
Pro. §§ 716–719; Archbold, Cr. Law,
147.
* Commonwealth v. Lottery Tick
ets, 5 Cush. 369; Else v. Smith, 1 D
.
& R. 97.
* Stone v. Dana, 5 Met. 98.
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scription in regard to the ownership," or a description so general
that it applies equally well to several buildings or places, would
render the warrant void in law.” Search-warrants are always
obnoxious to very serious objections; and very great particularity
is justly required in these cases, before the privacy of a man's
premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.”
And therefore a designation of goods to be searched for as
“goods, wares, and merchandises,” without more particular de
scription, has been regarded as insufficient, even in the case of
goods supposed to be smuggled,” where there is usually greater
difficulty in giving description, and where consequently more
latitude should be permitted than in the case of property
stolen.
* Lord Hale says, “It is fit that such warrants to [* 305]
search do express that search be made in the daytime ;
and though I do not say they are unlawful without such restric
tion, yet they are very inconvenient without it; for many times,
under pretence o
f
searches made in the night, robberies and bur
glaries have been committed, and a
t
best it creates great disturb
ance.”" And the statutes upon this subject will generally be
found to provide for searches in the daytime only, except in
very special cases.
The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other
proper officer, and not to private persons; though the party com
plainant may be present for the purposes o
f identification," and
other assistance can lawfully be called in b
y
the officer if neces
sary.
The warrant must also command that the goods or other arti
cles to be searched for, if found, together with the party in whose
1 Sandford r. Nichols, 13 Mass.
286; Allen v. Staples, 6 Gray, 491.
* Thus, a warrant to search the
“houses and buildings o
f
Hiram Ide
and Henry Ide,” is too general.
Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See
McGlinchy r. Barrows, 41 Me. 74;
Ashley v. Peterson, 25 Wis. 621. So
a warrant for the arrest of an un
known person under the designation
o
f John Doe, without further de
scription, is void. Commonwealth
v
. Crotty, 10 Allen, 403.
* A warrant for searching a dwell
ing-house will not justify a forcible
entry into a barn adjoining the dwell
ing-house. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me.
254; Downing v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539;
Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716–719.
* Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass.
286; Archbold, Cr. Law, 143.
* 2 Hale, P
.
C
.
150. See Arch
bold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.
• 2 Hale, P
.
C
.
150; Archbold, Cr.
Law (7th ed.), 145.
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custody they are found, be brought before the magistrate, to the
end that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods, and
the party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of accord
ing to law." And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant, that
it leaves the disposition of the goods searched for to the minis
terial officer, instead of requiring them to be brought before the
magistrate, that he may pass his judgment upon the truth of the
complaint made ; and it would also be a fatal objection to a
statute authorizing such a warrant, if it permitted a condemna
tion or other final disposition of the goods, without notice to the
claimant, and without an opportunity for a hearing being afforded
him.”
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evi
dence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an
offence actually committed.” Nor even then is it allowable to
invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining
[*306] evidence against him,” “except in a few special cases
where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed
to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest
in it or in it
s
destruction. Those special cases are familiar and
well understood in the law. Search-warrants have heretofore
been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed
to have been smuggled into the country in violation o
f
the
revenue laws, for implements o
f gaming or counterfeiting, for
lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law,
for obscene books and papers kept for sale o
r circulation, and for
* 2 Hale, P
.
C
. 150; Bell v. prevention o
f
offences in some cases:
Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Hibbard v.
People, 4 Mich. 126; Fisher v. Mc
Girr, 1 Gray, 1.
* The “Search and Seizure,”
clause in some o
f
the prohibitory
liquor laws was held void on this
ground. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1
;
Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis, 311; Hib
bard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also
Matter o
f Morton, 10 Mich. 208;
Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242; State
v
. Snow, 3 R
.
I. 64, for a somewhat
similar principle.
* We do not say that it would be
incompetent to authorize, b
y statute,
the issue of search-warrants for the
but it is difficult to state any case in
which it might be proper, except in
such cases o
f attempts, o
r
o
f prepara
tions to commit crime, as are in them
selves criminal.
* The fourth amendment to the
Constitution o
f
the United States,
found also in many State constitu
tions, would clearly preclude the
seizure o
f
one's papers in order to
obtain evidence against him; and the
spirit of the fifth amendment—that
no person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to give evidence against
himself — would also forbid such
seizure.
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powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to
endanger the public safety." A statute which should permit the
breaking and entering a man's house, and the examination of
books and papers with a view to discover the evidence of crime,
might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds in some
other cases; but the power of the legislature to authorize a resort
to this process is one which can properly be exercised only in
extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should go
unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his
premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, let
ters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the mis
constructions of ignorant and suspicious persons; and all this
under the direction of a mere ministerial officer, who brings with
him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them more
often with reference to physical strength and courage than to
their sensitive regard to the rights and feelings of others. To
incline against the enactment of such laws is to incline
to the side of safety.”
* These are the most common
cases, but in the following search
warrants are also sometimes provided
for by statute: books and papers of a
public character, retained from their
proper custody; females supposed to
be concealed in houses of ill-fame;
children enticed or kept away from
parents or guardians; concealed weap
ons; counterfeit money, and forged
bills or papers. See cases under
English statutes specified in 4 Broom
and Hadley's Commentaries, 332.
* Instances sometimes occur in
which ministerial officers take such
liberties, in endeavoring to detect and
punish offenders, as are even more
criminal than the offences they seek to
punish. The employment of spies
and decoys to lead men on to the
commission of crime, on the pretence
of bringing criminals to justice, can
not be too often or too strongly con
demned; and that prying into private
correspondence by officers, which has
sometimes been permitted by post
masters, is directly in the face of the
In principle they are * objection- [* 307]
law, and cannot be excused. The
importance of public confidence in
the inviolability of correspondence
through the post-office cannot well be
overrated ; and the proposition to
permit letters to be opened, at the
discretion of a ministerial officer,
would excite general indignation. In
Maine it has been decided that a
telegraph operator may be compelled
to disclose the contents of a message
sent by him for another party, and
that no rule of public policy would
forbid. State v. Litchfield, 58 Me,
267. The case is treated as if no
other considerations were involved
than those which arise in the ordinary
case of a voluntary disclosure by one
private person to another, without
necessity. Such, however, is not the
nature of the communication made to
the operator of the telegraph. That
instrument is used as a means of cor
respondence, and as a valuable, and in
many cases an indispensable, substi
tute for the postal facilities; and the
communication is made, not because
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able; in the mode of execution they are necessarily odious ;
and they tend to invite abuse and to cover the commission of
crime. We think it would generally be safe for the legisla
ture to regard a
ll
those searches and seizures “unreasonable”
which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on that
account to abstain from authorizing them; leaving parties and
the public to the accustomed remedies."
-
the party desires to put the operator
in possession of facts, but because
transmission without it is impossible.
It is not voluntary in any other sense
than this, that the party makes it
rather than deprive himself o
f
the
benefits o
f
this great invention and
improvement. The reasons o
f
a pub
lic nature for maintaining the secrecy
o
f telegraphic communication are the
same with those which protect cor
respondence b
y
mail; and though the
operator is not a public officer, that
circumstance appears to us imma
terial. He fulfils an important public
function, and the propriety o
f
his pre
serving inviolable secrecy in regard to
communications is so obvious, that it
is common to provide statutory penal
ties for disclosures. If on grounds
o
f public policy the operator should
not voluntarily disclose, why do not
the same considerations forbid the
courts compelling him to do so? Or
if it be proper to make him testify to
the correspondence by telegraph, what
good reason can be given why the
postmaster should not be made sub
ject to the process o
f subpoena for a
like purpose, and compelled to bring
the correspondence which passes
through his hands into court, and
open it for the purposes of evidence?
This decision has been followed in
some other cases. Henisler v. Freed
man, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas (Penn.) 274;
First National Bank of Wheeling v.
Merchants' National Bank, 7 West
Va. 544.
We should suppose, were it not for
the opinions to the contrary b
y
tribu
nals so eminent, that the public could
not be entitled to a man's private
correspondence, whether obtainable
by seizing it in the mails, or by com
pelling the operator o
f
the telegraph
to testify to it
,
o
r b
y
requiring his
servants to take from his desks his
private letters and journals, and bring
them into court on subpoena duces
tecum. Any such compulsory process
to obtain it seems a most arbitrary
and unjustifiable seizure o
f private
papers; such an “unreasonable seiz
ure " as is directly condemned by the
Constitution. In England, the secre
tary o
f
state sometimes issues his
warrant for opening a particular let
ter, where he is possessed o
f
such
facts as he is satisfied would justify
him with the public; but no Ameri
can officer o
r body possesses such au
thority, and it
s usurpation should not
be tolerated. For an account of the
former and present English practice
o
n this subject, see May, Constitu
tional History, c. 11; Todd, Parlia
mentary Government, Vol. I. p
.
272;
Broom, Const. Law, 615.
1 A search-warrant for libels and
other papers o
f
a suspected party was
illegal a
t
the common law. See 11
State Trials, 313, 321 ; Archbold, Cr.
Law (7th ed.), 141; Wilkes v. Wood,
19 State Trials, 1153. “Search
warrants were never recognized by
the common law as processes which
might be availed o
f by individuals in
the course o
f
civil proceedings, o
r for
the maintenance o
f any mere private
right; but their use was confined to
the case o
f public prosecutions insti
tuted and pursued for the suppression
o
f
crime, and the detection and pun
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We have said that if the officer follows the command of his
warrant, he is protected; and this is so even when the complaint
proves to have been unfounded." But if he exceed the
command by * searching in places not described therein, [* 308]
or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is
not protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in
other cases where he assumes to act without process.” Obeying
strictly the command of his warrant, he may break open outer
or inner doors, and his justification does not depend upon his dis
covering that for which he is to make search.”
In other cases than those to which we have referred, and sub
ject to the general police power of the State, the law favors the
complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own
premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that he
may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his
servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the in
truder, if that seem essential to the defence.*
ishment of criminals. Even in those
cases, if we may rely on the authority
of Lord Coke, their legality was for
merly doubted ; and Lord Camden
said that they crept into the law by
imperceptible practice. But their
legality has long been considered to
be established, on the ground of
public necessity; because without
them felons and other malefactors
would escape detection.” Merrick, J.,
in Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray,
456. “To enter a man's house,”
said Lord Camden, “by virtue of a
nameless warrant, in order to procure
evidence, is worse than the Spanish
Inquisition; a law under which no
Englishman would wish to live an
hour.” See his opinion in Entinck
r. Carrington, 19 State Trials, 1029:
s. c. 2 Wils. 275, and Broom, Const.
Law, 558; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils.
205; Leach v. Money, 19 State Trials,
1001; s. c. 3 Burr. 1692; and 1 W.
Bl. 555; note to Entinck v. Carring
ton, Broom, Const. Law, 613.
* Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush.
501.
* Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R.
224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State
v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278.
* 2 Hale, P. C. 151; Barnard v.
Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
* That in defence of himself, any
member of his family, or his dwelling,
a man has a right to employ all neces
sary violence, even to the taking of
life, see Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y.
193; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509;
Logue v. Commonwealth, 38 Penn.
St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich 150;
Maher v. People, 24 Ill. 241; Bohan
nan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 481 ;
s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 474. But except
where a forcible felony is attempted
against person or property, he should
avoid such consequences if possible,
and cannot justify standing up and
resisting to the death, when the as
sailant might have been avoided by
retreat. People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y.
396. But a man assaulted in his
dwelling is under no obligation to
retreat; his house is his castle, which
he may defend to any extremity.
And this means not simply the
dwelling house proper, but includes
whatever is within the curtilage as
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Quartering Soldiers in Private Houses.
A provision is found incorporated in the constitution of nearly
every State, that “no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered
in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” To us, after
four-fifths of a century have passed away since occasion has ex
isted for complaint of the action of the government in this par
ticular, the repetition of this declaration seems to savor of idle
form and ceremony; but “a frequent recurrence to the funda
mental principles of the Constitution ” can never be unimportant,
and indeed may well be regarded as “absolutely necessary to
preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free gov
ernment.” It is difficult to imagine a more terrible engine of
oppression than the power in the executive to fill the house of an
obnoxious person with a company of soldiers, who are to be fed
and warmed at his expense, under the direction of an officer accus
tomed to the exercise of arbitrary power, and in whose presence
the ordinary laws of courtesy, not less than the civil restraints
which protect person and property, must give way to
[* 309] unbridled will; who is sent as an instrument of * pun
ishment, and with whom insult and outrage may ap
pear quite in the line of his duty. However contrary to the
spirit of the age such a proceeding may be, it may always be
assumed as possible that it may be resorted to in times of great
excitement, when party action is generally violent; and “the
dragonades of Louis XIV. in France, of James II. in Scotland,
and those of more recent and present date in certain countries,
furnish sufficient justification of this specific guaranty.” The
clause, as we find it in the national and State constitutions, has
Schiner v. People, 23 Ill. 17; Patten
v. People, 18 Mich. 314; Henton v.
understood at the common law. Pond
v. People, 8 Mich. 150. And in de
ciding what force it is necessary to
employ in resisting the assault, a per
son must act upon the circumstances
as they appear to him at the time;
and he is not to be held criminal be
cause on a calm survey of the facts
afterwards it appears that the force
employed in defence was excessive.
See the cases above cited; also
State, 24 Tex. 454.
* Constitutions of Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida,
Illinois, and North Carolina. See
also Constitutions of Virginia, Ne
braska, and Wisconsin, for a similar
declaration.
* Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self
Government, c. 11.
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c
come down to us through the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights
of 1688, and the Declaration of Independence; and it is but a
branch of the constitutional principle, that the military shall in
time of peace be in strict subordination to the civil power."
Criminal Accusations.
Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal lib
erty consists in the mode of trial which is secured to every
person accused of crime. At the common law, accusations of
felony were made in the form of an indictment by a grand jury;
and this process is still retained in many of the States,” while
others have substituted in its stead an information filed by the
prosecuting officer of the State or county. The mode of investi
gating the facts, however, is the same in a
ll ; and this is through
a trial b
y jury, surrounded b
y
certain safeguards which are a well
understood part o
f
the system, and which the government cannot
dispense with.
First, we may mention that the humanity o
f
our law always
presumes a
n
accused party innocent until he is proved to be
guilty. This is a presumption which attends all the proceedings
against him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict,
which either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption
o
f
innocence into an adjudged fact.”
* Story on the Constitution, §§ 1899,
1900; Rawle on Constitution, 126.
In exceptional cases, however, mar
tial law may be declared and enforced,
whenever the ordinary legal authori
ties are unable to maintain the public
peace, and suppress violence and out
rage. Todd, Parliamentary Govern
ment in England, Vol. I. p
. 342;
1 Bl. Com. 413–415. As to martial
law in general, see Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 129.
* The indictment, to accomplish
the purpose o
f
the constitutional re
quirement, should set out the mate
rial facts charged against the accused.
State v. O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 153. This,
however, would not preclude the leg
islature from establishing forms, pro
vided they furnished such reasonable
information as would apprise the ac
cused o
f
the charge h
e
was to meet.
* See Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 Ill.
242. It is sometimes claimed that
where insanity is set u
p
a
s
a defence
in a criminal case, the defendant
takes upon himself the burden o
f
proof to establish it
,
and that he
must make it out beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Clark v. State, 12 Ohio,
494; Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio, N
.
s.
599; Bond v. State, 23 Ohio, N
.
s.
346; State r. Felton, 32 Iowa, 49;
McKenzie v. State, 42 Geo. 334; Bos
well v. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 860.
Other well-considered cases do not
support this view. The burden of
proof, it is held, rests throughout
upon the prosecution to establish
all the conditions o
f guilt; and the
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If there were any mode short of confinement which would,
with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused
to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict
upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a
greater or less degree, to the punishment of a guilty person,
while as yet it is not determined that he has committed any
crime. If the punishment on conviction cannot exceed in sever
ity the forfeiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable
to suppose that such a sum of money, or an agreement
[*310] by responsible * parties to pay it to the government in
case the accused should fail to appear, would be suffi
cient security for his attendance; and therefore, at the common
law, it was customary to take security of this character in all
cases of misdemeanor; one or more friends of the accused under
taking for his appearance for trial, and agreeing that a certain
sum of money should be levied of their goods and chattels, lands
and tenements, if he made default. But in the case of felonies,
the privilege of giving bail before trial was not a matter of right;
and in this country, although the criminal code is much more
merciful than it formerly was in England, and in some cases the
allowance of bail is almost a matter of course, there are others in
which it is discretionary with the magistrate to allow it or not,
and where it will sometimes be refused if the evidence of guilt is
strong or the presumption great. Capital offences are not gen
erally regarded as bailable ; at least, after indictment, or when
the party is charged by the finding of a coroner's jury;" and
this upon the supposition that one who may be subjected to the
terrible punishment that would follow a conviction, would not
for any mere pecuniary considerations remain to abide the judg
ment.” And where the death penalty is abolished and imprison
ment for life substituted, it is believed that the rule would be the
presumption of innocence that a
ll
the v. McCann, 16 N
.
Y
. 58; Common
while attends the prisoner entitles
him to an acquittal, if the jury are
not reasonably satisfied o
f
his guilt.
See State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43: Com
monwealth v. Myers, 7 Met. 500;
Polk v. State, 19 Ind. 170; Chase v.
People, 40 Ill. 352: People r. Schryver,
42 N. Y. 1 : Stevens v. State, 31 Ind.
485; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399;
State v. Jones, 50 N
.
H
. 349; People
wealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373 ;
Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 340;
Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385; People
v
. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23 : State p
.
Klinger, 43 Mo. 127; State v. Hund
ley, 46 Mo. 414.
1 Matter o
f Barronet, 1 El. & Bl.
1
;
Er parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39.
* State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139.
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same notwithstanding this change, and bail would still be denied
in the case of the highest offences, except under very peculiar
circumstances." In the case of other felonies it is not usual to
refuse bail, and in some of the State constitutions it has been
deemed important to make it a matter of right in a
ll
cases except
o
n capital charges “when the proof is evident or the presumption
great.”
When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be
required; * but the constitutional principle that demands [* 311]
this is one which, from the very nature o
f
the case, ad
dresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense o
f
justice o
f
the court o
r magistrate empowered to fix upon the
amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature
o
f
the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it
,
and the
probabilities that guilt will be established on the trial, seems no
more than sufficient to secure the party's attendance. In deter
mining this, some regard should be had to the prisoner's pecuniary
circumstances; that which is reasonable bail to a man o
f wealth,
being equivalent to a denial o
f right if exacted of a poor man
charged with the like offence. When the court or magistrate
requires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure
attendance, and keeps the prisoner in confinement for failure to
give it
,
it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution
attempts so carefully to secure has been disregarded; and though
the wrong is one for which, in the nature o
f
the case, n
o remedy
exists, the violation o
f
constitutional privilege is aggravated,
instead o
f being diminished, by that circumstance.”
The presumption o
f
innocence is a
n
absolute protection against
to this effect. And see Foley v. Peo
ple, Breese, 31; Ullery v. Common
wealth, 8 B
.
Monr. 3
;
Shore v. State,
* The courts have power to bail,
even in capital cases. United States
v
. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 18; United
States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 224; State
v
. Rockafellow, 1 Halst. 332; Com
monwealth v. Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665;
Commonwealth v. Archer, 6 Grat.
705; People v. Smith, 1 Cal. 9; Peo
ple v. Van Horne, 8 Barb. 158. In
England, when all felonies were cap
ital, it was discretionary with the
courts to allow bail before trial. 4 Bl.
Com. 297, and note.
* The constitutions o
f
a majority
o
f
the States now contain provisions
6 Mo. 640 ; State v. Summons, 19
Ohio, 139; Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss.
673; Moore v. State, 36 Miss. 137;
Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala. 89.
* The magistrate in taking bail
exercises a
n authority essentially judi
cial. Regina v. Badger, 4 Q
.
B
. 468;
Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q
.
B
.
240. As
to his duty to look into the nature o
f
the charge and the evidence to sus
tain it
,
see Barronet's Case, 1 El. &
Bl. 1.
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conviction and punishment, except either, first, on confession in
open court; or, second, on proof which places the guilt beyond
any reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for
felony stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode
was resorted to for the purpose of compelling him to do so; and
this might even end in his death: " but a more merciful proceed
ing is now substituted ; the court entering a plea of not guilty
for a party who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.
Again, it is required that the trial be speedy; and here also
the injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judg
ment of the court. In this country, where officers are specially
appointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions,
their position gives them an immense power for oppression; and
it is to be feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the
responsibility, and wield the power with due regard to the legal
rights and privileges of the accused.” When a person charged
with crime is willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the
part of the prosecution is reasonable, except only that which is
necessary for proper preparation and to secure the atten
[* 312] dance of * witnesses.” Very much, however, must be
left to the judgment of the prosecuting officer in these
1 4 Bl. Com. 324. In treason,
petit felony, and misdemeanors, wil
fully standing mute was equivalent to
a conviction, and the same punish
ment might be imposed ; but in other
cases there could be no trial or judg
ment without plea ; and an accused
party might therefore sometimes
stand mute and suffer himself to be
pressed to death, in order to save his
property from forfeiture. Poor Giles
Corey, accused of witchcraft, was
perhaps the only person ever pressed
to death for refusal to plead in Amer
ica. 3 Bancroft's U. S. 93 ; 2 Hil
dreth's U. S. 160. For English
cases, see Cooley's Bl. Com. 325,
note. Now in England the court
enters a plea of not guilty for a pris
oner refusing to plead, and the trial
proceeds as in other cases.
* It is the duty of the prosecuting
attorney to treat the accused with ju
dicial fairness; and to inflict injury at
the expense of justice is no part of the
purpose for which he is chosen. Un
fortunately, however, we sometimes
meet with cases in which these officers
appear to regard themselves as the
counsel for the complaining party
rather than the impartial representa
tive of public justice. But we trust
it is not often that cases occur like a
recent one in Tennessee, in which the
Supreme Court felt called upon to set
aside a verdict in a criminal case,
where by the artifice of the prosecut
ing officer the prisoner had been in
duced to go to trial under the belief
that certain witnesses for the State
were absent, when in fact they were
present and kept in concealment by
this functionary. Curtis v. State,
6 Cold. 9.
* See this discussed in Er parte
Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.
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cases; and the court would not compel the government to pro
ceed to trial at the first term after indictment found or informa
tion filed, if the officer who represents it should state, under the
responsibility of his official oath, that he was not and could not
be ready at that time." But further delay would not generally
be allowed without a more specific showing of the causes which
prevent the State proceeding to trial, including the names of the
witnesses, the steps taken to procure them, and the facts expected
to be proved by them, in order that the court might judge of the
reasonableness of the application, and that the prisoner might,
if he saw fit to take that course, secure an immediate trial by
admitting that the witnesses, if present, would testify to the facts
which the prosecution have claimed could be proved b
y
them.”
It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant
that every person who sees fi
t
shall in a
ll
cases b
e permitted to
attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where, from
the character o
f
the charge, and the nature o
f
the evidence by
which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on the
part o
f portions o
f
the community would be o
f
the worst char
acter, and where a regard to public morals and public decency
would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing
and witnessing the evidences o
f
human depravity which the trial
must necessarily bring to light. The requirement o
f
a public
trial is for the benefit o
f
the accused; that the public may see
h
e
is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the
presence o
f
interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive
to a sense o
f
their responsibility and to the importance o
f
their
functions; and the requirement is fairly observed, if
,
without
partiality or favoritism, a reasonable proportion o
f
the public is
suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose
presence could be o
f
n
o
service to the accused, and who would
only be drawn thither b
y
a prurient curiosity, are excluded al
together.
*But a far more important requirement is that the [* 313]
1 Watts v. State, 26 Geo. 231. tained ; and that he should be brought
* The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 to trial as early as the second term
Ch. II
.
c. 2
,
§ 1
, required a prisoner after the commitment. The princi
charged with crime to be released on ples o
f
this statute are considered as
bail, if not indicted the first term having been adopted into the Amer
after the commitment, unless the ican common law. Post, p
.
"345.
king's witnesses could not be ob
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proceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial. A pe
culiar excellence of the common-law system of trial over that
which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the
fact that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against
himself. Much as there was in that system that was heartless
and cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrust
worthy character of extorted confessions, and was never subject
to the reproach that it gave judgment upon them."
It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged
with crime, and is brought before an examining magistrate, and
the witnesses in support of the charge have been heard, that the
prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction
charged against him, and that this may be used against him on
the trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But
the prisoner is to be first cautioned that he is under no obligation
to answer any question put to him unless he chooses, and that
whatever he says and does must be entirely voluntary.” He is
also to be allowed the presence and advice of counsel; and if that
privilege is denied him it may be sufficient reason for discrediting
any damaging statements he may have made.” When, however,
the statute has been complied with, and no species of coercion
* See Lieber's paper on Inquisi
torial Trials, Appendix to Civil Lib
erty and Self-Government. Also the
article on Criminal Procedure in Scot
land and England, Edinb. Review,
Oct. 1858. And for an illustration
of inquisitorial trials in our own day,
see Trials of Troppman and Prince
Pierre Bonaparte, Am. Law Review,
Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates
from Whitelocke, that the bishop of
London having said to Felton, who
had assassinated the Duke of Buck
ingham, “If you will not confess, you
must go to the rack,” the man re
plied, “If it must be so, I know not
whom I may accuse in the extremity
of my torture, — Bishop Laud, per
haps, or any lord of this board.”
“Sound sense,” adds Foster, “ in
the mouth of an enthusiast and ruf
fian.” Laud having proposed the
rack, the matter was shortly debated
at the board, and it ended in a refer
ence to the judges, who unanimously
resolved that the rack could not be
legally used. DeLolme on Constitu
tion of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181,
note; 4 Bl. Com. 325; Broom, Const.
Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 3 State
Trials, 368, 371 ; Fortesq. De Laud.
c. 22, and note by Amos ; Brodie,
Const. Hist. c. 8. A legislative body
has no more right than a court to
make its examination of parties or
witnesses inquisitorial. Emery's Case,
107 Mass. 172.
* See Rev. Stat. of New York,
Pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14–16.
* Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432.
However, there is no absolute right to
the presence of counsel, or to public
ity in these preliminary examinations,
unless given by statute. Cox v. Cole
ridge, 1 B. & C. 37.
-
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appears to have been employed, the statement the prisoner may
have made is evidence which can be used against him on his trial,
and is generally entitled to great weight." And in any
other case * except treason” the confession of the ac- [* 314]
cused may be received in evidence to establish his guilt,
provided no circumstance accompanies the making of it which
should detract from its weight in producing conviction.
But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that
it was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were
employed to induce the accused to confess.” The evidence ought
to be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threat
ened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue.
Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self
possession are to be looked for in very few persons; and however
strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a
heinous offence of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal
courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions
could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever pun
ished criminally would be better established than witchcraft;"
* It should not, however, be taken
on oath, and if it is, that will be suffi
cient reason for rejecting it
.
Rex v.
Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex v. Webb,
4 C
.
& P
. 564; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C
.
&
P
. 161; Rex v. River, 7 C
.
& P
. 177;
Regina v. Pikesley, 9 C
.
& P
. 124;
People v. McMahon, 15 N
.
Y
.
384.
“The view of the English judges,
that an oath, even where a party is
informed he need answer no questions
unless he pleases, would, with most
persons, overcome that caution, is
,
I
think, founded on good reason and
experience. I think there is no coun
try — certainly there is none from
which any o
f
our legal notions are
borrowed — where a prisoner is ever
examined on oath.” People v.
Thomas, 9 Mich. 318, per Camp
bell, J. -
* In treason there can be no con
viction unless on the testimony o
f
two
witnesses to the same overt act, o
r
on
confession in open court. Const. o
f
United States, art. 3
,
§ 3
.
** See Smith v. Commonwealth,
10 Grat. 734 ; Shifflet v. Common
wealth, 14 Grat. 652; Page v. Com
monwealth, 27 Grat. 954 ; Williams v.
Commonwealth, 27 Grat. 997; United
States v. Cox, 1 Cliff. 5
,
2
1 ; Jordan's
Case, 32 Miss 382; Runnels v. State,
28 Ark. 121 ; Commonwealth v. Holt,
121 Mass. 61 ; Miller v. People, 39
Ill. 457.
* See Mary Smith's Case, 2 How
ell's State Trials, 1049 ; Case of Es
sex Witches, 4 Howell’s State Trials,
817; Case o
f
Suffolk Witches, 6 How
ell's State Trials, 647; Case of Devon
Witches, 8 Howell's State Trials,
1017. It is true that torture was em
ployed freely in cases o
f alleged witch
craft, but the delusion was one which
often seized upon the victims as well
a
s their accusers, and led the former
to freely confess the most monstrous
and impossible actions. Much curious
and valuable information on this sub
ject may be found in “Superstition
and Force,” by Lea; “A Physician's
Problems,” b
y
Elam ; and Leckey,
History o
f
Rationalism.
25
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and the judicial executions which have been justified by such
confessions ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too
ready reliance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case.
As “Mr. Justice Parke several times observed ” while holding
one of his circuits, “too great weight ought not to be attached
to evidence of what a party has been supposed to have said, as it
very frequently happens, not only that the witness has misunder
stood what the party has said, but that by unintentionally alter
ing a few of the expressions really used, he gives an effect to the
statement completely at variance with what the party really did
say.” And when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps
quite as often happens that it has been made under the influence
of the terrible fear excited by the charge, and in the
[* 315] hope that confession may ward * off some of the conse
quences likely to follow if guilt were persistently denied.
A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti. There should be other proof that a crime has
actually been committed; and the confession should only be al
lowed for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the of
fence.” And if the party's hopes or fears are operated upon to
induce him to make it
,
this fact will be sufficient to preclude the
confession being received; the rule upon this subject being so
strict that even saying to the prisoner it will be better for him to
confess, has been decided to be a holding out o
f
such induce
ments to confession, especially when said b
y
a person having a
prisoner in custody, as should render the statement ob
[* 316] tained b
y
means o
f
it inadmissible.” If
,
however, * state
1 Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C
.
&
P
.
542. See also 1 Greenl. Ev. § 214,
and note ; Commonwealth v. Curtis,
9
7 Mass. 574; Derby v. Derby, 21
N. J. Eq. 35 ; State v. Chambers,
39 Iowa, 179.
* In Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss.
157, a confession o
f
murder was held
not sufficient to warrant conviction,
unless the death o
f
the person alleged
to have been murdered was shown by
other evidence. In People v. Hennes
sey, 15 Wend. 147, it was decided
that a confession o
f
embezzlement by
a clerk would not warrant a conviction
where that constituted the sole evi
dence that an embezzlement had been
committed. So on an indictment for
blasphemy, the admission b
y
the de
fendant that he spoke the blasphemous
charge, is not sufficient evidence o
f
the uttering. People v. Porter, 2
Park. Cr. R. 14. And see State v.
Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Long's Case,
1 Hayw. 524; People v. Lambert, 5
Mich. 349; Ruloff v. State, 18 N. Y.
179.
* Rex v. Enoch, 5 C
.
& P
. 539;
State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563: Boyd
v
. State, 2 Humph. 390; Morehead r.
State, 9 Humph. 635; Commonwealth
v
. Taylor, 5 Cush. 605; Rex v. Par
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ments have been made before the confession, which were likely
to do away with the effect of the inducements, so that the
tridge, 7 C & P. 551; Commonwealth
v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574; State v.
Staley, 14 Minn. 105; Frain v. State,
40 Geo. 529; Austine v. State, 51 Ill.
236; People v. Phillips, 42 N. Y. 200;
State v. Brockman, 46 Mo. 566; Com
monwealth v. Mitchell, 117 Mass.
431; Commonwealth v. Sturtivant,
117 Mass. 122. Mr. Phillips states
the rule thus: “A promise of benefit
or favor, or threat or intimation of
disfavor, connected with the subject
of the charge, held out by a person
having authority in the matter, will
be sufficient to exclude a confession
made in consequence of such induce
ments, either of hope or fear. The
prosecutor, or prosecutor's wife or
attorney, or the prisoner's master or
mistress, or a constable, or a person
assisting him in the apprehension or
custody, or a magistrate acting in the
business, or other magistrate, has
been respectively looked upon as hav
ing authority in the matter; and the
same principle applies if the principle
has been held out by a person without
authority, in the presence of a person
who has such authority, and with his
sanction, either express or implied.”
1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Ed
wards, 544, and cases cited. But we
think the better reason is in favor of
excluding confessions where induce
ments have been held out by any per
son, whether acting by authority or
not. Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. C. C.
410; State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163;
Spears v. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 583;
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick.
496; Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221;
Rex v. Kingston, 4 C. & P. 387; Rex
v. Dunn, 4 C. & P. 543; Rex v.
Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Rex v.
Thomas, 6 C. & P. 353. “The rea
son is
,
that in the agitation o
f
mind
in which the party charged is sup
posed to be, he is liable to be influ
enced by the hope o
f advantage o
r
fear o
f injury to state things which
are not true.” Per Morton, J., in
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick.
496; People v. McMahon, 15 N
.
Y.
387. There are not wanting many
opposing authorities, which proceed
upon the idea, that “a promise made
by an indifferent person, who inter
fered officiously without any kind o
f
authority, and promised without the
means o
f performance, can scarcely
b
e
deemed sufficient to produce any
effect, even on the weakest mind, as
an inducement to confess.” 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 223. No supposition could be
more fallacious; and in point o
f
fact
a case can scarcely occur in which
some one, from age, superior wisdom
o
r experience, o
r
from his relations
to the accused o
r
to the prosecutor,
would not be likely to exercise more
influence upon his mind than some o
f
the persons who are regarded as “in
authority" under the rule as stated
by Mr. Phillips. Mr. Greenleaf
thinks that, while as a rule o
f
law all
confessions made to persons in au
thority should be rejected, “promises
and threats by private persons, not
being found so uniform in their oper
ation, perhaps may, with more pro
priety, be treated as mixed questions
o
f
law and fact; the principle o
f law,
that a confession must be voluntary,
being strictly adhered to, and the
question, whether the promises o
r
threats o
f
the private individuals who
employed them were sufficient to
overcome the mind o
f
the prisoner,
being left to the discretion o
f
the
judge under a
ll
the circumstances o
f
the case.” 1 Greenl. Ev. § 223.
This is a more reasonable rule than
that which admits such confessions
under all circumstances; but it is
impossible for a judge to say whether
inducements, in a particular case,
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accused cannot be supposed to have acted under their influence,
the confession may be received in evidence ; ; but the showing
ought to be very satisfactory on this point before the court should
presume that the prisoner's hopes did not still cling to, or his fears
dwell upon, the first inducements.”
Before prisoners were allowed the benefit of assistance from
counsel on trials for high crimes, it was customary for them to
hare influenced the mind or not; if
their nature were such that they were
calculated to have that effect, it is
safer, and more in accordance with
the human principles of our criminal
law, to presume, in favor of life and
liberty, that the confessions were
“forced from the mind by the flat
tery of hope, or by the torture of
fear ’’ (per Eyre, C. B., Warickshall’s
Case, 1 Leach, C. C. 299), and ex
clude them altogether. This whole
subject is very fully considered in
note to 2 Leading Criminal Cases,
182. And see Whart. Cr. Law,
§ 686 et seq. The cases of People v.
McMahon, 15 N. Y. 385, and Com
monwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574,
have carefully considered the general
subject. In the second of these, the
prisoner had asked the officer who
made the arrest, whether he had
better plead guilty, and the officer
had replied that “as a general thing
it was better for a man who was
guilty to plead guilty, for he got a
lighter sentence.” After this he
made statements which were relied
upon to prove guilt. These statements
were not allowed to be given in evi
dence. Per Foster, J.: “There is no
doubt that any inducement of tem
poral fear or favor coming from one
in authority, which preceded and may
have influenced a confession, will
cause it to be rejected, unless the
confession is made under such cir
cumstances as to show that the in
fluence of the inducement had passed
away. No cases require more careful
scrutiny than those of disclosures
made by the party under arrest to
the officer who has him in custody,
and in none will slighter threats or
promises of favor exclude the subse
quent confessions. Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 610; Common
wealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 193;
Commonwealth v. Morey, 1 Gray, 461.
“Saying to the prisoner that it will
be the worse for him if he does not
confess, or that it will be the better
for him if he does, is sufficient to
exclude the confession, according to
constant experience.’ 2 Hale, P. C.
659; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 219; 2 Bennett
and Heard's Lead. Cr. Cas 164:
Ward v. State, 50 Ala. 120. Each
case depends largely on it
s
own special
circumstances. But we have before
us an instance in which the officer
actually held out to the defendant
the hope and inducement o
f
a lighter
sentence if he pleaded guilty. And
a determination to plead guilty a
t
the
trial, thus induced, would naturally
lead to an immediate disclosure of
guilt.” And the court held it an
unimportant circumstance that the
advice o
f
the officer was given a
t
the
request o
f
the prisoner, instead o
f
being volunteered.
1 State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163;
Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn.
St. 269; State v. Vaigneur, 5 Rich.
391; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C
.
& P
. 535;
Rex v. Howes, 6 C
.
& P
. 404; Rex v.
Richards, 5 C
.
& P
. 318; Thompson
v
. Commonwealth, 20 Grat. 724.
* See State v. Roberts, 1 Dev. 259;
Rex v. Cooper, 5 C
.
& P
. 535;
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 20
Grat. 724; State v. Lowhorne, 66 N
.
C. 538.
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make such statements as they saw fi
t concerning the charge against
them, during the progress o
f
the trial, or after the evidence for
the prosecution was put in ; and upon these statements the prose
cuting officer o
r
the court would sometimes ask questions, which
the accused might answer or not at his option. And although
this practice has now become obsolete, yet if the accused in any
case should manage o
r
assist in his own defence, and should claim
the right o
f addressing the jury, it would be difficult to confine
him to “the record ” as the counsel may be confined in
his * argument. A disposition has been manifested of [* 317]
late to allow the accused to give evidence in his own be
half; and statutes to that effect are in existence in some of the
States, the operation o
f
which is believed to have been generally
satisfactory." These statutes, however, cannot be so construed as
to authorize compulsory process against a
n
accused to compel
him to disclose more than he chooses; they do not so far change
the old system as to establish an inquisitorial process for obtain
ing evidence; they confer a privilege, which the defendant may
use a
t
his option. If he does not choose to avail himself of it
,
unfavorable inferences are not to be drawn to his prejudice from
that circumstance;” and if he does testify, he is at liberty to stop
* See American Law Register,
Vol. V
.
N
.
s. pp. 129, 705; Ruloff
v
. People, 45 N
.
Y
.
213.
* People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522;
State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555. For
a case resting upon an analogous
principle, see Carne v. Litchfield,
2 Mich. 340. A different view would
seem to be taken in Maine. See
State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200. The
views of the court are thus stated in
the recent case of State v. Cleaves,
5
9 Me. 298. The judge below had
instructed the jury that the fact that
the defendant did not g
o
upon the
stand to testify was a proper mat
ter to be taken into consideration
by them in determining the ques
tion o
f
her guilt o
r
innocence. This
instruction was sustained. Appleton,
Ch. J. “It has been urged that this
view o
f
the law places the prisoner
in an embarrassed condition. Not
so. The embarrassment of the pris
oner, if embarrassed, is the result of
his own previous misconduct, not o
f
the law. If innocent, he will regard
the privilege o
f testifying as a boon
justly conceded. If guilty, it is op
tional with the accused to testify o
r
not, and he cannot complain o
f
the
election he may make. If he does
not avail himself o
f
the privilege o
f
contradiction o
r explanation, it is his
fault if by his own misconduct or
crime he has placed himself in such
a situation that he prefers any infer
ences which may be drawn from his
refusal to testify, to those which must
be drawn from his testimony, if truly
delivered. The instruction given was
correct, and in entire accordance with
the conclusions to which, after ma
ture deliberation, we have arrived.
State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200; State
v
. Lawrence, 57 Me. 375.”
In People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 529,
Sawyer, Ch. J., expresses the con
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at any point he chooses, and it must be left to the jury to give a
statement, which he declines to make a full one, such weight as,
trary view as follows: “At the trial,
by his plea of not guilty, the party
charged denies the charge against
him. This is itself a positive act of
denial, and puts upon the people the
burden of affirmatively proving the
offence alleged against him. When
he has once raised this issue by his
plea of not guilty, the law says he
shall thenceforth be deemed innocent
till he is proved to be guilty; and both
the common law and the statute give
him the benefit of any reasonable
doubt arising on the evidence. Now
if at the trial, when for al
l
the pur
poses o
f
the trial the burden is on the
people to prove the offence charged
by affirmative evidence, and the de
fendant is entitled to rest upon his
plea o
f
not guilty, a
n
inference o
f
guilt could legally be drawn from his
declining to go upon the stand as a
witness, and again deny the charge
against him in the form of testimony,
h
e
would practically if not theoreti
cally, by his act declining to exercise
his privilege, furnish evidence o
f
his
guilt that might turn the scale and
convict him. In this mode he would
indirectly and practically be deprived
o
f
the option which the law gives him,
and o
f
the benefit o
f
the provision o
f
the law and the Constitution, which
say in substance that he shall not be
compelled to criminate himself. If
the inference in question could be
legally drawn, the very act o
f exer
cising his option, as to going upon
the stand as a witness, which he is
necessarily compelled by the adoption
o
f
the statute to exercise one way o
r
the other, would be a
t
least to the
extent o
f
the weight given by the
jury to the inference arising from his
declining to testify a crimination o
f
himself. Whatever the ordinary
rule of evidence with reference to in
ferences to be drawn from the failure
o
f parties to produce evidence that
must be in their power to give, we
are satisfied that the defendant, with
respect to exercising his privilege
under the provisions o
f
the act in
question, is entitled to rest in silence
and security upon his plea o
f
not
guilty, and that n
o
inference o
f guilt
can be properly drawn against him
from his declining to avail himself o
f
the privilege conferred upon him to
testify in his own behalf; that to
permit such an inference would b
e
to violate the principles and the spirit
of the Constitution and the statute,
and defeat rather than promote the
object designed to be accomplished
by the innovation in question.” See
also Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97
Mass. 587; Commonwealth v. Mor
gan, 107 Mass. 109; Commonwealth
v
. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285; s. c. 19
Am. Rep. 346; Bird v. State, 50 Geo.
585. In New York and Ohio, by
statute, unfavorable inferences are not
allowed to be drawn from the fact of
the defendant not offering himself as
a witness. See Brandon v. People,
4
2 N
.
Y
.
265; Connors v. People, 50
N
.
Y
. 240; Stover v. People, 56 N
.
Y
.
315; Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio, N. S.
366.
In Devries v. Phillips, 63 N
.
C
.
53, the Supreme Court o
f North
Carolina held it not admissible for
counsel to comment to the jury on
the fact that the opposite party did
not come forward to be sworn as a
witness as the statute permitted. In
Michigan the wife o
f
a
n
accused party
may b
e sworn as a witness with his
assent; but it has been held that his
failure to call her was not to subject
him to inferences o
f guilt, even
though the case was such that, if his
defence was true, his wife must have
been cognizant o
f
the facts. Knowles
v
. People, 15 Mich. 408.
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under the circumstances, they think it entitled to ; otherwise
the statute must have set aside and overruled the constitutional
maxim which protects an accused party against being compelled
to testify against himself, and the statutory privilege becomes a
snare and a danger.”
* In State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459:
S. c. 13 Am. Rep. 88, the defendant
was put on trial for an illegal sale of
liquors; and, having offered himself
as a witness, was asked on cross
examination a question directly re
lating to the sale. He declined to
answer, on the ground that it might
tend to criminate him. Being con
victed, it was alleged for error that
the court suffered the prosecuting
officer to comment on this refusal to
the jury. The Supreme Court held
this no error. This ruling is in en
tire accord with the practice which
has prevailed without question in
Michigan, and which has always
assumed that the right of comment,
where the party makes himself his
own witness, and then refuses to
answer proper questions, was as clear
as the right to exemption from un
favorable comment when he abstains
from asserting his statutory privilege.
The case of Connors v. People, 50
N. Y. 240, is different. There the
defendant, having taken the stand as
a witness, objected to answer a ques
tion; but was directed by the court
to do so, and obeyed the direction.
This was held no error, because he
had waived his privilege. If the de
fendant had persisted in refusing, we
are not advised what action the court
would have deemed it proper to take,
and it is easy to conceive of serious
embarrassments in such a case. Un
der the Michigan practice, when the
court had decided the question to be
a proper one, it would have been left
to the defendant to answer or not at
his option, but if he failed to answer
what seemed to the jury a proper in
quiry, it would be thought surprising
if they gave his imperfect statement
much credence. On this point see
further State v. Wentworth, 65 Me.
234; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 688.
* The statute of Michigan of 1861,
p. 169, removed the common-law dis
abilities of parties to testify, and
added, “Nothing in this act shall be
construed as giving the right to com
pel a defendant in criminal cases to
testify ; but any such defendant shall
be at liberty to make a statement to
the court or jury, and may be cross
examined on any such statement.” It
has been held that this statement
should not be under oath. People v.
Thomas, 9 Mich. 314. That it
s pur
pose was to give every person on trial
for crime an opportunity to make full
explanation to the jury, in respect to
the circumstances given in evidence
which are supposed to have a bearing
against him. Annis v. People, 13
Mich. 511. That the statement is
evidence in the case, to which the
jury can attach such weight as they
think it entitled to. Maher v. People,
10 Mich. 212. That the court has no
right to instruct the jury that, when
it conflicts with the testimony of an
unimpeached witness, they must be
lieve the latter in preference. Durant
v
. People, 13 Mich. 351. And that
the prisoner, while on the stand, is
entitled to the assistance of counsel
in directing his attention to any
branch o
f
the charge, that he may
make explanations concerning it if he
desires. Annis v. People, 13 Mich.
511. The prisoner does not cease to
b
e
a defendant b
y becoming a witness,
nor forfeit rights b
y accepting a privi
lege. In People v. Thomas, 9 Mich.
21, Campbell, J., in speaking of the
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[* 318] * The testimony for the people in criminal cases can
only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses who are
present in court.” The defendant is entitled to be confronted
with the witnesses against him ; and if any of them be absent
from the Commonwealth, so that their attendance cannot be com
pelled, or if they be dead, or have become incapacitated to give
evidence, there is no mode by which their statements against the
prisoner can be used for his conviction. The exceptions to this
rule are of cases which are excluded from its reasons by their
peculiar circumstances; but they are far from numerous. If the
witness was sworn before the examining magistrate, or before a
coroner, and the accused had an opportunity then to cross-exam
ine him, or if there were a former trial on which he was sworn, it
seems allowable to make use of his deposition, or of the minutes
of his examination, if the witness has since deceased, or is insane,
or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears
to have been kept away by the opposite party.”
right which the statute gives to cross
examine a defendant who has made
his statement, says: “And while his
constitutional right of declining to
answer questions cannot be removed,
yet a refusal by a party to answer any
fair question, not going outside of
what he has offered to explain, would
have its proper weight with the jury.”
See Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97
Mass. 547; Commonwealth v. Curtis,
97 Mass. 574; Commonwealth v.
Morgan, 107 Mass. 199.
1 State v. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74;
Goodman v. State, Meigs, 197; Jack
son v. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656.
By the old common law, a party ac
cused of felony was not allowed to
call witnesses to contradict the evi
dence for the Crown ; and this seems
to have been on some idea that it
would be derogatory to the royal
dignity to permit it
. Afterwards,
when they were permitted to be called,
they made their statements without
oath ; and it was not uncommon for
both the prosecution and the court to
comment upon their testimony as o
f
So, also, if a
little weight because unsworn. It
was not until Queen Anne's time that
they were put under oath.
The rule that the prisoner shall be
confronted with the witnesses against
him does not preclude such documen
tary evidence to establish collateral
facts as would be admissible under
the rules o
f
the common law in other
cases. United States v. Benner, Baldw.
240; United States v. Little, 2 Wash.
C
.
C
. 205; United States v. Ortega, 4
Wash. C
.
C
.
531. But the corpus delicti
— e.g. the fact of marriage in an indict
ment for bigamy — cannot be proved
by certificates. People v. Lambert, 5
Mich. 349.
* 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 163–166; Bish
op, Cr. Pro. §§ 520–527; Whart.
Cr. Law, § 667; 2 Phil. Ev. by
Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 217, 229.
Whether evidence that the witness
cannot be found after diligent in
quiry, o
r
is out o
f
the jurisdiction,
would be sufficient to let in proof o
f
his former testimony, see Bul. N
.
P
.
239, 242; Rex v. Hagan, 8 C
.
& P
.
167; Sills v. Brown, 9 C
.
& P
.
601.
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person is on trial for homicide, the declarations of the party
whom he is charged with having killed, if made under the sol
emnity of a conviction that he was at the point of death, and
relating to matters of fact concerning the homicide, which passed
under his own observation, may be given in evidence against the
accused ; the condition of the party who made them being such
that every motive to falsehood must be supposed to have been
silenced, and the mind to be impelled by the most powerful con
siderations to tell the truth.” Not that such evidence is of very
conclusive character; it is not always easy for the hearer to
determine how much of the declaration related to what was
seen and positively known, and how much was surmise
* and suspicion only; but it is admissible from the neces- [* 319)
sity of the case, and the jury must judge of the weight to
be attached to it.
In cases of felony, where the prisoner's life or liberty is in
peril, he has the right to be present, and must be present, during
the whole of the trial, and until the final judgment. If he be
absent, either in prison or by escape, there is a want of jurisdic
tion over the person, and the court cannot proceed with the trial,
or receive the verdict, or pronounce the final judgment.” But
misdemeanors may be tried in the absence of the accused.
1 1 Greenl. Ev. § 156; 1 Phil. Ev.
by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 285–
289 : Whart. Cr. Law, §§ 669–682;
Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch. 463 ;
Hill's Case, 2 Grat. 594; State v.
Freeman, 1 Speers, 57; State v. Bru
netto, 13 La. Ann. 45; Dunn v. State,
2 Pike, 229 ; Mose v. State, 35 Ala.
421 ; Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433;
Whitley v. State, 38 Geo. 70: State
v. Quick, 15 Rich. 158; Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 656 ; State
v. Oliver, 2 Houston, 585. This
whole subject was largely considered
in Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193;
State v. Framburg. 40 Iowa, 555.
* See Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed,
550; Jacobs v. Cone, 5 S. & R. 335;
Witt v. State, 5 Cold. 11; State v.
Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Gladden v.
State, 12 Fla. 577; Maurer v. People,
43 N. Y. 1 ; note to Winchell v.
State, 7 Cow. 525. In capital cases
the accused stands upon a
ll
his rights,
and waives nothing. Nomaque v.
People, Breese, 145; Dempsey v
.
People, 47 Ill. 325; People v. Mc
Kay, 18 Johns. 217; Burley v. State,
1 Neb. 385. The court cannot make
a
n order changing the venue in a
criminal case in the absence of and
without notice to the defendant. Ea:
parte Bryan, 44 Ala. 404. Nor in the
course of the trial allow evidence to
b
e given to the jury in his absence,
even though it be that of a witness
which had been previously reduced to
writing. Jackson v. Commonwealth,
1
9 Grat. 656; Wade v. State, 12 Geo.
25. And in a capital case the record
must affirmatively show the presence
o
f
the accused a
t
the trial, and when
the verdict is received and sentence
pronounced. Dougherty v. Common
wealth, 69 Penn. St. 286.
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The Traverse Jury.
Accusations of criminal conduct are tried at the common law
by jury;" and wherever the right to this trial is guaranteed by
the constitution without qualification or restriction, it must be
understood as retained in all those cases which were triable
by jury at the common law,” and with a
ll
the common-law inci
dents to a jury trial, so far, at least, as they can be regarded as
tending to the protection o
f
the accused.”
A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who
are sworn to try the facts o
f
a case, a
s they are presented in the
* It is worthy of note that all that
is extant o
f
the legislation o
f
the Ply
mouth Colony for the first five years,
consists o
f
the single regulation,
“that all criminal facts, and also all
manner o
f trespasses and debts be
tween man and man, shall be tried by
the verdict o
f
twelve honest men, to
b
e impanelled by authority, in form
o
f
a jury, upon their oath.” 1 Pal
frey's New England, 340.
* Cases o
f contempt o
f
court were
never triable by jury ; and the object
o
f
the power would be defeated in
many cases if they were. The power
to punish contempts summarily is in
cident to courts o
f
law and equity.
Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Me. 165; Morrison
v
. McDonald, 21 Me. 550 ; State v.
White, T. U. P. Charl. 136; Yates v.
Lansing, 9 Johns. 395 ; Sanders v.
Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. 419 : Clark
v
. People, Breese, 340; People v.
Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; Oswald's Case,
1 Dall, 319 ; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark.
384; Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B
.
Monr.
638; State r. Woodfin, 5 Ired. 199;
Er parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883; State
v
. Tipton, 1 Blackf. 166 ; Middlebrook
v
. State, 43 Conn. 259. Justices o
f
the peace possess it
.
Rex v. Ravel,
1 Stra. 420 : Re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253 ;
Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay, 8. So do
the federal courts, United States r.
Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; United States
v
. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M.
401. But court commissioners have no
such power. In re Remington, 7 Wis.
643; Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355.
Nor can the legislature confer it upon
municipal councils. Whitcomb's
Case, 120 Mass. 118. The case
should be plain before the court
should assume the authority to punish
for contempt Bachelder v. Moore,
4
2 Cal. 415. See Storey v. People,
7
9 Ill. 45: Hollingsworth v. Duane,
Wall. C
.
C
. 77; Ex parte Bradley,
7 Wall. 364.
* See note to p
.
*410, post. A citi
zen not in the land o
r
naval service,
o
r
in the militia in actual service, can
not be tried by court-martial o
r mili
tary commission, on a charge o
f dis
couraging volunteer enlistments o
r
resisting a military conscription. In
re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359. See Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. The constitu
tional right o
f
trial by jury extends
to newly created offences. Plimpton
v
. Somerset. 33 Wt. 283 : State v.
Peterson, 41 Vt. 504. Contra, Tims
v
. State, 26 Ala. 165 [case o
f
a
n
inferior offence]. But not to offences
against city by-laws. McGear v.
Woodruff, 4 Vroom, 213. A provi
sion in an excise law, authorizing the
excise board to revoke licenses, is not
void as violating the constitutional
right o
f jury trial. People v. Board
o
f Commissioners, 59 N. Y 92.
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evidence placed before them. Any less than this number of
twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as
the Constitution guarantees to accused parties, when a less num
ber is not allowed in express terms; and the necessity of a full
panel could not be waived — at least in case of felony — even by
consent." The infirmity in case of a trial by jury of less than
twelve, by consent, would be that the tribunal would be one un
known to the law, created by mere voluntary act of the parties;
and it would in effect be an attempt to submit to a species of
arbitration the question whether the accused has been guilty of
an offence against the State. But in those cases which formerly
were not triable by jury, if the legislature provide for such a
trial now, they may doubtless create for the purpose a statutory
tribunal, composed of any number of persons, and no question
of constitutional power or right could arise.
Many of the incidents of a common-law trial by jury are
essential elements of the right. The jury must be indifferent
between the prisoner and the Commonwealth; and to secure im
partiality challenges are allowed, both for cause and also peremp
tory without assigning cause. The jury must also be
summoned *from the vicinage where the crime is sup- [*320]
posed to have been committed; * and the accused will
1 Work v. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 296 ;
Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128;
Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; 2
Lead. Cr. Cas. 337; Hill v. People,
16 Mich. 351. And see State v. Cox,
3 Eng. 436 ; Murphy v. Common
wealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 365; Tyzee v.
Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1 ;
State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Brown
r. State, 16 Ind. 496; Opinions of
Judges, 41 N. H. 550 : Lincoln v.
Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Dowling's Case,
13 Miss. 664; Tillman v. Arlles,
13 Miss. 373; Vaughan v. Seade, 30
Mo. 600; Kleinechmidt v. Dunphy, 1
Montana, 118: Allen v. State, 54 Ind.
461 ; State r. Everett, 14 Minn. 447.
In Commonwealth v. Dailey, 12 Cush.
80, it was held that, in a case of mis
demeanor, the consent of the defend
ant that a verdict might be received
from eleven jurors was binding upon
him, and the verdict was valid. In
Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 356, it was
decided that if one of the jurors
called was an alien, the defendant
did not waive the objection by fail
ing to challenge him, if he was not
aware of the disqualification ; and if
the court refused to set aside the ver
dict on affidavits showing these facts,
the judgment upon it would be re
versed on error. The case of State v.
Quarrel, 2 Bay, 150, is contra. The
case of State v. Stone, 2 Scam. 326,
in which it was held competent for
the court, even in a capital case, to
strike off a juryman after he was
sworn, because of alienage, affords
some support for Hill v. People.
* Offences against the United States
are to be tried in the district, and
those against the State in the county
in which they are charged to have
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thus have the benefit on his trial of his own good character and
standing with his neighbors, if these he has preserved ; and also
of such knowledge as the jury may possess of the witnesses who
may give evidence against him. He will also be able with more
certainty to secure the attendance of his own witnesses. The jury
must unanimously concur in the verdict. This is a very old
requirement in the English common law, and it has been adhered
to
,
notwithstanding very eminent men have assailed it as unwise
and inexpedient." And the jurors must be left free to act in
accordance with the dictates o
f
their judgment. The final deci
sion upon the facts is to rest with them, and interference by the
court with a view to coerce them into a verdict against their con
victions, is unwarrantable and irregular. A judge is not justified
been committed; but courts are gen
erally empowered, on the application
o
f
a
n
accused party, to order a change
o
f
venue, where for any reason a fair
and impartial trial cannot be had in
the locality. It has been held incom
petent to order such a change o
f
venue
o
n
the application o
f
the prosecution.
Kirk v. State, 1 Cold. 344. See also
Wheeler v. State, 24 Wis. 52; Osborn
v
. State, 24 Ark. 629. And in another
case in Tennessee it was decided that
a statute which permitted offences
committed near the boundary line o
f
two counties to be tried in either was
a
n
invasion o
f
the constitutional prin
ciple stated in the text. Armstrong
v
. State, 1 Cold. 338. See also State
v
. Denton, 6 Cold. 539. But see
State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447.
The case of Dana, recently decided
b
y Judge Blatchford, U
.
S
. District
Judge for the southern district o
f
New York, is of interest in this con
nection. The “New York Sun,” of
which Mr. Charles A. Dana was edi
tor-in-chief, published an article re
flecting upon the public conduct o
f
a
n official a
t Washington. This
article was claimed to be a libel.
The actual offence, if any, was com
mitted in New York; but a technical
publication also took place in Wash
ington, by the sale o
f papers there.
The offended party chose to have his
complaint tried summarily by a police
justice o
f
the latter city, instead o
f
submitting it to a jury required to be
indifferent between the parties. A
U. S. Commissioner issued a warrant
for Mr. Dana's arrest in New York
for transportation to Washington for
trial; but Judge Blatchford treated
the proceeding with little respect, and
ordered Mr. Dana’s discharge. Mat
ter o
f Dana, 7 Ben. D
.
C
.
1
. It
would have been a singular result o
f
a revolution where one o
f
the griev
ances complained o
f
was the assertion
o
f
a right to send parties abroad for
trial, if it should have been found
that an editor might be seized any
where in the Union and transported
by a federal officer to every territory
in which his paper might find its way,
to be tried in each in succession for
offences which consisted in a single
act not actually done in any o
f
them.
* For the origin of this principle,
see Forsyth, Trial b
y Jury, c. 11.
The requirement of unanimity does
not prevail in Scotland, o
r
on the
Continent. Among the eminent men
who have not approved it may be
mentioned Locke and Jeremy Ben
tham. See Forsyth, supra; Lieber,
Civil Liberty and Self-Government,
c. 20.
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in expressing his conviction to the jury that the defendant is
guilty upon the evidence adduced." Still less would he be justi
fied in refusing to receive and record the verdict of the jury,
because of it
s being, in his opinion, rendered in favor o
f
the
prisoner when it ought not to have been.
* He discharges his duty o
f giving instructions to the [*321]
jury when he informs them what in his view the law is
which is applicable to the case before them, and what is essential
to constitute the offence charged; and the jury should be left
free and unbiassed b
y
his opinion to determine for themselves
whether the facts in evidence are such as, in the light o
f
the in
structions o
f
the judge, make out beyond any reasonable doubt
that the accused party is guilty as alleged.”
* A judge who urges his opinion
upon the facts to the jury decides the
cause, while avoiding the responsi
bility. How often would a jury be
found bold enough to declare their
opinion in opposition to that o
f
the
judge upon the bench, whose words
would fall upon their ears with all the
weight which experience, learning,
and commanding position must always
carry with them? What lawyer would
care to sum u
p
his case, if he knew
that the judge, whose words would
be so much more influential, was to
declare in his favor, o
r
would be bold
enough to argue the facts to the jury,
if he knew the judge was to declare
against him? Blackstone has justly
remarked that “in settling and ad
justing a question o
f fact, where in
trusted to any single magistrate,
partiality and injustice have a
n ample
field to range in; either by boldly
asserting that to be proved which is
not so, o
r by more artfully distin
guishing away the remainder.” 3 Bl.
Com. 380. These are evils which
jury trial is designed to prevent; but
the effort must be vain if the judge
is to control b
y
his opinion where the
law has given him no power to com
mand. In Lord Campbell's Lives o
f
the Chancellors, c. 181, the author
justly condemns the practice with
some judges in libel cases, o
f express
ing to the jury their belief in the
defendant's guilt. On the trial o
f
parties, charged with a libel on the
Empress o
f Russia, Lord Kenyon,
sneering a
t
the late Libel Act, said:
“I am bound by my oath to declare
my own opinion, and I should forget
my duty were I not to say to you that
it is a gross libel.” Upon this Lord
Campbell remarks: “Mr. Fox's act
only requires the judges to give their
opinion on matters o
f
law in libel
cases a
s in other cases. But did any
judge ever say, ‘Gentlemen, I am of
opinion that this is a wilful, malicious,
and atrocious murder?' For a con
siderable time after the act passed,
against the unanimous opposition o
f
the judges, they almost all spitefully
followed this course. I myself heard
one judge say: “As the legislature
requires me to give my own opinion
in the present case, I am of opinion
that this is a diabolically atrocious
libel.’” Upon this subject, see Mc
Guffie v. State, 17 Geo. 497; State v.
McGinnis, 5 Nev. 337; Pittock v.
O'Niell, 63 Penn. St. 253; s. c. 3
Am. Rep. 544.
* The independence of the jury,
with respect to the matters o
f
fact in
issue before them, was settled by
Penn's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials,
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How far the jury are to judge of the law as well as of the facts,
is a question, a discussion of which we do not propose to enter
upon. If it be their choice to do so, they may return specially
what facts they find established by the evidence, and allow the
court to apply the law to those facts, and thereby to determine
whether the party is guilty or not. But they are not obliged in
any case to find a special verdict; they have a right to apply for
themselves the law to the facts, and to express their own opinion,
upon the whole evidence, of the defendant's guilt. Where a
general verdict is thus given, the jury necessarily determine in
their own mind what the law of the case is;" and if their deter
mination is favorable to the prisoner, no mode is known to the
law in which it can be reviewed or reversed. A writ of error
does not lie on behalf of the Commonwealth to reverse an ac
quittal, unless expressly given by statute;” nor can a new
[*322] * trial be granted in such a case ; * but neither a writ of
951, and by Bushel's Case, which
grew out of it
,
and is reported in
Vaughan's Reports, 135. A very
full account of these cases is also
found in Forsyth on Trial by Jury,
397. See Bushel's Case also in
Broom's Const. Law, 120, and the
valuable note thereto. Bushel was
foreman o
f
the jury which refused to
find a verdict o
f guilty a
t
the dictation
o
f
the court, and he was punished as
for contempt of court for his refusal,
but was released on habeas corpus.
* “As the main object of the in
stitution o
f
the trial b
y
a jury is to
guard accused persons against all
decisions whatsoever b
y
men intrusted
with any permanent official authority,
it is not only a settled principle that
the opinion which the judge delivers
has n
o weight but such as the jury
choose to give it
,
but their verdict
must besides [unless they see fi
t
to
return a special finding] comprehend
the whole matter in trial, and decide
a
s well upon the fact as upon the
point o
f
law which may arise out o
f
it; in other words, they must pro
nounce both on the commission of a
certain fact, and on the reason which
makes such fact to be contrary to
law.” DeLolme on the Constitution
o
f England, c. 13. In January, 1735,
Zenger, the publisher o
f Zenger's
Journal in New York, was informed
against for a libel on the governor
and other officers o
f
the king in
the province. He was defended by
Hamilton, a Quaker lawyer from
Philadelphia, who relied upon the
truth as a defence. The court ex
cluded evidence of the truth as consti
tuting n
o defence, but Hamilton ap
pealed to the jury as the judges o
f
the law, and secured an acquittal.
Street's Council o
f Revision, 71.
* See State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw.
110; United States v. More, 3
Cranch, 174; People v. Dill, 1 Scam.
257; People v. Royal, 1 Scam. 557;
Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush.
212; People v. Corning, 2 N
.
Y
. 9;
State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669. A con
stitutional provision, saving “to the
defendant the right o
f appeal '' in
criminal cases, does not, b
y implica
tion, preclude the legislature from
giving to the prosecution the same
right. State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 143.
* People v. Comstock, 8 Wend.
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error nor a motion for a new trial could reach an erroneous
determination by the jury, because, as they do not give reasons
for their verdict, the precise grounds for it can never be legally
known, and it is always presumable that it was given in favor of
the accused because the evidence was not sufficient in degree or
satisfactory in character; and no one is at liberty to allege or
suppose that they have disregarded the law.
Nevertheless, as it is the duty of the court to charge the jury
upon the law applicable to the case, it is still an important ques
tion whether it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon
the law as given to them by the court, or whether, on the other
hand, his opinion is advisory only, so that they are at liberty
either to follow it if it accords with their own convictions, or to
disregard it if it does not.
In one class of cases, that is to say, in criminal prosecutions
for libels, it is now very generally provided by the State consti
tutions, or by statute, that the jury shall determine the law
and the facts." How great a change is made in the common
549; State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54;
State v. Kanouse, 1 Spencer, 115;
State v. Burns, 3 Tex. 118; State v.
Taylor, 1 Hawks, 462.
* See Constitutions of Alabama,
Connecticut, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Michi
gan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ten
nessee, and Texas. That of Mary
land makes the jury judges of the
law in a
ll
criminal cases; and the
same rule is established by constitu
tion or statute in some other States.
In Holder v. State, 5 Geo. 444, the
following view was taken of such a
statute: “Our penal code declares,
‘On every trial of a crime or offence
contained in this code, o
r for any
crime o
r
offence, the jury shall be
judges o
f
the law and the fact, and
shall in every case give a general
verdict o
f guilty o
r
not guilty, and on
the acquittal o
f any defendant o
r
prisoner, no new trial shall on any
account be granted by the court.”
Juries were, at common law, in some
sense judges o
f
the law. Having the
right of rendering a general verdict,
that right involved a judgment on the
law as well as the facts, yet not such
a judgment as necessarily to control
the court. The early commentators
o
n
the common law, notwithstanding
they concede this right, yet hold that
it is the duty of the jury to receive
the law from the court. Thus Black
stone equivocally writes: “And such
public o
r open verdict may be either
general, guilty o
r
not guilty, o
r special,
setting forth all the circumstances o
f
the case, and praying the judgment
o
f
the court whether, for instance, on
the facts stated, it be murder or man
slaughter, o
r
no crime at all. This
is where they doubt the matter o
f law,
and therefore choose to leave it to the
determination o
f
the court, though
they have an unquestionable right
o
f determining upon all the circum
stances, and o
f finding a general ver
dict if they think proper so to hazard a
breach o
f
their oath,’ &c. 4 Bl. Com.
361; Co. Lit. 228 a ; 2 Hale, P. C
.
313. Our legislature have left no
doubt about this matter. The juries in
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[*323] law by these * provisions it is difficult to say, because the
rule of the common law was not very clear upon the
authorities; but for that very reason, and because the law of libel
was sometimes administered with great harshness, it was cer
tainly proper and highly desirable that a definite and liberal rule
should be thus established."
In al
l
other cases the jury have the clear legal right to return
a simple verdict o
f guilty or not guilty, and in so doing they
necessarily decide such questions o
f
law as well as o
f
fact as are
involved in the general question o
f guilt. If their view conduce
to a
n acquittal, their verdict to that effect can neither be reviewed
nor set aside. In such a case, therefore, it appears that they
pass upon the law as well as the facts, and that their finding is
conclusive. If
,
on the other hand, their view leads them to a
verdict o
f guilty, and it is the opinion o
f
the court that such ver
dict is against law, the verdict will be set aside and a new trial
granted. In such a case, although they have judged of the law,
the court sets aside their conclusion as improper and unwarranted.
But it is clear that the jury are no more the judges of the law
when they acquit than when they condemn, and the different
result in the two cases comes from the merciful maxim of the
common law, which will not suffer an accused party to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same cause, however erroneous may
have been the first acquittal.
Georgia can find no special verdict
a
t
law. They are declared to be
judges o
f
the law and the facts, and
are required in every case to give a
general verdict o
f guilty o
r
not guilty;
so jealous and rightfully jealous were
our ancestors of the influence of the
State upon the trial o
f
a citizen
charged with crime. We are not
called upon in this case to determine
the relative strength o
f
the judgment
o
f
the court and the jury, upon the
law in criminal cases, and shall ex
press n
o opinion thereon. We only
say it is the right and duty of the
court to declare the law in criminal
cases a
s well as civil, and that it is at
the same time the right o
f
the jury to
judge o
f
the law as well as o
f
the
facts in criminal cases. I would not
In theory, therefore, the rule
b
e understood as holding that it is
not the province o
f
the court to give
the law o
f
the case distinctly in charge
to the jury; it is unquestionably its
privilege and it
s duty to instruct them
a
s to what the law is
,
and officially to
direct their finding as to the law, yet
a
t
the same time in such way as not
to limit the range of their judgment.”
See also McGuffie v. State, 17 Geo.
497; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480.
1 For a condensed history of the
struggle in England on this subject,
see May's Constitutional History, c.
9
.
See also Lord Campbell's Lives
o
f
the Chancellors, c. 178; Introduc
tion to Speeches o
f Lord Erskine,
edited b
y
James L. High; Forsyth's
Trial b
y Jury, c. 12.
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of law would seem to be, that it is the duty of the "jury [* 324]
to receive and follow the law as delivered to them by the
court; and such is the clear weight of authority."
There are, however, opposing decisions,” and it is evident that
the judicial prerogative to direct conclusively upon the law can
not be carried very far or insisted upon with much pertinacity,
when the jury have such complete power to disregard it
,
without
the action degenerating into something like mere scolding. Upon
this subject the remarks o
f
Mr. Justice Baldwin, o
f
the Supreme
Court o
f
the United States, to a jury assisting him in the trial
o
f
a criminal charge, and which are given in the note, seem
peculiarly dignified and appropriate, and at the same time to
1 United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum.
240; Stittinus v. United States, 5
Cranch, C
.
C
.
573; United States v.
Morris, 1 Curt. 53 ; United States
v
. Riley, 5 Blatch. 206; Montgomery
v
. State, 11 Ohio, 427; Robbins v.
State, 8 Ohio, N
.
s. 131 ; Common
wealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Com
monwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185;
Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray, 4 ;
State v. Peace, 1 Jones, 251 ; Handy
v
. State, 7 Mo. 607; Nels v. State,
2 Tex. 280; People v. Pine, 2 Barb.
566; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb.
603; People v. Finnigan, 1 Park.
C
.
R
. 147; Safford v. People, 1 Park.
C
.
R
. 474; McGowan v. State, 9
Yerg. 184; Pleasant v. State, 13 Ark.
360 ; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3
J. J. Marsh. 132; Commonwealth v.
Van Tuyl, " Met. (Ky.) 1
;
Pierce v.
State, 13 N
.
H. 536; People v. Stew
art, 7 Cal. 40; Batre v. State, 18 Ala.
119, reviewing previous cases in the
same State. “As the jury have the
right, and if required b
y
the prisoner
are bound to return a general verdict
o
f guilty or not guilty, they must
necessarily, in the discharge o
f
their
duty, decide such questions o
f
law as
well as o
f
fact as are involved in the
general question, and there is no mode
in which their opinions on questions
o
f
law can be reviewed by this court
o
r any other tribunal. But this does
not diminish the obligation o
f
the
court to explain the law. The in
structions of the court in matters of
law may safely guide the consciences
o
f
the jury, unless they know them to
b
e wrong ; and when the jury under
take to decide the law (as they un
doubtedly have the power to do) in
opposition to the advice o
f
the court,
they assume a high responsibility, and
should be very careful to see clearly
that they are right.” Commonwealth
v
. Knapp, 10 Pick. 496, cited with ap
proval in McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg.
195, and Dale v. State, 10 Yerg. 555.
* See especially State v. Croteau,
2
3 Vt. 14, where will be found a very
full and carefully considered opinion,
holding that a
t
the common law the
jury are the judges of the law in crim
inal cases. See also State v. Wilkin
son, 2 Vt. 280 ; Doss v. Common
wealth, 1 Grat. 557; State v. Jones,
5 Ala. 666 : State v. Snow, 6 Shep.
346; State v. Allen, 1 McCord, 525;
Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf. 247;
Warren v. State, 4 Blackf. 150;
Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 ; Lynch
c. State, 9 Ind. 541 ; Nelson v. State,
2 Swan, 482; People v. Thayers, 1
Park. C
.
R
.
596 ; People v. Videto,
1 Park. C
.
R
. 603; McPherson c.
State, 22 Geo. 478. The subject was
largely discussed in People v. Cros
well, 3 Johns. Cas. 337.
26
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embrace about a
ll
that can properly be said to a jury on this
subject."
* “In repeating to you what was
said on a former occasion to another
jury, that you have the power to de
cide on the law as well as the facts
o
f
this case, and are not bound to find
according to our opinion o
f
the law,
we feel ourselves constrained to make
some explanations not then deemed
necessary, but now called for from
the course o
f
the defence. You may
find a general verdict o
f guilty o
r
not
guilty, as you think proper, o
r you
may find the facts specially, and leave
the guilt o
r
innocence o
f
the prisoner
to the judgment o
f
the court. If your
verdict acquit the prisoner, we cannot
grant a new trial, however much we
may differ with you as to the law
which governs the case; and in this
respect a jury are the judges of the
law, if they choose to become so.
Their judgment is final, not because
they settle the law, but because they
think it not applicable, or do not
choose to apply it to the case.
“But if a jury find a prisoner
guilty against the opinion o
f
the
court on the law o
f
the case, a new
trial will be granted. No court will
pronounce a judgment on a prisoner
against what they believe to be the
law. On an acquittal there is no
judgment; and the court do not act,
and cannot judge, there remaining
nothing to act upon.
-
“This, then, you will understand
to be what is meant by your power to
decide o
n
the law, but you will still
bear in mind that it is a very old,
sound, and valuable maxim in law,
that the court answers to questions o
f
law, and the jury to facts. Every
day's experience evinces the wisdom
of this rule.” United States v. Wil
son, Baldw. 108. We quote also
from an Alabama case : “When the
power o
f juries to find a general ver
dict, and consequently their right to
determine without appeal both law
and fact, is admitted, the abstract
question whether it is or is not their
duty to receive the law from the court
becomes rather a question o
f casuistry
o
r
conscience than one o
f
law ; nor
can we think that any thing is gained
in the administration o
f
criminal jus
tice b
y
urging the jury to disregard
the opinion o
f
the court upon the law
o
f
the case. It must, we think, be
admitted, that the judge is better
qualified to expound the law, from
his previous training, than the jury;
and in practice, unless he manifests a
wanton disregard o
f
the rights o
f
the prisoner, — a circumstance which
rarely happens in this age o
f
the
world and in this country, - his opin
ion o
f
the law will be received by the
jury as an authoritative exposition,
from their conviction o
f
his superior
knowledge o
f
the subject. The right
o
f
the jury is doubtless one of inesti
mable value, especially in those cases
where it may be supposed that the
government has an interest in the
conviction o
f
the criminal; but in
this country, where the government
in all its branches, executive, legis
lative, and judicial, is created b
y
the
people, and is in fact their servant,
we are unable to perceive why the
jury should be invited or urged to ex
ercise this right contrary to their own
convictions o
f
their capacity to do so,
without danger o
f
mistake. It ap
pears to us that it is sufficient that it
is admitted that it is their peculiar
province to determine facts, intents,
and purposes; that it is their right
to find a general verdict, and conse
quently that they must determine the
law; and whether in the exercise o
f
this right they will distrust the court
a
s expounders o
f
the law, o
r
whether
they will receive the law from the
court, must be left to their own dis
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* One thing more is essential to a proper protection of [*325]
accused parties, and that is
,
that one shall not be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy" upon the same charge. One [*326]
trial and verdict must, as a general rule, protect him
against any subsequent accusation o
f
the same offence, whether
the verdict be for or against him, and whether the courts are
satisfied with the verdict or not. We shall not attempt in this
place to collect together the great number o
f judicial decisions
cretion under the sanction o
f
the oath
they have taken.” State v. Jones,
5 Ala. 672. But as to this case, see
Batre v. State, 18 Ala. 119.
It cannot be denied that discredit is
sometimes brought upon the adminis
tration o
f justice by juries acquitting
parties who are sufficiently shown to
be guilty, and where, had the trial
been b
y
the court, a conviction would
have been sure to follow. In such
cases it must be supposed that the
jury have been controlled b
y
their
prejudices o
r
their sympathies. How
ever that may be, it b
y
n
o
means fol
lows that because the machinery o
f
jury trial does not work satisfactorily
in every case, we must therefore con
demn and abolish the system, or,
what is still worse, tolerate it
,
and
yet denounce it as being unworthy o
f
public confidence. The remarks o
f
Lord Erskine, the most distinguished
jury lawyer known to English history,
may b
e quoted as peculiarly appro
priate in this connection : “It is of
the nature o
f every thing that is great
and useful, both in the animate and
inanimate world, to be wild and irreg
ular, and we must be content to take
them with the alloys which belong
to them, or live without them. .
Liberty herself, the last and best gift
o
f
God to his creatures, must be taken
just as she is
.
You might pare her
down into bashful regularity, shape
her into a perfect model o
f severe,
scrupulous law ; but she would then
b
e Liberty no longer ; and you must
be content to die under the lash of
this inexorable justice which you
have exchanged for the banners o
f
freedom.”
The province of the jury is some
times invaded by instructions requir
ing them to adopt, as absolute conclu
sions o
f law, those deductions which
they are a
t liberty to draw from a
particular state o
f facts, if they regard
them as reasonable : such as that a
homicide must be presumed malicious,
unless the defendant proves the con
trary; which is a rule contradictory o
f
the results o
f
common observation;
o
r
that evidence o
f
a previous good
character in the defendant ought to
b
e disregarded, unless the other proof
presents a doubtful case ; which would
deprive an accused party o
f
his chief
protection in many cases o
f
false accu
sations and conspiracies. See People
v
. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 ; People v.
Lamb, 2 Keyes, 360; State v. Henry,
5 Jones, N
.
C
. 66; Harrington v.
State, 19 Ohio, N
.
s. 269 ; Silvus
v
. State, 22 Ohio, N
.
s. 90 ; State v.
Patterson, 45 Vt. 308; Remsen v.
People, 43 N
.
Y
.
6
. Upon the pre
sumption o
f
malice in homicide, the
reader is referred to the Review
of the Trial of Professor Web
ster, by Hon. Joel Parker, in the
North American Review, No. 72,
p
.
178. See also, upon the functions
o
f judge and jury respectively, the
cases o
f
Commonwealth v. Wood, 11
Gray, 86 ; Maher v. People, 10 Mich.
212; Commonwealth v. Billings, 97
Mass. 405; State v. Patterson, 63 N.C.
520 ; State v. Newton, 4 Nev. 410.
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bearing upon the question of legal jeopardy, and the exceptions
to the general rule above stated : for these the reader must be
referred to the treatises on criminal law, where the subject will
be found to be extensively treated. It will be sufficient for our
present purpose to indicate very briefly some general principles.
A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or
[*327] information * which is sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his
deliverance." And a jury is said to be thus charged when they
have been impanelled and sworn.” The defendant then becomes
entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new prose
cution; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a molle prosequi
entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a dis
charge of the jury and continuance of the cause.”
If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause," or if
1 Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. &
R. 586: State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg.
24; Williams v. Commonwealth, 2
Grat. 568 ; People v. McGowan, 17
Wend. 386; Mounts v. State, 14
Ohio, 295; Price v. State, 19 Ohio,
423; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 292;
State v. Nelson, 26 Ind. 366; State
v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; State v. Eph
raim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 162; Common
wealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 356 : People
v. Webb, 28 Cal. 467; People v. Cook,
10 Mich. 164 ; State v. Ned, 7 Port.
217 ; State v. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288.
It cannot be said, however, that a
party is in legal jeopardy in a prose
cution brought about by his own pro
curement ; and a former conviction
or acquittal is consequently no bar to
a second indictment, if the former
trial was brought about by the
procurement of the defendant, and
the conviction or acquittal was the
result of fraud or collusion on his
part. Commonwealth v. Alderman,
4 Mass. 477; State v. Little, 1 N. H.
257; State v. Green, 16 Iowa, 239.
See also State v. Reed, 26 Conn. 202.
And if a jury is called and sworn, and
then discharged for the reason that it
is discovered the defendant has not
been arraigned, this will not constitute
a bar. United States v. Riley, 5
Blatch. 205. In State v. Garvey, 42
Conn. 232, it is held that a prosecu
tion mol. prossed after the jury is
sworn is no bar to a new prosecu
tion, “if the prisoner does not claim
a verdict, but waives his right to insist
upon it.” See Hoffman v. State, 20
Md. 425.
2 McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23
Penn. St. 12; Lee v. State, 26 Ark.
260; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 611; O'Brian
v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush, 333; s. c.
15 Am. Rep. 715.
* People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, 304;
Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365;
Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; State
v. Connor, 5 Cold. 311 : State v. Cal
lendine, 8 Iowa, 288; Baker v. State,
12 Ohio, N. s. 214; Grogan v. State,
44 Ala. 9; State v. Alman, 64 N. C.
364; Nolan v. State, 55 Geo. 521 ;
contra, Swindel v. State, 32 Tex. 102.
* Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13
Mass. 455; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich.
161.
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the indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could
be rendered upon it," or if by any overruling necessity the jury
are discharged without a verdict,” which might happen from the
sickness or death of the judge holding the court,” or of a juror,”
or the inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasona
able time for deliberation and effort;" or if the term of the court
as fixed by law comes to an end before the trial is finished;" or
the jury are discharged with the consent of the defendant ex
pressed or implied ; 7 or if
,
after verdict against the ac
cused, it has been set aside on * his motion for a new [*328]
trial o
r
o
n writ o
f error,” o
r
the judgment thereon been
arrested,”—in any o
f
these cases the accused may again b
e put
1 Gerard v. People, 3 Scam. 363;
Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; Peo
ple v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164 ; Mount v.
Commonwealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 93;
People v. McNealy, 17 Cal. 333;
Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548;
State v. Kason, 20 La. Ann. 48 ; Black
v
. State, 36 Geo. 447; Commonwealth
v
. Bakeman, 105 Mass. 53.
* United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat.
579; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat.
166; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh,
620; People v. Goodwin, 18, Johns.
205; Commonwealth v. Bowden, 9
Mass. 194; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md.
425; Price v. State, 36 Miss. 533. In
State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C
.
203, the
officer in charge o
f
the jury was found
to have been conversing with them in
a way calculated to influence them un
favorably towards the evidence o
f
the
prosecution, and it was held that this
was such a case o
f necessity as author
ized the judge to permit a juror to be
withdrawn, and that it did not oper
ate a
s
a
n acquittal.
* Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port.
72.
* Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166;
State v. Curtis, 5 Humph. 601; Ma
hala v. State, 10 Yerg. 532; Common
wealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613.
* People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns.
187; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Lit.
140 ; Dobbins v. State, 14 Ohio, N
.
s.
o
493; Miller v. State, 8 Ind. 325; State
v
. Walker, 26 Ind. 346; Commonwealth
v
. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor v. The
Queen, L. R
.
1 Q
.
B
. 289; State v.
Prince, 63 N
.
C
. 529; Moseley v.
State, 33 Tex. 671; Lester v. State,
3
3
Geo. 329; Er parte McLaughlin,
4
1 Cal. 211; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 272.
* State v. Brooks, 3 Humph. 70;
State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala
v
. State, 10 Yerg. 532; State v. Spier,
1 Dev. 491; Wright v. State, 5 Ind.
290.
7 State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676; Elijah
v
. State, 1 Humph. 103; Common
wealth v. Stowell, 9 Met. 572.
* And it seems, if the verdict is so
defective that no judgment can be
rendered upon it
,
it may be set aside
even against the defendant’s objection,
and a new trial had. State v. Red
man, 17 Iowa, 329.
* Casborus v. People, 13 Johns.
351. But where the indictment was
good, and the judgment was errone
ously arrested, the verdict was held
to be a bar. State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg.
24. See People v. Webb, 28 Cal.
467. So if the error was in the
judgment and not in the prior pro
ceedings, if the judgment is reversed,
the prisoner must be discharged.
See post, p
.
*330. But it is compe
tent for the legislature to provide that
o
n reversing the erroneous judgment
*
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upon trial upon the same facts before charged against him, and
the proceedings had will constitute no protection. But where the
legal bar has once attached, the government cannot avoid it by
varying the form of the charge in a new accusation: if the first
indictment or information were such that the accused might have
been convicted under it on proof of the facts by which the second
is sought to be sustained, then the jeopardy which attached on
the first must constitute a protection against a trial on the second.”
And if a prisoner is acquitted on some of the counts in an indict
ment, and convicted on others, and a new trial is obtained on his
motion, he can be put upon trial a second time on those counts
only on which he was before convicted, and is for ever discharged
from the others.” .
Eccessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments.
It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall
not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Within such bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question
what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of
the court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and
there may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond
any limit fixed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive
A
in such case, the court, if the prior
proceedings are regular, shall remand
the case for the proper sentence.
McKee v. People, 32 N. Y. 239. It
is also competent, by statute, in the
absence of express constitutional pro
hibition, to allow an appeal or writ
of error to the prosecution, in crimi
nal cases. See State v. Tait, 22 Iowa,
141. Compare People v. Webb, 38
Cal. 467; State v. Lee, 10 R. I. 494.
1 State v. Cooper, 1 Green, 360;
Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick.
504; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend.
386; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423;
Leslie v. State, 18 Ohio, N. s. 395;
State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414.
* Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333;
State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris
v. State, 8 S. & M. 762; Esmon v.
as to be erroneous in law.” fine should have some refer
State, 1 Swan, 14; Guenther v. Peo
ple, 24 N. Y. 100; State v. Kattle
man, 35 Mo. 105; State v. Ross, 29
Mo. 39; State v. Martin, 30 Wis.
216; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 567; United
States v. Davenport, Deady, 264;
s. c. 1 Green, Cr. R. 429; Stuart v.
Commonwealth (Supreme Court of
Virginia), 4 Law and Equity Reporter,
288; Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31;
Barnett v. People, 54 Ill. 331. Contra,
State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio, N. s. 572.
A molle prosequi on one count of an
indictment after a jury is called and
sworn, is a bar to a new indictment
for the offence charged therein. Ba
ker v. State, 12 Ohio, N. s. 214.
* The subject of cruel and unusual
punishments was somewhat consid
ered in Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686,
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ence to the party's ability to pay it
.
* By Magna Charta [* 329]
a freeman was not to be amerced for a small fault, but
according to the degree o
f
the fault, and for a great crime in
proportion to the heinousness o
f it
,
saving to him his contenement;
and after the same manner a merchant, saving to him his merchan
dise. And a villein was to be amerced after the same manner,
saving to him his wainage. The merciful spirit o
f
these provisions
addresses itself to the criminal courts of the American States
through the provisions o
f
their constitutions.
It has been decided b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
Connecticut that
it was not competent in the punishment o
f
a common-law offence
to inflict fine and imprisonment without limitation. The prece
dent, it was said, cited b
y
counsel contending for the opposite
doctrine, o
f
the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor
Bacon, was deprived o
f
all force o
f authority by the circum
stances attending it; the extravagance of the punishment being
clearly referable to the temper o
f
the times. “The common law
can never require a fine to the extent o
f
the offender's goods and
chattels, o
r
sentence o
f imprisonment for life. The punishment
is both uncertain and unnecessary. It is no more difficult to
limit the imprisonment o
f
a
n
atrocious offender to a
n adequate
number o
f years than to prescribe a limited punishment for minor
offences. And when there exists no firmly established practice,
and public necessity o
r
convenience does not imperiously demand
the principle contended for, it cannot be justified b
y
the com
mon law, as it wants the main ingredients on which that law is
founded. Indefinite punishments are fraught with danger, and
ought not to b
e
admitted unless the written law should authorize
them.” "
It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant
where the opinion was expressed by
Chancellor Sanford that a forfeiture
o
f
fundamental rights — e. g., the
right to jury trial — could not be
imposed as a punishment, but that
a forfeiture o
f
the right to hold office
might be. But such a forfeiture
could not be imposed without giving
a right to trial in the usual mode.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush,
725. In Done r. People, 5 Park. 364,
the cruel punishments o
f
colonial
times, such as burning alive and
breaking on the wheel, were enumer
ated by W. W. Campbell, J., who was
o
f opinion that they must be regard
ed a
s “cruel ” if not “unusual,” and
therefore as being now forbidden.
1 Per Hosmer, Ch. J., in State p.
Danforth, 3 Conn. 115. Peters, J.,
in the same case, pp. 122–124, collects
a number o
f
cases in which perpetual
imprisonment was awarded a
t
the
common law, but, as his associates
believed, unwarrantably. Compare
Blydenburg v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484. "
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by cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment
declared by statute for an offence which was punishable in the
same way at the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or
unusual in the constitutional sense. And probably any new
statutory offence may be punished to the extent and in the mode
permitted by the common law for offences of similar nature. But
those degrading punishments which in any State had become
obsolete before it
s existing constitution was adopted, we think
may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual. We may
well doubt the right to establish the whipping-post and
[* 330] the pillory in * States where they were never recognized
a
s instruments o
f punishment, or in States whose consti
tutions, revised since public opinion had banished them, have
forbidden cruel and unusual punishments. In such States the
public sentiment must be regarded as having condemned them
a
s “cruel,” and any punishment which, if ever employed at all,
has become altogether obsolete, must certainly be looked upon as
“unusual.”
A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the pre
cise punishment meted out to him which the law provides, and
no other. A different punishment cannot be substituted on the
ground o
f
it
s being less in severity. Sentence to transportation
for a capital offence would be void; and as the error in such a
case would b
e
in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be en
titled to his discharge, and could not be tried again." If
,
how
ever, the legal punishment consists o
f
two distinct and severable
things, – as fine, and imprisonment, — the imposition of either is
legal, and the defendant cannot b
e
heard to complain that the
other was not imposed also.”
The Right to Counsel.
Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused o
f
1 Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El.
58; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N
.
Y
.
336; Hartung v. People, 26 N
.
Y
.
167;
Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365; Er
parte Page, 49 Mo. 291; Christian
v
. Commonwealth, 5 Met. 530; Er
parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; McDonald
v
. State (Ct. Appeals Ma.), 4 Am.
Law Times, N
.
S
.
484. See also
Whitebread v. The Queen, 7 Q. B
.
582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry. 58.
It is competent, however, to provide
by statute that on setting aside an
erroneous sentence the court shall pro
ceed to impose the sentence which the
law required. Wilson v. People, 24
Mich. 410; McDonald v. State, 45 Md.
90.
* See Kane v. People, 8 Wend.
203.
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crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.
From very early days a class of men, who have made the laws of
their country their special study, and who have been accepted for
the confidence of the court in their learning and integrity, have
been set apart as officers of the court, whose special duty it
should be to render aid to the parties and the court 1 in the appli
cation of the law to legal controversies. These persons, before
entering upon their employment, were to take an oath of fidelity
to the courts whose officers they were, and to their cli
ents;” and it was their special * duty to see that no wrong [* 331]
was done their clients by means of false or prejudiced
* In Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9
Pick. 498, the court denied the appli
cation of the defendant that Mr.
Rantoul should be assigned as his
counsel, because, though admitted to
the Common Pleas, he was not yet an
attorney of the Supreme Court, and
that court, consequently, had not the
usual control over him: and, besides,
counsel was to give aid to the court
as well as to the prisoner, and there
fore it was proper that a person of
more legal experience should be as
signed.
* “Every countor is chargeable by
the oath that he shall do no wrong
nor falsity, contrary to his knowledge,
but shall plead for his client the best
he cºn, according to his understand
ing.” Mirror of Justices, c. 2, § 5.
The oath in Pennsylvania, on the
admission of an attorney to the bar,
“to behave himself in the office of an
attorney, according to the best of his
learning and ability, and with a
ll
good fidelity, as well to the court
a
s
to the client; that he will use no
falsehood, nor delay any man's cause,
for lucre or malice,” is said, by Mr.
Sharswood, to present a comprehen
sive summary o
f
his duties as a prac
titioner. Sharswood's Legal Ethics,
p
.
3
. The advocate's oath, in Geneva,
was as follows: “I solemnly swear,
before Almighty God, to be faithful
to the Republic, and to the canton o
f
Geneva; never to depart from the
respect due to the tribunals and au
thorities; never to counsel o
r main
tain a cause which does not appear to
b
e just o
r equitable, unless it be the
defence o
f
a
n
accused person; never
to employ, knowingly, for the purpose
o
f maintaining the causes confided to
me, any means contrary to truth, and
never seek to mislead the judges by
any artifice o
r
false statement o
f
facts
or law; to abstain from all offensive
personality, and to advance no fact
contrary to the honor and reputation
o
f
the parties, if it be not indispensa
ble to the cause with which I may be
charged; not to encourage either the
commencement or continuance of a
suit from any motives o
f passion o
r
interest; nor to reject, for any consid
eration personal to myself, the cause
o
f
the weak, the stranger, o
r
the op
pressed.” In “The Lawyer's Oath,
its Obligations, and some o
f
the Du
ties springing out o
f them,” by D
.
Bethune Duffield, Esq., a masterly
analysis is given o
f
this oath ; and he
well says o
f it
:
“Here you have the
creed o
f
a
n upright and honorable
lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty
language in which it is expressed
needs no argument to elucidate its
principles, no eloquence to enforce its
obligations. It has in it the sacred
savor o
f
divine inspiration, and sounds
almost like a restored reading from
Sinai’s original, but broken tablets.”
410 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. X.
witnesses, or through the perversion or misapplication of the law
by the court. Strangely enough, however, the aid of this pro
fession was denied in the very cases in which it was needed most,
and it has cost a long struggle, continuing even into the present
century, to rid the English law of one of it
s
most horrible feat
ures. In civil causes and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor,
the parties were entitled to the aid o
f
counsel in eliciting the
facts, and in presenting both the facts and the law to the court
and jury; but when the government charged a person with
treason o
r felony, he was denied this privilege." Only
[* 332] such “legal questions as he could suggest was counsel
allowed to argue for him; and this was but a poor privi
lege to one who was himself unlearned in the law, and who, as
h
e
could not fail to perceive the monstrous injustice o
f
the whole
proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any perversion o
f
the law that might occur in the course o
f
it as regular and
proper, because quite in the spirit that denied him a de
fence. Only after the Revolution o
f
1688 was a full de
fence allowed on trials for treason,” and not until 1836 was
* When a
n ignorant person, unac
customed to public assemblies, and
perhaps feeble in body o
r
in intellect,
was put upon trial on a charge which,
whether true o
r false, might speedily
consign him to an ignominious death,
with able counsel arrayed against him,
and all the machinery o
f
the law
ready to be employed in bringing for
ward the evidence of circumstances
indicating guilt, it is painful to con
template the barbarity which could
deny him professional aid. Espe
cially when in most cases he would
b
e imprisoned immediately on being
apprehended, and would thereby be
prevented from making even the fee
ble preparations which might other
wise have been within his power. A
“trial '' under such circumstances
would be only a judicial Rurder in
very many cases. The spirit in which
the old law was administered may be
judged o
f
from the case o
f Sir William
Parkins, tried for high treason before
Lord Holt and his associates in 1695,
after the statute 7 William III. c. 3
,
allowing counsel to prisoners indicted
for treason, had been passed, but one
day before it was to take effect. He
prayed to be allowed counsel, and
quoted the preamble to the statute
that such allowance was just and
reasonable. His prayer was denied,
Lord Holt declaring that he must ad
minister the law as he found it, and
could not anticipate the operation o
f
a
n act o
f Parliament, even b
y
a sin
gle day. The accused was convicted
and executed. See Lieber's Hermen
eutics, c. 4
,
§ 15; Sedgwick on Stat.
and Const. Law, 81. In proceedings
b
y
the Inquisition against suspected
heretics the aid of counsel was ex
pressly prohibited. Lea’s Supersti
tion and Force, 377.
* See an account of the final
passage o
f
this bill in Macaulay's
“England,” Vol. IV. c. 21. It is
surprising, that the effort to extend
the same right to a
ll persons accused
o
f felony was so strenuously resisted
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* the same privilege extended
other felonies."
afterwards, and that, too, notwith
standing the best lawyers in the realm
admitted its importance and justice.
“I have myself,” said Mr. Scarlett,
“often seen persons I thought inno
cent convicted, and the guilty escape,
for want of some acute and intelligent
counsel to show the bearings of the
different circumstances on the con
duct and situation of the prisoner.”
House of Commons Debates, April
25, 1826. “It has lately been my
lot,” said Mr. Denman, on the same
occasion, “to try two prisoners who
were deaf and dumb, and who could
only be made to understand what was
passing by the signs of their friends.
The cases were clear and simple;
but if they had been circumstantial
cases, in what a situation would the
judge and jury be placed, when the
prisoner could have no counsel to
plead for him.” The cases looked
clear and simple, to Mr. Denman;
but how could he know they would
not have looked otherwise, had the
coloring of the prosecution been re
lieved by a counter-presentation for
the defence? See Sydney Smith's
article on Counsel for Prisoners, 45
Edinb. Rev. p. 74; Works, Vol. II
.
p
.
353. The plausible objection to
extending the right was, that the
judge would be counsel for the pris
oner, — a pure fallacy at the best,
and, with some judges, a frightful
Inockery. Baron Garrow, in a charge
to a grand jury, said: “It has been
truly said that, in criminal cases,
judges were counsel for the prisoners.
So, undoubtedly, they were, as far
a
s they could be, to prevent undue
prejudice, to guard against improper
influence being excited against pris
oners; but it was impossible for them
1
. By statute 6 & 7 William IV. c. 114;
May's Const. Hist. c. 18.
to persons accused o
f [* 333]
to g
o
further than this, for they could
not suggest the course . o
f
defence
prisoners ought to pursue; for judges
only saw the deposition so short a
time before the accused appeared a
t
the bar o
f
their country, that it was
quite impossible for them to act fully
in that capacity.”
If one would see how easily, and
yet in what a shocking manner, a
judge might pervert the law and the
evidence, and act the part o
f
both
prosecutor and king's counsel, while
assuming to be counsel for the pris
oner, h
e
need not g
o
further back
than the early trials in our own coun
try, and he is referred for a specimen
to the trials o
f
Robert Tucker and
others for piracy, before Chief Jus
tice Trott, a
t Charleston, S
. C., in
1718, a
s reported in 6 Hargrave's
State Trials, 156 et seq. Especially
may he there see how the statement
o
f prisoners in one case, to which no
credit was given for their exculpation,
was used as hearsay evidence to con
demn a prisoner in another case. All
these abuses would have been checked,
perhaps altogether prevented, had the
prisoners had able and fearless coup
sel. But without counsel for the de
fence, and under such a judge, the
witnesses were not free to testify, the
prisoners could not safely make even
the most honest explanation, and the
jury, when they retired, could only
feel that returning a verdict in ac
cordance with the opinion o
f
the
judge was merely matter o
f
form.
Sydney Smith's lecture on “The
judge that smites contrary to the
law” is worthy of being carefully
pondered in this connection. “If
ever a nation was happy, if ever a
nation was visibly blessed b
y
God,
4 Cooley's Bl. Com. 355;
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[* 334] * With us it is a universal principle of constitutional
law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defence by
counsel. And generally it will be found that the humanity of
the law has provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ
counsel, the court may designate some one to defend him who
shall be paid by the government; but when no such provision is
made, it is a duty which counsel so designated owes to his pro
fession, to the court engaged in the trial, and to the cause of
humanity and justice, not to withhold his assistance nor spare his
best exertions, in the defence of one who has the double mis
fortune to be stricken by poverty and accused of crime. No one
is at liberty to decline such an appointment," and few, it is to be
hoped, would be disposed to do so.
In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to the aid
of counsel, the Constitution secures it with all its accustomed
incidents. Among these is that shield of protection which is
thrown around the confidence the relation of counsel and client
if ever a nation was honored abroad,
and left at home under a government
(which we can now conscientiously
call a liberal government) to the full
career of talent, industry, and vigor,
we are at this moment that people,
and this is our happy lot. First, the
Gospel has done it
,
and then justice
has done it; and he who thinks it his
dyty that this happy condition o
f
existence may remain, must guard
the piety o
f
these times, and he must
watch over the spirit o
f justice which
exists in these times. First, he must
take care that the altars o
f
God are
not polluted, that the Christian faith
is retained in purity and in perfec
tion; and then, turning to human
affairs, let him strive for spotless,
incorruptible justice; praising, hon
oring, and loving the just judge, and
abhorring as the worst enemy o
f man
kind him who is placed there to
‘judge after the law, and who smites
contrary to the law.’”
* Wise v. Hamilton County, 19
Ill. 18. It has been held that, in the
absence o
f express statutory provi
sions, counties are not obliged to
compensate counsel assigned by the
court to defend poor prisoners. Ba
con v. Wayne County, 1 Mich. 461.
But there are several cases to the con
trary. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13;
Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene
(Iowa), 473; Carpenter v. Dane
County, 9 Wis. 277. But we think a
court has a right to require the ser
vice whether compensation is to be
made o
r not; and that counsel who
should decline to perform it
,
for no
other reason than that the law does
not provide pecuniary compensation,
is unworthy to hold his responsible
office in the administration o
f justice.
Said Chief Justice Hale in one case:
“Although sergeants have a mo
nopoly o
f practice in the Common
Pleas, they have a right to practise,
and do practise, a
t
this bar; and if
we were to assign one o
f
them as
counsel, and he was to refuse to act,
we should make bold to commit him
to prison.” Life of Chief Justice
Hale in Campbell's Lives o
f
the Chief
Justices, Vol. II.
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requires, and which does not permit the disclosure by the former,
even in the courts of justice, of communications which may have
been made to him by the latter, with a view to pending or an
ticipated litigation. This is the client's privilege; the counsel
cannot waive it; and the court would not permit the disclosure
even if the client were not present to take the objection."
* Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not [* 335]
afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the
consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may
be impressed with a belief in his client's guilt, it will nevertheless
be his duty to see that a conviction is not secured contrary to
the law.” The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the
laws; and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion
of the law, the injury to the cause of public justice will be more
serious and lasting in it
s
results than his being allowed to escape
altogether.”
* The history and reason of the
rule which exempts counsel from dis
closing professional communications
are well stated in Whiting v. Barney,
30 N. Y. 330. And see 1 Phil. Ev.
by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130
e
t seq.; Earle v. Grant, 46 Vt. 113:
Machette v. Wanless, 2 Col. 169. The
privilege would not cover communi
cations made, not with a view to pro
fessional assistance, but in order to
induce the attorney to aid in a crim
inal act. People v. Blakely, 1 Park.
Cr. R
. 176; Bank o
f
Utica v. Mer
sereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 398. And see
the analogous case o
f
Hewitt v. Prince,
21 Wend. 79. Communications ex
traneous o
r impertinent to the subject
matter o
f
the professional consulta
tion are not privileged. Dixon v.
Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185. See Brandon
v
. Gowing, 7 Rich. 459.
It has been intimated in New York
that the statute making parties wit
nesses has done away with the rule
which protects professional communi
cations. Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb.
Pr. R
. 249; note to 1 Phil. Ev. by
Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, p
.
159
(marg.). Supposing this to be so in
civil cases, the protection would still
b
e
the same in the case o
f persons
charged with crime, for such persons
cannot be compelled to give evidence
against themselves, so that the reason
for protecting professional confidence
is the same as formerly.
* If one would consider this duty
and the limitations upon it fully, he
should read the criticisms upon the
conduct o
f Mr. Charles Phillips on
the trial of Courvoisier for the mur
der of Lord William Russell. See
Sharswood, Legal Ethics, 46; Littell,
Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179,
230; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306; West.
Rev. Vol. XXXV. p
.
1
.
* There may be cases in which it
will become the duty of counsel to
interpose between the court and the
accused, and fearlessly to brave all
consequences personal to himself,
where it appears to him that in no
other mode can the law be vindicated
and justice done to his client; but
these cases are so rare, that doubtless
they will stand out in judicial history
a
s notable exceptions to the ready
obedience which the bar should yield
to the authority o
f
the court. The
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But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal
of his client, and to what extent he may be justified in throwing
his own personal character as a weight in the scale of justice, are
questions of ethics rather than of law. No counsel is justifiable
who defends even a just cause with the weapons of fraud and
falsehood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for
accepting the confidence of the accused, and then betraying it by
a feeble and heartless defence. And in criminal cases we think
the court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing
[* 336] that the prisoner suffers nothing "from inattention or
haste on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the
part of the prosecuting officer or of the court itself. Time may
be precious to the court, but it is infinitely more so to him whose
famous scene between Mr. Justice
Buller and Mr. Erskine, on the trial
of the Dean of St. Asaph for libel,
5 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors,
c. 158; Erskine's Speeches, by Jas. L.
High, Vol. I. p. 242, — will readily
occur to the reader as one of the ex
ceptional cases. Lord Campbell says
of Erskine's conduct: “This noble
stand for the independence of the bar
would alone have entitled Erskine to
the statue which the profession affec
tionately erected to his memory in
Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are to ad
mire the decency and propriety of his
demeanor during the struggle, no less
than its spirit, and the felicitous pre
cision with which he meted out the
requisite and justifiable portion of defi
ance. His example has had a salutary
effect in illustrating and establishing
the relative duties of judge and advo
cate in England.” And elsewhere, in
speaking of Mr. Fox's Libel Act, he
makes the following somewhat extrava
gant remark: “I have said, and I still
think, that this great constitutional
triumph is mainly to be ascribed to
Lord Camden, who had been fighting
in the cause for half a century, and
uttered his last words in the House of
Lords in its support; but had he not
received the invaluable assistance of
Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of
St. Asaph, the Star Chamber might
have been re-established in this coun
try.” And Lord Brougham says of
Erskine : “He was an undaunted
man; he was an undaunted advocate.
To no court did he ever truckle, nei
ther to the Court of the King, neither
to the Court of the King's Judges.
Their smiles and their frowns he dis
regarded alike in the fearless discharge
of his duty. He upheld the liberty
of the peers against the one; he de
fended the rights of the people against
both combined to destroy them. If
there be yet amongst us the power of
freely discussing the acts of our rulers;
if there be yet the privilege of meet
ing for the promotion of needful re
forms; if he who desires wholesome
changes in our Constitution be still
recognized as a patriot, and not
doomed to die the death of a traitor,
— let us acknowledge with gratitude
that to this great man, under Heaven,
we owe this felicity of the times.”
Sketches of Statesmen of the Time of
George III. A similar instance of the
independence of counsel is narrated
of that eminent advocate, Mr. Samuel
Dexter, in the reminiscences of his
life by “Sigma,” published at Bos
ton, 1857, p. 61. See Story on Const.
(4th ed.) $ 1064, note.
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life or whose liberty may depend upon the careful and patient
consideration of the evidence, when the counsel for the defence
is endeavoring to sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject
the whole to logical analysis, so as to show that how suspicious
soever the facts may be, they are nevertheless consistent with in
nocence. Often indeed it must happen that the impression of the
prisoner's guilt, which the judge and the jury unavoidably receive
when the case is opened to them by the prosecuting officer, will,
insensibly to themselves, color a
ll
the evidence in the case, so
that only a sense o
f duty will induce a due attention to the sum
ming up for the prisoner, which after all may prove unexpectedly
convincing. Doubtless the privilege o
f
counsel is sometimes
abused in these cases; we cannot think an advocate o
f high
standing and character has a right to endeavor to rob the jury o
f
their opinion by asseverating his own belief in the innocence o
f
his client; and cases may arise in which the court will feel com
pelled to impose some reasonable restraints upon the address to
the jury," but it is better in these cases to err on the side o
f lib
erality; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel, who are
apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time and oppor
tunity as they may deem necessary for presenting their client's
case fully, may possibly in some cases be so far erroneous in law
a
s to warrant setting aside a verdict o
f guilty.”
Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in
criminal cases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If
the jury in the particular case, b
y
the constitution or statutes o
f
the State, are judges o
f
the law, it would seem that counsel should
b
e
allowed to address them fully upon it,” though the contrary
seems to have been held in Maryland : * while in Massachusetts,
1 Thus it has been held, that, even sel should not argue the constitution
though the jury are the judges of the
law in criminal cases, the court may
refuse to allow counsel to read law
books to the jury. Murphy v. State,
6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch v. State,
9 Ind. 541; Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Allen, 11 Mich. 501.
* In People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581,
a verdict in a capital case was set
aside o
n this ground.
* Lynch r. State, 9 Ind. 541; Mur
phy v. State, 6 Ind. 490.
* Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236.
What was held there was, that coun
ality o
f
a statute to the jury; and
that the Constitution, in making the
jury judges o
f
the law, did not em
power them to decide a statute invalid.
This ruling corresponds to that of
Judge Chase in the United States
v
. Callendar, Whart. State Trials,
688, 710. But see remarks o
f Per
kins, J., in Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 542.
In Maryland, it seems to be optional
with the court whether it will give
the jury instructions upon the law.
Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356.
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[* 337] where it is “expected that the jury will receive the law
from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel has
a right to address them upon the law." It is unquestionably
more decorous and more respectful to the bench that argument
upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such,
we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument,
and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them
properly to be entitled to.
For misconduct in their practice the members of the legal
profession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will
not fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients
or the public, as well as to preserve the profession from the con
tamination and disgrace of a vicious associate.” A man of bad
reputation may be expelled for that alone; * and counsel who has
1 Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met.
263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray,
51.
* “As a class, attorneys are sup
posed to be, and in fact have always
been, the vindicators of individual
rights, and the fearless assertors of
the principles of civil liberty, exist
ing, where alone they can exist, in a
government, not of parties nor of
men, but of laws. On the other
hand, to declare them irresponsible
to any power but public opinion and
their consciences, would be incompat
ible with free government. Individ
uals of the class may, and sometimes
do, forfeit their professional franchise
by abusing it; and a power to exact
the forfeiture must be lodged some
where. Such a power is indispensable
to protect the court, the adminis
tration of justice, and themselves.
Abuses must necessarily creep in ;
and having a deep stake in the char
acter of their profession, they are
vitally concerned in preventing it from
being sullied by the misconduct of
unworthy members of it
.
No class o
f
community is more dependent on its
reputation for honor and integrity.
It is indispensable to the purposes of
its creation to assign it a high and
honorable standing; but to put it
above the judiciary, whose official
tenure is good behavior, and whose
members are removable from office by
the legislature, would render it in
tractable; and it is therefore neces
sary to assign it but an equal share o
f
independence. In the absence o
f spe
cific provision to the contrary, the
power o
f
removal is
,
from it
s nature,
commensurate with the power o
f ap
pointment, and it is consequently the
business o
f
the judges to deal with
delinquent members o
f
the bar, and
withdraw their faculties when they
are incorrigible.” Gibson, Ch. J.,
In re Austin et al., 5 Rawle, 203.
See State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278; Rice's
Case, 1
8 B
.
Monr. 472; Walker v.
State, 4 W. Va. 749.
An attorney may be disbarred for
a personal attack upon the judge for
his conduct as such ; but the attorney
is entitled to notice, and an opportu
nity to be heard in defence. Beene p
.
State, 22 Ark. 149. See In re Wal
lace, L. R
.
1 P
.
C
. 283; Er parte
Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Withers r.
State, 35 Ala. 252; Matter of Moore
e
t al., 63 N. C
.
397 : Biggs, Ex parte,
6
4 N
.
C
. 202; Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. 335; Dickens's Case, 67 Penn.
St. 169.
* For example, one whose reputa
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once taken part in litigation, and been the adviser or become in
trusted with the secrets of one party, will not afterwards be suf
fered to engage for an opposing party, notwithstanding the original
employment has ceased, and there is no imputation upon
his motives." And, on the * other hand, the court will [* 338]
not allow counsel to be made the instrument of injustice,
nor permit the client to exact of him services which are incon
sistent with the obligation he owes to the court and to public jus
tice; a higher and more sacred obligation than any which can rest
upon him to gratify a client's wh
tion for truth and veracity is such
that his neighbors would not believe
him when under oath. Matter of
Mills, 1 Mich. 393. See In re Percy,
36 N. Y. 651; People v. Ford, 54 Ill.
520. An attorney convicted and pun
ished for perjury, and disbarred, was
refused restoration, notwithstanding
his subsequent behavior had been un
exceptionable. Ex parte Garbett, 18
C. B. 403.
* In Gaulden v. State, 11 Geo. 47,
the late solicitor-general was not suf
fered to assist in the defence of a
criminal case, because he had, in the
course of his official duty, instituted
the prosecution, though he was no
longer connected with it
.
And see
Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.
* Upon this subject the remarks o
f
Chief Justice Gibson in Rush v. Cava
naugh, 2 Penn. St. 189, are worthy o
f
being repeated in this connection.
The prosecutor in a criminal case had
refused to pay the charges o
f
the
counsel employed b
y
him to prosecute
in the place o
f
the attorney-general,
because the counsel, after a part o
f
the evidence had been put in, had
consented that the charge might be
withdrawn. In considering whether
this was sufficient reason for the re
fusal, the learned judge said: “The
material question is
,
did the plaintiff
violate his professional duty to his
client in consenting to withdraw his
charge . . . instead o
f lending him
self to the prosecution o
f
one whom
ims, o
r
to assist in his revenge.”
he then and has since believed to be
an innocent man?
“It is a popular but gross mistake
to suppose that a lawyer owes no
fidelity to any one except his client,
and that the latter is the keeper o
f
his
professional conscience. He is ex
pressly bound by his official oath to
behave himself in his office o
f attorney
with all due fidelity to the court as
well as to the client; and he violates
it when he consciously presses for an
unjust judgment; much more so when
h
e presses for the conviction o
f
an
innocent man. But the prosecution
was depending before an alderman, to
whom, it may be said, the plaintiff
was bound to no such fidelity. Still
h
e was bound b
y
those obligations
which, without oaths, rest upon all
men. The high and honorable office
o
f
a counsel would be degraded to
that o
f
a mercenary, were he compel
lable to do the bidding o
f
his client
against the dictates o
f
his conscience.
The origin o
f
the name proves the
client to be subordinate to the counsel
a
s his patron. Besides, had the plain
tiff succeeded in having Crean held to
answer, it would have been his duty
to abandon the prosecution a
t
the
return o
f
the recognizance. As the
office o
f attorney-general is a public
trust which involves, in the discharge
o
f it
,
the exercise o
f
an almost bound
less discretion by an officer who stands
a
s impartial as a judge, it might be
doubted whether counsel retained by
27
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus.
It still remains to mention one of the principal safe
[* 339] guards to personal liberty, * and the means by which ille
gal restraints upon it are most speedily and effectually
remedied. To understand this guaranty, and the instances in
which the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforce
ment, we must first have a correct idea of what is understood by
personal liberty in the law, and inquire what restraints, if any,
must exist to its enjoyment.
Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the
power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person
to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.” It ap
pears, therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely
unrestricted, but that by due course of law certain qualifications
and limitations may be imposed upon it without infringing upon
constitutional liberty. Indeed, in organized society, liberty is the
creature of law, and every man will possess it in proportion as
the laws, while imposing no unnecessary restraints, surround
him and every other citizen with protections against the lawless
acts of others.”
a private prosecutor can be allowed to
perform any part of his duty; cer
tainly not unless in subservience to
his will and instructions. With that
restriction usage has sanctioned the
practice of employing professional as
sistants, to whom the attorney-general
or his regular substitute may, if he
please, confide the direction of the
particular prosecution; and it has
been beneficial to do so where the pros
ecuting officer has been overmatched or
overborne by numbers. In that pre
dicament the ends of justice may re
quire him to accept assistance. But
the professional assistant, like the regu
lar deputy, exercises not his own discre
tion, but that of the attorney-general,
whose locum tenens at sufferance he is;
and he consequently does so under the
obligation of the official oath.” And
see Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99.
11 Bl. Com. 134. Montesquieu says:
“In governments, that is
,
in societies
directed by laws, liberty can consist
only in the power o
f doing what we
ought to will, and in not being con
strained to do what we ought not to
will. We must have continually
present to our minds the difference
between independence and liberty.
Liberty is a right o
f doing what
ever the laws permit, and if a citizen
could do what they forbid, he would
no longer be possessed o
f liberty,
because all his fellow-citizens would
enjoy the same power.” Spirit of the
Laws, Book 11, c. 3.
* “Liberty,’” says Mr. Webster,
“is the creature of law, essentially
different from that authorized licen
tiousness that trespasses on right. It
is a legal and a refined idea, the off
spring o
f high civilization, which the
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If we examine the qualifications and restrictions which the law
imposes upon personal liberty, we shall find that they range them
selves in two classes; first, those of a public, and, second, those
of a private nature.
The first class are those which spring from the relative duties
and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizen.
These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows: 1. Those
imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened;
2. Those in punishment of crime committed; 3. Those in pun
ishment of contempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render
their jurisdiction effectual; 4. Those necessary to enforce the
duty citizens owe in defence of the State; 5. Those which may
become important to protect the community against the acts of
those who, by reason of mental infirmity, are incapable of self
control. All these limitations are well recognized and generally
understood, but a particular discussion of them does not belong
to our subject. The second class are those which spring from the
helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various rela
tions of life.
1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized as having
legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right
to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon it
s performance. The
precise nature o
f
the restraints which may be imposed b
y
the hus
band upon the wife's actions, it is not easy, from the nature o
f
the
case, to point out and define ; but at most they can only be such
gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her part
may appear to render necessary ; * and the general tendency o
f
savage never understood and never
can understand. Liberty exists in
proportion to wholesome restraint;
the more restraint on others to keep
is protected from injury.”
Vol. II
. p. 393.
* In Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn.
431, a statute authorizing the mem
Works,
off from us, the more liberty we have.
It is an error to suppose that liberty
consists in a paucity o
f
laws. If one
wants few laws, let him g
o
to Turkey.
The Turk enjoys that blessing. The
working o
f
our complex system, full
o
f
checks and restraints on legislative,
executive, and judicial power, is fav
orable to liberty and justice. Those
checks and restraints are so many
safeguards set around individual rights
and interests. That man is free who
bers o
f
a municipal council to arrest
and imprison without warrant per
sons refusing to obey the orders o
f
fire wardens at a fire was held un
warranted and void.
* 2 Kent, 181. See Cochran's
Case, 8 Dowl. P
.
C
.
630. The hus
band, however, is under no obligation
to support his wife except at his own
home; and it is only when he wrong
fully sends her away, or so conducts
himself as to justify her in leaving
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public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been in
the direction of doing away with the arbitrary power which the
husband was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing
[* 340] the two sexes in the marriage relation upon * a footing
nearer equality. It is believed that the right of the hus
band to chastise the wife, under any circumstances, would not be
recognized in this country; and such right of control as the law
gives him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct towards
the wife as was not warranted by the relation, and which should
render it improper for her to live and cohabit with him, or by
such conduct as, under the laws of the State, would entitle her
to a divorce." And he surrenders his right of control also, when
he consents to her living apart under articles of separation.”
2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his
child, has a corresponding right to control his actions and to em
ploy his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The
child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age,
either by the express assent of the father, or by being turned away
from his father's house and left to care for himself; * though in
neither case would the father be released from an obligation which
the law imposes upon him to prevent the child becoming a public
charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary.
The mother, during the father's life, has a power of control sub
ordinate to his ; but on his death * or conviction and sentence to
imprisonment for felony,” she succeeds to the relative rights which
the father possessed before.
3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corre
sponding in the main to that which the father has over his child,
* Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201;
McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State
v. Barrett, 45 N. H. 15; Wolcott v.
him, that he is bound to support her
elsewhere. Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N.
H. 570; Allen c. Aldrich, 9 Fost. 63;
Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198;
Clement v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93. In
such a case his liability to supply her
with necessaries cannot be restricted
by giving notice to particular persons
not to trust her. Bolton v. Prentice,
2 Strange, 1214; Harris r. Morris,
4 Esp. 41.
1 Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196;
Love v. Moynahan, 16 Ill. 277.
* Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur.
1005; 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 453.
Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171; Fairhurst
v. Lewis, 23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v.
Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320.
* Dedham v. Natick,
135. See p. 348.
* Bailey's Case, 6 Dowl. P. C.
311. If, however, there be a guardian
appointed for the child by the proper
court, his right to the custody of the
child is superior to that of the parent.
Macready v. Wolcott, 33 Conn. 321.
16 Mass.
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though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is
broader. The appointment of guardian when made by the courts
is of local force only, being confined to the State in which it is
made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the
domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the ap
pointment commonly has reference to the possession of property
by the ward, and over this property the guardian is given a power
of control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the
property owned by his child."
4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a con
tract between the two, generally with the consent of the parent
or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which
the * master is to teach the apprentice some specified [* 341]
trade or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly
or in part in consideration of the instruction, is to perform ser
vices for the master while receiving it
.
This relation is also
statutory and local, and the power to control the apprentice is
assimilated to that o
f
the parent b
y
the statute law.”
5
. The power o
f
the master to impose restraints upon the action
o
f
the servant h
e employs, is o
f
so limited a nature that practically
it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the
servant misconducts himself, o
r
refuses to submit to proper con
trol, the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to confine
ment o
r personal chastisement.
6
. The relation o
f
teacher and scholar places the former more
nearly in the place o
f
the parent than either o
f
the two preced
ing relations places the master. While the pupil is under his
care, h
e
has a right to enforce obedience to his commands law
fully given in his capacity o
f teacher, even to the extent o
f bodily
chastisement o
r
confinement. And in deciding questions of dis
cipline he acts judicially, and is not to be made liable, either
civilly o
r criminally, unless he has acted with express malice, o
r
been guilty o
f
such excess in punishment that malice may fairly
b
e implied. All presumptions favor the correctness and justice
of his action.”
* 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 462, and o
f
the apprentice and o
f
his proper
cases cited. guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana,
* The relation is one founded on 222; Nickerson v. Howard, 19 Johns.
personal trust and confidence, and 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.
the master cannot assign the articles * State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. &
o
f apprenticeship except b
y
consent Bat. 365; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4
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7. Where parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are
regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the
right to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering
him up to the officers of the law at any time before the liability
of the bail has become fixed by a forfeiture being judicially de
clared on his failure to comply with the condition of the bond."
This is a right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent,
and without resort to judicial process.”
8. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor,
through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of
his demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane
provisions which have been made of late by statute or by consti
tution. In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently con
tracted, or where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition
of property with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him
of payment, the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and
confined ; but the reader must be referred to the constitution
and statutes of his State for specific information on this sub
ject.
* These, then, are the legal restraints upon personal
liberty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the
legal rights which have been specified, the party restrained is
entitled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy
relief.
The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on
any statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As
slavery ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to
protect it by proper writ when infringed. But in those times
when the power of Parliament was undefined and in dispute, and
the judges held their offices only during the king's pleasure, it was
almost a matter of course that rights should be violated, and that
legal redress should be impracticable, however clear those rights
[* 342]
Ind. 290; Commonwealth v. Randall,
4 Gray, 38; Anderson v. State, 3
Head, 455; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114; Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59.
* Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216;
ommonwealth v. Brickett, 8 Pick.
138. The principal may be followed,
if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of
the court in which the bail was taken,
and arrested there. Parker v. Bid
well, 3 Conn. 84. Even though it be
out of the State. Harp v. Osgood,
supra. And doors, if necessary, may
be broken in order to make the arrest.
Read's Case, 4 Conn. 166; Nicolls v.
Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
* Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84;
Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
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might be. But in many cases it was not very clear what the
legal rights of parties were. The courts which proceeded accord
ing to the course of the common law, as well as the courts of
chancery, had limits to their authority which could be under
stood, and a definite course of proceeding was marked out for
them by statute or by custom; and if they exceeded their juris
diction and invaded the just liberty of the subject, the illegality
of the process would generally appear in the proceedings. But
there were two tribunals unknown to the common law, but exer
cising a most fearful authority, against whose abuses it was not
easy for the most upright and conscientious judge in all cases to
afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of Star Chamber, which
became fully recognized and established in the time of Henry VII.,
though originating long before. Its jurisdiction extended to all
sorts of offences, contempts of authority and disorders, the pun
ishment of which was not supposed to be adequately provided for
by the common law; such as slanders of persons in authority, the
propagation of seditious news, refusal to lend money to the king,
disregard of executive proclamations, &c. It imposed fines with
out limit, and inflicted any punishment in the discretion of its
judges short of death. Even jurors were punished in this court
for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the authorities.
Although the king's chancellor and judges were entitled to seats
in this court, the actual exercise of it
s powers appears to have
fallen into the hands o
f
the king's privy council, which sat as a
species o
f inquisition, and exercised almost any authority it saw
fi
t
to assume." The court was abolished b
y
the Long Parlia
ment in 1641. 2. The Court o
f High Commission, estab
lished “in the time of Elizabeth, and which exercised a [* 343]
power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to that which
the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an equally abso
lute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abolished in
1641, but was afterwards revived for a short time in the reign o
f
James II.
It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could be
1 See Hallam, Constitutional His- character, are very fully set forth
tory, c. 1 and 8
; Todd, Parliamentary in Brodie's Constitutional History of
Government in England, Vol. II
.
the British Empire, to which the
c. 1. The rise and extension o
f
au- reader is referred for more particular
thority o
f
this court, and it
s arbitrary information.
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no effectual security to liberty. A brief reference to the remark
able struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I. will
perhaps the better enable us to understand the importance of
those common-law protections to personal liberty to which we
shall have occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities
which have since been added.
When the king attempted to rule without the Parliament, and
in 1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, the
grant of monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys, as the means
of replenishing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by
taxes granted by the commons, the privy council was his con
venient means of enforcing compliance with his will. Those who
refused to contribute to the loans demanded were committed to
prison. When they petitioned the Court of the King's Bench for
their discharge, the warden of the fleet made return to the writ
of habeas corpus, that they were detained by warrant of the privy
council, informing him of no particular cause of imprisonment,
but that they were committed by the special command of his
majesty. Such a return presented for the decision of the court
the question, “Is such a warrant, which does not specify the
cause of detention, valid by the laws of England 2’” The court
held that it was, justifying their decision upon supposed prece
dents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, “it was evidently the con
sequence of this decision that every statute from the time of
Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal liberties of Eng
lishmen, became a dead letter, since the insertion of four words
in a warrant (per speciale mandatum regis), which might be
come matter of form, would control their remedial efficacy.
And this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious cause
of these gentlemen's imprisonment was their withstanding an
illegal exaction of money. Every thing that distinguished our
constitutional laws, a
ll
that rendered the name o
f England valu
able, was a
t
stake in this issue.”" This decision, among other
violent acts, led to the Petition o
f Right, one o
f
the principal
charters o
f English liberty, but which was not assented
[* 344] to b
y
the king until the judges had "intimated that if he
saw fi
t
to violate it b
y arbitrary commitments, they would
take care that it should not be enforced b
y
their aid against his
* Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 7. See also Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. II. c. 1.
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will. And four years later, when the king committed members of
Parliament for words spoken in debate, offensive to the royal
prerogative, the judges evaded the performance of their duty on
habeas corpus, and the members were only discharged when the
king gave his consent to that course."
The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent
such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial
officers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal
imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the
subject, but it furnished the means of enforcing those which ex
isted before.” The preamble recited that “whereas great delays
have been used by sheriffs, jailers, and other officers, to whose cus
tody any of the king's subjects have been committed for criminal
or supposed criminal matters, in making returns of writs of habeas
corpus, to them directed, by standing out on alias or pluries habeas
corpus, and sometimes more, and by other shifts, to avoid their
yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty and the
known laws of the land, whereby many of the king's subjects
have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in such
cases, where by, law they are bailable, to their great charge and
vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the more speedy re
lief of al
l
persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed
criminal matters,” the act proceeded to make elaborate and care
ful provisions for the future. The important provisions o
f
the act
may be summed up a
s follows: That the writ of habeas corpus
might b
e
issued b
y
any court o
f
record o
r judge thereof, either in
term-time o
r vacation, on the application o
f any person confined,
o
r o
f any person for him ; the application to be in writing and on
oath, and with a copy o
f
the warrant o
f
commitment attached, if
procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court or at cham
bers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to the
writ b
y bringing up the prisoner with the cause o
f
his detention,
and the court o
r judge to discharge him unless the imprisonment
appeared to b
e legal, and in that case to take bail if the case was
bailable; and performance o
f
all these duties was made
compulsory, under heavy penalties. *Thus the duty [* 345]
which the judge or other officer might evade with impu
1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 8
;
Bro- Beeching's Case, 4 B
.
& C
.
136; Matter
die, Const. Hist. Wol. I. c. 8. o
f Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.
* Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 13;
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nity before, he must now perform or suffer punishment. The
act also provided for punishing severely a second commitment for
the same cause, after a party had once been discharged on habeas
corpus, and also made the sending of inhabitants of England,
Wales, and Berwick-upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment ille
gal, and subject to penalty. Important as this act was it was
less broad in it
s scope than the remedy had been before, being
confined to cases o
f imprisonment for criminal o
r supposed crimi
nal matters;” but the attempt in Parliament nearly a century
later to extend it
s provisions to other cases was defeated b
y
the
opposition o
f
Lord Mansfield, on the express ground that it was
unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-law remedy was sufficient;”
a
s perhaps it might have been, had officers been always disposed to
perform their duty. Another attempt in 1816 was successful.”
The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to
extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and
in others b
y
silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all
the subsequent legislation in the American States has been based
upon it
,
and has consisted in little more than a re-enactment o
f
its essential provisions.
What Courts issue the Writ.
The protection o
f personal liberty is for the most part confided
to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must
apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There
are only a few cases in which the federal courts can interfere;
and those are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is
under pretence o
f
national authority, or in which this process be
comes important or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate
some right, or authority under the Constitution o
r
laws o
f
the
United States. -
The Judiciary Act o
f
1789 provided that each o
f
the several
1 Mr. Hurd, in the appendix to his
excellent treatise on the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, gives a complete
copy o
f
the act. See also appendix
to Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self
Government; Broom Const. Law,
218.
* See Mayor o
f
London's Case,
3 Wils. 198; Wilson's Case, 7 Q
.
B
.
984.
* Life of Mansfield by Lord Camp
bell, 2 Lives o
f
Chief Justices, c. 35;
1
5 Hansard's Debates, 897 et seq.
* By Stat. 56 Geo. IM. c. 100.
See Broom, Const. Law, 224.
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federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and a
ll
other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which might be necessary for the exercise o
f
their re
spective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages
o
f
law ; and that either o
f
the justices o
f
the Supreme Court, as
well as the district judges, should have power to grant writs o
f
habeas corpus for the purposes o
f
a
n inquiry into the cause o
f
commitment; provided that in no case should such writs
extend to * prisoners in jail, unless where they were in [* 346]
custody under o
r b
y
color o
f
the authority o
f
the United
States, o
r
were committed to trial before some court o
f
the same,
o
r
were necessary to b
e brought into court to testify." Under
this statute n
o court o
f
the United States or judge thereof could
issue a habeas corpus to bring u
p
a prisoner in custody under a
sentence o
r
execution o
f
a State court, for any other purpose than
to be used as a witness. And this was so whether the imprison
ment was under civil or criminal process.”
During what were known as the nullification troubles in South
Carolina, the defect o
f
federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ
became apparent, and another act was passed, having for it
s object,
among other things, the protection o
f persons who might be prose
cuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws
o
f
the United States. This act provided that either of the justices
o
f
the Supreme Court, o
r
a judge o
f any District Court o
f
the
United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by
law, should have power to grant writs o
f
habeas corpus in a
ll
cases o
f
a prisoner o
r prisoners in jail o
r confinement, where he
o
r they shall be committed or confined on or b
y
any authority o
f
law, for any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance o
f
a
law o
f
the United States, or any order, process, or decree o
f any
judge or court thereof.”
In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a necessity,
in order to give to the federal judiciary jurisdiction upon this writ
o
f
cases in which questions o
f
international law were involved,
* 1 Statutes a
t Large, 81. and was imprisoned under a warrant
* Er parte Dorr, 3 How. 103. issued by a State court for executing
* 4 Stat. a
t Large, 634. See Ex process under the Fugitive Slave Law,
parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355; s. c. and was discharged b
y
a justice o
f
1 Bond, 39; United States v. Jailer the Supreme Court of the United
o
f Fayette Co., 2 Abb. U
.
S
.
265. States under this act.
Robinson was United States marshal,
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and which, consequently, could only properly be disposed of by
the jurisdiction to which international concerns were by the Con
stitution committed. The immediate occasion for this legislation
was the arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the authorities of
the State of New York, for an act which his government avowed
and took the responsibility o
f,
and which was the subject o
f diplo
matic correspondence between the two nations. An act o
f Con
gress was consequently passed, which provides that either o
f
the
justices o
f
the Supreme Court, o
r any judge o
f any District Court
o
f
the United States in which a prisoner is confined, in addition
to the authority previously conferred by law, shall have power to
grant writs o
f
habeas corpus in all cases o
f any prisoner or pris
oners in jail or confinement, where he, she, or they, being sub
jects o
r
citizens o
f
a foreign State, and domiciled therein, shall
b
e committed, o
r confined, o
r
in custody, under o
r by any au
thority, or law, or process founded thereon, o
f
the United States
o
r
o
f any one o
f them, for or on account o
f any act done or
omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, pro
tection, or exemption, set u
p
o
r
claimed under the commission,
o
r order, o
r
sanction o
f any foreign State or sovereignty, the
validity o
r
effect whereof depends upon the law o
f nations, o
r
under color thereof."
In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the
several courts o
f
the United States, and the several justices and
judges o
f
such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in
addition to the authority already conferred b
y law, shall have
power to grant writs o
f
habeas corpus in all cases where any per
son may b
e
restrained o
f
his o
r
her liberty in violation o
f
the
Constitution, or o
f any treaty or law o
f
the United States.”
These are the cases in which the national courts and judges
have jurisdiction o
f
this writ: in other cases the party must
seek his remedy in the proper State tribunal.” And al
[* 347] though the State courts formerly * claimed and exercised
the right to inquire into the lawfulness o
f
restraint under
1 5 Stat. a
t Large, 539. McLeod's * 14 Stat. at Large, 385.
Case, which was the immediate occa- * Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103;
sion o
f
the passage o
f
this act, will be Barry v Mercein, 5 How. 103; Dek
found reported in 25 Wend. 482. It raft v. Barney, 2 Black, 704. See
was reviewed by Judge Talmadge in United States v. French, 1 Gall. 1
;
2
6 Wend. 663, and a reply to the Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65.
review appears in 3 Hill, 635.
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the national authority, it is now settled by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, that the question of the
legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determina
tion, exclusively, of the federal judiciary, so that although a State
court or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal
restraint upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon any
officer or person who detains another in custody under the
national authority, it is his duty, by proper return, to make
known to the State court or judge the authority by which he
holds such persºn, but not further to obey the process; and that
as the State judiciary have no authority within the limits of the
sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States,
the State court or judge can proceed no further with the case.”
The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus as
an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly applicable,
and designate the courts or officers which may issue it; but they
do not point out the cases in which it may be employed. Upon
this subject the common law and the statutes must be our guide;
and although the statutes will be found to make specific pro
vision for particular cases, it is believed that in no instance
which has fallen under our observation has there been any in
tention to restrict the remedy, and make it less broad and effec
tual than it was at the common law.”
1 See the cases collected in Hurd
on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, § 5,
acquiesce in such action of the State
courts, in cases where there can be no
'and in Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note.
* Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.
See Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92;
United States v. Rector, 5 McLean,
174; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298;
In re Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ex parte
Hill, 5 Nev. 154; Ex parte Bur, 49
Cal. 159. Notwithstanding the de
cision of Ableman v. Booth, the
State courts have frequently since
assumed to pass definitely upon cases
of alleged illegal restraint under fed
eral authority, and this, too, by the
acquiescence of the federal officers.
As the remedy in the State courts is
generally more expeditious and easy
than can be afforded in the national
tribunals, it is possible that the fed
eral authorities may still continue to
reason to fear that they will take
different views of the questions in
volved from those likely to be held
by the federal courts. Nevertheless,
while the case of Ableman v. Booth
stands unreversed, the law must be
held to be as there declared. It has
recently been approved in Tarble's
Case, 13 Wall. 397, Chief Justice
Chase dissenting.
* See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich.
4.17, where this whole subject is fully
considered. The application for the
writ is not necessarily made by the
party in person, but may be made by
any other person on his behalf, if a
sufficient reason is stated for its not
being made by him personally. The
Hottentot Venus Case, 13 East, 195;
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We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the
validity of judicial proceedings." In the great anxiety on the part
of our legislators to make the most ample provision for speedy
relief from unlawful confinement, authority to issue the writ of
habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial officers,
who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error, under
which they might correct the errors and irregularities of other
judges and courts, whatever their relative jurisdiction and dig
nity. Any such employment of the writ is an abuse.”
[* 348] Where a "party who is in confinement, under judicial
process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or
judge before whom he is returned will inquire : 1. Whether the
court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained
had jurisdiction of the case, and has acted within that jurisdiction
in issuing such process.”
Child's Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259.
A wife may have the writ to release
her husband from unlawful imprison
ment, and may herself be heard on the
application. Cobbett's Case, 15 Q. B.
181, note; Cobbett v. Hudson, 10 Eng.
L. & Eq. 318; s. c. 15 Q. B. 988. Lord
Campbell in this case cites the case of
the wife of John Bunyan, who was
heard on his behalf when in prison.
See post, p. *397 et seq.
* People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y.
559, 574; Petition of Crandall, 34
Wis. 177; Ex parte Van Hagan, 25
Ohio, N. s. 426; Ex parte Shaw,
7 Ohio, N. s. 81; Ex parte Parks,
93 U. S. Rep. 18, 23; Perry v. State,
41 Tex. 488; Matter of Underwood,
30 Mich. 502; Matter of Eaton, 27
Mich. 1; Re Stupp, 12 Blatch. 501;
Ex parte Winslow, 9 Nev. 71; Er
parte Hartman, 44 Cal. 32; In re
Falvey, 7 Wis. 630. Petition of
Semler, 41 Wis. 517; In re Stokes,
5 Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 71; Er parte Fer
nandez, 10 C. B. N. S. 2, 37. This
is so, even though there be no ap
pellate tribunal in which the judg
ment may be reviewed in the ordinary
way. Ex parte Plante, 6 Lower
Can. Rep. 106. It is worthy of seri
If so, mere irregularities or errors of
ous consideration whether, in those
States where the whole judicial power
is by the constitution vested in certain
specified courts, it is competent by
law to give to judicial officers not
holding such courts authority to
review, even indirectly, the decisions
of the courts, and to discharge per
sons committed under their judg
ments. Such officers could exercise
only a special statutory authority.
Yet its exercise in such cases is not
only judicial, but it is in the nature'
of appellate judicial power. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States to issue the writ
in cases of confinement under the
order of the District Courts, was
sustained in Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75, and Matter
of Metzger, 5 How. 190, on the ground
that it was appellate. See also Er
parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Er parte
Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ex parte Mil
burn, 9 Pet. 704; Matter of Kaine,
14 How. 103; Matter of Eaton, 27
Mich. 1; Matter of Buddington, 29
Mich. 472.
* The validity of the appointment
or election of an officer de facto cannot
be inquired into on habeas corpus.
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judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must be disregarded
on this writ, and must be corrected either by the court issuing
the process, or on regular appellate proceedings." 2. If the pro
cess is not void for want of jurisdiction, the further inquiry will
be made, whether, by law, the case is bailable, and if so, bail will
be taken if the party offers it; otherwise he will be remanded to
the proper custody.”
This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a party to en
force a right of control which by law he may have, springing from
some one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent
to obtain the custody and control of his child, where it is detained
from him by some other person. The courts, however, do not gen
erally go farther in these cases than to determine what is for the
best interest of the child; and they do not feel compelled to re
mand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the child's
interest. The theory of the writis, that it relieves from improper
restraint; and if the child is of an age to render it proper to con
sult his feelings and wishes, this
Er parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Rus
sell v. Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463.
Otherwise if a mere usurper issues
process for the imprisonment of a
citizen. Ex parte Strahl, supra.
1 People v. Cassels, 5 Hill, 164;
Bushnell's Case, 9 Ohio, N. s. 183;
Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Matter
of Metzger, 5 How. 191; Petition of
Smith, 2 Nev. 338; Ex parte Gibson,
31 Cal. 619; Hammond v. People,
32 Ill. 472, per Breese, J. In State
v. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, Bellows,
J., states the rule very correctly, as
follows: “If the court had jurisdic
tion of the matter embraced in
these causes, this court will not, on
habeas corpus, revise the judgment.
State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 541; Ross's
Case, 2 Pick. 166, and Riley's Case,
2 Pick. 171; Adams v. Vose, 1
Gray, 51. If in such case the pro
ceedings are irregular or erroneous,
the judgment is voidable and not void,
and stands good until revised or an
nulled in a proper proceeding insti
tuted for that purpose; but when it
appears that the magistrate had no
may be done in any case; * and
jurisdiction, the proceedings are void,
and the respondent may be discharged
on habeas corpus. State v. Towle,
before cited; Kellogg, Ex parte, 6 Vt.
509. See also State v. Richmond,
6 N. H. 232; Burnham v. Stevens,
33 N. H. 247; Hurst v. Smith, 1
Gray, 49.”
* It is not a matter of course that
the party is to be discharged even
where the authority under which he
is held is adjudged illegal. For it
may appear that he should be lawfully
confined in different custody; in
which case, the proper order may be
made for the transfer. Matter of
Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of Ring,
28 Cal. 247; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal.
619. And where he is detained for
trial on an imperfect charge of crime,
the court, if possessing power to
commit de novo, instead of discharg
ing him, should proceed to inquire
whether there is probable cause for
holding him for trial, and if so, should
order accordingly. Hurd on Habeas
Corpus, 416.
* Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick.
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it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are living
in separation and both desire his custody. The right of the
father, in these cases, is generally recognized as best ; but this
must depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age
of the child may often be a controlling consideration against his
claim. The courts have large discretionary power in these cases,
and the tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather
than restrict it."
There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the issues
of fact joined on habeas corpus ; but the issues both of fact and
of law are tried by the court or judge before whom the proceed
ing is had ; * though without doubt a jury trial might be provided
for by statute, and perhaps even ordered by the court in some
cases.”
[* 349] * Right of Discussion and Petition.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances, is one which “would
seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican
government, since it results from the very nature and structure
of its institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically
denied until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the
people had become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exer
cise any of the privileges of freemen.” “ But it has not been
thought unimportant to protect this right by statutory enactments
in England ; and indeed it will be remembered that one of the
most notable attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made
193; Shaw v. Nachwes, 43 Iowa, Moore, 278. Where the court is sat
653; Garner v. Gordan, 41 Ind. 92;
People v. Weissenbach, 60 N. Y. 385.
* Barry's Case may almost be said
to exhaust a
ll
the law on this subject.
We refer to the various judicial deci
sions made in it
,
so far as they are
reported in the regular reports. 8
Paige, 47 ; 25 Wend. 64; People v.
Mercein, 3 Hill, 399; 2 How. 65;
Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 105. See
also the recent case of Adams v.
Adams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former
rule, see The King v. De Manneville,
5 East, 221; Ex parte Skinner, 9 J. B.
isfied that the interest o
f
the child
would be subserved b
y
refusing the
custody to either o
f
the parents, it
may be confided to a third party.
Chetwynd v. Chetwynd, L. R
.
1 P
. &
D
. 39; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis.
274.
* See Hurd on Habeas Corpus,
297-302, and cases cited; Baker r.
Gordon, 23 Ind. 209.
* See Matter o
f Hakewell, 22 Eng.
L. & Eq. 395; s. c. 12 C. B. 223.
* Story on the Constitution, § 1894.
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the right of petition the point of attack, and selected for it
s
con
templated victims the chief officers in the Episcopal hierarchy.
The trial and acquittal o
f
the seven bishops in the reign o
f
James II
.
constituted one o
f
the decisive battles in English con
stitutional history;" and the right which was then vindicated is
“a sacred right which in difficult times shows itself in its full
magnitude, frequently serves as a safety-valve if judiciously
treated b
y
the recipients, and may give to the representatives o
r
other bodies the most valuable information. It may right many
a wrong, and the deprivation o
f
it would at once be felt b
y
every
freeman as a degradation. The right o
f petitioning is indeed a
necessary consequence o
f
the right o
f
free speech and delibera
tion, — a simple, primitive, and natural right. As a privilege it
is not even denied the creature in addressing the Deity.” Hap
pily the occasions for discussing and defending it have not been
numerous in this country, and have been confined to an exciting
subject now disposed of.”
* Right to bear Arms. [* 350]
Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned
the right o
f
the people to keep and bear arms.” A standing army
is peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy
o
f
such a
n army has a
t
times been so strongly manifested in
England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from
among themselves, it was more dreaded by the people as an in
strument o
f oppression than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign
power. S
o impatient did the English people become o
f
the very
1 See this case in 12 Howell's 57–60, 182–188, 209, 436–444; 12
State Trials, 183; 3 Mod. 212. Also
in Broom, Const. Law, 408. See
also the valuable note appended by
Mr. Broom, p
.
493, in which the
historical events bearing on the right
o
f petition are noted. Also, May,
Const. Hist. c. 7 ; 1 Bl. Com. 143.
* Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self
Government, c. 12.
* For the discussions on the right
o
f petition in Congress, particularly
with reference to slavery, see 1 Ben
ton's Abridgment o
f Debates, 397 ;
2 Benton’s Abridgment o
f Debates,
Benton's Abridgment o
f Debates,
660–679, 705–743; 13 Benton's
Abridgment o
f Debates, 5–28, 266–
290, 557-562. Also Benton's Thirty
Years' View, Vol. I. c. 135, Vol. II.
c. 32, 33, 36, 37. Also the current
political histories and biographies.
The right to petition Congress is one
of the attributes of national citizen
ship, and as such is under the protec
tion o
f
the national authority. United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U
.
S
. Rep.
542, 552, per Waite, Ch. J.
* 1 Bl. Com. 143.
28
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army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that
they demanded its reduction even before the liberation became
complete; and to this day the British Parliament render a stand
ing army practically impossible by only passing a mutiny act from
session to session. The alternative to a standing army is “a well
regulated militia; ” but this cannot exist unless the people are
trained to bearing arms. The federal and State constitutions
therefore provide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not
be infringed; but how far it may be in the power of the legislature
to regulate the right we shall not undertake to say. Happily
there neither has been, nor, we may hope, is likely to be, much
occasion for an examination of that question by the courts."
* In Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2
Lit. 90, the statute “to prevent
persons wearing concealed arms ”
was held unconstitutional, as infring
ing on the right of the people to bear
arms in defence of themselves and of
the State. But see Nunn v. State,
1 Kelly, 243; State v. Mitchell, 3
Blackf. 229; Aynette v. State, 2
Humph. 154; State v. Buzzard, 4
Ark. 18; Carroll v. State, 28 Ark.
99; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 538; State v.
Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399; s. c. 1
Green, Cr. Rep. 481 ; Owen v. State,
31 Ala. 387; Cockrum v. State, 24
Tex. 394; Andrews v. State, 3
Heisk. 165; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 8;
State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612. A statute
prohibiting the open wearing of arms
upon the person was held unconstitu
tional in Stockdale v. State, 32 Geo.
225. And one forbidding carrying,
either publicly or privately, a dirk,
sword-cane, Spanish stiletto, belt or
pocket pistol, or revolver, was sus
tained, except as to the last mentioned
weapon; and as to that it was held
that, if the weapon was suitable for
the equipment of a soldier, the right
of carrying it could not be taken
away. As bearing also upon the
right of self-defence, see Ely v.
Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 73, where
it was held that the statute subjecting
free persons of color to corporal pun
ishment for “lifting their hands in
opposition ” to a white person was
unconstitutional. And see, in gen
eral, Bishop on Stat. Crimes, c. 36,
and cases cited.
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* CHAPTER XI. [* 351]
OF THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “THE LAW OF THE
LAND.”
THE protection of the subject in the free enjoyment of his life,
his liberty, and his property, except as they might be declared by
the judgment of hi
s
peers o
r
the law o
f
the land to b
e forfeited,
was guaranteed b
y
the twenty-ninth chapter o
f Magna Charta,
“which alone,” says Sir William Blackstone, “would have mer
ited the title that it bears o
f
the Great Charter.” ". The people o
f
the American States, holding the sovereignty in their own hands,
have n
o
occasion to exact pledges from any one for a due observ
ance o
f
individual rights; but the aggressive tendency o
f power
is such, that they have deemed it o
f
n
o
small importance, that,
in framing the instruments under which their governments are to
b
e
administered b
y
their agents, they should repeat and re-enact
1 4 Bl. Com. 424. The chapter,
a
s it stood in the original charter o
f
John, was : “Ne corpus liberi hominis
capiatur nec imprisoneturnec dissei
sieturnec utlageturnec exuletur, nec
aliquo modo destruatur, nec rex eat
vel mittat super eum v
i,
nisi per judi
cium parium suorum, vel per legem
terrae.” No freeman shall be taken
o
r imprisoned o
r
disseised o
r
outlawed
o
r banished, o
r any ways destroyed,
nor will the king pass upon him, or
commit him to prison, unless b
y
the
judgment o
f
his peers, o
r
the law o
f
the land. In the charter of Henry III.
it was varied slightly, as follows:
“Nullus liber homo capiatur vel im
prisonetur, aut disseisietur de libero
tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel li
beris consuetudinibus suis, aut utlage
tur aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo de
struatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec
super eum mittemus, nisi per legale ju
dicium parium suorum, vel per legem
terrae.” See Blackstone's Charters.
The Petition of Right—1 Car. I. c. 1
— prayed, among other things, “that
no man be compelled to make or yield
any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, o
r
such
like charge, without common consent,
by act o
f Parliament; that none be
called upon to make answer for refusal
so to do; that freemen be imprisoned or
detained only b
y
the law o
f
the land,
o
r by due process o
f law, and not by
the king’s special command, without
any charge.” The Bill of Rights —
1 Wm. and Mary, § 2
,
c. 2—was
confined to an enumeration and con
demnation o
f
the illegal acts o
f
the
preceding reign ; but the Great Char
ter o
f Henry III. was then, and is
still, in force.
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this guaranty, and thereby adopt it as a principle of constitu
tional protection. In some form of words, it is to be found
in each of the State constitutions;” and, though verbal differ
* The following are the consti
tutional provisions in the several
States : —
Alabama : “That, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused . . . shall
not be compelled to give evidence
against himself, or be deprived of his
life, liberty, or property, but by due
course of law.” Art. 1, § 7. — Ar
kansas: “That no person shall . . .
be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, without due process of
law.” Art. 1, § 9. — California:
Similar to that of Alabama. Art. 1,
$ 8. – Connecticut: Same as Alabama.
Art. 1, § 9. — Delaware : Like that of
Alabama, substituting for “course of
law,” “the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land.”
Florida ; Similar to that of Alabama.
Art. 1, § 9.— Georgia: “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of
law.” Art. 1, § 3. — Illinois : “No
person shall be deprived of life, lib
erty, or property, without due process
of law.” .Art. 1, § 2. Colorado: The
same. Art. 1, § 25. — Iowa : The
same. Art. 1, § 9. — Kentucky:
“Nor can he be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, unless by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land.” Art. 13, § 12. — Maine:
“Nor be deprived of his life, liberty,
property, or privileges, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land.” Art. 1, § 6. — Maryland:
“That no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned, or disseised of his free
hold, liberties, or privileges, or out
lawed, or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the judg
ment of his peers, or by the law of
the land.” Declaration of Rights,
§ 23. — Massachusetts: “No subject
Art. 1, § 7. —
by the law of the land.”
shall be arrested, imprisoned, de
spoiled, or deprived of his property,
immunities, or privileges, put out of
the protection of the law, exiled, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or estate,
but by the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land.” Declaration of
Rights, Art. 12. — Michigan : “No
person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” Art. 6, § 32. —
Minnesota: Like that of Michigan.
Art. 1, § 7. — Mississippi : The same.
Art. 1, § 2. — Missouri: Same as
Delaware. Art. 1, § 18. — Nevada:
“Nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of
law.” Art. 1, § 8. — New Hamp
shire: Same as Massachusetts. Bill
of Rights, Art. 15. — New York:
Same as Nevada. Art. 1, § 6. —
North Carolina: “That no person
ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseised of his freehold, liberties, or
privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or
in any manner destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but
Declara
tion of Rights, $ 17. — Pennsylvania:
Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 9. – Rhode
Island: Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 10.
South Carolina: Like that of Massa
chusetts, substituting “person '' for
“subject.” Art. 1, § 14. — Tennes
see: “That no man shall be taken or
imprisoned, or disseised of his free
hold, liberties, or privileges, or out
lawed or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, or deprived of his life, lib
erty, or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or the law of the land.”
Art. 1, § 8. — Teras: “No citizen of
this State shall be deprived of life,
liberty, property, or privileges, out
lawed, exiled, or in any manner dis
franchised, except by due course of
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ences * appear in the different provisions, no change in [* 352]
language, it is thought, has in any case been made with a
view to essential * change in legal effect; and the differ- [* 353]
ences in phraseology will not, therefore, be of importance
in our discussion. Indeed, the language employed is generally
nearly identical, except that the phrase “due process [or course]
of law '' is sometimes used, sometimes “the law of the land,” and
in some cases both ; but the meaning is the same in every case."
And, by the fourteenth amendment, the guaranty is now incor
porated in the Constitution of the United States.”
If now we shall ascertain the sense in which the phrases “due
process of law " and “ the law of the land ’’ are employed in the
several constitutional provisions which we have referred to, when
the protection of rights in property is had in view, we shall be
able, perhaps, to indicate the rule, by which the proper conclu
sion may be reached in those cases in which legislative action is
objected to, as not being “ the law of the land; ” or judicial or
ministerial action is contested as not being “due process of law,”
within the meaning of these terms as the Constitution employs
them.
If we examine such definitions of these terms as are met with
in the reported cases, we shall find them so various, that some
difficulty must arise in fixing upon one which shall be accurate,
complete in itself, and at the same time appropriate in a
ll
the
cases. The diversity of definition is certainly not surprising,
when we consider the diversity o
f
cases for the purposes o
f
which
it has been attempted, and reflect that a definition that is suffi
cient for one case and applicable to its facts may be altogether
insufficient or entirely inapplicable in another.
the law o
f
the land.” Art. 1
,
§ 16. land; ” State v. imons, 2 Speers,
West Virginia : “No person, in time
o
f peace, shall be deprived o
f life, lib
erty, o
r property, without due process
o
f law.” Art. 2
,
§ 6. Under each
o
f
the remaining constitutions, equiv
alent protection to that which these
provisions give is believed to be
afforded by fundamental principles
recognized and enforced by the
courts.
1 2 Inst. 50: Bouv. Law. Dic.
“Due process o
f Law,” “Law of the
767; Wanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg.
260; Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2
Yerg. 554; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt.
311 ; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land Co., 18 How. 276, per Curtis, J.;
Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 129, per
Manning, J. ; Ervine's Appeal, 16
Penn. St. 256 ; Banning v. Taylor, 24
Penn. St. 289, 292; State v. Staten, 6
Cold. 244; Huber v. Reiley, 53 Penn.
St. 112.
* See ante, p
.
*11.
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Perhaps no definition is more often quoted than that given by
Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case: “By the law of
the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law which
hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and ren
ders judgment only after trial.ſ The meaning is that every citi
zen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities,
[* 354] under the protection of the Sº general rules which OWern
society. Every thing which may pass under the form of
an enactment is not therefore to be considered the law of the
land.” I \ TTT - - -
The definition here given is apt and suitable as applied to
judicial proceedings, which cannot be valid unless they “proceed
upon inquiry" and “render judgment only after trial.” It is
entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is
not necessarily the law of the land. “The words “by the law of
the land,’ as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute
passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction
would render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this
part of the Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would
be made to say to the two houses: ‘You shall be vested with the
legislative power of the State, but no one shall be disfranchised
or deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless you
pass a statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall not do the
wrong unless you choose to do it.’” ”
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
4. Wheat. 519; Works of Webster,
Vol. V. p. 487. And he proceeds:
“If this were so, acts of attainder,
bills of pains and penalties, acts of con
fiscation, acts reversing judgments,
and acts directly transferring one
man's estate to another, legislative
judgments, decrees and forfeitures in
all possible forms, would be the law
of the land. Such a strange con
struction would render constitutional
provisions of the highest importance
completely inoperative and void. It
would tend directly to establish the
union of all powers in the legislature.
There would be no general permanent
law for courts to administer or men
to live under. The administration of
justice would be an empty form, an
When the law of the land
idle ceremony. Judges would si
t
to
execute legislative judgments and de
crees, not to declare the law o
r admin
ister the justice o
f
the country.”
* Per Bronson, J., in Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill, 140. See also Jones
v
. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59; Ervine's Ap
peal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Arrowsmith v.
Burlingim, 4 McLean, 498; Lane v.
Dorman, 3 Scam. 238; Reed c. Wright,
2 Greene (Iowa), 15; Woodcock v.
Bennett, 1 Cow. 740; Kinney v. Bev
erley, 2 H
.
& M. 536; Commonwealth
v
. Byrne, 20 Grat. 165; Rowan v.
State, 30 Wis. 129; s. c. 11 Am.
Rep. 559. “Those terms, ‘law o
f
the land,” d
o not mean merely a
n
act
o
f
the General Assembly. If they did,
every restriction upon the legislative
authority would be a
t
once abrogated.
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is spoken o
f, “undoubtedly a pre-existing rule o
f
conduct” is
intended, “not an ea post facto rescript or decree made for the
occasion. The design" is “to exclude arbitrary power from every
branch o
f
the government; and there would be no exclusion if
such rescripts o
r
decrees were to take effect in the form o
f
a stat
ute.”" There are nevertheless many cases in which the title to
property may pass from one person to another, without the interven
tion o
f judicial proceedings, properly so called ; and in preceding
pages it has been shown that special legislative acts de
signed to accomplish the like end are allowable in "some [* 355]
cases. The necessity for “general rules,” therefore, is not
such as to preclude the legislature from establishing special rules
for particular cases, provided the particular cases range them
selves under some general rule o
f legislative power; nor is there
any requirement o
f judicial action which demands that, in every
case, the parties interested shall have a hearing in court.”
For what more can the citizen suffer
than to be taken, imprisoned, dis
seised o
f
his freehold, liberties, and
privileges; be outlawed, exiled, and
destroyed, and be deprived o
f
his
property, his liberty, and his life,
without crime? Yet all this he may
suffer if an act of the assembly simply
denouncing those penalties upon par
ticular persons, o
r
a particular class
o
f persons, be in itself a law o
f
the
land within the sense of the Constitu
tion; for what is in that sense the
law o
f
the land must be duly observed
b
y all, and upheld and enforced by
the courts. In reference to the in
fliction o
f punishment and devesting
the rights o
f property, it has been
repeatedly held in this State, and it is
believed in every other o
f
the Union,
that there are limitations upon the
legislative power, notwithstanding
these words; and that the clause
itself means that such legislative acts
a
s profess in themselves directly to
punish persons, o
r
to deprive the citi
zen o
f
his property, without trial
before the judicial tribunals, and a
decision upon the matter o
f right, as
determined by the laws under which
it vested, according to the course,
mode, and usages o
f
the common law,
a
s derived from our forefathers, are
not effectually laws o
f
the land ’ for
those purposes.” Hoke v. Hender
son, 4 Dev. 15. In Bank of Michigan
v
. Williams, 5 Wend. 478, 486, Mr.
Justice Sutherland says, vested rights
“are protected under general princi
ples o
f paramount, and, in this coun
try, of universal authority.” Mr.
Broom says: “It is indeed an essen
tial principle o
f
the law o
f England,
‘that the subject hath an undoubted
property in his goods and possessions;
otherwise there shall remain no more
industry, no more justice, no more
valor; for who will labor? who will
hazard his person in the day o
f
battle
for that which is not his own’’ The
Banker's Case, by Turnor, 10. And
therefore our customary law is not
more solicitous about any thing than
“to preserve the property o
f
the sub
ject from the inundation o
f
the pre
rogative.” Ibid.” Broom's Const.
Law, p. 228.
* Gibson, Ch. J., in Norman v.
Heist, 5 W. & S. 171, 173.
* See Wynehamer v. People, 13
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On the other hand, we shall find that\general rules may some
times be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive indi
vidual citizens of vested rights." While every man has a right
to require that his own sºlº shall be judged by the same
rules which are applied in the controversies of h
is neighbors, the
whole community is also entitled, a
t
all times, to demand the
protection o
f
the ancient principles which shield private rights
against arbitrary interference, even though such interference may
b
e under a rule impartial in it
s operation.) \I
t is not the partial
nature o
f
the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual charac
ter, that condemns it as unknown to the law o
f
the land, Mr.
Justice Edwards has said in one case: “Due process of law un
doubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings, accord
ing to those rules and forms which have been established for the
protection o
f private rights.” . And we have met in no judicial
decision a statement that embodies more tersely and accurately
the correct view o
f
the principle we are considering, than the fol
lowing, from an opinion b
y
Mr. Justice Johnson o
f
the Supreme
Court o
f
the United States: “As to the words from Magna
Charta incorporated in the Constitution o
f Maryland, after vol
umes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the
good sense o
f
mankind has a
t length settled down to this, – that
they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise o
f
the powers o
f government, unrestrained b
y
the estab
lished principles o
f private rights and distributive justice.””
N. Y
.
432, per Selden, J. In James 1 Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y.
v
. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 251, Chief Justice 209. See also State v. Staten, 6
Hemphill says: “ The terms ‘law of Cold. 233.
the land' . . . are now, in their most 2 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4
usual acceptation, regarded as general Wheat. 235. “What is meant by
public laws, binding upon all the ‘the law o
f
the land'? In this State,
members o
f
the community, under all
circumstances, and not partial o
r pri
vate laws, affecting the rights o
f
private individuals o
r
classes o
f in
dividuals.” And see Wanzant v.
Waddell, 2 Yerg. 269, per Peck, J.;
Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472.
Nevertheless there are many cases,
a
s
we have shown, ante, pp. *97, *109,
in which private laws may be passed
in entire accord with the general pub
lic rules which govern the State; and
we shall refer to more cases further on..
taking as our guide Zylstra's Case, 1
Bay, 384; White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev.
471; State v. Coleman and Maxy, 1
McMull. 502, there can be no hesita
tion in saying that these words mean
the common law and the statute law
existing in this State at the adoption
o
f
our constitution. Altogether they
constitute a body o
f
law prescribing
the course o
f justice to which a free
man is to be considered amenable for
all time to come.” Per O'Neill, J.,
in State v. Simons, 2 Speers, 761, 767.
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* The principles, then, upon which the process is based [* 356]
ãre to determine whether it is “due process” or not, and
not any considerations ofmere form./ Administrative and remedial
process may be changed from time to time, but only with due re
gard to the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen.
When the government through it
s
established agencies interferes
with the title to one's property, or with his independent enjoy
ment o
f it
,
and it
s
action is called in question as not in accordance
with the law o
f
the land, w
e
are to test it
s validity by those prin
ciples o
f
civil liberty and constitutional protection which have
become established in our system o
f laws, and not generally b
y
rules that pertain to forms o
f procedure merely. Injudicial pro
ceedings the law o
f
the land requires a hearing before condemna
tion, and judgment before dispossession;' but when property is
appropriated b
y
the government to public uses, o
r
the legislature
interferes to give direction to its title through remedial statutes,
different considerations from those which regard the controversies
between man and man must prevail, different proceedings are re
quired, and we have only to see whether the interference can be
justified by the established rules applicable to the special case.
Due process o
f
law in each particular case means, such an exer
tion o
f
the powers o
f government as the settled maxims o
f
law
permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection
o
f
individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class o
f
cases to which the one in question belongs.”
See also State v. Doherty, 60 Me.
509. It must not be understood from
this, however, that it would not be
competent to change either the com
mon law o
r
the statute law, so long
a
s the principles therein embodied,
and which protected private rights,
were not departed from.
* Wanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg.
260; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 478.
* See Wynehamer v. People, 13
N. Y
.
432, per Selden, J. In State
v
. Allen, 2 McCord, 56, the court, in
speaking o
f process for the collection
o
f taxes, say: “We think that any
legal process which was originally
founded in necessity, has been couse
crated by time, and approved and
acquiesced in by universal consent,
must be considered an exception to
the right of trial by jury, and is
embraced in the alternative ‘law of
the land.’” And see Hard v. Near
ing, 44 Barb. 472; Sears v. Cottrell,
5 Mich. 251; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev.
302. Taking property under the tax
ing power is due process o
f
law.
High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal. 363.
See also Cruikshanks v. Charleston,
1 McCord, 360; State v. Mayhew, 2
Gill, 487; Harper v. Commissioners,
23 Geo. 566. It is no violation of this
principle to exclude from the State
debauched women who are being im
ported for improper purposes. Matter
o
f Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402.
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. lº rights may be interfered with by either the legislative,executive, or judicial department of the government. The ex
ecutive department in every instance must show authority
[* 357] o
f
law for it
s action, and occasion does not often arise * for
a
n examination o
f
the limits which circumscribe it
s powers.
The legislative department may in some cases constitutionally au
thorize interference, and in others may interpose b
y
direct action.
Elsewhere we shall consider the police power o
f
the State, and
endeavor to show how completely all the property, as well as all
the people within the State, are subject to control under it
,
within
certain limits, and for the purposes for which that power is exer
cised. The right of eminent domain and the right o
f
taxation
will also be discussed separately, and it will appear that under
each the law o
f
the land sanctions devesting individuals o
f
their
property against their will, and b
y
somewhat summary proceed
ings. In every government there is inherent authority to appro
priate the property o
f
the citizen for the necessities o
f
the State,
and constitutional provisions d
o
not confer the power, though
they generally surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse. The
restraints are, that when specific property is taken, a pecuniary
compensation, agreed upon o
r
determined b
y judicial inquiry,
must be paid ; and in other cases property can only be taken for
the support o
f
the government, and each citizen can only be re
quired to contribute his proportion to that end. But/there is no
rule o
r principle known to our system under which private prop
erty can be taken from one person and transferred to another,
for the private use and benefit o
f
such other person, whether by
general law or b
y
special enactment. The purpose must be.
public, and must have reference to the ... of
the public. No reason o
f general public policy will be sufficient,
it seems, to validate such transfers when they operate upon exist
ing vested rights.' )
1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; for individual use. And see Matter
Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89, 91; s. c. 1
Am. Rep. 161. In Matter of Albany
Street, 11 Wend. 149, it is intimated
that the clause in the Constitution of
New York, withholding private prop
erty from public use except upon
compensation made, o
f
itself implies
that it is not to be taken in invitum
o
f
John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend.
676. A different opinion seems to
have been held b
y
the Supreme Court
o
f Pennsylvania, when they decided
in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63,
that the legislature might authorize
the laying out o
f private ways over
the lands o
f unwilling parties, to con
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Nevertheless, in many cases and many ways remedial legislation
may affect the control and disposition of property, and in some
cases may change the nature of rights, give remedies where none
existed before, and even devest legal titles in favor of substantial
equities where the legal and equitable rights do not chance to
cqncur in the same persons.
The chief restriction upon this class of legislation is
,
that vested rights must not be disturbed ; "|but in it
s
[* 358]
application as a shield o
f protection, the term “vested
rights” is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as im
porting a power o
f legal control merely, but rather as implying a
vested interest which it is right and equitable that the govern
ment should recognize and protect, and o
f
which the individual
could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. The right
to private property is a sacred right; not, as has been justly said,
“introduced as the result o
f princes' edicts, concessions, and
charters, but it was the old fundamental law, springing from the
original frame and constitution o
f
the realm.” "
utjas it is a right which rests upon equities, it has its reasonable
limits and restrictions; it must have some regard to the general
welfare and public policy;\ it cannot be a right which is to be
examined, settled, and defended o
n
a distinct and separate con
sideration o
f
the individual case, but ratherſon broad and general
grounds, which embrace the welfare o
f
the whole community,
and which seek the equal and impartial protection o
f
the inter
ests of all.”
And it may be well at this point to examine in the light of the
reported cases the question, What is a vested right in the consti
tutional sense 2 and when we have solved that question, we may
b
e
the better able to judge under what circumstances one may be
justified in resisting a change in the general laws o
f
the State
nect the coal-beds with the works of
public improvement, the constitution
not in terms prohibiting it
.
See note
to p
. *531, post.
* Arg. Nightingale v. Bridges,
Show. 138. See also Case of Alton
Woods, 1 Rep. 45 a , Alcock v. Cook,
5 Bing. 340; Bowman v. Middleton,
1 Bay, 282; ante, p
.
*37 and note, p
.
*175 and note.
* The evidences of a man's rights
— the deeds, bills of sale, promissory
notes, and the like — are protected
equally with his lands and chattels,
o
r rights and franchises o
f any kind ;
and the certificate o
f registration and
right to vote may be properly in
cluded in the category. State v.
Staten, 6 Cold. 243. See Davies v.
McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369.
cº
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affecting his interests, and how far special legislation may control
his rights without coming under legal condemnation. In organ
ized society every man holds all he possesses, and looks forward
to a
ll
h
e hopes for, through the aid and under the protection o
f
the laws; but as changes of circumstances and of public opinion,
a
s well as other reasons affecting the public policy, are a
ll
the
while calling for changes in the laws, and as these changes must
influence more o
r
less the value and stability o
f private posses
sions, and strengthen o
r destroy well-founded hopes, and as the
power to make very many o
f
them could not b
e disputed without
denying the right o
f
the political community to prosper and ad
vance, it is obvious that many rights, privileges, and exemptions
which usually pertain to ownership under a particular state o
f
the law, and many reasonable expectations, cannot be regarded
a
s vested rights in any legal sense." In many cases the courts,
in the exercise o
f
their ordinary jurisdiction, cause the property
vested in one person to be transferred to another, either through
the exercise o
f
a statutory power, o
r by the direct force o
f
their
judgments o
r decrees, o
r by means o
f compulsory conveyances.
If in these cases the courts have jurisdiction, they proceed in ac
cordance with “the law of the land ; ” and the right of one man
is devested b
y
way o
f enforcing a higher and better right in
another. Of these cases we do not propose to speak: constitu
tional questions cannot well arise concerning them, unless they
are attended b
y
circumstances o
f irregularity which are supposed
to take them out o
f
the general rule. All vested rights are held
subject to the laws for the enforcement o
f public duties and
private contracts, and for the punishment o
f wrongs; and if they
become devested through the operation o
f
those laws, it is only
b
y
way o
f enforcing the obligations o
f justice and good order.
What we desire to reach in this connection is the true meaning
o
f
the term “vested rights” when employed for the purpose o
f
indicating the interests o
f
which one cannot be deprived by
the mere force o
f legislative enactment, o
r by any other than
1 “A person has no property, no itself, as a rule of conduct, may be
vested interest, in any rule o
f
the changed a
t
the will, or even at the
common law. . . . Rights o
f prop- whim o
f
the legislature, unless pre
erty, which have been created b
y
the vented b
y
constitutional limitations.”
common law, cannot be taken away Waite, Ch. J., in Munn v. Illinois, 94
without due process; but the law U
.
S
. Rep. 113, 134.
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the * recognized modes of transferring title against the [* 359]
consent of the owner, to which we have alluded.
Interests in Expectancy.
First, it would seem that a right cannot be considered a vested
right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation
as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present
general laws: it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to
the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or
future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a
demand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has been
well said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as opposed
to fundamental axioms of legislation, “unless they impair rights
which are vested; because most civil rights are derived from
public laws; and if
,
before the rights become vested in particular
individuals, the convenience o
f
the State procures amendments o
r
repeals o
f
those laws, those individuals have no cause o
f com
plaint. The power that authorizes o
r proposes to give, may
always revoke before a
n
interest is perfected in the donee.”
And Chancellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says
that while such a statute, “affecting and changing vested rights,
is very generally regarded in this country as founded on uncon
stitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void,”
yet that “this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial
statutes, which may be o
f
a retrospective nature, provided they
d
o
not impair contracts, o
r
disturb absolute vested rights, and
only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance o
f
the remedy b
y curing defects and adding to the means o
f enforc
ing existing obligations. Such statutes have been held valid
when clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the general
welfare, even though they might operate in a degree upon vested
rights.”
And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future
is not considered a vested right, that the rules o
f
descent are held
subject to change in their application to all estates not already
1 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N
.
H
.
v
. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 91; Bridgeport v.
213. See Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H
.
Housatonic R
.
R
. Co., 15 Conn. 492;
304. Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Gil
* 1 Kent, Com. 455. See Briggs man v. Cutts, 23 N
.
H. 376, 382.
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passed tº the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir
to the living ; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to
rely upon succeeding to the property than the promise held
out by the statute of descents. But this promise is no
[* 360] * more than a declaration of the legislature as to it
s pres
ent view o
f public policy as regards the proper order o
f
succession, — a view which may at any time change, and then the
promise may properly be withdrawn, and a new course o
f
descent
b
e
declared. The expectation is not property; it cannot be sold
o
r mortgaged ; it is not subject to debts; and it is not in any
manner taken notice o
f by the law until the moment o
f
the ances
tor's death, when the statute o
f
descents comes in, and for reasons
o
f general public policy transfers the estate to persons occupying
particular relations to the deceased in preference to a
ll
others.
It is not until that moment that there is any vested right in the
person who becomes heir, to be protected b
y
the Constitution. An
anticipated interest in property cannot be said to be vested in any
person so long as the owner o
f
the interest in possession has full
power, by virtue o
f
his ownership, to cut off the expectant right
by grant or devise."
If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be
subject to legislative control and modification.” In this country
estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in fee
simple, b
y
statutes the validity o
f
which is not disputed.” Such
statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest
which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to
objection by him.” But no other person in these cases has any
* In re Lawrence, 1 Redfield, Sur.
Rep. 310. But after property has
once vested under the laws o
f descent,
it cannot be devested by any change
in those laws. Norman v. Heist, 5
W. & S. 171. And the right to
change the law o
f
descents in the case
o
f
the estate o
f
a person named with
out his consent being had, was denied
in Beall v. Beall, 8 Geo. 210. See
post, p. *379 and notes.
* Smith on Stat. and Const. Con
struction, 412.
* De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch.
56.
* On the same ground it has been
held in Massachusetts that statutes
converting existing estates in joint
tenancy into estates in common were
unobjectionable. They did not im
pair vested rights, but rendered the
tenure more beneficial. Holbrook v.
Finney, 4 Mass. 567; Miller v. Miller,
1
6 Mass. 59; Anable v. Patch, 3 Pick.
363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick.
534. Moreover, such statutes do no
more than either tenant at the com
mon law has a right to do, by convey
ing his interest to a stranger. See
Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S
.
& R
.
192; Wildes v. Wanvoorhis, 16 Gray,
147.
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vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by
such change; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must
be subject to the same control as in other cases."
The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage
relation must be referred to the same principle. At the common
law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to cer
tain rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then
possessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any
subsequent alteration in the law could not take them
away.” But other interests * were merely in expectancy. [* 361]
He could have a right as tenant by the courtesy initiate
in the wife's estates of inheritance the moment a child was born
of the marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such
estates. This right would be property, subject to conveyance
and to be taken for debts; and must therefore be regarded as a
vested right, no more subject to legislative interference than
other expectant interests which have ceased to be mere contin
gencies and become fixed. But while this interest remains in
expectancy merely, - that is to say, until it becomes initiate, –
the legislature must have full right to modify or even to abolish
it.” And the same rule will apply to the case of dower; though
the difference in the requisites of the two estates are such that
the inchoate right to dower does not become property, or any
thing more than a mere expectancy at any time before it is con
summated by the husband's death.” In neither of these cases
does the marriage alone give a vested right. It gives only a
capacity to acquire a right. The same remark may be made re
garding the husband's expectant interest in the after-acquired
1 See 1 Washb. Real Pr. 81–84
and notes. The exception to this
statement, if any, must be the case
of tenant in tail after possibility of
issue extinct; where the estate of the
tenant has ceased to be an inheri
tance, and a reversionary right has
become vested.
* Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y.
208. See Mr. Bishop's criticism of
this case — which, however, does not
reach the general principle above
stated—in 2 Bishop, Law of Married
Women, § 46, and note.
* Hathorn v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93;
Tong r. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And
see the cases cited in the next note.
* Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9;
Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel
v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore v. Mayor,
&c. of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and
8 N. Y. 110; Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich.
191; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 103, note. A
doubt as to this doctrine is inti
mated in Dunn v. Sargeant, 101
Mass. 340.
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personalty of the wife; it is subject to any changes in the law
made before his right becomes vested by the acquisition.”
Change of Remedies.
Again: the right to a particular remedy is not a vested right.
This is the general rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar
cases in which the remedy is part of the right itself.” As a gen
eral rule, every State has complete control over the remedies
which it offers to suitors in its courts.”
of courts and create another.
tional remedy for a right or equity already in existence.”
1 Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y.
208; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273;
Kelly v. McCarthy, 3 Bradf. 7. And
see Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351;
Clark r. McCreary, 12 S. & M. 347;
Jackson v. Lyon, 9 Cow. 664; ante, pp.
*287—"292. On the point whether the
husband can be regarded as having an
interest in the wife's choses in action,
before he has reduced them to pos
session, see Bishop, Law of Married
Women, Vol. II
.
§§ 45, 46. If the
wife has a right to personal property
subject to a contingency, the hus
band's contingent interest therein
cannot be taken away by subsequent
legislation. Dunn v. Sargeant, 101
Mass. 336. In Sutton v. Asker, 66
N. C
.
172, it was decided that where
by the statute the woman’s right o
f
dower was subject to be defeated by
the husband's conveyance, a subse
quent statute restoring her common
law rights was inoperative as to all
existing marriages.
* See ante, p
.
*290, and cases
cited. It has been held in some
cases that the giving o
f
a lien by
statute does not confer a vested right,
and it may be taken away b
y
a re
peal o
f
the statute. See ante, *287,
note.
* Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470;
Smith v. Bryan, 34 Ill. 377: Lord v.
Chadbourne, 42 Me. 429; Rockwell
It may abolish one class
It may give a new and addi
And
v
. Hubbell's Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
197; Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. 123;
Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa,
282; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa,
127; McArthur v. Goddin, 12 Bush,
274; Grundy v. Commonwealth, 12
Bush, 350; Briscoe v. Anketell, 28
Miss. 361.
* Hope v. Jackson, 2 Yerg. 125;
Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245;
Paschall v. Whitsett, 11 Ala. 472;
Commonwealth v. Commissioners,
&c., 6 Pick. 508; Whipple v. Farrar,
3 Mich. 436; United States v. Sam
peryac, 1 Hemp. 118; Sutherland v.
De Leon, 1 Tex. 250; Anonymous,
2 Stew. 228. See also Lewis v. Mc
Elvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees, &c.
v
. McCaughey, 2 Ohio, N
.
s. 152;
Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts, 300;
Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn.
St. 29; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass.
303; Brackett v. Norcross, 1 Greenl.
92; Ralston v. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303;
White School House v. Post, 31 Conn.
241; Van Rensselaer v. Hayes, 19
N. Y. 68; Van Rensselaer v. Ball,
1
9 N. Y
.
100; Sedgwick v. Bunker,
1
6 Kan. 498; Danville v. Pace, 25
Grat. 1. Thus it may give a legal
remedy where before there was only
one in equity. Bartlett v. Lang,
2 Ala. N
.
S
. 401. In Bolton v. Johns,
5 Penn. St. 145, the extreme ground
was taken that the legislature might
CH. XI.] of THE PROTECTION To PROPERTY, ETC. 449
it may abolish old remedies and * substitute new ; or [* 362]
even without substituting any, if a reasonable remedy
still remained." If a statute providing a remedy is repealed while
proceedings are pending, such proceedings will be thereby deter
mined, unless the legislature shall otherwise provide ; * and if it
be amended instead of repealed, the judgment pronounced in
such proceedings must be according to the law as it then stands.”
And any rule or regulation in regard to the remedy which does
not, under pretence of modifying or regulating it
,
take away o
r
impair the right itself, cannot be regarded as beyond the proper
province o
f legislation.*
But a vested right of action
which tangible things are pro
against arbitrary interference.
is property in the same sense in
perty, and is equally protected
Where it springs from contract,
o
r
from the principles o
f
the common law, it is not competent for
the legislature to take it away.”
give a lien on property for a prior
debt, where no contract would be
violated in doing so. In Towle v.
Eastern Railroad, 18 N. H. 546, the
power o
f
the legislature to give ret
rospectively a remedy for conse
quential damages caused by the tak
ing o
f property for a public use was
denied.
1 Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274;
Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N. Y.
558; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y.
361; Parker v. Shannohouse, 1 Phil.
(N. C.) 209.
* Bank o
f
Hamilton v. Dudley,
2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3
Ohio, 553; Eaton v. United States,
5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v.
United States, 6 Cranch, 329. If an
act is repealed without any saving o
f
rights, no judgment can afterwards be
taken under it
.
French v. State, 53
Miss. 651; State v. Passaic, 36 N
. J.
382; Menard County v. Kincaid, 71
Ill. 587; Musgrove v. Vicksburg,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 50 Miss. 677. But it
is well said in Pennsylvania that
before a statute should be construed
to take away the remedy for a prior
injury, it should clearly appear that
And every man is entitled to a
it embraces the very case. Chalker
v
. Ives, 55 Penn. St. 81. And see
Newsom v. Greenwood, 4 Oreg. 119.
* See cases cited in last note. Also
Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney,
. 601; United States v. Passmore, 4
Dall. 372; Patterson v. 1'hilbrook,
9 Mass. 151; Commonwealth v. Mar
shall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v.
Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v.
People, 21 N
.
Y
. 99; State v. Daley,
2
9 Conn. 272; Rathbun v. Wheeler,
29 Ind. 601 : State v. Norwood, 12
Md. 195; Bristol v. Supervisors, &c.,
20 Mich. 95; Sumner v. Miller, 64
N. C. 688.
* See ante, pp. *287—"292; Lennon
v
. New York, 55 N. Y
.
361.
* Dash v. Wan Kleeck, 7 Johns.
477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M.
R
.
R
. Co., 12 Wis. 67; Clark v. Clark,
1
0 N. H
. 386; Westervelt v. Gregg,
1
2 N. Y
.
211; Thornton v. Turner, 11
Minn. 339; Ward v. Brainerd, 1 Aik.
121; Keith v. Ware, 2 Vt. 174; Ly
man v. Mower, 2 Vt. 517; Kendall v.
Dodge, 3 Vt. 360; State v. Auditor,
&c., 33 Mo. 287; Griffin v. Wilcox,
2
1 Ind. 370; Norris v. Doniphan, 4
.
Met. (Ky.) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3
29
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certain remedy in the law for a
ll wrongs against his person or his
property, and cannot be compelled to buy justice, o
r
to submit to
conditions not imposed upon his fellows as a means o
f obtaining
it." Nor can a party by his misconduct so forfeit a right that
it may be taken from him without judicial proceedings in which
the forfeiture shall be declared in due form. Forfeitures o
f rights
and property cannot be adjudged b
y
legislative act, and confisca
tions without a judicial hearing after due notice would be void as
not being due process o
f
law.” Even Congress, it has been held,
has n
o power to protect parties assuming to act under the author
ity o
f
the general government, during the existence o
f
a civil war,
by depriving persons illegally arrested b
y
them o
f
all
[* 363] redress in the courts.”
Bush, 453; Willar v. Baltimore, &c.
Association, 45 Md. 546. An equita
ble title to lands, o
f
which the legal
title is in the State, is under the same
constitutional protection that the
legal title would be. Wright v.
Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452. Where an
individual is allowed to recover a
sum a
s
a penalty, the right may be
taken away at any time before judg-,
ment. Oriental Bank v. Freeze, 6
Shep. 109; Engle v. Schurtz, 1 Mich.
150; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454;
Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb.
599; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn.
149; O'Kelly v. Athens Manuf. Co.,
3
6
Geo. 51; United States v. Tynen,
1
1 Wall. 88; Chicago & Alton R
.
R
.
Co. v. Adler, 56 Ill. 350; Van In
wagen v. Chicago, 61 Ill. 31; Lyon
v
. Norris, 15 Geo. 480; post, p
.
*383.
See also Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb.
309, and 15 N. Y. 9
;
Coles v. Madi
son County, Breese, 115; Parmelee v.
Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331; post, p
.
*375–
*376.
* Thus, a person cannot be pre
cluded b
y
test oaths from maintaining
suits. McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn.
116; ante, p. *289, note. See post, pp.
*368, *369, note.
* Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 434.
See next note. Also Rison v. Farr,
2
4 Ark. 161; Woodruff v. Scruggs,
* And if the legislature cannot
2
7 Ark. 26; Hodgson v. Millward, 3
Grant's Cas. 406. But no constitu
tional principle is violated by a statute
which allows judgment to be entered
up against a defendant who has been
served with process, unless within a
certain number o
f days he files an
affidavit o
f
merits. Hunt v. Lucas,
97 Mass. 404,
* Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370.
In this case the act of Congress o
f
March 3
,
1863, which provided “that
any order o
f
the President o
r
under
his authority, made a
t any time during
the existence o
f
the present rebellion,
shall be a defence in all courts, to any
action o
r prosecution, civil o
r crimi
nal, pending o
r
to b
e commenced, for
any search, seizure, arrest, o
r impris
onment, made, done, o
r committed,
o
r
acts omitted to be done, under and
by virtue o
f
such order, o
r
under
color o
f any law o
f Congress,” was
held to be unconstitutional. The
same decision was made in Johnson
v
. Jones, 44 Ill. 142. It was said in
the first of these cases that “this act
was passed to deprive the citizens o
f
all redress for illegal arrests and im
prisonments; it was not needed as a
protection for making such as are
legal, because the common law gives
ample protection for making legal
arrests and imprisonments.” And it
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confiscate property or rights, neither can it authorize individ
uals to assume at their option powers of police, which they
may exercise in the condemnation and sale of property offending
against their regulations, or for the satisfaction of their charges
and expenses in it
s management and control, rendered o
r in
curred without the consent of its owners." And a statute
may b
e
added that those acts which
are justified by military o
r
martial
law are equally legal with those jus
tified by the common law. So in
Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563,
it was decided that Congress could
not take away a vested right to sue
for and recover back an illegal tax
which had been paid under protest to
a collector of the national revenue.
See also Bryan v. Walker, 64 N
.
C
.
146. Nor can the right to have a
void tax sale set aside be made con
ditional on the payment o
f
the illegal
tax. Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 44;
and other cases cited, post, pp. *368,
*369, note. The case o
f
Norris v.
Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385, may
properly be cited in this connection.
It was there held that the act of Con
gress o
f July 17, 1862, “to suppress
insurrection, to punish treason and
rebellion, to seize and confiscate the
property o
f
rebels, and for other
purposes,” in so far as it undertook
to authorize the confiscation of the
property o
f
citizens as a punishment
for treason and other crimes, b
y pro
ceedings in rem in any district in
which the property might be, without
presentment and indictment by a
grand jury, without arrest or sum
mons o
f
the owner, and upon such
evidence o
f
his guilt only as would be
proof o
f
any fact in admiralty o
r
revenue cases, was unconstitutional
and void, and therefore that Congress
had no power to prohibit the State
courts from giving the owners o
f
property seized the relief they would
be entitled to under the State laws.
A statute which makes a constitu
tional right to vote depend upon an
impossible condition is void. Davies
v
. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369. See further
State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243; Rison v.
Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ; Hodgson v. Mill
ward, 3 Grant, 406. Where no ex
press power o
f
removal is conferred
on the executive, he cannot declare
an office forfeited for misbehavior;
but the forfeiture must be declared in
judicial proceedings. Page v. Hardin,
8 B
.
Monr. 648; State v. Pritchard,
36 N. J. 101.
* The log-driving and booming
corporations, which were authorized
to be formed under a general law in
Michigan, were empowered, whenever
logs o
r
lumber were put into naviga
ble streams without adequate force
and means provided for preventing
obstructions, to take charge o
f
the
same, and cause it to be run, driven,
boomed, &c., at the owner's expense;
and it gave them a lien on the same
to satisfy all just and reasonable
charges, with power to sell the prop
erty for those charges and for the ex
penses o
f sale, on notice, either served
personally on the owner, o
r posted a
s
therein provided. In Ames v. Port
Huron Log–Driving and Booming
Co., 11 Mich. 147, it was held that
the power which this law assumed to
confer was in the nature o
f
a public
office; and Campbell, J., says: “It is
difficult to perceive by what process a
public office can be obtained or exer
cised without either election o
r appoint
ment. The powers o
f government are
parcelled out b
y
the Constitution,
which certainly contemplates some offi
cial responsibility. Every officer not
expressly exempted is required to take
an oath o
f
office a
s
a preliminary to
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[*364] * which authorizes a party to seize the property of an
other, without process or warrant, and to sell it without
notification to the owner, for the punishment of a private tres
pass, and in order to enforce a penalty against the owner, can
find no justification in the Constitution."
discharging his duties. It is absurd
to suppose that any official power can
exist in any person by his own as
sumption, or by the employment of
some other private person; and still
more so, to recognize in such an as
sumption a power of depriving indi
viduals of their property. And it is
plain that the exercise of such a power
is an act in it
s
nature public, and not
private. The case, however, involves
more than the assumption o
f
control.
The corporation, or rather its various
agents, must o
f necessity determine
when the case arises justifying inter
ference; and having assumed posses
sion, it assesses its own charges; and
having assessed them, proceeds to sell
the property seized to pay them, with
the added expense o
f
such sale. These
proceedings are a
ll
e
x parte, and are
all proceedings in invitum. Their
validity must therefore be determined
b
y
the rules applicable to such cases.
Except in those cases where proceed
ings to collect the public revenue may
stand upon a peculiar footing o
f
their
own, it is an inflexible principle of
constitutional right that no person
can legally be devested o
f
his prop
erty without remuneration, o
r against
his will, unless he is allowed a hear
ing before an impartial tribunal, where
h
e may contest the claim set u
p against
him, and be allowed to meet it on the
law and the facts. When his property
is wanted in specie, for public pur
poses, there are methods assured to
him whereby its value can be ascer
tained. Where a debt o
r penalty o
r
forfeiture may be set u
p against him,
the determination o
f
his liability be
comes a judicial question ; and all
judicial functions are required b
y
the
ly chosen.
Constitution to be exercised by courts
o
f justice, o
r judicial officers regular
He can only be reached
through the forms o
f
law upon a regu
lar hearing, unless he has by contract
referred the matter to another mode
of determination.”
* A statute of New York author
ized any person to take into his cus
tody and possession any animal which
might be trespassing upon his lands,
and give notice o
f
the seizure to a jus
tice o
r
commissioner o
f highways o
f
the town, who should proceed to sell
the animal after posting notice.
From the proceeds o
f
the sale, the
officer was to retain his fees, pay the
person taking up the animal fifty
cents, and also compensation for
keeping it
,
and the balance to the
owner, if he should claim it within a
year. In Rockwell v. Nearing, 35
N
.
Y
.
307, 308, Porter, J., says of
this statute: “The legislature has no
authority either to deprive the citizen
o
f
his property for other than public
purposes, o
r
to authorize it
s
seizure
without process o
r warrant, by per
sons other than the owner, for the
mere punishment o
f
a private tres
pass. S
o far as the act in question
relates to animals trespassing on the
premises o
f
the captor, the proceed
ings it authorizes have not even the
mocking semblance o
f
due process o
f
law. The seizure may be privately
made; the party making it is per
mitted to conceal the property on his
own premises; he is protected, though
the trespass was due to his own con
nivance o
r neglect; he is permitted to
take what does not belong to him
without notice to the owner, though
that owner is near and known; he is
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Notwithstanding the protection which the law gives to vested
rights, it is possible for a party to debar himself of the right to
assert the same in the courts, by his own negligence or
laches. " If one who is dispossessed “be negligent for a [* 365]
long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to
lend him any assistance to recover the possession merely, both to
punish his neglect (nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus sub
veniunt), and also because it is presumed that the supposed
wrong-doer has in such a length of time procured a legal title,
otherwise he would sooner have been sued.” Statutes of limi
tation are passed which fix upon a reasonable time within which
a party is permitted to bring suit for the recovery of his rights,
and which, on failure to do so, establish a legal presumption
against him that he has no rights in the premises. Such a stat
ute is a statute of repose.” Every government is under obliga
tion to it
s
citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies;* but
allowed to sell, through the interven
tion o
f
an officer, and without even
the form o
f judicial proceedings, an
animal in which he has n
o
interest by
way either o
f title, mortgage, pledge,
o
r
lien ; and all to the end that he
may receive compensation for detain
ing it without the consent of the
owner, and a fee o
f fifty cents for his
services as an informer. He levies
without process, condemns without
proof, and sells without execution.”
And he distinguishes these proceed
ings from those in distraining cattle,
damage feasant, which are always
remedial, and under which the party
is authorized to detain the property
in pledge for the payment o
f
his dam
ages. See also opinion b
y Morgan, J.,
in the same case, pp. 314–317, and
the opinions o
f
the several judges in
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N
.
Y
.
395,
419, 434, and 468. Compare Camp
bell v. Evans, 45 N
.
Y
. 356; Cook v.
Gregg, 46 N
.
Y
.
439.
1
.
3 Bl. Com. 188; Broom, Legal
Maxims, 857.
* Such a statute was formerly con
strued with strictness, and the defence
under it was looked upon as uncon
scionable, and not favored; but Mr.
Justice Story has well said, it has
often been matter o
f regret in modern
times that the decisions had not pro
ceeded upon principles better adapted
to carry into effect the real objects o
f
the statute; that instead o
f being
viewed in an unfavorable light as an
unjust and discreditable defence, it
had not received such support as
would have made it what it was in
tended to be, emphatically a statute
o
f
repose. It is a wise and beneficial
law, not designed merely to raise a
presumption o
f payment o
f
a just debt
from lapse o
f
time, but to afford secu
rity against stale demands after the
true state o
f
the transaction may have
been forgotten, o
r
b
e incapable o
f ex
planation by reason o
f
the death o
r
removal of witnesses. Bell v. Morri
son, 1 Pet. 360. See Leffingwell v.
Warren, 2 Black, 599.
* Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430.
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it is not bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who
neglects o
r
refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be pre
sumed that the means b
y
which the other party might disprove
his claim are lost in the lapse o
f
time."
When the period prescribed b
y
statute has once run, so as to
cut off the remedy which one might have had for the recovery o
f
property in the possession o
f another, the title to the property,
irrespective o
f
the original right, is regarded in the law as vested
in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect
to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent
repeal o
f
the limitation law could not be given a retroactive
effect, so as to disturb this title.” It is vested as completely and
perfectly, and is as safe from legislative interference as it would
have been had it been perfected in the owner b
y
grant, o
r by any
species o
f
assurance.”
1 Beal v. Nason, 2 Shep. 344; Bell
v
. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360; Stearns v.
Gittings, 23 Ill. 387: State v. Jones,
21 Md. 437.
* Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch,
358; Newby's Adm’rs v. Blakey, 3
H
.
& M. 57; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis.
532; Baggs's Appeal, 43 Penn. St.
512; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black,
599. See cases cited in next note.
* Although there is controversy on
this point, we consider the text fully
warranted by the following cases:
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396;
Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Lewis
v
. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Atkinson v.
Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Davis v. Minor,
1 How. (Miss.) 183; Hicks v. Steigle
man, 49 Miss 377; Knox v. Cleve
land, 13 Wis. 245; Sprecker v. Wake
lee, 11 Wis. 432; Pleasants v. Rohrer,
1
7 Wis. 577; Moor v. Luce, 29 Penn.
St. 260; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon,
113; McKinney v. Springer, 8 Blackf.
506 ; Stipp v. Brown, 2 Ind. 647;
Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86; Wires
v
. Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Woart v. Win
nick, 3 N
.
H
.
473; Rockport v. Wal
den, 54 N
.
H
. 167; s. c. 20 Am. Rep.
131; Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Lit.
137; Couch v. McKee, 1 Eng. (Ark.)
495; Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heisk.
280; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 700; Yancy v.
Yancy, 5 Heisk. 353; s. c. 13 Am.
Rep. 5
;
Bradford v. Shine's Exr's, 13
Fla. 393; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 339; Lock
hart v. Horn, 1 Woods, 628; Horbach
v
. Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Pitman v. Bump,
5 Oreg. 17; Thompson v. Reid, 41
Iowa, 48; Reformed Church v. School
craft, 65 N. Y
.
134. In some cases a
disposition has been manifested to dis
tinguish between the case o
f property
adversely possessed, and a claim not
enforced; and while it is conceded that
the title to the property cannot be dis
turbed after the statute has run, it is
held that the claim, under new legis
lation may still be enforced; the
statute o
f
limitations pertaining to
the remedy only, and not barring the
right. So it was held in Jones v.
Jones, 18 Ala. 248, where the remedy
o
n
the claim in dispute had been
barred b
y
the statute o
f
another State
where the debtor then resided. And
see Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex.
458. But this last-mentioned doctrine
is rejected in an opinion o
f
much force
by Diron, Ch. J., in Brown v. Parker,
28 Wis. 21, 28. And see Rockport v.
Walden, 54 N. H. 167; s. c. 20 Am.
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All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that
the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited
his right to assert his title in the law." Where they re
late to "property, it seems not to be essential that the [* 366]
adverse claimant should be in actual possession;” but one
who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have
his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit
against that other within a time specified to test the validity of a
claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It
has consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of
five years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under
a statutory power conclusive eyidence of a good title, could not
be valid as a limitation law against the original owner in posses
sion of the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal
proceedings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of
all he claims.”
Rep. 131; McMerty v. Morrison, 62
Mo. 140; Goodman v. Munks, 8
Port. (Ala.) 84; Harrison v. Stacy,
6 Rob. (La.) 15: Baker v. Stone
braker's Adm'r, 36 Mo. 338; Shelby
v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361. But the
statute of limitations may be sus
pended for a period as to demands
not already barred. Wardlaw v. Buz
zard, 15 Rich. 158; Caperton v. Mar
tin, 4 W. Va. 138; s. c. 6 Am. Rep.
270; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex.
745; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 270.
* Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389,
per Walker, J.; Sturgis v. Crownin
shield, 4 Wheat. 207, per Marshall,
Ch. J.; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Monr.
162; Griffin v. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163;
Coleman v. Holmes, 44 Ala. 125.
* Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389;
Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442.
* Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich.
329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12,
it was held that this statute could not
be enforced as a limitation law in
favor of the party in possession, in
asmuch as it did not proceed on the
idea of limiting the time for bringing
suit, but by a conclusive rule of evi
dence sought to pass over the prop
erty to the claimant under the statu
tory sale in all cases, irrespective of
possession. See also Baker v. Kelly,
11 Minn. 480; Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27
Iowa, 160, 173. The case of Leffing
well v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra.
That case follows Wisconsin deci
sions. In the leading case of Hill v.
Kricke, 11 Wis. 442, the holder of the
original title was not in possession ;
and what was decided was that it was
not necessary for the holder of the tax
title to be in possession in order to
claim the benefit of the statute; eject
ment against a claimant being per
mitted by law when the lands were
unoccupied. This circumstance of
possession or want of possession in
the person whose right is to be ex
tinguished seems to us of vital impor
tance. How can a man justly be held
guilty of laches in not asserting claims
to property, when he already possesses
and enjoys the property? The old
maxim is
,
“That which was origi
nally void cannot by mere lapse o
f
time be made valid;'' and if a void
claim by force o
f
a
n act o
f
limitation
can ripen into a conclusive title as
against the owner in possession, the
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All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the
courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants
without affording this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so,
it would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt
to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of
its provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reason
able time after they take effect for the commencement of suits
upon existing causes of action;' though what shall be considered
a reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the
[* 367] legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in estab
lishing the period of legal, bar it does not pertain to the
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire.”
policy underlying that species of leg
islation must be something beyond
what has been generally supposed.
* So held of a statute which took
effect some months after its passage,
and which, in it
s operation upon cer
tain classes o
f
cases, would have extin
guished adverse claims unless asserted
by suit before the act took effect.
Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See
also Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Pro
prietors, &c. v. Laboree, 2 Greenl.
294; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall.
141; Blackford v. Peltier, 1 Blackf.
36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn.
339; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wis. 573;
Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.),
113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.)
296; Ludwig v. Stewart, 32 Mich. 27;
Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162. In
the case last cited it was held that a
statute which only allowed thirty days
in which to bring action on an exist
ing demand was unreasonable and
void. And see what is said in Auld
r. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135. Compare
Davidson v. Lawrence, 49 Geo. 335;
Kimbro v. Bank of Fulton, 49 Geo.
419. In Pereless v. Watertown, 6
Biss. 79, Judge Hopkins, U
.
S
. Dis
trict Judge, decided that a limitation
o
f
one year for bringing suits on
municipal securities o
f
a class gene
rally sold abroad was unreasonable
and void. But a statute giving a new
remedy against a railroad company
for an injury, may limit to a short
time, e. g
.
six months, the time for
bringing suit. O'Bannon v. Louis
ville, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 8 Bush, 348. So
the remedy b
y
suit against stock
holders for corporate debts, it is held,
may b
e limited to one year. Adam
son v. Davis, 47 Mo. 268.
* Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387;
Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith v.
Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Price v. Hop
kin, 13 Mich. 318; De Moss v. New
ton, 31 Ind. 219. But see Berry v.
Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 296.
It may be remarked here, that
statutes o
f
limitation do not apply to
the State unless they so provide ex
pressly. Gibson v. Choteau, 13 Wall.
92. And State limitation laws do
not apply to the United States.
United States v. Hoar, 2 Mas. 311 ;
People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228.
And it has been held that the right
to maintain a public nuisance cannot
be acquired under the statute. State
v
. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240.
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Alterations in the Rules of Evidence.
It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversies
determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These
rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for it
s citi
zens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter into
and constitute a part o
f any contract, nor can be regarded as being
o
f
the essence o
f any right which a party may seek to enforce.
Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must therefore at all
times be subject to modification and control by the legislature; "
and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be made appli
cable to existing causes o
f action, even in those States in which
retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed would
only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal contro
versies in the future; and it could not therefore be called retro
spective even though some o
f
the controversies upon which it
may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been held
in New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disqualifica
tion o
f interest, and allowed parties in suits to testify, might law
fully apply to existing causes o
f
action.” So may a statute which
modifies the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to vary
the terms o
f
a written contract; * and a statute making the pro
test o
f
a promissory note evidence o
f
the facts therein stated.”
These and the like cases will sufficiently illustrate the general
rule, that the whole subject is under the control o
f
the legislature,
which prescribes such rules for the trial and determination as well
o
f existing as o
f
future rights and controversies as in it
s judgment
will most completely subserve the ends of justice.”
1 Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass.
533; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
349, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Fales v.
Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Karney v.
Paisley, 13 Iowa, 89; Commonwealth
v
. Williams, 6 Gray, 1
;
Hickox v.
Tallman, 38 Barb. 608 ; Webb v.
Den, 17 How. 576; Pratt v. Jones, 25
Wt. 303. See ante, p
.
*288 and note.
2 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323.
A very full and satisfactory examina
tion o
f
the whole subject will be
found in this case. To the same
effect is Southwick v. Southwick, 49
N. Y. 510. And see Cowan v. Mc
Cutchen, 43 Miss. 207; Carothers v.
Hurly, 41 Miss. 71.
* Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.
* Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 553.
* Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Ogden
v
. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb
v
. Den, 17 How. 577; Delaplaine v.
Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Kendall v. King
ston, 5 Mass. 534; Fowler v. Chatter
ton, 6 Bing. 258; Himmelman v.
Carpentier, 47 Cal. 42.
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[* 368] "A strong instance in illustration of legislative control
over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the
States in regard to conveyances of lands upon sales to satisfy
delinquent taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the
subject, such conveyances would not be evidence of title. They
are executed under a statutory power; and it devolves upon the
claimant under them to show that the successive steps which
under the statute lead to such conveyance have been taken. But
it cannot be doubted that this rule may be so changed as to make
a tax-deed prima facie evidence that a
ll
the proceedings have
been regular, and that the purchaser has acquired under them a
complete title." The burden o
f proof is thereby changed from
one party to the other; the legal presumption which the statute
creates in favor o
f
the purchaser being sufficient, in connection
with the deed, to establish his case, unless it is overcome by
countervailing testimony. Statutes making defective records
evidence o
f
valid conveyances are o
f
a similar nature ; and these
usually, perhaps always, havé reference to records before made,
and provide for making them competent evidence where before
they were merely void.” But they devest no title, and are not
even retrospective in character. They merely establish what the
legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule for the presen
tation b
y
the parties o
f
their rights before the courts in the
future.
But there are fixed bounds to the power of the legislature over
this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evi
dence, and which party shall assume the burden o
f proof in civil
cases, it
s authority is practically unrestricted, so long as it
s regu
lations are impartial and uniform ; but it has no power to estab
lish rules which, under pretence o
f regulating the presentation o
f
evidence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibit
ing his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the famil
iar doctrine o
f estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting
upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power
1 Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 543;
Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N
.
Y. 53; Dela
plaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v.
Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams v.
Beale, 19 Iowa, 61; Amberg v. Rog
ers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden v. Cross,
1
0 Wis. 289; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich.
140 ; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich.
414; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo.
162; s. c. 46 Mo. 291. The rule once
established may be abolished, even as
to existing deeds. Hickox v. Tall
man, 38 Barb. 608.
* See Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577.
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of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence
should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition
to it
.
In judicial investigations the law o
f
the land re
quires a
n opportunity for a trial;" and there * can be no [* 369]
trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs.
The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery; public
officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen o
f
his prop
erty; witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records
may be collusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and
that legislation which would preclude the fraud or wrong being
shown, and deprive the party wronged o
f
a
ll remedy, has n
o jus
tification in the principles o
f
natural justice or o
f
constitutional
law. A statute, therefore, which should make a tax-deed con
clusive evidence o
f
a complete title, and preclude the owner o
f
the original title from showing it
s invalidity, would be void,
because being not a law regulating evidence, but an unconstitu
tional confiscation o
f property.”
1 Tift v. Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz
v
. Charlton, 23 Wis. 482; Conway v.
Cable, 37 Ill. 89; ante, p
.
*362, note;
post, pp. *382–4383 and notes.
* Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich.
329 ; Case v
. Dean, 16 Mich. 13;
White v. Flynn, 23 Ind. 46; Corbin
v
. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70; Abbott v. Lin
denbower, 42 Mo. 162; s. c. 46 Mo.
291. And see the well-reasoned case
o
f McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356.
Also Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev.
349. As to how far the legislature
may make the tax-deed conclusive
evidence that mere irregularities have
not intervened in the proceedings, see
Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556;
Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508.
Undoubtedly the legislature may dis
pense with mere matters o
f
form in
the proceedings as well after they
have taken place a
s before; but this
is quite a different thing from making
tax-deeds conclusive on points mate
rial to the interest o
f
the property
owner. See further, Wantlan v.
White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mit
chell, 45 Barb. 212 ; McCready v.
Sexton, supra. It is not competent
And a statute which should
for the legislature to compel an owner
of land to redeem it from a void tax
sale as a condition on which he shall
be allowed to assert his title against
it
. Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; Hart
v
. Henderson, 17 Mich. 218; Wilson
v
. McKenna, 52 Ill. 44; Reed v.
Tyler, 56 Ill. 292; Dean v. Borchse
nius, 30 Wis. 236. But it seems that
if the tax purchaser has paid taxes
and made improvements, the payment
for these may be made a condition pre
cedent to a suit in ejectment against
him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644.
The case of Wright v. Cradlebaugh,
3 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connec
tion, “We apprehend,” says Beatty,
Ch. J., “that it is beyond the power
o
f
the legislature to restrain a defend
ant in any suit from setting up a
good defence to an action against
him. The legislature could not di
rectly take the property o
f A
.
to pay
the taxes o
f
B. Neither can it indi
rectly do so b
y
depriving A
.
o
f
the
right o
f setting up in his answer that
his separate property has been jointly
assessed with that o
f B., and asserting
his right to pay his own taxes without
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make the certificate or opinion of an officer conclusive evidence
of the illegality of an existing contract would be equally nuga
tory;" though perhaps if parties should enter into a contract in
view of such a statute then existing, it
s provisions might properly
b
e regarded as assented to and incorporated in their contract, and
therefore binding upon them.”
Retrospective Laws.
Regarding the circumstances under which a man may be said
to have a vested right to a defence against a demand made by
another, it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule
which the authorities will justify. It is certain that he who has
satisfied a demand cannot have it revived against him, and he who
has become released from a demand by the operation o
f
the stat
ute o
f
limitations is equally protected.” In both cases the demand
is gone, and to restore it would be to create a new contract for
the parties, – a thing quite beyond the power of legislation.” So
h
e
who was never bound, either legally or equitably, cannot have
a demand created against him b
y
mere legislative enactment.”
being incumbered with those o
f
B
.
. . . Due process o
f
law not only re
quires that a party shall be properly
brought into court, but that he shall
have the opportunity when in court to
establish any fact which, according to
the usages o
f
the common law o
r
the
provisions o
f
the constitution, would
b
e
a protection to him o
r
his prop
erty.” See Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kan.
498; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 558.
* Young v. Beardsley, 11 Paige, 93.
An act to authorize persons whose
sheep are killed b
y
dogs, to present
their claim to the selectmen of the
town for allowance and payment by
the town, and giving the town after
payment an action against the owner
o
f
the dog for the amount so paid, is
void, as taking away trial by jury,
and as authorizing the selectmen to
pass upon one's rights without giving
him an opportunity to be heard. East
Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H
. 57;
S
. c. 2 Am. Rep. 174.
* See post, p
.
*403, note.
* Ante, p
.
*365, note, and cases
cited.
* Albertson v. Landon, 42 Conn.
209; Ohio & M. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Lackey,
78 Ill. 55. In this last case it was
decided not to be competent to make
a railroad company responsible for
the coroner's inquest and burial o
f
persons dying on the cars, o
r
killed
by collision o
r
other accident occur
ring to the cars, &c., irrespective o
f
any wrong o
r negligence o
f
the com
pany o
r
it
s
servants. In A
.
& N
.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Baty, Sup. Ct. Neb.,
Oct. Term, 1877, it is held incompe
tent to make a railroad company lia
ble to double the value of stock
accidentally injured o
r destroyed on
the railroad track.
* In Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass.
215, it was held that where a pauper
had received support from the parish,
to which b
y
law he was entitled, a
subsequent legislative act could not
CH. XI.] of THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY, ETC. 461
But there are many cases in which, by existing laws, defences
based upon mere informalities are allowed in suits upon contracts,
or in respect to legal proceedings, in some of which a regard to
substantial justice would warrant the legislature in interfering to
take away the defence if it possesses the power to do so.
* In regard to these cases, we think investigation of [* 370]
the authorities will show that a party has no vested right
in a defence based upon an informality not affecting his substantial
equities. And this brings us to a particular examination of a class
of statutes which is constantly coming under the consideration of
the courts, and which are known as retrospective laws, by reason
of their reaching back to and giving some different legal effect to
some previous transaction to that which it had under the law
when it took place.
There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective laws
are not obnoxious to constitutional objection, while in others they
have been held to be void. The different decisions have been
based upon diversities in the facts which make different principles
applicable. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to
pass statutes which reach back to and change or modify the effect
of prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbid
den, eo nomine by the State constitution, and provided further
that no other objection exists to them than their retrospective
character." Nevertheless legislation of this character is exceed
ingly liable to abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that
a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless it
s
terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should oper
ate retrospectively.” And some of the States have deemed it
make him liable by suit to refund the
cost o
f
the support. This case was
approved and followed in People v.
Supervisors o
f Columbia, 43 N
.
Y
.
135. See ante, p
.
*362 and note;
Towle v. Eastern R
.
R., 1
8 N
.
H. 546.
1 Thornton v. McGrath, 1 Duvall,
349; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340;
Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Schen
ley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St.
57; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. 320;
Lane v. Nelson, 79 Penn. St. 407.
* Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns.
477; Sayre v. Wisner, 8 Wend, 661;
Watkins v. Haight, 18 Johns. 138;
Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447; Norris v.
Beyea, 13 N
.
Y
. 273; Drake v. Gil
more, 52 N. Y. 389 ; Quackenbush v.
Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Whitman v.
Hapgood, 13 Mass. 464; Medford
v
. Learned, 16 Mass. 215; Gerry v.
Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319 ; Perkins
v
. Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Plumb v.
Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Hubbard v.
Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563; Sturgis
v
. Hull, 48 Vt. 302; Briggs v. Hub
bard, 19 Vt. 86; Hastings v. Lane,
1
5 Me. 134; Torrey v. Corliss, 32
Me. 333; Atkinson v. Dunlop, 50 Me.
111 ; Rogers v. Greenbush, 58 Me.
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just and wise to forbid such laws altogether by their constitu
tions.”
[* 371] * A retrospective statute curing defects in legal pro
ceedings where they are in their nature irregularities only,
and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction, is not void on con
stitutional grounds, unless expressly forbidden. Of this class are
the statutes to cure irregularities in the assessment of property
395; Guard v. Rowan, 3 Ill. 499;
Garrett v. Doe, 2 Ill. 335; Thompson
v. Alexander, 11 Ill. 54; Conway v.
Cable, 37 Ill. 82; In re Tuller, 79 Ill.
99 ; Knight v. Begole, 56 Ill. 122;
McHaney v. Trustees of Schools, 68
Ill. 140; Hatcher v. Toledo, &c.
R. R. Co., 62 Ill. 477; Harrison v.
Metz, 17 Mich. 377; Danville v. Pace,
25 Grat. 1 ; Cumberland, &c. R. R.
Co. v. Washington Co. Court, 10
Bush, 564; State v. Barbee, 3 Ind.
258; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422;
Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257;
Knoulton v. Redenbaugh, 40 Iowa,
114; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. s.
588 ; Colony v. Dublin, 32 N. H.
432; Er parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277;
Garrett v. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377;
Clark v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 277; Wil
liams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500 ; State
v. The Auditor, 41 Mo. 25 ; State v.
Ferguson, 62 Mo. 77; Merwin v.
Ballard, 66 N. C. 398 ; Tyson v.
School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9 ;
Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Penn. St.
45; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 153; Baldwin
v. Newark, 38 N. J. 138. This doc
trine applies to amendments of stat
utes. Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595.
* See the provision in the Consti
tution of New Hampshire, considered
in Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 481;
Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Wil
lard v. Harvey, 24 N. H. 351; Rich v.
Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; and Simpson
v. Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 466; and
that in the Constitution of Texas, in
De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex.
470. The Constitution of Ohio pro
vides that “the General Assembly
shall have no power to pass retroac
tive laws, or laws impairing the obli
gation of contracts ; provided, how
ever, that the General Assembly may,
by general laws, authorize the courts
to carry into effect the manifest in
tention of parties and officers, by
curing omissions, defects, and errors
in instruments and proceedings, aris
ing out of their want of conformity
with the laws of this State, and upon
such terms as shall be just and equi
table.” Under this clause it was held
competent for the General Assembly
to pass an act authorizing the courts to
correct mistakes in deeds of married
women previously executed, whereby
they were rendered ineffectual. Gos
horn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. s. 641.
Under a provision in the Constitution
of Tennessee that no retrospective law
shall be passed, it has been held that
a law authorizing a bill to be filed by
slaves, by their next friend, to eman
cipate them, although it applied to
cases which arose before its passage,
was not a retrospective law within
the meaning of this clause. Fisher's
Negroes v. Dobbs, 6 Yerg. 119. An
act for the payment of bounties for
past services was held not retrospec
tive in State v. Richland, 20 Ohio,
N. s. 369. See further, Society v.
Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105 ; Officer v.
Young, 5 Yerg. 320: Legislation
may be ordered to take immediate
effect notwithstanding retrospective
laws are forbidden. Thomas v. Scott,
23 La. Ann. 689.
That the legislature cannot retro
spectively construe statutes and bind
parties thereby, see ante, p. *93 et seq.
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for taxation and the levy of taxes thereon ; irregularities in the
organization or elections of corporations; * irregularities in the
votes or other action by municipal corporations, or the like, where
a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution through
the carelessness of officers, or other cause ; * irregular proceedings
in courts, &c."
The rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially
the following: If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something
the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with
by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legisla
ture to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irreg
ularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of
doing some act which the legislature might have made imma
terial by prior law, it is equally competent to make the same
immaterial by a subsequent law.
A few of the decided cases will illustrate this principle. In
Kearney v. Taylor" a sale of real estate belonging to infant
tenants in common had been made by order of court in a parti
* Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. s.
225; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. &
S. 175; McCoy v. Michew, 7 W. & S.
390; Montgomery v. Meredith, 17
Penn. St. 42 ; Dunden v. Snodgrass,
18 Penn. St. 151; Williston v. Colkett,
9 Penn. St. 38; Boardman v. Beck
with, 18 Iowa, 292; The Iowa R. R.
Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 1.12;
Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361.
It is not unconstitutional to prohibit
the vacating of assessments for irreg
ularities. Astor v. New York, 62
N. Y. 580. The limit of power in
validating assessments is very clearly
shown by McKinstry, J., in People v.
Lynch, 51 Cal. 15. And see Walter
v. Bacon, 8 Mass. 472; Locke v. Dane,
9 Mass. 360; Patterson v. Philbrook,
9 Mass. 153; Trustees v. McCaughy,
2 Ohio, N. s. 152. The right to pro
vide for a reassessment of taxes ir
regularly levied is undoubted. See
Brevoot v. Detroit, 23 Mich. 322;
State v. Newark, 34 N. J. 237; Mus
selman v. Logansport, 29 Ind. 533.
But, of course, if the vice is in the
nature of the tax itself, it will con
tinue and be fatal, however often the
process of assessment may be re
peated. See post, p. *382.
* Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb.
188; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416.
* See Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn.
St. 218; Yost's Report, 17 Penn. St.
524; Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497;
Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Com
monwealth v. Marshall, 69 Penn. St.
328; State v. Union, 33 N. J. 250 ;
State v. Guttenberg, 38 N. J. 419.
By the Constitution of Missouri, the
legislature is forbidden to legalize the
unauthorized or invalid acts of any
officer or agent of the State, or of any
county or municipality. Art. 4, § 53.
* Lane v. Nelson, 79 Penn. St.
407; Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 78;
Supervisors v. Wisconsin Cent. R. R.
Co., 121 Mass. 460.
* 15 How. 494. And see Boyce v.
Sinclair, 3 Bush, 261; Weed v. Dono
van, 114 Mass. 181.
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tion suit, and the land bid off by a company of persons, who
proposed subdividing and selling it in parcels. The sale was
confirmed in their names, but by mutual arrangement the deed
was made to one only, for convenience in selling and conveying.
This deed failed to convey the title, because not following the
sale. The legislature afterwards passed an act providing that,
on proof being made to the satisfaction of the court or jury before
which such deed was offered in evidence that the land
[* 372] was sold fairly and without fraud, * and the deed exe
cuted in good faith and for a sufficient consideration, and
with the consent of the persons reported as purchasers, the deed
should have the same effect as though it had been made to the
purchasers. That this act was unobjectionable in principle was
not denied ; and it cannot be doubted that a prior statute, au
thorizing the deed to be made to one for the benefit of a
ll
and
with their assent, would have been open to no valid objection."
In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of
real estate on execution were void, because the officer had in
cluded in the amount due, several small items o
f
fees not allowed
b
y
law. It appeared, however, that, after the sales were made, the
legislature had passed an act providing that no levy should be
deemed void b
y
reason o
f
the officer having included greater fees
than were b
y
law allowable, but that a
ll
such levies, not in other
respects defective, should be valid and effectual to transmit the
title o
f
the real estate levied upon. The liability o
f
the officer for
receiving more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaf
fected. In the leading case the court say: “The law, undoubt
edly, is retrospective ; but is it unjust 2 All the charges of the
officer o
n
the execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and
for necessary services in the performance o
f
his duty; of conse
quence they are eminently just, and so is the act confirming the
levies. A law, although it be retrospective, if conformable to en
tire justice, this court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized
and enforced.” ”
* See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. b
y
certain specified defects and irregu
316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, larities.
for decisions under statutes curing * Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197;
irregular sales b
y guardians and ex- Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 350. And
ecutors. In many of the States gen- see Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn.
eral laws will be found providing 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319;
that such sales shall not be defeated Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149;
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In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages
had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not em
powered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that the
marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had afterwards
passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the court
sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the judicial
power ; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle no
controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of
the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out
by means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while
it was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it
made effectual the legal relation * of matrimony between [* 373]
the parties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of
property dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it
,
inasmuch as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retro
spectively. The court in disposing o
f
the case are understood to
express the opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to
validate an imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have
power to affect incidental, rights. “The man and the woman
were unmarried, notwithstanding the formal ceremony which
passed between them, and free in point o
f
law to live in celibacy,
o
r
contract marriage with any other persons at pleasure. It is a
strong exercise o
f power to compel two persons to marry without
their consent, and a palpable perversion o
f
strict legal right. At
the same time the retrospective law thus far directly operating on
vested rights is admitted to be unquestionably valid, because
manifestly just.” "
It is not to be inferred from this language that the court un
derstood the legislature to possess power to select individual
members o
f
the community, and force them into a relation o
f
marriage with each other against their will. That complete con
trol which the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic
Smith r. Merchand's Ex’rs, 7 S. & R
.
260; Underwood r. Lilly, 10 S. & R
.
97; Bleakney v. Bank o
f Greencastle,
1
7 S
.
& R
. 64; Menges v. Wertman,
1 Penn. St. 218; Weister v. Hade, 52
Penn. St. 474; Ahl v. Gleim, 52
Penn. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon,
1
9 Wis. 17; Parmelee v. Lawrence,
48 Ill. 331.
* Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
224, per Hosmer, J. The power to
validate void marriages held not to
exist in the legislature where, b
y
the
constitution, the whole subject was
referred to the courts. White v.
White, 105 Mass. 325.
30
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relations can hardly extend so far. The legislature may perhaps
divorce parties, with or without cause, according to its own view
of justice or public policy; but for the legislature to marry parties
against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against “the
law of the land.” The learned court must be understood as speak
ing here with exclusive reference to the case at bar, in which the
legislature, by the retrospective act, were merely removing a formal
defect in certain marriages which the parties had assented to,
and which they had attempted to form. Such an act, unless spe
cial circumstances conspired to make it otherwise, would certainly
be “manifestly just,” and therefore might well be held “unques
tionably valid.” And if the marriage was rendered valid, the
legal incidents would follow of course. In a Pennsylvania case
the validity of certain grading and paving assessments was in
volved, and it was argued that they were invalid for the reason
that the city ordinance under which they had been made was
inoperative, because not recorded as required by law. But the
legislature had passed an act to validate this ordinance, and had
declared therein that the omission to record the ordinance should
not affect or impair the lien of the assessments against the lot
owners. In passing upon the validity of this act, the court ex
press the following views: “Whenever there is a right, though
imperfect, the constitution does not prohibit the legislature from
giving a remedy. In Hepburn v. Curts," it was said, “The legis
lature, provided it does not violate the constitutional pro
[* 374] visions, may pass retrospective laws, "such as in their
operation may affect suits pending, and give to a party a
remedy which he did not previously possess, or modify an exist
ing remedy, or remove an impediment in the way of legal pro
ceedings.” What more has been done in this case? . . . While
(the ordinance) was in force, contracts to do the work were made
in pursuance of it
,
and the liability o
f
the city was incurred. But
it was suffered to become of no effect b
y
the failure to record it
.
Notwithstanding this, the grading and paving were done, and the
lots o
f
the defendants received the benefit a
t
the public expense.
Now can the omission to record the ordinance diminish the equi
table right o
f
the public to reimbursement 2 It is at most but a
formal defect in the remedy provided, – an oversight. That
1 7 Watts, 300.
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such defects may be cured by retroactive legislation need not be,
argued.” "
On the same principle legislative acts validating invalid con
tracts have been sustained. When these acts go no farther than
to bind a party by a contract which he has attempted to enter
into, but which was invalid by reason of some personal inability
on his part to make it
,
o
r through neglect o
f
some legal formality,
o
r
in consequence o
f
some ingredient in the contract forbidden
b
y law, the question which they suggest is one o
f policy, and not
o
f
constitutional power.
By statute of Ohio, all bonds, notes, bills, or contracts negoti
able o
r payable a
t any unauthorized bank, or made for the pur
pose o
f being discounted at any such bank, were declared to be
void. While this statute was in force a note was made for the
purpose o
f being discounted at one o
f
these institutions, and was
actually discounted b
y
it
.
Afterwards the legislature passed an
act, reciting that many persons were indebted to such bank, by
bonds, bills, notes, &c., and that owing, among other things, to
doubts o
f
it
s right to recover it
s debts, it was unable to meet it
s
own obligations, and had ceased business, and for the purpose o
f
winding up its affairs had made an assignment to a trustee ;
therefore the said act authorized the said trustee to bring suits
on the said bonds, bills, notes, &c., and declared it should not be
lawful for the defendants in such suits “to plead, set up, or insist
upon, in defence, that the notes, bonds, bills, o
r
other written
evidences of such indebtedness are void on account of
being contracts against o
r
in violation o
f any statute "law [* 375]
o
f
this State, o
r
o
n
account o
f
their being contrary to
public policy.” This law was sustained as a law “that contracts
may be enforced,” and a
s
in furtherance o
f equity and good mor
als.” The original invalidity was only because o
f
the statute, and
that statute was founded upon reasons o
f public policy which had
either ceased to b
e o
f force, o
r
which the legislature regarded as
overborne by countervailing reasons. Under these circumstances
' Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 The legislature has the same power
Penn. St. 29, 57. See also State v. to ratify and confirm an illegally ap
Newark, 27 N
. J. 185; Den v. Dow- pointed corporate body that it has to
nam, 13 N. J. 135; People v. Sey- create a new one. Mitchell v. Deeds,
mour, 16 Cal. 332; Grim v. Weis- 49 Ill. 416.
-
enburg School District, 57 Penn. St. * Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347.
433; State v. Union, 33 N. J. 355. -
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it was reasonable and just that the makers of such paper should
be precluded from relying upon such invalidity."
By a statute of Connecticut, where loans of money were made,
and a bonus was paid by the borrower over and beyond the inter
est and bonus permitted by law, the demand was subject to a
deduction from the principal of a
ll
the interest and bonus paid.
A construction appears to have been put upon this statute by
business men which was different from that afterwards given by
the courts; and a large number o
f
contracts o
f
loan were in con
sequence subject to the deduction. The legislature then passed
a “healing act,” which provided that such loans theretofore made
should not be held, b
y
reason o
f
the taking o
f
such bonus, to b
e
usurious, illegal, or in any respect void ; but that, if otherwise
legal, they were thereby confirmed, and declared to b
e
[* 376] valid, as to principal, interest, and *bonus. The case
- o
f
Goshen v. Stonington * was regarded as sufficient au
thority in support o
f
this act; and the principle to be derived
1 Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio,
N
.
s. 155; Johnson v. Bentley, 16
Ohio, 97. See also Syracuse Bank v.
Davis, 16 Barb. 188. By statute,
notes issued b
y unincorporated bank
ing associations were declared void.
This statute was afterwards repealed,
and action was brought against
bankers on notes previously issued.
Objection being taken that the legis
lature could not validate the void con
tracts, the judge says: “I will consider
this case on the broad ground o
f
the
contract having been void when made,
and o
f
no new contract having arisen
since the repealing act. But by ren
dering the contract void it was not
annihilated. The object o
f
the [orig
inal] act was not to vest any right in
any unlawful banking association, but
directly the reverse. The motive was
not to create a privilege, o
r
shield
them from the payment o
f
their just
debts, but to restrain them from vio
lating the law b
y destroying the credit
o
f
their paper, and punishing those
who received it. How then can the
defendants complain 2 As unauthor
ized bankers they were violators o
f
the law, and objects not o
f protection
but o
f punishment. The repealing
act was a statutory pardon o
f
the
crime committed b
y
the receivers o
f
this illegal medium. Might not the
legislature pardon the crime, without
consulting those who committed it?
. . . How can the defendants say
there was no contract, when the
plaintiff produces their written en
gagement for the performance o
f
a
duty, binding in conscience if not in
law? Although the contract, for
reasons o
f policy, was so far void
that an action could not be sustained
o
n it
,
yet a moral obligation to per
form it
,
whenever those reasons
ceased, remained; and it would be
going very far to say that the legis
lature may not add a legal sanction
to that obligation, on account o
f
some
fancied constitutional restriction.”
Hess v. Werts, 4 S
.
& R
.
361. See
also Bleakney v. Bank o
f Greencastle,
1
7 S
.
& R
. 64; Menges v. Wertman,
1 Penn. St. 218; Boyce v. Sinclair, 3
Bush, 264.
* 4 Conn. 224.
*372–4373.
See ante, pp.
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from that case was stated to be “that where a statute is expressly
retroactive, and the object and effect of it is to correct an inno
cent mistake, remedy a mischief, execute the intention of the
parties, and promote justice, then, both as a matter of right and
of public policy affecting the peace and welfare of the community,
the law should be sustained.” "
After the courts of the State of Pennsylvania had decided that
the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist in that State
under a Connecticut title, a statute was passed which provided
that the relation of landlord and tenant “shall exist and be held
as fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Penn
sylvania claimants as between other citizens of this Common
wealth, on the trial of any case now pending or hereafter to be
brought within this Commonwealth, any law or usage to the con
trary notwithstanding.” In a suit which was pending and had
been once tried before the statute was passed, the statute was
sustained by the Supreme Court of that State, and afterwards by
the Supreme Court of the United States, into which last-men
tioned court it had been removed on the allegation that it vio
lated the obligation of contracts. As its purpose and effect was
to remove from contracts which the parties had made a legal im
pediment to their enforcement, there would seem to be no doubt,
in the light o
f
the other authorities we have referred to, that the
conclusion reached was the only just and proper one.”
In the State of Ohio, certain deeds made b
y
married women
were ineffectual for the purposes o
f
record and evidence, b
y
reason
o
f
the omission on the part o
f
the officer taking the acknowledg
ment to state in his certificate that, before and a
t
the time o
f
the
1 Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn.
97. See also Savings Bank v. Bates,
8 Conn. 505; Andrews v. Russell, 7
Blackf. 474; Grimes v. Doe, 8 Blackf.
371; Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn.
292; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48
Ill. 331. In Curtis v. Leavitt, 17
Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9
,
and in
Woodruff v. Scruggs. 27 Ark. 26,
s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 777, a statute
forbidding the interposition o
f
the
defence o
f usury was treated as a
statute repealing a penalty. See
further, Lewis v. Foster, 1 N
.
H
.
61;
Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66;
Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn.
149; Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68;
Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb.
599; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill.
331; Danville v. Pace, 25 Grat 1.
The case of Gilliland v. Phillips,
1 S
. C
.
N
.
s. 152, is contra; but it
discusses the point but little, and
makes no reference to these cases.
* Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. &
R. 169, and 2 Pet. 380. And see
Watson v. Mercer. 8 Pet. 88; Lessee
o
f Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 G
.
& J.
461; Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220;
Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1.
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grantor making the acknowledgment, he made the contents known
to her by reading or otherwise. An act was afterwards passed
which provided that “any deed heretofore executed pur
[* 377] suant to * law, by husband and wife, shall be received in
evidence in any of the courts of this State, as conveying
the estate of the wife, although the magistrate taking the ac
knowledgment of such deed shall not have certified that he read
or made known the contents of such deed before or at the time
she acknowledged the execution thereof.” This statute, though
with some hesitation at first, was held to be unobjectionable. The
deeds with the defective acknowledgments were regarded by the
legislature and by the court as being sufficient for the purpose of
conveying at least the grantor's equitable estate; and if sufficient
for this purpose, no vested rights would be disturbed, or wrong
be done, by making them receivable in evidence as conveyances."
Other cases go much farther than this, and hold that, although
the deed was originally ineffectual for the purpose of conveying
the title, the healing statute may accomplish the intent of the
parties by giving it effect.”
* Chestnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16
Ohio, 599, overruling Connell v. Con
nell, 6 Ohio, 358; Good v. Zercher,
12 Ohio, 364; Meddock v. Williams,
12 Ohio, 377; and Silliman v. Cum
mins, 13 Ohio, 116. Of the dissent
ing opinion in the last case, which
the court approve in 16 Ohio, 609–610,
they say: “That opinion stands upon
the ground that the act operates only
upon that class of deeds where enough
had been done to show that a court
of chancery ought, in each case, to
render a decree for a conveyance, as
suming that the certificate was not
such as the law required. And where
the title in equity was such that a
court of chancery ought to interfere
and decree a good legal title, it was
within the power of the legislature to
confirm the deed, without subjecting
an indefinite number to the useless
expense of unnecessary litigation.”
See also Lessee of Dulany v. Tilgh
man, 6 G. & J. 461; Journeay v.
Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57; Grove v.
At first sight these cases might seem
Todd, 41 Md. 633. But the legis
lature, it has been declared, has no
power to legalize and make valid the
deed of an insane person. Routsong
v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174. In Illinois it
has been decided that a deed of re
lease of dower executed by a married
woman, but not so acknowledged as to
be effectual, cannot be validated by
retrospective statute, because to do so
would be to take from the woman a
vested right. Russell v. Rumsey, 35
Ill. 362.
* Lessee of Walton v. Bailey, 1
Binn. 477; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S.
& R. 101: Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. &
R. 72; Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R.
35; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88 ;
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How.
456; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316;
Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138; Es
tate of Stickmoth, 7 Nev. 227; Gos
horn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. s. 641.
In the last case the court say: “The
act of the married woman may, under
the law, have been void and inopera
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to go beyond the mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at
least technically objectionable, as depriving a party of
property " without an opportunity for trial, inasmuch as [* 378]
they proceeded upon the assumption that the title still
remained in the grantor, and that the healing act was required
for the purpose of divesting him of it
,
and passing it over to the
grantee." Apparently, therefore, there would seem to be some
force to the objection that such a statute deprives a party o
f
vested rights. But the objection is more specious than sound.
If all that is wanting to a valid contract or conveyance is the
observance o
f
some legal formality, the party may have a legal
right to avoid it: but this right is coupled with no equity, even
though the case be such that no remedy could be afforded the
other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes
away in such a case is the right in the party to avoid his contract, —
a naked legal right which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and
which no constitutional provision was ever designed to protect.”
As the point is put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a
party cannot have a vested right to do wrong ; * or, as stated by
the Supreme Court o
f
New Jersey, “Laws curing defects which
would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be presumed to
b
e
the desire o
f
the party affected, cannot be considered as taking
tive; but in justice and equity it did
not leave her right to the property
untouched. She had capacity to do
the act in a form prescribed b
y
law
for her protection. She intended to
d
o
the act in the prescribed form.
She attempted to do it
,
and her at
tempt was received and acted on in
good faith. A mistake subsequently
discovered invalidates the act; justice
and equity require that she should not
take advantage o
f
the mistake; and
she has therefore no just right to the
property. She has no right to com
plain if the law which prescribed
forms for her protection shall inter
fere to prevent her reliance upon
them to resist the demands o
f jus
tice.” Similar language is employed
in the Pennsylvania cases. See fur
ther, Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138.
* This view has been taken in
some similar cases. See Russell v.
Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362; Alabama, &c.
Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510; Orton
v
. Noonan, 23 Wis. 102; Dade v.
Medcalf, 9 Penn. St. 108.
* In Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich.
215, a check, void at the time it was
given, for want of a revenue stamp,
was held valid after being stamped as
permitted by a subsequent act o
f
Congress. A similar ruling was
made in Harris v. Rutledge, 19 Iowa,
389. The case of State v. Norwood,
1
2 Md. 195, is still stronger. The
curative statute was passed after
judgment had been rendered against
the right claimed under the defective
instrument, and it was held that it
must be applied by the appellate
court. See post, p
.
*381.
* Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.
245. See also Lycoming v. Union,
15 Penn. 166, 170.
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away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested con
trary to the justice and equity of the case.””
The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully re
stricted to the parties to the original contract, and to such other
persons as may have succeeded to their rights with no greater
equities. A subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot be deprived
of the property which he has acquired, by an act which retro
spectively deprives his grantor of the title which he had when
the purchase was made. Conceding that the invalid deed may
be made good as between the parties, yet if
,
while it remained
invalid, and the grantor still retained the legal title to the land,
a third person has purchased and received a conveyance,
[* 379] with no notice of any fact which should “preclude his
acquiring an equitable as well as a legal title thereby, it
would not be in the power o
f
the legislature to so confirm the orig
inal deed as to divest him o
f
the title he has acquired. The posi
tion o
f
the case is altogether changed b
y
this purchase. The legal
title is no longer separated from equities, but in the hands o
f
the
second purchaser is united with a
n equity as strong as that which
exists in favor o
f
him who purchased first. Under such circum
stances even the courts o
f equity must recognize the right o
f
the
second purchaser as best, and as entitled to the usual protection
which the law accords to vested interests.”
1 State v. Newark, 25 N. J. 197.
Compare Blount v. Janesville, 31 Wis.
648; Brown v. New York, 63 N. Y.
239. In New York, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Van Horn, 57 N
.
Y
.
473, the right o
f
the legislature to validate a void con
tract was denied on the ground that to
validate it would be to take the prop
erty o
f
the contracting party without
due process o
f
law. The cases which
are contra are not examined in the
opinion, o
r
even referred to.
* Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389;
Southard v. Central R
.
R
. Co., 26
N. J. 22 ; Thompson v. Morgan,
6 Minn. 292; Meighen v. Strong,
6 Minn. 177; Norman v. Heist, 5 W.
& S
. 171; Greenough v. Greenough,
1
1 Penn. St. 404: Le Bois v. Bramel,
4 How. 449; McCarthy v. Hoffman,
23 Penn. St. 50S ; Sherwood v. Flem
ing, 25 Tex. 408; Wright v. Hawkins,
28 Tex. 452. The legislature cannot
validate an invalid trust in a will, by
act passed after the death o
f
the testa
tor, and after title vested in the heirs.
Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn. St. 338.
See Snyder v. Bull, 17 Penn. St. 58;
McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St.
507; Bolton v. Johns, 5 Penn. St.
145; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338.
The cases here cited must not be un
derstood as establishing any different
principle from that laid down in
Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209,
where it was held competent to vali
date a marriage, notwithstanding the
rights o
f
third parties would be inci
dentally affected. Rights o
f
third par
ties are liable to be incidentally affected
more or less in any case in which
a defective contract is made good; but
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If
,
however, a grantor undertakes to convey more than he pos
sesses, o
r contrary to the conditions o
r qualifications which, for
the benefit o
f others, are imposed upon his title, o
r
in fraud o
f
the rights o
f
others whose representative o
r agent he is
,
so that the
defect in his conveyance consists not in any want o
f
due formality,
nor in any disability imposed b
y law, it is not in the power o
f
the
legislature to validate it retrospectively; and we may add, also,
that it would not have been competent to authorize it in advance.
In such case the rights of others intervene, and they are entitled
to protection o
n
the same grounds, though for still stronger rea
sons, which exist in the case o
f
the bona fide purchasers above
referred to."
this is no more than might happen in
enforcing a contract o
r decreeing a di
vorce. See post, p
.
*384. Also Tall
man v
. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71.
1 In Shouk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St.
327, the facts were that a married
woman held property under a devise,
with an express restraint upon her
power to alienate. She nevertheless
gave a deed o
f
the same, and a legis
lative act was afterwards obtained to
validate this deed. Held void. A g
new, J. : “Many cases have been
cited to prove that this legislation is
merely confirmatory and valid, begin
ning with Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. &
R
.
72, and ending with Journeay v.
Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. The most
of them are cases of the defective ac
knowledgments o
f
deeds o
f
married
women. But there is a marked differ
ence between them and this. In all
o
f
them there was a power to convey,
and only a defect in the mode o
f
its
exercise. Here there is an absolute
want o
f power to convey in any mode.
In ordinary cases a married woman
has both the title and the power to
convey o
r
to mortgage her estate, but
is restricted merely in the manner o
f
its exercise. This is a restriction it
is competent for the legislature to
remove, for the defect arises merely
in the form o
f
the proceeding, and
not in any want o
f authority. Those
to whom her estate descends, because
o
f
the omission o
f
a prescribed form,
are really not injured by the valida
tion. It was in her power to cut
them off, and in truth and conscience
she did so, though she failed a
t
law.
They cannot complain, therefore, that
the legislature interferes to do justice.
But the case before us is different.
[The grantor] had neither the right
nor the power during coverture to cut
off her heirs. She was forbidden by
the law o
f
the gift, which the donor
imposed upon it to suit his own pur
poses. Her title was qualified to this
extent. Having done an act she had
n
o right to do, there was no moral
obligation for the legislature to en
force. Her heirs have a right to say
. . . . the legislature cannot take our
estate and vest it in another who
bought it with notice on the face o
f
his
title that our mother could not convey
to him.” The true principle on which
retrospective laws are supported was .
stated long ago b
y Duncan, J., in Un
derwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R
.
101; to
wit, where they impair no contract, or
disturb no vested right, but only vary
remedios, cure defects in proceedings
otherwise fair, which do not vary ex
isting obligations contrary to their
situation when entered into and when
prosecuted.” In White Mountains
R. R. Co. v. White Mountains R. R.
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We have already referred to the case of contracts by municipal
corporations which, when made, were in excess of their authority,
but subsequently have been confirmed by legislative action. If
the contract is one which the legislature might originally have
authorized, the case falls within the principle above laid down,
and the right of the legislature to confirm it must be recognized."
This principle is one which has very often been acted upon in the
case of municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement,
where the original undertaking was without authority of law, and
the authority given was conferred by statute retrospectively.”
It has not usually been regarded as a circumstance of impor
tance in these cases, whether the enabling act was before or after
the corporation had entered into the contract in question; and if
the legislature possesses that complete control over the subject of
taxation by municipal corporations which has been declared in
Co. of N. H., 50 N. H. 50, it was de
cided that the legislature had no
power, as against non-assenting par
ties, to validate a fraudulent sale of
corporate property. In Alter's Ap
peal, 67 Penn. St. 341, s. c. 5 Am.
Rep. 433, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania declared it incompetent
for the legislature, after the death of
a party, to empower the courts to cor
rect a mistake in his will which ren
dered it inoperative — the title having
already passed to his heirs. But
where it was not known that the de
cedent left heirs, it was held compe
tent, as against the State, to cure
defects in a will after the death, and
thus prevent an escheat. Estate of
Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 229.
1 See Shaw v. Norfolk R. R.
Corp., 5 Gray, 179, in which it was
held that the legislature might vali
date an unauthorized assignment of a
franchise. Also May v. Holdridge,
23 Wis. 93, and cases cited, in which
statutes authorizing the reassessment
of irregular taxes were sustained. In
this case, Paine, J., says: “ This rule
must of course be understood with its
proper restrictions. The work for
which the tax is sought to be assessed
must be of such a character that the
legislature is authorized to provide
for it by taxation. The method
adopted must be one liable to no
constitutional objection. It must be
such as the legislature might origi
nally have authorized had it seen fit.
With these restrictions, where work
of this character has been done, I
think it competent for the legislature
to supply a defect of authority in the
original proceedings, to adopt and
ratify the improvement and provide
for a reassessment of the tax to pay
for it.” And see. Brewster v. Syra
cuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Kunkle v. Frank
lin, 13 Minn. 127; Boyce v. Sinclair,
3 Bush, 264; Dean v. Borchsenius,
30 Wis. 236; Stuart v. Warren, 37
Conn. 225. A city ordinance may be
validated retrospectively. Truchelut
v. Charleston, 1 N. & McC. 227.
* See, among other cases, McMillan
v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 330; Gould v. Ster
ling, 23 N. Y. 457 ; Thompson v. Lee
County, 3 Wall. 327; Bridgeport v.
Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Conn. 475;
Board of Commissioners v. Bright, 18
Ind. 93; Gibbons v. Mobile, &c. R. R.
Co., 36 Ala. 410.
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many cases, it is difficult to perceive how such a corporation can
successfully contest the validity of a special statute, which
only sanctions a contract previously made by the * cor- [* 380]
poration, and which, though at the time ultra vires, was
nevertheless for a public and local object, and compels its per
formance through an exercise of the power of taxation."
1 In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13
Wis. 37, it appeared that the city of
Milwaukee had been authorized to
contract for the construction of a
harbor, at an expense not to exceed
$100,000. A contract was entered
into by the city providing for a larger
expenditure; and a special legislative
act was afterwards obtained to ratify
it. The court held that the subse
quent legislative ratification was not
sufficient, proprio vigore, and without
evidence that such ratification was
procured with the assent of the city,
or had been subsequently acted upon
or confirmed by it
,
to make the con
tract obligatory upon the city. The
court say, per Dixon, Ch. J.: “The
question is
,
can the legislature, by
recognizing the existence o
f
a previ
ously void contract, and authorizing
its discharge by the city, o
r
in any
other way, coerce the city against its
will into a performance of it
,
o
r
does
the law require the assent o
f
the city,
a
s well as o
f
the legislature, in order
to make the obligation binding and
efficacious? I must say that, in my
opinion, the latter act, as well as the
former, is necessary for that purpose,
and that without it the obligation can
not be enforced. A contract void for
want o
f capacity in one o
r
both o
f
the
contracting parties to enter into it is
a
s no contract; it is as if no attempt
a
t
a
n agreement had ever been made.
And to admit that the legislature, of
its own choice, and against the wishes
o
f
either o
r
both o
f
the contracting
parties, can give it life and vigor, is
to admit that it is within the scope of
legislative authority to devest settled
rights o
f property, and to take the
property o
f
one individual o
r corpo
ration and transfer it to another.”
This reasoning is of course to be un
derstood in the light o
f
the particular
case before the court; that is to say,
a case in which the contract was to do
something not within the ordinary
functions o
f
local government. See
the case explained and defended by
the same eminent judge in Mills v.
Charlton, 29 Wis. 413. Compare Fisk
v
. Kenosha, 26 Wis. 26, 33, Knapp
v
. Grant, 27 Wis. 147, and Single v.
Supervisors o
f Marathon, 38 Wis. 363,
in which the right to validate a con
tract which might originally have
been authorized was fully affirmed.
And see Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill.
218, 225, opinion by Chief Justice
Lawrence, in which, after referring to
Harward v. St. Clair, &c. Drainage
Co., 51 Ill. 130, People v. Mayor of
Chicago, 51 Ill. 30, Hessler v. Drain
age Com’rs, 53 Ill. 105, and Loving.
ston v. Wider, 53 Ill. 302, it is said,
“These cases show it to be the settled
doctrine o
f
this court, that, under the
constitution o
f 1848, the legislature
could not compel a municipal corpo
ration to incur a debt for merely local
purposes, against its own wishes, and
this doctrine, as already remarked, has
received the sanction o
f express en
actment in our existing constitution.
That was the effect of the curative
act under consideration, and it was
therefore void.” The cases of Guil
ford v. Supervisors o
f Chenango, 18
Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y. 143, Brews
ter v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y
.
116, and
Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65, es
pecially go much further than is nec
essary to sustain the text. See also
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[• 381] * Nor is it important in any of the cases to which we
have referred, that the legislative act which cures the
irregularity, defect, or want of original authority, was passed after
suit brought, in which such irregularity or defect became matter
of importance. The bringing of suit vests in a party no right to
a particular decision ; 1 and his case must be determined on the
law as it stands, not when the suit was brought, but when the
judgment is rendered.”
Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 33 Conn.
408: People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y.
551; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608;
Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474;
State v. Sullivan, 43 Ill. 413: John
son v. Campbell, 49 Ill. 316. In Brew
ster v. Syracuse, parties had con
structed a sewer for the city at a
stipulated price, which had been fully
paid to them. The charter of the
city forbade the payment of extra
compensation to contractors in any
case. The legislature afterwards
passed an act empowering the Com
mon Council of Syracuse to assess,
collect, and pay over the further sum
of $600 in addition to the contract
price; and this act was held constitu
tional. In Thomas v. Leland, certain
parties had given bond to the State,
conditioned to pay into the treasury
a certain sum of money as an induce
ment to the State to connect the
Chenango Canal with the Erie at
Utica, instead of at Whitestown as
originally contemplated, – the sum
mentioned being the increased ex
pense in consequence of the change.
Afterwards the legislature, deeming
the debt thus contracted by individ
uals unreasonably partial and onerous,
passed an act, the object of which was
to levy the amount on the owners of
real estate in Utica. This act seemed
to the court unobjectionable. “The
general purpose of raising the money
by tax was to construct a canal, a
public highway, which the legislature
believed would be a benefit to the city
of Utica as such; and independently
It has been held that a statute allowing
of the bond, the case is the ordinary
one of local taxation to make or im
prove a highway. If such an act be
otherwise constitutional, we do not
see how the circumstance that a bond
had before been given securing the
same money can detract from it
s
validity. Should an individual volun
teer to secure a sum o
f
money, in itself
properly leviable by way o
f
tax on a
town o
r county, there would be noth
ing in the nature o
f
such an arrange
ment which would preclude the legis
lature from resorting, by way o
f tax,
to those who are primarily and more
justly liable. Even should he pay the
money, what is there in the constitu
tion to preclude his being reimbursed
by a tax.” Here, it will be perceived,
the corporation was compelled to as
sume an obligation which it had not
even attempted to incur, but which
private persons, for considerations
which seemed to them sufficient, had
taken upon their own shoulders. We
have expressed doubts o
f
the correct
ness o
f
this decision, ante, pp. *230–
*231, note, where a number o
f
cases
are cited, bearing upon the point.
1
,
Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 309:
Butler p. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Cow
gill v. Long, 15 Ill. 203; Miller v.
Graham, 17 Ohio, N
.
s. 1
:
State v.
Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Patterson v.
Philbrook, 9 Mass. 151.
2 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88;
Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54;
Bristol v. Supervisors, &c., 20 Mich.
93 : Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S
.
& R.
169, and 2 Pet. 380.
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amendments to indictments in criminal cases might constitution
ally be applied to pending suits; " and even in those States in
which retrospective laws are forbidden, a cause must be tried
under the rules of evidence existing at the time of the trial,
though different from those in force when the suit was com
menced.” And if a case is appealed, and pending the appeal the
law is changed, the appellate court must dispose of the case under
the law in force when their decision is rendered.”
But the healing statute must in al
l
cases b
e confined to validat
ing acts which the legislature might previously have au
thorized. “It cannot make good retrospectively acts or [* 382]
contracts which it had and could have no power to per
mit or sanction in advance.* There lies before us at this time a
volume o
f
statutes o
f
one of the States, in which are contained
acts declaring certain tax-rolls valid and effectual, notwithstand
ing the following irregularities and imperfections: a failure in the
supervisor to carry out separately, opposite each parcel o
f
land on
the roll, the taxes charged upon such parcel, as required b
y law;
| State c. Manning, 11 Tex. 402.
* Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304.
* State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195.
In Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch,
281, a vessel had been condemned in
admiralty, and pending an appeal the
act under which the condemnation
was declared was repealed. The
court held that the cause must be
considered as if no sentence had been
pronounced; and if no sentence had
been pronounced, then, after the ex
piration or repeal o
f
the law, no pen
alty could be enforced o
r punishment
inflicted for a violation of the law
committed while it was in force, un
less some special provision o
f
statute
was made for that purpose. See also
Schooner Rachel v. United States,
6 Cranch, 329; Commonwealth v.
Duane, 1 Binney, 601; United States
v
. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Common
wealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350;
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick.
373; Hartung v. People, 22 N
.
Y
.
100; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4
Biss. 327; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How.
129; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall.
541; Er parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506;
United States v. Tyner, 11 Wall. 88;
Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150. In the
McCardle case the appellate jurisdic
tion o
f
the United States Supreme
Court in certain cases was taken away
while a case was pending. Per Chase,
Ch. J.: “Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law; and when it ceases
to exist, the only function remaining
to the court is that o
f announcing the
fact and dismissing the cause. This
is not less clear upon authority than
upon principle.” But where a State
has jurisdiction o
f
a subject, e. g
.
pilotage, until Congress establishes
regulations, and penalties are incurred
under a State act, and afterwards
Congress legislates on the subject,
this does not repeal, but only sus
pends the State law; and a penalty
previously incurred may still be col
lected. Sturgis v. Spofford, 45 N
.
Y
.
446.
* Kimball v. Rosenthal, (Sup. Ct.
Wis.) 5 Cent. Law Journal, 372.
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a failure in the supervisor to sign the certificate attached to the
roll; a failure in the voters of the township to designate, as re
quired by law, in a certain vote by which they had assumed the
payment of bounty moneys, whether they should be raised by tax
or loan ; corrections made in the roll by the supervisor after it had
been delivered to the collector; the including by the supervisor
of a sum to be raised for township purposes without the previous
vote of the township, as required by law; adding to the roll a
sum to be raised which could not lawfully be levied by taxation
without legislative authority; the failure of the supervisor to
make out the roll within the time required by law; and the acci
dental omission of a parcel of land which should have been em
braced by the roll. In each of these cases, except the last, the
act required by law, and which failed to be performed, might by
previous legislation have been dispensed with ; and perhaps in the
last case there might be question whether the roll was rendered
invalid by the omission referred to, and, if it was, whether the
subsequent act could legalize it." But if township officers should
assume to do acts under the power of taxation which could not
lawfully be justified as an exercise of that power, no subsequent
legislation could make them good. If
,
for instance, a part o
f
the
property in a taxing district should be assessed at one rate, and a
part at another, for a burden resting equally upon all, there would
b
e
n
o
such apportionment a
s
is essential to taxation, and the
roll would be beyond the reach of curative legislation.” And
* See Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 o
f
the legislature to cause an irregu
Wis. 242; Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis.
1
;
post, p
.
*515, note.
* This is clearly shown by McKin
stry, J., in People v. Lynch, 51 Cal.
15. And see Billings v. Detten, 15
Ill. 218, Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82,
and Thames Manufacturing Co. v.
Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, for cases where
curative statutes were held not effec
tual to reach defects in tax proceed
ings. As to what defects may o
r
may not be cured by subsequent leg
islation, see Allen v. Armstrong, 16
Iowa, 508, Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis.
556, and Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42
Mo. 162. In Tallman v. Janesville, 17
Wis. 71, the constitutional authority
lar tax to be reassessed in a subse
quent year, where the rights o
f
bona
fide purchasers had intervened, was
disputed; but the court sustained the
authority as “a salutary and highly
beneficial feature o
f
our systems o
f
taxation,” and “not to be abandoned
because in some instances it produces
individual hardships.” Certainly bona
fide purchasers, as between themselves
and the State, must take their pur
chases subject to a
ll public burdens
justly resting upon them. The case
o
f Conway v. Cable is instructive. It
was there held among other things, –
and very justly as we think, - that
the legislature could not make good a
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if persons or property should be assessed for taxation * in [* 883]
a district which did not include them, not only would the
assessment be invalid, but a healing statute would be ineffectual
to charge them with the burden." In such a case there would be
a fatal want of jurisdiction ; and even in judicial proceedings, if
there was originally a failure of jurisdiction, no subsequent law
can confer it.”
º
Statutory Privileges and Eremptions.
The citizen has no vested right in statutory privileges and
exemptions. Among these may be mentioned,—exemptions from
the performance of public duty upon juries, or in the militia, and
the like ; exemptions of property or person from assessment for the
purposes of taxation ; exemptions of property from being seized
on attachment, or execution, or for the payment of taxes; ex
emption from highway labor, and the like. All these rest upon
reasons of public policy, and the laws are changed as the varying
circumstances seem to require. The State demands the perform
ance of military duty by those persons only who are within cer
tain specified ages; but if
,
in the opinion o
f
the legislature, the
public exigencies should demand military service from all other
persons capable o
f bearing arms, the privilege o
f exemption might
b
e recalled, without violation o
f any constitutional principle. The
fact that a party had passed the legal age under an existing law,
and performed the service demanded b
y it
,
could not protect him
against further calls, when public policy or public necessity was
tax sale effected b
y
fraudulent combi
nation between the officers and the
purchasers. In Miller v. Graham, 17
Ohio, N
.
s. 1
,
a statute validating cer
tain ditch assessments was sustained,
notwithstanding the defects covered
by it were not mere irregularities; but
that statute gave the parties an oppor
tunity to be heard as to these defects.
* See Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385;
People v. Supervisors o
f Chenango,
1
1 N
.
Y
. 563; Hughey's Lessee v.
Howell, 2 Ohio, 231; Covington v.
Southgate, 15 B
.
Monr. 491; Morford v.
Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; post, pp. *499, *500.
* So held in McDaniel v. Correll,
19 Ill. 228, where a statute came un
der consideration which assumed to
make valid certain proceedings in
court which were void for want of
jurisdiction o
f
the persons concerned.
See also Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen,
361 ; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wis.
367; Griffin's Ex’r v. Cunningham,
2
0 Grat. 109, per Joynes, J.; Rich
ards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St. 248; State
v
. Doherty, 60 Me. 504; Pryor v. Dow
ney, 50 Cal. 388; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 656.
Walpole v. Elliott, 18 Ind. 259, is dis
tinguishable from these cases. In that
case there was not a failure o
f juris
diction, but an irregular exercise o
f
it
.
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thought to require them." In like manner, exemptions from tax
ation are always subject to recall, when they have been granted
merely as a privilege, and not for a consideration received by the
public ; as in the case of exemption of buildings for religious or
educational purposes, and the like.” So, also, are exemptions of
property from execution.” So, a license to carry on a particular
trade for a specified period, may be recalled before the period has
elapsed." So, as before stated, a penalty given by statute may be
taken away by statute at any time before judgment is recovered.”
So an offered bounty may be recalled, except as to so much as
was actually earned while the offer was a continuing
[* 384] one ; * and the fact that a party has purchased property
or incurred expenses in preparation for earning the bounty
cannot preclude the recall."
* Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass.
443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Geo. 67 ;
Mayer, Ex parte, 27 Tex. 715;
Bragg v. People, 78 Ill. 328; Moore
v. Cass, 10 Kan. 288; Murphy v. Peo
ple, 37 Ill. 447; State v. Miller, 2
Blackf. 35; State v. Quimby, 51 Me.
395; State v. Wright, 53 Me. 328;
State v. Forshner, 43 N. H. 89. And
see Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew.
387.
* See ante, pp. *280, *281, and notes.
All the cases concede the right in the
legislature to recall an exemption
from taxation, when not resting upon
contract. The subject was considered
in People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629, in
which it was decided that a limited
immunity from taxation, tendered to
the members of voluntary military
companies, might be recalled at any
time. It was held not to be a con
tract, but “only an expression of the
legislative will for the time being, in
a matter of mere municipal regula
tion.” And see Christ Church v.
Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Lord v.
Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; East Sagi
naw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw,
19 Mich. 259 ; S. c. in error, 13 Wall.
373.
8 Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 238.
* Of this there can be no question
A franchise granted by the State
unless a fee was paid for the license;
and well-considered cases hold that it
may be even then. See Adams v.
Hackett, 5 Gray, 597; Metropolitan
Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y.
657; ante, p. *283, note.
* Oriental Bank v. Freeze, 6 Shep.
109. The statute authorized the
plaintiff, suing for a breach of a pris
on bond, to recover the amount of his
judgment and costs. This was re
garded by the court as in the nature
of a penalty; and it was therefore
held competent for the legislature,
even after breach, to so modify the
law as to limit the plaintiff's recovery
to his actual damages. See ante,
p. *362, note 5, and cases cited.
* East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v.
East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 271; s. c.
2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 373.
But as to so much of the bounty as
was actually earned before the change
in the law, the party earning it has a
vested right which cannot be taken
away. People v. State Auditors, 9
Mich. 327. And it has been held
competent in changing a county seat
to provide by law for compensation,
through taxation to the residents of
the old site. Wilkinson v. Cheatham,
43 Geo. 258.
-
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with a reservation of a right of repeal must be regarded as a
mere privilege while it is suffered to continue, but the legislature
may take it away at any time, and the grantees must rely for the
perpetuity and integrity of the franchises granted to them solely
upon the faith of the sovereign grantor." A statutory right to
have cases reviewed on appeal may be taken away, by a repeal of
the statute, even as to causes which had been previously appealed.”
A mill-dam act which confers upon the person erecting a dam the
right to maintain it
,
and flow the lands o
f private owners on pay
ing such compensation as should be assessed for the injury done,
may be repealed even as to dams previously erected.” These
illustrations must suffice under the present head.
Consequential Injuries.
It is a general rule that no one has a vested right to be pro
tected against consequential injuries arising from a proper exer
cise o
f rights by others.” This rule is peculiarly applicable to
injuries resulting from the exercise o
f public powers. Under the
police power the State sometimes destroys, for the time being, and
perhaps permanently, the value to the owner o
f
his property, with
out affording him any redress. The construction o
f
a new way
o
r
the discontinuance o
f
a
n old one may very seriously affect the
value o
f adjacent property; the removal o
f
a county o
r
State cap
ital will often reduce very largely the value of al
l
the real estate
o
f
the place from whence it was removed ; but in neither case
can the parties, whose interests would be injuriously affected,
enjoin the act, o
r
claim compensation from the public.” The gen
eral laws o
f
the State may b
e
so changed a
s
to transfer, from one
town to another, the obligation to support certain individuals, who
may become entitled to support as paupers, and the Constitution
will present no impediment." The granting of a charter to a new
1 Per Smith, J., in Pratt v. Brown,
3 Wis. 611. See post, pp. *578–"579,
note.
* Er parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.
* Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603.
But if the party maintaining the dam
had paid to the other party for the
permanent flowing o
f
his land, a com
pensation assessed under the statute,
it might be otherwise.
* For the doctrine damnum absºue
injuria, see Broom’s Maxims, 185;
Sedgwick on Damages, 30, 112.
* See ante, p
.
*208, and cases cited
in note. Also Wilkinson v. Cheat
ham, 43 Geo. 258; Fearing v. Irwin,
55 N. Y. 486.
* Goshen v. Richmond, 4 Allen,
460 ; Bridgewater v. Plymouth, 97
Mass. 390.
31
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corporation may sometimes render valueless the franchise of an
existing corporation ; but unless the State by contract has pre
cluded itself from such new grant, the incidental injury
[* 385] * can constitute no obstacle." But indeed it seems idle
to specify instances, inasmuch as a
ll changes in the laws
o
f
the State are liable to inflict incidental injury upon individuals,
and, if every citizen was entitled to remuneration for such injury,
the most beneficial and necessary changes in the law might be
found impracticable o
f accomplishment.
We have now endeavored to indicate what are and what are
not to be regarded as vested rights, and to classify the cases in
which individual interests, in possession o
r expectancy, are pro
tected against being devested b
y
the direct interposition o
f legis
lative authority. Some other cases may now be considered, in
which legislation has endeavored to control parties as to the man
ner in which they should make use o
f
their property, o
r
has per
mitted claims to be created against it through the action o
f
other
parties against the will of the owners. We do not allude now to
the control which the State may possess through an exercise o
f
the police power, — a power which is merely one of regulation
with a view to the best interests and the most complete enjoyment
o
f rights by all,—but to that which, under a claim of State policy,
and without any reference to wrongful act o
r
omission b
y
the
owner, would exercise a supervision over his enjoyment o
f un
the value o
f
the first franchise, if not
to render it altogether worthless.
But the first charter was not exclusive
1 The State of Massachusetts
granted to a corporation the right
to construct a toll-bridge across the
Charles River, under a charter which
was to continue for forty years, after
wards extended to seventy, a
t
the end
o
f
which period the bridge was to
become the property o
f
the Common
wealth. During the term the corpo
ration was to pay 200l. annually to
Harvard College. Forty-two years
after the bridge was opened for pas
sengers, the State incorporated a com
pany for the purpose of erecting
another bridge over the same river,
a short distance only from the first,
and which would accommodate the
same passengers. The necessary
effect would be to decrease greatly
in its terms; no contract was violated
in granting the second; the resulting
injury was incidental to the exercise
o
f
a
n undoubted right by the State,
and a
s all the vested rights o
f
the first
corporation still remained, though re
duced in value b
y
the new grant, the
case was one o
f damage without legal
injury. Charles River Bridge v. War
ren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344, and 11 Pet.
420. See also Turnpike Co. v. State,
3 Wall. 210; Piscataqua Bridge v.
New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N
.
H. 35;
English v. New Haven, &c. Co., 32
Conn. 240; Binghamton Bridge Case,
2
7 N. Y. S7, and 3 Wall. 51.
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doubted rights, or which, in some cases, would compel him to
recognize and satisfy demands upon his property which have been
created without his assent.
In former times sumptuary laws were sometimes passed, and
they were even deemed essential in republics to restrain the lux
ury so fatal to that species of government." But the ideas which
suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would
seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right
of every man to do what he will with his own, not interfering
with the reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the funda
mentals of our law. The instances of attempt to interfere with
it have not been numerous since the early colonial days. A
notable instance of an attempt to substitute the legislative judg
ment for that of the proprietor, regarding the manner in which
he should use and employ his property, may be mentioned. In
the State of Kentucky an act was at one time passed to compel
the owners of wild lands to make certain improvements upon
them within a specified time, and declared them forfeited to the
State in case the statute was not complied with. It would be
difficult to frame, consistently with the general principles of free
government, a plausible argument in support of such a statute.
It was not an exercise of the right of eminent domain, for that
appropriates property to some specific public use on making com
pensation. It was not taxation, for that is simply an apportion
ment of the burden of supporting the government. It was not a
police regulation, for that could not go beyond preventing
an improper use of the land with reference to “the due exer-[* 386]
cise of rights and enjoyment of legal privileges by others.
It was purely and simply a law to forfeit a man's property, if he
failed to improve it according to a standard which the legislature
* Montesq. Sp. of the Laws, B. 7.
Such laws, though common in some
countries, have never been numerous
in England. See references to the
legislation of this character, 4 Bl.
Com. 170. Some of these statutes
prescribed the number of courses per
missible at dinner or other meal,
while others were directed to restrain
ing extravagance in dress. See Hal
lam, Mid. Ages, c. 9, pt. II
.
; and as
to Roman sumptuary laws, Encyc.
Metrop. Vol. X
.
p
.
110. Adam Smith
said o
f
such laws, “It is the highest
impertinence and presumption in
kings and ministers to pretend to
watch over the economy o
f private
people, and to restrain their expense,
either b
y sumptuary laws, o
r by pro
hibiting the importation o
f foreign
luxuries.” Wealth of Nations, B
.
2
,
c. 3. As to prohibitory liquor laws,
see post, pp. *581—"584.
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had prescribed. To such a power, if possessed by the govern
ment, there could be no limit but the legislative discretion; and
if defensible on principle, then a law which should authorize the
officer to enter a man's dwelling and seize and confiscate his fur
niture if it fell below, or his food if it exceeded, an established
legal standard, would be equally so. But in a free country such
laws when mentioned are condemned instinctively."
But cases may sometimes present themselves in which im
provements actually made by one man upon the land of another,
even though against the will of the owner, ought on grounds of
strict equity to constitute a charge upon the land improved. If
they have been made in good faith, and under a reasonable ex
pectation on the part of the person making them, that he was to
reap the benefit of them, and if the owner has stood by and suf
fered them to be made, but afterwards has recovered the land and
appropriated the improvements, it would seem that there must
exist against him at least a strong equitable claim for reimburse
ment of the expenditures made, and perhaps no sufficient reason
why provision should not be made by law for their recovery.
Accordingly in the several States statutes will be found which
undertake to provide for these equitable claims. These statutes
are commonly known as betterment laws; and as an illustration
of the whole class, we give the substance of that adopted in Ver
mont. It provided that after recovery in ejectment, where he or
those through whom he claimed had purchased or taken a lease
of the land, supposing at the time that the title purchased was
good, or the lease valid to convey and secure the title and inter
est therein expressed, the defendant should be entitled to recover
of the plaintiff the full value of the improvements made by him
or by those through whom he claimed, to be assessed by jury, and
to be enforced against the land, and not otherwise. The value
was ascertained by estimating the increased value of the land in
consequence of the improvements, but the plaintiff at his election
might have the value of the land without the improvements
assessed, and the defendant should purchase the same at that
price within four years, or lose the benefit of his claim for im
provements. But the benefit of the law was not given
[* 387] to one who had entered on land * by virtue of a contract
1 The Kentucky statute referred Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana, 499. See
to was declared unconstitutional in also Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana, 326.
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with the owner, unless it should appear that the owner had failed
to fulfil such contract on his part."
This statute, and similar ones which preceded it
,
have been
adjudged constitutional b
y
the Supreme Court o
f Vermont, and
have frequently been enforced. In an early case the court ex
plained the principle o
f
these statutes a
s follows: “The action
for betterments, as they are now termed in the statute, is given
o
n
the supposition that the legal title is found to be in the
plaintiff in ejectment, and is intended to secure to the defendant
the fruit o
f
his labor, and to the plaintiff all that he is justly
entitled to, which is his land in as good a situation as it would
have been had no labor been bestowed thereon. The statute is
highly equitable in a
ll
it
s provisions, and would do exact justice
if the value either of the improvements or of the land was
always correctly estimated. The principles upon which it is
founded are taken from the civil law, where ample provision was
made for reimbursing the boma fide possessor the expense o
f
his
improvements, if he was removed from his possession b
y
the
legal owner. It gives to the possessor not the expense which he
has laid out on the land, but the amount which he has increased
the value o
f
the land by his betterments thereon ; or, in other
words, the difference between the value o
f
the land as it is when
the owner recovers it
,
and the value if no improvement had been
made. If the owner takes the land together with the improve
ments, a
t
the advanced value which it has from the labor of the
possessor, what can be more just than that he should pay the
difference 2 But if he is unwilling to pay this difference, by
giving a deed as the statute provides, he receives the value as it
would have been if nothing had been done thereon. The only
objection which can be made is
,
that it is sometimes compelling
the owner to sell when he may have been content with the prop
erty in its natural state. But this, when weighed against the
loss to the boma fide possessor, and against the injustice o
f de
priving him o
f
the fruits o
f
his labor, and giving it to another,
who, by his negligence in not sooner enforcing his claim, has
in some measure contributed to the mistake under which he has
labored, is not entitled to very great consideration.” ”
* Revised statutes o
f
Vermont o
f
class o
f
legislation was also elabo
1839, p
.
216. rately examined and defended by
* Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37. This Trumbull, J., in Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill.
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[* 388] *The last circumstance stated in this opinion — the
negligence of the owner in asserting his claim — is evi
dently deemed important in some States, whose statutes only
allow a recovery for improvements by one who has been in pos
session a certain number of years. But a later Vermont case
dismisses it from consideration as a necessary ground on which
to base the right of recovery. “The right of the occupant to
recover the value of his improvements,” say the court, “does
not depend upon the question whether the real owner has been
vigilant or negligent in the assertion of his rights. It stands
upon a principle of natural justice and equity; viz., that the
occupant in good faith, believing himself to be the owner, has
added to the permanent value of the land by his labor and his
money; is in equity entitled to such added value; and that it
would be unjust that the owner of the land should be enriched
by acquiring the value of such improvements, without compen
sation to him who made them. This principle of natural justice
has been very widely, we may say universally recognized.” "
171, and in some of the other cases
referred to in the succeeding note.
See also Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478;
s. c. 2 Story, 607.
1 Whitney v. Richardson, 31 Vt.
306. For other cases in which similar
laws have been held constitutional, see
Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374;
Fowler v. Halbert, 4 Bibb, 54 ; With
ington v. Corey, 2 N. H. 115; Bacon
v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303; Pacquette
v. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Childs v.
Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Scott v. Ma
ther, 14 Tex. 235; Saunders v. Wil
son, 19 Tex. 194; Brackett v. Nor
cross, 1 Greenl. 92; Hunt's Lessee v.
McMahan, 5 Ohio, 132; Longworth
v. Worthington, 6 Ohio, 10. See fur
ther, Jones v. Carter, 12 Mass. 314;
Coney v. Owen, 6 Watts, 435; Steele
v. Spruance, 22 Penn. St. 256; Lynch
v. Brudie, 63 Penn. St. 206; Dothage
v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Fenwick v.
Gill, 38 Mo. 510; Howard v. Zeyer,
18 La. Ann. 407; Pope v. Macon, 23
Ark. 644; Marlow v. Adams. 24 Ark.
109; Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598;
Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal. 487. For a
contrary ruling, see Nelson v. Allen, 1
Yerg. 376, in which, however, Judge
Catron in a note says the question
was really not involved. Mr. Justice
Story held, in Society, &c. v. Wheeler,
2 Gall. 105, that such a law could not
constitutionally be made to apply to
improvements made before its pas
sage; but this decision was made un
der the New Hampshire Constitution,
which forbade retrospective laws.
The principles of equity upon which
such legislation is sustained would
seem not to depend upon the time
when the improvements were made.
See Davis's Lessee v. Powell, 13
Ohio, 308. In Childs v. Shower, 18
Iowa, 261, it was held that the legis
lature could not constitutionally make
the value of the improvements a per
sonal charge against the owner of the
land, and authorize a personal judg
ment against him. The same ruling
was had in McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio,
N. S. 463. A statute had been passed
authorizing the occupying claimant at
his option, after judgment rendered
against him for the recovery of the
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* Betterment laws, then, recognize the existence of an [*389]
equitable right, and give a remedy for it
s
enforcement
where none had existed before. It is true that they make a man
pay for improvements which he has not directed to be made ; but
this legislation presents n
o
feature o
f
officious interference by
the government with private property. The improvements have
been made b
y
one person in good faith, and are now to be appro
priated by another. The parties cannot be placed in statu quo,
and the statute accomplishes justice as nearly as the circumstances
o
f
the case will admit, when it compels the owner of the land,
who, if he declines to sell, must necessarily appropriate the
betterments made by another, to pay the value to the person a
t
whose expense they have been made. The case is peculiar; but
a statute cannot be void as an unconstitutional interference with
private property which adjusts the equities o
f
the parties a
s
nearly as possible according to natural justice."
Unequal and Partial Legislation.
In the course of our discussion of this subject it has been seen
that some statutes are void though general in their scope, while
others are valid though establishing rules for single cases only.
An enactment may therefore be the law of the land without
being a general law. And this being so, it may be important to
land, to demand payment from the
successful claimant of the full value
o
f
his lasting and valuable improve
ments, o
r
to pay to the successful
claimant the value of the land with
out the improvements, and retain it
.
The court say: “The occupying
claimant act, in securing to the occu
pant a compensation for his improve
ments as a condition precedent to the
restitution o
f
the lands to the owner,
goes to the utmost stretch o
f
the legis
lative power touching this subject.
And the statute . . . providing for
the transfer of the fee in the land to
the occupying claimant, without the
consent o
f
the owner, is a palpable
invasion o
f
the right o
f private prop
erty, and clearly in conflict with the
Constitution.”
1 In Harris v. Inhabitants of Mar
blehead, 10 Gray, 44, it was held that
the betterment law did not apply to a
town which had appropriated private
property for the purposes of a school
house, and erected the house thereon.
The law, it was said, did not apply
“where a party is taking land by
force o
f
the statute, and is bound to
see that a
ll
the steps are regular. If
it did, the party taking the land might
in fact compel a sale o
f
the land, o
r
compel the party to buy the school
house, o
r any other building erected
upon it.” But as a matter of con
stitutional authority, we see no reason
to doubt that the legislature might ex
tend such a law even to the cases of
this description.
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consider in what cases constitutional principles will require a
statute to be general in its operation, and in what cases, on the
other hand, it may be valid without being general. We speak
now in reference to general constitutional principles, and not to
any peculiar rules which may have become established by special
provisions in the constitutions of individual States.
The cases relating to municipal corporations stand upon pe
culiar grounds from the fact that those corporations are agencies
of government, and as such are subject to complete legislative
control. Statutes authorizing the sale of property of minors and
other persons under disability are also exceptional, in that they
are applied for by the parties representing the interests of the
owners, and are remedial in their character. Such statutes are
supported by the presumption that the parties in interest would
consent if capable of doing so; and in law they are to be
[* 390] considered as assenting in * the person of the guardians
or trustees of their rights. And perhaps in any other
case, if a party petitions for legislation and avails himself of it
,
h
e may justly be held estopped from disputing it
s validity; so
that the great bulk o
f private legislation which is adopted from
year to year, may at once be dismissed from this discussion.
Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutional
provision forbids,” be either general o
r
local in their application;
they may embrace many subjects o
r one, and they may extend
to all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors o
r
married women, bankers o
r traders, and the like.” The authority
that legislates for the State a
t large must determine whether
particular rules shall extend to the whole State and all it
s citi
* This doctrine was applied in Fer
guson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230, to
parties who had obtained a statute for
the levy o
f
a tax to refund bounty
moneys, which statute was held void
a
s
to other persons. And see Motz v.
Detroit, 18 Mich. 495. A man may
b
e bound b
y
his assent to an act
changing the rules o
f
descent in his
particular case, though it would be
void if not assented to. Beall v.
Beall, 8 Geo. 210.
* See ante, p
.
*128, note, and cases
cited. To make a statute a pub
lic law o
f general obligation, it is not
necessary that it should be equally
applicable to all parts o
f
the State;
all that is required is that it shall ap
ply equally to all persons within the
territorial limits described in the act.
State v. County Commissioners o
f
Baltimore, 29 Md. 516. See Pollock
v
. McClurken, 42 Ill. 370; Haskell v.
Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232.
* See the Iowa R. R. Land Co. v.
Soper, 39 Iowa, 112; Matter o
f Good
ell, 39 Wis. 232; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 42;
Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf.
Co., 120 Mass. 383.
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zens, or, on the other hand, to a subdivision of the State or a
single class of it
s
citizens only. The circumstances o
f
a particu
lar locality, o
r
the prevailing public sentiment in that section o
f
the State, may require o
r
make acceptable different police regula
tions from those demanded in another, or call for different tax
ation, and a different application o
f
the public moneys. The
legislature may therefore prescribe o
r
authorize different laws o
f
police, allow the right o
f
eminent domain to be exercised in
different cases and through different agencies, and prescribe
peculiar restrictions upon taxation in each distinct municipality,
provided the State constitution does not forbid. These discrim
inations are made constantly; and the fact that the laws are o
f
local o
r special operation only is not supposed to render them
obnoxious in principle. The legislature may also deem it desira
ble to prescribe peculiar rules for the several occupations, and to
establish distinctions in the rights, obligations, duties, and capa
cities o
f
citizens. The business o
f
common carriers, for instance,
o
r
o
f bankers, may require special statutory regulations for the
general benefit, and it may be matter of public policy to give
laborers in one business a specific lien for their wages, when it
would be impracticable o
r impolitic to do the same b
y
persons
engaged in some other employments. If the laws be otherwise
unobjectionable, a
ll
that can be required in these cases is
,
that
they be general in their application to the class or locality to
which they apply; and they are then public in character, and o
f
their propriety and policy the legislature must judge.
But a statute would not be constitutional which should pro
scribe a class o
r
a party for opinion's sake," or which should
1 The sixth section of the Metro
politan Police Law o
f
Baltimore (1859)
provided that “no Black Republican,
o
r
indorser o
r supporter o
f
the Helper
book, shall be appointed to any office”
under the Board of Police which it
established. This was claimed to be
unconstitutional, as introducing into
legislation the principle o
f proscrip
tion for the sake o
f political opinion,
which was directly opposed to the
cardinal principles o
n
which the Con
stitution was founded. The court dis
missed the objection in the following
words: “That portion of the sixth
section which relates to Black Repub
licans, &c., is obnoxious to the objec
tion urged against it
,
if we are to
consider that class o
f persons as pro
scribed on account o
f
their political
o
r religious opinions. But we cannot
understand, officially, who are meant
to be affected by the proviso, and there
fore cannot express a judicial opinion
on the question.” Baltimore v. State,
1
5 Md. 468. See also p
.
484. This
does not seem to be a very satisfactory
disposition o
f
so grave a constitutional
objection to a legislative act. That
courts may take judicial notice o
f
490 [CH. XI.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
[*391] select particular * individuals from a class or locality,
and subject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them
special obligations or burdens from which others in the same
locality or class are exempt."
The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws
of the State; but when it does so the suspension must be general,
and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular local
ities.” Privileges may be granted to particular individuals when
the fact that the electors of the coun
try are divided into parties with
well-known designations cannot be
doubted; and when one of these is
proscribed by a name familiarly ap
plied to it by it
s opponents, the infer
ence that it is done because of political
opinion seems to be too conclusive to
need further support than that which
is found in the act itself. And we
know n
o
reason why courts should
decline to take notice of those facts
o
f general notoriety, which, like the
names o
f political parties, are a part
o
f
the public history o
f
the times. A
statute requiring causes in which the
venue has been changed to be re
manded on the affidavits of three un
conditional Union men, that justice
can be had in the courts where it
originated, held void, on the principles
stated in the text in Brown v. Hay
wood, 4 Heisk. 357.
It has been decided that State laws
forbidding the intermarriage o
f
whites
and blacks are such police regulations
a
s
are entirely within the power o
f
the States, notwithstanding the pro
visions of the new amendments to the
federal Constitution. State v. Gib
son, 36 Ind. 389; s. c. 10 Am. Rep.
42; State v. Hairston, 63 N
.
C
. 451;
Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525; Lonas v.
State, 3 Heisk. 287; s. c. 1 Green,
Cr. R
. 452; Er rel. Hobbs and John
son, 1 Woods, 537. But Ellis v.
State is overruled b
y
Burns v. State,
48 Ala. 195; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 34.
It is also said colored children may be
required to attend separate schools, if
impartial provision is made for their
instruction. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev.
342; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 713; Cory v.
Carter, 48 Ind. 327; Ward v. Flood,
48 Cal. 36 ; State v. McCann, 21
Ohio, N
.
s. 198. But some States
forbid this. People v. Board o
f Edu
cation, 18 Mich. 400; Clark v. Board
o
f Directors, 24 Iowa, 266; Dove r.
School District, 41 Iowa, 689. And
when separate schools are not estab
lished for colored children, they are
entitled to admission to the other
public schools. State v. Duffy, supra.
1 Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal.
534. There is no reason, however,
why the law should not take notice o
f
peculiar views held by some classes o
f
people, which unfit them for certain
public duties, and excuse them from
the performance o
f
such duties; as
Quakers are excused from military
duty, and persons denying the right
to inflict capital punishment are ex
cluded from juries in capital cases.
These, however, are in the nature o
f
exemptions, and they rest upon con
siderations o
f
obvious necessity.
* The statute of limitations cannot
b
e suspended in particular cases while
allowed to remain in force generally.
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Davi
son v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 393. See
ante, p
. *365, note. The general
exemption laws cannot be varied for
particular cases o
r
localities. Bull v.
Conroe, 13 Wis. 238, 244. The leg
islature, when forbidden to grant
divorces, cannot pass special acts
authorizing the courts to grant di
vorces in particular cases for causes
not recognized in the general law.
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by so doing the rights of others are not interfered with ; disabili
ties may be removed; the legislature as parens patriae, when not
forbidden, may grant authority to the guardians or trustees of
incompetent persons to exercise a statutory control over their
estates for their assistance, comfort, or support, or for the dis
charge of legal or equitable liens upon their property; but every
one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules,
and a special statute which, without his consent, singles his case
out as one to be regulated by a different law from that
which is applied "in al
l
similar cases, would not be legiti- [*392]
mate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate
a
s is not within the province o
f
free governments. Those who
make the laws “are to govern b
y
promulgated, established laws,
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for
rich and poor, for the favorite a
t
court and the countryman a
t
plough.”" This is a maxim in constitutional law, and b
y
it
we may test the authority and binding force o
f legislative
enactments.”
Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 671; Simonds
v
. Simonds, 103 Mass. 572. See, for
the same principle, Alter's Appeal, 67
Penn. St. 341. The authority in
emergencies to suspend the civil laws
in a part of the State only, by a
declaration o
f
martial law, we do not
call in question by any thing here
stated. Nor in what we have here
said do we have any reference to sus
pensions o
f
the laws generally, o
r o
f
any particular law, under the extraor
dinary circumstances o
f
rebellion o
r
War.
1 Locke on Civil Government, § 142;
State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 349.
* In Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326,
the validity o
f
a statute granting an
appeal from a decree o
f
the Probate
Court in a particular case came under
review. The court say: “On princi
ple it can never be within the bounds
o
f legitimate legislation to enact a
special law, o
r pass a resolve dispens
ing with the general law in a particu
lar case, and granting a privilege and
indulgence to one man, b
y
way o
f
exemption from the operation and
effect o
f
such general law, leaving all
other persons under its operation.
Such a law is neither just nor reason
able in its consequences. It is our
boast that we live under a government
o
f laws, and not o
f men; but this
can hardly be deemed a blessing,
unless those laws have for their im
movable basis the great principles o
f
constitutional equality. Can it be
supposed for a moment that, if the
legislature should pass a general law,
and add a section by way o
f proviso,
that it never should be construed to
have any operation o
r
effect upon the
persons, rights, o
r property o
f Arche
laus Lewis or John Gordon, such a
proviso would receive the sanction o
r
even the countenance of a court of
law? And how does the supposed
case differ from the present? A
resolve passed after the general law
can produce only the same effect as
such proviso. In fact, neither can
have any legal operation.” See also
Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140;
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 ;
Piquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 64; Budd
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Special courts cannot be created for the trial of the rights
and obligations of particular parties;" and those cases in which
legislative acts granting new trials or other special relief in
judicial proceedings, while they have been regarded as usurpa
tions of judicial authority, have also been considered obnoxious
to the objection that they undertook to suspend general
[* 393] laws in special * cases. The doubt might also arise-
whether a regulation madé-for any one class of citizens,
o) entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights,
privileges, or legal capacities in a e
r
before unknown to the
law, could be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Dis
tinctions in these respects must rest upon some reason upon
which they can be defended, – like the want of capacity in
infants and insane persons; and if the legislature should under
take to provide that persons following some specified lawful
n
' trade o
r employment should not have capacity to make contracts, 3
& o
r
to receive conveyances, o
r
to build such houses as others were
º allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use of
| their property as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be
Q
S
doubted that the act would transcend the due bounds o
f legisla
tive power, even though no express constitutional provision could
b
e pointed out with which it would come in conflict. To forbid
v
. State, 3 Humph. 483; Van Zant
v
. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; People v.
Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135; Davis v. Men
asha, 2
1 Wis. 497; Lancaster v. Barr,
2
5 Wis. 560; Brown v. Haywood, 4
Heisk. 357; Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy,
2 Yerg. 554. In the last case it is
said: “The rights of every individual
must stand o
r
fall by the same rule o
r
law that governs every other member
o
f
the body politic, o
r land, under
similar circumstances; and every par
tial o
r private law, which directly pro
poses to destroy o
r
affect individual
rights, o
r
does the same thing by
affording remedies leading to similar
consequences, is unconstitutional and
void. Were it otherwise, odious in
dividuals and corporations would be
governed b
y
one law; the mass of the
community and those who made the
law, by another ; whereas the like
general law affecting the whole com
munity equally could not have been
passed.” See further, Officer v.
Young, 5 Yerg. 320; Griffin v. Cun
ningham, 20 Grat. 31 (an instructive
case); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64;
s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 528; Trustees v.
Bailey, 10 Fla. 238; Lawson v. Jef
fries, 47 Miss. 686; s. c. 12 Am. Rep.
342; Arnold v. Kelley, 5 W. Va. 446;
ante, pp. *95–"96.
1 As, for instance, the debtors o
f
a
particular bank. Bank o
f
the State
v
. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599. Compare
Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, in
which it was declared that a special
exemption o
f
the city o
f
Janesville
from the payment o
f
costs in any
proceeding against it to set aside a
tax or tax sale was void. In matter
o
f Nichols, 8 R
.
I. 50, a special act
admitting a tort debtor committed to
jail to take the poor debtor's oath and
b
e discharged, was held void.
CH. XI.] OF THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY, ETC. 499
to an individual or a class the right to the acquisition or enjoy
ment of property in such manner as should be permitted to the
community at large, would be to deprive them of liberty in par
ticulars of primary importance to their “pursuit of happiness; J.
and those who should claim a right to do so ought to be able to
show a specific authority therefor, instead of calling upon others
to show how and where the authority is negatived.
Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably
should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are
granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case,
it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as
little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government.”
* Burlamaqui (Politic Law, c. 3,
§ 15) defines natural liberty as the
right which nature gives to all man
kind of disposing of their persons
and property after the manner they
judge most consonant to their happi
ness, on condition of their acting
within the limits of the law of nature,
and so as not to interfere with an
equal exercise of the same rights by
other men. See 1 Bl. Com. 125.
Lieber says: “Liberty of social man
consists in the protection of unre
strained action in as high a degree
as the same claim of protection of
each individual admits of, or in the
most efficient protection of his rights,
claims, interests, as a man or citizen,
or of his humanity manifested as a
social being.” Civil Liberty and
Self-Government. “Legal liberty,”
says Mackintosh, in his essay on the
Study of the Law of Nature and of
Nations, “consists in every man's
security against wrong.’
* In the Case of Monopolies, Darcy
v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84, the grant of
an exclusive privilege of making
playing cards was adjudged void,
inasmuch as “the sole trade of any
mechanical artifice, or any other mo
nopoly, is not only a damage and
prejudice to those who exercise the
same trade, but also to all other sub
jects; for the end of all these monopo
lies is for the private gain of the
patentees.” And see Norwich Gas
Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co.,
25 Conn. 19; State v. Cincinnati, &c.
Gas Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 262. Com
pare with these State v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co., 29 Wis. 454. On this
ground it has been denied that the
State can exercise the power of taxa
tion on behalf of corporations who
undertake to make or to improve the
thoroughfares of trade and travel for
their own benefit. The State, it is
said, can no more tax the community
to set one class of men up in business
than another; can no more subsidize
one occupation than another; can no
more make donations to the men who
build, and own railroads in consider
ation of expected incidental benefits,
than it can make them to the men
who build stores or manufactories in
consideration of similar expected
benefits. People v. Township Board
of Salem, 20 Mich. 452. See further,
as to monopolies, Chicago v. Rumpff,
45 Ill. 90; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23
Mich. 344. In State v. Mayor, &c.
of Newark, 35 N. J. 157, s. c. 10
Am. Rep. 223, the doctrine of the
text was applied to a case in which by
statute the property of a society had
been exempted from “taxes and as
sessments; ” and it was held that
only the ordinary public taxes were
meant, and the property might be
subjected to local assessments for
municipal purposes.
!*
&
2." !
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The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and
designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special
privileges are always obnoxious, and discriminations against per
sons or classes are still more so; and, as a rule of construction,
it is to be presumed they were probably not contemplated or
designed. It has been held that a statute requiring attorneys to
render services in suits for poor persons without fee or reward,
was to be confined strictly to the cases therein prescribed;
[* 394] and if by its terms it * expressly covered civil cases only,
it could not be extended to embrace defences of criminal
prosecutions." So where a constitutional provision confined the
elective franchise to “white male citizens,” and it appeared that
the legislation o
f
the State had always treated o
f negroes, mulat
toes, and other colored persons in contradistinction to white, it was
held that although quadroons, being a recognized class o
f
colored
persons, must be excluded, yet that the rule o
f
exclusion would
not be carried further.” S
o
a statute making parties witnesses
against themselves cannot be construed to compel them to dis
close facts which would subject them to criminal punishment.”
And a statute which authorizes summary process in favor of a
bank against debtors who have b
y
express contract made their
obligations payable a
t
such bank, being in derogation o
f
the
ordinary principles o
f private right, must be subject to strict
construction.* These cases are only illustrations o
f
a rule o
f
general acceptance.”
There are unquestionably cases in which the State may grant
privileges to specified individuals without violating any constitu
tional principle, because, from the nature o
f
the case, it is impos
sible they should be possessed and enjoyed b
y all; and if it is
* Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.
* People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406.
See Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77; Mon
roe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N
.
s. 665.
The decisions in Ohio were still more
liberal, and ranked as white persons
all who had a preponderance o
f
white
blood. Gray v. State, 4 Ohio, 354;
Jeffres v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 372;
Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio, 376; An
derson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio, N
.
S
. 406.
But see Van Camp v. Board of Edu
cation, 9 Ohio, N
.
s. 406. Happily
all such questions are now disposed
o
f by constitutional amendments.
It seems, however, in the opinion of
the Supreme Court o
f California,
that these amendments do not pre
clude a State denying to a race, e.g.
the Chinese, the right to testify
against other persons. People v.
Brady, 40 Cal. 198; s. c. 6 Am. Rep.
604.
* Broadbent v. State, 7 Md. 416.
See Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408.
* Bank o
f
Columbia v. Okely, 4
Wheat. 241.
* See 1 Bl. Com. 89, and note.
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important that they should exist, the proper State authority must
be left to select the grantees." Of this class are grants of the
franchise to be a corporation. Such grants, however, which
confer upon a few persons what cannot be shared by the many,
and which, though supposed to be made on public grounds, are
nevertheless frequently of great value to the corporators, and
therefore sought with avidity, are never to be extended by con
struction beyond the plain terms in which they are conferred.
No rule is better settled than that charters of incorporation are
to be construed strictly against the corporators.” The
just presumption in * every such case is
,
that the State [* 395]
has granted in express terms all that it designed to grant
a
t all. “When a State,” says the Supreme Court of Pennsyl
vania, “means to clothe a corporate body with a portion o
f
her
own sovereignty, and to disarm herself to that extent o
f
the
power that belongs to her, it is so easy to say so, that we will
never believe it to be meant when it is not said. . . . In the
construction o
f
a charter, to be in doubt is to be resolved ; and
every resolution which springs from doubt is against the corpora
tion. If the usefulness of the company would be increased by
extending [its privileges], let the legislature see to it
,
but remem
ber that nothing but plain English words will do it.” ” This is
sound doctrine, and should be vigilantly observed and enforced.
* In Gordon v. Building Associa
tion, 12 Bush, 110, it is decided that
a special privilege granted to a par
ticular corporation to take an interest
o
n its loans greater than the regular
interest allowed b
y
law is void; it not
being granted in consideration o
f any
obligation assumed b
y
the corporation
to serve the public.
* Providence Bank v. Billings, 4
Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 544; Perrine
v
. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal
Co., 9 How. 172; Richmond, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Louisa R
.
R
. Co., 13 How.
71; Bradley v. N
.
Y
.
& N
.
H
.
R
.
R
.
Co., 21 Conn. 294; Parker v. Sun
bury and Erie R
.
R
. Co., 19 Penn. St.
211; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143;
Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton
Bridge Co., 27 N
.
Y
.
S7, and
3 Wall. 51;
N. C. 604.
* Pennsylvania R
.
R
.
Co. v. Canal
Commissioners, 21 Penn. St. 22. And
see Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, &c.
R. R
. Co., 24 Penn. St. 159; Che
nango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton
Bridge Co., 27 N
.
Y
.
93, per Wright,
J.; Baltimore v. Baltimore, &c. R. R.
Co., 21 Md. 50; Richmond v. Rich
mond and Danville R
.
R. Co., 21 Grat.
614; Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall.
500; Delancey v. Insurance Co., 52
N. H
.
581. We quote from the Su
preme Court o
f
Connecticut in Brad
ley v. N
.
Y
.
and N
.
H
.
R
.
R
. Co., 21
Conn. 306: “The rules of construc
tion which apply to general legislation,
in regard to those subjects in which
the public a
t large are interested, are
essentially different from those which
State v. Krebs, 64
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[*396] *And this rule is not confined to the grant of a corpo
rate franchise, but it extends to al
l
grants o
f
franchises
o
r privileges by the State to individuals, in the benefits o
f
which
the people a
t large cannot participate. “Private statutes,” says
Parsons, Ch. J., “made for the accommodation of particular citi
zens o
r corporations, ought not to be construed to affect the rights
o
r privileges o
f others, unless such construction results from ex
press words o
r
from necessary implication.” "
apply to private grants to individuals,
o
f powers o
r privileges designed to be
exercised with special reference to
their own advantage, although in
volving in their exercise incidental
benefits to the community generally.
The former are to be expounded
largely and beneficially for the pur
poses for which they were enacted;
the latter liberally, in favor o
f
the
public, and strictly as against the
grantees. The power in the one case
is original and inherent in the State
o
r sovereign power, and is exercised
solely for the general good o
f
the
community; in the other it is merely
derivative, is special if not exclusive
in its character, and is in derogation
o
f
common right, in the sense that it
confers privileges to which the mem
bers o
f
the community a
t large are
not entitled. Acts o
f
the former kind,
being dictated solely by a regard to
the benefit o
f
the public generally,
attract none o
f
that prejudice o
r
jealousy towards them which natu
rally would arise towards those of the
other description, from the consider
ation that the latter were obtained
with a view to the benefit o
f particu
lar individuals, and the apprehension
that their interests might be promoted
a
t
the sacrifice o
r
to the injury o
f
those of others whose interests should
b
e equally regarded. It is universally
understood to be one o
f
the implied
and necessary conditions upon which
men enter into society and form gov
ernments, that sacrifices must some
times be required o
f
individuals for
And the grant of
the general benefit o
f
the community,
for which they have no rightful claim
to specific compensation; but, as be
tween the several individuals compos
ing the community, it is the duty of
the State to protect them in the en
joyment o
f just and equal rights. A
law, therefore, enacted for the com
mon good, and which there would
ordinarily be no inducement to per
vert from that purpose, is entitled to
b
e
viewed with less jealousy and dis
trust than one enacted to promote the
interests o
f particular persons, and
which would constantly present a
motive for encroaching on the rights
of others.”
* Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass.
140. See also Dyer v. Tuscaloosa
Bridge Co., 2 Port. (Ala.) 296;
Grant v. Leach, 20 La. Ann. 329. In
Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419, it
was held that one embarking upon
the Cayuga Lake six miles from the
bridge o
f
the Cayuga Bridge Co.,
and crossing the lake in an oblique
direction so as to land within sixty
rods o
f
the bridge, was not liable to
pay toll under a provision in the
charter o
f
said company which made
it unlawful for any person to cross
within three miles o
f
the bridge with
out paying toll. In another case
arising under the same charter, which
authorized the company to build a
bridge across the lake o
r
the outlet
thereof, and to rebuild in case it
should be destroyed o
r
carried away
b
y
the ice, and prohibited a
ll
other
persons from erecting a bridge within
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ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the like, is not
only to be construed strictly against the grantees, but it will not
be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing privilege
to others, unless the terms of the grant render such construction
imperative."
* The Constitution of the United States contains pro- [* 397]
visions which are important in this connection. One of
these is
,
that the citizens o
f
each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities o
f
citizens o
f
the several States,” and
a
ll persons born o
r
naturalized in the United States, and subject
to it
s jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and o
f
the
State wherein they reside.” The States are also forbidden to make
o
r
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni
ties o
f
the citizens o
f
the United States, or to deprive any person
o
f life, liberty, or property, without due process o
f law, or to deny
to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection o
f
the
laws.”
three miles o
f
the place where a bridge
should be erected b
y
the company, it
was held, after the company had
erected a bridge across the lake and
it had been carried away by the ice,
that they had n
o authority afterwards
to rebuild across the outlet of the
lake, two miles from the place where
the first bridge was built, and that
the restricted limits were to be meas
ured from the place where the first
bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge
Co. v. Magee, 2 Paige, 116; S. C
.
6 Wend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper
Works, 30 Conn. 461, it was held
that statutes giving a preference to
certain creditors over others should
be construed with reasonable strict
ness, a
s
the law favored equality. In
People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9
,
it
appeared that an act o
f
the legislature
had authorized a proprietor o
f
lands
lying in the East River, which is an
arm o
f
the sea, to construct wharves
and bulkheads in the river, in front
o
f
his land, and there was a
t
the time
a public highway through the land,
terminating a
t
the river. Held, that
the proprietor could not, b
y
filling u
p
Although the precise meaning o
f “privileges and immu
the land between the shore and the
bulkhead, obstruct the public right
o
f passage from the land to the water,
but that the street was, b
y
operation
o
f law, extended from the former
terminus over the newly made land
to the water. Compare Commission
ers o
f
Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke
Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446;
s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 247.
* Mills v. St. Clair County, 8 How.
569; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica and
S
. R
.
R
. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Chenango
Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge
Co., 27 N
.
Y
. 87; s. c. 3 Wall. 51.
* Const. o
f
United States, art. 4
,
§ 2. See ante, pp. *15, *16.
* Const. o
f
United States, 14th
Amendment.
* Const. o
f
United States, 14th
Amendment. The fourteenth amend
ment is violated b
y
a statute which
allows the overseers o
f
the poor to
commit paupers and vagrants to the
work-house without trial. Portland
v
. Bangor, 65 Me. 120; Dunn v. Bur
leigh, 62 Me. 24. It does not confer
the right o
f suffrage upon females.
Van Walkenburgh v. Brown, 43 Cal.
32
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nities” is not very conclusively settled as yet, it appears to be con
ceded that the Constitution secures in each State to the citizens
of a
ll
other States the right to remove to, and carry on busi
ness therein; the right b
y
the usual modes to acquire and hold
property, and to protect and defend the same in the law; the
right to the usual remedies for the collection o
f
debts and the
enforcement o
f
other personal rights, and the right to be exempt,
in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the prop
erty, o
r persons, o
f
citizens o
f
the same State are not subject to."
To this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by
State laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many
other rights and privileges may b
e
made — as they usually are —
to depend upon actual residence : such as the right to vote, to
have the benefit o
f exemption laws, to take fish in the waters o
f
the State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are
not violated by a statute which allows process b
y
attachment
against a debtor not a resident o
f
the State, notwithstanding such
process is not admissible against a resident.” The protection b
y
due process o
f
law has already been considered. It was not within
the power o
f
the States before the adoption o
f
the fourteenth
amendment, to deprive citizens o
f
the equal protection o
f
the
laws; but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when
these were made freemen, there were some who disputed their
claim to citizenship, and some State laws were in force which
established discriminations against them. To settle doubts and
preclude a
ll
such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted ;
and the same securities which one citizen may demand, all others
are now entitled to.
Judicial Proceedings.
Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as
well as against legislative; and perhaps the question, what con
43; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130;
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.
See ante, p
. *391, note.
Granting licenses for the sale o
f
intoxicating drinks to males only,
does not violate a constitutional pro
vision which forbids the grant o
f
special privileges o
r
immunities. Blair
v
. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 315.
1 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380;
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H
.
& McH.
554; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 343;
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
281.
* Campbell v. Morris, 3 H
.
&
McH. 554; State v. Medbury, 3 R
.
I.
141. And see generally the cases
cited, ante, p. *16, note.
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stitutes due process of law, arises as often when judicial action is
in question as in any other cases. But it is not so difficult here
to arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judi
cial authority are much better defined than those of the legisla
tive, and each case can generally be brought to the test of definite
and well-settled rules of law.
The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction
of the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction
is
,
first, o
f
* the subject-matter; and, second, o
f
the persons [* 398]
whose rights are to be passed upon."
A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if
,
by the law o
f
its organization, it has authority to take cognizance o
f, try, and
determine cases o
f
that description. If it assumes to act in a
case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceed
ing and judgment will be altogether void, and rights o
f property
cannot be devested b
y
means o
f
them.
It is a maxim in the law that consent can never confer juris
diction : * b
y
which is meant that the consent o
f parties cannot
empower a court to act upon subjects which are not submitted
to its determination and judgment b
y
the law. The law creates
courts, and upon considerations o
f general public policy defines
and limits their jurisdiction; and this can neither be enlarged
nor restricted by the act o
f
the parties.
Accordingly, where a court b
y
law has no jurisdiction o
f
the
subject-matter o
f
a controversy, a party whose rights are sought
to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate it
s proceedings and
refuse to be bound b
y them, notwithstanding he may once have
1 Bouvier defines jurisdiction thus:
“Jurisdiction is a power constitution
ally conferred upon a court, a single
judge, o
r
a magistrate, to take cogni
zance and decide causes according to
law, and to carry their sentence into
execution. The tract of land within
which a court, judge, o
r magistrate
has jurisdiction is called his territory;
and his power in relation to his terri
tory is called his territorial jurisdic
tion.” 3 Bouv. Inst. 71.
* Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129;
Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432;
Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 165;
Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N
.
Y
. 9
;
Pres
ton v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7
;
Chapman
v
. Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374;
Thompson v. Steamboat Morton, 2
Ohio, N
.
s. 26; Gilliland v. Adminis
trator o
f Sellers, 2 Ohio, N
.
s. 223;
Dicks v. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380 ; Over
street v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green
v
. Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwick v.
Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Georgia R
. R.,
&c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; State v.
Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts,
3
3 Ala. 343; Ginn v. Rogers, 4 Gilm.
131; Neill v. Keese, 5 Tex. 23; Ames
v
. Boland, 1 Minn. 365 ; Brady v.
Richardson, 18 Ind. 1
;
White v. Bu
chanan, 6 Cold. 32.
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consented to it
s action, either b
y voluntarily commencing the
proceeding as plaintiff, or as defendant b
y
appearing and pleading
to the merits, or b
y
any other formal or informal action. This
right he may avail himself o
f
a
t any stage o
f
the case; and the
maxim that requires one to move promptly who would take
advantage o
f
a
n irregularity does not apply here, since this is
not mere irregular action, but a total want o
f power to act at all.
Consent is sometimes implied from failure to object; but
[*399] there can be no “waiver of rights b
y
laches in a case
where consent would be altogether nugatory."
In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages
voluntary arrangements;” and the settlements which the parties
may make for themselves, it allows to be made for them b
y
arbi
trators mutually chosen. But the courts of a country cannot
have those controversies referred to them b
y
the parties which
the law-making power has seen fi
t
to exclude from their cog
nizance. If the judges should sit to hear such controversies,
they would not si
t
a
s
a court; a
t
the most they would be arbitra
tors only, and their action could not be sustained on that theory,
unless it appeared that the parties had designed to make the
judges their arbitrators, instead o
f expecting from them valid
judicial action as an organized court. Even then the decision
could not be binding as a judgment, but only as an award ; and
a mere neglect b
y
either party to object the want o
f jurisdiction
could not make the decision binding upon him either as a judg
ment or as an award. Still less could consent in a criminal case
bind the defendant ; since criminal charges are not the subject
o
f arbitration, and any infliction o
f
criminal punishment upon an
individual, except in pursuance o
f
the law o
f
the land, is a wrong
done to the State, whether the individual assented or not. Those
cases in which it has been held that the constitutional right o
f
trial b
y jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative of the
legal view o
f
this subject.” -
If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by con
sent, neither can they b
y
consent empower any individual other
1 Bostwick v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; * Brown v
. State, 8 Blackf. 561;
Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; White Work v. Ohio, 2 Ohio, N. s. 296 ;
v
. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32. Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128;
* Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Smith v. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill v.
Works, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner v. People, 16 Mich. 351. See also State
Lynde, 10 Ind. 282. v. Turner, 1 Wright, 20.
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than the judge of the court to exercise it
s powers. Judges are
chosen in such manner as shall be provided b
y law; and a stipu
lation by parties that any other person than the judge shall exer
cise his functions in their case would be nugatory, even though
the judge should vacate his seat for the purposes o
f
the hearing."
Sometimes jurisdiction o
f
the subject-matter will depend upon
considerations o
f locality, either o
f
the thing in dispute or o
f
the
parties. At law certain actions are local, and others are
transitory. “The first can only be tried where the prop- [*400]
erty is which is the subject o
f
the controversy, o
r in
respect to which the controversy has arisen. The United States
courts take cognizance o
f
certain causes b
y
reason only o
f
the
fact that the parties are residents o
f
different States o
r
countries.”
The question o
f jurisdiction in these cases is sometimes deter
mined b
y
the common law, and sometimes is matter o
f statutory
regulation. But there is a class of cases in respect to which the
courts o
f
the several States o
f
the Union are constantly being
called upon to exercise authority, and in which, while the juris
diction is conceded to rest on considerations o
f locality, there has
not, unfortunately, at all times been entire harmony o
f
decision
a
s to what shall confer jurisdiction. We refer now to suits for
divorce from the bonds o
f matrimony.
The courts o
f
one State o
r country have no general authority
to grant divorce, unless for some reason they have control over
the particular marriage contract which is sought to be annulled.
But what circumstance gives such control 2 Is it the fact that
the marriage was entered into in such country o
r
State 2 Or
that the alleged breach o
f
the marriage bond was within that
jurisdiction ? Or that the parties resided within it either at the
time o
f
the marriage o
r
a
t
the time o
f
the offence 2 Or that the
parties now reside in such State o
r country, though both marriage
and offence may have taken place elsewhere? Or must mar
riage, offence, and residence, all or any two o
f them, combine to
1 Winchester v. Ayres, 4 Greene individual may sometimes be treated
(Iowa), 104. as void, when he was not suable in
* See a case where a judgment o
f
that court o
r
in that manner, notwith
a United States court was treated as standing he may have so submitted
o
f
n
o force, because the court had not himself to the jurisdiction as to be
jurisdiction in respect to the plaintiff. personally bound. See Georgia R
. R.,
Vose v. Morton, 4 Cush. 27. As to &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; Hinchman
third persons, a judgment against an v. Town, 10 Mich. 508.
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confer the authority ? These are questions which have frequently
demanded the thoughtful attention of the courts, who have sought
to establish a rule at once sound in principle, and that shall pro
tect as far as possible the rights of the parties, one or the other
of whom, unfortunately, under the operation of any rule which
can be established, it will frequently be found has been the victim
of gross injustice.
We conceive the true rule to be that the actual, bona fide res
idence of either husband or wife within a State will give
[*401] to that * State authority to determine the status of such
party, and to pass upon any questions affecting his or her
continuance in the marriage relation, irrespective of the locality
of the marriage, or of any alleged offence; and that any such
court in that State as the legislature may have authorized to take
cognizance of the subject may lawfully pass upon such questions,
and annul the marriage for any cause allowed by the local law.
But if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of his dom
icile for the purpose of procuring a divorce, and has residence
there for that purpose only, such residence is not bona fide, and
does not confer upon the courts of that State or country juris
diction over the marriage relation, and any decree they may
assume to make would be void as to the other party."
* There are a number of cases in Chase, 6 Gray, 157, the same ruling
which this subject has been consid
ered. In Inhabitants of Hanover v.
Turner, 14 Mass. 227, instructions to
a jury were sustained, that if they
were satisfied the husband, who had
been a citizen of Massachusetts, re
moved to Vermont merely for the
purpose of procuring a divorce, and
that the pretended cause for divorce
arose, if it ever did arise, in Massa
chusetts, and that the wife was never
within the jurisdiction of the court of
Vermont, then and in such case the
decree of divorce which the husband
had obtained in Vermont must be
considered as fraudulently obtained,
and that it could not operate so as
to dissolve the marriage between the
parties. See also Vischer v. Vischer,
12 Barb. 640; and McGiffert v. Mc
Giffert, 31 Barb. 69. In Chase v.
was had as to a foreign divorce, not
withstanding the wife appeared in and
defended the foreign suit. In Clark
v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21, the court re
fused a divorce on the ground that
the alleged cause of divorce (adultery),
though committed within the State,
was so committed while the parties
had their domicile abroad. This de
cision was followed in Greenlaw v.
Greenlaw, 12 N. H. 200. The court
say: “If the defendant never had any
domicile in this State, the libellant
could not come here, bringing with
her a cause of divorce over which this
court had jurisdiction. If at the time
of the [alleged offence] the domicile
of the parties was in Maine, and the
facts furnished no cause for a divorce
there, she could not come here and
allege those matters which had already
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*But to render the jurisdiction of a court effectual in [*402]
any case, it is necessary that the thing in controversy, or
occurred, as a ground for a divorce
under the laws of this State. Should
she under such circumstances obtain
a decree of divorce here, it must be
regarded as a mere nullity elsewhere.”
In Frary v. Frary, 10 N. H. 61, im
portance was attached to the fact
that the marriage took place in New
Hampshire; and it was held that the
court had jurisdiction of the wife's
application for a divorce, notwith
standing the offence was committed
in Vermont, but during the time of
the wife's residence in New Hamp
shire. See also Kimball v. Kimball,
13 N. H. 225; Bachelder v. Bachelder,
14 N. H. 380; Payson v. Payson, 34
N. H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35
N. H. 474. In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 10
Ind. 436, it was held that the resi
dence of the libellant at the time of
the application for a divorce was suffi
cient to confer jurisdiction, and a
decree dismissing the bill because the
cause for divorce arose out of the
State was reversed. And see Tolen
v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See also
Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424;
Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 263; Borden
v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Bradshaw v.
Heath, 13 Wend. 407. In any of
these cases the question of actual
residence will be open to inquiry
wherever it becomes important, not
withstanding the record of proceed
ings is in due form, and contains the
affidavit of residence required by the
practice. Leith r. Leith, 39 N. H. 20.
And see McGiffert v. McGiffert, 31
Barb. 69; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb.
317; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.
30; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247.
The Pennsylvania cases agree with
those of New Hampshire, in holding
that a divorce should not be granted
unless the cause alleged occurred while
the complainant had domicile within
the State. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts,
349; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn.
St. 449; McDermott's Appeal, 8 W.
& S. 251. And they hold also that
the injured party in the marriage
relation must seek redress in the
forum of the defendant, unless where
such defendant has removed from
what was before the common domi
cile of both. Calvin v. Reed, 35 Penn.
St. 375; Elder v. Reel, 62 Penn. St.
308; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 414. For cases
supporting to a greater or less extent
the doctrine stated in the text, see
Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;
Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Pawling
v. Bird's Ex’rs, 13 Johns. 192; Kerr
v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Harrison p.
Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v.
State, 28 Ala. 12; Cooper v. Cooper,
7 Ohio, 594; Mansfield v. McIntyre,
10 Ohio, 28; Smith v. Smith, 4 Greene
(Iowa), 266; Yates v. Yates, 2 Beas
ley, 280; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana,
181; Waltz v. Waltz, 18 Ind. 449;
Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174; Man
ley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell
v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason v.
Gleason, 4 Wis. 64; Hare v. Hare, 15
Tex. 355. And see Story, Confl.
Laws, $ 230 a ; Bishop on Mar. and
Div. (1st ed.) $ 727 et seq.; Ibid.
(4th ed.) Vol. II
.
§ 155 et seq. The
recent cases of Hoffman v. Hoff
man, 46 N
.
Y
.
30; s. c. 7 Am. Rep.
299; Elder v. Reel, 62 Penn. St. 30.8;
s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 414; and People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, are very ex
plicit in declaring that where neither
party is domiciled within a particular
State, its courts can have no jurisdic
‘tion in respect to their marital status,
and any decree o
f
divorce made therein
must be nugatory. A number of the
cases cited hold that the wife may
have a domicile separate from the
husband, and may therefore be enti
tled to a divorce, though the husband
never resided in the State. These
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the parties interested, be subjected to the process of the court.
Certain cases are said to proceed in rem, because they take notice
rather of the thing in controversy than of the persons concerned;
and the process is served upon that which is the object
[*403] of the suit, without * specially noticing the interested
parties; while in other cases the parties themselves are
brought before the court by process. Of the first class admiralty
proceedings are an illustration; the court acquiring jurisdiction
by seizing the vessel or other thing to which the controversy re
lates. In cases within this class, notice to all concerned is required
to be given, either personally or by some species of publication or
proclamation; and if not given, the court which had jurisdiction
of the property will have none to render judgment." Suits at
the common law, however, proceed against the parties whose
interests are sought to be affected; and only those persons are
concluded by the adjudication who are served with process, or
who voluntarily appear.”
cases proceed upon the theory that,
although in general the domicile of
the husband is the domicile of the
wife, yet that if he be guilty of such
act or dereliction of duty in the rela
tion as entitles her to have it partially
or wholly dissolved, she is at liberty
to establish a separate jurisdictional
domicile of her own. Ditson v. Dit
son, 4 R. I. 87; Harding v. Alden,
9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire,
7 Dana, 181; Hollister v. Hollister, 6
Penn. St. 449. The doctrine in New
York seems to be, that a divorce ob
tained in another State, without per
sonal service of process or appearance
of the defendant, is absolutely void.
Vischer v. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640;
McGiffert v. McGiffert, 31 Barb. 69;
Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. See
Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio, N. s. 502; s. c.
2 Am. Rep. 415. An appearance by
defendant afterwards for the purposes
of a motion to set aside the decree,
which motion was defeated on techni
cal grounds, will not affect the ques
tion. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.
30; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 299.
Upon the whole subject of juris
Some cases also partake of the nature
diction in divorce suits, no case in the
books is more full and satisfactory
than that of Ditson v. Ditson, supra,
which reviews and comments upon a
number of the cases cited, and par
ticularly upon the Massachusetts cases
of Barber v. Root, 10 Mass, 265; In
habitants of Hanover v. Turner, 14
Mass. 227 ; Harteau v. Harteau, 14
Pick, 181; and Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray,
367. The divorce of one party di
vorces both. Cooper v. Cooper, 7
Ohio, 594. And will leave both at
liberty to enter into new marriage
relations, unless the local statute ex
pressly forbids the guilty party from
contracting a second marriage. See
Commonwealth v. Putnam, 1 Pick.
136; Baker v. People, 2 Hill, 325.
1 Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594.
See Matter of Empire City Bank, 18
N. Y. 199; Nations v. Johnson, 24
How. 204, 205; Blackwell on Tax
Titles, 213.
* Jack v. Thompson, 41 Miss. 49.
As to the right of an attorney to no
tice of proceedings to disbar him, see
notes to pp. *337 and *404. “No
tice of some kind is the vital breath
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both of proceedings in rem and of personal actions, since, although
they proceed by seizing property, they also contemplate the
service of process on defendant parties. Of this class are the
proceedings by foreign attachment, in which the property of a
non-resident or concealed debtor is seized and retained by the
officer as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered against him, but at the same time process is
issued to be served upon the defendant, and which must be
served, or some substitute for service had before judgment can
be rendered.
In such cases, as well as in divorce suits, it will often happen
that the party proceeded against cannot be found in the State,
and personal service upon him is therefore impossible, unless it is
allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any
such service would be ineffectual. No State has authority to in
vade the jurisdiction of another, and by service of process com
pel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies
to the determination of its courts; and those courts will conse
quently be sometimes, unable to enforce a jurisdiction which the
State possesses in respect to the subjects within it
s limits,
unless * a substituted service is admissible. A substituted [*404]
service is provided by statute for many such cases; gen
erally in the form o
f
a notice, published in the public journals, o
r
posted, as the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with a
view to bring it home, if possible, to the knowledge of the party
that animates judicial jurisdiction over
the person. It is the primary element
o
f
the application o
f
the judicatory
power. It is of the essence of a cause.
Without it there cannot be parties,
and without parties there may be the
form o
f
a sentence, but no judgment
obligating the person.” See Bragg's
Case, 11 Coke, 99 a Rex v. Chan
cellor o
f Cambridge, 1 Str. 567;
Cooper r. Board o
f Works, 14 C
.
B
.
N
.
s. 194; Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 1
Brock. 324 : Goetcheus v. Mathewson,
6
1 N
.
Y
.
420; Underwood v. McVeigh,
2
3 Grat. 409 ; McVeigh v. United
States, 11 Wall. 259; Littleton v.
Richardson, 34 N
.
H. 179; Black v.
Black, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 205.
Where, however, a statute provides
for the taking of a certain security,
and authorizes judgment to be ren
dered upon it on motion, without
process, the party entering into the
security must be understood to assent
to the condition, and to waive process
and consent to judgment. Lewis v.
Garrett's Adm’r, 6 Miss. 434; People
v
. Van Eps, 4 Wend. 390; Chappee
v
. Thomas, 5 Mich. 53 ; Gildersleeve
v
. People, 10 Barb. 35; People v.
Lott, 21 Barb. 130; Pratt v. Donovan,
1
0 Wis. 378 ; Murray v. Hoboken
Land Co., 18 How. 272; Philadelphia
v
. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 451;
Whitehurst v. Coleen, 53 Ill. 247.
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to be affected, and to give him an opportunity to appear and de
fend. The right of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and
to give it effect as process, rests upon the necessity of the case,
and has been long recognized and acted upon."
But such notice is restricted in it
s legal effect, and cannot be
made available for a
ll purposes. It will enable the court to give
effect to the proceeding so far as it is one in rem, but when the
res is disposed o
f,
the authority o
f
the court ceases. The statute
may give it effect so far as the subject-matter o
f
the proceeding
is within the limits, and therefore under the control, o
f
the State;
but the notice cannot be made to stand in the place o
f process, so
a
s to subject the defendant to a valid judgment against him per
sonally. In attachment proceedings, the published notice may be
sufficient to enable the plaintiff to obtain a judgment which he can
enforce b
y
sale o
f
the property attached, but for any other purpose
such judgment would be ineffectual. The defendant could not be
followed into another State or country, and there have recovery
against him upon the judgment as an established demand. The
fact that process was not personally served is a conclusive
objection to the judgment as a personal claim, unless the de
fendant caused his appearance to be entered in the attachment
proceedings.” Where a party
, “It may be admitted that a
statute which authorized any debt
o
r damages to be adjudged against a
person upon purely ea parte proceed
ings, without pretence o
f notice, o
r
any provision for defending, would be
a violation o
f
the constitution, and
void; but when the legislature has
provided a kind o
f
notice by which it
is reasonably probable that the party
proceeded against will be apprised of
what is going on against him, and an
opportunity is afforded him to defend,
I am of opinion that the courts have
not the power to pronounce the pro
ceedings illegal.” Denio, J., in Mat
ter o
f Empire City Bank, 18 N
.
Y
.
200. See also, per Morgan, J., in
Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y
. 314;
Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195;
Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321 ; Mason
v
. Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261 ; Cupp v.
has property in a State, and
Commissioners o
f
Seneca Co., 19
Ohio, N
.
s. 173; Campbell v. Evans,
4
5 N
.
Y. 356; Happy v. Mosher, 48
N. Y. 317. In Burnam v. Common
wealth, 1 Duv. 210, a personal judg
ment against the absconding officers
o
f
the provisional government was
sustained. But in the case of con
structive notice, if the party appears,
h
e
has a right to be heard, and this
cannot be denied him, even though
he be a rebel. McVeigh v. United
States, 11 Wall. 259, 267.
* Pawling v. Willson, 13 Johns.
192: Heirs o
f
Holman v. Bank o
f
Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Curtis v. Gibbs,
1 Penn. 399; Miller's Ex’r v. Mil
ler, 1 Bailey, 242; Cone v. Cotton, 2
Blackf. 82 ; Kilburn v. Woodworth,
5 Johns. 37; Robinson v. Ward's
Ex’r, 8 Johns. 86; Hall v. Williams,
6 Pick. 232; Bartlet v. Knight, 1
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* resides elsewhere, his property is justly subject to a
ll [*405]
valid claims that may exist against him there; but be
yond this, due process o
f
law would require appearance or per
sonal service before the defendant could be personally bound by
any judgment rendered. -
The same rule applies in divorce cases. The courts o
f
the
State where the complaining party resides have jurisdiction o
f
the
subject-matter; and if the other party is a non-resident, they must
b
e
authorized to proceed without personal service o
f process. The
publication which is permitted b
y
the statute is sufficient to justify
a decree in these cases changing the status o
f
the complaining party,
and thereby terminating the marriage;" and it might be sufficient
also to empower the court to pass upon the question o
f
the cus
tody and control o
f
the children o
f
the marriage, if they were then
within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject could only
b
e absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained
within the jurisdiction; if they acquire a domicile in another State
o
r country, the judicial tribunals o
f
that State o
r country would
have authority to determine the question o
f
their guardianship
there.”
Mass. 401; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt.
58; Fenton v. Garlick, 6 Johns. 194;
Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Den
ison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 508; Aldrich
v
. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Hoxie v.
Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newell v. Newton,
1
0 Pick. 470; Starbuck v. Murray, 5
Wend. 161 ; Armstrong v. Harshaw,
1 Dev. 188; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13
Wend. 407; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige,
299; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 460;
Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Green
v
. Custard, 23 How. 486. In Ex parte
Heyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127, it was
held that an attorney could not be
stricken from the rolls without notice
o
f
the proceeding, and opportunity to
be heard. And see ante, p
.
*337, n
.
Leaving notice with one's family is
not equivalent to personal service.
Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 329. And
see Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536.
1 Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174;
Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hub
bell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Mans
field v. McIntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Ditson
v
. Ditson, 4 R
.
I. 97 ; Harrison v.
Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson v.
State, 28 Ala. 12; Harding v. Alden,
9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7
Dana, 181; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb.
317. It is immaterial in these cases
whether notice was actually brought
home to the defendant or not. And
see Heirs of Holman v. Bank o
f Nor
folk, 12 Ala. 369.
* This must be so on general prin
ciples, as the appointment o
f guardian
for minors is of local force only. See
Monell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 156;
Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen, 321;
Potter v. Hiscox, 30 Conn. 508; Kraft
v
. Wickey, 4 G
.
& J. 322. The case
o
f
Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412,
appears to b
e contra, but some reli
ance is placed by the court on the
statute of the State which allows the
foreign appointment to be recognized
for the purposes of a sale of the real
estate of a ward.
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[*406] * But in divorce cases, no more than in any other, can
the court make a decree for the payment of money by a
defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case,
which shall be binding upon him personally. It must follow, in
such a case, that the wife, when complainant, cannot obtain a
valid decree for alimony, nor a valid judgment for costs. If the
defendant had property within the State, it would be competent
to provide by law for the seizure and appropriation of such prop
erty, under the decree of the court, to the use of the complainant;
but the legal tribunals elsewhere would not recognize a decree for
alimony or for costs not based on personal service or appearance.
The remedy of the complainant must generally, in these cases, be
confined to a dissolution of the marriage, with the incidental ben
efits springing therefrom, and to an order for the custody of the
children, if within the State."
When the question is raised whether the proceedings of a
court may not be void for want of jurisdiction, it will sometimes
be important to note the grade of the court and the extent of it
s
authority. Some courts are o
f general jurisdiction, by which is
meant that their authority extends to a great variety o
f matters;
while others are only o
f special and limited jurisdiction, b
y
which
it is understood that they have authority extending only to cer
tain specified cases. The want o
f jurisdiction is equally fatal in
the proceedings o
f
each ; but different rules prevail in showing it
.
It is not to be assumed that a court of general jurisdiction has in
any case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over which it had no
authority; and it
s jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether there
are recitals in its records to show it or not. On the other hand,
no such intendment is made in favor o
f
the judgment o
f
a court
o
f
limited jurisdiction, but the recitals contained in the min
utes o
f proceedings must be sufficient to show that the case
was one which the law permitted the court to take cognizance
* See Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns.
424; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;
Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 ;
Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463;
Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181;
Townsend v. Griflin, 4 Harr. 440. In
Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321, Perkins,
J., after a learned and somewhat
elaborate examination o
f
the subject,
expresses the opinion that the State
may permit a personal judgment for
alimony in the case o
f
a resident
defendant, on service b
y publication
only, though he conceded that there
would be no such power in the case o
f
non-residents.
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of, and that the parties were subjected to it
s jurisdiction by
proper process." -
* There is also another difference between these two [*407]
classes o
f
tribunals in this, that the jurisdiction o
f
the
one may be disproved under circumstances where it would not be
allowed in the case o
f
the other. A record is not commonly suf
fered to be contradicted b
y parol evidence; but wherever a fact
showing want o
f jurisdiction in a court o
f general jurisdiction can
b
e proved without contradicting it
s recitals, it is allowable to do
so, and thus defeat it
s
effect.” But in the case of a court of spe
cial and limited authority, it is permitted to g
o
still further, and
to show a want o
f jurisdiction even in opposition to the recitals
contained in the record.” This we conceive to be the general
rule, though there are apparent exceptions o
f
those cases where
the jurisdiction may be said to depend upon the existence o
f
a
certain state o
f facts, which must be passed upon b
y
the courts
themselves, and in respect to which the decision o
f
the court once
rendered, if there was any evidence whatever on which to base
it
,
must be held final and conclusive in all collateral inquiries,
notwithstanding it may have erred in it
s
conclusions.”
* See Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221;
Cleveland v. Rogers, 6 Wend. 438;
People v. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39; Sheldon
v
. Wright, 1 Seld. 511 : Clark v.
Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper
v
. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114; Wall v.
Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; Denning v.
Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Bridge v.
Ford, 6 Mass. 641; Smith v. Rice, 11
Mass. 511; Barrett v. Crane, 16 Vt.
246; Teft v. Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Jen
nings v. Stafford, 1 Ired. 404: Her
shaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, 513; Perrine
v
. Farr, 2 Zab. 356; State v. Metz
ger, 26 Mo. 65.
* See this subject considered a
t
some length in Wilcox v. Kassick, 2
Mich. 165. And see Rape v. Heaton,
9 Wis. 329; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4
Scam. 536; Webster v. Reid, 11 How.
437.
* Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N
.
Y
.
497;
Dyckman v. Mayor, &c. o
f N
. Y., 5
N. Y
.
434; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland,
3 Iowa, 114; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn.
273 ; Brown v. Foster, 6 R
.
I. 564;
Fawcett v. Fowlis, 1 Man. & R
.
102.
But see Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich.
527, where it was held that the entry
in the docket o
f
a justice that the
parties appeared and proceeded to
trial was conclusive. And see Selin
v
. Snyder, 7 S
.
& R
.
72.
* Britain v. Kinnard, 1 B
.
& B
.
432. Conviction under the Bumboat
Act. The record was fair on its face,
but it was insisted that the vessel in
question was not a “boat” within
the intent o
f
the act. Dallas, Ch. J.:
“The general principle applicable to
cases o
f
this description is perfectly
clear: it is established by a
ll
the an
cient, and recognized b
y
all the
modern decisions; and the principle
is
,
that a conviction by a magistrate,
who has jurisdiction over the sub
ject-matter, is
,
if no defects appear
on the face o
f it
,
conclusive evidence
o
f
the facts stated in it
.
Such being
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[*408] * When it is once made to appear that a court has
jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and of the parties,
the principle, what are the facts of
the present case? If the subject
matter in the present case were a
boat, it is agreed that the boat would
be forfeited; and the conviction stated
it to be a boat. But it is said that
in order to give the magistrate juris
diction, the subject-matter of his con
viction must be a boat; and that it is
competent to the party to impeach
the conviction by showing that it was
not a boat. I agree, that if he had
not jurisdiction, the conviction signi
fies nothing. Had he then jurisdic
tion in this case? By the act of
Parliament he is empowered to search
for and seize gunpowder in any boat
on the river Thames. Now, allow
ing, for the sake of argument, that
“boat' is a word of technical mean
ing, and somewhat different from a
vessel, still, it was a matter of fact to
be made out before the magistrate,
and on which he was to draw his own
conclusion. But it is said that a
jurisdiction limited as to person,
place, and subject-matter is stinted in
its nature, and cannot be lawfully
exceeded. I agree: but upon the
inquiry before the magistrate, does
not the person form a question to be
decided upon the evidence? Does
not the place, does not the subject
matter, form such a question? The
possession of a boat, therefore, with
gunpowder on board, is part of the
offence charged; and how could the
magistrate decide, but by examining
evidence in proof of what was alleged?
The magistrate, it is urged, could not
give himself jurisdiction by finding
that to be a fact which did not exist.
But he is bound to inquire as to the
fact, and when he has inquired, his
conviction is conclusive of it. The
magistrates have inquired in the pres
ent instance, and they find the sub
ject of conviction to be a boat. Much
has been said about the danger of
magistrates giving themselves juris
diction; and extreme cases have been
put, as of a magistrate seizing a ship
of seventy-four guns, and calling it a
boat. Suppose such a thing done,
the conviction is still conclusive, and
we cannot look out of it
. It is urged
that the party is without remedy;
and so he is, without civil remedy, in
this and many other cases; his rem
edy is by proceeding criminally; and
if the decision were so gross as to call
a ship o
f seventy-four guns a boat, it
would be good ground for a criminal
proceeding. Formerly the rule was
to intend everything against a stinted
jurisdiction: that is not the rule now;
and nothing is to be intended but
what is fair and reasonable, and it is
reasonable to intend that magistrates
will do what is right.” Richardson,
J., in the same case, states the real
point very clearly: “Whether the
vessel in question were a boat or no
was a fact on which the magistrate
was to decide; and the fallacy lies in
assuming that the fact which the
magistrate has to decide is that which
constitutes his jurisdiction. If a fact
decided a
s this has been might be
questioned in a civil suit, the magis
trate would never be safe in his juris
diction. Suppose the case for a
conviction under the game laws o
f
having partridges in possession; could
the magistrate, in an action o
f tres
pass, b
e called on to show that the
bird in question was really a partridge;
and yet it might as well be urged, in
that case, that the magistrate had no
jurisdiction unless the bird were a
partridge, as it may be urged in the
present case that he has none unless
the machine be a boat. So in the
case o
f
a conviction for keeping dogs
for the destruction of game without
being duly qualified to d
o so; after
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the judgment which * it pronounces must be held con- [*409]
clusive and binding upon the parties thereto and their
privies, notwithstanding the court may have proceeded irregu
larly, or erred in it
s application o
f
the law to the case before it
.
It is a general rule that irregularities in the course of judicial
proceedings d
o not render them void." An irregularity may be
defined as the failure to observe that particular course o
f pro
ceeding which, conformably with the practice o
f
the court, ought
to have been observed in the case; * and if a party claims to be
aggrieved b
y
this, he must apply to the court in which the suit
is pending to set aside the proceedings, o
r
to give him such other
redress as he thinks himself entitled to ; or he must take steps
to have the judgment reversed b
y
removing the case for review
to an appellate court, if any such there be. Wherever the ques
tion o
f
the validity o
f
the proceedings arises in any collateral
suit, he will be held bound b
y
them to the same extent as if in
all respects the court had proceeded according to law. An
irregularity cannot be taken advantage o
f collaterally ; that is to
say, in any other suit than that in which the irregularity occurs,
o
r
o
n appeal o
r process in error therefrom. And even in the
same proceeding a
n irregularity may be waived, and will com
monly be held to be waived if the party entitled to complain of it
the conviction had found that the
offender kept a dog o
f
that descrip
tion, could he, in a civil action, be
allowed to dispute the truth o
f
the
conviction? In a question like the
present we are not to look a
t
the in
convenience, but a
t
the law; but
surely if the magistrate acts bona fide,
and comes to his conclusion as to
matters o
f
fact according to the best
o
f
his judgment, it would be highly
unjust if he were to have to defend
himself in a civil action; and the
more so, as he might have been com
pelled by a mandamus to proceed on
the investigation. Upon the general
principle, therefore, that where the
magistrate has jurisdiction his con
viction is conclusive evidence of the
facts stated in it
,
I think this rule
must be discharged.” See also Bas
ten v. Carew, 3 B
.
& C
. 648; Fawcett
v
. Fowlis, 7 B
.
& C
. 394; Ashcroft
v
. Bourne, 3 B
.
& Ad. 684; Mather
v
. Hodd, 8 Johns. 44; Mackaboy v.
Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Cas. 268;
Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Wt. 509; State v.
Scott, 1 Bailey, 294; Facey v. Fuller,
1
3 Mich. 527; Wall v. Trumbull, 16
Mich. 228; Sheldon v. Wright, 5
N. Y. 512; Wanzer v. Howland,
1
0 Wis. 16; Freeman on Judgments,
§ 523, and cases cited.
* Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509;
Edgerton v. Hart, 8 Vt. 208; Carter
v
. Walker, 2 Ohio, N
.
s. 339; Free
man on Judgments, $135.
* “The doing or not doing that in
the conduct o
f
a suit at law, which,
conformably to the practice o
f
the
court, ought o
r ought not to be done.”
Bouv. Law Dic. See Dick v. Mc
Laurin, 63 N
.
C
.
185.
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shall take any subsequent step in the case inconsistent with an
intent on his part to take advantage of it."
We have thus briefly indicated the cases in which judicial
action may be treated as void because not in accordance
[*410] with the * law of the land. The design of the present
work does not permit an enlarged discussion of the topics
which suggest themselves in this connection, and which, however
interesting and important, do not specially pertain to the subject
of constitutional law.
But a party in any case has a right to demand that the judg
ment of the court be given upon his suit, and he cannot be bound
by a delegated exercise of judicial power, whether the delegation
be by the courts or by legislative act devolving judicial duties on
ministerial officers.” Proceedings in any such case would be
void; but they must be carefully distinguished from those cases
in which the court has itself acted, though irregularly. All the
State constitutions preserve the right of trial by jury, for civil as
well as for criminal cases, with such exceptions as are specified,
and which for the most part consist in such cases as are of small
consequence, and are triable in inferior courts. The constitu
tional provisions do not extend the right; they only secure it in
the cases in which it was a matter of right before.” But in doing
1 Robinson v. West, 1 Sandf. 19: * Hall v. Marks, 34 Ill. 363;
Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill, 657; Wood
v. Randall, 5 Hill, 285; Baker v. Kerr,
13 Iowa, 384; Loomis v. Wadhams,
8 Gray, 557; Warren v. Glynn, 37
N. H. 340. A strong instance of
waiver is where, on appeal from a
court having no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter to a court having gen
eral jurisdiction, the parties going to
trial without objection are held bound
by the judgment. Randolph Co. v.
Ralls, 18 Ill. 29; Wells v. Scott, 4
Mich. 347; Tower v. Lamb, 6 Mich.
362. In Hoffman v. Locke, 19 Penn.
St. 57, objection was taken on con
stitutional grounds to a statute which
allowed judgment to be entered up
for the plaintiff in certain cases, if the
defendant failed to make and file an
affidavit of merits; but the court sus
tained it.
Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. As
to the right to send civil causes to a
referee for hearing, see King v. Hop
kins, 57 N. H. 334; St. Paul, &c.
R. R. Co. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132;
s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 334. For the dis
tinction between judicial and ministe
rial acts, see Flournoy v. Jefferson
ville, 17 Ind. 173.
* Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H.
19; Opinions of Judges, 41 N. H. 551;
Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 210;
Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461; Mead
v. Walker, 17 Wis. 189; Common
wealth v. Seabrook, 2 Strob. 560;
Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Lake
Erie, &c. R. R. Co. v. Heath, 9 Ind.
558; Byers v. Commonwealth, 42
Penn. St. 89; State v. Peterson, 41
Vt. 504; Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co. v.
Burket, 26 Tex. 588; Sands v. Kim
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this, they preserve the historical jury of twelve men," with all its
incidents, unless a contrary purpose clearly appears. The party
is therefore entitled to examine into the qualifications and im
partiality of jurors;” and to have the proceedings public; * and no
conditions can be imposed upon the exercise of the right that shall
impair its value and usefulness.” It has been held, however, in
many cases, that it is competent to deny to parties the privilege
of a trial in a court of first instance, provided the right is allowed
on appeal.” It is undoubtedly competent to create new tribunals
without common-law powers, and to authorize them to proceed
without a jury; but a change in the forms of action will not
authorize submitting common-law rights to a tribunal in which
no jury is allowed." In any case, we suppose a failure to award
a jury on proper demand would be an irregularity merely, ren
dering the proceedings liable to reversal, but not making them
void.
bark, 27 N. Y. 147; Howell v. Fry, 19
Ohio, N. s. 556; Guile v. Brown, 38
Conn. 237; Howe v. Plainfield, 37 N. J.
143; Commissioners v. Morrison, 22
Minn. 178.
* See ante, p. *319. And see the
general examination of the subject
historically in Hagany v. Cohnen, 29
Ohio, N. s. 82; and Copp p. Henniker,
55 N. H. 179.
* Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248;
Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108.
* Watertown Bank, &c. v. Mix,
51 N. Y. 558.
* Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C.
311; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328;
Norristown, &c. Co. v. Burket, 26
Ind. 53; State v. Gurney, 37 Me.
156; Copp v. Henniker, 55 N. H. 179.
It is not inadmissible, however, to
require of a party demanding a jury -
that he shall pay the jury fee.
dall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37.
* Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416;
Biddle v. Commonwealth, 13 S. & R.
405; McDonald v. Schell, 6 S. & R.
240; Keddie v. Moore, 2 Murph. 41;
Wilson v. Simonton, 1 Hawks, 482;
Monford v. Barney, 8 Yerg. 444; Beers
v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; State v. Bren
Ran
man’s Liquors, 25 Conn. 278; Curtis
v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49; Reckner v.
Warner, 22 Ohio, N. s. 275; Jones
v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Hapgood v.
Doherty, 8 Gray, 374; Flint River,
&c. Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo. 208; Mur
ford v. Barnes, 8 Geo. 444; State r.
Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; Lincoln v.
Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 360; Steuart
v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500; Common
wealth v. Whitney, 108 Mass. 6. But
that this could not be admissible in
criminal cases was held in Matter of
Dana, 7 Benedict, 1, by Judge Blatch
ford, who very sensibly remarks, “In
my judgment the accused is entitled,
not to be first convicted by a court,
and then to be acquitted by a jury,
but to be convicted or acquitted in the
first instance by a jury.”
* See Rhines v. Clark, 51 Penn.
St. 96. Compare Haines v. Levin,
51 Penn. St. 412; Haines' Appeal,
73 Penn. St. 169. Whether jury trial
is of right in quo warranto cases, see
State v. Allen, 5 Kan. 213; State v.
Johnson, 26 Ark. 281: State v. Vail,
53 Mo. 97; People v. Cicott, 16 Mich.
283.
33
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There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which
may have an important bearing upon the constitutional validity
of judgments in some cases. No one ought to be a judge in his
own cause; and so inflexible and so manifestly just is this rule,
that Lord Coke has laid it down that “even an act of Parliament
made against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own
case, is void in itself; for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they
are leges legum.” "
* This maxim applies in all cases where judicial func
tions are to be exercised, and excludes all who are
interested, however remotely, from taking part in their exercise.
It is not left to the discretion of a judge, or to his sense of
decency, to decide whether he shall act or not ; all his powers
are subject to this absolute limitation; and when his own rights
are in question, he has no authority to determine the cause.”
Nor is it essential that the judge be a party named in the record;
if the suit is brought or defended in his interest, or if he is a
corporator in a corporation which is a party, or which will be
benefited or damnified by the judgment, he is equally excluded
as if he were the party named.” Accordingly, where the Lord
Chancellor, who was a shareholder in a company in whose favor
the Vice-Chancellor had rendered a decree, affirmed this decree,
the House of Lords reversed the decree on this ground, Lord
Campbell observing: “It is of the last importance that the maxim
that “no man is to be a judge in his own cause ' should be held
sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he
is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest.”
“We have again and again set aside proceedings in inferior tri
bunals, because an individual who had an interest in a cause took
[*411]
1 Co. Lit. § 212. See Day v.
Savadge, Hobart, 85. We should
not venture to predict, however, that
even in a case of this kind, if one
* Washington Insurance Co. v.
Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Dimes v. Pro
prietors of Grand Junction Canal, 3
House of Lords Cases, 759; Pearce v.
could be imagined to exist, the courts
would declare the act of Parliament
void; though they would never find
such an intent in the statute, if any
other could possibly be made consis
tent with the words.
2 Washington Insurance Co. v.
Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Sigourney v.
Sibley, 21 Pick. 191; Freeman on
Judgments, $144.
Atwood, 13 Mass. 340; Peck v. Free
holders of Essex, 20 N. J. 457; Com
monwealth v. McLane, 4 Gray, 427;
Dively v. Cedar Rapids, 21 Iowa, 565;
Clark v. Lamb, 2 Allen, 396; Stock
well ºv. White Lake, 22 Mich. 341;
Petition of New Boston, 49 N. H.
328.
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a part in the decision. And it will have a most salutary effect
on these tribunals, when it is known that this high court of last
resort, in a case in which the Lord Chancellor of England had
an interest, considered that his decree was on that account a
decree not according to law, and should be set aside. This
will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care, not only
that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal
interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an
influence.” "
-
It is matter of some interest to know whether the legislatures
of the American States can set aside this maxim of the common
law, and by express enactment permit one to act judicially
when * interested in the controversy. The maxim itself, [*412]
it is said, in some cases, does not apply where, from
necessity, the judge must proceed in the case, there being no
other tribunal authorized to act; * but we prefer the opinion of
Chancellor Sandford of New York, that in such a case it belongs
to the power which created such a court to provide another in
which this judge may be a party; and whether another tribunal
is established or not, he at least is not intrusted with authority to
determine his own rights, or his own wrongs.”
It has been held that where the interest was that of corporator
in a municipal corporation, the legislature might provide that it
should constitute no disqualification where the corporation was
a party. But the ground of this ruling appears to be, that the
interest is so remote, trifling, and insignificant, that it may fairly
be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of
influencing the conduct of an individual.” And where penalties
are imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal court, the
judges or jurors in which would be interested as corporators in
the recovery, the law providing for such recovery must be re
garded as precluding the objection of interest.” And it is very
1 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand
Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords
Cases, 759.
* Ranger v. Great Western R.,
5 House of Lords Cases, 88; Stewart
v. Mechanics’ and Farmers' Bank, 19
Johns. 501.
* Washington Insurance Co. v.
Price, Hopk. Ch. 2. This subject
was considered in Hall v. Thayer,
105 Mass. 221, and an appointment
by a judge of probate of his wife's
brother as administrator of an estate
of which her father was a principal
creditor was held void. And see
People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83.
* Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray,
475.
* Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 Mass.
90; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick. 104; Com
monwealth v. Emery, 11 Cush. 406.
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common, in a certain class of cases, for the law to provide that
certain township and county officers shall audit their own accounts
for services rendered the public; but in such case there is no
adversary party, unless the State, which passes the law, or the
municipalities which are it
s component parts and subject to it
s
control, can b
e regarded as such.
But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see
how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which
is among the fundamentals o
f judicial authority. The people of
the State, when framing their constitution, may possibly establish
so great a
n anomaly, if they see fit; but if the legislature is in
trusted with apportioning and providing for the exercise o
f
the
judicial power, we cannot understand it to be authorized, in the
execution of this trust, to do that which has never been
[*413] recognized as * being within the province of the judicial
authority. To empower one party to a controversy to
decide it for himself is not within the legislative authority, be
cause it is not the establishment of any rule of action or decision,
but is a placing o
f
the other party, so far as that controversy
is concerned, out o
f
the protection o
f
the law, and submitting him
to the control of one whose interest it will be to decide arbitra
rily and unjustly.”
Nor do we see how the objection o
f
interest can b
e
waived by
the other party. If not taken before the decision is rendered, it
will avail in an appellate court ; and the suit may there be dis
missed o
n
that ground.” The judge acting in such a case is not
simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting without jurisdic
tion. And if one of the judges constituting a court is disquali
fied o
n
this ground, the judgment will be void, even though the
proper number may have concurred in the result, not reckoning
the interested party.”
1 Matter o
f Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39.
Even this must be deemed doubtful
Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 350; Scuffletown Fence Co. v.
since the adoption o
f
the fourteenth
article of the amendments to the
federal Constitution, which denies to
the State the right to deprive one o
f
life, liberty, o
r property, without due
process o
f
law. -
* See Ames v. Port Huron Log
Driving and Booming Co., 11 Mich.
139; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 325;
State v. Crane, 36°N. J. 394; Cypress
McAllister, 12 Bush, 312.
8 Richardson v. Welcome, 6 Cush.
332; Dimes v. Proprietors o
f
Grand
Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords
Cases, 787. And see Sigourney v.
Sibley, 21 Pick. 106; Oakley v. As
pinwall, 3 N
.
Y
.
547.
* In Queen v. Justices o
f Hertford
shire, 6 Queen’s Bench, 753, it was
decided that, if any one of the magis
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Mere formal acts necessary to enable the case to be brought
before a proper tribunal for adjudication, an interested judge may
do ; * but that is the extent of his power.
trates hearing a case at sessions was
interested, the court was improperly
constituted, and an order made in
the case should be quashed. It was
also decided that it was no answer to
the objection, that there was a major
ity in favor of the decision without
reckoning the interested party, nor
that the interested party withdrew
before the decision, if he appeared to
have joined in discussing the matter
with the other magistrates. See also
The Queen v. Justices of Suffolk, 18
Q. B. 416; The Queen v. Justices
of London, 18 Q. B. 421; Peninsula
R. R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 26.
1 Richardson v. Boston, 1 Curtis,
C. C. 251; Washington Insurance
Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Bucking
ham v. Davis, 9 Md. 324; Heydenfeldt
v. Towns, 27 Ala. 430. If the judge
who renders judgment in a cause had
previously been attorney in it
,
the
judgment is a nullity. Reams v.
Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
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[*414] * CHAPTER XII.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.
'THE first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. With jealous
care of what is almost universally regarded as a highly important
right, essential to the existence and perpetuity of free govern
ment, a provision of similar import has been embodied in each
of the State constitutions, and a constitutional principle is thereby
established which is supposed to form a shield of protection to the
free expression of opinion in every part of our land."
* The following are the constitu
tional provisions: Maine: Every citi
zen may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of
this liberty. No law shall be passed
regulating or restraining the freedom
of the press; and, in prosecutions for
any publication respecting the official
conduct of men in public capacity, or
the qualifications of those who are
candidates for the suffrages of the
people, or where the matter published
is proper for public information, the
truth thereof may be given in evi
dence; and in all indictments for libel,
the jury, after having received the
direction of the court, shall have a
right to determine, at their discretion,
the law and the fact. Declaration of
Rights, $ 4.—New Hampshire : The
liberty of the press is essential to the
security of freedom in a State; it
ought, therefore, to be inviolably
preserved. Bill of Rights, $ 22. —
Vermont : That the people have a
right to freedom of speech, and of
writing and publishing their senti
ments concerning the transactions of
government; therefore the freedom
of the press ought not to be re
strained. Declaration of Rights,
Art. 13. — Massachusetts : The liberty
of the press is essential to the security
of freedom in a State; it ought not,
therefore, to be restrained in this Com
monwealth. Declaration of Rights,
Art. 16. – Rhode Island: The liberty
of the press being essential to the se
curity of freedom in a State, any
person may publish his sentiments on
any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty; and in a
ll
trials
for libel, both civil and criminal, the
truth, unless published from malicious
motives, shall be sufficient defence to
the person charged. Art. 1
,
§ 20. —
Connecticut: No law shall ever be
passed to curtail o
r
restrain the lib
erty o
f speech o
r
o
f
the press. In all
prosecutions o
r
indictments for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence,
and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts, un
der the direction of the court. Art.
1
,
§§ 6 and 7. — New York: Every
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* It is to be observed of these several provisions, that [*415]
they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek to
person may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all sub
jects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or the press. In all
criminal prosecutions or indictments
for libels, the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libellous is true, and was
published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted, and the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the
fact. Art. 1, § 8. — New Jersey:
Every person may freely speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right. No law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the lib
erty of speech or of the press. In all
prosecutions or indictments for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged as
libellous is true, and was published
with good motives and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted;
and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the fact. Art.
1, § 5. — Pennsylvania: That the
printing-press shall be free to every
person who may undertake to exam
ine the proceedings of the legislature,
or any branch of government, and no
law shall ever be made to restrain
the right thereof. The free commu
nication of thoughts and opinions is
one of the invaluable rights of man,
and every citizen may freely speak,
write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that lib
erty. No conviction shall be had in
any prosecution for the publication
of papers, relating to the official con
duct of officers or men in public
capacity, or to any other matter
proper for public investigation or
information, where the fact that such
publication was not maliciously or
negligently made shall be established
to the satisfaction of the jury; and in
all indictments for libels, the jury
shall have the right to determine the
law and the facts, under the direction
of the court, as in other cases. Art.
1, § 7. — Delaware: The press shall
be free to every citizen who under
takes to examine the official conduct
of men acting in public capacity, and
any citizen may print on any such
subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty. In prosecu
tions for publications investigating
the proceedings of officers, or where
the matter published is proper for
public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and in all
indictments for libels, the jury may
determine the facts and the law, as in
other cases. Art. 1, § 5. — Maryland:
That the liberty of the press ought to
be inviolably preserved; that every
citizen of the State ought to be al
lowed to speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on a
ll subjects, being
responsible for the abuse o
f
that
privilege. Declaration o
f Rights,
Art. 40. — West Virginia : No law
abridging the freedom o
f speech o
r
o
f
the press shall be passed; but the
legislature may provide for the re
straint and punishment o
f
the pub
lishing and vending o
f
obscene books,
papers, and pictures, and o
f
libel and
defamation o
f character, and for the
recovery in civil action b
y
the ag
grieved party o
f
suitable damages
for such libel or defamation. At
tempts to justify and uphold an armed
invasion o
f
the State, o
r
a
n organized
insurrection therein during the con
tinuance of such invasion or insurrec
tion, by publicly speaking, writing.
o
r printing, o
r by publishing, o
r cir
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[*416) protect and perpetuate * them, by declaring that they shall
not be abridged, or that they shall remain inviolate. They
culating such writing or printing,
may be by law declared a misde
meanor, and punished accordingly.
In prosecutions and civil suits for
libel, the truth may be given in evi
dence; and if it shall appear to the
jury that the matter charged as li
bellous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, the verdict shall be for the
defendant. Art. 2, §§ 4 and 5. —
Kentucky: That printing-presses shall
be free to every person who under
takes to examine the proceedings of
the General Assembly, or any branch
of the government, and no law shall
ever be made to restrain the right
thereof. The free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every
citizen may freely speak, write, and
print, on any subject, being responsi
ble for the abuse of that liberty. In
all prosecutions for the publication of
papers investigating the official con
duct of officers or men in a public
capacity, or where the matter pub
lished is proper for public informa
tion, the truth thereof may be given
in evidence; and in all indictments
for libels, the jury shall have a right
to determine the law and the facts,
under the direction of the court, as in
other cases. Art. 13, §§ 9 and 10. —
Tennessee : Nearly the same as Penn
sylvania. Art. 1, § 19. — Ohio:
Every citizen may freely speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of the right; and no law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or of the press.
In all criminal prosecutions for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged as
libellous is true, and was published
with good motives and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted.
Art. 1, § 11. — Iowa, Art. 1, § 7, and
Nevada, Art. 1, § 9. Substantially
same as Ohio. — Illinois : Every
person may freely speak, write, and
publish on all subjects, being respon
sible for the abuse of that liberty;
and in all trials for libel, both civil
and criminal, the truth, when pub
lished with good motives and for
justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defence. Art. 2, § 4. — Indiana :
No law shall be passed restraining
the free interchange of thought and
opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever; but for the abuse
of that right every person shall be
responsible. In al
l
prosecutions for
libel, the truth o
f
the matters alleged
to be libellous may be given in jus
tification. Art. 1
,
§§ 9 and 10. —
Michigan : In all prosecutions for
libels, the truth may be given in evi
dence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libellous is true, and was
published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted. The jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the
fact. Art. 6
,
§ 25. — Wisconsin :
Same as New York. Art. 1
,
§ 3
. —
Minnesota . The liberty o
f
the press
shall for ever remain inviolate, and
all persons may freely speak, write,
and publish their sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the
abuse o
f
such right. Art. 1
,
§ 3. —
Oregon: No law shall be passed re
straining the free expression o
f opin
ion, o
r restricting the right to speak,
write, o
r print freely on any subject
whatever; but every person shall be
responsible for the abuse of this
right. Art. 1
,
§ 8
. — California :
Same a
s New York. Art. 1
,
§ 9. —
Kansas: The liberty o
f
the press
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do not assume to create new rights, but * their purpose is [*417]
to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of those already
shall be inviolate, and all persons
may freely speak, write, or publish
their sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of such
right; and in all civil or criminal
actions for libel, the truth may be
given in evidence to the jury; and if
it shall appear that the alleged li
bellous matter was published for
justifiable ends, the accused party
shall be acquitted. Bill of Rights,
§ 11. — Missouri: That no law shall
be passed impairing the freedom of
speech; that every person shall be free
to say, write, or publish whatever he
will on every subject, being responsible
for all abuse of that liberty; and that
in all prosecutions for libel, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence, and
the jury, under the direction of the
court, shall determine the law and
the fact. Art. 2, § 14. — Nebraska:
Same as Illinois. Art. 1, § 5. — Ar
kansas: The liberty of the press
shall for ever remain inviolate. The
free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and all persons may
freely speak, write, and publish their
sentiments on a
ll subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of such
right. In all criminal prosecutions
for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury: and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter
charged as libellous is true, and was
published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted. Art. 1
,
§ 2. — Florida:
Every person may freely speak and
write his sentiments on a
ll subjects,
being responsible for the abuse o
f
that right, and no law shall be passed
to restrain o
r abridge the liberty o
f
speech o
r
the press. In al
l
criminal
prosecutions and civil actions for
libel, the truth may be given in evi
dence to the jury; and if it appear
that the matter charged as libellous
is true, and was published with good
motives, the party shall be acquitted
o
r
exonerated. Declaration o
f Rights,
§ 10. – Georgia: No law shall ever be
passed to curtail o
r
restrain the liberty
o
f speech o
r
o
f
the press; any person
may speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being re
sponsible for the abuse o
f
that lib
erty. Art. 1
,
§ 1
, par 15. — Louisiana :
The press shall be free; every citizen
may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this
liberty. Title 1
,
Art. 4.—North
Carolina: The freedom of the press
is one o
f
the great bulwarks o
f lib
erty, and therefore ought never to be
restrained; but every individual shall
b
e held responsible for the abuse o
f
the same. Declaration o
f Rights,
§ 20. — South Carolina: All persons
may freely speak, write, and publish
their sentiments on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse o
f
that
right; and no laws shall be enacted
to restrain o
r abridge the liberty o
f
speech o
r
o
f
the press. In prosecu
tions for the publication o
f papers
investigating the official conduct o
f
officers o
r
men in public capacity, o
r
when the matter published is proper
for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence;
and in all indictments for libel the
jury shall be judges of the law and
the facts. Art. 1
,
§§ 7 and 8. —
Alabama : That any citizen may speak,
write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse o
f
that liberty. That in prose
cutions for the publication o
f papers
investigating the official conduct o
f
officers o
r
men in public capacity, o
r
when the matter published is proper
for public information, the truth there
o
f may be given in evidence; and that
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possessed. We are at once, therefore, turned back from these
provisions to the pre-existing law, in order that we may ascertain
what the rights are which are thus protected, and what is the ex
tent of the privileges they undertake to assure.
At the common law, however, it will be found that liberty of
the press was neither well protected nor well defined. The art
of printing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a
comparatively recent period, been regarded rather as an instru
ment of mischief, which required the restraining hand of the gov
ernment, than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged.
Like a vicious beast it might be made useful if properly harnessed
and restrained. The government assumed to itself the right to
determine what might or might not be published; and
[*418] censors were appointed * without whose permission it was
criminal to publish a book or paper upon any subject.
Through a
ll
the changes o
f government, this censorship was
continued until after the Revolution o
f 1688, and there are no
instances in English history o
f
more cruel and relentless persecu
tion than for the publication o
f
books which now would pass un
noticed by the authorities. To a much later time the press was
not free to publish even the current news o
f
the day where the
government could suppose itself to be interested in it
s suppression.
in al
l
indictments for libels, the jury
shall have the right to determine the
law and the facts, under the direction
o
f
the court. Art. 1
,
§§ 5 and 13. —
Mississippi: The freedom of speech
and o
f
the press shall be held sacred;
and in all indictments for libel, the
jury shall determine the law and
the facts, under the direction o
f
the court. Art. 1
,
§ 4. — Texas:
Every citizen shall be a
t liberty to
speak, write, o
r publish his opinions
o
n any subject, being responsible for
the abuse o
f
that privilege; and no
law shall ever be passed curtailing the
liberty o
f speech o
r
o
f
the press. In
prosecutions for the publication o
f
papers, investigating the official con
duct o
f
officers o
r
men in a public
capacity, o
r
when the matter pub
lished is proper for public informa
tion, the truth thereof may be given
in evidence; and in a
ll prosecutions
for libels, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the
facts, under the direction o
f
the court,
a
s in other cases. Art. 1
,
§§ 5 and 6.
— Virginia: That the freedom of the
press is one o
f
the great bulwarks o
f
liberty, and can never be restrained
but by despotic governments, and
any citizen may speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty. Art. 1
,
§ 14. — Colorado:
That no law shall be passed impairing
the freedom o
f speech; that every
person shall be free to speak, write,
o
r publish whatever he will on any
subject, being responsible for all
abuse o
f
that liberty; and that [in]
all suits and prosecutions for libel,
the truth thereof may be given in evi
dence, and the jury, under the direc
tion o
f
the court, shall determine the
law and the fact. Art. 2
,
§ 10.
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Many matters, the publication of which now seems important to
the just, discreet, and harmonious administration of free institu
tions, and to the proper observation of public officers by those
interested in the discharge of their duties, were treated by the
public authorities as offences against good order, and contempts
of their authority. By a fiction not very far removed from the
truth, the Parliament was supposed to sit with closed doors. No
official publication of it
s
debates was provided for, and no other
was allowed." The brief sketches which found their way into
print were usually disguised under the garb o
f
discussions in a
fictitious parliament, held in a foreign country. Several times the
Parliament resolved that any such publication, o
r any intermed
dling by letter-writers, was a breach o
f
their privileges, and should
b
e punished accordingly on discovery o
f
the offenders. For such
a publication in 1747 the editor o
f
the “Gentleman's Magazine ‘’
was brought to the bar o
f
the House o
f
Commons for reprimand,
and only discharged on expressing his contrition. The general
publication o
f Parliamentary debates dates only from the Ameri
can Revolution, and even then was still considered a technical
breach o
f privilege.”
The American Colonies followed the practice o
f
the parent
country.” Even the laws were not at first published for general
circulation, and it seemed to be thought desirable by the magis
1 In 1641, Sir Edward Deering was
expelled and imprisoned for publish
ing a collection o
f
his own speeches,
and the book was ordered to be burned
by the common hangman. See May's
Const. Hist. c. 7.
* See May's Constitutional His
tory, c. 7
,
9
,
and 10, for a complete
account o
f
the struggle between the
government and the press, resulting
a
t
last in the complete enfranchise
ment and protection o
f
the latter in
the publication o
f all matters of public
interest, and in the discussion o
f pub
lic affairs. Freedom to report pro
ceedings and debates was due a
t
last
to Wilkes, who, worthless as he was,
proved a great public benefactor in
his obstinate defence o
f liberty o
f
the
press and security from arbitrary
search and arrest. A fair publication
o
f
a debate is now held to be privi
leged; and comments on public legis
lative proceedings are not actionable,
so long as a jury shall think them hon
est and made in a fair spirit, and such
a
s
are justified by the circumstances.
Wason v. Walter, Law Rep. 4 Q
.
B
.
73.
* The General Court of Massa
chusetts “appointed two persons, in
October, 1662, licensers o
f
the press,
and prohibited the publishing any
books o
r papers which should not be
supervised by them, and in 166S the
supervisors having allowed o
f
the
printing “Thomas à Kempis de Imi
tatione Christi,' the court interposed,
“it being wrote b
y
a popish minister,
and containing some things less safe
to be infused among the people,’ and
therefore they commended to the li
censers a more full revisal, and ordered
the press to stop in the mean time.”
1 Hutchinson's Mass. 257, 2d ed.
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trates to keep the people in ignorance of the precise
[*419] boundary * between that which was lawful and that
which was prohibited, as more likely to make them avoid
a
ll
doubtful actions. The magistrates o
f Massachusetts, when
compelled b
y public opinion to suffer the publication o
f general
laws in 1649, permitted it under protest, as a hazardous experi
ment. For publishing the laws o
f
one session in Virginia, in
1682, the printer was arrested and put under bonds until the
king's pleasure could be known, and the king's pleasure was de
clared that n
o printing should be allowed in the Colony." There
were not wanting instances o
f
the public burning o
f books, as
offenders against good order. Such was the fate o
f
Elliot's book
in defence o
f
unmixed principles o
f popular freedom,” and Calef's
book against Cotton Mather, which was given to the flames a
t
Cambridge.” A single printing-press was introduced into the
Colony so early as 1640; but the publication even o
f
State doc
uments did not become free until 1719, when, after a quarrel be
tween Governor Shute and the House, he directed that body not
to print one o
f
their remonstrances, and, on their disobeying,
sought in vain to procure the punishment o
f
their printer.” When
Dongan was sent out as Governor o
f
New York in 1683, he was
expressly instructed to suffer n
o printing,” and that Colony ob
tained it
s
first press in 1692, through a Philadelphia printer being
driven thence for publishing an address from a Quaker, in which
h
e
accused his brethren in office o
f being inconsistent with their
principles in exercising political authority.” So late as 1671,
Governor Berkley o
f Virginia expressed his thankfulness that
neither free schools nor printing were introduced in the Colony,
and his trust that these breeders o
f disobedience, heresy, and
sects, would long be unknown."
The public bodies o
f
the united nation did not at once invite
publicity to their deliberations. The Constitutional Convention
o
f
1787 sat with closed doors, and although imperfect reports
o
f
the debates have since been published, the injunction o
f
secrecy upon it
s
members was never removed. The Senate for a
1 Hildreth, History o
f
the United • 2 Hildreth, 298.
States, 561. * 2 Hildreth, 77.
* 1 Hutchinson's Mass. (2d ed.) • 2 Hildreth, 171.
211; 2 Bancroft, 73; 1 Hildreth, 452; 7 1 Hildreth, 526; 2 Hen. Stat.
2 Palfrey's New England, 511, 512. 517; Wise's Seven Decades o
f
the
& 1 Bancroft, 97; 2 Hildreth, 166. Union, 310.
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time followed this example, and the first open " debate [*420]
was had in 1793, on the occasion of the controversy over
the right of Mr. Gallatin to a seat in that body." The House of
Representatives sat with open doors from the first, tolerating the
presence of reporters, – over whose admission, however, the
Speaker assumed control,- and refusing in 1796 the pittance of
two thousand dollars for full publication of debates.
It must be evident from these brief references that liberty of
the press, as now understood and enjoyed, is of very recent
origin; * and commentators seem to be agreed in the opinion that
the term itself means only that liberty of publication without the
previous permission of the government, which was obtained by
the abolition of the censorship. In a strict sense, Mr. Hallam
says, it consists merely in exemption from a licenser.” A similar
view is expressed by De Lolme. “Liberty of the press,” he says,
“consists in this: that neither courts of justice, nor any other
judges whatever, are authorized to take notice of writings in
tended for the press, but are confined to those which are actually
printed.” “ Blackstone also adopts the same opinion,” and it has
been followed by American commentators of standard authority
as embodying correctly the idea incorporated in the constitu
tional law of the country by the provisions in the American Bills
of Rights."
It is conceded on all sides that the common-law rules that sub
jected the libeller to responsibility for the private injury, or the
public scandal or disorder occasioned by his conduct, are not
abolished by the protection extended to the press in our constitu
tions. The words of Ch. J. Parker of Massachusetts on this sub
1 “This broke the spell of delib
erations in secret conclave; and a few
days afterwards, on the 20th of the
same month, a general resolution was
adopted by the Senate, that, after the
end of the present annual session, its
proceedings in its legislative capacity
should be with open doors, unless in
special cases which, in the judgment
of the body, should require secrecy.”
Life of Madison, by Rives, Vol. III.
p. 371.
The first legislative body in Amer
ica to throw open it
s
debates to the
public was the General Court o
f
Massachusetts, in 1766, on the mo
tion o
f
Otis. Tudor's Life of Otis,
252.
* It is mentioned neither in the
English Petition o
f Rights nor in the
Bill of Rights; of so little importance
did it seem to those who were seeking
to redress grievances in those days.
* Hallam's Const. Hist. o
f Eng
land, c. 15.
* De Lolme, Const. o
f England,
254.
5 4 Bl. Com. 151.
• Story on Const. § 1889; 2 Kent,
1
7
e
t seq.; Rawle on Const. c. 10.
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ject have been frequently quoted, generally recognized as sound
in principle, and accepted as authority. “Nor does our constitu
tion or declaration of rights,” he says, speaking of his own State,
“ abrogate the common law in this respect, as some have insisted.
The sixteenth article declares that “liberty of the press is essential
to the security of freedom in a State ; it ought not therefore to be
restrained in this Commonwealth.” The liberty of the
[*421] press, not it
s
licentiousness : * this is the construction
which a just regard to the other parts o
f
that instrument,
and to the wisdom o
f
those who founded it
,
requires. In the
eleventh article it is declared that every subject of the Common
wealth ought to find a certain remedy, b
y
having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, o
r
character ; and thus the general declaration in the
sixteenth article is qualified. Besides, it is well understood and
received a
s
a commentary o
n
this provision for the liberty o
f
the
press, that it was intended to prevent all such previous restraints
upon publications a
s
had been practised by other governments,
and in early times here, to stifle the efforts o
f patriots towards
enlightening their fellow-subjects upon their rights and the duties
o
f
rulers. The liberty o
f
the press was to b
e unrestrained, but he
who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse ; like the
right to keep fire-arms, which does not protect him who uses them
for annoyance or destruction.” "
But while we concede that liberty of speech and of the press
does not imply complete exemption from responsibility for every
thing a citizen may say o
r publish, and complete immunity to ruin
the reputation o
r
business o
f
others so far as falsehood and detrac
tion may be able to accomplish that end, it is nevertheless be
lieved that the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot
b
e a
ll
that is secured b
y
the constitutional provisions, inasmuch
a
s o
f
words to be uttered orally there can be no previous censor
ship, and the liberty o
f
the press might b
e
rendered a mockery
and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if
,
while every
man was a
t liberty to publish what he pleased, the public author
ities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications.
1 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 State v. Lehre, 2 Rep. Const. Court,
Pick. 313. See charge o
f
Chief Jus- 809; Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates,
tice McKean o
f Penn., 5 Hildreth, 267.
166; Wharton's State Trials, 323;
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An examination of the controversies which have grown out of
the repressive measures resorted to for the purpose of restraining
the free expression of opinion will sufficiently indicate the purpose
of the guaranties which have since been secured against such re
straints in the future. Except so far as those guaranties relate
to the mode of trial, and are designed to secure to every accused
person the right to be judged by the opinion of a jury upon the
criminality of his act, their purpose has evidently been to protect
parties in the free publication of matters of public con
cern, to "secure their right to a free discussion of public [*422]
events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at
any time to bring the government and any person in authority to
the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct
in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred
upon them. To guard against repressive measures by the several
departments of the government, by means of which persons in
power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scru
tiny and condemnation, was the general purpose ; and there was
no design or desire to modify the rules of the common law which
protected private character from detraction and abuse, except so
far as seemed necessary to secure to accused parties a fair trial.
The evils to be guarded against were not the censorship of the
press merely, but any action of the government by means of which
it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelli
gent exercise of their rights as citizens.
The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we un
derstand it
,
implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever
the citizen may please, and to be protected against any respon
sibility for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their
blasphemy, obscenity, o
r
scandalous character, may b
e
a public
offence, o
r
a
s b
y
their falsehood and malice they may injuriously
affect the standing, reputation, o
r pecuniary interests o
f individ
uals. Or, to state the same thing in somewhat different words,
we understand Tiberty o
f speech and o
f
the press to imply not
only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal cen
sure and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not
harmful in it
s character, when tested b
y
such standards as the
law affords. For these standards we must look to the common
law rules which were in force when the constitutional guaranties
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were established, and in reference to which they have been
adopted.
-
-
At the common law an action would lie against any person pub
lishing a false and malicious communication tending to disgrace o
r
injure another. Falsehood, malice, and injury were the elements
o
f
the action; but as the law presumed innocence of crime or mis
conduct until the contrary was proved, the falsity o
f
a
n injurious
publication was presumed until it
s
truth was averred and substan
tiated by the defendant; and if false, malice in the publication was
also presumed unless the publication was privileged under rules to
b
e
hereafter stated. There were many cases, also, where
[*423] the law presumed injury, and did not call upon the * com
plaining party to make any other showing that he was
damnified than such implication as arose from the character o
f
the
communication itself. One o
f
these was where the charge, if
true, would subject the party charged to an indictment for a
crime involving moral turpitude, o
r subject him to an infamous
punishment; but in such case it seems not to be important that
the charge imports a crime already punished, o
r
for which a pros
1 Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188;
Alexander v. Alexander, 9 Wend.
141; Young v. Miller, 3 Hill, 21 ;
Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio, N
.
s. 326;
Todd v. Rough, 10 S. & R
.
18; Beck
v
. Stitzel, 21 Penn. St. 522; Stitzell
v
. Reynolds, 67 Penn. St. 54; Klumph
v
. Dunn, 66 Penn. St. 141; Hoag v.
Hatch, 23 Conn. 585; Billings v.
Wing, 7 Wt. 439; Harrington v. Miles,
1
1 Kan. 480; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 355;
Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709;
Filber v. Dauterman, 26 Wis. 518;
Perdue v. Burnett, Minor, 138; Mc
Cuen v. Ludlum, 17 N. J. 12; Gage
v
. Shelton, 3 Rich. 242; Pollard v.
Lyon, 91 U
.
S
. Rep. 225; Wagaman
v
. Byers, 17 Md. 183; Castleberry v.
Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; Burton v. Burton,
3 Greene (Iowa), 316; Simmons v.
Holster, 13 Minn. 249. If, however,
the words, though seeming to charge
a crime, are equivocal, and may be
understood in an innocent sense, they
will not be actionable without the
proper averment to show the sense in
which they were used; as, for in
stance, where one is charged with
having sworn falsely; which may o
r
may not be a crime. Gilman v
.
Lowell, 8 Wend. 573; Brown v. Han
son, 53 Geo. 632; Crone v. Angell, 14
Mich. 340; Bricker v. Potts, 12 Penn.
St. 200. It is not necessary, however,
that technical words be employed;
if the necessary inference, taking the
words together, is a charge o
f crime,
it is sufficient. Morgan v. Livingston,
2 Rich. 573; True v. Plumley, 36
Me. 466; Curtis v. Curtis, 10 Bing.
477. But to say of one “He has
stolen my land ” is not actionable
per se, land not being the subject o
f
larceny. Ogden v. Riley, 14 N
. J.
186: Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40;
Ayers v. Grider, 15 Ill. 37; Edgerly v.
Swain, 32 N
.
H
.
478; Trabue v. Mays,
3 Dana, 138; Perry v. Man, 1 R
.
I.
263; Wright v. Lindsay, 20 Ala. 428;
Cock v. Weatherby, 13 Miss. 333.
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ecution is barred by limitation of time." Another was, to charge a
man with contagious disease; the effect of the charge, if believed,
being to exclude him from the society of his fellows.” Another was
where the charge affected the party in his business, office, or means
of livelihood, as where it was said of a postmaster that he would
rob the mail; * or of a trader, to whom credit is important, that
he is insolvent; * and the like. Still another was where any
injurious charge holding a party up to public contempt, scorn, or
ridicule was propagated by printing, writing, signs, burlesques,
&c.” And although it was formerly held that to charge a female
verbally with want of chastity was not actionable without proof
of special damage," yet of late a disposition has been
exhibited to * break away from this rule in favor of one [*424]
more just and sensible," and the statutes of several of the
States have either made adultery and incontinence punishable as
crimes, whereby to charge them becomes actionable per se under
the common-law rule, or else in express terms have declared such
a charge actionable without proof of special damage.”
* Carpenter v. Tarrant, Cas.
temp. Hardw. 339; Smith v. Stew
art, 5 Penn. St. 372; Holley v. Bur
gess, 9 Ala. 728; Van Ankin v. West
fall, 14 Johns. 233; Krebs v. Oliver,
12 Gray, 239; Baum v. Clause, 5
Hill, 196; Utley v. Campbell, 5 T. B.
Monr. 396; Indianapolis Sun v. Hor
rell, 53 Ind. 527.
* Taylor v. Hall, 2 Stra. 1389;
Carlslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473;
Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Kelly, 57;
Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Irons v.
Field, 9 R. I. 216; Kancher v. Blinn,
29 Ohio, N. s. 62.
* Craig v. Brown, 5 Blackf. 44.
For other illustrations the following
cases may be referred to: Gottbehnet
v. Hubachek, 36 Wis. 515; Robbins v.
Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540; Hook
v. Hackney, 16 S. & R. 385.
* Brown v. Smith, 13 C. B. 599;
Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Mott
v. Comstock, 7 Cow. 654; Lewis v.
Hawley, 2 Day, 495; Nelson v. Bor
chenius, 52 Ill. 236; Orr v. Skofield,
56 Me. 183; Weiss v. Whittemore,
28 Mich. 366.
* Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748;
Van Ness v. Hamilton, 19 Johns.
367; Clegg v. Laffer, 10 Bing. 250;
Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214;
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. Rep. 225.
* Gascoign v. Ambler, 2 Ld.
Raym. 1004; Graves v. Blanchet, 2
Salk. 696; Wilby v. Elston, 8 C. B.
142; Buys v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. 115;
Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188; Bradt
v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Dyer v.
Morris, 4 Mo. 214; Stanfield v. Boyer,
6 H. & J. 248; Woodbury v. Thomp
son, 3 N. H. 194; Berry v. Carter, 4
Stew. & Port. 387; Elliot v. Ailsbury,
2 Bibb, 473; Linney v. Malton, 13
Tex. 449; Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt.
40; Castlebury v. Kelly, 26 Geo. 606.
* See the cases of Sexton v. Todd,
Wright, 317; Wilson v. Runyan,
Wright, 671; Malone v. Stewart, 15
Ohio, 319; Moberly v. Preston, 8
Mo. 462; Sidgreaves v. Myatt, 22
Ala. 617; Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430;
Spencer v. McMasters, 16 Ill. 405.
* See Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn.
707; Miller v. Parish, 8 Pick. 384;
Robbins v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115;
34
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But in any other case a party complaining of a false, malicious,
and disparaging communication might maintain an action there
for, on averment and proof o
f special damage ; though the
truth o
f
the charge, if pleaded and established, was generally a
complete defence.”
In those cases in which the injurious charge was propagated
by printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c., there might also be a
criminal prosecution, as well as a suit for private damages. The
criminal prosecution was based upon the idea that the tendency
o
f
such publications was to excite to a breach o
f
the public
peace ; * and it might be supported in cases where the injurious
publication related to whole classes or communities o
f people,
Pledger v. Hitchcock, 1 Kelly, 550;
Smally v. Anderson, 2 T
.
B
.
Monr.
56; Williams v. Bryant, 4 Ala. 44;
Dailey v. Reynolds, 4 Greene (Iowa),
354; Symonds v. Carter, 32 N. H.
458; McBrayer v. Hill, 4 Ired. 136;
Morris v. Barkley, 1 Lit. 64; Phillips
v
. Wiley, 2 Lit. 153; Watts v. Green
lee, 2 Dev. 115; Drummond v. Leslie,
5 Blackf. 453; Worth v. Butler, 7
Blackf. 251; Richardson v. Roberts,
23 Geo. 215; Buford v. Wible, 32
Penn. St. 95; Freeman v. Price, 2
Bailey, 115; Regnier v. Cabot, 7 Ill.
34; Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78;
Adams v. Rankin, 1 Duvall, 58;
Downing v. Wilson, 36 Ala. 717; Cox
v
. Bunker, Morris, 269; Smith v.
Silence, 4 Iowa, 321; Truman v. Tay
lor, 4 Iowa, 424; Beardsley v. Bridge
man, 17 Iowa, 242; Patterson v.
Wilkinson, 55 Me. 45; Mayer v.
Schleichter, 29 Wis. 646. The in
justice o
f
the common-law rule is
made prominent in those cases where
it has been held that an allegation
that, in consequence o
f
the charge,
the plaintiff had fallen into disgrace,
contempt, and infamy, and lost her
credit, reputation, and peace o
f
mind
(Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N
.
H
.
194), and that she is shunned by her
neighbors (Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill,
310), was not a sufficient allegation o
f
special damage to support the action.
In the following States, and perhaps
some others, to impute unchastity to
a female is actionable per se by stat
ute: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Ken
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, and South
Carolina.
1 Kelley v. Partington, 3 Nev. & M.
116; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns.
214; Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630;
Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend. 63 ;
Weed v. Foster, 11 Barb. 203; Cooper v.
Greeley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone v. Coop
er, 2 Denio, 293. The damage, how
ever, must be o
f
a pecuniary charac
ter. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 309.
But very slight damage has been held
sufficient to support considerable re
coveries. Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend.
305; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend.
253; Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend. 506;
Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39 ;
Knight v. Gibbs, 1 Ad. & El. 43.
* See Heard on Libel and Slander,
§ 151; Townsend on Libel and Slan
der, § 73; Bourland v. Edison, 8
Grat. 27: Scott v. McKinnish, 15
Ala. 662; Porter v. Bothius, 59 Penn.
St. 484; Hutchinson r. Wheeler, 35
Vt. 330; Thomas v. Dunaway, 30
Ill. 373; Huson v. Dale, 19 Mich. 17;
Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710;
Knight v. Foster, 39 N
.
H
.
576.
* Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass.
168.
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without singling out any single individual so as to entitle him
to a private remedy."
1 In Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H.
214, suit was brought against a town
for the destruction of a printing press
by a mob. The defence was, that
plaintiff had caused the mob by libel
lous articles published in his paper re
flecting upon the army. Smith, J.,
says: “The first of these articles
charges the United States forces in
Virginia with cowardice, and holds
them up as objects of ridicule there
for. The fourth article calls the
army a “mob; ' and although the
charges of murder and robbery may
perhaps be considered as limited in
their application, the charge of coward
ice against the whole army is repeated.
The fifth article in effect charges
those bodies of soldiers who passed
through, or occupied, Hampton, Mar
tinsburg, Fairfax, or Germantown,
with improper treatment of persons
of all ages and sexes, in each of those
places. If such charges had been
made against a single soldier named
in the articles, they would prima facie
have constituted a libel. The ten
dency to expose him to contempt or
ridicule could not be doubted, and the
tendency to injure his professional
reputation would be equally apparent.
A soldier's character for courage or
discipline is as essential to his good
standing as a merchant's reputation
for honesty, or a physician's reputa
tion as to professional learning or
skill, would be in their respective
callings. And by military law, to
which the soldier is amenable, we
suppose cowardice would be regarded
a crime punishable by severe penalties.
As these charges were made against a
body of men, without specifying indi
viduals, it may be that no individual
soldier could have maintained a pri
vate action therefor. But the ques
tion whether the publication might
not afford ground for a public prose
On similar grounds to publish inju
cution is entirely different. Civil
suits for libel are maintainable only
on the ground that the plaintiff has
individually suffered damage. In
dictments for libel are sustained
principally because the publication of
a libel tends to a breach of the peace,
and thus to the disturbance of society
at large. It is obvious that a libel
lous attack on a body of men, though
no individuals be pointed out, may
tend as much, or more, to create pub
lic disturbances as an attack on one
individual; and a doubt has been
suggested whether ‘the fact of num
bers defamed does not add to the
enormity of the act.’ See 2 Bishop
on Criminal Law (3d ed.), § 922; Holt
on Libel, 246–247; Russell on Crimes
(1st Am. ed.), 305–332. In Sumner v.
Buel, 12 Johns. 475, where a majority
of the court held that a civil action
could not be maintained by an officer
of a regiment, for a publication re
flecting on the officers generally, un
less there was an averment of special
damage, Thompson, Ch. J., said,
p. 478: ‘The offender, in such case,
does not go without punishment.
The law has provided a fi
t
and proper
remedy, by indictment; and the gen
erality and extent o
f
such libels make
them more peculiarly public offences.”
In Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186,
Walworth, Chancellor, – who held,
in opposition to the majority o
f
the
Court o
f Errors, that the plaintiff
could not maintain a civil suit, be
cause the publication reflected upon a
class o
f individuals, and not upon the
plaintiff personally, - said, pp. 195–
196: “There are many cases in the
books where the writers and pub
lishers o
f defamatory charges, reflect
ing upon the conduct o
f particular
classes o
r
bodies o
f individuals, have
been proceeded against b
y
indictment
o
r information, although no particu
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[*425] rious charges against a foreign “prince or ruler was also
held punishable as a public offence, because tending to
embroil the two nations, and to disturb the peace of the world.”
These common-law rules are wholesome, and are still in force.
We are not so much concerned, however, with the general
rules pertaining to the punishment of injurious publications, as
with those special cases where, for some reason of general public
policy, the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where,
consequently, it may be supposed to be within the constitutional
protection. It has always been held, notwithstanding the general
rule that malice is to be inferred from a false and injurious pub
lication, that there were some cases to which the presumption
would not apply, and where a private action could not be main
tained without proof of express malice. These are the cases
which are said to be privileged. The term “privileged,” as ap
plied to a communication alleged to be libellous, means generally
that the circumstances under which it was made were such as to
rebut the legal inference of malice, and to throw upon the plain
lar one was named or designated
therein to whom the charge had a
personal application. All those
causes, however, whether the libel
is upon an organized body of men,
a legislature, a court of justice, a
church, or a company of soldiers, or
upon a particular class of individuals,
proceed upon the ground that the
charge is a misdemeanor, although it
has no particular personal application
to the individual of the body or class
libelled ; because it tends to excite
the angry passions of the community
either in favor of or against the body
or class in reference to the conduct of
which the charge is made, or because
it tends to impair the confidence of
the people in their government or in
the administration of its laws.’ In
the course of his opinion, the Chan
cellor mentions a Scotch case (Shear
lock v. Beardsworth, 1 Murray's Re
port of Jury Cases) where a civil suit
was maintained, which was ‘brought
by a lieutenant-colonel, in behalf of
his whole regiment, for defamation,
in calling them a regiment of cowards
and blackguards.” In Rex v. Hector
Campbell, King’s Bench, Hil. Term,
1808 (cited in Holt on Libel, 249,
250), an information was granted for
a libel on the college of physicians;
and the respondent was convicted and
sentenced. Cases may be supposed
where publications, though of a de
famatory nature, have such a wide
and general application that, in all
probability, a breach of the peace
would not be caused thereby ; but it
does not seem to us that the present
publication belongs to that class.
“Our conclusion is that the jury
should have been instructed that the
first, fourth, and fifth articles were
prima facie libellous; and that the
publication of those articles must be
regarded as “illegal conduct,’ unless
justified or excused by facts sufficient
to constitute a defence to an indict
ment for libel.”
* 27 State Trials, 627; 2 May,
Const. History of England, c. 9.
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tiff the burden of offering some evidence of its existence beyond the
mere falsity o
f
the charge." The cases falling within this classi
fication are those in which a party has a duty to discharge which
requires that he should be allowed to speak freely and fully that
which he believes ; where he is himself directly interested in the
subject-matter o
f
the communication, and makes it with a view
to the protection o
r
advancement o
f
his own interest, o
r
where
h
e
is communicating confidentially with a person interested in
the communication, and by way o
f
advice o
r
admonition.” Many
such cases suggest themselves which are purely o
f private con
cern : such as answers to inquiries into the character o
r
conduct
o
f
one formerly employed b
y
the person to whom the inquiry is
addressed, and o
f
whom the information is sought with a view to
guiding the inquirer in his own action in determining upon em
ploying the same person; * answers to inquiries b
y
one
tradesman o
f
another * a
s
to the solvency o
f
a person [*426]
whom the inquirer has been desired to trust; * answers
b
y
a creditor to inquiries regarding the conduct and dealings o
f
his debtor, made b
y
one who had become surety for the debt;"
1 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N
. Y.
373, per Seldon, J.; Townsend on
Libel and Slander, § 209. “It prop
erly means this and nothing more:
, that the exceptional instances shall
so far change the ordinary rule with
respect to slanderous o
r
libellous
matter as to remove the regular and
usual presumption o
f malice, and to
make it incumbent on the party com
plaining to show malice.” Daniel, J.,
in White v. Nichols, 3 How. 266, 287.
And see Dillard v. Collins, 25 Grat.
343.
* “When a communication is
made in confidence, either by o
r
to
a person interested in the communi
cation, supposing it to be true, or by
way o
f
admonition o
r advice, it seems
to be a general rule that malice (i
.
e
.
express malice) is essential to the
maintenance of an action.” 1 Star
kie on Slander, 321. See Harrison v.
Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Somerville
v
. Hawkins, 10 C
.
B
. 589; Wright
v
. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R
.
573;
Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C
.
B
.
N
.
s.
392. A paper signed by a number
o
f parties agreeing to join in the ex
pense o
f prosecuting others, who were
stated therein to have “robbed and
swindled ” them, is privileged.
Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y
. 427; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 360.
8 Pattison v. Jones, 8 B
.
& C
. 578;
Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill. 498; Noonan
v
. Orton, 32 Wis. 106 ; Fowles v.
Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Hatch v. Lane,
105 Mass. 394; Bradley v. Heath, 12
Pick. 163. Compare Fryer v. Kin
nersley, 15 C
.
B
.
N
.
s. 422.
* Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. N
.
C
.
372; Story v. Challands, 8 C
.
& P
.
234. But the reports o
f
a mercantile
agency to it
s
customers are not privi
leged. Taylor v. Church, 8 N
.
Y
.
452; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N
.
Y. 188; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 322. Com
pare Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Blatch.
497.
-
* Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Campb. 269,
note; White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266.
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communications from an agent to his principal, reflecting injuri
ously upon the conduct of a third person in a matter connected
with the agency;" communications to a near relative respecting
the character of a person with whom the relative is in negotia
tion for marriage; * and as many more like cases as would fall
within the same reasons.” The rules of law applicable to these
cases are very well settled, and are not likely to be changed with
a view to greater stringency.”
Libels upon the Government.
At the common law it was indictable to publish any thing
against the constitution of the country, or the established
system of government. The basis of such a prosecution was
the tendency of publications of this character to excite dis
affection with the government, and thus induce a revo
[*427] lutionary spirit. The law always, * however, allowed a
calm and temperate discussion of public events and meas
| Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio,
110. See Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266.
* Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88.
But there is no protection to such
a communication from a stranger.
Joannes v. Bennett, 5 Allen, 170.
* As to whether a stranger volun
teering to give information injurious
to another, to one interested in the
knowledge, is privileged in so doing,
See Coxhead v. Richards, 2 M. G. &
S. 569; and Bennett v. Deacon, 2 M.
G. & S. 628. Where a confidential
relation of any description exists be
tween the parties, the communication
is privileged; as where the tenant of
a nobleman had written to inform
him of his gamekeeper's neglect of
duty. Cockagne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C.
& P. 543. Where a son-in-law wrote
to warn his mother-in-law of the bad
character of a man she was about to
marry. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P.
88. Where a banker communicated
with his correspondent concerning a
note sent to him for collection ; the
court saying that “all that is neces
sary to entitle such communication to
be privileged is
,
that the relation o
f
the parties should be such as to afford
reasonable ground for supposing an
innocent motive for giving the infor
mation, and to deprive the act o
f
the
appearance o
f
officious intermeddling
with the affairs of others.” Lewis v.
Chapman, 16 N
.
Y
.
375. Where one
communicated to an employer his sus
picions o
f
dishonest conduct in a ser
vant towards himself. Amann v.
Damm, 8 C
.
B. N
.
s. 597. Where
a tradesman published in a newspaper
that his servant had left his employ,
and taken upon himself to collect the
tradesman's bills. Hatch v. Lane,
105 Mass. 394. Compare Lawler v.
Earle, 5 Allen, 22.
* See further, Harrison v. Bush, 5
El. & Bl. 344; Shipley v. Todhunter,
7 C
.
& P
. 680; Lawler v. Earle, 5
Allen, 22; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B
.
Monr. 301; Rector v. Smith, 11
Iowa, 302; Goslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr.
3
;
Joannes v. Bennett, 5 Allen, 169;
State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.
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ures, and recognized in every man a right to give every public
matter a candid, full, and free discussion. It was only when
a publication went beyond this, and tended to excite tumult,
that it became criminal." It cannot be doubted, however,
that the common-law rules on this subject were administered in
many cases with great harshness, and that the courts, in the in
terests of repression and at the instigation of the government,
often extended them to cases not within their reasons. This was
especially true during the long and bloody struggle with France,
at the close of the last and beginning of the present century, and
for a few subsequent years, until a rising public discontent with
political prosecutions began to lead to acquittals, and finally to
abandonment of a
ll
such attempts to restrain the free expres
sion o
f
sentiments o
n public affairs. Such prosecutions have
now altogether ceased in England. Like the censorship of the
press, they have fallen out o
f
the British constitutional system.
“When the press errs, it is by the press itself that its errors
are left to be corrected. Repression has ceased to be the policy
o
f rulers, and statesmen have at length realized the wise maxim
o
f
Lord Bacon, that “the punishing o
f
wits enhances their au
thority, and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain
spark o
f
truth that flies up in the faces o
f
them that seek to
tread it out.’” ”
We shall venture to express a doubt if the common-law prin
ciples o
n
this subject can be considered as having been practically
adopted in the American States. It is certain that no prosecu
tions could now be maintained in the United States courts for
libels on the general government, since those courts have no
common-law jurisdiction,” and there is now no statute, and never
was except during the brief existence o
f
the Sedition Law, which
assumed to confer any such power.
The Sedition Law was passed during the administration o
f
the
elder Adams, when the fabric o
f government was still new and
untried, and when many men seemed to think that the breath o
f
heated party discussions might tumble it about their heads. Its
1 Regina v. Collins, 9 C
.
& P
. 456, * May, Constitutional History, c. 10.
per Littledale, J. See the proceed- * United States v. Hudson, 7
ings against Thomas Paine, 27 State Cranch, 32. See ante, p
. *19, and
Trials, 357. cases cited in note.
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constitutionality was always disputed by a large party, and its
impolicy was beyond question. It had a direct tendency to pro
duce the very state of things it sought to repress; the
[*428] prosecutions * under it were instrumental, among other
- things, in the final overthrow and destruction of the
party by which it was adopted, and it is impossible to conceive,
at the present time, of any such state of things as would be
likely to bring about it
s re-enactment, o
r
the passage o
f any
similar repressive statute."
When it is among the fundamental principles o
f
the govern
ment that the people frame their own constitution, and that in
doing so they reserve to themselves the power to amend it from
time to time, as the public sentiment may change, it is difficult
to conceive o
f any sound principle on which prosecutions for
libels on the system o
f government can be based, except when
their evident intent and purpose is to excite rebellion and civil
war.” It is very easy to lay down a rule for the discussion of
constitutional questions; that they are privileged, if conducted
with calmness and temperance, and that they are not indictable
unless they g
o
beyond the bounds o
f
fair discussion. But what
is calmness and temperance, and what is fair in the discussion o
f
supposed evils in the government 2 And if something is to be
allowed “for a little feeling in men's minds,” ” how great shall
b
e
the allowance 2 The heat o
f
the discussion will generally be
in proportion to the magnitude o
f
the evil as it appears to the
party discussing it: must the question whether he has exceeded
due bounds o
r
not b
e
tried b
y judge and jury, who may sit under
different circumstances from those under which he has spoken,
o
r
a
t
least after the heat o
f
the occasion has passed away, and
who, feeling none o
f
the excitement themselves, may think it
unreasonable that any one else should ever have felt it? The
dangerous character o
f
such prosecutions would be the more
* For prosecutions under this law, * The author of the Life and
see Lyon's Case, Wharton's State
Trials, 333; Cooper's Case, Whar
ton’s State Trials, 659; Haswell's
Case, Wharton's State Trials, 684 ;
Callender’s Case, Wharton's State
Trials, 688. And see 2 Randall, Life
o
f Jefferson, 417–421; 5 Hildreth,
History of United States, 247, 365.
Times o
f
Warren very truly remarks
that “the common-law offence of
libelling a government is ignored in
constitutional systems, as inconsistent
with the genius o
f
free institutions.”
P. 47. -
* Regina v. Collins, 9 C
.
& P
. 460,
per Littledale, J.
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glaring if aimed at those classes who, not being admitted to a
share in the government, attacked the constitution in the point
which excluded them. Sharp criticism, ridicule, and the exhibi
tion of such feeling as a sense of injustice engenders, are to be
expected from any discussion in these cases; but when the very
classes who have established the exclusion as proper and reason
able are to try as judges and jurors the assaults made
upon it
,
they will be very likely to enter upon the “ex-[*429]
amination with a preconceived notion that such assaults
upon their reasonable regulations must necessarily be unreasona
ble. If any such principle of repression should ever be recognized
in the common law o
f America, it might reasonably be anticipated
that in times o
f high party excitement it would lead to prosecu
tions b
y
the party in power, to bolster up wrongs and sustain
abuses and oppressions b
y
crushing adverse criticism and discus
sion. The evil, indeed, could not be o
f long continuance ; for,
judging from experience, the reaction would be speedy, thorough,
and effectual; but it would be no less a serious evil while it
lasted, the direct tendency o
f
which would be to excite discon
tent and to breed a rebellious spirit. Repression o
f full and free
discussion is dangerous in any government resting upon the will
o
f
the people. The people cannot fail to feel that they are de
prived o
f rights, and will be certain to become discontented,
when their discussion o
f public measures is sought to be circum
scribed b
y
the judgment o
f
others upon their temperance or fair
ness. They must be left at liberty to speak with the freedom
which the magnitude o
f
the supposed wrongs appears in their
minds to demand ; and if they exceed al
l
the proper bounds o
f
moderation, the consolation must be, that the evil likely to spring
from the violent discussion will probably be less, and it
s
correction
b
y public sentiment more speedy, than if the terrors of the law
were brought to bear to prevent the discussion.
The English common-law rule which made libels on the consti
tution or the government indictable, as it was administered by
the courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circum
stances o
f
the people o
f America, and therefore never to have
been adopted in the several States. If we are correct in this,
it would not be in the power of the State legislatures to pass
laws which should make mere criticism of the constitution or of
the measures o
f government a crime, however sharp, unreasona
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ble, and intemperate it might be. The constitutional freedom of
speech and of the press must mean a freedom as broad as existed
when the constitution which guarantees it was adopted, and it
would not be in the power of the legislature to restrict it
,
unless
it might be in those cases of publications injurious to private
character, o
r public morals or safety, which come strictly within
the reasons o
f
civil or criminal liability at the common law, but
in which, nevertheless, the common law as we have adopted it
failed to provide a remedy. It certainly could not be said that
freedom o
f speech was violated b
y
a law which should
[*430] * make imputing the want of chastity to a female action
able without proof o
f special damage ; for the charge is
one o
f grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy de
manding protection to the communication, and the case is strictly
analogous to many other cases where the common law made the
party responsible for his false accusations. The constitutional
provisions d
o
not prevent the modification o
f
the common-law
rules o
f liability for libels and slanders, but they would not per
mit bringing new cases within those rules when they do not rest
upon the same o
r similar reasons."
* In Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates,
267, the defendant was indicted in
1805 for publishing the following in
a public newspaper: “A democracy
is scarcely tolerated a
t any period
o
f
national history. Its omens are
always sinister, and its powers are
unpropitious. With all the lights of
experience blazing before our eyes, it
is impossible not to discover the futil
ity of this form of government. It
was weak and wicked at Athens, it
was bad in Sparta, and worse in
Rome. It has been tried in France,
and terminated in despotism. It was
tried in England, and rejected with
the utmost loathing and abhorrence.
It is on its trial here, and its issue
will be civil war, desolation, and
anarchy. No wise man but discerns
its imperfections, no good man but
shudders a
t
its miseries, no honest
man but proclaims its fraud, and no
brave man but draws his sword
against its force. The institution o
f
a scheme o
f polity so radically con
temptible and vicious is a memorable
example o
f
what the villany o
f
some
men can devise, the folly of others
receive, and both establish in spite o
f
reason, reflection, and sensation.”
Judge Yeates charged the jury, among
other things, as follows: “The
seventh section o
f
the ninth article
of the constitution of the State must
b
e
our guide upon this occasion; it
forms the solemn compact between
the people and the three branches
o
f
the government, — the legisla
tive, executive, and judicial powers.
Neither of them can exceed the limits
prescribed to them respectively. To
this exposition o
f
the public will
every branch o
f
the common law and
o
f
our municipal acts o
f assembly
must conform; and if incompatible
there with, they must yield and give
way. Judicial decisions cannot weigh
against it when repugnant thereto.
It runs thus: “The printing-presses
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* Criticism upon Officers and Candidates for Office. [*431]
There are certain cases where criticism upon public officers,
their actions, character, and motives, is not only recognized as
shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceed
ings of the legislature, or any branch
of the government; and no law shall”
ever be made to restrain the right
thereof. The free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man; and every
citizen may freely speak, write, and
print on any subject, being responsi
ble for the abuse of that liberty. In
prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official con
duct of officers or men in a public
capacity, or where the matter pub
lished is proper for public informa
tion, the truth thereof may be given
in evidence; and in all indictments
for libels, the jury shall have a right
to determine the law and the facts
under the direction of the court, as
in other cases.” Thus it is evident
that legislative acts, or of any branch
of the government, are open to public
discussion; and every citizen may
freely speak, write, or print on any
subject, but is accountable for the
abuse of that privilege. There shall
be no licensers of the press. Publish
as you please in the first instance,
without control; but you are answer
able both to the community and the
individual if you proceed to unwar
rantable lengths. No alteration is
hereby made in the law as to private
men affected by injurious publica
tions, unless the discussion be proper
for public information. But “if one
uses the weapon of truth wantonly
for disturbing the peace of families,
he is guilty of a libel.” Per General
Hamilton, in Croswell's Trial, p. 70.
The matter published is not proper
for public information. The common
weal is not interested in such a com
munication, except to suppress it
.
“What is the meaning of the
words “being responsible for the
abuse o
f
that liberty,’ if the jury are
interdicted from deciding on the case?
Who else can constitutionally decide
on it? The expressions relate to and
pervade every part o
f
the sentence.
The objection that the determinations
o
f juries may vary at different times,
arising from their different political
opinions, proves too much. The same
matter may be objected against them
when party spirit runs high, in other
criminal prosecutions. But we have
no other constitutional mode of de
cision pointed out to us, and we are
bound to use the method described.
“It is no infraction of the law to
publish temperate investigations o
f
the nature and forms o
f government.
The day is long past since Algernon
Sidney’s celebrated treatise on gov
ernment, cited on this trial, was
considered as a treasonable libel.
The enlightened advocates o
f repre
sentative republican government pride
themselves in the reflection that the
more deeply their system is examined,
the more fully will the judgments o
f
honest men be satisfied that it is the
most conducive to the safety and
happiness o
f
a free people. Such
matters are ‘proper for public infor
mation.” But there is a marked and
evident distinction between such pub
lications and those which are plainly
accompanied with a criminal intent,
deliberately designed to unloosen the
social band o
f union, totally to un
hinge the minds o
f
the citizens, and to
produce popular discontent with the
exercise o
f power b
y
the known con
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*432] *legitimate, but largeg latitude and great freedom of
expression are permitted, so long" as good faith inspires
stituted authorities. These latter
writings are subversive of all govern
ment and good order. ‘The liberty
of the press consists in publishing the
truth, from good motives and for
justifiable ends, though it reflects on
government or on magistrates.” Per
General Hamilton, in Croswell's Trial,
pp. 63, 64. It disseminates political
knowledge, and, by adding to the
common stock of freedom, gives a
just confidence to every individual.
But the malicious publications which
I have reprobated infect insidiously
the public mind with a subtle poison,
and produce the most mischievous
and alarming consequences by their
tendency to anarchy, sedition, and
civil war. We cannot, consistently
with our official duty, declare such
conduct dispunishable. We believe
that it is not justified by the words
or meaning of our constitution. It is
true it may not be easy in every in
stance to draw the exact distinguish
ing line. To the jury it peculiarly
belongs to decide on the intent and
object of the writing. It is their
duty to judge candidly and fairly
leaning to the favorable side when
the criminal intent is not clearly and
evidently ascertained.
“It remains, therefore, under our
most careful consideration of the
ninth article of the Constitution, for
the jury to divest themselves of all
political prejudices (if any such they
have), and dispassionately to examine
the publication which is the ground
of the present prosecution. They
must decide on their oaths, as they
will answer to God and their country,
whether the defendant, as a factious
and seditious person, with the crimi
nal intentions imputed to him, in
order to accomplish the objects stated
in the indictment, did make and pub
lish the writing in question. Should
they find the charges laid against
them in the indictment to be well
founded, they are bound to find him
guilty. They must judge for them
selves on the plain import of the
words, without any forced or strained
construction of the meaning of the
"author or editor, and determine on
the correctness of the innuendoes.
To every word they will assign it
s
natural sense, but will collect the true
intention from the context, the whole
piece. They will accurately weigh
the probabilities o
f
the charge against
a literary man. Consequences they
will wholly disregard, but firmly dis
charge their duty. Representative
republican governments stand on im
movable bases, which cannot be
shaken by theoretical systems. Yet
if the consciences of the jury shall be
clearly satisfied that the publication
was seditiously, maliciously, and wil
fully aimed at the independence o
f
the United States, the Constitution
thereof o
r
o
f
this State, they should
convict the defendant. If, on the
other hand, the production was hon
estly meant to inform the public
mind, and warn them against sup
posed dangers in society, though the
subject may have been treated erron
eously, o
r
that the censures on de
mocracy were bestowed on pure
unmixed democracy, where the people
e
n masse execute the sovereign power
without the medium o
f
their repre
sentatives (agreeably to our forms o
f
government), as have occurred a
t
different times in Athens, Sparta,
Rome, France, and England, then,
however the judgments o
f
the jury
may incline them to think individu
ally, they should acquit the defendant.
In the first instance the act would be
criminal; in the last it would be in
nocent. If the jury should doubt of
the criminal intention, then also the
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the communication. There are cases where it is clearly the duty
of every one to speak freely what he may have to say concerning
public officers, or those who may present themselves for public
positions. Through the ballot-box the electors approve or con
demn those who ask their suffrages; and if they condemn, though
upon grounds the most unjust or frivolous, the law affords no
redress. Some officers, however, are not chosen by the people
directly, but designated through some other mode of ap
pointment. But the public have a right to be * heard on [*433]
the question of their selection; and they have the right,
for such reasons as seem to their minds sufficient, to ask for their
dismissal afterwards. They have also the right to complain of
official conduct affecting themselves, and to petition for a redress
of grievances. A principal purpose in perpetuating and guarding
the right of petition is to insure to the public the privilege of
being heard in these and the like cases.
In a case in the Court for the Correction of Errors of the State
of New York, a party was prosecuted for a libel contained in a
petition signed by him and a number of other citizens of his
county, and presented to the council of appointment, praying for
the removal of the plaintiff from the office of district attorney of
the county, which, the petition charged, he was prostituting to
private purposes. The defendant did not justify the truth of this
allegation, and the plaintiff had judgment. On error, the sole
question was, whether the communication was to be regarded as
privileged, that character having been denied it by the court
below. The prevailing opinion in the court of review character
ized this as “a decision which violates the most sacred and
unquestionable rights of free citizens; rights essential to the very
existence of a free government; rights necessarily connected with
the relations of constituent and representative ; the right of peti
tioning for a redress of grievances, and the right of remonstrating
to the competent authority against the abuse of official functions.”
And it was held that the communication was privileged, and
law pronounces that he should be
acquitted. 4 Burr. 2552, per Lord
Mansfield.” Verdict, not guilty.
The fate of this prosecution was the
same that would attend any of a
similar character in this country,
admitting its law to be sound, ex
cept possibly in cases of violent ex
citement, and when a jury could be
made to believe that the defendant
contemplated and was laboring to
produce a change of government, not
by constitutional means, but by re
bellion and civil war.
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could not support an action for libel, unless the plaintiff could
show that the petition was malicious and groundless, and pre
sented for the purpose of injuring his character.” Such a petition,
it was said, although containing false and injurious aspersions,
did not prima facie carry with it the presumption of malice.” A
similar ruling was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
where a party was prosecuted for charges against a justice of the
peace, contained in a deposition made to be presented to the
governor.” The subsequent case of Howard v. Thompson * has
enlarged this rule somewhat, and has required of the plaintiff, in
order to sustain his action in any such case, to prove not
[*434] only malice in the * defendant, but also a want of prob
able cause for believing the injurious charges which the
petition contained. The action for libel, in such a case, it was
said, was in the nature of an action for malicious prosecution;
and in that action malice and want of probable cause are both
necessary ingredients. And it has also been held that in such a
case the court will neither compel the officer to whom it was
addressed to produce the petition in evidence, nor will they suffer
its contents to be proved by parol.”
The rule of protection in these cases does not appear to be
disputed, and has been laid down in other cases coming within
the same reasons." The rule, however, is subject to this qualifi
1 Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns.
528, per Clinton, Senator.
* Ibid. p. 526, per L’Hommedieu,
Senator.
vestry should not return him on the
list of persons qualified to serve as
constables. The defendant was a
parishioner, and his communication
* Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.
A remonstrance against the employ
ment of a school teacher is privileged.
Van Arsdale v. Laverty, 69 Penn. St.
103. For similar cases of privilege
see Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 ;
Whitney v. Allen, 62 Ill. 472; Reid v.
Delorme, 2 Brev. 76. -
* 21 Wend. 319. See Harris v.
Harrington, 2 Tyler, 129; Bodwell v.
Osgood, 3 Pick. 379.
* Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.
See Hare v. Mellor, 3 Lev. 138.
• In Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch.
743, the defendant was prosecuted for
slander in a communication made by
him to the vestry, imputing perjury
to the plaintiff as a reason why the
was held privileged. In O’Donaghue
v. McGovern, 23 Wend. 26, a commu
nication from a member of a church
to his bishop, respecting the charac
ter, moral conduct, and demeanor of
a clergyman of the church, was placed
upon the same footing of privilege.
And see Reid v. Delorme, 2 Brev. 76;
Chapman v. Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365.
A remonstrance to the board of ex
cise, against the granting of a license
to the plaintiff, comes under the same
rule of protection. Vanderzee v. Mc
Gregor, 12 Wend. 545. See also
Kendillon v. Maltby, 1 Car. & Marsh.
402; Woodward v. Landor, 6 C. & P.
548; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105;
Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick 163.
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cation, that the petition or remonstrance must be addressed to
the body or officer having the power of appointment or removal,
or the authority to give the redress or grant the relief which is
sought ; or at least that the petitioner should really and in good
faith believe he is addressing himself to an authority possessing
power in the premises.”
* Such being the rule of privilege when one interested [*435]
in the discharge of powers of a public nature is address
ing himself to the body having the authority of appointment,
supervision, or removal, the question arises whether the same
reasons do not require the like privilege when the citizen ad
dresses himself to his fellow-citizens in regard to the conduct of
persons elevated to office by their suffrages, or in regard to the
character, capacity, or fitness of those who may present them
selves, or be presented by their friends, – which always assumes
their assent, — as candidates for public positions.
When Morgan Lewis was Governor of the State of New York,
and was a candidate for re-election, a public meeting of his oppo
nents was called, at which an address was adopted condemning
his conduct in various particulars. Among other things, he was
charged with want of fidelity to his party, pursuing a system of
family aggrandizement in his appointments, signing the charter
of a bank with notice that it had been procured by fraudulent
practices, publishing doctrines unworthy of a chief magistrate and
subversive of the dearest interests of society, attempting to de
* This principle is recognized in all
the cases referred to. See also Fair
man v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642. In that
case a petition addressed by a creditor
of an officer in the army to the Secre
tary of War, bona fide and with a
view of obtaining through his inter
ference the payment of a debt due,
and containing a statement of facts
which, though derogatory to the offi
cer’s character, the creditor believed
to be true, was held not to support an
action. A letter to the Postmaster
General complaining of the conduct
of a postmaster, with a view to the
redress of grievances, is privileged.
Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548;
Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf. 341. And a
complaint to a master, charging a
servant with a dishonest act which
had been imputed to the complaining
party, has also been held privileged.
Coward v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531.
And see, further, Hosmer v. Love
land, 19 Barb. 111. A petition is
privileged while being circulated.
Wanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend.
545; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105.
If, however, a petition is circulated
and exhibited, but never presented,
the fact that the libellous charge has
assumed the form of a petition will
not give it protection. State v. Burn
ham, 9 N. H. 34. And see Hunt v.
Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Van Wyck v.
Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190.
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stroy the liberty of the press by vexatious prosecutions, and call
ing out the militia without occasion, thereby putting them to
unnecessary trouble and expense. These seem to have been the
more serious charges. The chairman of the meeting signed the
address, and he was prosecuted by the governor for the libel con
tained therein. No justification was attempted upon the facts,
and the Supreme Court held that the circumstances constituted
no protection in the law. We quote from the opinion delivered
by Mr. Justice Thompson : —
“Where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification
or excuse lies on the defendant, and on failure thereof the law
implies a criminal intent." If a libel contains an imputation of a
crime, or is actionable without showing special damage, malice
is
,
prima facie, implied ; and if the defendant claims to be exon
erated, o
n
the ground o
f
want o
f malice, it lies on him to show
it was published under such circumstances as to rebut this pre
sumption o
f
law.” The manner and occasion o
f
the publication
have been relied o
n for this purpose, and in justification
[*436] of the libel. It has " not been pretended but that the
address in question would be libellous if considered as the
act o
f
a
n individual; but its being the act o
f
a public meeting,
o
f
which the defendant was a member, and the publication being
against a candidate for a public office, have been strenuously
urged a
s affording a complete justification. The doctrine con
tended for by the defendant's counsel results in the position that
every publication ushered forth under the sanction o
f
a public po
litical meeting, against a candidate for an elective office, is beyond
the reach o
f legal inquiry. To such a proposition I can never
yield my assent. Although it was urged b
y
the defendant's
counsel, I cannot discover any analogy whatever between the
proceedings o
f
such meetings and those o
f
courts o
f justice, o
r any
other organized tribunals known in our law for the redress o
f
grievances. That electors should have a right to assemble, and
freely and openly to examine the fitness and qualifications o
f
candidates for public offices, and communicate their opinions to
others, is a position to which I most cordially accede. But there
is a wide difference between this privilege and a right irrespon
sibly to charge a candidate with direct specific and unfounded
1 5 Burr. 2667; 4 T
.
R
.
127. 2 1 T. R. 110.
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crimes. It would, in my judgment, be a monstrous doctrine to
establish, that, when a man becomes a candidate for an elective
office, he thereby gives to others a right to accuse him of any im
aginable crimes, with impunity. Candidates have rights as well
as electors; and those rights and privileges must be so guarded
and protected as to harmonize one with the other. If one hun
dred or one thousand men, when assembled together, undertake
to charge a man with specific crimes, I see no reason why it
should be less criminal than if each one should do it individually
at different times and places. All that is required, in the one
case or the other, is
,
not to transcend the bounds o
f
truth. If a
man has committed a crime, any one has a right to charge him
with it
,
and is not responsible for the accusation; and can any
one wish for more latitude than this? Can it be claimed a
privilege to accuse ad libitum a candidate with the most base and
detestable crimes? There is nothing upon the record showing
the least foundation or pretence for the charges. The accusa
tions, then, being false, the prima facie presumption o
f
law is
,
that the publication was malicious; and the circumstance o
f
the
defendant being associated with others does not per se rebut this
presumption. How far this circumstance ought to affect
the measure o
f damages * is a question not arising on [*437]
the record. It may in some cases mitigate, in others
enhance, them. Every case must necessarily, from the nature o
f
the action, depend upon it
s
own circumstances, which are to be
submitted to the sound discretion o
f
a jury. It is difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule on the subject.” "
The difficulty one meets with in the examination of this opinion
is in satisfying himself in what manner the privileges o
f electors,
o
f
which it speaks, are protected b
y
it
. It is not discovered that
the citizen who publicly discusses the qualifications and fitness o
f
the candidate for public office who challenges his suffrage is
,
b
y
this decision, so far as suits for recovery o
f private damages are
concerned, placed o
n any different footing in the law from that
occupied b
y
one who drags before the public the character o
f
a
private individual. In either case, if the publication proves to be
false, the law, it seems, attaches to it a presumption of malice.
Nothing in the occasion justifies or excuses the act in either case.
1 Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1
,
35. 261; Aldrich v. Printing Co., 9 Minn.
See also Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 133.
35
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It is true it is intimated that it may lie in the sound discretion of
a jury to be moderate in the imposition of damages, but it is also
intimated that the jury would be at liberty to consider the circum
stances o
f
the public meeting an aggravation. There is abso
lutely no privilege o
f
discussion to the elector under such a rule;
no right to canvass the fitness o
f
candidates beyond what exists
in other cases. Whatever reasons he may give his neighbors for
voting against a candidate, he must be prepared to support by
evidence in the courts. In criminal prosecutions, if he can prove
the truth o
f
his charges, h
e may b
e protected in some cases where
h
e would not be if the person assailed was only a private individ
ual ; because in the latter case he must make a showing o
f
a justi
fiable occasion for uttering even the truth. But in al
l
cases
where the matter is proper for the public information, the truth
justifies it
s publication.
The case above quoted has the sanction o
f
a subsequent de
cision o
f
the Court for the Correction o
f Errors, which in like
manner repudiated the claim o
f privilege." The office then in
question was that o
f Lieutenant-Governor, and the candidate was
charged in public newspapers with habits o
f
intoxication which
unfitted him for the position. And this last decision has since
been followed as authority b
y
the Superior Court o
f
New York;
in a case, however, which does not seem to be analogous,
[*438] since there the general public * was addressed in regard
to a candidate for an office which was not elective, but
was to be filled by an appointing board.”
The case o
f King v. Root” will certainly strike any one as a
very remarkable one, when the evidence given in the case is con
sidered. The Lieutenant-Governor was charged in the public
press with intoxication in the Senate Chamber, exhibited as he
was proceeding to take his seat as presiding officer o
f
that body.
When prosecuted for libel, the publishers justified the charge as
true, and brought a number o
f
witnesses who were present on
the occasion, and who testified to the correctness o
f
the statement.
There was therefore abundant reason for supposing the charge to
1 King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113. in the Supreme Court, 7 Cow. 613.
* Hunt v. Bennett, 4 E
.
D
. Smith, It has recently been followed in Illi
647; s. c. 19 N. Y
.
173. See Dun- nois, in the case o
f
Rearick v. Wilcox,
combe v. Daniell, 8 C
.
& P
.
213. 81 Ill. 77.
* 4 Wend. 113. See the same case
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have been published in the full belief in its truth. If it was true,
there was abundant reason, on public grounds, for making the
publication. Nevertheless, the jury were of opinion that the pre
ponderance of evidence was against the truth of the charge, and
being instructed that the only privilege the defendants had was
“simply to publish the truth, and nothing more,” and that the
unsuccessful attempt at justification — which in fact was only the
forming of such an issue, and putting in such evidence as showed
the defendants had reason for making the charge — was in itself
an aggravation of the offence, they returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, with large damages. Throughout his instructions to the
jury by the judge presiding at the trial, no privilege of discussion
whatever is conceded to the elector, springing from the relation
of elector and candidate, or of citizen and representative, but the
case is considered as one where the accusation was to be defended
precisely as if no public considerations had in any way been in
volved."
The law of New York is not placed by these decisions on a
footing very satisfactory to those who claim the utmost freedom
of discussion in public affairs. The courts have considered the
subject as if there were no middle ground between absolute im
munity for falsehood and the application of the same strict rules
which prevail in other cases. Whether they have duly consid
ered the importance of publicity and discussion on a
ll
matters o
f
general concern in a representative government must be left to
the consideration o
f judicial tribunals, as these questions shall
come before them in the future. It is perhaps safe to say
that the general public *sentiment and the prevailing [*439]
customs allow a greater freedom o
f discussion, and hold
the elector less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true
than is done by these decisions.”
1 See also Onslow v. Hone, 3 Wils.
177; Harwood v. Astley, 1 New Rep.
47.
* “Freedom of speech is a princi
pal pillar of a free government ; when
this support is taken away, the con
stitution o
f
a free society is dissolved,
and tyranny is erected on its ruins.
Republics and limited monarchies de
rive their strength and vigor from a
popular examination into the action
o
f
the magistrates; this privilege in
all ages has been and always will be
abused. The best o
f
men could not
escape the censure and envy o
f
the
times they lived in. Yet this evil is
not so great as it might appear a
t
first
sight. A magistrate who sincerely
aims at the good o
f society will al
ways have the inclinations o
f
a great
majority on his side, and an impar
tial posterity will not fail to render
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A much more reasonable rule — though still, we think, not suffi
ciently comprehensive and liberal — was indicated by Pollock,
C. B., in a case where it was urged upon the court that a sermon,
preached but not published, was the subject of criticism in the
enlarged style of commentary which that word seems to introduce
according to the decided cases; and that the conduct of a clergy
man with reference to the parish charity, and especially the rules
of it
,
justified any bona fide remarks, whether founded in truth in
point o
f fact, or justice in point o
f commentary, provided only
they were a
n
honest and bona fide comment. “My brother Wilde,”
h
e says, “urged upon the court the importance o
f
this question ;
and I own I think it is a question of very grave and deep impor
tance. He pressed upon us that, whenever the public had an
interest in such a discussion, the law ought to protect it
,
and work
out the public good b
y permitting public opinion, through the
medium o
f
the public press, to operate upon such transactions.
I am not sure that so extended a rule is at al
l
necessary to the
public good. I do not in any degree complain ; on the contrary,
I think it quite right that all matters that are entirely of a public
nature — conduct of ministers, conduct of judges, the proceedings
o
f
all persons who are responsible to the public at large — are
deemed to be public property; and that all bona fide and honest
remarks upon such persons, and their conduct, may be made with
perfect freedom, and without being questioned too nicely for
either truth or justice.” But these remarks were somewhat
aside from the case then before the learned judge, and though
supported b
y
similar remarks from his associates, yet one o
f
those
associates deemed it important to draw such a distinction as to
detract very much from the value o
f
this privilege. “It seems,”
h
e says, “that there is a distinction, although I must say I really
can hardly tell what the limits o
f it are, between the comments
on a man's public conduct and on his private conduct. I can
exuberant branches, he would be apt
to destroy the tree.” Franklin,
him justice. Those abuses o
f
the
freedom o
f speech are the excesses o
f
liberty. They ought to be repressed;
but to whom dare we commit the care
o
f doing it? An evil magistrate,
intrusted with power to punish for
words, would be armed with a weapon
the most destructive and terrible.
Under pretence o
f pruning off the
Works b
y Sparks, Vol. II
.
p
.
2S5.
1 Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. &
W. 331–333. See Commonwealth v.
Clap, 4 Mass. 163, per Parsons,
Ch. J.; Townsend on Libel and
Slander, $ 260.
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understand that you have a right to comment on the public acts
of a minister, upon the public acts of a general, upon the public
judgments of a judge, upon the public skill of an actor; I can un
derstand that ; but I do not know where the limit can be
drawn distinctly between where the * comment is to cease, [*440]
as being applied solely to a man's public conduct, and
where it is to begin as applicable to his private character; be
cause, although it is quite competent for a person to speak of a
judgment of a judge as being an extremely erroneous and foolish
one, – and no doubt comments of that sort have great tendency
to make persons careful of what they say, - and although it is
perfectly competent for persons to say of an actor that he is a
remarkably bad actor, and ought not to be permitted to perform
such and such parts, because he performs them so ill, yet you
ought not to be allowed to say of an actor that he has dis
graced himself in private life, nor to say of a judge or a minister
that he has committed felony, or any thing of that description,
which is in no way connected with his public conduct or public
judgment; and therefore there must be some limits, although I
do not distinctly see where those limits are to be drawn. No
doubt, if there are such limits, my brother Wilde is perfectly right
in saying that the only ground on which the verdict and damages
can go is for the excess, and not for the lawful exercise of the
criticism.” 1
The radical defect in this rule, as it seems to us, consists in its
assumption, that the private character of a public officer is some
thing aside from, and not entering into or influencing, his public
conduct; that a thoroughly dishonest man may be a just minister,
and that a judge who is corrupt and debauched in private life may
be pure and upright in his judgments; in other words, that an
evil tree is as likely as any other to bring forth good fruits. Any
such assumption is false to human nature, and contradictory to
general experience; and whatever the law may say, the general
public will still assume that a corrupt life will influence public
conduct, and that a man who deals dishonestly with his fellows as
individuals will not hesitate to defraud them in their aggregate
and corporate capacity, if the opportunity shall be given him.
They are, therefore, interested in knowing what is the character
* Alderson, B., same case, p. 338.
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of their public servants, and what sort of persons are offering
themselves for their suffrages. And if this be so, it would seem
that there should be some privilege of comment; that that privi
lege could only be limited by good faith and just intention; and
that of these it was the province of a jury to judge, in view of the
nature of the charges made and the reasons which existed for
making them.
The English cases allow considerable latitude of comment to
publishers of public journals, upon subjects in the discussion of
which the public may reasonably be supposed to have an
[*441] interest, and they hold the discussions to be "privileged
if conducted within the bounds of moderation and rea
son." A more recent case, however, limits the range of priv
ilege somewhat, and suggests a distinction which we are not
aware has ever been judicially pointed out in this country, and
which we are forced to believe
slow to adopt.
functionary whose conduct is in
* In Kelley v. Sherlock, Law Rep.
1 Q. B. 686, it was held that a ser
mon commenting upon public affairs
— e. g. the appointment of chaplains
for prisons and the election of a Jew
for mayor — was a proper subject for
comment in the papers. And in Kel
ley v. Tinling, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 699,
a church-warden, having written to
the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing
him of having desecrated the church
by allowing books to be sold in it
during service, and by turning the
vestry-room into a cooking-apart
ment, the correspondence was pub
lished without the plaintiff's permis
sion in the defendant's newspaper,
with comments on the plaintiff's con
duct. Held, that this was a matter
of public interest, which might be
made the subject of public discus
sion ; and that the publication was
therefore not libellous, unless the
language used was stronger than, in
the opinion of the jury, the occasion
justified.
In Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B.
73, the proprietor of the “London
The distinction is this:
the American courts would be
That if the officer or
question is one in whose duties
Times” was prosecuted for comments
in his paper upon a debate in the
House of Lords. The plaintiff had
presented a petition to that body,
charging Sir Fitzroy Kelly with hav
ing, many years before, made a state
ment false to his own knowledge, in
order to deceive a committee of the
House of Commons; and praying in
quiry, and his removal from an office
he held, if the charge was found true.
A debate ensued, and the charge was
wholly refuted. Held, that this was
a subject of great public concern, on
which a writer in a public newspaper
had full right to comment; and the
occasion was therefore so far privi
leged that the comments would not
be actionable so long as a jury should
think them honest, and made in a
fair spirit, and such as were justified
by the circumstances disclosed in the
debate. The opinion by Chief Jus
tice Cockburn is very clear and pointed,
and reviews all the previous decisions.
See further, Fairchild v. Adams, 11
Cush. 549; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La.
Ann. 375.
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the general public, and not merely the local public, has an inter
est, then a discussion of his conduct is privileged; otherwise it
is not. Thus the public journals are privileged to comment
freely within the limits of good faith, on the manner in which a
judge performs his duties, but they are not privileged in like
manner in the case of an official charged with purely local du
ties, such, for instance, as the physician to a local public charity.
We cannot believe there is any sufficient reason for allowing free
discussion in the one case and not in the other; but the opinion
is of sufficient importance to justify special attention being di
rected to it." And in this country it has been held that where a
charge against an officer or a candidate respects only his qualifi
cations for the office, and does not impugn his character, it forms
no basis for a recovery of damages. To address to the electors
of a district letters charging that a candidate for office is of im
paired understanding, and his mind weakened by disease, is pre
senting that subject to “the proper and legitimate tribunal to try
the question.” “Talents and qualifications for office are mere
matters of opinion, of which the electors are the only competent
judges.””
Statements in the Course of Judicial Proceedings.
There are some cases which are so absolutely privileged on
reasons of public policy, that no inquiry into motives is permit
ted in an action for slander or libel. Of these, the case of a
party who is called upon to give evidence in the course of judi
cial proceedings is a familiar illustration. No action will lie
against a witness a
t
the suit o
f
a party aggrieved b
y
his false
testimony, even though malice b
e charged.” The remedy against
* Purcell v. Lowler, L. R
.
C
.
P
.
Div. 781. The plaintiff was
1 C
.
P
. 606; Wason v. Walter, L. R.
4 Q. B
.
73. It is clear that a trustee
medical officer of the Kuntsford work
house, and the alleged libel consisted
in a report o
f
a
n inquiry by the board
in charge into his conduct and the
treatment o
f
the poor under him, and
comments thereon. The following
cases are commented upon and dis
tinguished : Davis v. Duncan, 9 C
.
P
.
396; Kelly v. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q
.
B
.
699 ; Henwood v. Harrison, L. R
.
7
o
f
a mining corporation is not such an
officer a
s to be subjected to general
criticism under the privilege o
f
the
press. Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.
* Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott &
McCord, 348.
8 Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y.
309; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann.
375; Smith v. Howard, 28 Iowa, 51.
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a dishonest witness is confined to the criminal prosecution for
perjury.” So what a juror may say to his fellows in the jury
room while they are considering their verdict, concerning one of
the parties to the suit who has been a witness therein, cannot be
the subject of an action for slander.” False accusations, how
ever, contained in the affidavits or other proceedings, by
[*442] which a prosecution is commenced for supposed crime, * or
in any other papers in the course of judicial proceedings,
are not so absolutely protected. They are privileged,” but the
party making them is liable to action, if actual malice be averred
and proved.* Preliminary information, furnished with a view to
set on foot an inquiry into an alleged offence, or to institute a
criminal prosecution, is
,
in like manner, privileged ; * but the
* But a qualification of this rule is
made where what is said by the wit
ness is not pertinent o
r
material to
the cause, and he has been actuated
by malice in stating it
.
White v.
Carroll, 42 N. Y
.
166; s. c. 1 Am.
Rep. 504; Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Me.
442; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen,
393. He is not, however, to be him
self the judge o
f
what is pertinent o
r
material when questions are put to
him, and no objection o
r warning
comes to him from court or counsel.
Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193. See
also Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195;
Garr v. Selden, 4 N
.
Y
. 91; Jennings
v
. Paine, 4 Wis. 358; Perkins v. Mit
chell, 31 Barb. 461; Revis v. Smith,
1
8 C
.
B
.
126; Grove v. Brandenburg,
7 Black, 2.34; Cunningham v. Brown,
1
8 Vt. 123; Dunlap v. Glidden, 31
Me. 435.
* Dunham r. Powers, 42 Vt. 1
;
Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.
* Astley v. Younge, Burr. 807;
Strauss v. Meyer, 48 Ill. 385.
* Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. &
El. 380; Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W.
297; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8
Cow. 141; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3
Allen, 393; Doyle v. O'Doherty,
1 Car. & Marsh. 418; Wilson v. Col
lins, 5 C
.
& P
. 373; Home v.
Bentinck, 2 Brod. & Bing 130;
Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180.
In Goslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3
,
it
was held that where a crime had
been committed, expressions o
f opin
ion founded upon facts within the
knowledge o
f
the party, o
r communi
cated to him, made prudently and in
confidence, to discreet persons, and
made obviously in good faith with a
view only to direct their watchfulness,
and enlist their aid in recovering the
money stolen, and detecting and
bringing to justice the offender, were
privileged. The cause, occasion, ob
ject, and end, it was said, was justifi
able, proper, and legal, and such as
should actuate every good citizen.
If a party in presenting his case to a
court, wanders from what is material
to libel another, the libel is not privi
leged. Wyatt v. Buell, 47 Cal. 624.
* Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B
.
Monr. 301.
The subject of communications privi
leged o
n grounds o
f public policy will
b
e found considered, a
t
some length
and with much ability, in the recent
case o
f
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, Law
Rep. 5 C
.
B
.
94. The publication
complained o
f
was by a military offi
cer to his superior concerning the
qualifications and capacity o
f
the
plaintiff as a subordinate military
officer under him; and it was averred
that the words were published b
y
the
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protection only extends to those communications which are in the
course of the proceedings to bring the supposed offender to jus
tice, or are designed for the purpose of originating or forwarding
'such proceedings; and communications not of that character are
not protected, even although judicial proceedings may be pend
ing for the investigation of the offence which the communication
refers to." Still less would a party be justified in repeating a
charge of crime, after the person charged has been examined on
his complaint, and acquitted of a
ll guilt.”
Privilege o
f
Counsel.
One o
f
the most important cases o
f privilege, in a constitu
tional point o
f view, is that o
f
counsel employed to rep
resent a party in * judicial proceedings. The benefit o
f [*443]
the constitutional right to counsel depends very greatly
on the freedom with which he is allowed to act, and to comment
o
n
the facts appearing in the case, and o
n
the inferences deduci
ble therefrom. The character, conduct, and motives o
f parties
and their witnesses, as well as o
f
other persons more remotely
connected with the proceedings, enter very largely into any
defendant o
f
actual malice, and with
out any reasonable, probable, o
r jus
tifiable cause, and not bona fide, o
r
in
the bona fide discharge o
f
defendant’s
duty as superior officer. On demur
rer, a majority o
f
the court (Mellor
and Lush, JJ.) held the action would
not lie: planting themselves, in part,
o
n grounds o
f public policy, and in
part, also, on the fact that the military
code provided a remedy for wrongs o
f
the nature complained o
f
; and quot
ing with approval Johnstone v. Sut
ton, 1 T
.
R
.
544, and Dawkins v.
Lord Rokeby, 4 F. & F. 841. Cock
burn, Ch. J., delivered an able dissent
ing opinion.
1 Dancaster v. Hewson, 2 M. &
Ry. 176. As to the privilege con
nected with church trials and investi
gations, see Dunn v. Winters, 2
Humph. 512; York v. Pease, 2 Gray,
282.
* Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8
Cow. 141. In Mower v. Watson,
1
1 Vt. 536, an action was brought for
slander in saying to a witness who
was giving his testimony on a mate
rial point in a cause then on trial to
which defendant was a party, “That's
a lie,” and for repeating the same
statement to counsel for the opposite
party afterwards. The words were
held not to be privileged. To the
same effect are the cases of Mc
Claughry v. Wetmore, 6 Johns. 82,
and Kean v. McLaughlin, 2 S. & R
.
469. See also Torrey v. Field, 10
Vt. 353; Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio,
41. A report made by a grand jury
upon a subject which they conceive to
b
e within their jurisdiction, but which
is not, is nevertheless privileged.
Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.
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judicial inquiry, and must form the subject of comment, if they
are to be sifted and weighed. To make the comment of value,
there must be the liberty of examination in every possible light,
and of suggesting any view of the circumstances of the case, and
of the motives surrounding it
,
which seems legitimate to the
person discussing them. It will often happen, in criminal pro
ceedings, that, while no reasonable doubt can exist that a crime
has been committed, there may b
e very great doubt whether the
prosecutor o
r
the accused is the guilty party; and to confine the
counsel for the defence to such remarks concerning the prose
cutor as he might justify, if he had made them without special
occasion, would render the right to counsel, in many cases, o
f
n
o
value. The law justly and necessarily, in view o
f
the importance
o
f
the privilege, allows very great liberty in these cases, and sur
rounds them with a protection that is always a complete shield,
except where the privilege o
f
counsel has been plainly and pal
pably abused.
The rule upon this subject was laid down in these words in an
early English case: “A counsellor hath privilege to enforce any
thing which is informed him b
y
his client, and to give it in evi
dence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to
examine whether it be true or false; for a counsellor is at his
peril to give in evidence that which his client informs him, being
pertinent to the matter in question ; but matter not pertinent to
the issue, o
r
the matter in question, he need not deliver; for he
is to discern in his discretion what he is to deliver, and what
not ; and although it be false, he is excusable, it being pertinent
to the matter. But if he give in evidence any thing not mate
rial to the issue, which is scandalous, he ought to aver it to be
true; otherwise he is punishable; for it shall be considered as
spoken maliciously and without cause; which is a good ground
for the action. . . . So if counsel object matter against a witness
which is slanderous, if there be cause to discredit his testimony,
and it be pertinent to the matter in question, it is justifi
[*444] able, what he * delivers b
y
information, although it be
false.”" The privilege o
f
counsel in these cases is the
* Brook v. Montagne, Cro. Jac. Ald. 232. And see Mackay v. Ford,
90. See this case approved and ap- 5 H
.
& N. 792.
plied in Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B
.
&
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same with that of the party himself," and the limitation upon it
is concisely suggested in a Pennsylvania case, “that if a man
should abuse his privilege, and, under pretence of pleading his
cause, designedly wander from the point in question, and mali
ciously heap slander upon his adversary, I will not say that he is
not responsible in an action at law.”” Chief Justice Shaw has
stated the rule very fully and clearly: “We take the rule to be
well settled by the authorities, that words spoken in the course
of judicial proceedings, though they are such as impute crime to
another, and therefore, if spoken elsewhere, would import malice.
and be actionable in themselves, are not actionable, if they are
applicable and pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The ques
tion, therefore, in such cases is
,
not whether the words spoken
are true, not whether they are actionable in themselves, but
whether they were spoken in the course o
f judicial proceedings,
and whether they are relevant or pertinent to the cause or sub
ject o
f
the inquiry. And in determining what is pertinent, much
latitude must be allowed to the judgment and discretion o
f
those
who are intrusted with the conduct o
f
a cause in court, and a
much larger allowance made for the ardent and excited feelings
with which a party, o
r
counsel who naturally and almost neces
sarily identifies himself with his client, may become animated,
by constantly regarding one side only o
f
a
n interesting and ani
mated controversy, in which the dearest rights o
f
such party may
become involved. And if these feelings sometimes manifest
themselves in strong invectives, o
r exaggerated expressions, be
yond what the occasion would strictly justify, it is to be recol
lected that this is said to a judge who hears both sides, in whose
mind the exaggerated statement may b
e
a
t
once controlled and
met by evidence and argument o
f
a contrary tendency from the
other party, and who, from the impartiality o
f
his position, will
naturally give to an exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the
occasion, n
o
more weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege
must be restrained by some limit, and we consider that limit to
b
e this: that a party or counsel shall not avail himself o
f
his situation to * gratify private malice b
y uttering slan- [*445]
derous expressions, either against a party, witness, o
r
third person, which have no relation to the cause or subject
1 Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 194, per * McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,
Shaw, Ch. J. 178, per Tilghman, Ch. J.
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matter of the inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is
,
o
n
the
whole, for the public interest, and best calculated to subserve the
purposes o
f justice, to allow counsel full freedom o
f speech in
conducting the cases and advocating and sustaining the rights o
f
their constituents; and this freedom o
f
discussion ought not to
b
e impaired b
y
numerous and refined distinctions.””
Privilege o
f Legislators.
The privilege of a legislator in the use of language in debate
is made broader and more complete than that o
f
the counsel o
r
party in judicial proceedings b
y
constitutional provisions, which
give him complete immunity, b
y forbidding his being questioned
in any other place for any thing said in speech or debate.” In
a
n early case in Massachusetts, the question o
f
the extent o
f
this
constitutional privilege came before the Supreme Court, and was
largely discussed, as well by counsel as by the court. The con
stitutional provision then in force in that State was as follows:
“The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either house
cannot be the foundation o
f any accusation or prosecution, action
o
r complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.” The de
fendant was a member of the General Court, and was prosecuted
for uttering slanderous words to a fellow-member in relation to
the plaintiff. The member to whom the words were uttered
had moved a resolution, o
n
the suggestion o
f
the plaintiff, for
the appointment o
f
a
n additional notary-public in the county
1 Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 197. See
also Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. &
o
f another, an action o
f
slander will
not lie, provided what is said be per
El. 380; Ring v. Wheeler, 7 Cow.
725; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536;
Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio, 41; Hast
ings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Bradley
v
. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Lea v. White,
4 Sneed, 111; Marshall v. Gunter,
6 Rich. 419 ; Ruohs v. Backer, 6
Heisk. 395; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis.
358: Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279;
Lester v. Thurmond, 51 Geo. 118. In
Hastings v. Lusk, it is said that the
privilege o
f
counsel is as broad as
that o
f
a legislative body; however
false and malicious may be the charge
made by him affecting the reputation
tinent to the question under discus
sion. And see Warner v. Paine, 2
Sandf. 195; Garr v. Selden, 4 N
.
Y.
91; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358.
* There are provisions to this effect
in every State constitution except
those o
f
North Carolina, South Caro
lina, Mississippi, Texas, California,
and Nevada. Mr. Cushing, in his
work on the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies, § 602, has
expressed the opinion that these pro
visions were unnecessary, and that
the protection was equally complete
without them.
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where the plaintiff" resided. The mover, in reply to an in- [*446]
quiry privately made by defendant, as to the source of his
information that such appointment was necessary, had designated
the plaintiff, and the defendant had replied by a charge against
the plaintiff of a criminal offence. The question before the
court was, whether this reply was privileged. The house was in
session at the time, but the remark was not made in course of
speech or debate, and had no other connection with the legisla
tive proceedings than is above shown.
Referring to the constitutional provision quoted, the learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case thus
expressed himself: “In considering this article, it appears to me
that the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of
the house as an organized body, as of each individual member
composing it
,
who is entitled to this privilege, even against the
declared will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege
a
t
the pleasure o
f
the house, but derives it from the will of the
people, expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the
will of either or both branches of the legislature. In this re
spect, the privilege here secured resembles other privileges at
tached to each member b
y
another part o
f
the constitution, by
which he is exempted from arrest on mesne (or original) process,
during his going to, returning from, or attending the General,
Court. Of these privileges, thus secured to each member, he
cannot be deprived b
y
a resolve o
f
the house, o
r b
y
a
n
act o
f
the
legislature.
“These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights o
f
the people, b
y
enabling their repre
sentatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecution, civil o
r
criminal. I therefore think the article ought
not to b
e
construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of
it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opin
ion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend
it to the giving o
f
a vote, to the making o
f
a written report, and
to every other act resulting from the nature and in the execution
o
f
the office; and I would define the article as securing to every
member exemption from prosecution for every thing said or done
b
y
him, a
s
a representative, in the exercise o
f
the functions o
f
that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular
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according to the rules of the house, or irregular and
[*447] against their rules. I do *not confine the member to
his place in the house, and I am satisfied that there are
cases in which he is entitled to this privilege when not within
the walls of the representatives' chamber. He cannot be exer
cising the functions of his office as member of a body, unless the
body is in existence. The house must be in session to enable
him to claim this privilege, and it is in session notwithstanding
occasional adjournments for short intervals for the convenience
of the members. If a member, therefore, be out of the cham
ber, sitting in committee, executing the commission of the house,
it appears to me that such member is within the reason of the ar
ticle, and ought to be considered within the privilege. The body
of which he is a member is in session, and he, as a member of
that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office. He
ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or criminal prosecu
tions for every thing said or done by him in the exercise of his
functions as a representative, in a committee, either in debating
or assenting to or draughting a report. Neither can I deny the
member his privilege when executing the duties of the office, in
a convention of both houses, although the convention may be
holden in the Senate Chamber.” And after considering the
hardships that might result to individuals in consequence of this
privilege, he proceeds : “A more extensive construction of the
privilege of the members secured by this article I cannot give,
because it could not be supported by the language or the mani
fest intent of the article. When a representative is not acting
as a member of the house, he is not entitled to any privilege
above his fellow-citizens; nor are the rights of the people af
fected if he is placed on the same ground on which his constitu
ents stand.” And coming more particularly to the facts then
before the court, it was shown that the defendant was not in the
discharge of any official duty at the time of uttering the obnox
ious words; that they had no connection or relevancy to the
business then before the house, but might with equal pertinency
have been uttered at any other time or place, and consequently
could not, even under the liberal rule of protection which the
court had laid down, be regarded as within the privilege."
1 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1. See Loveland, 19 Barb. 111; State v.
Jefferson’s Manual, § 3; Hosmer v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.
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* Publication of Privileged Communications through the [*448]
Press.
If now we turn from the rules of law which protect communi
cations because of the occasion on which they are made and the
duty resting upon the person making them, to those rules which
concern the spreading before the world the same communica
tions, we shall discover a very remarkable difference. It does
not follow because a counsel may freely speak in court as he be
lieves or is instructed, that therefore he may publish his speech
through the public press. The privilege in court is necessary to
the complete discharge of his duty to his client; but when the
suit is ended, that duty is discharged, and he is not called upon to
appeal from the court and the jury to the general public. Indeed
such an appeal, while it could not generally have benefit to the
client in view, would be unfair and injurious to the parties re
flected upon by the argument, inasmuch as it would take only a
partial and one-sided view of the case, and the public would not
have, as the court and jury did, al
l
the facts o
f
the case as given
in evidence before them, so that they might be in position to
weigh the arguments fairly and understandingly, and reject inju
rious inferences not warranted by the evidence.
The law, however, favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far
a
s that object can be attained without injustice to the persons
immediately concerned. The public are permitted to attend
nearly a
ll judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no sufficient
reason why they should not also be allowed to see in print the
reports o
f trials, if they can thus have them presented as fully as
they are in court, o
r
a
t
least a
ll
the material portion o
f
the pro
ceedings stated impartially, so that one shall not, by means o
f
them, derive erroneous impressions, which h
e
would not have
received from hearing the case in court.
It seems to be a settled rule of law, that a fair and impartial
account o
f judicial proceedings, which have not been ea parte,
but in the hearing o
f
both parties, is
,
generally speaking, a justi
fiable publication." But it is said that, if a party is to be allowed
1 Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C
.
B
. 20; And see Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf.
Lewis v. Levy, E
.
B
.
& E
. 537; Ry- 21; Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Tim
alls v. Leader, Law Rep. 1 Exch. 296. berlake, 10 Ohio, N
.
s. 548; Torrey
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to publish what passes in a court of justice, he must publish the
whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which he him
self draws from the evidence." A plea that the sup
[*449] posed libel was, in * substance, a true account and
report of a trial has been held bad ; * and a statement of
the circumstances of a trial as from counsel in the case has been
held not privileged.” The report must also be strictly confined
to the actual proceedings in court, and must contain no defama
tory observations or comments from any quarter whatsoever, in
addition to what forms strictly and properly the legal proceed
ings.” And if the nature of the case is such as to make it im
proper that the proceedings should be spread before the public,
because of their immoral tendency, or of the blasphemous or
indecent character of the evidence exhibited, the publication,
though impartial and full, will be a public offence, and punish
able accordingly.”
It has, however, been held, that the publication of ex parte
proceedings, or mere preliminary examinations, though of a judi
cial character, is not privileged ; and when they reflect injuri
ously upon individuals, the publisher derives no protection from
their having already been delivered in court.”
v. Field, 10 Vt. 353; Saunders v.
Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369; Storey v. Wal
lace, 60 Ill. 51. But not if the matter
published is indecent or blasphemous.
Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167; Rex
v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273. The
privilege extends to the publication
of testimony taken on an investiga
tion by Congress. Terry v. Fellows,
21 La. Ann. 375. And of the pro
ceedings on trials in voluntary organ
izations. Barrows v. Bell, 7 Gray,
301.
1 Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald.
611.
* Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.
* Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213;
Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473. And
see Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 26;
Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 605.
* Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 493;
Delegal v. Highley, 3 Bing. N. C.
950. And see Lewis v. Clement, 3
The reason for
B. & Ald. 702; Pittock v. O'Neill,
63 Penn. St. 253; s. c. 3 Am. Rep.
544.
* Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167;
Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.
* Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C.
556; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473;
Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385;
Rex v. Lee, 5 Esp. 123; Rex v. Fisher,
2 Camp. 563; Delegal v. Highley, 3
Bing. N. C. 950; Behrens v. Allen,
3 Fost. & F. 135; Cincinnati Gazette
Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. S.
548; Mathews v. Beach, 5 Sandf.
256; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120;
Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 120; Usher
v. Severance, 20 Me. 9. It seems, how
ever, that if the proceeding has re
sulted in the discharge of the per
son accused, or in a decision that no
cause exists for proceeding against
him, a publication of an account of it
is privileged. In Curry v. Walter, 1
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* distinguishing these cases from those where the parties [*450]
are heard is thus stated by Lord Ellenborough, in the early
case of The King v. Fisher: "“Jurors and judges are still but men;
they cannot always control feeling excited by inflammatory lan
guage.
justice must sometimes be done.
although they may occasionally
have been held to be privileged.
If they are exposed to be thus warped and misled, in
Trials at law, fairly reported,
prove injurious to individuals,
Let them continue so privileged.
The benefit they produce is great and permanent, and the evil
B. & P. 525, the Court of Common
Pleas held that, in an action for libel,
it was a good defence, under the plea
of not guilty, that the alleged libel
was a true account of what had passed
upon a motion in the Court of King's
Bench for an information against two
magistrates for corruption in refusing
to license an inn; the motion having
been refused for want of notice to the
magistrates. In Lewis v. Levy, El.
Bl. & El. 537, the publisher of a
newspaper gave a full report of an
examination before a magistrate on a
charge of perjury, resulting in the
discharge of the defendant; and the
Court of Queen's Bench sustained
the claim of privilege; distinguishing
the case from those where the party
was held for trial, and where the pub
lication of the charges and evidence
might tend to his prejudice on the
trial. The opinion of Lord Campbell
in the case, however, seems to go far
towards questioning the correctness
of the decisions above cited. See es
pecially his quotation from the opin
ion of Lord Denman, delivered before
a committee of the House of Lords in
the year 1843, on the law of libel :
“I have no doubt that [police re
ports] are extremely useful for the
detection of guilt by making facts
notorious, and for bringing those
facts more correctly to the knowledge
of all parties interested in unravelling
the truth. The public, I think, are
perfectly aware that those proceedings
are ex parte, and they become more
and more aware of it in proportion to
their growing intelligence; they know
that such proceedings are only in
course of trial, and they do not form
their opinion until the trial is had.
Perfect publicity in judicial proceed
ings is of the highest importance in
other points of view, but in its effects
on character I think it desirable. The
statement made in open court will
probably find its way to the ears of
all in whose good opinion the party
assailed feels an interest, probably in
an exaggerated form, and the impu
tation may often rest upon the wrong
person; both these evils are prevented
by correct reports.” In the case
of Lewis v. Levy, it was insisted
that the privilege of publication
only extended to the proceedings of
the superior courts of law and
equity; but the court gave no coun
tenance to any such distinction.
See also Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4.
Q. B. 73; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La.
Ann. 375.
* 2 Camp. 563. Compare with
this and the cases cited in the pre
ceding note, Ryalls v. Leader, L. R.
1 Exch. 295; Smith v. Scott, 2 C. &
K. 580; Ackerman v. Jones, 37 N. Y.
Sup. C. R. 42. It is clear that the
report is not privileged, if accom
panied with injurious comments.
Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 493: Com
monwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304;
Usher v. Severance, 20 Me. 9; Pittock
v. O’Niell, 63 Penn. St. 253.
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that arises from them is rare and incidental. But these prelimi
nary examinations have né such privilege. Their only tendency
is to prejudge those whom the law still presumes to be innocent,
and to poison the sources of justice. It is of infinite importance
to us all, that whatever has a tendency to prevent a fair trial
should be guarded against. Every one of us may be questioned
in a court of law, and called upon to defend his life and character.
We would then wish to meet a jury of our countrymen with un
biassed minds. But for this there can be no security, if such pub
lications are permitted.” And in another case it has been said:
“It is our boast that we are governed by that just and salutary
rule upon which security of life and character often depends, that
every man is presumed innocent of crimes charged upon him,
until he is proved guilty. But the circulation of charges founded
upon ea parte testimony, of statements made, often under excite
ment, by persons smarting under real or fancied wrongs, may prej
udice the public mind, and cause the judgment of conviction to
be passed long before the day of trial has arrived. When
[*451] that day of trial comes, the rule has been * reversed, and
the presumption of guilt has been substituted for the pre
sumption of innocence. The chances of a fair and impartial trial
are diminished. Suppose the charge to be utterly groundless. If
every preliminary ea parte complaint which may be made before
a police magistrate may, with entire immunity, be published and
scattered broadcast over the land, then the character of the inno
cent, who may be the victim of a conspiracy, or of charges proved
afterwards to have arisen entirely from misapprehension, may be
cloven down, without any malice on the part of the publisher.
The refutation of slander, in such cases, generally follows its prop
agation a
t
distant intervals, and brings often but an imperfect
balm to wounds which have become festered, and perhaps incur
able. It is not to be denied, that occasionally the publication of
such proceedings is productive o
f good, and promotes the ends o
f
justice. But, in such cases, the publisher must find his justifica
tion, not in privilege, but in the truth o
f
the charges.””
1 Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 30. express an opinion whether a publi
See this case approved and followed cation o
f
the proceedings on prelimi
in Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timber- nary examinations may not be privi
lake, 10 Ohio, N
.
s. 548, where, how- leged, where the accused is present,
ever, the court are careful not to with full opportunity of defence.
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Privilege of Publishers of News.
Among the inventions of modern times, by which the world
has been powerfully influenced, and from which civilization has
received a new and wonderful impulse, must be classed the news
paper. Beginning with a small sheet, insignificant alike in mat
ter and appearance, published at considerable intervals, and
including but few in it
s visits, it has become the daily vehicle, to
almost every family in the land, o
f
information from al
l
quarters
o
f
the globe, and upon every subject. Through it
,
and by means
o
f
the electric telegraph, the public proceedings o
f every civilized
country, the debates o
f
the leading legislative bodies, the events
o
f war, the triumphs o
f peace, the storms in the physical world,
and the agitations in the moral and mental, are brought home to
the knowledge o
f every reading person, and, to a very large ex
tent, before the day is over on which the events have taken place.
And not public events merely are discussed and described, but
the actions and words o
f public men are made public
property; and any person sufficiently notorious * to be- [*452]
come an object o
f public interest will find his movements
chronicled in this index o
f
the times. Every party has it
s
news
paper organs; every shade o
f opinion on political, religious, liter
ary, moral, industrial, or financial questions has its representative :
every locality has it
s press to advocate it
s claims, and advance it
s
interests, and even the days regarded as sacred have their special
papers to furnish reading suitable for the time. The newspaper
is also the medium b
y
means o
f
which all classes o
f
the people
communicate with each other concerning their wants and desires,
and through which they offer their wares, and seek bargains.
As it has gradually increased in value, and in the extent and
variety o
f
it
s contents, so the exactions o
f
the community upon
its conductors have also increased, until it is demanded o
f
the
newspaper publisher, that he shall daily spread before his readers
a complete summary o
f
the events transpiring in the world, pub
lic or private, so far as those readers can reasonably be supposed
to take an interest in them ; and he who does not comply with
this demand must give way to him who will.
The newspaper is also one o
f
the chief means for the education
o
f
the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale o
f intelli
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gence resort to its columns for information ; it is read by those
who read nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it the
medium of communication with each other on the highest and
most abstruse subjects. Upon politics it may be said to be the
chief educator of the people; it
s
influence is potent in every leg
islative body; it gives tone and direction to public sentiment on
each important subject as it arises; and no administration in any
free country ventures to overlook o
r disregard an element so per
vading in it
s influence, and withal so powerful. -
And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever
influenced a
t all the current o
f
the common law, in any particular
important to the protection o
f
the publishers. The railway has
become the successor o
f
the king's highway, and the plastic rules
of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new
condition o
f things; but the changes accomplished b
y
the public
press seem to have passed unnoticed in the law, and, save only
where modifications have been made by constitution or statute,
the publisher o
f
the daily paper occupies to-day the position in
the courts that the village gossip and retailer o
f
scandal occupied
two hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more pro
tection.
[*453) * We quote from an opinion b
y
the Supreme Court o
f
New York, in a case where a publisher of a newspaper
was prosecuted for libel, and where the position was taken b
y
counsel, that the publication was privileged : “It is made a point
in this case, and was insisted upon in argument, that the editor
o
f
a public newspaper is at liberty to copy an item o
f
news from
another paper, giving at the same time his authority, without sub
jecting himself to legal responsibility, however libellous the arti
cle may be, unless express malice is shown. It was conceded that
the law did not, and ought not, to extend a similar indulgence to
any other class o
f citizens; but the counsel said that a distinction
should b
e
made in favor o
f editors, on the ground o
f
the pecu
liarity o
f
their occupation. That their business was to dissemi
mate useful information among the people ; to publish such matters
relating to the current events o
f
the day happening a
t
home o
r
abroad as fell within the sphere of their observation, and as the
public curiosity or taste demanded ; and that it was impracticable
for them at all times to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the
various statements contained in other journals. We were also
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told that if the law were not thus indulgent, some legislative
relief might become necessary for the protection of this class of
citizens. Undoubtedly if it be desirable to pamper a depraved pub
lie appetite o
r taste, if there be any such, b
y
the republication o
f
all the falsehoods and calumnies upon private character that may
find their way into the press, – to give encouragement to the
widest possible circulation o
f
these vile and defamatory publica
tions by protecting the retailers o
f them, - some legislative inter
ference will be necessary, for no countenance can be found for
the irresponsibility claimed in the common law. That reprobates
the libeller, whether author or publisher, and subjects him to both
civil and criminal responsibility. His offence is there ranked
with that o
f
the receiver o
f
stolen goods, the perjurer and sub
orner o
f perjury, the disturber o
f
the public peace, the conspira
tor, and other offenders o
f
like character.” And again: “The
act o
f publication is an adoption o
f
the original calumny, which
must be defended in the same way as if invented b
y
the defend
ant. The republication assumes and indorses the truth o
f
the
charge, and when called o
n b
y
the aggrieved party, the publisher
should be held strictly to the proof. If he chooses to become the
indorser and retailer o
f private scandal, without taking the trouble
to inquire into the truth o
f
what h
e publishes, there is n
o
ground for * complaint if the law, which is as studious to [*454]
protect the character as the property o
f
a citizen, holds
him to this responsibility. The rule is not only just and wise in
itself, but, if steadily and inflexibly adhered to and applied by
courts and juries, will greatly tend to the promotion of truth,
good morals, and common decency o
n
the part o
f
the press, by
inculcating caution and inquiry into the truth o
f charges against
private character before they are published and circulated through
out the community.” "
mon to all.1 Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill,
513, per Nelson, Ch. J. And see
King v. Root, 4 Wend. 138, per Wal
worth, Chancellor. “It has been
urged upon you that conductors o
f
the public press are entitled to pe
culiar indulgences and have especial
rights and privileges. The law recog
nizes n
o
such peculiar rights, privi
leges, o
r
claims to indulgence. They
have no rights but such as are com
They have just the same
rights that the rest o
f
the community
have, and no more. They have the
right to publish the truth, but no
right to publish falsehood to the in
jury of others with impunity.” In
structions approved in Sheckell v.
Jackson, 10 Cush. 26. And see Pal
mer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 216. In
People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, a publi
cation regarding a pending cause cal
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If this strong condemnatory language were confined to the
cases where private character is dragged before the public for
detraction and abuse, to pander to a depraved appetite for scan
dal, it
s propriety and justice and the force o
f
it
s
reasons would be
a
t
once conceded. But a very large proportion of what the news
papers spread before the public relates to matters o
f public con
cern, but in which, nevertheless, individuals figure, and must
therefore b
e
mentioned in any account. To a great extent, also,
the information comes from abroad; the publisher can have no
knowledge concerning it
,
and n
o inquiries which he could make
would be likely to give him more definite information, unless he
delays the publication until it ceases to be of value to his readers.
Whatever view the law may take, the public sentiment does not
brand the publisher o
f
a newspaper as libeller, conspirator, o
r
villain, because the telegraph despatches transmitted to him from
a
ll parts o
f
the world, without any knowledge on his part con
cerning the facts, are published in his paper, in reliance upon the
prudence, care, and honesty o
f
those who have charge o
f
the lines
o
f communication, and whose interest it is to be vigilant and truth
ful. The public demand and expect accounts of every important
meeting, o
f every important trial, and o
f
a
ll
the events which have
a bearing upon trade and business, o
r upon political affairs. It is
impossible that these shall be given in all cases without matters
being mentioned derogatory to individuals; and if the question
were a new one in the law, it might be worthy o
f inquiry whether
some line o
f
distinction could not be drawn which would protect
the publisher when giving in good faith such items o
f
news a
s
would be proper, if true, to spread before the public, and which
h
e gives in the regular course o
f
his employment, in pursuance
o
f
a public demand, and without any negligence, as they
[*455] come to him from the * usual and legitimate sources,
which he has reason to rely upon; at the same time leav
ing him liable when he makes his columns the vehicle o
f private
gossip, detraction, and malice."
culated to bring public odium upon the
court in respect to its treatment o
f
the
case, was punished as a contempt o
f
court. But in Storey v. People, 79
Ill. 45, it was held a publisher could
not be punished as for contempt for
a
n article reflecting on the grand jury,
because, under the guaranty o
f free
dom o
f
the press, entitled to jury trial.
And see Queen v. Lefroy, L. R
.
8 Q.
B
.
134; 2 Moak, 250.
1 In Story v. Eager, just decided
by the Supreme Court o
f Illinois, a
rule like that indicated in the text
seems to be laid down.
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The question, however, is not new, and the authorities have
generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid respon
sibility with any other person who makes injurious communications.
Malice on his part is conclusively inferred, if the communications
are false. It is no defence that they have been copied with or
without comment from another paper; * or that the source of the
information was stated at the time of the publication; * or that
the publication was made in the paper without the knowledge
of the proprietor, as an advertisement or otherwise ; * or that it
consists in a criticism on the course and character of a candi
date for public office ; * or that it is a correct and impartial ac
1 Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill,
510. Even though they be preceded
by the statement that they are so
copied. Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N.Y
20. Or are given as a rumor merely.
Wheeler v. Shields, 3 Ill. 348; Mason
v. Mason, 4 N. H. 110. See State v.
Butman, 15 La. Ann. 166; Parker v.
McQueen, 8 B. Monr. 16; Sans v.
Joerris, 14 Wis. 663; Hampton
v. Wilson, 4 Dev. 468; Beardsley v.
Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290.
* Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447;
Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659; In
man v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Hotch
kiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 514; Cates v.
Kellogg, 9 Ind. 506; Fowler v. Chi
chester, 26 Ohio, N. s. 9; Cummer
ford v. McAvoy, 15 Ill. 311.
* Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns, 260;
Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; s. c.
6 N. Y. 337; Marten v. Van Schaick,
4 Paige, 479; Commonwealth v.
Nichols, 10 Met. 259.
* King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113.
The action was for a libel, published
in the “New York American,” re
flecting upon Root, who was candi
date for lieutenant-governor. We
quote from the opinion of the chan
cellor : “It is insisted that this libel
was a privileged communication. If
so, the defendants were under no ob
ligation to prove the truth of the
charge, and the party libelled had no
right to recover, unless he established
malice in fact, or showed that the
editors knew the charge to be false.
The effect of such a doctrine would
be deplorable. Instead of protecting,
it would be destroying the freedom
of the press, if it were understood
that an editor could publish what he
pleased against candidates for office,
without being answerable for the
truth of such publications. No hon
est man could afford to be an editor,
and no man who had any character
to lose would be a candidate for office
under such a construction of the law
of libel. The only safe rule to adopt
in such cases is to permit editors to
publish what they please in relation
to the character and qualifications of
candidates for office, but holding them
responsible for the truth of what they
publish.” Notwithstanding the de
plorable consequences here predicted
from too great license to the press, it
is matter of daily observation that the
press, in it
s
comments upon public
events and public men, proceeds in
all respects as though it were privi
leged ; public opinion would not
sanction prosecutions b
y
candidates
for office for publications amounting
to technical libels, but which were
nevertheless published without malice
in fact ; and the man who has a
“character to lose ’’ presents himself
for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens
in the full reliance that detraction by
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[*456] count of a public * meeting," or of any proceedings in
which the public have an interest, unless they were leg
islative or judicial in their character, and where both par
[*457] ties had opportunity to be heard.” Criticisms on * works
of art and literary productions are allowable, if fair, rea
the public press will be corrected
through the same instrumentality,
and that unmerited abuse will react
on the public opinion in his favor.
Meantime the press is gradually be
coming more just, liberal, and digni
fied in its dealings with political op
ponents, and vituperation is much
less common, reckless, and bitter
now that it was at the beginning of
the century, when repression was
more often resorted to as a remedy.
1 Dawson v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl.
229.
2 Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20.
Bennett was sued for publishing in
the “New York Herald" the speech
of a person convicted of murder,
made upon the scaffold as he was
about to be executed, and reflecting
upon the counsel who had defended
him. The principal question in the
case was, whether a statute of the
State, passed after the publication
but before the trial, was applicable.
The statute privileged any fair and
true report in a newspaper, of a judi
cial, legislative, or other public official
proceeding, or statement, speech, ar
gument, or debate in the course of
the same. The court held the statute
not applicable, both because it was
not retrospective in its provisions, and
therefore could not apply to publica
tions previously made, and also because
this was not any such proceeding as
the statute contemplated. Upon the
question whether the publication was
not privileged, independent of the
statute, Denio, J., says: “The want
of legal connection between the words
spoken and the proceeding which was
going forward at the same time and
place, which has led me to the con
clusion that the statute does not ap
ply, shows that it is not within the
reason upon which the common-law
rule is based. That rule assumes
that the public may have a legiti
mate interest in being made ac
quainted with the proceedings of
courts of justice and of legislative
bodies. The free circulation of such
intelligence is of vast advantage in
every country, and particularly here,
where all reforms in legal or adminis
trative polity must proceed from the
people at large. But neither the rea
son of the rule, nor, as I believe, the
rule itself, has any application to a
proceeding in which neither forensic
debate nor legislative or administra
tive deliberations or determinations
have any place. Where the proceed
ing is a mere act, with which neither
oral nor written communications have
any thing more than an accidental or
fortuitous connection, there is no room
for the application of the doctrine of
privilege to whatever may be spoken
or written at the time and place
where and when it is transpiring.
Such transactions are subject to be
reported, described, and published in
newspapers or otherwise, like other
affairs in which individuals and com
munities feel a curiosity, and with the
same liability attaching to the pub
lisher to answer for any injury which
may happen to the character of indi
viduals if
,
in the course o
f
such publi
cations, libellous imputations are ap
plied to any one. It is of course
perfectly lawful to publish a
ll
the
circumstances attending a public exe
cution, including the dying speech o
f
the malefactor; but it is a necessary
condition o
f
that right, that if scanda
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sonable, and temperate; but the artist or author is not to be
criticised through his works, and his personal character is not
made the property of the public by his publications." For fur
ther privilege it would seem that publishers of news must appeal
to the protection of public opinion, or they must call upon the
legislature for such modification of the law as may seem impor
tant to their just protection.
The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsible for
all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of
injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable
for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained
of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge, and
he has been guilty of no negligence in the selection of agents, or
of personal misconduct, and is not shown habitually to make his
paper the vehicle of detraction and malice.”
Publication of Legislative Proceedings.
Although debates, reports, and other proceedings in legislative
bodies are privileged, it does not seem to follow that the publica
tion of them is always equally privileged. The English decisions
do not place such publications on any higher ground of right than
any other communication through the public press. A member
of Parliament, it is said, has a right to publish his speech, but it
lous imputations are used by the cul
prit or any one else which are untrue,
he who publishes them afterwards
must be responsible for the wrong
and injury thereby occasioned to the
person attacked.” Mason, J., in the
same case gives a reason for concur
ring in the conclusion of the court,
which seems to us to possess some
force, independent of the question of
privilege. It is that the provisions of
law then in force, requiring capital
executions to be within the walls of
the prison, or in an adjoining enclo
sure, and excluding all spectators
with limited exceptions, must be re
garded as indicating a legislative
policy adverse to the publicity of
what passes on such occasions.
* The libel suits brought by J.
Fenimore Cooper may be usefully
consulted in this connection. Cooper
v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Cooper p.
Barber, 24 Wend. 105; Cooper v.
Greeley, 1 Denio, 347. As to criti
cisms on public entertainments, see
Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54, and 28
N. Y. 324; Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp.
28; Green v. Chapman, 4 Bing. N.
C. 92. As to how far sermons,
preached, but not otherwise published,
form a proper subject for comment
and criticism by the public press, see
Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 318.
* Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, and
Detroit Free Press v. Same, 16 Mich.
447; Perret c. New Orleans Times,
25 La. Ann. 170; Scripps v. Reilly,
35 Mich. 371; Same v. Same, 37
Mich.
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must not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual,
and if it is
,
it is a libel." And in another case: “A mem
[*458] ber of [* the House of Commons] has spoken what he
thought material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in
his character as a member o
f
that house. So far he is privileged;
but he has not stopped there, but, unauthorized b
y
the house, has
chosen to publish a
n
account o
f
that speech, in what he has pleased
to call a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out
reflections injurious to the character o
f
a
n individual.” And he
was convicted and fined for the libel.”
The circumstance that the publication was unauthorized b
y
the
house was alluded to in this opinion, but the rule o
f
law would
seem to be unaffected by it
,
since it was afterwards held that an
order o
f
the house directing a report made to it to be published
did not constitute any protection to the official printer, who had
published it in the regular course of his duty, in compliance with
such order. All the power of the house was not sufficient to
protect its printer in obeying the order to make this publication ;
and a statute was therefore passed to protect in the future per
sons publishing parliamentary reports, votes, or other proceedings,
by order o
f
either house.”
* Rex v. Lord Abington, 1 Esp.
226. In this case the defendant was
fined, imprisoned, and required to
find security for his good behavior,
for a libel contained in a speech made
by him in Parliament, and afterwards
published.
* Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 278.
* Stat. 3 and 4 Victoria, c. 9. The
case was that o
f
Stockdale v. Hansard,
very fully reported in 9 Al. & El. 1.
See also 11 Al. & El. 253. The
Messrs. Hansard were printers to the
House o
f Commons, and had printed
by order o
f
that house the report o
f
the inspectors o
f prisons, in which a
book, published b
y
Stockdale, and
found among the prisoners in New
gate, was described as obscene and
indecent. Stockdale brought an ac
tion against the printers for libel, and
recovered judgment. Lord Denman,
presiding on the trial, said that “the
fact o
f
the House o
f
Commons having
directed Messrs. Hansard to publish
all their parliamentary reports is no
justification for them, or for any
bookseller who publishes any parlia
mentary report containing a libel
against any man.” The house re
sented this opinion and resolved,
“that the power of publishing such
o
f its reports, votes, and proceedings
a
s it shall deem necessary or condu
cive to the public interests is an es
sential incident to the constitutional
functions o
f Parliament, more espe
cially o
f
this house as the represent
ative portion o
f it.” They also
resolved that for any person to in
stitute a suit in order to call its
privileges in question, o
r
for any
court to decide upon matters o
f priv
ilege inconsistent with the determina
tion o
f
either house, was a breach
o
f privilege. Stockdale, however,
brought other actions, and again re
covered. When he sought to enforce
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* It has been intimated, however, that what a represent- [*459]
ative is privileged to address to the house of which he is
these judgments by executions, his
solicitor and himself were proceeded
against for contempt of the house,
and imprisoned. While in prison,
Stockdale commenced a further suit.
The sheriffs, who had been ordered
by the House of Commons to restore
the money which they had collected,
were, on the other hand, compelled
by attachments from the Queen’s
Bench to pay it over to Stockdale.
In this complicated state of affairs,
the proper and dignified mode of re
lieving the difficulty by the passage of
a statute making such publications
privileged for the future was adopted.
For an account of this controversy, in
addition to what appears in the law
reports, see May, Law and Practice of
Parliament, 156–159, 2d ed.: May,
Constitutional History, c. 7. A case
in some respects similar to that of
Stockdale v. Hansard is that of Pop
ham v. Pickburn, 7 Hurl. & Nor. 891.
The defendant, the proprietor of a
newspaper, was sued for publishing a
report made by a medical officer of
health to a vestry board, in pursuance
of the statute, and which reflected
severely upon the conduct of the
plaintiff. The publication was made
without any comment, and as a part
of the proceedings of the vestry board.
It was held not to be privileged, not
withstanding the statute provided for
the publication of the report by the
vestry board, –which, however, had
not yet been made. Wilde, B., de
livering the opinion of the court, said:
“The defendant has published that
of the plaintiff which is undoubtedly
a libel, and which is untrue. He
seeks to protect himself on the ground
that the publication is a correct report
of a document read at a meeting of
the Clerkenwell vestry, which docu
ment must have been published and
sold at a small price by the vestry in
a short time. But we are of opinion
this furnishes no defence. Undoubt
edly the report of a trial in a court of
justice in which this document had
been read would not make the pub
lisher thereof liable to an action for
libel, and reasonably, for such reports
only extend that publicity which is so
important a feature of the adminis
tration of the law in England, and
thus enable to be witnesses of it not
merely the few whom the court can
hold, but the thousands who can read
the reports. But no case has de
cided that the reports of what takes
place at the meeting of such a body
as this vestry are so privileged ; in
deed the case cited in the argument
[Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293] is an
authority that they are not. Then,
is the publication justified by the
statute? It is true that the document
would have been accessible to the
public in a short time, though not
published by the defendant; but this
cannot justify his anticipating the
publication, and giving it a wider
circulation, and possibly without an
answer which the vestry might have
received in some subsequent report or
otherwise, and which would then
have been circulated with the libel.
This defence therefore fails.
“It was further contended that
this libel might be justified as a mat
ter of public discussion on a subject
of public interest. The answer is:
This is not a discussion or comment.
It is the statement of a fact. To
charge a man incorrectly with a dis
graceful act is very different from
commenting on a fact relating to him
truly stated; there the writer may, by
his opinion, libel himself rather than
the subject of his remarks.
“It is to be further observed that
this decision does not determine or
affect the question whether, after the
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a member, he is also privileged to address to his constituents;
and that the bona fide publication for that purpose of his speech
in the house is protected." And the practice in this
[*460] country appears to proceed on * this idea; the speeches
and proceedings in Congress being fully reported by the
press, and the exemption of the member from being called to ac
count for his speech being apparently supposed to extend to it
s
publication also. When complete publicity is thus practised, per
haps every speech published should be regarded as addressed
boma fide by the representative, not only to the house, but also to
his constituents. But whether that view be taken or not, if pub
lication is provided for b
y law, as in the case o
f Congressional
debates, the publishing must be considered as privileged.
The Jury as Judges of the Law.
In a considerable number of the State constitutions it is pro
vided that, in prosecutions for libel, the jury shall have a right to
determine the law and the fact. In some it is added, “as in other
cases; ” in others, “under the direction of the court.” For the
necessity o
f
these provisions we must recur to the rulings o
f
the English judges in the latter half o
f
the last century, and the
memorable contest in the courts and in Parliament, resulting a
t
last in the passage o
f Mr. Fox's Libel Act, declaratory of the
rights o
f juries in prosecutions for libel.
In the year 1770, Woodfall, the printer of the “Morning Ad
vertiser,” was tried before Lord Mansfield for having published
in his paper what was alleged to be a libel on the king ; and his
lordship told the jury that a
ll they had to consider was, whether
the defendant had published the paper set out in the information,
and whether the innuendoes, imputing a particular meaning to
particular words were true, as that “the K ” meant his
Majesty King George III. ; but that they were not to consider
whether the publication was, as alleged in the information, false
and malicious, those being mere formal words; and that whether
the letter was libellous or innocent was a pure question o
f law,
upon which the opinion o
f
the court might be taken b
y
a demurrer,
statutory publication, it might or 1 Lives o
f
Chief Justices, by Lord
might not be competent to others to Campbell, Vol. III. p
.
167; Davison
republish these reports, with o
r
with- v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229, 233.
out reasonable comments.”
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or a motion in arrest of judgment. His charge obviously required
the jury, if satisfied the publication was made, and had the mean
ing attributed to it
,
to render a verdict o
f guilty, whether they
believed the publication false and malicious or not; in other
words, to convict the party o
f guilt, notwithstanding they might
believe the essential element o
f criminality to be wanting. The
jury, dissatisfied with these instructions, and unwilling to
make their verdict cover * matters upon which they were [*461]
not at liberty to exercise their judgment, returned a ver
dict o
f “guilty of printing and publishing only,” but this the
court afterwards rejected as ambiguous, and ordered a new
trial."
In Miller's case, which was tried the same year, Lord Mans
field instructed the jury as follows: “The direction I am going
to give you is with a full conviction and confidence that it is the
language o
f
the law. If you by your verdict find the defendant
not guilty, the fact established b
y
that verdict is
,
h
e
did not pub
lish a paper o
f
that meaning; that fact is established, and there
is an end o
f
the prosecution. You are to try the fact, because
your verdict establishes that fact, that he did not publish it
. If
you find that, according to your judgment, your verdict is final,
and if you find it otherwise, it is between God and your con
sciences, for that is the basis upon which a
ll
verdicts ought to be
founded; then the fact finally established b
y your verdict, if you
find him guilty, is
,
that he printed and published a paper o
f
the
tenor and o
f
the meaning set forth in the information ; that is
the only fact finally established by your verdict; and whatever
fact is finally established never can be controverted in any shape
whatever. But you do not b
y
that verdict give an opinion, o
r
establish whether it is or not lawful to print or publish a paper of
the tenor and meaning in the information ; for, supposing the
defendant is found guilty, and the paper is such a paper as by
the law o
f
the land may be printed and published, the defendant
has a right to have judgment respited, and to have it carried to
the highest court o
f judicature.””
Whether these instructions were really in accordance with the
law o
f England, it would be of little importance now to inquire.
1 20 State Trials, 895. question in Pennsylvania, so early as
* 2
0 State Trials, 870. For an 1692, see The Forum, by David Paul
account o
f
the raising o
f
the same Brown, Vol. I. p
.
280.
574 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XII.
They were assailed as not only destructive to the liberty of the
press, but as taking from the jury that right to cover by their
verdict all the matter charged and constituting the alleged of
fence, as it was conceded was their right in al
l
other cases. In
n
o
other case could the jury be required to find a criminal intent
which they did not believe to exist. In the House of Lords
they were assailed by Lord Chatham; and Lord Camden, the
Chief Justice o
f
the Common Pleas, in direct contradiction to
Lord Mansfield, declared his instructions not to be the
[*462] law of England. * Nevertheless, with the judges gen
erally the view o
f
Lord Mansfield prevailed, and it con
tinued to be enforced for more than twenty years, so far as juries
would suffer themselves to be controlled b
y
the directions o
f
the
COurtS.
The act known as Mr. Fox’s Libel Act was passed in 1792,
against the protest o
f
Lord Thurlow and five other lords, who
predicted from it “the confusion and destruction of the law of
England.” It was entitled “An act to remove doubts respect
ing the functions o
f juries in cases o
f libel,” and it declared and
enacted that the jury might give a general verdict o
f guilty o
r
not guilty, upon the whole matter put in issue upon the indict
ment o
r information, and should not be required or directed by
the court o
r judge before whom it should be tried to find the de
fendant guilty, merely on the proof o
f
the publication o
f
the
paper charged to b
e
a libel, and o
f
the sense ascribed to the same
in the indictment or information : Provided, that on every such
trial the court or judge before whom it should be tried should,
according to their discretion, give their opinion and direction to
the jury on the matter in issue, in like manner as in other crim
inal cases: Provided also, that nothing therein contained should
prevent the jury from finding a special verdict in their discretion,
a
s in other criminal cases: Provided also, that in case the jury
should find the defendant guilty, he might move in arrest o
f
judgment on such ground and in such manner as b
y
law he might
have done before the passing o
f
the act.
Whether this statute made the jury the rightful judges of the
law as well as o
f
the facts in libel cases, o
r whether, on the other
hand, it only placed these cases on the same footing as other
criminal prosecutions, leaving it the duty o
f
the jury to accept
and follow the instructions o
f
the judge upon the criminal char
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acter of the publication, are questions upon which there are still
differences of opinion. Its friends have placed' the former con
struction upon it
,
while others adopt the opposite view.”
In the United States the disposition of the early judges was to
adopt the view o
f
Lord Mansfield as a correct exposition o
f
the
respective functions o
f
court and jury in cases o
f libel; and on
the memorable trial o
f Callendar, which led to the impeachment
o
f Judge Chase, of the United States Supreme Court,
the right o
f
the *jury to judge of the law was the point [*463]
in dispute upon which that judge first delivered his opin
ion, and afterwards invited argument. The charge there was o
f
libel upon President Adams, and was prosecuted under the Sedi
tion Law, so called, which expressly provided that the jury should
have the right to determine the law and the fact, under the di
rection o
f
the court, as in other cases. The defence insisted that
the Sedition Law was unconstitutional and void, and proposed to
argue that question to the jury, but were stopped by the court.
The question o
f
the constitutionality o
f
a statute, it was said b
y
Judge Chase, was a judicial question, and could only be passed
upon b
y
the court; the jury might determine the law applicable
to the case under the statute, but they could not inquire into the
validity o
f
the statute by which that right was given.”
Whatever may be the true import o
f
Mr. Fox's Libel Act, it
would seem clear that a constitutional provision which allows the
jury to determine the law, refers the questions o
f
law to them for
their rightful decision. Wherever such provisions exist, the jury,
w
e think, are the judges o
f
the law ; and the argument o
f coun
sel upon it is rightfully addressed to both the court and the jury.
Nor can the distinction be maintained which was taken by Judge
Chase, and which forbids the jury considering questions affect
ing the constitutional validity o
f
statutes. When the question
before them is
,
what is the law o
f
the case, the highest and par
amount law of the case cannot be shut from view. Neverthe
less, we conceive it to be proper, and indeed the duty o
f
the
judge, to instruct the jury upon the law in these cases, and it is
to be expected that they will generally adopt and follow his
opinion.
* Compare Forsyth on Trial by Jury, c. 12, with May's Constitutional
History of England, c. 9.
* Wharton's State Trials, 688.
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Where, however, the constitution provides that they shall be
judges of the law “as in other cases,” or may determine the law
and the fact “under the direction of the court,” we must per
haps conclude that the intention has been simply to put libel
cases on the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions,'
* “By the last clause of the sixth
section of the eighth article of the
Constitution of this State, it is de
clared that, in all indictments for
libel, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts under
the direction of the court as in other
cases. It would seem from this that
the framers of our Bill of Rights did
not imagine that juries were rightfully
judges of the law and fact in criminal
cases, independently of the directions
of courts. Their right to judge of
the law is a right to be exercised only
under the direction of the courts; and
if they go aside from that direction
and determine the law incorrectly,
they depart from their duty, and
commit a public wrong; and this in
criminal as well as in civil cases.”
Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427.
See also State v. Allen, 1 McCord,
525; State v. Jay, 34 N. J. 368, 370.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania
declares that “in all indictments for
libels the jury shall have a right to
determine the law and the facts, un
der the direction of the court, as in
other cases.” In Pittock v. O’Neill,
63 Penn. St. 256; s. c. 3 Am. Rep.
544, Sharswood, J., says: “There
can be no doubt that both in criminal
and civil cases the court may express
to the jury their opinion as to whether
the publication is libellous. The
difference is that in criminal cases
they are not bound to do so, and if
they do, their opinion is not binding
on the jury, who may give a general
verdict in opposition to it; and if that
verdict is for the defendant, a new
trial cannot be granted against his
consent. As our declaration of rights
succinctly expresses it
,
the jury have
the right to determine the law and
the facts in indictments for libel as in
other cases. But in civil cases the
judge is bound to instruct the jury
a
s to whether the publication is li
bellous, supposing the innuendoes to
be true; and if that instruction is
disregarded, the verdict will be set
aside a
s contrary to law. In Eng
land, the courts have recently dis
regarded, to some extent, this plain
distinction between criminal and civil
proceedings. It appears to be upon
the ground that Mr. Fox's act,
though limited in terms to indict
ments and informations was declara
tory o
f
the law in a
ll
cases o
f libel;
upon what principle o
f construction,
however, it is not very easy to under
stand. It is there the approved
practice for the judge in civil actions,
after explaining to the jury the legal
definition o
f
a libel, to leave to them
the question whether the publication
upon which the action is founded
falls within that definition. Folkard’s
Stark. 202; Baylis v. Lawrence, 11
A. & E. 920; Parmiter v. Coupland,
6 M. & W. 105; Campbell v. Spottis
woode, 3 B
.
& S. 781; Cox v. Lee,
L. R. 4 Exch. 284. These cases
were followed in Shattuck v. Allen, 4
Gray, 540. Yet it is clearly held that
a verdict for the defendant upon that
issue will be set aside, and a new trial
granted. Hakewell v. Ingram, 28
Eng. Law & Eq. 413. ‘Though in
criminal proceedings for libel,” says
Jarvis, Ch. J., “there may be no
review, in civil matters there are
cases in which verdicts for the de
fendant are set aside upon the ground
that the matter was a libel, though
the jury have found it was not.’ This
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and that the jury will be expected to receive the law from the
court.
* “Good Motives and Justifiable Ends.” [*464]
In civil suits to recover damages for slander or libel, the truth
is generally a complete defence, if pleaded and established." In
criminal prosecutions it was formerly not so. The basis of the
prosecution being that the libel was likely to disturb the peace
and order of society, that liability was supposed to be all the
greater if the injurious charges were true, as a man would be
more likely to commit a breach of the peace when the matters
alleged against him were true than if they were false, in which
latter case he might, perhaps, afford to treat them with contempt.
Hence arose the common maxim, “The greater the truth, the
greater the libel,” which subjected the law on this subject to a
great deal of ridicule and contempt. The constitutional provi
sions we have quoted generally make the truth a defence if pub
lished with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely
what showing shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion
must be settled by future decisions. In one case the suggestion
was thrown out that proof of the truth of the charge alone
might be sufficient,” but this was not an authoritative decision,
must be conceded to be an anomaly;
and it will be best to avoid a practice
which leads to such a result. The
law, indeed, may be considered as
settled in this State by long practice,
never questioned, but incidentally
confirmed in McConkle v. Binns,
5 Binn. 340, and Hays v. Brierly, 4
Watts, 392. It was held in the case
last cited that where words of a du
bious import are used, the plaintiff
has a right to aver their meaning by
innuendo, and the truth of such innu
endo is for the jury. In New York,
since the recent English cases, the
question has been ably discussed and
fully considered in Snyder v. An
drews, 6 Barb. 43; Green v. Telfair,
20 Barb. 11; Hunt v. Bennett, 19
N. Y. 173; and the law established
on its old foundations.”
1 Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76.
See ante, p. *455.
* Charge of Judge Betts to the
jury in King v. Root, 4 Wend. 121:
“Should the scope of proofs and
circumstances lead you to suppose
the defendants had no good end in
contemplation, that they were insti
gated to these charges solely to
avenge personal and political resent
ments against the plaintiff, still, if
they have satisfactorily shown the
charges to be true, they must be ac
quitted of a
ll liability to damage in
a private action on account o
f
the
publication. Indeed, if good motives
and justifiable ends must be shown,
they might well be implied from the
establishment o
f
the truth o
f
a charge,
for the like reason that malice is in
ferred from its falsity.” Malice, it is
37
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and it could not be true in any case where the matter published
was not fi
t
to b
e spread before the public, whether true or false.
It must be held, we think, that where the defendant justifies in a
criminal prosecution, the burden is upon him to prove, not only
the truth o
f
the charge, but also the “good motives and justifi
able ends" of the publication. These might appear from the
very character o
f
the publication itself, if it was true ; as where
it exhibited the misconduct or unfitness of a candidate
[*465] for public office; but where it related to a * person in
private life, and who was himself taking no such action
a
s should put his character in issue before the public, some fur
ther showing would generally be requisite after the truth had
been proved."
said b
y
Abbott, Ch. J., is alleged in
the declaration “rather to exclude
the supposition that the publication
may have made on some innocent
occasion than for any other purpose.”
Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B
.
& C
.
556,
585. See Moore v. Stephenson, 27
Conn. 14.
* In Commonwealth v. Bonner,
9 Met. 410, the defendant was in
dicted for a libel on one Oliver
Brown, in the following words:
“However, there were few who, ac
cording to the old toper's dictionary,
were drunk; yea, in all conscience,
drunk as a drunken man; and who
and which o
f you desperadoes o
f
the
town got them so? Was it . you
whose groggery was open, and the
rat soup measured out a
t your bar to
drunkards, while a daughter lay a
corpse in your house, and even on the
day she was laid in her cold and
silent grave, a victim o
f
God’s chas
tening rod upon your guilty drunk
ard-manufacturing head P Was it you
who refused to close your drunkery
on the day that your aged father was
laid in the narrow house appointed
for all the living, and which must ere
long receive your recreant carcass?
We ask again, Was it you? Was it
you?” On the trial the defendant
introduced evidence to prove, and
contended that he did prove, all the
facts alleged in his publication. The
court charged the jury that the bur
den was upon the defendant to show
that the matter charged to be libellous
was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends; that malice is
the wilful doing of an unlawful act,
and does not necessarily imply per
sonal ill-will towards the person li
belled. The defendant excepted to
the ruling o
f
the court as applied to
the facts proved, contending that,
having proved the truth o
f
all the
facts alleged in the libel, and the pub
lication being in reference to an illegal
traffic, a public nuisance, the jury
should have been instructed that it
was incumbent on the government to
show that defendant’s motives were
malicious, in the popular sense o
f
the
word, as respects said Brown. By
the court, Shaw, Ch. J.: “The court
are o
f opinion that the charge o
f
the
judge o
f
the Common Pleas was
strictly correct. If the publication
be libellous, that is, be such as to
bring the person libelled into hatred,
contempt, and ridicule amongst the
people, malice is presumed from the
injurious act. But by Rev. Stat. c.
133, § 6
,
in every prosecution for
writing o
r publishing a libel, the de
fendant may give in evidence, in his
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defence upon the trial, the truth of
the matter contained in the publica
tion charged as libellous: provided,
that such evidence shall not be deemed
a sufficient justification, unless it shall
be further made to appear, on the
trial, that the matter charged to be
libellous was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends.’
Nothing can be more explicit. The
judge, therefore, was right in direct
ing the jury that, after the publica
tion had been shown to have been
made by the defendant, and to be li
bellous and malicious, the burden was
on the defendant, not only to prove
the truth of the matter charged as
libellous, but likewise that it was
published with good motives and for
justifiable ends. We are also satis
fied that the judge was right in his
description or definition of legal
malice, that it is not malice in its
popular sense; viz., that of hatred
and ill-will to the party libelled, but
an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and
in violation of the just rights of
another.” And yet it would seem as
if
,
conceding the facts published to
b
e true, the jury ought to have found
the occasion a proper one for cor
recting such indecent conduct by pub
lic exposure. See further on this
subject, Regina v. Newman, 1 El.
& Bl. 268 and 558; s. c. 18 Eng. L.
& Eq. 113; Barthelemy v. People,
2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired.
180; State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34;
Cole v. Wilson, 18 B
.
Monr. 217;
Hagan v. Hendry, 18 Md. 191; Brad
ley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Snyder v.
Fulton, 34 Md. 128; Commonwealth
v
. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337. The fact
that the publication is copied from
another source is clearly no protec
tion, if it is not true in fact. Regina
v
. Newman, ubi sup. Compare Saun
ders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Creevy v.
Carr, 7 C
.
& P
.
64. Neither are the
motives o
r good character o
f
the de
fendant, if he has published libellous
matter which is false. Barthelemy
v
. People, 2 Hill, 248; Commonwealth
v
. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337; Wilson v.
Noonan, 27 Wis. 610. Where the
truth is relied upon as a defence, the
charge should appear to be true as
made. Whittemore v. Weiss, 33
Mich. 348; Palmer v. Smith, 21
Mich. 419.
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[*467] • * CHAPTER XIII.
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.
A CAREFUL examination of the American constitutions will
disclose the fact that nothing is more fully set forth or more
plainly expressed than the determination of their authors to pre
serve and perpetuate religious liberty, and to guard against the
slightest approach towards the establishment of an inequality in the
civil and political rights of citizens, which shall have for it
s
basis
only their differences o
f religious belief. The American people
came to the work o
f framing their fundamental laws after centuries
o
f religious oppression and persecution, sometimes by one party o
r
sect and sometimes b
y another, had taught them the utter futility
o
f
a
ll attempts to propagate religious opinions b
y
the rewards,
penalties, o
r
terrors o
f
human laws. They could not fail to per
ceive, also, that a union o
f
Church and State, like that which
existed in England, if not wholly impracticable in America, was
certainly opposed to the spirit o
f
our institutions, and that any
domineering o
f
one sect over another was repressing to the ener
gies o
f
the people, and must necessarily tend to discontent and
disorder. Whatever, therefore, may have been their individual
sentiments upon religious questions, or upon the propriety o
f
the
State assuming supervision and control o
f religious affairs under
other circumstances, the general voice has been, that persons of
every religious persuasion should be made equal before the law,
and that questions o
f religious belief and religious worship should
b
e questions between each individual man and his Maker. Of
these questions human tribunals, so long as the public order is not
disturbed, are not to take cognizance, except as the individual, b
y
his voluntary action in associating himself with a religious organiza
tion, may have conferred upon such organization a jurisdiction over
him in ecclesiastical matters." These constitutions, therefore,
* The religious societies which ex- societies, having little resemblance to
ist in America are mere voluntary those which constitute a part o
f
the
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have not established religious toleration merely, but religious
equality; in that particular being far in advance not only of the
machinery of government in England.
They are for the most part formed
under general laws, which permit the
voluntary incorporation of attendants
upon religious worship, with power
in the corporation to hold real and
personal estate for the purposes of
their organization, but not for other
purposes. Such a society is “a vol
untary association of individuals or
families, united for the purpose of
having a common place of worship,
and to provide a proper teacher to
instruct them in religious doctrines
and duties, and to administer the or
dinances of baptism, &c. Although
a church or body of professing Chris
tians is almost uniformly connected
with such a society or congregation,
the members of the church have no
other or greater rights than any other
members of the society who statedly
attend with them for the purposes of
divine worship. Over the church, as
such, the legal or temporal tribunals
of the State do not profess to have
any jurisdiction whatever, except so
far as is necessary to protect the civil
rights of others, and to preserve the
public peace. All questions relating
to the faith and practice of the church
and its members belong to the church
judicatories, to which they have vol
untarily subjected themselves. But,
as a general principle, those ecclesias
tical judicatories cannot interfere with
the temporal concerns of the congre
gation or society with which the
church or the members thereof are
connected.” Walworth, Chancellor,
in Baptist Church v. Wetherell, 3
Paige, 301. See Ferraria v. Vascon
cellos, 31 Ill. 25; Lawyer v. Clipper
ly, 7 Paige, 281 ; Shannon v. Frost,
3 B. Monr. 258; German, &c., Cong.
v. Pressler, 17 La. Ann. 127; Sohier
v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1. Such
a corporation is not an ecclesiastical,
but merely a private civil corporation,
the members of the society being the
corporators, and the trustees the
managing officers, with such powers
as the statute confers, and the ordi
nary discretionary powers of officers
in civil corporations. Robertson v.
Bullions, 11 N. Y. 249; Miller v.
Gable, 2 Denio, 492. Compare Wat
son v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679. The
church connected with the society, if
any there be, is not recognized in the
law as a distinct entity; the corpora
tors in the society are not necessarily
members thereof, and the society may
change its government, faith, form of
worship, discipline, and ecclesiastical
relations at will, subject only to the
restraints imposed by their articles of
association, and to the general laws
of the State. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6
Ohio, 363; Robertson v. Bullions, 11
N. Y. 249; Parish of Bellport v.
Tooker, 29 Barb. 256; same case,
21 N. Y. 267: Burrel v. Associated
Reform Church, 44 Barb. 282. The
courts of the State have no general
jurisdiction and control over the offi
cers of such corporations in respect
to the performance of their official
duties ; but as in respect to the prop
erty which they hold for the corpora
tion they stand in position of trustees,
the courts may exercise the same su
pervision as in other cases of trust.
Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 25;
Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; Watson
v. Avery, 2 Bush, 322; Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Hale v. Everett,
53 N. H. 9. But the courts will in
terfere where abuse of trust is alleged
only in clear cases, especially if the
abuse alleged be a departure from the
tenets of the founders of a charity.
Happy v. Morton, 33 Ill. 398. See
Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9. The
articles of association will determine
who may vote when the State law
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mother country, but also of much of the colonial legislation,
which, though more liberal than that of other civilized countries,
nevertheless exhibited features of discrimination based upon re
ligious beliefs or professions."
does not prescribe qualifications.
State v. Crowell, 4 Halst. 390.
Should there be a disruption of the
society, the title to the property will
remain with that part of it which is
acting in harmony with its own law;
seceders will be entitled to no part of
it
.
McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Penn.
St. 9
;
M. E
.
Church v. Wood, 5
Ohio, 286; Keyser v. Stansifer, 6
Ohio, 363; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B
.
Monr. 253; Gibson v. Armstrong,
7 B
.
Monr. 281; Hadden v. Chorn,
8 B
.
Monr. 70; Ferraria v. Vascon
cellos, 23 Ill. 456. And this even
though there may have been a change
in doctrine on the part of the con
trolling majority. Keyser v. Stan
sifer, 6 Ohio, 363. See Petty v.
Tooker, .21 N. Y. 267; Horton v.
Baptist Church, 34 Vt. 309; Eggles
ton v. Doolittle, 33 Conn. 396; Miller
v
. English, 21 N
. J. 317; Niccolls v.
Rugg, 47 Ill. 47; Kinkead v. McKee,
9 Bush, 535. Peculiar rights some
times arise on a division o
f
a society;
a
s to which we can only refer to Re
formed Church v. Schoolcraft, 65
N. Y. 134; Kinkead v. McKee, 9
Bush, 535; Niccolls v. Rugg, 47 Ill.
47; Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How.
288. The administration of church
rules o
r discipline the courts o
f
the
State do not interfere with, unless
civil rights become involved, and then
only for the protection of such rights.
Hendrickson v. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577;
Harmon v. Dreher, 2 Speers Eq. 87;
Dieffendorf v. Ref. Cal. Church, 20
Johns. 12; Johns Island Church, 2
Rich. Eq. 215; Den v. Bolton, 12
N. J. 206; Baptist Church v. Wether
ell, 3 Paige, 301; German Reformed
Church v. Seibert, 3 Penn. St. 291;
Watson v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183; Mc
Ginnis v. Watson, 41 Penn. St. 21;
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Chase
v
. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509; Gartin v. Pen
ick, 5 Bush, 110; Lucas v. Case, 9
Bush, 297; People v. German, &c.
Church, 53 N. Y. 103; Grosvenor v.
United Society, 118 Mass. 78. But an
excommunication will not be allowed
to affect civil rights. Fitzgerald v.
Robinson, 112 Mass. 371.
1 For the distinction between re
ligious toleration and religious equal
ity, see Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio
St. 390; Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H
.
1
.
And see Madison's views, in his Life
by Rives, Vol. I. p
.
140. It was not
easy, two centuries ago, to make men
educated in the ideas o
f
those days
understand how there could be com
plete religious liberty, and a
t
the
same time order and due subordina
tion to authority in the State.
“Coleridge said that toleration was
impossible until indifference made it
worthless.” Lowell, “Among my
Books,” 336. Roger Williams ex
plained and defended his own views,
and illustrated the subject thus:
“There goes many a ship to sea, with
many hundred souls in one ship, whose
weal and woe is common, and is a
true picture o
f
a commonwealth, o
r
human combination or society. It hath
fallen out sometimes that both Papists
and Protestants, Jews and Turks,
may be embarked in one ship; upon
which supposal I affirm that all the
liberty o
f
conscience I ever pleaded
for turns upon these two hinges:
that none o
f
the Papists, Protestants,
Jews, or Turks be forced to come to
the ship's prayers o
r worship if they
practice any. I further add that I
never denied that, notwithstanding
this liberty, the commander o
f
this
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* Considerable differences will appear in the provisions [*468]
in the State constitutions on the general subject of the
present chapter; some of them being confined to declarations and
prohibitions whose purpose is to secure the most perfect equality
before the law of all shades of religious belief, while some ex
hibit a jealousy of ecclesiastical authority by making persons who
exercise the functions of clergyman, priest, or teacher of any
religious persuasion, society, or sect, ineligible to civil office; "
and still others show some traces of the old notion, that truth
and a sense of duty do not consort with scepticism in religion.”
ship ought to command the ship's
course, yea, and also command that
justice, peace, and sobriety be kept
and practised, both among the sea
men and all the passengers. If any
of the seamen refuse to perform their
service, or passengers to pay their
freight; if any refuse to help, in per
son or purse, towards the common
charges or defence; if any refuse to
obey the common laws and orders of
the ship, concerning their common
peace and preservation; if any shall
mutiny and rise up against their com
manders and officers; if any should
preach or write that there ought to
be no commanders or officers, because
all are equal in Christ, therefore no
masters nor officers, no laws nor or
ders, no corrections nor punishments;
I say I never denied but in such cases,
whatever is pretended, the commander
or commanders may judge, resist,
compel, and punish such transgres
sors according to their deserts and
merits.” Arnold's History of Rhode
Island, Vol. I. p. 254, citing Knowles,
279, 280.
* There are provisions to this
effect, more or less broad, in the
Constitutions of Tennessee, Louisi
ana, Delaware, Maryland, and Ken
tucky.
* The Constitution of Pennsyl
vania provides “that no person who
acknowledges the being of God, and
a future state of rewards and punish
ments, shall, on account of his relig
ious sentiments, be disqualified to
hold any office or place of trust or
profit under this commonwealth.”
Art. 1, § 4. — The Constitution of
North Carolina: “The following
classes of persons shall be disqualified
for office : First. All persons who
shall deny the existence of Almighty
God,” &c. Art. 6, § 5. — The Con
stitutions of Mississippi and South
Carolina: “No person who denies
the existence of the Supreme Being
shall hold any office under this Con
stitution.” — The Constitution of
Tennessee : “No person who denies
the being of a God, or of a future
state of rewards and punishments,
shall hold any office in the civil de
partment of this State.” — On the
other hand, the Constitutions of
Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, West
Virginia, Maine, Delaware, Indiana,
Iowa, Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey,
Nebraska, Minnesota, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, Mis
souri, Rhode Island, Nevada, and
Wisconsin expressly forbid religious
tests as a qualification for office or
public trust. Very inconsistently the
Constitutions of Mississippi and Ten
nessee contain a similar prohibition.
Art. 12, § 3. – In the Constitutions of
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jer
sey, Rhode Island, and West Virginia,
it is provided that no person shall be
denied any civil or political right,
privilege, or capacity on account of
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[*469] There are exceptional * clauses, however, though not
many in number ; and it is believed that, where they
exist, they are not often made use of to deprive any person of the
civil or political rights or privileges which are placed by law within
the reach of his fellows.
Those things which are not lawful under any of the American
constitutions may be stated thus : —
1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. The
legislatures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of
Church and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of
any one religious persuasion or mode of worship. There is not
complete religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the
State and given an advantage by law over other sects." What
ever establishes a distinction against one class or sect is
,
to the
extent to which the distinction operates unfavorably, a persecu
tion ; and if based on religious grounds, a religious persecution.
The extent o
f
the discrimination is not material to the principle;
it is enough that it creates an inequality of right or privilege.
2
. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, o
f religious
instruction. Not only is no one denomination to be favored at
the expense o
f
the rest, but all support o
f religious instruction
must be entirely voluntary.
ernment to coerce it.”
his religious opinions. – The Consti
tution o
f Maryland provides “that
no religious test ought ever to be re
quired as a qualification for any office
o
f
trust o
r profit in this State, other
than a declaration of belief in the
existence o
f God; nor shall the
legislature prescribe any other oath
o
f
office than the oath prescribed by
this constitution.” Declaration of
Rights, Art. 37. — The Constitution
o
f
Illinois provides that “the free ex
ercise and enjoyment o
f religious pro
fession and worship without discrimi
nation shall for ever be guaranteed;
and n
o person shall be denied any
civil o
r political right, privilege, o
r
capacity, on account o
f
his religious
opinions; but the liberty o
f
con
science hereby secured shall not be
construed to dispense with oaths o
r
affirmations, excuse acts o
f licentious
It is not within the sphere of gov
ness, o
r justify practices inconsistent
with the peace o
r safety o
f
the State.
No person shall be required to attend
o
r support any ministry o
r place o
f
worship against his consent, nor shall
any preference be given b
y
law to any
religious denomination o
r
mode o
f
worship.” Art. 2
,
§ 3. — The Con
stitutions o
f California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illi
nois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missis
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York,
and South Carolina contain pro
visions that liberty o
f
conscience is
not to justify licentiousness o
r prac
tices inconsistent with the peace and
moral safety o
f society.
1 A city ordinance is void which
gives to one sect a privilege denied to
others. Shreveport r. Levy, 26 La.
Ann. 671.
* We must exempt from this the
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3. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship. Whoever
is not led by choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordi
nances of religion is not to be compelled to do so by the State.
It is the province of the State to enforce, so far as it may be
found practicable, the obligations and duties which the citizen
may be under or may owe to his fellow-citizen or to society; but
those which spring from the relations between himself and his
Maker are to be enforced by the admonitions of the conscience,
and not by the penalties of human laws. Indeed, as all real
worship must essentially and necessarily consist in the free-will
offering of adoration and gratitude by the creature to the Cre
ator, human laws are obviously inadequate to incite or compel
those internal and voluntary emotions which shall induce it
,
and
human penalties a
t
most could only enforce the observance o
f
idle ceremonies, which, when unwillingly performed, are alike
valueless to the participants and devoid o
f
all the elements o
f
true worship.
4
.
Restraints upon the free exercise o
f religion according to
the dictates o
f
the conscience. No external authority is
to place itself "between the finite being and the Infinite [*470]
when the former is seeking to render the homage that is
due, and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and
judgment as being suitable for him to render and acceptable to
its object.
5
. Restraints upon the expression o
f religious belief. An
earnest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate hi
s
opinions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of
this right is to take from him the power to perform what he con
siders a most sacred obligation. -
These are the prohibitions which in some form o
f
words are to
be found in the American constitutions, and which secure free
State o
f
New Hampshire, whose con
stitution permits the legislature to
authorize “the several towns, par
1
,
Art. 6. As to meaning of Protes
tant, see Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 1.
The attempt to amend the above pro
ishes, bodies corporate, o
r religious
societies within this State to make
adequate provisions, at their own ex
pense, for the support and mainten
ance o
f public Protestant teachers o
f
piety, religion, and morality; ” but
not to tax those of other sects or de
nominations for their support. Part
vision b
y striking out the word “Prot
estant ’’ was made in 1876, but failed,
though a
t
the same time the accept
ance o
f
the Protestant religion as a
test for office was abolished, and the
application o
f moneys raised b
y
taxa
tion to the support o
f
denominational
schools was prohibited.
586 [CH. x:III.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
dom of conscience and of religious worship. No man in relig
ious matters is to be subjected to the censorship of the State or of
any public authority; and the State is not to inquire into or take
notice of religious belief, when the citizen performs his duty to
the State and to his fellows, and is guilty of no breach of public
morals or public decorum.”
* This whole subject was consid
ered very largely in the case of Minor
v. The Board of Education. in the
Superior Court of Cincinnati, involv
ing the right of the school board of
that city to exclude the reading of
the Bible from the public schools.
The case was reported and published
by Robert Clarke and Co., Cincinnati,
under the title, “The Bible in the
Public Schools,” 1870. The point of
the case may be briefly stated. The
constitution of the State, after vari
ous provisions for the protection of
religious liberty, contained this clause:
“Religion, morality, and knowledge,
however, being essential to good gov
ernment, it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to pass suitable
laws to protect every religious de
nomination in the peaceable enjoy
ment of its own mode of public
worship, and to encourage schools and
the means of instruction.” There
being no legislation on the subject,
except such as conferred large dis
cretionary power on the Board of
Education in the management of
schools, that body passed a resolu
tion, “that religious instruction and
the reading of religious books, in
cluding the Holy Bible, are prohibited
in the Common Schools of Cincinnati;
it being the true object and intent of
this rule to allow the children of the
parents of all sects and opinions, in
matters of faith and worship, to enjoy
alike the benefit of the Common
School fund.” Certain taxpayers
and citizens of said city, on the pre
tence that this action was against
public policy and morality, and in
violation of the spirit and intent of
the provision in the constitution which
has been quoted, filed their complaint
in the Superior Court, praying that
the board be enjoined from enforcing
said resolution. The Superior Court
(Judge Taft dissenting) made an
order granting the prayer of the com
plaint: but the Supreme Court, on
appeal, reversed it
,
holding that the
provision in the constitution requiring
the passage o
f
suitable laws to en
courage morality and religion was
one addressed solely to the judgment
and discretion o
f
the legislative de
partment; and that, in the absence
o
f any legislation on the subject, the
Board of Education could not be
compelled to permit the reading o
f
the Bible in the schools. Board of
Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio, N
.
s.
211. On the other hand, it has been
decided that the school authorities, in
their discretion, may compel the read
ing o
f
the Bible in schools b
y
pupils,
even though it be against the objec
tion and protest o
f
their parents.
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376;
Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen, 127.
* Congress is forbidden, by the
first amendment to the Constitution
o
f
the United States, from making
any law respecting an establishment
o
f religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. Mr. Story says o
f
this provision: “It was under a sol
emn consciousness o
f
the dangers
from ecclesiastical ambition, the
bigotry o
f spiritual pride, and the
intolerance o
f sects, exemplified in
our domestic, as well as in foreign
annals, that it was deemed advisable
to exclude from the national govern
ment a
ll power to act upon the sub
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But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend relig
ious freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain
no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn
recognition o
f
a superintending Providence in public transac
tions and exercises as the general religious sentiment o
f
mankind
inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite and
dependent beings. Whatever may be the shades * o
f [*471]
religious belief, al
l
must acknowledge the fitness o
f rec
ognizing in important human affairs the superintending care and
control o
f
the great Governor o
f
the Universe, and o
f acknowl
edging with thanksgiving his boundless favors, or bowing in con
trition when visited with the penalties o
f
his broken laws. No
principle o
f
constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving o
r
fast days are appointed ; when chaplains are designated for the
army and navy; when legislative sessions are opened with prayer
o
r
the reading o
f
the Scriptures, o
r
when religious teaching is
encouraged b
y
a general exemption o
f
the houses o
f religious
worship from taxation for the support o
f
State government.
Undoubtedly the spirit o
f
the constitution will require, in all
these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrimination in favor o
f
o
r against any one religious denomination or sect; but the power
to d
o any o
f
these things does not become unconstitutional
simply because o
f
it
s susceptibility to abuse. This public recog
nition o
f religious worship, however, is not based entirely, per
haps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to the Supreme
ject. The situation, too, of the imperfect security, if it had not been
different States equally proclaimed
the policy as well as the necessity o
f
such an exclusion. In some of the
States, Episcopalians constituted the
predominant sect; in others, Presby
terians; in others, Congregationalists;
in others, Quakers; and in others
again there was a close numerical
rivalry among contending sects. It
was impossible that there should not
arise perpetual strife and perpetual
jealousy on the subject o
f
ecclesiasti
cal ascendency, if the national gov
ernment were left free to create a
religious establishment. The only
security was in extirpating the power.
But this alone would have been an
followed up b
y
a declaration o
f
the
right o
f
the free exercise o
f religion,
and a prohibition (as we have seen)
o
f
all religious tests. Thus, the
whole power over the subject o
f
religion is left exclusively to the State
governments, to be acted upon ac
cording to their own sense o
f justice
and the State constitutions; and the
Catholic and the Protestant, the Cal
vinist and the Arminian, the Jew and
the infidel, may sit down at the com
mon table o
f
the national councils,
without any inquisition into their
faith o
r
mode o
f worship.” Story on
the Constitution, § 1879.
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Being himself as the author of all good and of all law; but the
same reasons of State policy which induce the government to aid
institutions of charity and seminaries of instruction, will incline
it also to foster religious worship and religious institutions, as
conservators of the public morals, and valuable, if not indispen
sable, assistants in the preservation of the public order.
Nor, while recognizing a superintending Providence, are we
always precluded from recognizing also, in the rules prescribed
for the conduct of the citizen, the notorious fact that the pre
vailing religion in the States is Christian. Some acts would be
offensive to public sentiment in a Christian community, and would
tend to public disorder, which in a Mahometan or Pagan country
might be passed by without notice, or even be regarded as meri
torious; just as some things would be considered indecent, and
worthy of reprobation and punishment as such, in one state of
society which in another would be in accord with the prevailing
customs, and therefore defended and protected by the laws. The
criminal laws of every country are shaped in greater or less de
gree by the prevailing public sentiment as to what is right, proper,
and decorous, or the reverse; and they punish those acts as crimes
which disturb the peace and order, or tend to shock the moral
sense or sense of propriety and decency, of the community. The
moral sense is largely regulated and controlled by the religious
belief; and therefore it is that those things which, estimated by
a Christian standard, are profane and blasphemous, are properly
punished as crimes against society, since they are offensive in the
highest degree to the general public sense, and have a direct ten
dency to undermine the moral support of the laws, and to corrupt
the community.
[*472] * It is frequently said that Christianity is a part of the
law of the land. In a certain sense and for certain pur
poses this is true. The best features of the common law, and
especially those which regard the family and social relations;
which compel the parent to support the child, the husband to
support the wife ; which make the marriage-tie permanent and
forbid polygamy, - if not derived from, have at least been im
proved and strengthened by, the prevailing religion and the
teachings of it
s
sacred Book. But the law does not attempt to
enforce the precepts o
f Christianity on the ground o
f
their sacred
character o
r divine origin. Some o
f
those precepts, though we
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may admit their continual and universal obligation, we must
nevertheless recognize as being incapable of enforcement by hu
man laws. ) That standard of morality which requires one to love
his neighbor as himself we must admit is too elevated to be ac
cepted by human tribunals as the proper test by which to judge
the conduct of the citizen; and one could hardly be held respon
sible to the criminal laws if in goodness of heart and spontaneous
charity he fell something short of the Good Samaritan. The pre
cepts of Christianity, moreover, affect the heart, and address
themselves to the conscience ; while the laws of the State can
regard the outward conduct only: and for these several reasons
Christianity is not a part of the law of the land in any sense
which entitles the courts to take notice of and base their judg
ments upon it
,
except so far as they can find that it
s precepts and
principles have been incorporated in and made a component part
o
f
the positive law o
f
the State."
Mr. Justice Story has said in the Girard Will case that, although
Christianity is a part o
f
the common law o
f
the State, it is only
so in this qualified sense, that it
s
divine origin and truth are ad
mitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled
and blasphemed against, to the annoyance o
f
believers o
r
to the
injury o
f
the public.” It may be doubted, however, if the pun
ishment o
f blasphemy is based necessarily upon an admission o
f
the divine origin or truth o
f
the Christian religion, or incapable
o
f being otherwise justified. .
-
Blasphemy has been defined as consisting in speaking evil o
f
the Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine
majesty, and to alienate the minds o
f
others from the love and
reverence o
f
God. It is purposely using words concerning the
Supreme Being calculated and designed to impair and destroy
the reverence, respect, and confidence due t
o him, as the intelli
gent Creator, Governor, and Judge o
f
the world. It embraces
the idea o
f
detraction as regards the character and attributes o
f
* Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf.
182; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3
Sandf. 377; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr.
555; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N
.
s.
387; Board o
f
Education v. Minor,
23 Ohio, N
.
s. 210. The subject is
largely considered in Hale v. Everett,
5
3 N. H. 1
,
204 et seq., and also by
Dr. S. T
. Spear in his book entitled
“Religion and the State.” -
* Vidal v. Girard's Ex’rs, 2 How. ,
198. Mr. Webster's argument that
Christianity is a part o
f
the law o
f
Pennsylvania is given in 6 Webster's
Works, p. 175.
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God, as calumny usually carries the same idea when applied to an
individual. It is a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen men's
reverence of God, by denying his existence or his attributes as an
intelligent Creator, Governor, and Judge of men, and to
[*473] prevent their having confidence in him as such.' * Con
tumelious reproaches and profane ridicule of Christ or
of the Holy Scriptures have the same evil effect in sapping the
foundations of society and of public order, and are classed under
the same head.” -
In an early case where a prosecution for blasphemy came before
Lord Hale, he is reported to have said: “Such kind of wicked,
blasphemous words are not only an offence to God and religion,
but a crime against the laws, State, and government, and there
fore punishable in the Court of King's Bench. For to say relig- .
ion is a cheat, is to subvert a
ll
those obligations whereby civil
society is preserved ; that Christianity is a part o
f
the laws o
f
England, and to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in .
subversion o
f
the law.” ” Eminent judges in this country have
adopted this language, and applied it to prosecutions for blas
phemy, where the charge consisted in malicious ridicule o
f
the
Author and Founder o
f
the Christian religion. The early cases
in New York and Massachusetts * are particularly marked b
y
clearness and precision on this point, and Mr. Justice Clayton, of
Delaware, has also adopted and followed the ruling o
f
Lord Chief
Justice Hale, with such explanations o
f
the true basis and justifi
cation o
f
these prosecutions as to give us a clear understanding
o
f
the maxim that Christianity is a part o
f
the law o
f
the land,
* Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth was convicted of publishing libels,
v
. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 213.
* People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290;
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
213; Updegraph v. Commonwealth,
1
1 S
.
& R
.
394; State v. Chandler,
2 Harr. 553; Rex v. Waddington, 1
B
.
& C
. 26; Rex v. Carlile, 3 B
.
&
Ald. 161 ; Cowan v. Milbourn, Law
R. 2 Exch. 230.
* The King r. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607,
Vent. 293. See also The King v.
Woolaston, 2 Stra. 844, Fitzg. 64,
Raym. 162, in which the defendant
ridiculing the miracles o
f Christ, his
life and conversation. Lord Ch. J.
Raymond in that case says: “I would
have it taken notice of, that we do
not meddle with the difference of
opinion, and that we interfere only
where the root o
f Christianity is
struck at.”
* People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 291;
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
203. See also Zersweiss v. James,
6
3 Penn. St. 465, 471; McGinnis v.
Watson, 41 Penn. St. 9
,
14.
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as understood and applied by the courts in these cases."
Taken with the explanation * given, there is nothing in [*474]
the maxim of which the believer in any creed, or the dis
believer of all, can justly complain. The language which the
Christian regards as blasphemous, no man in sound mind can feel
under a sense of duty to make use of under any circumstances,
and no person is therefore deprived of a right when he is prohib
ited, under penalties, from uttering it
.
But it does not follow, because blasphemy is punishable as a
crime, that therefore one is not at liberty to dispute and argue
against the truth o
f
the Christian religion, o
r
o
f any accepted
dogma. Its “divine origin and truth '' are not so far admitted in
the law as to preclude their being controverted. To forbid dis
cussion on this subject, except b
y
the various sects o
f believers,
would be to abridge the liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in a
point which, with many, would be regarded as most important o
f
all. Blasphemy implies something more than a denial o
f any o
f
the truths o
f religion, even o
f
the highest and most vital. A bad
motive must exist; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt
to lessen men's reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted relig
ion. But outside o
f
such wilful and malicious attempt, there is
a broad field for candid investigation and discussion, which is as
much open to the Jew and the Mahometan as to the professors of
the Christian faith. “No author or printer who fairly and con
scientiously promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is
1 State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555.
The case is very full, clear, and in
structive, and cites all the English
and American authorities.
clusion a
t
which it arrives is, that
“Christianity was never considered
a part o
f
the common law, so far as
that for a violation of it
s injunctions
independent o
f
the established laws
o
f man, and without the sanction of
any positive act o
f
Parliament made
to enforce those injunctions, any man
could be drawn to answer in a com
mon-law court. It was a part of the
common law, “so far that any person
reviling, subverting, o
r ridiculing it
might be prosecuted a
t
common law,”
a
s Lord Mansfield has declared; be
cause, in the judgment o
f
our English
The con
ancestors and their judicial tribunals,
he who reviled, subverted, or ridiculed
Christianity, did an act which struck
a
t
the foundation o
f
our civil society,
and tended by its necessary conse
quences to disturb that common peace
o
f
the land o
f
which (as Lord Coke
had reported) the common law was .
the preserver. The common law . . .
adapted itself to the religion o
f
the
country just so far as was necessary
for the peace and safety o
f
civil in
stitutions; but it took cognizance o
f
offences against God only, when, by
their inevitable effects, they became
offences against man and his temporal
security.” See, also, what is said on
this subject b
y
Duer, J., in Andrew
v
. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182.
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impressed, for the benefit of others, is answerable as a criminal.
A malicious and mischievous intention is
,
in such a case, the broad
boundary between right and wrong; it is to be collected from the
offensive levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language, and other
circumstances, whether the act o
f
the party was malicious.” "
Legal blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wan
ton manner, “with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not
in a serious discussion upon any controverted point in religion.” "
The courts have always been careful, in administering the law,
to say that they did not intend to include in blasphemy disputes
between learned men upon particular controverted points.”
[*475] The constitutional * provisions for the protection of relig
ious liberty not only include within their protecting power
a
ll
sentiments and professions concerning o
r upon the subject o
f
religion, but they guarantee to every one a perfect right to form
and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religious
matters, and in relation to the existence, power, attributes, and
providence o
f
a Supreme Being as to himself shall seem reason
able and correct. In doing this he acts under an awful responsi
bility, but it is not to any human tribunal.”
* Updegraph v. Commonwealth,
1
1 S
. & R
.
394. In Ayres v. Metho
dist Church, 3 Sandf. 377, Duer, J.,
in speaking o
f “pious uses,” says:
“If the Presbyterian and the Baptist,
the Methodist and the Protestant
Episcopalian, must each be allowed
to devote the entire income of his
real and personal estate, for ever, to
the support o
f missions, o
r
the
spreading o
f
the Bible, so must the
Roman Catholic his to the endow
ment o
f
a monastery, o
r
the founding
o
f
a perpetual mass for the safety o
f
his soul; the Jew his to the transla
tion and publication o
f
the Mishna o
r
the Talmud, and the Mahometan (if
in that colluvies gentium to which this
city [New York], like ancient Rome,
seems to be doomed, such shall be
among us), the Mahometan his to
the assistance or relief of the annual
pilgrims to Mecca.”
* People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293,
per Kent, Ch. J.
* Rex v. Woolaston, Stra. 834;
Fitzg. 64; People v. Ruggles, 8
Johns. 293, per Kent, Ch. J
* Per Shaw, Ch. J., in Common
wealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 234.
The language of the courts has per
haps not always been as guarded as
it should have been on this subject.
In The King v. Waddington, 1 B
.
&
C
.
26, the defendant was on trial for
blasphemous libel, in saying that
Jesus Christ was an impostor, and
a murderer in principle. One o
f
the
jurors asked the Lord Chief Justice
(Abbott) whether a work which
denied the divinity o
f
the Saviour
was a libel. The Lord Chief Justice
replied that “a work speaking of
Jesus Christ in the language used in
the publication in question was a
libel, Christianity being a part o
f
the
law of the land.” This was doubt
less true, as the wrong motive was
apparent; but it did not answer the
juror's question. On motion for a
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* Other forms of profanity, besides that of blasphemy, [*476]
are also made punishable by statutes in the several States.
new trial, the remarks of Best, J.,
are open to a construction which an
swers the question in the affirmative:
“My Lord Chief Justice reports to
us that he told the jury that it was
an indictable offence to speak of
Jesus Christ in the manner in which
he is spoken of in the publication for
which this defendant is indicted. It
cannot admit of the least doubt that
this direction was correct. The 53
Geo. III. c. 160, has made no altera
tion in the common law relative to
libel. If
,
previous to the passing o
f
that statute, it would have been a
libel to deny, in any printed book,
the divinity o
f
the second person in
the Trinity, the same publication
would be a libel now. The 53 Geo.
III. c. 160, as its title expresses, is
an act to relieve persons who impugn
the doctrine o
f
the Trinity from cer
tain penalties. If we look at the
body o
f
the act to see from what
penalties such parties are relieved,
we find that they are the penalties
from which the 1 W. & M. Sess. 1
,
c. 18, exempted all Protestant dis
senters, except such as denied the
Trinity, and the penalties or disabili
ties which the 9 & 10 W. III. imposed
o
n
those who denied the Trinity.
The 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, c. 18, is
,
a
s
it has been usually called, an act of
toleration, o
r
one which allows dis
senters to worship God in the mode
that is agreeable to their religious
opinions, and exempts them from
punishment for non-attendance a
t
the
Established Church and non-conform
ity to its rights. The legislature, in
passing that act, only thought o
f
easing the conscience o
f dissenters,
and not o
f allowing them to attempt
to weaken the faith of the members
of the church. The 9 & 10 W. III.
was to give security to the govern
ment b
y
rendering men incapable o
f
office, who entertained opinions hos
tile to the established religion. The
only penalty imposed by that statute
is exclusion from office, and that pen
alty is incurred b
y any manifestation
o
f
the dangerous opinion, without
proof o
f
intention in the person enter
taining it
,
either to induce others to
b
e o
f
that opinion, o
r
in any manner
to disturb persons o
f
a different per
suasion. This statute rested on the
principle o
f
the test laws, and did not
interfere with the common law rela
tive to blasphemous libels. It is not
necessary for me to say whether it be
libellous to argue from the Scriptures
against the divinity o
f Christ; that is
not what the defendant professes to
do; he argues against the divinity of
Christ by denying the truth o
f
the
Scriptures. A work containing such
arguments, published maliciously
(which the jury in this case have
found), is by the common law a libel,
and the legislature has never altered
this law, nor can it ever do so while
the Christian religion is considered
the basis o
f
that law.” It is a little
difficult, perhaps, to determine pre
cisely how far this opinion was de
signed to g
o
in holding that the law
forbids the public denial o
f
the truth
o
f
the Scriptures. That arguments
against it
,
made in good faith b
y
those who d
o
not accept it
,
are legiti
mate and rightful, we think there is
n
o
doubt ; and the learned judge
doubtless meant to admit as much
when he required a malicious publi
cation as an ingredient in the offence.
However, when w
e
are considering
what is the common law o
f England
and o
f
this country as regards of
fences against God and religion, the
existence o
f
a State church in that
country and the effect o
f
it
s recogni
tion upon the law, are circumstances
to be kept constantly in view.
In People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R
.
14, the defence o
f
drunkenness was
38
594 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XIII.
The cases these statutes take notice of are of a character no one
can justify, and their punishment involves no question of religious
liberty. The right to use profane and indecent language is recog
nized by no religious creed, and the practice is reprobated by
right-thinking men of every nation and every religious belief.
The statutes for the punishment of public profanity require no
further justification than the natural impulses of every man who
believes in a Supreme Being, and recognizes his right to the rev
erence of his creatures.
The laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, by
labor or sports, are not so readily defensible by arguments the
force of which will be felt and admitted by all. It is no hardship
to any one to compel him to abstain from public blasphemy or
other profanity, and none can complain that his rights of con
science are invaded by this enforced respect to a prevailing relig
ious sentiment. But the Jew who is forced to respect the first
day of the week, when his conscience requires of him the observ
ance of the seventh also, may plausibly urge that the law discrim
inates against his religion, and by forcing him to keep a second
Sabbath in each week, unjustly, though by indirection, punishes
him for his belief.
The laws which prohibit ordinary employments on Sunday are
to be defended, either on the same grounds which justify the
punishment of profanity, or as establishing sanitary regulations,
based upon the demonstration of experience that one day's rest in
seven is needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of
[*477] body and mind. If “sustained on the first ground, the
view must be that such laws only require the proper
deference and regard which those not accepting the common be
lief may justly be required to pay to the public conscience. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have preferred to defend such
legislation on the second ground rather than the first ; * but it
men to worship Almighty God ac
cording to the dictates of their own
consciences; it compels none to at
made to a prosecution for a blasphe
mous libel. Walworth, Circuit Judge,
presiding at the trial, declared the in
toxication of defendant, at the time
of uttering the words, to be an aggra
vation of the offence rather than an
excuse.
1 “It intermeddles not with the
natural and indefeasible right of all
tend, erect, or support any place of
worship, or to maintain any ministry
against his consent; it pretends not
to control or to interfere with the
rights of conscience, and it establishes
no preference for any religious estab
CH. XIII.] OF RELIGIOUS IIBERTY. 595
appears to us that if the benefit to the individual is alone to be
considered, the argument against the law which he may make
who has already observed the seventh day of the week, is un
answerable. But on the other ground it is clear that these laws
are supportable on authority, notwithstanding the inconvenience
which they occasion to those whose religious sentiments do not
recognize the sacred character of the first day of the week."
Whatever deference the constitution or the laws may require
to be paid in some cases to the conscientious scruples or religious
convictions of the majority, the general policy always is
,
to "avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on [*478]
the religious scruples o
f any, however little reason may
seem to others to underlie them.
lishment o
r
mode o
f worship. It
treats no religious doctrine as para
mount in the State; it enforces no
unwilling attendance upon the cele
bration o
f
divine worship. It says
not to the Jew or Sabbatarian, “You
shall desecrate the day you esteem as
holy, and keep sacred to religion that
we deem to be so.” It enters upon no
discussion of rival claims o
f
the first
and seventh days o
f
the week, nor
pretends to bind upon the conscience
o
f any man any conclusion upon a
subject which each must decide for
himself. It intrudes not into the do
mestic circle to dictate when, where,
o
r
to what god its inmates shall ad
dress their orisons; nor does it pre
sume to enter the synagogue o
f
the
Israelite, o
r
the church o
f
the seventh
day Christian, to command o
r
even
persuade their attendance in the tem
ples o
f
those who especially approach
the altar on Sunday. It does not in
the slightest degree infringe upon the
Sabbath o
f any sect, o
r
curtail their
freedom o
f worship. It detracts not
one hour from any period o
f
time
they may feel bound to devote to this
object, nor does it add a moment be
yond what they may choose to em
ploy. Its sole mission is to inculcate
a temporary weekly cessation from
labor, but it adds not to this re
Even in the important matter
quirement any religious obligation.”
Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn.
St. 312. See also Charleston v. Ben
jamin, 2 Strob. 508; Bloom v. Rich
ards, 2 Ohio St. 387; McGatrick v.
Wason, 3 Ohio St. 566; Hudson v.
Geary, 4 R
.
I. 485.
1 Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. &
R. 50; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 17
S
.
& R
. 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng.
529; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112;
State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincin
nati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. In
Simonds's Ex’rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. &
Watts, 416, it was held that the con
scientious scruples o
f
a Jew to appear
and attend a trial of his cause on
Saturday were not sufficient cause for
a continuance. But quare o
f
this.
In Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,
40 Ala. 725, it was held that a statute
o
r municipal ordinance prohibiting
the sale o
f goods by merchants on
Sunday, in it
s application to religious
Jews “who believe that it is their re
ligious duty to abstain from work on
Saturdays, and to work on all the
other six days o
f
the week,” was not
violative of the article in the State
constitution which declares that no
person shall, “upon any pretence
whatsoever, be hurt, molested, o
r re
strained in his religious sentiments o
r
persuasions.”
ſ
p
|
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of bearing arms for the public defence, those who cannot in
conscience take part are excused, and their proportion of this
great and sometimes imperative burden is borne by the rest of
the community."
Some of the State constitutions have also done away with the
distinction which existed at the common law regarding the admis
sibility of testimony in some cases. All religions were recognized
by the law to the extent of allowing a
ll persons to be sworn and
to give evidence who believed in a superintending Providence,
who rewards and punishes, and that an oath was binding on their
conscience.” But the want o
f
such belief rendered the person
incompetent. Wherever the common law remains unchanged, it
must, we suppose, b
e
held n
o violation o
f religious liberty to
recognize and enforce it
s distinctions; but the tendency is to do
away with them entirely, o
r
to allow one's unbelief to g
o
to his
credibility only, if taken into account at all.”
1 There are constitutional provi
sions to this effect more or less broad
in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mis
souri, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, and South
Carolina, and statutory provisions in
some other States. In Tennessee
“no citizen shall be compelled to
bear arms, provided he will pay an
equivalent to be ascertained b
y
law.”
Art. 1
,
§ 28.
* See upon this point the leading
case o
f
Ormichund v. Barker, Willes,
538, and 1 Smith's Leading Cases,
535, where will be found a full dis
cussion o
f
this subject. Some o
f
the
earlier American cases required o
f
a
witness that he should believe in the
existence o
f God, and of a state o
f
rewards and punishments after the
present life. See especially Atwood
v
. Welton, 7 Conn. 66. But this
rule did not generally obtain; belief
in a Supreme Being who would pun
ish false swearing, whether in this
world o
r
in the world to come, being
regarded sufficient. Cubbison v. Mc
Creary, 7 W. & S. 262; Blocker v.
Burness, 2 Ala. 354; Jones v. Harris,
1 Strob. 160; Shaw v. Moore, 4 Jones,
25; Hunscum v. Hunscum, 15 Mass.
184; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121;
Bennett v. State, 1 Swan, 411; Cen
tral R
.
R
.
Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill.
541; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
But one who lacked this belief was
not sworn, because there was no
mode known to the law by which it
was supposed an oath could be made
binding upon his conscience. Arnold
v
. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
* The States o
f Iowa, Minnesota,
Michigan, Oregon, Wisconsin, Ar
kansas, Florida, Missouri, California,
Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada,
Ohio, and New York have constitu
tional provisions expressly doing away
with incompetency from want o
f relig
ious belief. Perhaps the general pro
visions in some of the other constitu
tions declaring complete equality o
f
civil rights, privileges, and capacities
are sufficiently broad to accomplish
the same purpose. Perry's Case, 3
Grat. 632. In Michigan and Oregon
a witness is not to be questioned con
cerning his religious belief. See Peo
ple v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305. In Geor
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gia the code provides that religious
belief shall only go to the credit of a
witness, and it has been held inad
missible to inquire of a witness
whether he believed in Christ as the
Saviour. Donkle v. Kohn, 44 Geo.
266. In Maryland no one is incom
petent as a witness or juror “pro
vided he believes in the existence of
God, and that, under His dispensa
tion, such person will be held morally
accountable for his acts, and be re
warded or punished therefor, either
in this world or the world to come.”
Const. Dec. of Rights, $ 36.
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[*479] * CHAPTER XIV.
THE POWER OF TAXATION.
THE power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest
in the discretion of the authority which exercises it
. It reaches
to every trade or occupation ; to every object o
f industry, use,
o
r enjoyment; to every species o
f possession; and it imposes a
burden which, in case o
f
failure to discharge it
,
may b
e followed
b
y
seizure and sale o
r
confiscation o
f property. No attribute o
f
sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point does the power
o
f
the government affect more constantly and intimately a
ll
the
relations o
f
life than through the exactions made under it
.
Taxes are defined to be burdens o
r charges imposed by the
legislative power upon persons o
r property, to raise money for
public purposes." The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is
inherent in every sovereignty. The legislature o
f every free
State will possess it under the general grant of legislative power,
whether particularly specified in the constitution among the
powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional govern
ment can exist without it
,
and n
o arbitrary government without
regular and steady taxation could be any thing but an oppressive
and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation
would be a forced extortion for the needs o
f
government from
such persons o
r objects as the men in power might select as vic
tims. Chief Justice Marshall has said o
f
this power: “The power
1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1. A Law Dic. “The revenues of a State
tax is a contribution imposed by gov
ernment on individuals for the service
o
f
the State. It is distinguished from
a subsidy as being certain and orderly,
which is shown in its derivation from
Greek, túšus, ordo, order o
r arrange
ment. Jacob, Law Dic.; Bouvier,
are a portion that each subject gives
o
f
his property in order to secure, o
r
to have, the agreeable enjoyment o
f
the remainder.” Montesquieu, Spirit
o
f
the Laws, B
.
12, c. 30. See other
definitions, Cooley on Taxation, 1.
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of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very
existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on
the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to
which the government may choose to carry it
.
The only secu
rity against the abuse o
f
this power is found in the struc
ture o
f
the government itself. In imposing a * tax, the [*480]
legislature acts upon its constituents. This is
,
in general,
a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The people o
f
a State, therefore, give to their government a right
o
f taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies o
f
the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the
exercise o
f
this right, resting confidently on the interest o
f
the
legislator, and on the influence o
f
the constituents over their
representative, to guard them against its abuse.” "
And the same high authority has said in another case: “The
power o
f legislation, and consequently o
f taxation, operates on
all persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is
a
n original principle, which has it
s
foundation in society itself.
It is granted by al
l
for the benefit o
f
all. It resides in the gov
ernment as part o
f itself, and need not be reserved where prop
erty o
f any description, or the right to use it in any manner, is
granted to individuals or corporate bodies. However absolute
the right o
f any individual may be, it is still in the nature of that
right that it must bear a portion o
f
the public burdens, and that
portion must be determined b
y
the legislature. This vital power
may b
e abused; but the interest, wisdom, and justice o
f
the rep
resentative body, and it
s
relations with it
s constituents, furnish
the only security against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as
against unwise taxation.” And again, the same judge says it is
“unfit for the judicial department to inquire what degree of tax
ation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the
abuse, o
f
the power.” And the same general views have been
frequently expressed in other cases.”
* McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 478; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones,
428. Law, 552; Herrick v. Randolph, 13
* Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Vt. 529; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt.
Pet. 561. 745; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend.
* McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 65; People v. Mayor, &c. o
f Brook
430. lyn, 4 N
.
Y
. 425; Portland Bank v.
* Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252; Western
Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. St. Union Telegraph Co. v. Mayer, 28
168; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. Ohio, N
.
s. 521.
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Notwithstanding the pervading nature of this power, there are
some things under our system of government which, by necessary
implication, are exempted from it
s
exercise. Thus, the States
cannot tax the agencies o
f
the general government; for, if they
could, it would be within their power to impose taxation
[*481] to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, “the
operations o
f
the national authorities within their proper
sphere o
f
action. “That the power to tax,” says Chief Justice
Marshall, “involves the power to destroy ; that the power to
destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create ; that
there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a
power to control the constitutional measures o
f another, which
other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control,- are propositions
not to be denied.” And referring to the argument that confi
dence in the good faith o
f
the State governments must forbid our
indulging the anticipation o
f
such consequences, he adds: “But
all inconsistencies are to be reconciled b
y
the magic word, – con
fidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoid
ably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction would be
a
n abuse, to presume which would banish that confidence which
is essential to a
ll government. But is this a case o
f
confidence 2
Would the people o
f any one State trust those o
f
another with a
power to control the most insignificant operations o
f
their State
government? We know they would not. Why then should we
suppose that the people o
f any one State would be willing to trust
those o
f
another with a power to control the operations o
f
a gov
ernment to which they have confided their most important and
most valuable interests 2 In the legislature of the Union alone
are a
ll represented. The legislature o
f
the Union alone, there
fore, can b
e
trusted b
y
the people with the power o
f controlling
measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be
abused. This, then, is not a case o
f
confidence.”"
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
431. The case involved the right o
f
the State o
f Maryland to impose taxes
upon the operations, within it
s limits,
o
f
the Bank o
f
the United States,
created b
y
authority o
f Congress.
“If,” continues the Chief Justice,
“we apply the principle for which
the State o
f Maryland contends to
the Constitution generally, we shall
find it capable o
f changing totally the
character of that instrument. We
shall find it capable o
f arresting all
the measures o
f
the government, and
o
f prostrating it a
t
the foot o
f
the
States. The American people have
declared their Constitution, and the
laws made in pursuance thereof, to b
e
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* It follows as a logical result from this doctrine that [*482]
if the Congress of the Union may constitutionally create
a Bank of the United States, as an agency of the national gov
ernment in the accomplishment of it
s
constitutional purposes, any
power o
f
the States to tax such bank, or its property, or the
means o
f performing it
s functions, is precluded b
y
necessary im
plication." For the like reasons a State is prohibited from taxing
a
n
officer o
f
the general government for his office o
r
its emolu
ments; since such a tax, having the effect to reduce the compen
sation for the services provided b
y
the act o
f Congress, would to
that extent conflict with such act, and tend to neutralize its pur
pose.” So the States may not impose taxes upon the obligations
o
r
evidences o
f
debt issued b
y
the general government upon the
loans made to it
,
unless such taxation is permitted b
y
law o
f Con
gress, and then only in the manner such law shall prescribe, –
any such tax being a
n impediment to the operations o
f
the gov
ernment in negotiating loans, and, in greater o
r
less degree in
proportion to it
s magnitude, tending to cripple and embarrass the
national power.” The tax upon the national securities is a tax
supreme; but this principle would
transfer the supremacy in fact to the
States. If the States may tax one
instrument employed by the govern
ment in the execution o
f
its powers,
they may tax any and every other
instrument. They may tax the mail;
they may tax the mint; they may tax
patent rights; they may tax the pa
pers o
f
the custom-house; they may
tax judicial process; they may tax all
the means employed by the govern
ment to an excess which would defeat
all the ends o
f government. This
was not intended by the American
people. They did not design to make
their government dependent on the
States.” In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
8 Wall. 533, it was held competent
for Congress, in aid of the circulation
o
f
the national banks, to impose re
straints upon the circulation o
f
the
State banks in the form of taxation.
Perhaps no other case goes so far as
this, in holding that taxation may be
imposed for other purposes than the
raising o
f revenue, though the levy
o
f
duties upon imports with a view
to incidental protection to domestic
manufactures is upon a similar prin
ciple.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316; Osborn v. United States Bank,
9 Wheat. 738; Dobbins v. Commis
sioners o
f
Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435. But
the doctrine which exempts the in
strumentalities o
f
the general gov
ernment from the influence of State
taxation, being founded on the im
plied necessity for the use of such
instruments b
y
the government, such
legislation as does not impair the
usefulness o
r capability o
f
such in
struments to serve the government,
is not within the rule o
f prohibition.
National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9
Wall. 353; Thompson v. Pacific R
.
R.
Co., 9 Wall. 579.
* Dobbins v. Commissioners o
f
.
Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435.
* Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet.
449; Bank o
f
Commerce v. New
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upon the exercise of the power of Congress “to borrow money
on the credit of the United States.” The exercise of this power
is interfered with to the extent of the tax imposed under State
authority; and the liability of the certificates of stock or other
securities to taxation by a State, in the hands of individuals,
would necessarily affect their value in market, and therefore
affect the free and unrestrained exercise of the power. “If the
right to impose a tax exists, it is a right which, in it
s nature, ac
knowledges n
o limits. It may be carried to any extent within the
jurisdiction o
f
the State o
r corporation which imposes it
,
which
the will of such State or corporation may prescribe.”"
* If the States cannot tax the means by which the
national government performs it
s functions, neither, on
the other hand and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the
agencies o
f
the State governments. “The same supreme power
which established the departments o
f
the general government
determined that the local governments should also exist for their
own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in
their common interests without them. Each of these several
agencies is confined to its own sphere, and all are strictly subor
dinate to the constitution which limits them, and independent o
f
other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is
nothing in the Constitution [of the United States] which can be
made to admit o
f any interference by Congress with the secure
existence o
f any State authority within its lawful bounds. And
any such interference b
y
the indirect means o
f
taxation is quite
a
s
much beyond the power o
f
the national legislature as if the
interference were direct and extreme.”” It has therefore been
[*483]
York City, 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax are not taxable.
Case, 2 Wall. 200; Van Allen v. As
sessors, 3 Wall. 573; People v. Com
missioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bradley v.
Palfrey v. Boston,
101 Mass. 329. Nor United States
treasury notes. Montgomery County
v
. Elston, 32 Ind. 27.
People, 4 Wall. 459; The Banks v.
The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Su
pervisors, 7 Wall. 26. For a kindred
doctrine, see State v. Jackson, 33
N. J. 450.
1 Weston v. Charleston, 4 Pet.
449; Bank o
f
Commerce v. New York
City, 2 Black, 631; Bank Tax Case,
2 Wall. 200; Society for Savings v.
Coite, 6 Wall. 594. Revenue stamps
* Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 509.
“In respect to the reserved powers,
the State is as sovereign and inde
pendent as the general government.
And if the means and instrumen
talities employed b
y
that government
to carry into operation the powers
granted to it are necessarily, and for
the sake o
f self-preservation, exempt
from taxation b
y
the States, why are
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held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be
stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of
the State courts; since otherwise Congress might impose such
restrictions upon the State courts as would put an end to their
effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them
altogether."
CaseS.
not those of the States depending
upon their reserved powers, for like
reasons, equally exempt from federal
taxation? Their unimpaired exist
ence in the one case is as essential as
in the other. It is admitted that
there is no express provision in the
Constitution that prohibits the general
government from taxing the means
and instrumentalities of the States,
nor is there any prohibiting the States
from taxing the means and instru
mentalities of that government. In
both cases the exemption rests upon
necessary implication, and is upheld
by the great law of self-preservation;
as any government, whose means em
ployed in conducting its operations,
if subject to the control of another
and distinct government, can only
exist at the mercy of that government.
Of what avail are these means if
another power may tax them at dis
cretion?” Per Nelson, J., in Col
lector v. Day, 11 Wall. 124. See
also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418,
427; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18
Wall. 5; Freedman v. Sigel, 10
Blatch. 327.
1 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279;
Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369;
Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Union
Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325;
Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 796; Moore v.
Quirk, 105 Mass. 49; s. c. 7 Am. Rep.
499.
It has been repeatedly decided
that the act of Congress which pro
vided that certain papers not stamped
should not be received in evidence
must be limited in its operation to
the federal courts. Carpenter v.
And a similar ruling has been made in other
Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Green v.
Holway, 101 Mass. 250; s. c. 3 Am.
Rep. 339; Clemens v. Conrad, 19
Mich. 170; Haight v. Grist, 64 N. C.
739; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239;
People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Bowen
v. Byrne, 55 Ill. 467; Hale v. Wilkin
son, 21 Grat. 75; Atkins v. Plympton,
44 Wt. 21; Bumpas v. Taggart, 26
Ark. 398; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 623;
Sammons v. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162;
s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 465; Duffy v. Hob
son, 40 Cal. 240; Sporrer v. Eiſler,
1 Heisk. 633; McElvain v. Mudd, 44
Ala. 48; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 106; Bur
son v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415;
s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 497 ; Davis v.
Richardson, 45 Miss. 499; s. c. 7
Am. Rep. 732; Hunter v. Cobb, 6
Bush, 239; Craig v. Dimmock, 47 Ill.
308; Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467;
s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 466. Several of
these cases have gone still farther,
and declared that Congress cannot
preclude parties from entering into
contracts permitted by the State laws,
and that to declare them void was not
a proper penalty for the enforcement
of tax laws. Congress connot make
void a tax deed issued by a State.
Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225. Nor
require a stamp upon the official
bonds of State officers. State v.
Garton, 32 Ind. 1. Nor tax the salary
of a State officer. Day v. Buffington,
Am. Law Rev. Oct. 1870, 176; s. c.
in error, 11 Wall. 113; Freedman v.
Sigel, 10 Blatch. 327. Nor forbid
the recording of an unstamped in
strument under the State laws.
Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 499. “Power to tax
604 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. xiv.
* Strong as is the language employed to characterize
the taxing power in some of the cases which have con
sidered this subject, subsequent events have demonstrated that it
was by no means extravagant. An enormous national
[*485] debt has not only made * imposts necessary which in
some cases reach several hundred per cent of the original
cost of the articles upon which they are imposed, but the systems
of State banking which were in force when the necessity for
contracting that debt first arose, have been literally taxed out of
existence by burdens avowedly imposed for that very purpose."
. If taxation is thus unlimited in its operation upon the objects
within it
s reach, it cannot be extravagant to say that the agen
cies o
f government are necessarily excepted from it
,
since other
wise it
s
exercise might altogether destroy the government through
the destruction o
f
it
s agencies. That which was predicted as a
possible event has been demonstrated b
y
actual facts to b
e within
the compass o
f
the power; and if considerations of policy were
important, it might be added that, if the States possessed the au
thority to tax the agencies o
f
the national government, they would
hold within their hands a constitutional weapon which factious
and disappointed parties would be able to wield with terrible effect
when the policy o
f
the national government did not accord with
their views; while, on the other hand, if the national govern
ment possessed a corresponding power over the agencies o
f
the
State governments, there would not be wanting men who, in
times o
f strong party excitement, would be willing and eager to
resort to this power as a means o
f coercing the States in their
legislation upon the subjects remaining under their control.
There are other subjects which are o
r may be removed from
the sphere o
f
State taxation b
y
force o
f
the Constitution o
f
the
United States, or o
f
the legislation o
f Congress under it
.
That
instrument declares that “no State shall, without the consent of
[*484]
for State purposes is as much an ex
clusive power in the States, as the
power to lay and collect taxes to pay
the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare o
f
the
United States is an exclusive power
in Congress.” Clifford, J., Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 427. In United
States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322,
it was decided that a municipal cor
poration o
f
a State, being a portion o
f
the sovereign power, was not subject
to taxation by Congress upon its
municipal revenues.
1 The constitutionality of this tax
ation was sustained by a divided
court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8
Wall. 533.
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Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it
s inspection laws.”
This prohibition has led to some difficulty in its practical applica
tion. Imports, as such, are not to be taxed generally, but it was
not the purpose o
f
the Constitution to exclude permanently from
the sphere o
f
State taxation a
ll property brought into the country
from abroad; and the difficulty encountered has been met with in
endeavoring to indicate with sufficient accuracy for practical pur
poses the point o
f
time a
t which articles imported cease to be
regarded as imports within the meaning o
f
the prohibition. In
general terms it has been said that when the importer has so acted
upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and
mixed u
p
with the mass o
f property in the country, it has perhaps
lost it
s
distinctive character as an import, and has become sub
ject to the taxing power o
f
the State; but that while remaining
the property o
f
the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form o
r package in which it was “imported, a [*486]
tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the
prohibition in the Constitution." And in the application of this
rule it was declared that a State law which, for revenue pur
poses, required a
n importer to take a license and pay fifty dollars
before he should be permitted to sell a package o
f imported
goods, was equivalent to laying a duty upon imports. It has also
been held in another case, that a stamp duty imposed b
y
the leg
islature o
f
California upon bills o
f lading for gold or silver, trans
ported from that State to any port or place out o
f
the State, was
in effect a tax upon exports, and the law was consequently void.”
Congress also is vested with power to regulate commerce; but
this power is not so far exclusive as to prevent regulations b
y
the
States also, when they d
o
not conflict with those established by
Congress.” The States may unquestionably tax the subjects o
f
commerce; and n
o necessary conflict with that complete control
which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised
a
s
to defeat o
r
embarrass the congressional legislation. Where
1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal.
441, per Marshall, Ch. J. 265; Garrison v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal.
* Almy v. People, 24 How. 169. 404; Ex parte Martin, 7 Nev. 140.
See what is said of this case in Wood- * Cooley v. Board o
f Wardens, 12
ruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 137. And How. 299. See also Wilson v. Black
compare Jackson Iron Co. v. Audi- bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245.
tor-General, 32 Mich. 488. See also
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Congress has not acted at all upon the subject, the State taxation
cannot be invalid on this ground; but when national regula
tions exist, under which rights are established or privileges given,
the State can impose no burdens which shall in effect make the
enjoyment of those rights and privileges contingent upon the pay
ment of tribute to the State.” Duties of tonnage the States are
also forbidden to lay.” The meaning of this seems to be that ves
sels must not be taxed as vehicles of commerce, according to
capacity;” but it is admitted they may be taxed like other prop
erty.”
It is also believed that that provision in the Constitu
[*487] tion of the * United States, which declares that “the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the several States,” ” will pre
clude any State from imposing upon the property within it
s
limits
belonging to citizens o
f
other States, any higher burdens by way
o
f
taxation than are imposed upon the like property o
f
it
s
own
citizens. This is the express decision o
f
the Supreme Court o
f
Alabama,” following in this particular the dictum o
f
a
n
eminent
1 In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
141, it was held that a license fee of
fifty dollars, required by the State o
f
a
n importer before he should be per
mitted to sell imported goods, was
unconstitutional, as coming directly
in conflict with the regulations of
Congress over commerce. For fur
ther discussion o
f
this subject, see
New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Li
cense Cases, 5 How. 504; Lin Sing
v
. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; Erie
Railway Co. v. New Jersey, 31 N
. J.
531, reversing same case in 30 N
. J.;
Pennsylvania R
.
R
.
Co. v. Common
wealth, 3 Grant, 128; Hinsen v. Lott,
40 Vt. 133; Commonwealth v. Erie
R
. R., 62 Penn. St. 286; Osborn v.
Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; S. C. in error,
1
6 Wall. 479; State v. Philadelphia,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 45 Md. 361; Wolcott
v
. People, 17 Mich. 68. In Crandall
v
. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, it was held
that a State law imposing a tax o
f
one dollar on each person leaving the
State b
y
public conveyance was not
void as coming in conflict with the
control o
f Congress over commerce,
though set aside on other grounds.
This general subject underwent dis
cussion in the recent case of Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; and also in
Case o
f
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall.
232, and Case o
f Tax on Railway
Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284. And
see Cooley on Taxation, 61–64.
* Const. o
f U
.
S., art. 1
,
§ 10,
par. 2.
* Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall.
577. See Steamship Co. v. Port
Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; State Tonnage
Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; Lott v.
Morgan, 41 Ala. 246; Johnson v.
Drummond, 20 Grat. 419 ; State
v
. Charleston, 4 Rich. 286.
* See above cases. Wharfage
charges are not forbidden by the
above clause of the Constitution.
Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146.
* Art. 4
,
§ 2.
* Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627.
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federal judge at an early day,” and the same doctrine has been
recently affirmed by the federal Supreme Court.” As the States
are forbidden to pass any laws impairing the obligation of con
tracts, they are of course precluded from levying any taxes which
would have that effect. Therefore, as was shown in a previous
chapter, if the State by any valid contract has obligated itself
not to tax particular property, or not to tax beyond a certain
rate, a tax in disregard of the obligation is void.” It is also held
that to tax in one State contracts owned in another impairs their
obligation, even though they are made and payable in the State
imposing the tax, and are secured by mortgage in that State.”
& Having thus indicated the extent of the taxing power, it is
necessary to add that certain elements are essential in all taxa
tion, and that it will not follow as of course, because the power
is so vast, that every thing which may be done under pretence of
it
s
exercise will leave the citizen without redress, even though
there be n
o conflict with express constitutional inhibitions. Every
thing that may be done under the name o
f
taxation is not neces
sarily a tax ; and it may happen that an oppressive burden
imposed b
y
the government, when it comes to be carefully scru
tinized, will prove, instead of a tax, to be an unlawful confisca
tion o
f property, unwarranted b
y
any principle o
f
constitutional.
government.
In the first place taxation having for it
s only legitimate object
the raising o
f money fo
r
public purposes and the proper needs o
f
government, the exaction o
f moneys from the citizens for other
purposes is not a proper exercise o
f
this power, and must there
fore be unauthorized. In this place, however, we do not use the
word public in any narrow and restricted sense, nor do we mean
* Washington, J., in Corfield v.
Coryell, 4 Wash. C
.
C
.
380. And
see Campbell v. Morris, 3 H
.
& McH.
“not the growth, produce, or manu
facture of the State.” State v. Wel
ton, 55 Mo. 288; State v. Hodgdon,
554; Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH.
340; and other cases cited, ante, p
.
*16, note. See also Oliver v. Wash
ington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
* Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430;
Case o
f
State Tax on Foreign Held
Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. Since the
above decisions it has been held com
petent for the State to levy a tax on
the business o
f
those dealing in articles
41 Vt. 139.
* See ante, p
.
*280, and cases cited
in note.
* State Tax on Foreign Held
Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. See also Rail
road Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262;
Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
268. Compare Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt.
152; Jenkins v. Charleston, 5 S. C
.
N. S. 393.
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to be understood that whenever the legislature shall overstep the
legitimate bounds of their authority, the case will be such that
the courts can interfere to arrest their action. There are many
cases of unconstitutional action by the representatives of the
people which can be reached only through the ballot-box; and
there are other cases where the line of distinction between that
which is allowable and that which is not is so faint and shadowy
that the decision of the legislature must be accepted as final,
even though the judicial opinion might be different. But
[*488] there are still other cases where * it is entirely possible
for the legislature so clearly to exceed the bounds of due
authority that we cannot doubt the right of the courts to inter
fere and check what can only be looked upon as ruthless extor
tion, provided the nature of the case is such that judicial process
can afford relief. An unlimited power to make any and every
thing lawful which the legislature might see fi
t
to call taxation,
would be, when plainly stated, an unlimited power to plunder
the citizen."
It must always be conceded that the proper authority to deter
mine what should and what should not properly constitute a
public burden is the legislative department o
f
the State. This
is not only true for the State at large, but it is true also in respect
to each municipality or political division o
f
the State; these in
ferior corporate existences having only such authority in this
regard as the legislature shall confer upon them.” And in deter
mining this question, the legislature cannot be held to any
narrow o
r
technical rule. Certain expenditures are not only
absolutely necessary to the continued existence o
f
the govern
1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51
Penn. St. 9
;
Morford v. Unger, 8
Iowa, 92; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray,
421; Hansen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28;
Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 139; s. c. 11
Am. Rep. 185; Ferguson v. Landraw,
5 Bush, 230; People v. Township
Board o
f Salem, 21 Mich. 459;
Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St.
353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255. “It is
the clear right o
f every citizen to in
sist that no unlawful or unauthorized
exaction shall be made upon him un
der the guise o
f
taxation. If any such
illegal encroachment is attempted, he
can always invoke the aid o
f
the ju
dicial tribunals for his protection, and
prevent his money o
r
other property
from being taken and appropriated
for a purpose and in a manner not
authorized b
y
the Constitution and
laws.” Per Bigelow, Ch. J., in Free
land v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575. See
Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 379; Peo
ple v. Suprs o
f Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22.
* Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y.
123. See ante, p
.
*230, and cases
cited in note to p
.
*489.
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ment, but as a matter of policy it may sometimes be proper and
wise to assume other burdens which rest entirely on considera
tions of honor, gratitude, or charity. The officers of government
must be paid, the laws printed, roads constructed, and public
buildings erected; but with a view to the general well-being of
society, it may also be important that the children of the State
should be educated, the poor kept from starvation," losses in the
public service indemnified, and incentives held out to faithful and
fearless discharge of duty in the future, by the payment of pen
sions to those who have been faithful public servants in the past.
There will therefore be necessary expenditures, and expenditures
which rest upon considerations of policy alone; and in regard to
the one as much as to the other, the decision of that department
to which alone questions of State policy are addressed, must be
accepted as conclusive.
Very strong language has been used by the courts, in some of
the cases on this subject. In a case where was ques
tioned the * validity of the State law confirming township [*489]
action which granted gratuities to persons enlisting in
the military service of the United States, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut assigned the following reasons in it
s
favor: —
“In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent
for the legislative power to make a gift of the common property,
o
r
o
f
a sum o
f money to be raised by taxation, where no possible
public benefit, direct or indirect, can be derived therefrom, such
exercise o
f
the legislative power must be o
f
a
n extraordinary
character to justify the interference o
f
the judiciary ; and this is
not that case.
“Second. If there be the least possibility that making the
gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it be
comes a question o
f policy, and not o
f
natural justice, and the
determination o
f
the legislature is conclusive. And such is this
case. Such gifts to unfortunate classes o
f society, as the indi
gent blind, the deaf and dumb, o
r insane, o
r grants to particular
colleges o
r schools, o
r grants o
f pensions, swords, or other
mementos for past services, involving the general good indi
* Taxes cannot be levied to donate authorities have no supervision and
to benevolent and charitable societies, control. So held in an able opinion
which are controlled by private indi- in St. Mary's Industrial School v.
viduals, and over which the public Brown, 45 Md. 310.
39
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rectly and in slight degree, are frequently made and never
questioned.
“Third. The government of the United States was consti
tuted by the people of the State, although acting in concert with
the people of the other States, and the general good of the peo
ple of this State is involved in the maintenance of that general
government. In many conceivable ways the action of the town
might not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but
render the service of that class more efficient to the general gov
ernment, and therefore it must be presumed that the legislature
found that the public good would be thereby promoted.
“And fourth. It is obviously possible, and therefore to be
intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to jus
tify their action.”
And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has said: “To justify
the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax
void, the absence of a
ll possible public interest in the purposes
for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable ; so
clear and palpable a
s
to b
e perceptible b
y
every mind a
t
the first
blush. . . . It is not denied that claims founded in
[*490] equity and justice, in the “largest sense of those terms,
o
r
in gratitude o
r charity, will support a tax. Such is
the language o
f
the authorities.””
1 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn.
128. See to the same effect Speer v.
School Directors o
f Blairville, 50
Penn. St. 150. The legislature is not
obliged to consult the will o
f
the peo
ple concerned in ordering the levy
o
f
local assessments for the public
purposes o
f
the local government.
Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B
.
Monr. 350;
Slack v. Maysville, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
1
3 B
.
Monr. 26; Cypress Pond Drain
ing Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 353.
Compare People v. Common Council
o
f Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. The legis
lature cannot delegate to parties con
cerned the authority to levy taxes for
the benefit o
f
their own estates and of
those o
f
others interested with them
but not consenting. Scuffletown
Fence Co. v. McAllister, 12 Bush, 312.
* Brodhead v. City o
f Milwaukee,
19 Wis. 652. See Mills v. Charlton, 29
Wis. 411; Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenl.
273; Williams v. School District,
3
3
Wt. 423. It is not competent for
a city to levy taxes to loan to persons
who have suffered from a fire. Lowell
v
. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; s. c. 15
Am. Rep. 39, and note p
.
56. Or to
supply farmers, whose crops have been
destroyed, with provisions, and grain
for seed and feed. State v. Osawkee,
14 Kan. 418. Or to aid manufactur
ing enterprises. Allen v. Jay, 60 Me.
124; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 185; Com
mercial Bank v. Iola, 2 Dill. 353;
Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall.
655; Opinions o
f Judges, 58 Me. 590.
Or to pay a subscription to a private
corporation not for a public purpose.
Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91.
A city cannot be empowered to erect
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But we think it clear in the words of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, that “the legislature cannot . . . in the form of a
tax, take the money of the citizen and give to an individual, the
public interest or welfare being in no way connected with the
transaction. The objects for which money is raised by taxation
must be public, and such as subserve the common interest and
well-being of the community required to contribute.” ” Or, as
stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “the legislature
has no constitutional right to . . . levy a tax, or to authorize any
municipal corporation to do it
,
in order to raise funds for a mere
private purpose. No such authority passed to the assembly by
the general grant o
f
the legislative power. This would not be
legislation. Taxation is a mode o
f raising revenue for public
purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected
with the public interest o
r welfare, it ceases to be taxation and
becomes plunder. Transferring money from the owners o
f it
into the possession o
f
those who have n
o title to it
,
though it be
done under the name and form o
f
a tax, is unconstitutional for
all the reasons which forbid the legislature to usurp any other
power not granted to them.” And by the same court, in a still
later case, where the question was whether the legislature could
lawfully require a municipality to refund to a bounty association
the sums which they had advanced to relieve themselves from an
impending military conscription, “such an enactment would not
b
e legislation a
t
all. It would be in the nature of judicial action,
it is true, but wanting the justice of notice to parties to be af
fected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force
to regular judicial proceedings; it would much more resemble
an imperial rescript than constitutional legislation: first, in declar
ing an obligation where none was created or previously existed;
and next, in decreeing payment, b
y directing the money o
r prop
erty o
f
the people to be sequestered to make the payment. The
legislature can exercise no such despotic functions.””
a dam, with the privilege afterwards ions o
f Judges, 58 Me. 590; Moulton
a
t
discretion to devote it to either a v. Raymond, 60 Me. 121; post, p
.
*494
public o
r private purpose; but the pub- and note.
lic purpose must appear. Attorney- * Per Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless
General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. St. 168. See
1 Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590.
v
. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652. See also * Tyson v. School Directors o
f
Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; Opin- Halifax, 51 Penn. St. 9. See also
./
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Grim v. Weisenburg School District,
57 Penn. St. 433. The decisions in
Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540,
Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9,
and Shackford v. Newington, 46 N.
H. 415, so far as they hold that a
bounty law is not to be held to cover
moneys before advanced by an indi
vidual without any pledge of the
public credit, must be held referable,
we think, to the same principle. We
are aware that there are some cases,
the doctrine of which seems opposed
to those we have cited, but perhaps
a careful examination will enable us
to harmonize them all. One of these
is Guilford v. Supervisors of Che
nango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y.
143. The facts in that case were as
follows: Cornell and Clark were for
merly commissioners of highways of
the town of Guilford, and as such, by
direction of the voters of the town,
had sued the Butternut and Oxford
Turnpike Road Company. They were
unsuccessful in the action, and were,
after a long litigation, obliged to pay
costs. The town then refused to re
imburse them these costs. Cornell
and Clark sued the town, and, after
prosecuting the action to the court of
last resort, ascertained that they had
no legal remedy. They then applied
to the legislature, and procured an
act authorizing the question of pay
ment or not by the town to be sub
mitted to the voters at the succeeding
town meeting. The voters decided
that they would not tax themselves
for any such purpose. Another ap
plication was then made to the leg
islature, which resulted in a law
authorizing the county judge of Che
nango County to appoint three com
missioners, whose duty it should be
to hear and determine the amount of
costs and expenses incurred by Cor
nell and Clark in the prosecution and
* The Supreme Court of Michigan has proceeded upon
the same principle in a recent case. The State is forbid
defence of the suits mentioned. It
authorized the commissioners to make
an award, which was to be filed with
the county clerk, and the board of
supervisors were then required, at
their next annual meeting, to appor
tion the amount of the award upon
the taxable property of the town of
Guilford, and provide for its collec
tion in the same manner as other
taxes are collected. The validity of
this act was affirmed. It was regarded
as one of those of which Denio, J.,
says, “The statute book is full, per
haps too full, of laws awarding dama
ges and compensation of various kinds
to be paid by the public to individuals,
who had failed to obtain what they
considered equitably due to them by
the decision of administrative officers
acting under the provisions of former
laws. The courts have no power to
supervise or review the doings of the
legislature in such cases.” It is ap
parent that there was a strong equita
ble claim upon the township in this
case for the reimbursement of moneys
expended by public officers under the
direction of their constituents, and
perhaps no principle of constitutional
law was violated by the legislature
thus changing it into a legal demand,
and compelling its satisfaction. Mr.
Sedgwick criticises this act, and says
of it that it “may be called taxation,
but in truth it is the reversal of a
judicial decision.” Sedg. on Stat.
and Const. Law, 414. There are
very many claims, however, resting
in equity, which the courts would be
compelled to reject, but which it
would be very proper for the legis
lature to recognize, and provide for
by taxation. Brewster v. City of
Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. Another
case, perhaps still stronger than that
of Guilford v. The Supervisors, is
Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65.
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den by the * constitution to engage in works of public [*492]
improvement, except in the expenditure of grants or
Persons at Utica had given bond to
pay the extraordinary expense that
would be caused to the State by
changing the junction of the Che
nango Canal from Whitesborough to
Utica, and the legislature afterwards
passed an act requiring the amount
to be levied by a tax on the real
property of the city of Utica. The
theory of this act may be stated thus:
The canal was a public way. The
expense of constructing a
ll public
ways may be properly charged on the
community specially o
r peculiarly
benefited b
y
it
.
The city o
f
Utica
was specially and peculiarly benefited
by having the canal terminate there;
and as the expense o
f
construction
was thereby increased, it was proper
and equitable that the property to be
benefited should pay this difference,
instead o
f
the State a
t large. The
act was sustained by the courts, and
it was well remarked that the fact
that a bond had been before given
securing the same money could not
detract from its validity. Whether
this case can stand with some others,
and especially with that o
f Hampshire
v
. Franklin, 16 Mass. 83, we have
elsewhere expressed a doubt, and it
must be conceded that, for the legis
lature in any case to compel a mu
nicipality to assume a burden, on the
ground o
f
local benefit o
r
local obli
gation, against the will of the citizens,
is the exercise o
f
a
n arbitrary power
little in harmony with the general
features o
f
our republican system,
and only to be justified, if at all, in
extreme cases. The general idea o
f
our tax system is, that those shall
vote the burdens who are to pay them;
and it would be intolerable that a
central authority should have power,
not only to tax localities, for local
purposes o
f
a public character which
they did not approve, but also, if it
so pleased, to compel them to assume
and discharge private claims not
equitably chargeable upon them.
See the New York cases above re
ferred to criticised in State v. Tappan,
29 Wis. 674, 680. See also Shaw v.
Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416. The cases o
f
Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B
.
Monr. 330;
Sharp's Ex. v. Dunavan, 17 B
.
Monr.
223; Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.)
553, will throw some light on this
general subject. The case o
f Cypress
Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 350, is also instructive. The
Cypress Pond Draining Company was
incorporated to drain and keep drained
the lands within a specified boundary,
at the cost of the owners, and was
authorized b
y
the act to collect a tax
on each acre, not exceeding twenty
five cents per acre, for that purpose,
for ten years, to be collected b
y
the
sheriff. With the money thus col
lected, the board o
f managers, six in
number, named in the act, was re
quired to drain certain creeks and
ponds within said boundary. The
members of the board owned in the
aggregate 3,840 acres, the larger
portion o
f
which was low land, sub
ject to inundation, and o
f
little o
r
n
o
value in its then condition, but which
would be rendered very valuable by
the contemplated draining. The cor
porate boundary contained 14,621
acres, owned by sixty-eight persons.
Thirty-four of these, owning 5,975
acres, had no agency in the passage
o
f
the act, and no notice o
f
the ap
plication therefor, gave no assent to
its provisions, and a very small por
tion o
f
their land, if any, would be
benefited o
r improved in value b
y
the
proposed draining; and they resisted
the collection o
f
the tax. As to these
owners the act o
f incorporation was
held unconstitutional and inoperative.
See also The City of Covington v.
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other property made to it for this purpose. The State, with this
prohibition in force, entered into a contract with a private party
for the construction by such party of an improvement in
[*493] the Muskegon River, for which the State was to pay * the
contractor fifty thousand dollars, from the Internal Im
provement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State
officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground
that the fund from which payment was to have been made was
exhausted. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls
upon the property passing through the improvement sufficient to
pay the contract price within five years. The court held this act
void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a
work from it
s general fund, and could not constitutionally have
agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was n
o theory on
which the act could be supported, except it was that the State
had misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and there
fore ought to provide payment from some other source. But if
the State had misappropriated the fund, the burden o
f
reimburse
ment would fall upon the State at large; it could not lawfully
b
e imposed upon a single town o
r district, o
r upon the commerce
o
f
a single town or district. The burden must be borne b
y
those
upon whom it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power
to compel some single district to assume and discharge a State
debt would be to recognize it
s power to make an obnoxious dis
trict or an obnoxious class bear the whole burden of the State
government. An act to that effect would not be taxation, nor
would it be the exercise of any legitimate legislative authority."
Southgate, 15 B
.
Monr. 491; Lov
ingston v. Wider, 53 Ill. 302; Curtis
v
. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; People v.
Flagg, 46 N
.
Y
.
401; People v. Bach
eller, 53 N. Y
.
128; People v. Com
mon Council o
f Detroit, 28 Mich.
228. The author has considered the
subject o
f
this note a
t
some length in
his treatise on Taxation, c. 21.
1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269.
See also People v. Springwells, 25
Mich. 153. “Uniformity in taxation
implies equality in the burden o
f tax
ation.” Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N
.
s.
15. “This equality in the burden
constitutes the very substance de
signed to be secured by the rule.”
Weeks v. City o
f Milwaukee, 10 Wis.
258. See also Sanborn n. Rice, 9
Minn. 273; State v. Haben, 22 Wis.
660. The reasoning of these cases
seems not to have been satisfactory
to the New York Court of Appeals.
See Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 614,
in which an act was sustained which
authorized “and required ” the vil
lage o
f Brockport to levy a tax for
the erection of a State Normal School
building a
t
that place. No recent
case, we think, has gone so far as
this. Compare State v. Tappan, 29
Wis. 674; Mayor of Mobile v. Dar
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And it may be said of such an act, that, so far as it would ope
rate to make those who would pay the tolls pay more
than their proportion of the State obligation, it * was in [*494]
effect taking their property for the private benefit of
other citizens of the State, and was obnoxious to all the objec
tions against the appropriation of private property for private
purposes which could exist in any other case.
And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: “If there be such
a flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden im
posed; if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes
in which those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not
bound to contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is
exercised, – whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regu
lation of the boundaries of the local government, which results
in subjecting the party unjustly to local taxes, – it must be
regarded as coming within the prohibition of the constitution
designed to protect private rights against oppression however
made, and whether under color of recognized power or not.””
When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecu
niary burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions
gan, 45 Ala. 310; Livingston County
v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427; Burr v. Car
bondale, 76 Ill. 455. “There can be
no doubt that, as a general rule,
where an expenditure is to be made
for a public object, the execution of
which will be substantially beneficial
to every portion of the Common
wealth alike, and in the benefits and
advantages of which all the people
will equally participate, if the money
is to be raised by taxation, the assess
ment would be deemed to come within
that class which was laid to defray
one of the general charges of govern
ment, and ought therefore to be im
posed as nearly as possible with
equality upon a
ll persons resident
and estates lying within the Common
wealth. . . . An assessment for such
a purpose, if laid in any other man
ner, could not in any just o
r proper
sense b
e regarded as ‘proportional'
within the meaning o
f
the Constitu
tion.” Merrick v. Inhabitants of
Amherst, 12 Allen, 504, per Bigelow,
Ch. J. This case holds that local
taxation for a State purpose may be
permitted in consideration o
f
local
benefits, and only differs in principle
from Gordon v. Cornes, in that the
one permitted what the other required.
The case of Marks v. Trustees of
Pardue University, 37 Ind. 155, fol
lows Merrick v. Amherst. Taxation
not levied according to the principles
upon which the right to tax is based,
is an unlawful appropriation o
f pri
vate property to public uses. City o
f
Covington v. Southgate, 15 B
.
Monr.
498; People v. Township Board o
f
Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Tide Water
Co. v. Costar, 3 C
.
E
. Green, 519;
Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn.
St. 146; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 615.
1 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.
See Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa.
194.
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may always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden
may properly be considered public on any of the grounds above
indicated;" and second, if public, then whether the burden is
one which should properly be borne by the district upon which it
is imposed. If either of these questions is answered in the nega
tive, the legislature must be held to have assumed an author
ity not conferred in the general grant of legislative power, and
which is therefore unconstitutional and void. “The power of
taxation,” says an eminent writer, “is a great governmental at
tribute, with which the courts have very wisely shown extreme
unwillingness to interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share
the fate of a
ll
other usurpations.” ” In the case of burdens thus
assumed b
y
the legislature o
n behalf o
f
the State, it is not always
that a speedy and safe remedy can be properly afforded in the
courts. It would certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power
for a court to attempt to stay the collection o
f
State taxes because
a
n illegal demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State
taxes are not usually levied for the purpose o
f satisfying specific
demands, but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be
sufficient for the wants o
f
the year, the question is not one usually
o
f
the unconstitutionality o
f taxation, but o
f
the misappropriation
o
f moneys which have been raised b
y
taxation. But if the State
should order a city, township, o
r village to raise money by taxa
tion to establish one o
f
it
s
citizens in business, o
r
for any other
object equally removed from the proper sphere o
f government,
o
r
should undertake to impose the whole burden o
f
the govern
ment upon a fraction o
f
the State, the usurpation o
f
[*495] authority would not only be * plain and palpable, but the
proper remedy would also be plain, and no court o
f
com
petent jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the
paramount law.” -
In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it
* Though the legislature first de
cides that the use is public, the deci
sion is not conclusive. They cannot
make that a public purpose which is
not so in fact. Gove v. Epping, 41
N
.
H
.
539; Crowell v. Hopkinton,
45 N
.
H
. 9
;
Freeland v. Hastings, 10
Allen, 570; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me.
379; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124; s. c.
1
1 Am. Rep. 185; Tyler v. Beacher,
44 Vt. 651: Ferguson v. Landraw, 5
Bush, 230; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Penn.
St. 319; People v. Flagg, 46 N
.
Y
.
401; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350.
* Sedgwick on Const. and Stat.
Law, 414.
* Loan Association v. Topeka, 20
Wall. 655.
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be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there
should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden is
common, there should be common contribution to discharge it."
Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the govern
ment affords to the persons and property of it
s citizens; and as
a
ll
are alike protected, so a
ll
alike should bear the burden, in
proportion to the interests secured. Taxes b
y
the poll are justly
regarded a
s odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection
o
f revenue; and when taxes are levied upon property there must
b
e
a
n apportionment with reference to a uniform standard, o
r
they degenerate into mere arbitrary exactions. In this particular
the State constitutions have been very specific, though in provid
ing for equality and uniformity they have done little more than
to state in concise language a principle o
f
constitutional law
which, whether declared o
r not, would inhere in the power to
tax.
Taxes may assume the form o
f duties, imposts, and excises;
and those collected b
y
the national government are very largely
o
f
this character. They may also assume the form o
f
license
fees, for permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy
special franchises.” They may be specific ; such as are often
levied upon corporations, in reference to the amount o
f capital
stock, or to the business done, or profits earned b
y
them. Or
they may be direct, upon property, in proportion to its value, o
r
upon some other basis o
f apportionment, which the legislature
shall regard as just, and which shall keep in view the general
idea o
f uniformity. The taxes collected b
y
the States are mostly
o
f
the latter class, and it is to them that the constitutional prin
ciples we shall have occasion to discuss will more particularly
apply. -
As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be
1 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, wealth v. Moore, 25 Grat. 951;
9 Minn. 273; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Cousins v. State, 50 Ala. 113; s. c.
Mich. 269; Oliver v. Washington 20 Am. Rep. 290; Morrill v. State,
Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tidewater Co. 38 Wis. 428; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 12.
v
. Costar, 3 C
.
E
. Green, 519. But revenue cannot be raised in the
* As to taxes on business and form of license fees under an author
franchises, see Cooley on Taxation, ity to require licenses to be taken out
c. 18. That al
l
occupations may for mere police purposes. Burlington
be taxed when no restraints are im- v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673, and
posed by the constitution, see State cases cited.
v
. Hayne, 4 Rich. 403; Common
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taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute
uniformity must be applicable. A State tax is to be apportioned
through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax
through the city; while in the case of local improvements, bene
fiting in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State
or of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing
district, within which the expense shall be apportioned.
[*496] School districts and road districts are * also taxing dis
tricts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and
villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the
townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a
requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon
property according to value, such a requirement implies an as
sessment of valuation by public officers at such regular periods as
shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such
assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus,
the Constitutions of Maine and Massachusetts require that there
shall be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to be
made at least every ten years;" the Constitution of Michigan
requires the annual assessments which are made by township
officers to be equalized by a State board, which reviews them for
that purpose every five years;” and the Constitution of Rhode
Island requires the legislature “from time to time" to provide
for new valuations of property for the assessment of taxes in such
manner as they may deem best.” Some other constitutions con
tain no provisions upon this subject; but the necessity for valua
tion is nevertheless implied, though the mode of making it
,
and
the periods a
t
which it shall be made, are left to the legislative
discretion.
There are some kinds o
f taxes, however, that are not usually
assessed according to the value o
f property, and some which could
not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does
not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property.”
Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a
view to a revenue, either for itself or for any o
f
the municipal
1 Constitution o
f Maine, art. 9
,
* Constitution o
f
Rhode Island,
§ 7
;
Constitution o
f Mass., Part 2
,
art. 4
,
§ 15.
c. 1
,
§ 1
,
art. 4. * See Bright v. McCulloch, 2
7 Ind.
* Constitution o
f Mich., art. 14, 223; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat.
§ 13. 464.
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governments, or for the support of the governmental machinery
in any of the political divisions, is levied under the power of tax
ation, whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some
other designation. The license fees which are sometimes required
to be paid by those who follow particular employments are, when
imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes; the tolls upon persons
or property, for making use of the works of public improvement
owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax; stamp
duties when imposed are taxes; and it is not uncommon, as we
have already stated, to require that corporations shall pay -
a certain sum annually, in proportion to their “capital [*497]
stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode
regarded by the State as most convenient and suitable for the .
taxation of such organizations. It is evident, therefore, that the
constitutional requirements sometimes met with, that taxation
upon property shall be according to value, do not include every
species of taxation; but all special cases like those we have here
referred to are, by implication, excepted.
But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are
levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not
to be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the
opening, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining
of swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made
upon property, with some reference to the supposed benefits
which the property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore,
of making the assessment include all the property of the munici
pal organization in which the improvement is made, a new and
special taxing district is created, whose bounds are confined to the
limits within which property receives a special and peculiar ben
efit, in consequence of the improvement. Even within this dis
trict the assessment is sometimes made by some other standard
than that of value; and it is evident that if it be just to create
the taxing district with reference to special benefits, it would be
equally just and proper to make the taxation within the district
have reference to the benefit each parcel of property receives,
rather than to its relative value. The opening or paving of a
street may increase the value of all property upon or near it; and
it may be just that all such property should contribute to the
expense of the improvement: but it by no means follows that
each parcel of the property will receive from the improvement a
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benefit in proportion to the previous value. One lot upon the
street may be greatly increased in value, another at a little dis
tance may be but slightly benefited ; and if no constitutional pro
vision interferes, there is consequently abundant reason why the
tax levied within the taxing district should have reference, not to
value, but to benefit.
It has been objected, however, to taxation upon this basis, that
inasmuch as the district upon which the burden is imposed is
compelled to make the improvement for the benefit of the general
public, it is
,
to the extent o
f
the tax levied, an appropriation o
f
private property for the public use ; and as the persons taxed, as
a part o
f
the public, would be entitled o
f right to the enjoyment
o
f
the improvement when made, such right o
f enjoyment could
not be treated as compensation for the exaction made, and such
exaction would therefore be opposed to those constitutional prin
ciples which declare the inviolability o
f private property. But
those principles have no reference to the taking o
f property under
the right o
f
taxation. When the constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
[*498] compensation made therefor, it has reference to * an
appropriation thereof under the right o
f
eminent domain.
Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the
same foundation, as each implies the taking o
f private property
for the public use on compensation made ; but the compensation
is different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for
the public use, the tax-payer receives, o
r
is supposed to receive,
his just compensation in the protection which government affords
to his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value
o
f
his possessions b
y
the use to which the government applies the
money raised b
y
the tax," and either o
f
these benefits will support
the burden.
But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come
under the general provisions on the subject o
f
taxation to b
e
found in our State constitutions? The Constitution o
f Michigan
provides that “the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of
taxation, except on property paying specific taxes; and taxes
* People v. Mayor, &c. o
f
Brook- Northern Indiana R
.
R
.
Co. v. Con
lyn, 4 N
.
Y
.
422; Williams v. Mayor, nelly, 10 Ohio, N
.
s. 165; Washing
&c. o
f Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills ton Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c.
v
. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N
.
s. 126; 8 Am. Rep. 255.
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shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by
law; ”’ and again: “All assessments hereafter authorized shall
be on property at it
s
cash value.”” The first o
f
these provisions
has been regarded as confiding to the discretion o
f
the legislature
the establishment o
f
the rule o
f uniformity by which taxation was
to be imposed ; and the second as having reference to the annual
valuation o
f property for the purposes o
f taxation, which it is
customary to make in that State, and not to the actual levy o
f
a
tax. And a local tax, therefore, levied in the city of Detroit, to
meet the expense o
f paving a public street, and which was levied,
not in proportion to the value o
f property, but according to an
arbitrary scale o
f supposed benefit, was held not invalid under
the constitutional provision.”
So the Constitution o
f
Illinois provides that “the General As
sembly shall provide for levying a tax b
y valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
o
f
his o
r
her property; such value to be ascertained b
y
some per
son o
r persons to be elected o
r appointed in such manner as the
General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise,” ” &c. The
charter o
f
the city o
f
Peoria provided that, when a pub
lic street * was opened o
r improved, commissioners should [*499]
b
e appointed b
y
the county court to assess upon the
property benefited the expense o
f
the improvement in proportion
to the benefit. These provisions were held to be constitutional,
o
n
the ground that assessments o
f
this character were not such
taxation as was contemplated b
y
the general terms which the
constitution employed.” And a similar view o
f
these local as
sessments has been taken in other cases.”
* Art. 14, § 11.
* Art. 14, § 12.
* Williams v. Mayor, &c. of De
troit, 2 Mich. 560. And see Wood
bridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274.
* Art. 9
,
§ 2.
* City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill.
357. See also Canal Trustees v. Chi
cago, 12 Ill. 406. In the subsequent
case o
f Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203,
it was decided, after very full argu
ment and consideration, that, while
taxation for these local assessments
might constitutionally be made in
proportion and to the extent o
f
the
benefits received, it could not be
made on the basis o
f frontage. This
case was followed in Wright v. Chi
cago, 46 Ill. 44.
• People v. Mayor, &c. o
f Brook
lyn, 4 N
.
Y
. 419; Matter of Mayor,
&c. o
f
New York, 11 Johns. 77;
Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Livingston
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 8 Wend.
85; Matter o
f
Furman St., 17 Wend.
649; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn.
189; Schenley v. City o
f Alleghany,
25 Penn. St. 128; Wray v. Pittsburg,
46 Penn. St. 365; Hammett v. Phila
delphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; s. c. 3 Am.
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But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the require
ment that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to
these local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The
difference is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the
basis on which it is established. But to render taxation uniform
in any case, two things are essential. The first of these is that
each taxing district should confine itself to the objects of taxa
tion within it
s
limits. Otherwise there is
,
o
r may be, dupli
cate taxation, and o
f
course inequality. Assessments upon real
estate not lying within the taxing districts would be void," and
Rep. 615; Washington Avenue, 69
Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255;
McBride v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 574; Chi
cago v
. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; City of
Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9
Dana, 513; Barnes v. Atchison, 2
Kan. 454; Hines v. Leavenworth,
3 Kan. 186; St. Joseph v. O'Dono
ghue, 31 Mo. 345; Egyptian Levee
Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; St. Joseph
v
. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537; Burnet v.
Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Yeatman v.
Crandell, 11 La. Ann. 220; Wallace
v
. Shelton, 14 La. Ann. 498; Richard
son v. Morgan, 16 La. Ann. 429;
Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 243;
Marion v. Epler, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 250;
Reeves v
. Treasurer o
f
Wood Co.,
8 Ohio, N
.
s. 333; Northern Ind.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N
.
s.
159; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio,
N
.
s. 534; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio,
N
.
s. 636; State v. Dean, 3 Zab. 335;
State v. Mayor, &c. o
f Jersey City,
4
. Zab. 662; Bond v. Kenosha, 17
Wis. 289; City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff,
2
0 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 v.
White, 9 La. Ann. 447; Cumming v.
Police Jury, 9 La. Ann. 503; Northern
Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13
Penn. St. 107; McGee v. Mathis, 21
Ark. 40; Goodrich v. Winchester,
&c. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119; Emery
v
. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Palmer v.
Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Dergan v. Bos
ton, 12 Allen, 223. In Alabama a
recent decision has been made the
other way. The constitution pro
vides that “all taxes levied on prop
erty in this State shall be assessed in
exact proportion to the value o
f
such
property; provided, however, that the
General Assembly may levy a poll
tax not to exceed one dollar and fifty
cents on each poll, which shall be
applied exclusively in aid o
f
the pub
lic school fund.” This, it was de
cided, would preclude the levy o
f
a
local assessment for the improvement
o
f
a street by the foot front. Mayor
o
f
Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310.
The cases o
f
Weeks v. Milwaukee,
10 Wis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, 10
Wis. 282, recognize the fact that these
local burdens are generally imposed
under the name of assessments instead
o
f
taxes, and that therefore they are
not covered by the general provisions
in the constitution of the State on
the subject o
f
taxation. And see
Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Hale
v
. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599. An exemp
tion o
f
church property from taxation
will not preclude its being assessed
for improving streets in front of it
.
See post, p
.
*514, note.
* But sometimes, when a parcel o
f
real estate lies partly in two districts,
authority is given by law to assess
the whole in one o
f
these districts,
and the whole parcel may then be
considered a
s having been embraced
within the district where taxed, by
a
n enlargement o
f
the district bounds
to include it
.
Saunders v. Spring
stein, 4 Wend. 429.
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assessments for personal property" made against persons [* 500]
not residing in the district would also be void, unless
made with reference to the actual presence of the property in
such district.”
In Wells v. City of Weston,” the Supreme Court of Missouri
deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one
taxing district to assessment in another, upon the express ground
that it is in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of
one class of citizens for the benefit of another class. The case
was one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying
outside the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the
theory that it received some benefit from the city government,
and ought to contribute to it
s support. In Kentucky” and Iowa.”
decisions have been made which, while affirming the same prin
ciple as the case above cited, g
o
still further, and declare that it
is not competent for the legislature to increase the limits o
f
a city,
in order to include therein farming lands, occupied b
y
the owner
for agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets o
r
houses, o
r
other purposes o
f
a town, where the purpose is merely
to increase the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that
the extension o
f
the limits o
f
a city o
r town, so as to include its
actual enlargement, as manifested b
y
houses and population, is to
b
e
deemed a legitimate exercise o
f
the taxing power, but they
declare that an indefinite or unreasonable extension, so as to em
brace lands o
r
farms a
t
a distance from the local government, does
not rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a
delicate a
s well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose,
the court had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which
the legislative discretion cannot go. “It is not every case of
injustice or oppression which may be reached; and it is not every
case which will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the
1 People v. Supervisors o
f Che
nango, 11 N
.
Y
.
563; Mygatt v. Wash
burn, 15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith,
24 Barb. 419; Hartland v. Church,
4
7 Me. 169; Lessee o
f Hughey v.
Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231. -
* 22 Mo. 385. To the same effect
is In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398.
Compare case o
f
State Tax on For
eign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; St.
Charles v. Noble, 51 Mo. 122; s. c.
1
1 Am. Rep. 440. The case of Lang
horne v. Robinson, 20 Grat. 661, is
contra.
* City of Covington v. Southgate,
1
5 B
.
Monr. 491; Arbegust v. Louis
ville, 3 Bush, 271; Swift v. Newport,
7 Bush, 37.
* Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
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minute operation of laws imposing taxes, or defining the boun
daries of local jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the
local authority may in some cases be greater than is necessary to
include the adjacent population, or territory laid out into
[* 501] city lots, without a * case being presented in which the
courts would be called upon to apply a nice and exact
scrutiny as to it
s pract cal operation. It must be a case of fla
grant injustice and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking o
f
private property without such compensation in return as the tax
payer is a
t liberty to consider a fair equivalent for the tax.” This
decision has been subsequently recognized and followed as author
ity, in the last-named State."
The second essential is that there should be uniformity in the
manner o
f
the assessment, and approximate equality in the amount
o
f
exactions within the district; and to this end that all the
objects o
f
taxation within the district should be embraced. The
correctness o
f
this principle will be conceded, but whether in
practice it has been applied or not, it may not always be easy to
determine.
e
“With the single exception of specific taxes,” says Christiancy,
J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,” “the terms “tax' and “assessment’
both, I think, when applied to property, and especially to lands,
always include the idea o
f
some ratio or rule o
f apportionment, so
that o
f
the whole sum to b
e raised, the part paid by one piece o
f
property shall bear some known relation to, o
r
b
e affected by, that
paid by another. Thus, if one hundred dollars are to be raised
from tracts A, B
,
and C
,
the amount paid b
y
A will reduce b
y
so
* Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa,
86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa,
404; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282.
These cases were cited and followed
in Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16.
These cases, however, do not hold
the legislative act which enlarges the
city limits to be absolutely void, but
only hold that they will limit the
exercise o
f
the taxing power as nearly
a
s practicable to the line where the
extension of the boundaries ceases to
b
e beneficial to the proprietor in a
municipal point o
f
view. For this
purpose they enter into an inquiry o
f
fact, whether the lands in question,
in view of their relative position to
the growing and improved parts o
f
the town, and partaking more o
r
less
o
f
the benefits o
f municipal govern
ment, are proper subjects o
f
munici
pal taxation; and if not, they enjoin
the collection of such taxes. It would
seem a
s if there must be great prac
tical difficulties—if not some of prin
ciple — in making this disposition o
f
such a case. They have nevertheless
been followed repeatedly in Iowa.
* 8 Mich. 301. See also Chicago
v
. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; Creote v.
Chicago, 56 Ill. 422.
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much that to be paid by B and C, and so of the others. In the
case of specific taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the
amount paid by one is not affected by that paid by another, yet
there is a known and fixed relation of one to the other, a uniform
rate by which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of
property or persons to which the specific tax applies; and this is
so of duties and imposts, whether specific or ad valorem. To
compel individuals to contribute money or property to the use of
the public, without reference to any common ratio, and
without requiring the sum * paid by one piece or kind of [* 502]
property, or by one person, to bear any relation whatever
to that paid by another, is
,
it seems to me, to lay a forced contri
bution, not a tax, duty, or impost, within the sense o
f
these terms,
a
s applied to the exercise o
f powers by any enlightened o
r respon
sible government.”
In the case of Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, an
important and interesting question arose, involving the very point
now under discussion. The Constitution o
f
Wisconsin provides
that “the rule of taxation shall be uniform,” which, if we are
correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an affirm
ance o
f
a settled principle o
f
constitutional law. The city o
f
Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land
embraced within the recorded plat o
f
the village o
f
Janesville and
its additions, but also a large quantity o
f
the adjacent farming o
r
agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners o
f
these lands to b
e
greatly and unequally burdened b
y
taxation for the support o
f
the city government, the legislature passed a
n
act declaring that
“in no case shall the real and personal property within the terri
torial limits o
f
said city, and not included within the territorial
limits o
f
the recorded plat o
f
the village o
f Janesville, or o
f any
additions to said village, which may be used, occupied, o
r re
served for agricultural o
r
horticultural purposes, be subject to an
annual tax to defray the current expenses o
f
said city, exceeding
one-half o
f
one per cent, nor for the repair and building o
f
roads
and bridges, and the support o
f
the poor, more than one-half as
much on each dollar's valuation shall be levied for such purposes
a
s
o
n
the property within such recorded plats, nor shall the same
b
e subject to any tax for any o
f
the purposes mentioned in § 3 o
f
1 9 Wis. 410.
40
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c. 5 of [the city charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening
lands be subject to any tax, other than before mentioned, for any
city purpose whatever.” Under the charter the property of the
city was liable to an annual tax of one per centum to defray the
current expenses of the city; and also an additional tax of such
sum as the common council might deem necessary for the repair
and building of roads and bridges, and for the support of the
poor. Thus it will be perceived that the legislature, within the
same taxing district, — if the whole city is to be considered one
district only, -undertook to provide that a portion of the prop
erty should be taxed at one rate in proportion to value, and
another portion at a much lower rate ; while from taxation for
certain proper local purposes the latter class was exempted al
together.
[* 503] * “It was contended in argument,” say the court,
“that as those provisions fixed one uniform rate without
the recorded plats, and another within them, thus taxing all the
property without alike, and a
ll
within alike, they do not infringe
the constitution. In other words, that for the purpose of taxa
tion, the legislature have the right arbitrarily to divide up and
classify the property o
f
the citizens, and, having done so, they do
not violate the constitutional rule o
f uniformity, provided all the
property within a given class is rated alike.
“The answer to this argument is
,
that it creates different rules
o
f taxation, to the number o
f
which there is n
o limit, except that
fixed by legislative discretion, while the constitution establishes
but one fixed, unbending, uniform rule on the subject. It is be
lieved that if the legislature can, by classification, thus arbitrarily,
and without regard to value, discriminate in the same municipal
corporation between personal and real property within, and per
sonal and real property without, a recorded plat, they can also by
the same means discriminate between lands used for one purpose
and those used for another, such as lands used for growing wheat
and those used for growing corn, o
r any other crop; meadow
lands and pasture-lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands; o
r
they can classify b
y
the description, such as odd-numbered lots
and blocks and even-numbered ones, or odd and even numbered
sections. Personal property can be classified b
y
it
s character, use,
o
r description, or, as in the present case, b
y
it
s location, and thus
the rules o
f
taxation may be multiplied to an extent equal in
CH. XIV.] THE POWER OF TAXATION. 627
number to the different kinds, uses, descriptions, and locations of
real and personal property. We do not see why the system may
not be carried further, and the classification be made by the char
acter, trade, profession, or business of the owners. For certainly
this rule of uniformity can as well be applied to such a classifica
tion as any other, and thus the constitutional provision be saved
intact. Such a construction would make the constitution opera
tive only to the extent of prohibiting the legislature from dis
criminating in favor of particular individuals, and would reduce
the people, while considering so grave and important a proposi
tion, to the ridiculous attitude of saying to the legislature, “You
shall not discriminate between single individuals or corporations;
but you may divide the citizens up into different classes, as the
followers of different trades, professions, or kinds of busi
ness, or as the owners of * different species or descriptions [* 504]
of property, and legislate for one class, and against
another, as much as you please, provided you serve a
ll
o
f
the
favored o
r
unfavored classes alike ;' thus affording a direct and
solemn sanction to a system o
f
taxation so manifestly and grossly
unjust that it will not find an apologist anywhere, at least outside
o
f
those who are the recipients o
f
it
s
favor. We do not believe
the framers o
f
that instrument intended such a construction, and
therefore cannot adopt it.” "
The principle to be deduced from the Iowa and Wisconsin
cases, assuming that they do not in any degree conflict, seems to
b
e this: The legislature cannot arbitrarily include within the
1 Per Dixon, Ch. J., 9 Wis. 421.
Besides the other cases referred to,
see, o
n this same general subject,
Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534;
State v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 12 La.
Ann. 802; Adams v. Somerville, 2
Head, 363; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn.
295; Attorney-General v. Winnebago
Lake and Fox River P. R
. Co., 11
Wis. 35; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10
Wis. 242; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill.
557; Philadelphia Association, &c.
v
. Wood, 39 Penn. 73; Sacramento
v
. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119. There
was a provision in the charter o
f
Covington that a street might be
paved with the Nicholson pavement
a
t
the expense o
f
the adjoining own
ers, when the owners o
f
the larger
part o
f
the frontage should petition
therefor. An amendatory act au
thorized it as to a portion of a certain
street without such a petition; thus
permitting a special improvement on
that street, a
t
the expense o
f
the own
ers o
f adjoining lots, on a different
principle from that adopted for the
city generally. In Howell v. Bristol,
8 Bush, 493, this amendment was
held inconsistent with the fundamen
tal principles o
f taxation, and conse
quently void.
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limits of a village, borough, or city, property and persons not
properly chargeable with it
s burdens, and for the sole purpose o
f
increasing the corporate revenues b
y
the exaction o
f
the taxes.
But whenever the corporate boundaries are established, it is to be
understood that whatever property is included within those limits
has been thus included b
y
the legislature, because it justly be
longs there, as being within the circuit which is benefited b
y
the
local government, and which ought consequently to contribute to
its burdens. The legislature cannot, therefore, after having
already, b
y
including the property within the corporation, de
clared its opinion that such property should contribute to the
local government, immediately turn about and establish a basis o
f
taxation which assumes that the property is not in fact urban
property a
t all, but is agricultural lands, and should be assessed
accordingly. The rule o
f apportionment must be uniform
throughout the taxing district, applicable to all alike,; but the
legislature have n
o power to arrange the taxing districts arbi
trarily, and without reference to the great fundamental principle
o
f taxation, that the burden must be borne by those upon whom
it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that, in a
case where they have manifestly and unmistakably done so, the
courts may interfere and restrain the imposition o
f municipal
burdens on property which does not properly belong within the
municipal taxing district at all. It must be manifest, however,
that the effect of the decisions in the States last referred to is to
establish judicially two or more districts within a municipality
where the legislature has established one only; and as this is plainly
a legislative function, it would seem that the legislature must
b
e
a
t
least as competent to establish them directly as any court
can b
e
to d
o
the same thing indirectly. And in Missouri,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, no difficulty has been found in
sustaining legislation which discriminated in taxation between
“rural ” lands and others within the same city."
[* 505] * This rule of uniformity has perhaps been found most
difficult o
f application in regard to those cases o
f
taxation
which are commonly known under the head o
f assessments, and
which are made either fo
r
local improvement and repair, o
r
to
1 Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179; 355. And see Gillette r. Hartford,
Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607; 31 Conn. 351.
Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Penn. St.
º
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prevent local causes resulting in the destruction of health or
property. In those cases where it has been held that such assess
ments were not covered by the constitutional provision that taxa
tion should be laid upon property in proportion to value, it has,
nevertheless, been decided that the authority to make them must
be referred to the taxing power, and not to the police power of
the State, under which sidewalks have sometimes been ordered to
be constructed. Apportionment of the burden was therefore
essential, though it need not be made upon property in proportion
to it
s
value. But the question then arises: What shall be the
rule o
f apportionment? Can a street be ordered graded and
paved, and the expense assessed exclusively upon the property
which, in the opinion o
f
the assessors, shall b
e peculiarly bene
fited thereby, in proportion to such benefit? Or may a taxing
district be created for the purpose, and the expense assessed in
proportion to the area o
f
the lots 2 Or may the street be made
a taxing district, and the cost levied in proportion to the front
age 2 Or may each lot owner be required to grade and pave in
front o
f
his lot ? These are grave questions, and they have not
been found o
f easy solution.
The case o
f
The People v. The Mayor, &c. o
f Brooklyn," is a
leading case, holding that a statute authorizing a municipal cor
poration to grade and improve streets, and to assess the expense
among the owners and occupants o
f
lands benefited by the im
provement, in proportion to the amount o
f
such benefit, is a con
stitutional and valid law. The court in that case concede that
taxation cannot be laid without apportionment, but hold that the
basis o
f apportionment in these cases is left by the constitution
with the legislature. The application o
f any one rule or principle
o
f apportionment to all cases would be manifestly oppressive and
unjust. Taxation is sometimes regulated b
y
one principle, and
sometimes by another; and very often it has been apportioned
without reference to locality, o
r
to the tax-payer's ability to con
tribute, or to any proportion between the burden and the benefit.
“The excise laws, and taxes on carriages and watches,
are among the many examples o
f
* this description o
f [* 506]
taxation. Some taxes affect classes o
f
inhabitants only.
All duties on imported goods are taxes on the class of consumers.
The tax on one imported article falls on a large class of consumers,
* 4 N
.
Y
. 410; reversing same case, 6 Barb. 209.
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while the tax on another affects comparatively a few individuals.
The duty on one article consumed by one class of inhabitants is
twenty per cent of it
s value, while on another, consumed b
y
a
different class, it is forty per cent. The duty on one foreign
commodity is laid for the purpose o
f
revenue mainly, without
reference to the ability o
f
it
s
consumers to pay, as in the case of
the duty on salt. The duty on another is laid for the purpose of
encouraging domestic manufacture o
f
the same article, thus com
pelling the consumer to pay a higher price to one man than he
could otherwise have bought the article for from another. These
discriminations may be impolitic, and in some cases unjust ; but
if the power of taxation upon importations had not been trans
ferred b
y
the people o
f
this State to the federal government,
there could have been n
o pretence for declaring them to be
unconstitutional in State legislation.
“A property tax for the general purposes of the government,
either o
f
the State a
t large o
r o
f
a county, city, or other district,
is regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious.
It apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly than
any other inflexible rule o
f general taxation. A rich man derives
more benefit from taxation, in the protection and improvement o
f
his property, than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more.
But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot
b
e
ascertained and estimated with any degree o
f certainty; and
for that reason a property tax is adopted, instead o
f
an estimate
o
f
benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the
local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated
to a reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and
assumed to b
e
true b
y
the legislature, whose duty it is to pre
scribe the rules o
n
which taxation is to be apportioned, and
whose determination o
f
this matter, being within the scope o
f
it
s
lawful power, is conclusive.”
The reasoning o
f
this case has been generally accepted as satis
factory, and followed in subsequent cases."
1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N
.
s. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Uhrig v. St.
126; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 243; Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Bradley v. McAtee,
Marion v. Epler, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 250; 7 Bush, 667; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309;
Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N
.
s. Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 461;
636; City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio,
Ill. 351; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood N. s. 349; State v. Fuller, 34 N
. J.
Co., 8 Ohio, N
.
s. 333; Garrett v. 227; Holton v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis.
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* On the other hand, and on the like reasoning, it has [* 507]
been held equally competent to make the street a taxing
district, and assess the expense of the improvement upon the lots
27; McMasters v. Commonwealth,
3 Watts, 292; Allentown v. Henry,
73 Penn. St. 404; Weber v. Rein
hard, 73 Penn. St. 370; Livingston
v. New York, 8 Wend. 86; Wright v.
Boston, 9 Cush. 233; Jones v. Boston,
104 Mass. 461; Nichols v. Bridgeport,
23 Conn. 189; Cone v. Hartford, 28
Conn. 363; Alexander v. Baltimore,
5 Gill, 383; Howard v. The Church,
18 Md. 451; Hoyt v. East Saginaw,
19 Mich. 39; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25
Mo. 505; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12
Cal. 76; La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind.
140. The right to assess by benefits
has been denied in South Carolina.
State v. Charleston, 12 Rich. 702.
The legislation in Ohio on the sub
ject has authorized the cities and
villages, in opening and improving
streets, to assess the expense either
upon the lots abutting on the street
in proportion to the street front, or
upon the lands in proportion to their
assessed value. In a case where the
former mode was resorted to, and an
assessment made upon property owned
by the Northern Indiana Railroad
Company for it
s corporate purposes,
Peck, J., thus states and answers an
objection to the validity o
f
the tax:
“But it is said that assessments, as
distinguished from general taxation,
rest solely upon the idea o
f equivalents;
a compensation proportioned to the
special benefits derived from the im
provement, and that, in the case a
t
bar, the railroad company is not, and
in the nature of things cannot be, in
any degree benefited by the improve
ment. It is quite true that the right
to impose such special taxes is based
upon a presumed equivalent; but it
by n
o
means follows that there must
b
e in fact such full equivalent in
every instance, o
r
that it
s
absence
will render the assessment invalid.
The rule of apportionment, whether
by the front foot o
r
a percentage upon
the assessed valuation must be uni
form, affecting all the owners and all
the property abutting on the street
alike. One rule cannot be applied to
one owner, and a different rule to
another owner. One could not be
assessed ten per cent, another five,
another three, and another left alto
gether unassessed because he was not
in fact benefited. It is manifest that
the actual benefits resulting from the
improvement may be as various al
most as the number of the owners
and the uses to which the property
may be applied. No general rule,
therefore, could be laid down which
would do equal and exact justice to
all. The legislature have not at
tempted so vain a thing, but have
prescribed two different modes in
which the assessment may be made,
and left the city authorities free to
adopt either. The mode adopted by
the council becomes the statutory
equivalent for the benefits conferred,
although in fact the burden imposed
may greatly preponderate. In such
case, if no fraud intervene, and the
assessment does not substantially ex
haust the owner's interest in the land,
his remedy would seem to be to pro
cure, by a timely appeal to the city
authorities, a reduction o
f
the special
assessment, and its imposition, in
whole o
r
in part, upon the public a
t
large.” Northern Indiana R
.
R
.
Co. v
.
Connelly, 10 Ohio, N
.
s. 159,165. And
see Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493.
There are no constitutional objections
to meeting the expense o
f repaving
a street by local assessments that do
not equally lie to such assessments
for the first paving. Blount v. Janes
ville, 31 Wis. 648.
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in proportion to the"frontage." Here also is apportionment by a
rule which approximates to what is just, but which, like any other
rule that can be applied, is only an approximation to absolute
equality. But if
,
in the opinion o
f
the legislature, it is the
proper rule to apply to any particular case, the courts must
enforce it.
*But a very different case is presented when the legis
lature undertakes to provide that each lot upon a street
shall pay the whole expense o
f grading and paving the street along
its front. For while in such a case there would be something
having the outward appearance o
f apportionment, it requires but
slight examination to discover that it is a deceptive semblance
only, and that the measure o
f equality which the constitution
requires is entirely wanting. If every lot owner is compelled to
construct the street in front o
f
his lot, his tax is neither increased
nor diminished b
y
the assessment upon his neighbors; nothing is
divided or apportioned between him and them; and each particu
lar lot is in fact arbitrarily made a taxing district, and charged
with the whole expenditure therein, and thus apportionment
[* 508]
1 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560;
Northern Ind. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Connelly,
10 Ohio, N
.
s. 159; Lumsden v. Cross,
1
0 Wis. 282. And see St. Joseph v.
O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Burnett
v
. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Scoville
v
. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N
.
s. 126; Hill
v
. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 243; Ernst v.
Kunkle, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 520; Hines v.
Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186; Magee
v
. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St. 358;
Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365;
Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329. In
Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn.
St. 146, s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 615, while
the cases here cited are approved, it is
denied that a street already laid out
and in good condition can be taken
and improved for a public drive or
carriage-way a
t
the expense o
f
the
adjacent owners; this not being an
improvement for local but for general
purposes. Compare Washington
Avenue, 69 Penn. St. 353; s. c. 8
Am. Rep. 255; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt.
174 (case o
f water-rents); Willard v.
Presbury, 14 Wall. 676; Hoyt v.
East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; s. c. 2
Am. Rep. 76; La Fayette v. Fowler,
3
4 Ind. 140; Chambers v. Satterlee,
4
0 Cal. 497; Bradley v. McAtee, 7
Bush, 667; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 309.
In Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St.
353, s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255, it is denied
that this principle can be applied to
the country and to farming lands.
Agnew, J., says: “To apply it to the
country, o
r
to farm lands, would lead
to such inequality and injustice as to
deprive it of all soundness as a rule,
or as a substitute for a fair and im
partial valuation o
f
benefits in pursu
ance o
f law; so that at the very first
blush every one would pronounce it
palpably unreasonable and unjust.”
The able opinion in this case is a very
satisfactory and very thorough ex
amination o
f
the principles on which
local assessments are supported. The
case o
f
Seely v. Pittsburg, 82 Penn.
St. 360, is a case in principle similar
to that last above cited.
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avoided. If the tax were for grading the street simply, those
lots which were already at the established grade would escape
altogether, while those on either side, which chanced to be above
and below, must bear the whole burden, though no more benefited
by the improvement than the others.” It is evident, therefore,
that a law for making assessments on this basis could not have in
view such distribution of burdens in proportion to benefits as
ought to be a cardinal idea in every tax law.” It would be
nakedly an arbitrary command of the law to each lot owner to
construct the street in front of his lot at his own expense, accord
ing to a prescribed standard ; and a power to issue such command
could never be exercised by a constitutional government, unless
we are at liberty to treat it as a police regulation, and place the
duty to make the streets upon the same footing as that to keep
the sidewalks free from obstruction and fi
t
for passage.
such idea is clearly inadmissible.”
* In fact, lots above and below an
established grade are usually less
benefited by the grading than the
others; because the improvement
subjects them to new burdens, in
order to bring the general surface to
the grade o
f
the street, which the
others escape.
* The case o
f
Warren v. Henley,
3
1 Iowa, 38, is opposed to the rea
soning o
f
the text; but the learned
Judge who delivers the opinion con
cedes that he is unable to support his
conclusions on the authorities within
his reach.
* See City of Lexington v. Mc
Quillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, and
opinions o
f
Campbell and Christiancy,
JJ., in Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8.
Mich. 274. The case o
f
Weeks v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258, seems to be
contra. We quote from the opinion
o
f
the court by Paine, J. After
stating the rule that uniformity in
taxation implies equality in the bur
den, he proceeds: “The principle
upon which these assessments rest is
clearly destructive o
f
this equality.
It requires every lot owner to build
whatever improvements the public
But any
may require on the street in front o
f
his lot, without reference to inequali
ties in the value o
f
the lots, in the
expense o
f constructing the improve
ments, o
r
to the question whether the
lot is injured or benefited by their
construction. Corner lots are re
quired to construct and keep in repair
three times as much as other lots;
and yet it is well known that the
difference in value bears n
o propor
tion to this difference in burden. In
front of one lot the expense of build
ing the street may exceed the value
o
f
the lot; and its construction may
impose on the owner additional ex
pense, to render his lot accessible.
In front o
f
another lot, o
f
even much
greater value, the expense is com
paratively slight. These inequalities
are obvious; and I have always
thought the principle o
f
such assess
ments was radically wrong. They
have been very extensively discussed,
and sustained upon the ground that
the lot should pay because it receives
the benefit. But if this be true, that
the improvements in front o
f
a lot
are made for the benefit of the lot
only, then the right of the public to
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[* 509] "In many other cases, besides the construction, im
provement, and repair of streets, may special tax
tax the owner at a
ll for that purpose
fails; because the public has no right
to tax the citizen to make him build
improvements for his own benefit
merely. It must be for a public
purpose; and it being once established
that the construction o
f
streets is a
public purpose that will justify taxa
tion, I think it follows, if the matter
is to be settled on principle, that the
taxation should be equal and uni
form, and that to make it so the
whole taxable property o
f
the politi
cal division in which the improve
ment is made should be taxed b
y
a
uniform rule for the purpose of it
s
construction.
“But in sustaining these assess
ments when private property was
wanted for a street, it has been said
that the State could take it
,
because
the use o
f
the street was a public use;
in order to justify a resort to the
power o
f taxation, it is said the build
ing o
f
a street is a public purpose.
But then, having got the land to
build it on, and the power to tax
b
y
holding it a public purpose, they
immediately abandon: that idea, and
say that it is a private benefit, and
make the owner o
f
the lot build the
whole o
f
it
. I think this is the same
in principle as it would be to say that
the town, in which the county seat is
located, should build the county
buildings, o
r
that the county where
the capital is should construct the
public edifices o
f
the State, upon the
ground that, b
y
being located nearer,
they derived a greater benefit than
others. If the question, therefore,
was, whether the system o
f
assess
ment could be sustained upon prin
ciple, I should have no hesitation in
deciding it in the negative. I fully
agree with the reasoning o
f
the Su
preme Court o
f
Louisiana in the case
o
f Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9
La. Ann. 447, upon this point.
“But the question is not whether
this system is established upon sound
principles, but whether the legislature
has power, under the constitution, to
establish such a system. As already
stated, if the provision requiring the
rule o
f
taxation to be uniform was
the only one bearing upon the ques
tion, I should answer this also in the
negative. But there is another pro
vision which seems to me so impor
tant, that it has changed the result to
which I should otherwise have ar
rived. That provision is § 3 of art.
11, and is as follows: “It shall be
the duty o
f
the legislature, and they
are hereby empowered, to provide for
the organization o
f
cities and incor
porated villages, and to restrict their
power o
f taxation, assessment, borrow
ing money, contracting debts, and
loaning their credit, so as to prevent
abuses in assessments and taxation,
and in contracting debts b
y
such mu
nicipal corporations.”
“It cannot well be denied that if
the word “assessment,’ as used in
this section, had reference to this es
tablished system o
f special taxation
for municipal improvements, that
then it is a clear recognition of the
existence and legality o
f
the power.”
And the court, having reached the
conclusion that the word did have
reference to such an established sys
tem, sustain the assessment, add
ing: “The same effect was given to
the same clause in the Constitution
o
f Ohio, by the Supreme Court o
f
that State, in a recent decision in the
case o
f Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N
.
s.
243. And the reasoning of Chief
Justice Ranney on the question I
think it impossible to answer.”
If the State of Wisconsin had any
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ing districts be created, with a * view to local im- [* 510]
provements. The cases of drains to relieve swamps,
marshes, and other low lands of their stagnant water, and of
levees to prevent lands being overflowed by rivers, will at once
suggest themselves. In providing for such cases, however, the
legislature exercises another power besides the power of taxation.
On the theory that the drainage is for the sole purpose of benefit
ing the lands of individuals, it might be difficult to defend such
legislation. But if the stagnant water causes or threatens dis
ease, it may be a nuisance, which, under it
s power o
f police, the
State would have authority to abate. The laws for this purpose,
so far as they have fallen under our observation, have proceeded
upon this theory. Nevertheless, when the State incurs
* expense in the exercise o
f
it
s police power for this [* 511]
settled and known practice, desig
nated as assessments, under which
each lot owner was compelled to con
struct the streets in front of his lot,
then the constitution as quoted may
well be held to recognize such prac
tice. In this view, however, it is still
difficult to discover any “restriction ”
in a law which perpetuates the arbi
trary and unjust custom, and which
still permits the whole expense of
making the street in front o
f
each lot
to be imposed upon it
.
The only
restriction which the law imposes is
,
that its terms exclude uniformity,
equality, and justice, which surely
could not be the restriction the con
stitution designed. Certainly the
learned judge shows very clearly that
such a law is unwarranted as a legiti
mate exercise o
f
the taxing power;
and a
s it cannot be warranted under
any other power known to constitu
tional government, the authority to
adopt it should not be found in
doubtful words. The case of Hill
v
. Higdon, referred to, is different.
There the expense o
f improving the
street was assessed upon the property
abutting on the street, in proportion
to the foot front. The decision there
was, that the constitutional provision
that “laws shall be passed taxing by
a uniform rule all moneys, &c., and
also all real and personal property,
according to its true value in money,”
had no reference to these local assess
ments, which might still be made, as
they were before the constitution was
adopted, with reference to the bene
fits conferred. The case, therefore,
showed a rule o
f apportionment which
was made applicable throughout the
taxing district, to wit, along the
street so far as the improvement ex
tended. The case of State v. City of
Portage, 12 Wis. 562, holds that a
law authorizing the expense o
f
an
improvement to be assessed upon the
abutting lots, in proportion to their
front or size, would not justify and
sustain city action which required the
owner o
f
each lot to bear the expense
o
f
the improvement in front o
f it
.
It has been often contended that
taxation by frontage was in effect a
taking o
f property for the public use,
but the courts have held otherwise.
People v. Mayor, &c. o
f Brooklyn,
4 N
.
Y. 419; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt.
174; Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 39;
Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St.
353; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 255.
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purpose, it may be proper to assess that expense upon the
portion of the community specially and peculiarly benefited. The
assessment is usually made with reference to the benefit to prop
erty; and it is difficult to frame or to conceive of any other rule
of apportionment that would operate so justly and so equally in
these cases. There may be difficulty in the detail; difficulty in
securing just and impartial assessments; but the principle of such
a law would not depend for it
s
soundness upon such considera
tions."
* See Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood
Co., 8 Ohio, N
.
s. 333; Sessions v.
Crunklinton, 20 Ohio, N
.
s. 349;
French v. Kirkland, 1 Paige, 117;
Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige, 560;
Anderson v. Kerns Co., 14 Ind. 199;
O'Reiley v. Kankakee Co., 32 Ind.
169; Draining Co. Case, 11 La. Ann.
338; Hagar v. Supervisors o
f Yolo,
47 Cal. 222. In Woodruff v. Fisher,
1
7 Barb. 224, Hand, J., speaking of
one o
f
these drainage laws, says: “If
the object to be accomplished b
y
this
statute may be considered a public
improvement, the power o
f
taxation
seems to have been sustained upon
analogous principles. [Citing People
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f Brooklyn, 4 N. Y
.
419; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend.
65; and Livingston v. Mayor, &c.
o
f
New York, 8 Wend. 101.] But
if the object was merely to improve
the property o
f individuals, I think
the statute would be void, although
it provided for compensation. The
water privileges on Indian River can
not be taken or affected in any way
solely for the private advantage of
others, however numerous the bene
ficiaries. Several statutes have been
passed for draining swamps, but it
seems to me that the principle above
advanced rests upon natural and con
stitutional law. The professed ob
ject o
f
this statute is to promote
public health. And one question
that arises is, whether the owners o
f
large tracts o
f
land in a state o
f na
ture can be taxed to pay the expense
o
f draining them, by destroying the
dams, &c., o
f
other persons away
from the drowned lands, and for the
purposes o
f public health. This law
proposes to destroy the water power
o
f
certain persons against their will,
to drain the lands o
f others, also, for
all that appears, against their will;
and all at the expense o
f
the latter,
for this public good. If this taxation
is illegal, no mode of compensation is
provided, and all is illegal.” “The
owners of these lands could not be
convicted o
f maintaining a public
nuisance because they did not drain
them; even though they were the
owners o
f
the lands upon which the
obstructions are situated. It does
not appear by the act o
r
the com
plaint that the sickness to be pre
vented prevails among inhabitants
on the wet lands, nor whether these
lands will be benefited or injured by
draining; and certainly, unless they
will be benefited, it would seem to be
partial legislation to tax a certain
tract o
f land, for the expense o
f do
ing to it what did not improve it
,
merely because, in a state o
f nature,
it may be productive of sickness.
Street assessments are put upon the
ground that the land assessed is im
proved, and its value greatly en
hanced.” The remarks o
f Green, J.,
in Williams v. Mayor, &c. of Detroit,
2 Mich. 560, 567, may be here quoted:
“Every species of taxation, in every
mode, is in theory and principle based
upon an idea o
f compensation, ben
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Sewers in cities and populous districts are a necessity, not only
that the streets may be kept clean and in repair, but to prevent
the premises of individuals from becoming nuisances. The ex
pense of these is variously assessed. It may unquestionably be
made by benefits and by frontage under proper legislation."
* In certain classes of cases, it has been customary to [* 512]
call upon the citizen to appear in person and perform ser
vice for the State, in the nature of police duties. The burden of
improving and repairing the common highways of the country,
except in the urban districts, is generally laid upon the people in
the form of an assessment of labor. The assessment may be
upon each citizen, in proportion to his property; or, in addition
to the property assessment, there may be one also by the poll.
But though the public burden assumes the form of labor, it is
still taxation, and must therefore be levied on some principle of
uniformity. But it is a peculiar species of taxation; and the
general terms “ tax,” or “taxation,” as employed in the State con
efit, or advantage to the person or
property taxed, either directly or in
directly. If the tax is levied for the
support of the government and gen
eral police of the State, for the edu
cation and moral instruction of the
citizens, or the construction of works
of internal improvement, he is sup
posed to receive a just compensation
in the security which the government
affords to his person and property,
the means of enjoying his posses
sions, and their enhanced capacity
to contribute to his comfort and
gratification, which constitute their
value.” -
It has been held incompetent, how
ever, for a city which has itself created
a nuisance on the property of a citi
zen, to tax him for the expense of re
moving or abating it
.
Weeks v. Mil
waukee, 10 Wis. 258.
In Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin,
2
7 Mo. 495, it was held that a special
assessment for the purpose o
f reclaim
ing a district from inundation might
properly be laid upon land in propor
tion to its area, and that the constitu
tional provision that taxation should
be levied o
n property in proportion to
its valuation did not preclude this
mode of assessment. The same rul
ing was made in Louisiana cases.
Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. Ann. 329;
Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. Ann.
220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann.
498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La. Ann.
147; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La.
Ann. 429. And see McGehee v.
Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Jones v. Boston,
104 Mass. 461; Daily v. Swope, 47
Miss. 367; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss.
652.
* In England it is made by benefits.
In this country different methods
are adopted. See Wright v. Boston,
9 Cush. 233; Cone v. Hartford, 28
Conn. 363; St. Louis v. Oeters, 36
Mo. 456; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61
Penn. St. 255; Philadelphia v. Tryon,
3
5 Penn. St. 401; Warner v. Grand
Haven, 30 Mich. 24. It would not
b
e competent, however, to make the
assessment for a city sewer by the
area upon both in and out lots, as
this, from the nature o
f
the case, could
not possibly be equal.
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stitutions, would not generally be understood to include it
. It has
been decided that the clause in the Constitution o
f Illinois, that
“the mode of levying a tax shall be b
y valuation, so that every
person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value o
f
the property he
o
r
she has in his o
r
her possession,” did not prevent the levy o
f poll
taxes in highway labor. “The framers of the constitution intended
to direct a uniform mode o
f
taxation o
n property, and not to
prohibit any other species o
f taxation, but to leave the legisla
ture the power to impose such other taxes as would be consonant
to public justice, and as the circumstances o
f
the country might
require. They probably intended to prevent the imposition o
f
a
n arbitrary tax on property, according to kind and quantity, and
without reference to value. The inequality o
f
the mode o
f
taxation
was the object to b
e
avoided. We cannot believe that they intended
that all the public burdens should be borne by those having prop
erty in possession, wholly exempting the rest o
f
the com
[* 513] munity, who, by the * same constitution, were made secure
in the exercise o
f
the rights o
f suffrage, and a
ll
the immu
nities o
f
the citizen.”’’ And in another case, where an assess
ment o
f highway labor is compared with one upon adjacent
property for widening a street, — which had been held not to be
taxation, a
s
that term was understood in the constitution, — it is
said: “An assessment of labor for the repair of roads and streets
is less like a tax than is such an assessment. . The former is not
based upon, nor has it any reference to, property o
r
values owned
b
y
the person o
f
whom it is required, whilst the latter is based
alone upon the property designated b
y
the law imposing it
.
Nor
is an assessment a capitation tax, as that is a sum o
f money
levied upon each poll. This rate, on the contrary, is a requisi
tion for so many days’ labor, which may be commuted in money.
No doubt, the number o
f days levied, and the sum which may
b
e
received b
y
commutation, must b
e
uniform within the limits
o
f
the district or body imposing the same. This requisition for
labor to repair roads is not a tax, and hence this exemption is not
repugnant to the constitution.””
It will be apparent from what has already been said, that it is
i Sawyer v. City of Alton, 4 Ill. Draining Co. Case, 11 La. Ann. 338,
130; State v. Halifax, 4 Dev. 345; 372.
Amenia v. Stamford, 6 Johns. 92; * Town o
f
Pleasant v. Kost, 29
Ill. 494.
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not essential to the validity of taxation, that it be levied accord
ing to rules of abstract justice." It is only essential that the
legislature keep within its proper sphere of action, and not im
pose burdens under the name of taxation which are not taxes in
fact ; and its decision as to what is proper, just, and politic, must
then be final and conclusive. Absolute equality and strict jus
tice are unattainable in tax proceedings. The legislature must
be left to decide for itself how nearly it is possible to approxi
mate so desirable a result. It must happen under any tax law
that some property will be taxed twice, while other property will
escape taxation altogether. Instances will also occur where per
sons will be taxed as owners of property which has ceased to
exist. The system in vogue for taking valuations of property
fixes upon a certain time for that purpose, and a party becomes
liable to be taxed upon what he possesses at the time the valuing
officer calls upon him. Yet changes of property from person to
person are occurring while the valuation is going on, and the
same parcel of property is found by the assessor in the hands of
two different persons, and is twice assessed, while another parcel
for similar reasons is not assessed at all. Then the man
who owns property when the assessment is "taken may [* 514]
have been deprived of it by accident or other misfortune
before the tax becomes payable; but the tax is nevertheless a
charge against him. And when the valuation is only made once
in a series of years, the occasional hardships and inequalities in
consequence of relative changes in the value of property from
various causes, become sometimes very glaring. Nevertheless,
no question of constitutional law is involved in these cases, and
the legislative control is complete.”
1 Frellsen v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann.
79; People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351;
Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 43. In
this last case, Beck, J., criticises the
position taken ante, pp. *507, *508,
that the cost of a local improvement
cannot be imposed on the adjoining
premises irrespective of any appor
tionment, and appears to suppose our
views rest upon the injustice of such
a proceeding. This is not strictly cor
rect; it may or may not be just in
any particular case; but taxation
necessarily implies apportionment,
and even a just burden cannot be
imposed as a tax without it
.
* In Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 405,
objection was taken to an assessment
made for a local improvement under
a special statute, that the commis
sioners, in determining who should
b
e liable to pay the tax, and the
amount each should pay, were to be
governed by the last assessment o
f
taxable property in the county. It
was insisted that this was an unjust
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The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has
been prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select
in its discretion the subjects of taxation. The rule of uniform
ity requires an apportionment among all the subjects of taxation
within the districts; but it does not require that every thing
which the legislature might make taxable shall be made so in
fact. Many exemptions are usually made from taxation from rea
sons the cogency of which is at once apparent. The agencies of
the national government, we have seen, are not taxable by the
States; and the agencies and property of States, counties, cities,
boroughs, towns, and villages, are also exempted by law, because,
if any portion of the public expenses was imposed upon them, it
must in some form be collected from the citizens before it can be
paid. No beneficial object could therefore be accomplished by
any such assessment. The property of educational and religious
institutions is also generally exempted from taxation by law upon
very similar considerations, and from a prevailing belief that it is
the policy and the interest of the State to encourage
[* 515] them."
criterion, for a man might have dis
posed of a
ll
the taxable property as
sessed to him in the last assessment
before this tax was actually declared
by the commissioners. The court,
however, regarded the objection as
more refined than practical, and one
that, if allowed, would at once anni
hilate the power o
f
taxation. “In
the imposition o
f taxes, exact and
critical justice and equality are abso
lutely unattainable. If we attempt
it
,
we might have to divide a single
year’s tax upon a given article o
f
property among a dozen different in
dividuals who owned it at different
times during the year, and then be
almost as far from the desired end as
when we started. The proposition is
Utopian. The legislature must adopt
some practicable system; and there is
no more danger o
f oppression or in
justice in taking a former valuation
than in relying upon one to be made
subsequently.” And see People v.
Worthington, 21 Ill. 171. -
If the State *may cause taxes to be levied from
* As in the case of other special
privileges, exemptions from taxation
are to be strictly construed. Trustees
o
f
M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3
;
State v. Mills, 34 N. J. 177; and many
other cases cited in Cooley on Taxa
tion, 146. The local authorities can
not be authorized by the legislature
to make exemptions. Farnsworth Co.
v
. Lisbon, 62 Me. 451; Wilson v. Su
pervisors o
f Sutter, 47 Cal. 91. See
Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me.
62; s. c. 16 Am. Rep. 395; State v.
Hudson, 37 N. J. 12. It has been
generally held that an exemption
from taxation would not exempt the
property from being assessed for a
local improvement. Matter o
f Mayor,
&c., 11 Johns. 77; Baltimore v. Ceme
tery Co., 7 Md. 517; La Fayette v.
Orphan Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1
;
Pray
v
. Northern Liberties, 31 Penn. St.
69; Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586;
Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20;
Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee,
8 Bush, 508; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 480;
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motives of charity or gratitude, so for the like reasons it may
exempt the objects of charity and gratitude from taxation.
Property is sometimes released from taxation by contract between
the State and corporations, and specified occupations are some
times charged with specific taxes in lieu of all taxation of their
property. A broad field is here opened to legislative discretion.
As matter of State policy it might also be deemed proper to make
general exemption of sufficient of the tools of trade or other
means of support, to enable the poor man, not yet a pauper, to
escape becoming a public burden. There is still ample room for
apportionment after a
ll
such exemptions have been made. The
constitutional requirement o
f equality and uniformity only extends
to such objects o
f
taxation as the legislature shall determine
to b
e properly subject to the burden.” The power to determine
the persons and the objects to b
e
taxed is trusted exclusively to
the legislative department: * but over all those objects the burden
must be spread, o
r it will be unequal and unlawful as to such as
are selected to make the payment.”
Universalist Society v. Providence, 6 corporations, and exempt them from
R
.
I. 235; Patterson v. Society, &c., municipal taxation. So held on the
2
4 N
. J. 385; Cincinnati College v. ground of stare decisis. Kneeland v.
State, 19 Ohio, 110; Brewster v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
Hough, 10 N
.
H
.
138; Seymour v. 8 In the case of Weeks v
. Milwau
Hartford, 21 Conn. 481; Palmer kee, 10 Wis. 242, a somewhat pecul
v
. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Peoria v. iar exemption was made. It appears
Kidder, 26 Ill., 351; Hale v. Kenosha, that several lots in the city upon which
29 Wis. 599; Seamen's Friend So- a new hotel was being constructed,
ciety v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181; o
f
the value o
f
from $150,000 to
Orange, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Alexandria, $200,000, were purposely omitted to
17 Grat. 176. be taxed, under the direction o
f
the
1 State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; Peo- Common Council, “in view of the
ple v. Colman, 3 Cal. 46; Durach's great public benefit which the con
Appeal, 62 Penn. St. 494; Brewer struction o
f
the hotel would be to the
Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62. city.” Paine, J., in delivering the
* Wilson v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New opinion o
f
the court, says: “I have
York, 4 E. D
. Smith, 67.5; Hill v. no doubt this exemption originated
Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 245; State v. in motives o
f generosity and public
Parker, 33 N
. J. 313; State v. County spirit. And perhaps the same mo
Court, 19 Ark. 360. Classes of prop- tives should induce the tax-payers of
erty as well as classes o
f persons may the city to submit to the slight in
b
e exempted. Butler's Appeal, 73 crease o
f
the tax thereby imposed o
n
Penn. St. 448. Notwithstanding a each, without questioning its strict.
requirement that “the rule of taxa- legality. But they cannot be com
tion shall be uniform,” the legisla- pelled to
.
No man is obliged to be
ture may levy specific State taxes on more generous than the law requires,
41
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In some of the States it has been decided that the par
[* 516] ticular * provisions inserted in their constitutions to insure
uniformity are so worded as to forbid exemptions. Thus
the late Constitution of Illinois provided that “the General As
but each may stand strictly upon his
legal rights. That this exemption
was illegal, was scarcely contested.
I shall, therefore, make no effort to
show that the Common Council had
no authority to suspend or repeal the
general law of the State, declaring
what property shall be taxable and
what exempt. But the important
question presented is
,
whether, con
ceding it to have been entirely unau
thorized, it vitiates the tax assessed
upon other property. And upon this
question I think the following rule is
established, both by reason and au
thority. Omissions o
f
this character,
arising from mistakes o
f fact, erro
neous computations, o
r
errors o
f
judgment on the part o
f
those to
whom the execution o
f
the taxing
laws is intrusted, do not necessarily
vitiate the whole tax. But inten
tional disregard o
f
those laws, in such
manner as to impose illegal taxes on
those who are assessed, does. The
first part o
f
the rule is necessary to
enable taxes to be collected at all.
The execution of these laws is neces
sarily intrusted to men, and men are
fallible, liable to frequent mistakes o
f
fact and errors o
f judgment. If such
errors, on the part o
f
those who are
attempting in good faith to perform
their duties, should vitiate the whole
tax, no tax could ever be collected.
And, therefore, though they some
times increase improperly the bur
dens o
f
those paying taxes, that part
of the rule which holds the tax not
thereby avoided is absolutely essential
to a continuance o
f government. But
it seems to me clear that the other
part is equally essential to the just
protection o
f
the citizen. If those
executing these laws may deliberately
disregard them, and assess the whole
tax upon a part only o
f
those who
are liable to pay it
,
and have it still
a legal tax, then the laws afford no
protection, and the citizen is a
t
the
mercy o
f
those officers, who, by being
appointed to execute the laws, would
seem to be thereby placed beyond
legal control. I know of no consid
erations o
f public policy o
r necessity
that can justify carrying the rule to
that extent. And the fact that in this
instance the disregard o
f
the law pro
ceeded from good motives ought not
to affect the decision o
f
the question.
It is a rule of law that is to be estab
lished; and, if established here be
cause the motives were good, it would
serve a
s
a precedent where the mo
tives were bad, and the power usurped
for purposes of oppression.” pp. *263–
*265. See also Henry v. Chester, 15
Vt. 460; State v. Collector of Jersey
City, 24 N
. J. 108; Insurance Co. v.
Yard, 17 Penn. St. 331; Williams v.
School District, 21 Pick. 75; Hersey
v
. Supervisors o
f Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
185; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal. 242;
Primm v. Belleville, 59 Ill. 142 ;
Adams v. Beman, 10 Kan. 37. But
it seems that an omission of property
from the tax-roll b
y
the assessor, un
intentionally, through want o
f judg
ment and lack o
f diligence and busi
ness habits, will not invalidate the
roll. Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1.
In Scofield v. Watkins, 22 Ill. 66,
and Merritt v. Farriss, 22 Ill. 303, it
appears to be decided that even in the
case of intentional omissions the tax
roll would not be invalidated, but the
parties injured would be left to their
remedy against the assessor. See
also Dunham v. Chicago, 55 Ill. 361.
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sembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his or her property.” Under this it has been held that ex
emption by the legislature of persons residing in a city from a
tax levied to repair roads beyond the city limits, by township
authority, — the city being embraced within the township which,
for that purpose, was the taxing district, — was void.” It is to
be observed of these cases, however, that they would have fallen
within the general principle laid down in Knowlton v.
Supervisors of Rock Co.,” and the legislative acts * un- [* 517]
der consideration might, if that case were followed, have
been declared void on general principles, irrespective of the pe
culiar wording of the constitution. These cases, notwithstanding,
as well as others in Illinois, recognize the power in the legislature
to commute for a tax, or to contract for its release for a consider
ation. The Constitution of Ohio provides” that “ laws shall be
passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments
in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and also
all real and personal property, according to it
s
true value in
money.” Under this section it was held not competent for the
legislature to provide that lands within the limits o
f
a city should
not be taxed for any city purpose, except roads, unless the same
were laid off into town lots and recorded as such, o
r
into out
lots not exceeding five acres each.” Upon this case we should
make the same remark as upon the Illinois cases above referred to.
It is
,
moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing offi
cers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they
assume to impose in every instance. Taxes can only be voted by
the people's representatives. They are in every instance an ap
propriation by the people to the government, which the latter is
to expend in furnishing the people protection, security, and such
facilities for enjoyment as it properly pertains to government to
provide. This principle is a chief corner-stone of Anglo-Saxon
liberty; and it has operated not only as an important check on
* Art. 9
,
§ 2
,
o
f
the old Constitu- 357. See also Louisville, &c. R
.
R
.
tion. Co. v. State, 8 Heisk. 664, 744.
* O’Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. 561; * 9 Wis. 410. See ante, p
.
*502.
Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146. See * Art. 12, § 2.
also Trustees v. McConnell, 12 Ill. * Zanesville v. Auditor of Mus
138 ; Madison County v. People, 58 kingum County, 5 Ohio, N
.
s. 589.
Ill. 456; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 Ill.
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government, in preventing extravagant expenditures, as well as
unjust and tyrannical action, but it has been an important guar
anty of the right of private property. Property is secure from
the lawless grasp of the government, if the means of existence
of the government depend upon the voluntary grants of those
who own the property. Our ancestors coupled their grants with
demands for the redress of grievances; but in modern times the
surest protection against grievances has been found to be to vote
specific taxes for the specific purposes to which the people's rep
resentatives are willing they shall be devoted ; ' and the persons
exercising the functions of government must then become peti
tioners if they desire money for other objects. And then these
grants are only made periodically. Only a few things, such as
the salaries of officers, the interest upon the public debt,
[* 518] the support " of schools, and the like, are provided for by
permanent laws; and not always is this done. The gov
ernment is dependent from year to year on the periodical vote of
supplies. And this vote will come from representatives who are
newly chosen by the people, and who will be expected to reflect
their views regarding the public expenditures. State taxation,
therefore, is not likely to be excessive or onerous, except when the
people, in times of financial ease, excitement, and inflation, have
allowed the incurring of extravagant debts, the burden of which
remains after the excitement has passed away.
But it is as true of the political divisions of the State as it is of
the State at large, that legislative authority must be shown for
every levy of taxes.” The power to levy taxes by these divi
sions comes from the State. The State confers it
,
and a
t
the same
time exercises a parental supervision b
y
circumscribing it
. In
deed, on general principles, the power is circumscribed by the
rule that the taxation by the local authorities can only be for
local purposes.” Neither the State nor the local body can au
thorize the imposition o
f
a tax o
n
the people o
f
a county o
r
town
for an object in which the people o
f
the county or town are not
concerned. And by some of the State constitutions it is ex
pressly required that the State, in creating municipal corpora
* Hoboken v. Phinney, 29 N
. J. 59; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s.
65. 273.
* Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, * Foster v. Kenosha, 1
2 Wis. 616.
494; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, See ante, p
.
*213.
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tions, shall restrict their power of taxation over the subjects
within their control. These requirements, however, impose an
obligation upon the legislature which only it
s
sense o
f duty can
compel it to perform." It is evident that if the legislature fail
to enact the restrictive legislation, the courts have no power to
compel such action. Whether in any case a charter o
f incorpo
ration could be held void on the ground that it conferred unlim
ited powers o
f taxation, is a question that could not well arise,
a
s
a charter is probably never granted which does not impose
some restrictions; and where that is the case, it must be inferred
that those were all the restrictions the legislature deemed impor
tant, and that therefore the constitutional duty o
f
the legislature
has been performed.”
* In Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N
.
s.
248, Ranney, J., says of this pro
vision: “A failure to perform this
duty may be of very serious import,
but lays no foundation for judicial
correction.” And see Maloy v. Ma
rietta, 11 Ohio, N
.
s. 638.
* The Constitution of Ohio re
quires the legislature to provide by
general laws for the organization o
f
cities and incorporated villages, and
to restrict their power o
f taxation,
assessment, &c. The general law
authorizing the expense o
f grading
and paving streets to be assessed on
the grounds bounding and abutting
on the street, in proportion to the
street front, was regarded as being
passed in attempted fulfilment o
f
the
constitutional duty, and therefore
valid. The chief restriction in the
case was, that it did not authorize
assessment in any other o
r
different
mode from what had been customary.
Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Con
nelly, 10 Ohio, N
.
s 165. The statute
also provided that no improvement
o
r repair o
f
a street o
r highway, the
cost o
f
which was to be assessed upon
the owners, should be directed with
out the concurrence of two-thirds of
the members elected to the municipal
council, or unless two-thirds o
f
the
owners to be charged should petition
in writing therefor. In Maloy r.
Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 639, Peck, J.,
says: “This may be said to be a very
imperfect protection; and in some
cases will doubtless prove to be so;
but it is calculated and designed, by
the unanimity o
r
the publicity it re
quires, to prevent any flagrant abuses
o
f
the power. Such is plainly its
object; and we know o
f
n
o rights
conferred upon courts to interfere
with the exercise o
f
a legislative dis
cretion which the constitution has
delegated to the law-making power.”
And see Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis.
242. The Constitution of Michigan
requires the legislature, in providing
for the incorporation of cities and
villages, to “restrict their power o
f
taxation,” &c. The Detroit Metro
politan Police Law made it the duty
o
f
the Board o
f
Police to prepare and
submit to the city controller, on o
r
before the first day o
f May in each
year, an estimate in detail o
f
the cost
and expense o
f maintaining the police
department, and the Common Council
was required to raise the same by
general tax. These provisions, it was
claimed, were in conflict with the
constitution, because no limit was
fixed by them to the estimates that
might be made. In People v. Ma
haney, 13 Mich. 498, the court say:
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[* 519] * When, however, it is said to be essential to valid
taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax
that is laid, it is not meant that the legislative department of the
State must have passed upon the necessity and propriety
[* 520] of every particular tax; * but those who assume to seize
the property of the citizen for the satisfaction of the tax
must be able to show that that particular tax is authorized, either
by general or special law. The power inherent in the govern
ment to tax lies dormant until a constitutional law has been
passed calling it into action, and is then vitalized only to the ex
tent provided by the law. Those, therefore, who act under such
law should be careful to keep within it
s limits, lest they remove
from their acts the shield o
f
it
s protection. While we do not
propose to enter upon any attempt to point out the various cases
in which a failure to obey strictly the requirements o
f
the law
will render the proceedings void, and in regard to which a diver
sity o
f
decision would be met with, we think we shall be safe in
saying that, in cases o
f
this description, which propose to dispos
sess the citizen o
f
his property against his will, not only will any
excess o
f
taxation beyond what the law allows render the pro
ceedings void, but any failure to comply with such requirements
o
f
the laws as are made for the protection o
f
the owner's interest
will also render them void.
There are several cases in which taxes have been levied but
slightly in excess o
f legislative power, in which it has been urged
in defence o
f
the proceedings, that the law ought not to take
“Whether this provision of the con
stitution can be regarded as manda
tory in a sense that would make all
charters o
f municipal corporations
and acts relating thereto which are
wanting in this limitation invalid, we
do not feel called upon to decide in
this case, since it is clear that a limi
tation upon taxation is fixed by the
act before us. The constitution has
not prescribed the character o
f
the
restriction which shall be imposed,
and from the nature of the case it
was impossible to do more than to
make it the duty o
f
the legislature to
set some bounds to a power so liable
to abuse. A provision which, like the
one complained of, limits the power
o
f
taxation to the actual expenses a
s
estimated by the governing board,
after first limiting the power o
f
the
board to incur expense within narrow
limits, is as much a restriction as if
it confined the power to a certain per
centage upon taxable property, or to
a sum proportioned to the number o
f
inhabitants in the city. Whether the
restriction fixed upon would as effect
ually guard the citizen against abuse
a
s any other which might have been
established was a question for the
legislative department o
f
the govern
ment, and does not concern us on this
inquiry.”
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notice of such unimportant matters; but an excess of jurisdic
tion is never unimportant. In one case in Maine, the excess was
eighty-seven cents only in a tax of $225.75, but it was held suffi
cient to render the proceedings void. We quote from Mellen,
Ch. J.
,
delivering the opinion o
f
the court: “It is contended that
the sum o
f eighty-seven cents is such a trifle as to fall within
the range o
f
the maxim de minimis, &c.; but if not, that still
this small excess does not vitiate the assessment. The maxim is
so vague in itself as to form a very unsafe ground o
f proceeding
o
r judging ; and it may be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule
in pecuniary concerns as to the interest which a witness has in
the event o
f
a cause ; and in such case it cannot apply. Any
interest excludes him. The assessment was therefore unauthor
ized and void. If the line which the legislature has established
b
e
once passed, we know o
f
n
o boundary to the discretion o
f
the assessors.” . The same view has been taken b
y
the
Supreme Court o
f Michigan, by which the * opinion is [* 521]
expressed that the maxim de minimis lea: non curat should
b
e applied with great caution to proceedings o
f
this character,
and that the excess could not be held unimportant and overlooked
where, as in that case, each dollar o
f legal tax was perceptibly
increased thereby.” Perhaps, however, a slight excess, not the
result o
f intention, but o
f
erroneous calculations, may b
e over
looked, in view o
f
the great difficulty in making a
ll
such calcula
tions mathematically correct, and the consequent impolicy o
f
requiring entire freedom from a
ll
errors.”
Wherever a tax is invalid because o
f
excess o
f authority, o
r
1 Huse v. Merriam, 2 Me. 375.
See Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush.
567; Kemper v. McClelland, 19
Ohio, 324; School District v. Mer
rills, 12 Conn. 437; Elwell v. Shaw,
1 Me. 335; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N.
H. 393; Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21
Ark. 145.
* Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12. And
see Commonwealth v. Savings Bank,
5 Allen, 428; Bucknall v. Story, 36
Cal. 67; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt. 506;
Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393.
* This was the view taken by the
Supreme Court o
f
Wisconsin in Kel
ley v. Corson, 8 Wis. 182, where an
excess o
f
$8.61 in a tax o
f $6,654.57
was held not to be fatal; it appearing
not to be the result o
f intention, and
the court thinking that an accidental
error no greater than this ought to be
disregarded. See also O’Grady v.
Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287; State v.
Newark, 25 N. J. 399. In Iowa the
statute requires a sale to be upheld if
any portion o
f
the tax was legal.
See Parker v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 421.
If a part of a tax only is illegal, the
balance will be sustained if capable
o
f being distinguished. O’Kane v.
Treat, 25 Ill. 557; People v. Nichols,
49 Ill. 517.
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because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law has pro
vided for the protection of the tax-payer are not complied with,
any sale of property based upon it will be void also. The owner
is not deprived of his property by “the law of the land,” if it is
taken to satisfy an illegal tax. And if property is sold for the
satisfaction of several taxes, any one of which is unauthorized,
or for any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void."
* This has been repeatedly held.
Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Lacy
v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Bangs v.
Snow, 1 Mass. 188; Thurston v. Lit
tle, 3 Mass. 429; Dillingham v. Snow,
5 Mass. 547; Stetson v. Kempton, 13
Mass. 283; Libby v. Burnham, 15
Mass. 144; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick.
492; Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. 70;
Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Drew
v. Davis, 10 Wt. 506: Doe v. Mc
Quilkin, 8 Blackf. 335; Kemper v.
McClelland, 19 Ohio, 324. This is
upon the ground that the sale being
based upon both the legal and the
illegal tax, it is manifestly impossible
afterwards to make the distinction,
so that the act shall be partly a tres
pass and partly innocent. But when
a party asks relief in equity before a
sale against the collection of taxes, a
part of which are legal, he will be
required first to pay that part, or at
least to so distinguish them from the
others that process of injunction can
be so framed as to leave the legal
taxes to be enforced; and failing in
this, his bill will be dismissed. Con
way v. Waverley, 15 Mich. 257; Palmer
v. Napoleon, 16 Mich. 176; Hersey v.
Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
182; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 288;
Myrick v. La Crosse, 17 Wis. 442;
Roseberry v. Huff, 27 Ind. 12.
As to the character and extent of
the irregularities which should defeat
the proceedings for the collection of .
taxes, we could not undertake to
speak here. We think the statement
in the text, that a failure to comply
with any such requirements of the
law as are made for the protection of
And the
the owner's interest will prove fatal
to a tax sale, will be found abun
dantly sustained by the authorities,
while many of the cases go still fur
ther in making irregularities fatal.
It appears to us that where the re
quirement of the law which has failed
of observance was one which had re
gard simply to the due and orderly
conduct of the proceedings, or to the
protection of the public interest, as
against the officer, so that to the tax
payer it is immaterial whether it was
complied with or not, a failure to
comply ought not to be recognized as
a foundation for complaint by him.
But those safeguards which the legis
lature has thrown around the estates
of citizens, to protect them against
unequal, unjust, and extortionate
taxation, the courts are not at liberty
to do away with by declaring them
non-essential. To hold the require
ment of the law in regard to them
directory only, and not mandatory,
is in effect to exercise a dispensing
power over the laws. Mr. Blackwell,
in his treatise on Tax Titles, has col
lected the cases on this subject in
dustriously, and perhaps we shall be
pardoned for saying also with a per
ceptible leaning against that species
of conveyance. As illustrations how
far the courts will go, in some cases,
to sustain irregular taxation, where
officers have acted in good faith,
reference is made to Kelley v. Corson,
11 Wis. 1; Hersey v. Supervisors of
Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 185. See also
Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 497, where
the court endeavors to lay down a
general rule as to the illegalities
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general rule is applicable here, that where property is taken
under statutory authority in derogation of common right, every
requisite of the statute having a semblance of benefit to the
owner must be complied with or the proceeding will be inef
fectual."
which should render a tax roll in
valid. A party bound to pay a tax,
or any portion thereof, cannot get
title to the land by neglecting pay
ment and allowing a sale to be made
at which he becomes the purchaser.
McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300.
See Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich. 292;
Cooley on Taxation, 346.
1 See ante, pp. *74–78. Also
Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486;
Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349,
353; Cooley on Taxation, c. 15.
It should be stated that in Iowa,
under legislation favorable to tax titles,
the courts go farther in sustaining
them than in perhaps any other State.
Reference is made to the following
cases: Eldridge v. Keuhl, 27 Iowa,
160; McReady v. Sexton, 29 Iowa,
356; Hurley v. Rowell, 31 Iowa, 64;
Rima v. Cowan, 31 Iowa, 125; Thomas
v. Steckle, 32 Iowa, 71; Henderson v.
Oliver, 32 Iowa, 512; Bulkley v. Cal
lanan, 32 Iowa, 461; Ware v. Little,
35 Iowa, 234; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35
Iowa, 305; Genther v. Fuller, 36 Iowa,
604; Leavitt v. Watson, 37 Iowa, 93;
Phelps v. Meade, 41 Iowa, 470. It
may be useful to compare these cases
with Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis.
407.
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[* 523] * CHAPTER XV.
THE EMINENT DOMAIN.
EveRY sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other prop
erty, which it holds for the use of its officers and agents, to enable
them to perform their public functions. It may also have prop
erty from the rents, issues, and profits, o
r perhaps the sale, o
f
which it is expected the State will derive a revenue. Such prop
erty constitutes the ordinary domain o
f
the State. In respect to
its use, enjoyment, and alienation, the same principles apply which
govern the management and control o
f
like property o
f individ
uals; and the State is in fact but an individual proprietor, whose
title and rights are to be tested, regulated, and governed b
y
the
same rules that would have pertained to the ownership o
f
the
same property b
y any o
f
it
s
citizens. There are also cases in
which property is peculiarly devoted to the general use and
enjoyment o
f
the individual citizens who compose the organized
society, but the regulation and control o
f
which are vested in the
State b
y
virtue o
f
its sovereignty. The State may be the pro
prietor o
f
this property, and retain it for the common use, as a
means o
f contributing to the general health, comfort, or happiness
o
f
the people ; but generally it is not strictly the owner, but
rather the governing and supervisory trustee o
f
the public rights
in such property, vested with the power and charged with the
duty o
f
so regulating, protecting, and controlling them, as to
secure to each citizen the privilege to make them available for his
purposes, so far as may be consistent with an equal enjoyment by
every other citizen o
f
the same privilege." In some instances
1 In The Company of Free Fishers,
&c. v. Gann, 20 C
.
B
.
N
.
s. 1
,
it was
held that the ownership o
f
the Crown
in the bed o
f navigable waters is for
the benefit o
f
the subject, and cannot
be used in any such manner as to
derogate from o
r
interfere with the
right of navigation, which belongs by
law to all the subjects of the realm.
And that consequently the grantees
o
f
a particular portion, who occupied
it for a fishery, could not be lawfully
authorized to charge and collect an
chorage dues from vessels anchoring
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*
these rights are of such a nature, or the circumstances are such,
that the most feasible mode of enabling every citizen to partici
pate therein may seem to be for the State to transfer its control,
wholly or partially, to individuals, either receiving by way of aug
mentation of the public revenues a compensation therefor, or
securing in return a release to the citizens generally from some
tax or charge which would have rested upon them in
* respect to such rights, had the State retained the [* 524]
usual control in its own hands, and borne the incidental
burdens.
The rights of which we here speak are considered as pertain
ing to the State by virtue of an authority existing in every sov
ereignty, and which is called the eminent domain. Some of these
are complete without any action on the part of the State; as is
the case with the rights of navigation in it
s seas, lakes, and pub
lic rivers, the rights o
f fishery in public waters, and the right o
f
the State to the precious metals which may b
e
mined within its
limits." Others only become complete and are rendered effectual
through the State displacing, either partially o
r wholly, the rights
o
f private ownership and control; and this it accomplishes either
by contract with the owner, b
y
accepting his gift, o
r by appro
priating his property against his will through an exercise of its
superior authority. Of these, the common highway furnishes an
example ; the public rights therein being acquired either b
y
the
grant or dedication o
f
the owner o
f
the land over which they run,
o
r by a species o
f
forcible dispossession when the public necessity
demands the way, and the private owner will neither give nor
sell it
. All these rights rest upon a principle which in every
sovereignty is essential to its existence and perpetuity, and which,
so far as when called into action it excludes pre-existing individ
ual rights, is sometimes spoken o
f
a
s being based upon a
n implied
reservation b
y
the government when its citizens acquire property
from it or under it
s protection. And as there is not often occa
sion to speak o
f
the eminent domain except in reference to those
1 1 Bl. Com. 294; 3 Kent, 378,
note. In California it has been de
therein. As regards public and ex
clusive rights o
f fishery in this coun
try, see Commonwealth r. Alger, 7
Cush. 63; Lakeman v. Burnham, 7
Gray, 440; Commonwealth v. Look,
108 Mass. 452; Angell on Water
courses, § 6
5 a
,
and cases cited.
cided that a grant o
f public lands by
the government carries with it to the
grantee the title to all mines. Boggs
v
. Merced, &c. Co., 14 Cal. 279;
Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199.
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cases in which the government is called upon to appropriate prop
erty against the will of the owners, the right itself is generally
defined as if it were restricted to such cases, and is said to be that
superior right of property pertaining to the sovereignty by which
the private property acquired by it
s
citizens under it
s protection
may b
e
taken o
r its use controlled for the public benefit without
regard to the wishes o
f
it
s
owners. More accurately, it is the
rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control
and regulate those rights o
f
a public nature which pertain to it
s
citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity,
convenience, o
r
welfare may demand."
* When the existence o
f
a particular power in the
- government is recognized o
n
the ground o
f necessity, no
delegation o
f
the legislative power b
y
the people can be held to
vest authority in the department which holds it in trust, to bargain
away such power, o
r
to so tie u
p
the hands o
f
the government as
to preclude it
s repeated exercise, a
s
often and under such circum
stances a
s
the needs o
f
the government may require. For if this
were otherwise, the authority to make laws for the government
and welfare o
f
the State might be so exercised, in strict con
[* 525]
* Wattel, c. 20, § 34; Bynker
shoek, lib. 2
,
c. 15; Ang. on Water
courses, § 457; 2 Kent, 338-340; Redf.
on Railw. c. 11, § 1. “The right
which belongs to the society o
r
to the
sovereign o
f disposing, in case of ne
cessity, and for the public safety, o
f
all the wealth contained in the State,
is called the eminent domain.” Mc
Kinley, J., in Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 3 How. 223. “Notwith
standing the grant to individuals, the
highest and most exact idea o
f prop
erty remains in the government, o
r in
the aggregate body o
f
the people in
their sovereign capacity; and they
have a right to resume the possession
o
f
the property, in the manner di
rected by the constitution and laws
o
f
the State, whenever the public in
terest requires it
.
This right of re
sumption may be exercised, not only
where the safety, but also where the
interest o
r
even the expediency, o
f
the
State is concerned; as where the land
of the individual is wanted for a road,
canal, o
r
other public improvement.”
Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman v.
Saratoga and Schenectady R
.
R
. Co.,
3 Paige, 73. The right is inherent
in all governments, and requires no
constitutional provision to give it
force. Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss.
227; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 143.
“Title to property is always held
upon the implied condition that it
must be surrendered to the govern
ment, either in whole o
r
in part,
when the public necessities, evidenced
according to the established forms o
f
law, demand.” Hogeboom, J., in
People v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
3
2 Barb. 112. And see Heyward r.
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 7 N. Y.
314; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart,
41 Ind. 364; Wier v. St. Paul, &c.
R. R
. Co., 18 Minn. 155.
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formity with it
s constitution, as at length to preclude the State
performing it
s ordinary and essential functions, and the agent
chosen to govern the State might put an end to the State itself.
It must follow that any legislative bargain in restraint of the
complete, continuous, and repeated exercise o
f
the right o
f emi
nent domain is unwarranted and void; and that provision o
f
the
Constitution of the United States which forbids the States vio
lating the obligation o
f
contracts could not be so construed as to
render valid and effectual such a bargain, which originally was in
excess o
f proper authority. Upon this subject we shall content
ourselves with referring in this place to what has been said in
another connection."
As under the peculiar American system the protection and
regulation o
f private rights, privileges, and immunities in general
properly pertain to the State governments, and those governments
are expected to make provision for those conveniences and neces
sities which are usually provided for their citizens through the
exercise o
f
the right o
f
eminent domain, the right itself, it would
seem, must pertain to those governments also, rather than to the
government o
f
the nation; and such has been the conclusion o
f
the authorities. In the new territories, however, where the gov
ernment o
f
the United States exercises sovereign author
ity, it possesses, * as incident thereto, the right o
f
eminent [* 526]
domain, which it may exercise directly or through the
territorial governments; but this right passes from the nation to
the newly formed State whenever the latter is admitted into the
Union.” So far, however, as the general government may deem
1 See ante, p
.
*281.
* Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3
How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbee, 9
How. 471; Doe v. Beebe, 13 How.
25; United States v. The Railroad
Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517; Weber
v
. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall.
57; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427;
Warren v. St. Paul, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
18 Minn. 384. The States have
sometimes assumed authority, under
the eminent domain, to appropriate
the property o
f
individuals in order
to donate it to the general govern
ment for national purposes; but the
right to do this would seem doubtful.
The authority of the general govern
ment to appropriate private property
for it
s
needs is unquestionable; but
every sovereignty must judge o
f
it
s
needs for itself, and the right to de
cide upon and supply them by dis
possessing private rights cannot, as
it seems to us, be assumed by any
other authority without the incorpo
ration o
f
some new principle into the
law o
f
eminent domain. The follow
ing decisions have been made o
n
this
subject. In Reddall v. Bryan, 14
Md. 478, proceedings in Maryland,
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it important to appropriate lands or other property for its own
purposes, and to enable it to perform it
s functions, – as must
sometimes b
e necessary in the case o
f forts, light-houses, military
posts o
r roads, and other conveniences and necessities o
f govern
ment, — the general government may still exercise the authority,
a
s well within the States as within the territory under its exclu
sive jurisdiction, and it
s right to do so may be supported b
y
the
same reasons which support the right in any case ; that is to say,
the absolute necessity that the means in the government for per
forming its functions and perpetuating it
s
existence should not
b
e
liable to be controlled or defeated b
y
the want o
f
consent o
f
private parties, o
r
o
f any other authority."
What Property is subject to the Right.
Every species o
f property which the public needs may require,
and which government cannot lawfully appropriate under any
other right, is subject to be seized and appropriated under the
right o
f
eminent domain.” Lands for the public ways; timber,
stone, and gravel with which to make o
r improve the public
under its laws, to appropriate lands
for the purpose of supplying the city
o
f Washington with water, were sus
tained. The opinion affirms the right
generally to employ the State eminent
domain for the purposes o
f
the general
government; but the court attach im
portance to the fact that in ceding its
portion o
f
the District o
f
Columbia
to the United States, “the State
never intended to abandon all interest
in the District. The relation, there
fore, between the District o
f
Colum
bia, composed o
f territory ceded by
Maryland for certain purposes only,
and the State of whose soil it forms a
part, is more intimate and close than
that which it bears to any other
State.” Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18
Cal. 229, was a proceeding in the
State court, on the application o
f
the
United States by its agent, to con
demn lands for the purposes o
f
a light
house. The right to maintain it was
contested, but sustained. Similar deci
sions were made in Burt v. Merchants'
Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356, and Cum
mings v. Ash, 50 N
.
H
.
590. In
Trombley v. Auditor-General, 23
Mich. 471, an act of the legislature
authorizing the Governor to take pro
ceedings to condemn lands for the use
o
f
the general government was held
invalid, on the ground that every sov
ereignty possesses inherent authority
to appropriate the property o
f
its citi
zens o
r subjects for public uses, and
must be the judge o
f
its own needs.
This view has since been approved by
the United States Supreme Court.
Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367.
1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
Rep. 367; Trombley v. Auditor-Gen
eral, 23 Mich. 471; Darlington p
.
United States, 82 Penn. St. 382.
* People v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 32 Barb. 102; Bailey v. Milten
berger, 31 Penn. St. 37.
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ways; buildings standing in the way of contemplated improve
ments, or which for any other reason it becomes necessary to take,
remove, or destroy for the public good ; * streams of water;”
corporate franchises; * and generally, it may be said, legal and
* Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend.
647; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569;
Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315;
Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Wat
kins v. Walker Co., 18 Tex. 585. In
Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Wt. 484, it was
held competent for a railroad com
pany to appropriate lands for piling
the wood and lumber used on the
road, and brought to it to be trans
ported thereon.
* Wells v. Somerset, &c. R. R.
Co., 47 Me. 345. But the destruc
tion of a private house during a fire
to prevent the spreading of a con
flagration has been held not to be an
appropriation under the right of emi
nent domain, but an exercise of the
police power. “The destruction was
authorized by the law of overruling
necessity; it was the exercise of a
natural right belonging to every in
dividual, not conferred by law, but
tacitly excepted from all human
codes.” Per Sherman, Senator, in
Russell v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
2 Denio, 461, 473. See also So
rocco r. Geary, 3 Cal. 69; Conwell
v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35; American Print
Works v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. 248;
Same v. Same, 23 N. J. 590; Mc
Donald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38;
Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575.
The municipal corporation whose
officers order the destruction is not
liable for the damages unless ex
pressly made so by statute. White
v. Charleston, 2 Hill (S. C.), 571;
Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 355;
Stone v. Mayor, &c. of New York,
25 Wend. 157; Taylor v. Plymouth,
8 Met. 462; Ruggles v. Nantucket,
11 Cush. 433.
* Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162. In this case a stream was
appropriated in order to supply a
town with water. The appropriation
might, of course, be made for any
other object of public utility; and a
stream may even be diverted from its
course to remove it out of the way of a
public improvement when not appro
priated. See Johnson v. Atlantic,
&c. R. R. Co., 35 N. H. 569; Balti
more, &c. R. R. Co. v. Magruder,
34 Md. 79; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 310.
But in general, in constructing a
public work, it is the duty of those
concerned to avoid diverting streams,
and to construct the necessary cul
verts, bridges, &c., for that purpose.
March v. Portsmouth, &c. R. R. Co.,
19 N. H. 372; Boughton v. Carter, 18
Johns. 405; Rowe v. Addison, 34
N. H. 306; Proprietors, &c. v.
Nashua and Lowell R. R. Co., 10 Cush.
388; Haynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt.
350. And see Pettigrew v. Janes
ville, 25 Wis. 23; Arimond v. Green
Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316; Stein v. Bur
den, 24 Ala. 130. As to the obliga
tion of a railroad company to com
pensate parties whose lands are
flooded by excavations or embank
ments of the company, see Brown v.
Cayuga, &c. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y.
486; Norris v. Wt. Cent. R. R. Co.,
28 Vt. 99. Compare Eaton v. Bos
ton, C. & M. R. R. Co., 51 N. H.
504, where it was decided that a
corporation which flooded a man’s
land by removing a natural protection
in the construction of their road was
liable for the injury, even though
their road was constructed with due
care, with Bellinger v. N. Y. Central
R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 42, and other
cases cited, post, pp. *570, *571.
* Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp
shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Crosby v.
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[* 527] equitable rights of *every description are liable to be
thus appropriated. From this statement, however, must
be excepted money, or that which in ordinary use passes as such,
and which the government may reach by taxation, and also
rights in action, which can only be available when made to pro
duce money; neither of which can it be needful to take under
this power."
Hanover, 36 N. H. 420; Boston
Water Power Co. v. Boston and
Worcester R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360;
Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell,
4 Gray, 474; West River Bridge v.
Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond R. R.
Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 81,
per Grier, J.; Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio
R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; State v.
Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Red River Bridge
Co. v. Clarksville, 1 Sneed, 176; Ar
mington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White
River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Cen
tral R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 594; Newcastle,
&c. R. R. Co. v. Peru and Indiana
R. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Springfield v.
Connecticut River R. R. Co., 4 Cush.
63; Forward v. Hampshire, &c.
Canal Co., 22 Pick. 462; Common
wealth v. Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co.,
58 Penn. St. 50. “The only true
rule of policy as well as of law is
,
that a grant for one public purpose
must yield to another more urgent
and important, and this can be ef
fected without any infringement o
n
the constitutional rights o
f
the sub
ject. If in such cases suitable and
adequate provision is made by the
legislature for the compensation of
those whose property o
r
franchise is
injured o
r
taken away, there is no
violation o
f public faith o
r private
right. The obligation o
f
the contract
created by the original charter is
thereby recognized.” Per Bigelow,
J., in Central Bridge Corporation v.
Lowell, 4 Gray, 482. This subject
receives a very full and satisfactory
examination by Judges Pearson and
Sharswood, in Commonwealth v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn. St.
41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329. In Cen
tral City Horse Railway Co. v. Fort
Clark Horse Railway Co., 87 Ill. 523,
this subject is somewhat considered.
The question involved is thus stated
by the court: “Can a competing
horse railway company in an incorpo
rated city acquire by compulsion a
title to o
r
the joint use of [a part of J
the track and superstructure o
f an
other like corporation, and for the
express purpose o
f making the tracks
so compulsorily taken a portion o
f
its
own line?” This question is an
swered in the negative, though a
t
the
same time it is intimated that “pro
ceedings might be instituted, perhaps,
to condemn the entire road and fran
chise, and thus pass it over as an en
tirety to the competing road.”
* Property o
f
individuals cannot
b
e appropriated by the State under
this power for the mere purpose o
f
adding to the revenues o
f
the State.
Thus it has been held in Ohio, that
in appropriating the water o
f
streams
for the purposes of a canal, more
could not be taken than was needed
for that object, with a view to raising
a revenue b
y
selling o
r leasing it
.
“The State, notwithstanding the
sovereignty o
f
her character, can take
only sufficient water from private
streams for the purposes o
f
the canal.
So far the law authorizes the commis
sioners to invade private right as to
take what may be necessary for canal
navigation, and to this extent author
ity is conferred by the constitution,
provided a compensation be paid to the
owner. The principle is founded on
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Legislative Authority requisite.
The right to appropriate private property to public
uses lies "dormant in the State, until legislative action is [* 528]
had, pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions,
and agencies for it
s appropriation." Private property can only
b
e
taken pursuant to law; but a legislative act declaring the
necessity, being the customary mode in which that fact is deter
mined, must be held to be for this purpose “the law of the land,”
and n
o further finding o
r adjudication can be essential, unless the
constitution o
f
the State has expressly required it.”
the superior claims o
f
a whole com
munity over an individual citizen;
but then in those cases only where
private property is wanted for public
use, o
r
demanded b
y
the public wel
fare. We know of no instances in
which it has or can be taken, even by
State authority, for the mere purpose
o
f raising a revenue by sale o
r other
wise; and the exercise o
f
such a
power would be utterly destructive o
f
individual right, and break down all
the distinctions between meum and
tuum, and annihilate them for ever
a
t
the pleasure o
f
the State.” Wood,
J., in Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio,
296. To the same effect is Cooper v.
Williams, 5 Ohio, 392.
Taking money under the right o
f
eminent domain, when it must be
compensated in money afterwards,
could be nothing more nor less than
a forced loan, only to be justified as
a last resort in a time of extreme
peril, where neither the credit o
f
the
government nor the power o
f taxa
tion could be made available. It is
impossible to lay down rules for such
a case, except such as the law o
f over
ruling necessity, which for the time
being sets aside all the rules and pro
tections o
f private right, shall then
prescribe. See post, p
.
*530, note.
* Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97;
Railroad Co. v. Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Allen
v
. Jones, 47 Ind. 438. It cannot be pre
sumed that any corporation has au
When, how
thority to exercise the right o
f emi
nent domain until the grant be shown.
Phillips v. Dunkirk, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
78 Penn. St. 177; Allen v. Jones, 47
Ind. 438.
* “Whatever may be the theoreti
cal foundation for the right o
f emi
nent domain, it is certain that it
attaches a
s
a
n incident to every sov
ereignty, and constitutes a condition
upon which a
ll property is holden.
When the public necessity requires it
,
private rights to property must yield
to the paramount right o
f
the sov
ereign power. We have repeatedly
held that the character of the work
for which the property is taken, and
not the means o
r agencies employed
for its construction, determines the
question o
f power in the exercise o
f
this right. It requires no judical
condemnation to subject private
property to public uses. Like the
power to tax, it resides in the legis
lative department to whom the dele
gation is made. It may be exercised
directly o
r indirectly b
y
that body;
and it can only be restrained by the
judiciary when it
s
limits have been
exceeded, o
r
its authority has been
abused o
r perverted.” Kramer v.
Cleveland and Pittsburg R
.
R
. Co.,
5 Ohio, N
.
s. 146. The mode o
f ex
ercise is left to the legislative discre
tion, when not restrained by the con
stitution. Secombe v. Railroad Co.,
23 Wall. 109.
42
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ever, action is had for this purpose, there must be kept in view
that general as well as reasonable and just rule, that, whenever
in pursuance of law the property of an individual is to be devested
by proceedings against his will, a strict compliance must be had
with a
ll
the provisions o
f
law which are made for his protection
and benefit, o
r
the proceeding will be ineffectual." Those provi
sions must be regarded a
s in the nature o
f
conditions precedent,
which are not only to be observed and complied with before the
right o
f
the property owner is disturbed, but the party claiming
authority under the adverse proceeding must show affirmatively
such compliance. For example, if by a statute prescribing the
mode o
f exercising the right o
f
eminent domain, the damages to
b
e
assessed in favor o
f
the property owner for the taking o
f
his
land are to be so assessed b
y
disinterested freeholders o
f
the mu
nicipality, the proceedings will be ineffectual unless they show on
their face that the appraisers were such freeholders and inhabi
tants.” So if a statute only authorizes proceedings in invitum
after a
n
effort shall have been made to agree with the owner on
the compensation to be paid, the fact o
f
such effort and its failure
must appear.” S
o if the statute vests the title to lands
[* 529] appropriated in the State or in * a corporation on pay
ment therefor being made, it is evident that, under the
rule stated, the payment is a condition precedent to the passing
* Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c.
R. R
. Co., 13 Ill. 1
;
Stanford v.
Worn, 27 Cal. 171; Dalton v. Water
Commissioners, 41 Cal. 222; Stock
ton v. Whitmore, 50 Cal. 554; Su
pervisors o
f Doddridge v. Stout, 9
W. Va. 703; Mitchell v. Illinois, &c.
Coal Co., 68 Ill. 286; Chicago, &c.
R. R
.
Co. v. Smith, 78 Ill. 96;
Springfield, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Hall,
6
7 Ill. 79; Powers's Appeal, 29 Mich.
504; Kroop v. Forman, 31 Mich.
144; Arnold v. Decatur, 29 Mich. 77;
Lund v. New Bedford, 121 Mass.
286; Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen,
120 Mass. 352; Bohlman v. Green
Bay, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 40 Wis. 157;
Moore v. Railway Co., 34 Wis.
173; United States v. Reed, 56 Mo.
565; Decatur County v. Humphreys,
4
7
Geo. 565; Commissioners v. Beck
with, 10 Kan. 603.
* Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn.
189; Judson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn.
428; People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57;
Moore v. Railway Co., 34 Wis. 173.
* Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley
R. R
. Co., 21 Penn. St. 100; Ellis v.
Pacific R
.
R
. Co., 51 Mo. 200; United
States v. Reed, 56 Mo. 565; Burt v.
Brigham, 117 Mass. 307; West Va.
Transportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil
and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382. But it
was held in this last case that if the
owner appears in proceedings taken
for the assessment of damages, and
contests the amount without object
ing the want o
f any such attempt,
the court must presume it to have
been made.
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of the title." And where a general railroad law authorized routes
to be surveyed by associated persons desirous of constructing
roads, and provided that if the legislature, on being petitioned
for the purpose, should decide by law that a proposed road would
be of sufficient utility to justify it
s construction, then the com
pany, when organized, might proceed to take land for the way, it
was held that, until the route was approved b
y
the legislature, n
o
authority could be claimed under the law to appropriate land for
the purpose.” These cases must suffice as illustrations o
f
a gen
* Stacy v. Vermont Central R
.
R
.
Co., 27 Vt. 44. By the section o
f
the statute under which the land was
appropriated, it was provided that
when land or other real estate was
taken b
y
the corporation, for the use
o
f
their road, and the parties were
unable to agree upon the price o
f
the
land, the same should be ascertained
and determined by the commissioners,
together with the costs and charges
accruing thereon and upon the payment
o
f
the same, o
r by depositing the amount
in a bank, as should be ordered b
y
the
commissioners, the corporation should be
deemed to be seized and possessed o
f
the
lands. Held, that, until the payment
was made, the company had n
o right
to enter upon the land to construct
the road, or to exercise any act o
f
ownership over it; and that a court
o
f equity would enjoin them from
exercising any such right, o
r they
might be prosecuted in trespass a
t
law. This case follows Baltimore
and Susquehanna R
.
R
.
Co. v. Nesbit,
1
0 How. 395, and Bloodgood v. Mo
hawk and Hudson R. R
. Co., 18
Wend. 10, where the statutory pro
visions were similar. See further
State v. Seymour, 35 N
. J. 56; Cam
eron r. Supervisors, 47 Miss. 264;
St. Joseph, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Callender,
1
3 Kan. 496; Paris v. Mason, 37 Tex.
447; People v. McRoberts, 62 Ill. 38;
St. Louis, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Teters,
6
8 Ill. 144; Sherman v. Milwaukee,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 40 Wis. 645; Bohlman
v
. Green Bay, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 40 Wis.
157; Brady v. Bronson, 45 Cal. 640;
Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Eide
miller v. Wyandotte, 2 Dill. 376. In
the case in Howard it is said: “It
can hardly be questioned that without
acceptance in the mode prescribed
[i
.
e
., by payment o
f
the damages
assessed], the company were not
bound; that if they had been dissatis
fied with the estimate placed on the
land, o
r
could have procured a more
eligible site for the location o
f
their
road, they would have been a
t liberty,
before such acceptance, wholly to
renounce the inquisition. The pro
prietors o
f
the land could have no
authority to coerce the company into
its adoption.” Daniel, J., 10 How.
399.
* Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c.
R. R
. Co., 13 Ill. 1. “The statute
says that, after a certain other act
shall have been passed, the company
may then proceed to take private
property for the use o
f
their road;
that is equivalent to saying that that
right shall not be exercised without
such subsequent act. The right to
take private property for public use
is one o
f
the highest prerogatives o
f
the sovereign power; and here the
legislature has, in language not to be
mistaken, expressed its intention to
reserve that power until it could judge
for itself whether the proposed road
would be o
f
sufficient public utility
to justify the use of this high pre
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eral rule, which indeed would seem to be too plain and obvious
to require either illustration or discussion."
* So the powers granted by such statutes are not to be
enlarged by intendment, especially where they are being
exercised by a corporation by way of appropriation of land for its
corporate purposes. “There is no rule more familiar or better
settled than this: that grants of corporate power, being in dero
gation of common right, are to be strictly construed ; and this is
especially the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the
right of eminent domain, one of the highest powers of sovereignty
pertaining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and
often vexatiously with the ordinary rights of property.”” It has
accordingly been held that where a railroad company was author
ized by law to “enter upon any land to survey, lay down, and
construct its road,” “to locate and construct branch roads,” &c.,
to appropriate land “for necessary side tracks,” and “a right of
way over adjacent lands sufficient to enable such company to
construct and repair it
s road,” and the company had located, and
was engaged in the construction o
f
it
s
main road along the north
side o
f
a town, it was not authorized under this grant of power
to appropriate a temporary right o
f way for a term o
f years along
the south side o
f
the town, to be used as a substitute for the main
track whilst the latter was in process o
f
construction.” And sub
stantially the same strict rule is applied when the State itself
seeks to appropriate private property; for it is not unreasonable
that the property owner should have the right to insist that the
State, which selects the occasion and prescribes the conditions for
the appropriation o
f
his property, should confine it
s
action strictly
within the limits which it has marked out as sufficient. So high
a prerogative as that o
f devesting one's estate against his will
[* 530]
rogative. It did not intend to cast Miami Coal Co. v. Wigton, 19 Ohio,
N. S. 560.this power away, to be gathered up
and used by any who might choose to
exercise it.” Ibid. p
.
4
.
* See further the cases of Atlantic
and Ohio R
.
R
.
Co. v. Sullivant, 5
Ohio, N
.
s. 277; Parsons v. Howe,
41 Me. 218; Atkinson v. Marietta
and Cincinnati R
.
R
. Co., 15 Ohio,
N. S
.
21.
* Currier v. Marietta and Cincin
nati R
.
R
. Co., 11 Ohio, N
.
s. 228;
See ante, pp. *394–396.
* Currier v. Marietta and Cincin
nati R
.
R
. Co., 11 Ohio, N
.
s. 228.
And see Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19
Cal. 47; Bensley v. Mountain Lake,
&c. Co., 13 Cal. 306; Brunnig v.
N. O
.
Canal and Banking Co., 12
La. Ann. 541; West Virginia Trans
portation Co. v. Volcanic Oil and
Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382.
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should only be exercised where the plain letter of the law per
mits it
,
and under a careful observance o
f
the formalities pre
scribed for the owner's protection.
The Purpose.
The definition given o
f
the right o
f
eminent domain implies
that the purpose for which it may be exercised must not be a mere
private purpose; and it is conceded on all hands that the legis
lature has no power, in any case, to take the property o
f
one indi
vidual and pass it over to another without reference to some use
to which it is to be applied for the public benefit.” “The right
o
f
eminent domain,” it has been said, “does not imply a right in
the sovereign power to take the property o
f
one citizen and trans
fer it to another, even for a full compensation, where the public
interest will be in no way promoted b
y
such transfer.”
It seems not to be allowable, therefore, to authorize "pri- [* 531]
vate roads to be laid out across the lands o
f unwilling
parties b
y
a
n
exercise o
f
this right. The easement in such a case
would be the property o
f
him for whom it was established ; and
* In a work o
f
this character, we
have n
o
occasion to consider the right
o
f
the government to seize and ap
propriate to its own use the property
o
f
individuals in time o
f war, through
its military authorities. That is a
right which depends on the existence
o
f hostilities, and the suspension,
partially o
r wholly, o
f
the civil laws.
For recent cases in which it has been
considered, see Mitchell v. Harmony,
13 How. 128; Wilson v. Crockett, 43
Mo. 216; Williams v. Wickerman,
44 Mo. 484; Yost v. Stout, 4 Cold.
205; Sutton v. Tiller, 6 Cold. 593;
Taylor v. Nashville, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
6 Cold. 646; Coolidge v. Guthrie,
8 Am. Law Reg. N
.
s. 22; Echols v.
Staunton, 3 W. Va. 574; Wilson v.
Franklin, 63 N
.
C
. 259; Ferguson
v
. Loar, 5 Bush, 689.
* Beekman v. Saratoga and Schen
ectady R
.
R
. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Hep
burn's Case, 3 Bland, 95; Sadler v.
Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg v.
Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139; Matter o
f
Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149; Matter
o
f
John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend.
659; Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 393;
Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio, 296;
Reeves v. Treasurer o
f
Wood Co.,
8 Ohio, N
.
s. 333. See this subject
considered on principle and authority
by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood v.
Mohawk and Hudson R
.
R
. Co., 18
Wend. 55 et seq. See also Embury
v
. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Kramer v.
Cleveland and Pittsburgh R
.
R
. Co.,
5 Ohio, N
.
s. 146; Pratt v. Brown,
3 Wis. 603: Concord R. R. v. Gree
ley, 17 N. H. 47; N. Y. and Harlem
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Kip, 46 N
.
Y
.
546; s. c.
7 Am. Rep. 385. The power can
only be exercised to supply some
existing public need o
r
to gain some
present public advantage; not with
a view to contingent results dependent
o
n
a projected speculation. Edge
wood R
.
R
.
Co.'s Appeal, 79 Penn.
St. 257.
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although the owner would not be deprived of the fee in the land,
the beneficial use and exclusive enjoyment of his property would
in greater or less degree be interfered with. Nor would it be
material to inquire what quantum of interest would pass from
him : it would be sufficient that some interest, the appropriation
of which detracted from his right and authority, and interfered
with his exclusive possession as owner, had been taken against
his will; and if taken for a purely private purpose, it would be
unlawful." Nor could it be of importance that the public would
1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 142, per
Bronson, J.; Clark v. White, 2 Swan,
540; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474;
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pitts
burg v. Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139; Nesbitt
v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110; Osborn v.
Hart, 24 Wis. 90; s. c. 1 Am. Rep.
161; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648;
Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540;
Witham v. Osborn, 4 Oreg. 318; s. c.
18 Am. Rep. 287; Stewart v. Hart
man, 46 Ind. 331; Wild v. Deig, 43
Ind. 455; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 399;
White v. Clark, 2 Swan, 230; Hick
man's Case, 4 Harr. 580; Robinson
v. Swope, 12 Bush, 21. A neighbor
hood road is only a private road, and
taking land for it would not be for a
public use. Dickey v. Tennison, 27
Mo. 373. But see as to this Ferris
v. Bramble, 5 Ohio, N. s. 109; Bell
v. Prouty, 43 Vt. 299; Whitting
ham v. Bowen, 22 Vt. 317; Proctor
v. Andover, 42 N. H. 348. To avoid
this difficulty, it is provided by the
constitutions of some of the States
that private roads may be laid out
under proceedings corresponding to
those for the establishment of high
ways. There are provisions to that
effect in the Constitutions of New
York, Georgia, and Michigan. But
in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 65,
it was held that the right might be
exercised in order to the establish
ment of private ways from coal fields
to connect them with the public im
provements, there being nothing in
the constitution forbidding it
.
See
also The Pocopson Road, 16 Penn. St.
15; Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 487.
But this doctrine is directly opposed
to Young v. McKenzie, 3 Geo. 44;
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Buffalo
and N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Brainerd, 9
N
.
Y
.
108; Bradley v. N
.
Y
.
and N.
H. R
.
R
. Co., 21 Conn. 305; Reeves
v
. Treasurer o
f
Wood Co., 8 Ohio.
N
.
s. 344, and many other cases;
though possibly convenient access to
the great coal fields o
f
the State might
be held to be so far a matter o
f gen
eral concern as to support an exercise
o
f
the power on the ground o
f
the
public benefit. In Eldridge v. Smith,
34 Wt. 484, it was held that the man
ufacture of railroad cars was not so
legitimately and necessarily connected
with the management o
f
a railroad
that the company would be author
ized to appropriate lands therefor.
So, also, o
f
land for the erection o
f
dwelling-houses to rent by railroad
companies to their employés. But
under authority to a railroad com
pany to take land for constructing
and operating its road, it may take
what is needful for depot grounds.
N. Y
.
and Harlaem R
.
R
.
Co. v. Kip,
46 N
.
Y
.
546; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 385.
In the text we have stated what is
unquestionably the result o
f
the au
thorities; though if the question were
an open one, it might well be debated
whether the right to authorize the
appropriation o
f
the property o
f indi
viduals did not rest rather upon
grounds o
f general public policy than
CH. xv.] THE EMINENT DOMAIN. 663
receive incidental benefits, such as usually spring from the im
provement of lands or the establishment of prosperous private
enterprises: the public use implies a possession, occupation, and
enjoyment of the land by the public at large, or by public agen
cies;" and a due protection to the rights of private property will
preclude the government from seizing it in the hands of the
owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of public
benefit to spring from the more profitable use to which the latter
may devote it
.
We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we
undertake to define, * in the light o
f
the judicial decisions, [* 532]
/ what constitutes a public use.A.) It has been said by a
learned jurist that, “if the public interest can be in any way pro
moted b
y
the taking o
f private property, it must rest in the wis
dom o
f
the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the
public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for
them to exercise the right!of eminent domainland to authorize an
interference with the private rights o
f
individuals for that pur
pose.” W It is upon this principle that the legislatures of several of
the States have authorized the condemnation of the lands of indi
viduals for mill sites, when from the nature o
f
the country such
mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the in
habitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned. Upon
the same principle o
f public benefit, not only the agents o
f
the
government, but also individuals and corporate bodies, have been
authorized to take private property for the purpose o
f making
public highways, turnpike roads, and canals; o
f erecting and
constructing wharves and basins; o
f establishing ferries; o
f
upon the public purpose to which it
was proposed to devote it
.
There
are many cases in which individuals
o
r private corporations have been em
powered to appropriate the property
o
f
others when the general good de
manded it
,
though the purpose was
no more public than it is in any case
where benefits are to flow to the
community generally from a private
enterprise. The case of appropria
tions for mill-dams, railroads, and
drains to improve lands are familiar
examples. These appropriations have
been sanctioned under an application
o
f
the term “public purpose,” which
might also justify the laying out o
f
private roads, when private property
could not otherwise be made available.
Upon this general subject the reader .
is referred to an article by Hon. J. .
W
.
Campbell in the “Bench and Bar,”
for July, 1871.
* Per Tracy, Senator, in Blood
good v. Mohawk and Hudson R
.
R
.
Co., 18 Wend. 60.
* 2 Kent Com. 340.
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draining swamps and marshes; and of bringing water to cities
and villages. In a
ll
such cases the object o
f
the legislative grant
o
f power is the public advantage expected from the contemplated
improvement, whether such improvement is to be effected di
rectly by the agents o
f
the government, o
r through the medium
o
f corporate bodies, or o
f
individual enterprise.” "
It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with much
liberality the language)above quoted, that, “where the public
interest can b
e in any way promoted b
y
the taking o
f private
property,’” the taking can be considered for a public use. It is
certain that there are very many cases in which the property o
f
some individual owners would be likely to be better employed o
r
occupied to the advancement o
f
the public interest in other hands
than in their own ; but it does not follow from this circumstance
alone that they may rightfully be dispossessed. It may be for
the public benefit that all the wild lands o
f
the State b
e im
proved and cultivated, all the low lands drained, all the unsightly
places beautified, all dilapidated buildings replaced by new ;
because all these things tend to give an aspect o
f beauty, thrift,
and comfort to the country, and thereby to invite settlement,
increase the value o
f lands, and gratify the public taste ; but the
common law has never sanctioned an appropriation o
f property
based upon these considerations alone and some further element
must therefore b
e involved before the appropriation can
[* 533] be regarded as sanctioned * b
y
our constitutions. A The
reason o
f
the case and the settled practice o
f
free gov
ernments must b
e our guides in determining what is o
r
is not to
b
e regarded a public use ; and that only can be considered such
where the government is supplying it
s
own needs, o
r
is furnishing
facilities for it
s
citizens in regard to those matters o
f public
necessity, convenience, o
r welfare, which, on account o
f
their pe
culiar character, and the difficulty — perhaps impossibility — of
making provision for them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful,
and needful for the government to provide.
Every government is expected to make provision for the public
ways, and for this purpose it may seize and appropriate lands.
And as the wants of traffic and travel require facilities beyond
1 Walworth, Chancellor, in Beek- Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.,
man v. Saratoga and Schenectady 2 Pet. 251.
R
.
R
. Co., 3 Paige, 73. And see
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those afforded by the common highway, over which any one may
pass with his own vehicles, the government may establish the
higher grade of highways, upon some of which only its own ve
hicles can be allowed to run, while others, differently constructed,
shall be open to use by all on payment of toll. The common
highway is kept in repair by assessments of labor and money;
the tolls paid upon turnpikes, or the fares on railways, are the
equivalents to these assessments; and when these improved ways
are required by law to be kept open for use by the public impar
tially, they also may properly be called highways, and the use to
which land for their construction is put be denominated a public
use. The government also provides court-houses for the admin
istration of justice; buildings for it
s
seminaries o
f
instruction ; *
aqueducts to convey pure and wholesome water into large towns; *
it builds levees to prevent the country being overflowed by the
rising streams;" it may cause drains to be constructed to relieve
swamps and marshes o
f
their stagnant water;" and other meas
ures o
f general utility, in which the public at large are interested,
and which require the appropriation o
f private property, are also
within the power, where they fall within the reasons underlying
the cases mentioned.”
drains, but must have reference to
the public health, convenience, o
r
welfare. Reeves v. Treasurer, &c.,
supra. And see People v. Nearing,
27 N. Y. 306. It is said in a recent
case that an act for the drainage o
f
a
large quantity o
f land, which in its
1 Williams v. School District, 33
Vt. 271. See Hooper v. Bridgewater,
102 Mass. 512; Long v. Fuller, 68
Penn. 170.
* Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444;
Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240; Gard
ner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162;
Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350; Bur
den v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104.
* Mithoff v. Carrollton, 12 La.
Ann. 185; Cash v. Whitworth, 13
La. Ann. 401; Inge v. Police Jury,
14 La. Ann. 117.
* Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co.,
14 Ind. 199; Reeves v. Treasurer o
f
Wood County, 8 Ohio, N
.
s. 344.
See a clear statement o
f
the general
principle and its necessity in the last
mentioned case. The drains, how
ever, which can be authorized to be
cut across the land o
f unwilling par
ties, o
r for which individuals can be
taxed, must not be mere private
present condition is not only worth
less for cultivation but unfit for resi
dence, and for an assessment o
f
the
cost b
y
benefits, is for a purpose suffi
ciently public to justify an exercise o
f
the right o
f
eminent domain. Matter
o
f Drainage of Lands, 35 N
. J. 497.
It is competent under the eminent do
main to appropriate and remove a
dam owned by private parties, in
order to reclaim a considerable body
o
f
lands flowed b
y
means o
f it
,
paying
the owner o
f
the dam its value. Tal
bot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
* Such, for instance, as the con
struction o
f
a public park, which, in
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[* 534] * Whether the power of eminent domain can rightfully
be exercised in the condemnation of lands for manufac
turing purposes, where the manufactories are to be owned and
occupied by individuals, is a question upon which the authorities
are at variance. Saw-mills, grist-mills, and various other manu
factories are certainly a public necessity; and while the country
is new, and capital not easily attainable for their erection, it
sometimes seems to be essential that government should offer
large inducements to parties who will supply this necessity. Be
fore steam came into use, water was almost the sole reliance for
motive power; and as reservoirs were generally necessary for this
purpose, it would sometimes happen that the owner of a valuable
mill site was unable to render it available, because the owners of
lands which must be flowed to obtain a reservoir would neither
consent to the construction of a dam, nor sell their lands except
at extravagant and inadmissible prices. The legislatures in some
of the States have taken the matter in hand, and have sur
mounted the difficulty, sometimes by authorizing the land to be
appropriated, and at other times by permitting the erection of the
dam, but requiring the mill owner to pay annually to the propri
etor of the land the damages caused by the flowing, to be assessed
in some impartial mode." The reasons for such statutes have
been growing weaker with the introduction of steam power and
the progress of improvement, but their validity has repeatedly
been recognized in some of the States, and probably the same
courts would continue still to recognize it
,
notwithstanding the
large cities, is as much a matter o
f
v
. Boston, 100 Mass. 544. A private
public utility as a railway or a supply
o
f pure water. See Matter of Cen
tral Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr.
Rep. 56; Owners o
f
Ground v. Mayor,
&c. o
f Albany, 15 Wend. 374;
Brooklyn Park Com’rs v. Armstrong,
4
5 N
.
Y
. 234; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 70;
County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo.
175. Or b
y
a boom company for the
purposes o
f
a boom. Patterson v.
Mississippi, &c. Boom Co., 3 Dill. 465.
Or sewers in cities. Hildreth v. Low
ell, 11 Gray, 345. A city may be
authorized to appropriate lands in
order to fill them up, and thereby
abate a nuisance upon them. Dingley
corporation may be empowered to ex
ercise the right o
f
eminent domain to
obtain a way along which to lay pipe
for the transportation of oil to a rail
road o
r navigable water. West Va.
Transportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil
and Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382. It is
held in Evergreen Cemetery v. New
Haven, 43 Conn. 234, that lands may
b
e appropriated under this power for
a cemetery ; but in Matter o
f Deans
ville Cemetery Association, 66 N
.
Y.
569, this is denied.
* See Angell on Watercourses, c.
12, for references to the statutes on
this subject.
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public necessity may no longer appear to demand such laws."
The rights granted by these laws to mill owners are said by
Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, to be “granted for the
better use of the water power, upon considerations of general
policy and the general good; ”” and in this view, and in order to
render available a valuable property which might other
wise be made of little use by narrow, selfish, and * un- [* 535.]
friendly conduct on the part of individuals, such laws
may perhaps be sustained on the same grounds which support an
exercise of the right of eminent domain to protect, drain, and
render valuable the lands which, by the overflow of a river,
might otherwise be an extensive and worthless swamp.”
* “The encouragement of mills
has always been a favorite object with
the legislature; and though the rea
sons for it may have ceased, the favor
of the legislature continues.” Wol
cott Woollen Manufacturing Co. v.
Upham, 5 Pick. 294. The practice
in Michigan has been different. See
Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333.
* French v. Braintree Manufac
turing Co., 23 Pick. 220.
* Action on the case for raising a
dam across the Merrimac River, by
which a mill stream emptying into
that river, above the site of said dam,
was set back and overflowed, and a
mill of the plaintiff situated thereon,
and the mill privilege, were damaged
and destroyed. Demurrer to the dec
laration. The defendant company
were chartered for the purpose of
constructing a dam across the Merri
mac River, and constructing one or
more locks and canals, in connection
with said dam, to remove obstructions
in said river by falls and rapids, and
to create a water power to be used for
mechanical and manufacturing pur
poses. The defendants claimed that
they were justified in what they had
done, by an act of the legislature ex
ercising the sovereign power of the
State, in the right of eminent domain;
that the plaintiff's property in the mill
and mill privilege was taken and ap
propriated under this right; and that
his remedy was by a claim of dam
ages under the act, and not by action
at common law as for a wrongful and
unwarrantable encroachment upon his
right of property. Shaw, Ch. J.: “It
is contended that if this act was in
tended to authorize the defendant
company to take the mill power and
mill of the plaintiff, it was void be
cause it was not taken for public use,
and it was not within the power of
the government in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. This is
the main question. In determining
it
,
we must look to the declared pur
poses o
f
the act; and if a public use
is declared, it will be so held, unless
it manifestly appears by the provisions
o
f
the act that they can have no ten
dency to advance and promote such
public use. The declared purposes
are to improve the navigation o
f
the
Merrimac River, and to create a large
mill power for mechanical and man
ufacturing purposes. In general,
whether a particular structure, as a
bridge, o
r
a lock, or canal, or road,
is for the public use, is a question for
the legislature, and which may be
presumed to have been correctly de
cided by them. Commonwealth v.
Breed, 4 Pick. 463. That the im
provement o
f
the navigation o
f
a
river is done for the public use has
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[* 536] * On the other hand, it is said that the legislature of
New York has never exercised the right of eminent do
main in favor of mills of any kind, and that “sites for steam
engines, hotels, churches, and other public conveniences, might
as well be taken by the exercise of this extraordinary power.” "
Similar views have been taken by the Supreme Courts of Ala
bama and Michigan.”
been too frequently decided and acted
upon to require authorities. And so
to create a wholly artificial navigation
by canals. The establishment of a
great mill power for manufacturing
purposes, as an object of great public
interest, especially since manufactur
ing has come to be one of the great
industrial pursuits of the Common
wealth, seems to have been regarded
by the legislature, and sanctioned by
the jurisprudence of the Common
wealth, and in our judgment rightly
so, in determining what is a public
use, justifying the exercise of right of
eminent domain. See St. 1825, c. 148,
incorporating the Salem Mill Dam
Corporation; Boston and Roxbury
Mill Dam Corporation v. Newman,
12 Pick. 467. The act since passed,
and the cases since decided on this
ground, are very numerous. That
the erection of this dam would have
a strong and direct tendency to ad
vance both these public objects, there
is no doubt. We are, therefore, of
opinion that the powers conferred on
the corporation by this act were so
done within the scope of the authority
of the legislature, and were not a vio
lation of the Constitution of the Com
monwealth.” Hazen v. Essex Com
pany, 12 Cush. 477. See also Boston
and Roxbury Mill Corporation v.
Newman, 12 Pick. 467; Fiske v.
Framingham Manufacturing Co.,
12 Pick. 67; Harding v. Goodlett,
3 Yerg. 41. The courts of Wiscon
sin have sustained such laws. New
come v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71; Thien
v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 461; Pratt v.
Brown, 3 Wis. 603. But with some
It is quite possible that, in any State in
hesitation of late. See Fisher v. Hor
ricon Co., 10 Wis. 351; Curtis r.
Whipple, 24 Wis. 350. And see the
note of Judge Redfield to Allen v.
Inhabitants of Jay, Law Reg., Aug.
1873, p. 493. And those of Connecti
cut. Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn.
532. And of Maine. Jordan r.
Woodward, 40 Me. 317. And of
Minnesota. Miller v. Troost, 14
Minn. 365. And of Kansas. Venard
v. Cross, 8 Kan. 248; Harding r.
Funk, 8 Kan. 315. And of Indiana.
Hawkins v. Lawrence, 8 Blackf. 266.
And they have been enforced else
where without question. Burgess v.
Clark, 13 Ired. 109; McAfee's Heirs
v. Kennedy, 1 Lit. 92; Smith v. Con
nelly, 1 T. B. Monr. 58; Shackleford
v. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh. 40; Cren
shaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245.
The whole subject was very fully con
sidered and the validity of such legis
lation affirmed in Great Falls Manuf.
Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. And
see Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591.
In Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Geo.
500, an act for the condemnation of
land for a grist-mill was held uncon
stitutional, though the tolls were reg
ulated and discrimination forbidden.
In Newell v. Smith, 15 Wis. 101, it
was held not constitutional to author
ize the appropriation of the property,
and leave the owner no remedy ex
cept to subsequently recover it
s
value
in an action o
f trespass.
* Hay v. Cohoes Company, 3
Barb. 47.
* Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333;
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. In
this last case, however, it was as
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which this question would be entirely a new one, and where it
would not be embarrassed by long acquiescence, or by either
judicial or legislative precedents, it might be held that these laws
are not sound in principle, and that there is no such necessity,
and consequently no such imperative reasons of public policy, as
would be essential to support an exercise of the right of eminent
domain." But accepting as correct the decisions which have been
made, it must be conceded that the term “public use,” as em
ployed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning much con
trolled by the necessity, and somewhat different from that which
it bears generally.”
sumed that lands for the purposes
of grist-mills which grind for toll, and
were required to serve the public im
partially, might, under proper legis
lation, be taken under the right of
eminent domain. The case of Lough
bridge v. Harris, 42 Geo. 500, is
contra. In Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt.
648, it was held not competent, where
the mills were subject to no such re
quirement. See the case, 8 Am.
Rep. 398. And see note by Redfield,
Am. Law Reg., Aug. 1873, p. 493.
* See this subject in general dis
cussed in a review of Angell on
Watercourses, 2 Am. Jurist, p. 25.
* In People v. Township Board of
Salem, 21 Mich. 259, the court consider
the question whether a use which is
regarded as public for the purposes of
an exercise of the right of eminent
domain, is necessarily so for the pur
poses of taxation. They say: “Rea
soning by analogy from one of the
sovereign powers of government to
another is exceedingly liable to de
ceive and mislead. An object may
be public in one sense and for one
purpose, when in a general sense and
for other purposes it would be idle or
misleading to apply the same term.
All governmental powers exist for
public purposes, but they are not
necessarily to be exercised under the
same conditions of public interest.
The sovereign police power which the
State possesses is to be exercised
only for the general public welfare,
but it reaches to every person, to
every kind of business, to every
species of property within the Com
monwealth. The conduct of every
individual, and the use of all property
and of all rights is regulated by it
,
to any extent found necessary for the
preservation o
f
the public order, and
also for the protection o
f
the private
rights o
f
one individual against en
croachment by others. The sovereign
power o
f
taxation is employed in a
great many cases where the power o
f
eminent domain might be made more
immediately efficient and available,
if constitutional principles could suf
fer it to be resorted to ; but each o
f
these has its own peculiar and appro
priate sphere, and the object which
is public for the demands of the one
is not necessarily o
f
a character to
permit the exercise o
f
the other.
“If we examine the subject criti
cally, we shall find that the most im
portant consideration in the case o
f
eminent domain is the necessity o
f
accomplishing some public good which
is otherwise impracticable; and we
shall also find that the law does not
so much regard the means a
s
the need.
The power is much nearer akin to
that o
f
the public police than to that
o
f taxation; it goes but a step farther,
and that step is in the same direc
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The Taking of Property.
Although property can only be taken for a public use, and the
legislature must determine in what cases, it has been long settled
tion. Every man has an abstract right
to the exclusive use of his own prop
erty for his own enjoyment in such
manner as he shall choose; but if
he should choose to create a nuisance
upon it
,
o
r
to do any thing which
would preclude a reasonable enjoy
ment o
f adjacent property, the law
would interfere to impose restraints.
He is said to own his private lot to
the centre o
f
the earth, but he would
not be allowed to excavate it indefi
nitely, lest his neighbor's lot should
disappear in the excavation. The
abstract right to make use o
f
his own
property in his own way is compelled
to yield to the general comfort and
protection o
f
the community, and to
a proper regard to relative rights in
others. The situation o
f
his property
may even be such that he is compelled
to dispose o
f
it because the law will
not suffer his regular business to be
carried on upon it
.
A needful and
lawful species of manufacture may
so injuriously affect the health and
comfort o
f
the vicinity that it cannot
be tolerated in a densely settled neigh
borhood, and therefore the owner o
f
a lot in that neighborhood will not
b
e allowed to engage in that manu
facture upon it
,
even though it be
his regular and legitimate business.
The butcher in the vicinity of whose
premises a village has grown up, finds
himself compelled to remove his busi
ness elsewhere, because his right to
make use o
f
his lot as a place for the
slaughter o
f
cattle has become incon
sistent with the superior right o
f
community to the enjoyment o
f pure
air and the accompanying blessings
and comforts. The owner of a lot
within the fire limits o
f
a city may
b
e compelled to part with the prop
erty, because h
e
is unable to erect a
brick o
r
stone structure upon it
,
and
the local regulations will not permit
one o
f
wood. Eminent domain only
recognizes and enforces the superior
right of the community against the
selfishness of individuals in a similar
way. Every branch o
f
needful in
dustry has a right to exist, and com
munity has a right to demand that
it be permitted to exist; and if for
that purpose a peculiar locality al
ready in possession o
f
a
n individual
is essential, the owner's right to un
disturbed occupancy must yield to
the superior interest o
f
the public.
A railroad cannot g
o
around the farm
o
f
every unwilling person, and the
business o
f transporting persons and
property for long distances b
y rail,
which has been found so essential to
the general enjoyment and welfare,
could never have existed if it were in
the power o
f any unwilling person to
stop the road a
t
his boundary, o
r
to
demand unreasonable terms as a con
dition o
f passing him. The law in
terferes in these cases, and regulates
the relative rights o
f
the owner and
o
f
the community with as strict re
gard to justice and equity as the
circumstances will permit. It does
not deprive the owner o
f
his property,
but it compels him to dispose o
f
so
much o
f it as is essential on equitable
terms. While, therefore, eminent
domain establishes no industry, it so
regulates the relative rights o
f all
that no individual shall have it in his
power to preclude it
s
establishment.”
On this general subject see Olmstead
v
. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, in which it
was very fully and carefully con
sidered.
What is a public use is a question
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that it is not essential the taking should be to or by the State
itself, if by any other agency, in the opinion of the legislature,
the use can be made equally effectual for the public benefit.
There are many cases in which the appropriation consists simply
in throwing the property open to use by such persons as may see
fi
t
to avail themselves o
f it; as in the case of common highways
and public parks. In these cases the title of the owner is not
disturbed, except as it is charged with this burden; and the State
defends the easement, not b
y
virtue o
f any title in the property,
but b
y
means o
f
criminal proceedings when the general
right is disturbed. * But in other cases it seems impor- [* 537]
tant to take the title ; and in many o
f
these it is conven
ient, if not necessary, that the taking be, not b
y
the State, but by
the municipality for which the use is specially designed, and to
whose care and government it will be confided. When property
is needed for a district school-house, it is proper that the district
appropriate it
;
and it is strictly in accordance with the general
theory a
s well as with the practice o
f
our government for the
State to delegate to the district the exercise o
f
the power o
f emi
nent domain for this special purpose. So a county may be au
thorized to take lands for it
s
court-house o
r jail; a city, for its
town hall, it
s
reservoirs o
f water, it
s sewers, and other public
works o
f
like importance. In these cases no question of power
arises; the taking is b
y
the public ; the use is b
y
the public ;
and the benefit to accrue therefrom is shared in greater o
r
less
degree by the whole public. -
-
If
,
however, it be constitutional to appropriate lands for mill
dams o
r mill sites, it ought also to be constitutional that the tak
ing be b
y
individuals instead o
f by the State o
r any o
f
it
s organ
ized political divisions; since it is no part of the business of the
government to engage in manufacturing operations which come
in competition with private enterprise; and the cases must be
very peculiar and very rare where a State or municipal corpora
tion could be justified in any such undertaking.) And although
the practice is not entirely uniform on the subject, the general
for the courts; though where a use
has been declared public by the legis
lature, the courts will hold it to be
such unless the contrary clearly ap
pears. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Ill.
540. See Olmstead v. Camp, 33
Conn. 551; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt.
648; Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Geo.
500; Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Lake,
7
1 Ill. 333; Water Works Co. v.
Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364.
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sentiment is adverse to the construction of railways by the State,
and the opinion is quite prevalent, if not general, that they can
be better managed, controlled, and operated for the public benefit
in the hands of individuals than by State or municipal officers or
agencies.)
And while there are unquestionably some objections to com
pelling a citizen to surrender his property to a corporation, whose
corporators, in receiving it
,
are influenced b
y
motives o
f private
gain and emolument, so that to them the purpose o
f
the appropri
ation is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled that these
facilities for travel and commerce are a public necessity, if the
legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, decide that the gen
eral benefit is better promoted b
y
their construction through indi
viduals or corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly
b
e pressing a constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were
to b
e
held that the public necessity should only be provided for
in the way which is least consistent with the public
[* 538] * interest. Accordingly, on the principle o
f public ben
efit, not only the State and it
s political divisions, but also
individuals and corporate bodies, have been authorized to take
private property for the construction o
f
works o
f public utility,
and when duly empowered b
y
the legislature so to do, their pri
vate pecuniary interest does not preclude their being regarded as
public agencies in respect to the public good which is sought to
b
e accomplished."
-
The Necessity for the Taking.
The authority to determine in any case whether it is needful
to permit the exercise o
f
this power must rest with the State
* Beekman v. Saratoga and Schen
ectady R
.
R
. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Wilson
v
. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet.
251; Buonaparte v. Camden and
Amboy R
.
R
. Co., 1 Bald. 205;
Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson
R
.
R
. Co., 18 Wend. 1
;
Lebanon
v
. Olcott, 1 N
.
H. 339; Petition o
f
Mount Washington Road Co., 35
N. H
.
141; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis.
603; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427;
Stevens v
. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass.
466; Boston Mill Dam v. Newman,
1
2 Pick. 467; Gilmer v. Lime Point,
1
8 Cal. 229; Armington v. Barnet, 15
Vt. 750; White River Turnpike v.
Central Railroad, 21 Vt. 590; Raleigh,
&c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat.
451; Whiteman's Ex’r v. Wilming
ton, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 2 Harr. 514;
Bradley v. N. Y
.
and N
.
H
.
R
.
R
.
Co., 21 Conn. 294; Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Eaton v. Bos
ton, C
.
& M. R
.
R
. Co., 51 N. H.
504.
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itself; and the question is always one of strictly political charac
ter, not requiring any hearing upon the facts or any judicial deter
mination. Nevertheless, when a work or improvement of local
importance only is contemplated, the need of which must be de
termined upon a view of the facts which the people of the vicinity
may be supposed best to understand, the question of necessity is
generally referred to some local tribunal, and it may even be sub
mitted to a jury to decide upon evidence." But parties interested
have no constitutional right to be heard upon the question, unless
the State constitution clearly and expressly recognizes and pro
vides for it
.
On general principles, the final decision rests with
the legislative department o
f
the State ; * and if the question is
referred to any tribunal for trial, the reference and the opportu
nity for being heard are matters o
f
favor and not o
f right. The
State is not under any obligation to make provision for a judicial
contest upon that question. And where the case is such that it
is proper to delegate to individuals o
r
to a corporation the power
to appropriate property, it is also competent to delegate the
authority to decide upon the necessity for the taking.”
1 Iron R
.
R
.
Co. v
. Ironton, 19
Ohio, N
.
s. 299. The constitutions
o
f
some o
f
the States require the
question o
f
the necessity o
f any spe
cific appropriation to be submitted to
a jury; and this requirement cannot
be dispensed with. Mansfield, &c.
R. R
.
Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519;
Arnold v. Decatur, 29 Mich. 77.
* United States v. Harris, 1 Sum.
21, 42; Ford v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 14 Wis. 609; People v. Smith,
21 N. Y. 595; Water Works Co. v.
Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364.
* People v. Smith, 21 N
.
Y. 597;
Ford v. Chicago and N
.
W. R
.
R
.
Co., 14 Wis. 617; Matter of Albany
St., 11 Wend. 152; Lyon v. Jerome,
26 Wend. 484; Hays v. Risher, 32
Penn. St. 169; North Missouri R
.
R
.
Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515; Same
v
. Gott, 25 Mo. 540; Bankhead v.
Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Contra Costa
R
.
R
.
v
. Moss, 23 Cal. 323; Matter
o
f Fowler, 53 N
.
Y
.
60; N
.
Y
. Cen
tral, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Met. Gas Co.,
6
3 N
.
Y
. 326; Chicago, &c. R. R
.
Co. v. Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Warren v.
St. Paul, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 18 Minn.
384. In the case first cited, Denio, J.,
says: “The question is
,
whether the
State, in the exercise o
f
the power to
appropriate the property o
f individu
als to a public use, where the duty o
f
judging o
f
the expediency o
f making
the appropriation, in a class o
f cases,
is committed to public officers, is
obliged to afford to the owners o
f
the
property an opportunity to be heard
before those officers when they sit for
the purpose o
f making the determi
nation. I do not speak now of the
process for arriving at the amount
o
f compensation to be paid to the
owners, but o
f
the determination
whether, under the circumstances o
f
a particular case, the property re
quired for the purpose shall be taken
o
r not; and I am of opinion that the
State is not under any obligation to
make provision for a judicial contest
upon that question. The only part
43
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[* 539) * How much Property may be taken.
The taking of property must always be limited to the necessity
of the case, and consequently no more can be appropri
[* 540] ated in any "instance than the proper tribunal shall
adjudge to be needed for the particular use for which the
of the constitution which refers to
the subject is that which forbids pri
vate property to be taken for public
use without compensation, and that
which prescribes the manner in which
the compensation shall be ascertained.
It is not pretended that the statute
under consideration violates either
of those provisions. There is, there
fore, no constitutional injunction on
the point under consideration. The
necessity for appropriating private
property for the use of the public or
of the government is not a judicial
question. The power resides in the
legislature. It may be exercised by
means of a statute which shall at once
designate the property to be appro
priated and the purpose of the appro
priation; or it may be delegated to
public officers, or, as it has been re
peatedly held, to private corporations
established to carry on enterprises in
which the public are interested.
There is no restraint upon the power,
except that requiring compensation
to be made. And where the power
is committed to public officers, it is
a subject of legislative discretion. to
determine what prudential regulations
shall be established to secure a dis
creet and judicious exercise of the
authority. The constitutional pro
vision securing a trial by jury in cer
tain cases, and that which declares
that no citizen shall be deprived of
his property without due process of
law, have no application to the case.
The jury trial can only be claimed as
a constitutional right where the sub
ject is judicial in its character. The
exercise of the right of eminent do
main stands on the same ground with
the power of taxation. Both are
emanations from the law-making
power. They are attributes of po
litical sovereignty, for the exercise
of which the legislature is under no
necessity to address itself to the courts.
In imposing a tax, or in appropriating
the property of a citizen, or of a class
of citizens, for a public purpose, with
a proper provision for compensation,
the legislative act is itself due process
of law; though it would not be if it
should undertake to appropriate the
property of one citizen for the use of
another, or to confiscate the property
of one person or class of persons, or
a particular description of property
upon some view of public policy,
where it could not be said to be taken
for a public use. It follows from
these views that it is not necessary
for the legislature, in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, either
directly, or indirectly through public
officers or agents, to invest the pro
ceedings with the forms or substance
of judicial process It may allow the
owner to intervene and participate in
the discussion before the officer or
board to whom the power is given of
determining whether the appropria
tion shall be made in a particular
case, or it may provide that the otii
cers shall act upon their own views
of propriety and duty, without the
aid of a forensic contest. The ap
propriation of the property is an act
of public administration, and the
form and manner of its performance
is such as the legislature in its dis
cretion shall prescribe.”
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appropriation is made. When a part only of a man's premises
is needed by the public, the necessity for the appropriation of
that part will not justify the taking of the whole, even though
compensation be made therefor. The moment the appropriation
goes beyond the necessity of the case, it ceases to be justified on
the principles which underlie the right of eminent do
main." If
,
*however, the statute providing for such ap-[* 541]
propriation is acted upon, and the property owner accepts
the compensation awarded to him under it
,
h
e will be precluded
b
y
this implied assent from afterwards objecting to the excessive
* By a statute o
f
New York it was
enacted that whenever a part only o
f
a lot o
r parcel o
f
land should be re
quired for the purposes o
f
a city street,
if the commissioners for assessing
compensation should deem it expe
dient to include the whole lot in the
assessment, they should have power
so to do ; and the part not wanted
for the particular street or improve
ment should, upon the confirmation
o
f
the report, become vested in the
corporation, and might be appropri
ated to public uses, or sold in case
o
f
n
o
such appropriation. Of this
statute it was said by the Supreme
Court o
f
New York: “If this pro
vision was intended merely to give
to the corporation capacity to take
property under such circumstances
with the consent o
f
the owner, and
then to dispose o
f
the same, there can
b
e no objection to it
;
but if it is to
b
e taken literally, that the commis
sioners may, against the consent o
f
the owner, take the whole lot, when
only a part is required for public use,
and the residue to be applied to pri
vate use, it assumes a power which,
with all respect, the legislature did not
possess. The constitution, by au
thorizing the appropriation o
f prop
erty to public use, impliedly declares
that for any other use private prop
erty shall not be taken from one and
applied to the private use o
f
another.
It is in violation of natural right; and
if it is not in violation of the letter of
the constitution, it is of its spirit, and
cannot be supported. This power
has been supposed to be convenient
when the greater part o
f
a lot is
taken, and only a small part left, not
required for public use, and that
small part o
f
but little value in the
hands of the owner. In such case
the corporation has been supposed
best qualified to take and dispose o
f
such parcels, o
r goers, as they have
sometimes been called; and probably
this assumption o
f power has been
acquiesced in b
y
the proprietors. I
know o
f
no case where the power has
been questioned, and where it has
received the deliberate sanction of
this court. Suppose a case where
only a few feet, o
r
even inches, are
wanted, from one end o
f
a lot to
widen a street, and a valuable build
ing stands upon the other end o
f
such
lot; would the power be conceded to
exist to take the whole lot, whether
the owner consented or not? The
quantity o
f
the residue o
f any lot can
not vary the principle The owner
may b
e very unwilling to part with
only a few feet; and I hold it equally
incompetent for the legislature to
dispose o
f private property, whether
feet or acres are the subject o
f
this
assumed power.” Matter o
f Albany
St., 11 Wend. 151, per Savage, Ch.
J. To the same effect is Dunn c.
City Council, Harper, 129. And see
Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108.
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appropriation." And where land is taken for a public work, there
is nothing in the principle we have stated which will preclude
the appropriation of whatever might be necessary for incidental
conveniences; such as the workshops or depot buildings of a rail
way company,” or materials to be used in the construction of their
road, and so on. Express legislative power, however, is needed
for these purposes; it will not follow that, because such things
are convenient to the accomplishment of the general object, the
public may appropriate them without express authority of law;
but the power to appropriate must be expressly conferred, and
the public agencies seeking to exercise this high prerogative must
be careful to keep within the authority delegated, since the pub
lic necessity cannot be held to extend beyond what has been
plainly declared on the face o
f
the legislative enactment.
What constitutes a Taking o
f Property.
Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does
not directly encroach upon the property o
f
a
n individual, o
r dis
turb him in it
s possession or enjoyment, will not entitle him to
compensation, o
r give him a right o
f
action.” If
,
for
[* 542] instance, the * State, under its power to provide and
1 Embury v. Conner, 3 N
.
Y
.
511.
There is clearly nothing in constitu
tional principles which would preclude
the legislature from providing that
a man's property might be taken with
his assent, whether the assent was
evidenced by deed o
r not; and if he
accepts payment, h
e must be deemed
to assent. The more recent case of
House v. Rochester, 15 Barb. 517, is
not, we think, opposed to Embury v.
Conner, o
f
which it makes no men
tion. See Haskell v. New Bedford,
108 Mass. 208.
* Chicago, B
.
and Q
.
R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Low v. Galena
and C
.
U
.
R
.
R
. Co., 18 Ill. 324;
Giesy r. Cincinnati, W. and Z
.
R
.
R
.
Co., 4 Ohio, N
.
s. 308.
* Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co.,
1 W. & S. 346; Shrunk v. Schuylkill
Navigation Co., 14 S. & R
. 71; Mo
nongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons,
6 W. & S. 101; Davidson v. Boston
& Maine R
.
R
. Co., 3 Cush. 91; Gould
v
. Hudson River R
.
R. Co., 12 Barb.
616, and 6 N. Y. 522; Radcliff r.
Mayor, &c. o
f Brooklyn, 4 N
.
Y
.
195:
Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 551;
Hooker v. New Haven and Northamp
ton Co., 14 Conn. 146; People v.
Kerr, 27 N. Y
.
193; Fuller r. Ed
ings, 11 Rich. Law, 239; Eddings
v
. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law, 504;
Richardson v. Vermont Central R. R.
Co., 25 Wt. 465; Kennett's Petition,
4 Fost. 139; Alexander v. Milwaukee,
1
6 Wis. 247; Richmond, &c. Co. r.
Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135; Harvey r.
Lackawanna, &c. R. R. Co., 47 Penn.
St. 428; Tinicum Fishing Co. r.
Carter, 61 Penn. St. 21. The dis
continuance o
f
a highway does not
entitle parties incommoded thereby
to compensation. Fearing v. Irwin,
55 N. Y. 486.
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regulate the public highways, should authorize the construction
of a bridge across a navigable river, it is quite possible that all
proprietary interests in land upon the river might be injuriously
affected ; but such injury could no more give a valid claim against
the State for damages, than could any change in the general laws
of the State, which, while keeping in view the general good, might
injuriously affect particular interests." So if
,
by the erection o
f
a
dam in order to improve navigation, the owner o
f
a fishery finds
it diminished in value,” or if by deepening the channel of a river
to improve the navigation a spring is destroyed,” o
r by a change
in the grade o
f
a city street the value o
f adjacent lots is dimin
ished,” — in these and similar cases the law affords no redress for
1 Davidson v. Boston and Maine
R. R
. Co., 3 Cush. 91.
* Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation
Co., 14 S. & R. 71. In Green t?.
Swift, 47 Cal. 536, it is held that
where one finds his land injured in
consequence o
f
a change in the cur
rent o
f
a river, caused by straighten
ing it
,
h
e cannot claim compensation
a
s o
f right.
* Commonwealth v. Richter, 1
Penn. St. 467. It is justly said by
Mr. Justice Miller, in Pumpelly v.
The Green Bay, &c. Co., 13 Wall.
180, that the decisions “that for the
consequential injury to the property
o
f
a
n individual from the prosecution
o
f improvement of roads, streets,
rivers, and other highways for the
public good, there is no redress,”
“have gone to the extreme and limit
o
f
sound judicial construction in favor
o
f
this principle, and in some cases
beyond it; and it remains true that
where real estate is actually invaded
by superinduced additions o
f water,
earth, sand, o
r
other material, o
r by
having any artificial structure placed
on it
,
so a
s effectually to destroy o
r
impair it
s usefulness, it is a taking
within the meaning of the constitu
tion.” See also Arimond v. Green
Bay, &c. Co., 31 Wis. 316; Aurora
v
. Reed, 57 Ill. 29; s. c. 11 Am.
Rep. 1. This whole subject is most
elaborately considered by Smith, J.,
in Eaton v. Boston, C
.
& M. R
.
R
.
Co., 51 N. H. 504. It was decided
in that case that, notwithstanding a
party had received compensation for
the taking o
f
his land for a railroad,
h
e
was entitled to a further remedy a
t
the common law for the flooding o
f
his land in consequence o
f
the road
being cut through a ridge on the land
o
f another; and that this flooding
was a taking o
f
his property within
the meaning o
f
the constitution. The
cases to the contrary are all consid
ered by the learned judge, who is
able to adduce very forcible reasons
for his conclusions. Compare Ald
rich v. Cheshire R
.
R
. Co., 21 N. H.
359; West Branch, &c. Canal Co. v.
Mulliner, 68 Penn. St. 357; Bellinger
v
. N
.
Y. Central R. R. Co., 23 N. Y.
42; Hatch v. Vt. Central R
.
R
. Co.,
25 Vt. 49.
* British Plate Manufacturing Co.
v
. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Matter of
Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649; Rad
cliff's Ex’rs v. Mayor, &c. of Brook
lyn, 4 N
.
Y
.
195; Graves v. Otis, 2
Hill, 466; Wilson v. Mayor, &c. of
New York, 1 Denio, 595; Murphy v.
Chicago, 29 Ill. 279; Roberts v. Chi
cago, 26 Ill. 249; Charlton v. Alle
ghany City, 1 Grant, 208; La Fayette
v
. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Macy v. In
dianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes v.
678 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [ch. xv.
the injury. So if
,
in consequence o
f
the construction o
f
a public
work, an injury occurs, but the work was constructed on proper
plan and without negligence, and the injury is caused b
y
acci
dental and extraordinary circumstances, the injured party cannot
demand compensation."
* This principle is peculiarly applicable to those cases
where property is appropriated under the right of eminent
domain. It must frequently occur that a party will find his rights
seriously affected though no property to which he has lawful claim
is actually appropriated. As where a road is laid out along the
line o
f
a man's land without taking any portion o
f it
,
in conse
quence o
f
which he is compelled to keep u
p
the whole o
f
what
before was a partition fence, one-half o
f
which his neighbor was
required to support.” No property being taken in this case, the
party has no relief, unless the statute shall give it
.
The loss is
damnum absºlue injuria. So a turnpike company, whose profits
will be diminished b
y
the construction o
f
a railroad along the
same general line o
f travel, is not entitled to compensation.” So
[* 543]
Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Green v. Read
ing, 9 Watts, 382; O’Conner v. Pitts
burg, 18 Penn. St. 187; In re Ridge
Street, 29 Penn. St. 391; Callendar v.
Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Creal v. Keokuk,
4 Greene (Iowa), 47; Smith v. Wash
ington, 20 How. 135: Skinner v. Hart
ford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Ben
den v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477; Pontiac
r. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; Goszler v.
Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 703. The
cases o
f
McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio,
474, and 18 Ohio, 229, and Crawford
v
. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N
.
s. 459, are
contra. Those cases, however, admit
that a party whose interests are in
jured by the original establishment o
f
a street grade can have no claim to
compensation; but they hold that
when the grade is once established,
and lots are improved in reference to
it
,
the corporation has no right to
change the grade afterwards, except
o
n payment o
f
the damages.
* As in Sprague v. Worcester, 13
Gray, 193, where, in consequence o
f
the erection o
f
a bridge over a stream
on which a mill was situated, the mill
was injured by a
n extraordinary rise
in the stream; the bridge, however,
being in a
ll respects properly con
structed. And see Brown v. Cayuga,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 12 N. Y. 486, where
bridge proprietors were held liable
for similar injuries on the ground of
negligence. And compare Norris r.
Wt. Central R. R
. Co., 28 Wt. 102,
with Mellen v. Western R
.
R
. Corp.,
4 Gray, 301. And see note 3 on pre
ceding page. -
2 Kennett's Petition, 4 Fost. 139.
See Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich.
Law, 504; Slatter v. Des Moines Wal
ley R
.
R
. Co., 29 Iowa, 154; Hoag v.
Switzer, 61 Ill. 294.
* Troy and Boston R
.
R
.
Co. r.
Northern Turnpike Co., 16 Barb.
100. See La Fayette Plank Road
Co. v. New Albany and Salem R
.
R
.
Co., 13 Ind. 90; Richmond, &c. Co.
v
. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135. So an in
creased competition with a party's
business caused b
y
the construction
o
r
extension o
f
a road is not a ground
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where a railroad company, in constructing their road in a proper
manner on their own land, raised a high embankment near to and
in front of the plaintiff's house, so as to prevent his passing to
and from the same with the same convenience as before, this con
sequential injury was held to give no claim to compensation.” So
the owner of dams erected by legislative authority is without
remedy, if they are afterwards rendered valueless by the
construction of a canal.” “And in New York it has been [* 544]
of claim. Harvey v. Lackawanna, &c.
R. R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 428. “Every
great public improvement must, almost
of necessity, more or less, affect indi
vidual convenience and property; and
when the injury sustained is remote
and consequential, it is damnun abs
que injuria, and is to be borne as a
part of the price to be paid for the
advantages of the social condition.
This is founded upon the principle
that the general good is to prevail
over partial individual convenience.”
Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 149.
* Richardson v. Vermont Central
R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. But quare if
this could be so, if the effect were to
prevent access from the lot to the
highway. In certain Indiana cases it
is said that the right of the owner of
adjoining land to the use of the high
way is as much property as the land
itself; that it is appurtenant to the
land, and is protected by the consti
tution. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind.
38; Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c.
R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 469; New Albany
and Salem R. R. Co. v. O'Dailey,
13 Ind. 463. The same doctrine is
recognized in Crawford v. Delaware,
7 Ohio, N. s. 459, and Street Railway
v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 523.
See also Indianapolis R. R. Co. v.
Smith, 52 Ind. 428; Pekin v. Brere
ton, 67 Ill. 477; Pekin v. Winkel, 77
Ill. 56; Grand Rapids, &c. R. R.
Co. v. Heisel, 37 Mich. In the Ver
mont case above cited it was held
that an excavation by the company
on their own land, so near the line of
the plaintiff’s that his land, without
any artificial weight thereon, slid into
the excavation, would render the com
pany liable for the injury; the plain
tiff being entitled to the lateral sup
port for his land.
* Susquehanna Canal Co. v.
Wright, 9 W. & S. 9; Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S.
101. In any case, if parties exer
cising the right of eminent domain
shall cause injury to others by a neg
ligent or improper construction of
their work, they may be liable in
damages. Rowe v. Granite Bridge
Corporation, 21 Pick. 348; Sprague
v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193. And if
a public work is of a character to
necessarily disturb the occupation
and enjoyment of his estate by one
whose land is not taken, he may have
an action on the case for the injury,
notwithstanding the statute makes
no provision for compensation. As
where the necessary, and not simply
the accidental, consequence was, to
flood a man's premises with water,
thereby greatly diminishing their
value. Hooker v. New Haven and
Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146;
s. c. 15 Conn. 312; Evansville, &c.
R. R. Co. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Robin
son v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co., 27
Barb. 512; Trustees of Wabash and
Erie Canal r. Spears, 16 Ind. 441;
Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R. R. Co.,
51 N. H. 504. So where, by blasting
rock in making an excavation, the
fragments are thrown upon adja
cent buildings so as to render
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held that, as the land where the tide ebbs and flows, between
high and low water mark, belongs to the public, the State may
lawfully authorize a railroad company to construct their road
along the water front below high-water mark, and the owner
of the adjacent bank can claim no compensation for the conse
quential injury to his interests." So the granting of a ferry right
with a landing on private property within a highway terminating
on a private stream is not an appropriation of property,” the ferry
being a mere continuation of the highway, and the landing place
upon the private property having previously been appropriated to
public uses. - -
These cases must suffice as illustrations of the principle stated,
though many others might be referred to. On the other hand,
any injury to the property of an individual which deprives the
owner of the ordinary use of it
,
is equivalent to a taking, and
entitles him to compensation.” Water front on a stream where
the tide does not ebb and flow is property, and if taken, must be
paid for as such.” So with an exclusive right o
f wharfage upon
tide water.”
their occupation unsafe. Hay v.
Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain
v
. Same, 2 N. Y
.
163; Carman v.
Steubenville and Indiana R
.
R. Co.,
4 Ohio, N
.
s. 399; Sunbury and Erie
R. R
.
Co. v. Hummel, 27 Penn. St.
99. There has been some disposition
to hold private corporations liable for
all incidental damages caused b
y
their
exercise o
f
the right o
f
eminent do
main. See Tinsman v. Belvidere and
Delaware R
.
R
. Co., 26 N. J. 148;
Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 255.
1 Gould v. Hudson River R. R
.
Co., 6 N. Y. 522. And see Stevens
v
. Paterson, &c. R. R. Co., 34 N
. J.
532; Tomlin v. Dubuque, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 32 Iowa, 106; s. c. 7 Am. Rep.
176. So far as these cases hold it
competent to cut off a riparian pro
prietor from access to the navigable
water, they seem to us to justify an
appropriation o
f
his property without
compensation ; for even those courts
which hold the fee in the soil under
navigable waters to be in the State
So with the right o
f
the owner o
f
land to use
admit valuable riparian rights in the
adjacent proprietor. See Yates r.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497: Chicago,
&c. R. R. Co. v. Stein, 75 Ill. 41.
Compare Pennsylvania R
.
R
.
Co. v.
New York, &c. R. R
. Co., 23 N. J.
Eq. 157.
* Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561.
8 Hooker v. New Haven and North
ampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; Pumpelly
v
. Green Bay, &c. Co., 13 Wall. 166:
Arimond v. Green Bay, &c. Co., 31
Wis. 316: Port Huron v. Ashley, 35
Mich. 296. The flowing of private
lands by the operations o
f
a booming
company is a taking o
f property.
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis,
30 Mich. 308. The legislature can
not authorize a telegraph company to
erect it
s poles on the lands o
f
a rail
road company without compensation.
Atlantic, &c. Telegraph Co. v. Chi
cago, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 6 Biss 158.
* Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 547.
See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.
* Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.
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an adjoining street, whether he is owner of the land over
which the *street is laid out or not.' So with the right [* 545]
of pasturage in streets, which belongs to the owners of
the soil.” So a partial destruction or diminution of value of
property by an act of the government which directly and not
merely incidentally affects it
,
is to that extent a
n appropriation.”
It sometimes becomes important, where a highway has been
laid out and opened, to establish a different and higher grade o
f
way upon the same line, with a view to accommodate an increased
public demand. The State may be willing to surrender the con
trol o
f
the streets in these cases, and authorize turnpike, plank
road, o
r
railroad corporations to occupy them for their purposes;
and if it shall give such consent, the control, so far as is neces
sary to the purposes o
f
the turnpike, plank-road, o
r railway, is
thereby passed over to the corporation, and their structure in
what was before a common highway cannot be regarded as a
public nuisance.” But the municipal organizations in the State
have n
o power to give such consent without express legislative
permission; the general control o
f
their streets which is com
monly given b
y municipal charters not being sufficient authority
1 Lackland v. North Missouri R. R.
Co., 31 Mo. 180. See supra, p
. *543,
note.
2 Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Mun
ger, 5 Denio, 255; Woodruff v. Neal,
28 Conn. 165. In the first case it was
held that a by-law o
f
a town giving
liberty to the inhabitants to depasture
their cows in the public highways un
der certain regulations, passed under
the authority o
f
a general statute em
powering towns to pass such by-laws,
was o
f
n
o validity, because it appro
priated the pasturage, which was
private property, to the public use,
without making compensation. The
contrary has been held in New York
a
s to all highways laid out while such
a statute was in existence; the owner
being held to be compensated for the
pasturage as well as for the use o
f
the
land for other purposes, at the time
the highway was laid out. Griffin v.
Martin, 7 Barb. 297; Hardenburgh v.
Lockwood, 25 Barb. 9. See also Ker
whacker v. Cleveland, C
.
and C
.
R
.
R.
Co., 3 Ohio, N
.
s. 177, where it was
held that by ancient custom in that
State there was a right o
f pasturage
by the public in the highways.
* See Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt.
211; Eaton v. Boston, C
.
& M. R
.
R.
Co., 51 N. H
.
504. Even a tempo
rary right to the possession o
f
lands
cannot be given by the legislature
- without provision for compensation.
San Mateo Water Works v. Sharp
stein, 50 Cal. 284. A provision in
the charter o
f
a corporation that it
shall not be liable for diverting water
is void. Harding v. Stamford Water
Co., 41 Conn. 87.
* See Commonwealth r. Erie and
N. E. R
.
R
. Co., 27 Penn. St. 339;
Tennessee, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Adams,
3 Head, 596: New Orleans, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 517;
Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Joliet, 79
Ill. 25; Donnaher's Case, 16 Miss.
679.
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[* 546] for this purpose." When, however, the * public authori
ties have thus assented, it may be found that the owners
of the adjacent lots, who are also owners of the fee in the high
way subject to the public easement, may be unwilling to assent
to the change, and may believe their interests to be seriously and
injuriously affected thereby. The question may then arise, Is
the owner of the land, who has been once compensated for the
injury he has sustained in the appropriation of his land as a high
way, entitled to a new assessment for any further injury he may
sustain in consequence of the street being subjected to a change
in the use not contemplated at the time of the original taking,
but nevertheless in furtherance of the same general purpose 2
When a common highway is made a turnpike or a plank-road,
upon which tolls are collected, there is much reason for holding
that the owner of the soil is not entitled to any further compen
sation. The turnpike or the plank-road is still an avenue for
public travel, subject to be used in the same manner as the
ordinary highway was before, and, if properly constructed, is
generally expected to increase rather than diminish the value of
* Lackland v. North Missouri
R. R. Co., 31 Mo. 180; New York
and Harlem R. R. Co. v. Mayor, &c.
of New York, 1 Hilt. 562; Milhau v.
Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; State v. Cincin
nati, &c. Gas Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 262;
State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. 79. In
Inhabitants of Springfield v. Connecti
cut River R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 71, it
was held that legislative authority to
construct a railroad between certain
termini, without prescribing its pre
cise course and direction, would not
prima facie confer power to lay out
the road on and along an existing
public highway. Per Shaw, Ch. J.:
“The whole course of legislation on
the subject of railroads is opposed to
such a construction. The crossing of
public highways by railroads is ob
viously necessary, and of course war
ranted; and numerous provisions are
industriously made to regulate such
crossings, by determining when they
shall be on the same and when on
different levels, in order to avoid col
lision, and when on the same level
what gates, fences, and barriers shall
be made, and what guards shall be
kept to insure safety. Had it been
intended that railroad companies,
under a general grant, should have
power to lay a railroad over a high
way longitudinally, which ordinarily
is not necessary, we think that would
have been done in express terms, ac
companied with full legislative pro
visions for maintaining such barriers
and modes of separation as would
tend to make the use of the same
road, for both modes of travel, con
sistent with the safety of travellers on
both. The absence of any such pro
vision affords a strong inference that,
under general terms, it was not in
tended that such a power should be
given.” See also Commonwealth r.
Erie and N. E. R. R. Co., 27 Penn.
St. 339; Attorney-General v. Morris
and Essex R. R. Co., 19 N. J. Eq.
386.
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property along it
s
line ; and though the adjoining proprietors are
required to pay toll, they are supposed to be, and generally are,
fully compensated for this burden by the increased excellence o
f
the road, and b
y
their exemption from highway labor upon it."
But it is different when a highway is appropriated for the purposes
o
f
a railroad. “It is quite apparent that the use by the
public o
f
a highway, and the use thereof by a * railroad [* 547]
company, is essentially different. In the one case every
person is a
t liberty to travel over the highway in any place o
r
part thereof, but he has no exclusive right o
f occupation o
f any
part thereof except while he is temporarily passing over it
. It
would be trespass for him to occupy any part o
f
the highway ex
clusively for any longer period o
f
time than was necessary for
that purpose, and the stoppages incident thereto. But a railroad
company takes exclusive and permanent possession o
f
a portion
o
f
the street o
r highway. It lays down its rails upon, or imbeds
them in, the soil, and thus appropriates a portion o
f
the street to
its exclusive use, and for its own particular mode o
f conveyance.
In the one case, al
l
persons may travel o
n
the street o
r highway
in their own common modes o
f conveyance. In the other, no
one can travel on o
r
over the rails laid down, except the railroad
company and with their cars specially adapted to the tracks. In
one case the use is general and open alike to all. In the other,
it is peculiar and exclusive.
“It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may
not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from
its use. With a single track, and particularly if the cars used
upon it were propelled b
y
horse-power, the interruption o
f
the
public easement in the street might be very trifling and o
f
n
o
practical consequence to the public at large. But this consider
ation cannot affect the question o
f
the right of property, or o
f
the increase o
f
the burden upon the soil. It would present simply
a question o
f degree in respect to the enlargement o
f
the easement,
* See Commonwealth v. Wilkin- Natural Bridge Plank Road Co., 21
Mo. 580.son, 16 Pick. 175; Benedict v. Goit,
3 Barb. 459; Wright v. Carter, 27
N. J. 76; State v. Laverack, 34
N. J. 201; Chagrin Falls and Cleve
land Plank-Road Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio,
N
.
s. 419: Douglass v. Turnpike Co.,
22 Md. 219. But see Williams v.
In Murray v. County Com
missioners o
f Berkshire, 12 Met. 455,
it was held that owners of lands ad
joining a turnpike were not entitled
to compensation when a turnpike was
changed to a common highway.
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and would not affect the principle, that the use of a street for the
purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new burden.” "
* The case from which we here quote is approved in
recent cases in Wisconsin, where importance is attached
to the different effect the common highway and the railroad will
have upon the value of adjacent property. “The dedication to
the public as a highway,” it is said, “enhances the value of the
lot, and renders it more convenient and useful to the owner.
The use by the railroad company diminishes it
s value, and ren
ders it inconvenient and comparatively useless. It would be a
most unjust and oppressive rule which would deny the owner
compensation under such circumstances.””
It is not always the case, however, that the value of a lot of
land will be enhanced b
y
the laying out o
f
a common highway
across it
,
o
r diminished by the construction o
f
a railway over the
same line afterwards. The constitutional question cannot depend
upon the accidental circumstance that the new road will o
r will
not have an injurious effect; though that circumstance is prop
erly referred to, since it is difficult to perceive how a change of
[* 548]
1 Wager v. Troy Union R
.
R
. Co.,
2
5 N
.
Y
.
532, approving Williams v.
New York Central R
.
R
. Co., 16 N
.
Y. 97; Carpenter v. Oswego and
Syracuse R
.
R
. Co., 24 N
. Y. 655;
Mahon v. New York Central R. R.
Co., 24 N. Y. 658; Starr v. Camden
and Atlantic R
.
R
. Co., 24 N
. J.
592; Donnaher's Case, 16 Miss. 649;
Cox v. Louisville, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 48
Ind. 178. In Inhabitants of Spring
field v. Connecticut River R
.
R. Co.,
4 Cush. 71, where, however, the pre
cise question here discussed was not
involved, Chief Justice Shaw, in
comparing railroads with common
highways, says: “The two uses are
almost, if not wholly, inconsistent
with each other, so that taking the
highway for a railroad will nearly
supersede the former use to which it
had been legally appropriated.” See
also Presbyterian Society o
f
Waterloo
v
. Auburn and Rochester R
.
R
. Co.,
3 Hill, 567; Craig r. Rochester, &c.
R. R
. Co., 39 Barb. 494; Schurmeier
v
. St. Paul, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 10 Minn.
82; Gray v. First Division, &c., 13
Minn. 365; Central R
.
R
.
Co. r. Het
field, 5 Dutch. 206; South Carolina
R. R
.
Co. v. Steiner, 44 Geo. 546.
The cases of Philadelphia and Trenton
R. R
. Co., 6 Whart. 25, and Morris
and Essex R. R. Co. v. Newark, 2
Stockt. 352, are opposed to the New
York cases. And see Wolfe v. Cov
ington, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 15 B
.
Monr.
404; Com. v. Erie and N. E. R
.
R
.
Co., 27 Penn St. 339: Snyder r.
Pennsylvania R
.
R
. Co., 55 Penn. St.
340; Peddicord v. Baltimore, &c.
R
.
R
. Co., 34 Md. 463. A gas-light
company cannot be authorized to lay
its pipes in a country highway with
out consent o
f
o
r compensation to the
owners o
f
the fee. Bloomfield, &c.
Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386.
* Ford v. Chicago and North
western R
.
R
. Co., 14 Wis. 616;
followed in Pomeroy v. Chicago and
M. R
.
R
. Co., 16 Wis. 610.
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use which may possibly have an injurious effect not contemplated
in the original appropriation can be considered any thing else
than the imposition of a new burden upon the owner's estate.
In Connecticut, where the authority of the legislature to author
ize a railroad to be constructed in a common highway without
compensation to land-owners is also denied, importance is at
tached to the terms of the statute under which the original ap
propriation was made, and which are regarded as permitting the
taking for the purposes of a common highway, and for no other.
The reasoning of the court appears to us sound ; and it is appli
cable to the statutes of the States generally."
* Imlay r. Union Branch R. R. Co.,
26 Conn. 255. “When land is con
demned for a special purpose,” say
the court, “on the score of public
utility, the sequestration is limited to
that particular use. Land taken for
a highway is not thereby converted
into a common. As the property is
not taken, but the use only, the right
of the public is limited to the use,
the specific use, for which the pro
prietor has been devested of a com
plete dominion over his own estate.
These are propositions which are no
longer open to discussion. But it is
contended that land once taken and
still held for highway purposes may
be used for a railway without ex
ceeding the limits of the easement
already acquired by the public. If
this is true, if the new use of the land
is within the scope of the original
sequestration or dedication, it would
follow that the railway privileges are
not an encroachment on the estate
remaining in the owner of the soil,
and that the new mode of enjoying
the public easement will not enable
him rightfully to assert a claim to
damages therefor. On the contrary,
if the true intent and efficacy of the
original condemnation was not to
subject the land to such a burden as
will be imposed upon it when it is
confiscated to the uses and control of
a railroad corporation, it cannot be
denied that in such a case the estate
of the owner of the soil is injuriously
affected by the supervening servitude;
that his rights are abridged, and that
in a legal sense his land is again
taken for public uses. Thus it ap
pears that the court have simply to
decide whether there is such an iden
tity between a highway and a railway,
that statutes conferring a right to
establish the former include an au
thority to construct the latter.
“The term ' public highway,’ as
employed in such of our statutes as
convey the right of eminent domain,
has certainly a limited import. Al
though, as suggested at the bar, a
navigable river or a canal is
,
in some
sense, a public highway, yet an ease
ment assumed under the name of a
highway would not enable the public
to convert a street into a canal. The
highway, in the true meaning o
f
the
word, would be destroyed. But as
no such destruction o
f
the highway is
necessarily involved in the location
o
f
a railroad track upon it
,
we are
pressed to establish the legal propo
sition that a highway, such as is re
ferred to in these statutes, means o
r
a
t
least comprehends a railroad. Such
a construction is possible only when
it is made to appear that there is a
substantial practical o
r
technical iden
tity between the uses o
f
land for high
way and for railway purposes.
“No one can fail to see that the
terms railway’ and ' highway' are
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[* 549] * It would appear from the cases cited that the weight
of judicial authority is against the power of the legisla
not convertible, or that the two uses,
practically considered, although anal
ogous, are not identical. Land as
ordinarily appropriated by a railroad
company is inconvenient, and even
impassable, to those who would use
it as a common highway. Such a
corporation does not hold itself bound
to make or to keep its embankments
and bridges in a condition which will
facilitate the transitus of such vehicles
as ply over an ordinary road. A
practical dissimilarity obviously ex
ists between a railway and a common
highway, and is recognized as the
basis of a legal distinction between
them. It is so recognized on a large
scale when railway privileges are
sought from legislative bodies, and
granted by them. If the terms
‘highway' and railway’ are synony
mous, or if one of them includes the
other by legal implication, no act
could be more superfluous than to
require or to grant authority to con
struct railways over localities already
occupied as highways.
“If a legal identity does not sub
sist between a highway and a railway,
it is illogical to argue that, because
a railway may be so constructed as
not to interfere with the ordinary
uses of a highway, and so as to be
consistent with the highway right
already existing, therefore such a new
use is included within the old use. It
might as well be urged, that if a com
mon, or a canal, laid out over the
route of a public road, could be so
arranged as to leave an ample road
way for vehicles and passengers on
foot, the land should be held to be
originally condemned for a canal or
a common, as properly incident to the
highway use.
“There is an important practical
reason why courts should be slow to
recognize a legal identity between the
two uses referred to. They are by no
means the same thing to the propri
etor whose land is taken; on the con
trary, they suggest widely different
standards of compensation. One can
readily conceive of cases where the
value of real estate would be directly
enhanced by the opening of a high
way through it
;
while it
s
confiscation
for a railway at the same or a sub
sequent time would be a gross injury
to the estate, and a total subversion
o
f
the mode o
f enjoyment expected
b
y
the owner when he yielded his
private rights to the public exigency.
“But essential distinctions also
exist between highway and railway
powers, as conferred b
y
statute, –
distinctions which are founded in the
very nature o
f
the powers themselves.
In the case of the highway, the statute
provides that, after the observance o
f
certain legal forms, the locality in
question shall be for ever subservient
to the right o
f every individual in the
community to pass over the thorough
fare so created at all times. This
right involves the important implica
tion that he shall so use the privilege
a
s to leave the privilege o
f
all others
a
s unobstructed as his own, and that
he is therefore to use the road in the
manner in which such roads are or
dinarily used, with such vehicles a
s
will not obstruct, or require the de
struction o
f
the ordinary modes o
f
travel thereon. He is not authorized
to lay down a railway track, and run
his own locomotive and car upon it.
No one ever thought o
f regarding
highway acts as conferring railway
privileges, involving a right in every
individual, not only to break up ordi
nary travel, but also to exact tolls
from the public for the privilege o
f
using the peculiar conveyances adapted
to a railroad. If a right of this de
scription is not conferred when a
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ture to appropriate a * common highway to the purposes [* 550]
of a railroad, unless at the same time provision is made
for compensation to the owners of the fee. *. These [* 551]
cases, however, have had reference to the common rail
road operated by steam. In one of the New York cases” it is
intimated, and in another case in the same State it was directly
decided, that the ruling should be the same in the case of the
street railway operated by horse-power.” There is generally,
however, a very great difference in the two cases, and some of
the considerations to which the courts have attached importance
could have no application in many cases of common horse rail
ways. A horse railway, as a general thing, will interfere very
little with the ordinary use of the way by the public, even upon
the very line of the road; and in many cases it would be a relief
to an overburdened way, rather than an impediment to the pre
vious use. In Connecticut, after it had been decided, as above
shown, that the owner of the fee subject to a perpetual highway
was entitled to compensation when the highway was appropriated
for an ordinary railroad, it was also held that the authority to lay.
highway is authorized by law, it is
idle to pretend that any proprietor is
devested of such a right. It would
seem that, under such circumstances,
the true construction of highway laws
could hardly be debatable, and that
the absence of legal identity between
the two uses of which we speak was
patent and entire.
“Again, no argument or illustra
tion can strengthen the self-evident
proposition that, when a railway is
authorized over a public highway, a
right is created against the proprietor
of the fee, in favor of a person, an
artificial person, to whom he before
bore no legal relation whatever. It
is understood that when such an ease
ment is sought or bestowed, a new
and independent right will accrue to
the railroad corporation as against
the owner of the soil, and that, with
out any reference to the existence of
the highway, his land will for ever
stand charged with the accruing ser
vitude. Aecordingly, if such a high
way were to be discontinued according
to the legal forms prescribed for that
purpose, the railroad corporation
would still insist upon the express
and independent grant of an ease
ment to itself, enabling it to maintain
its own road on the site of the aban
doned roadway. We are of opinion,
therefore, as was distinctly intimated
by this court in a former case (see
opinion of Hinman, J., in Nicholson
v. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 22
Conn. 85), that to subject the owner
of the soil of a highway to a further
appropriation of his land to railway
uses is the imposition of a new ser
vitude upon his estate, and is an act
demanding the compensation which
the law awards when land is taken
for public purposes.” And see South
Carolina R. R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Geo.
546.
1 Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co.,
25 N. Y. 532.
* Craig v. Rochester City and
Brighton R. R. Co., 39 Barb. 449.
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and use a horse-railway track in a public street was not a new
servitude imposed upon the land, for which the owner of the fee
would be entitled to damages, but that it was a part of the public
use to which the land was originally subjected when taken for a
street." The same distinction between horse railways and those
operated by steam is also taken in recent New York cases * But
whether the mere difference in the motive-power will make dif
ferent principles applicable is a question which the courts will
probably have occasion to consider further. Conceding that the
interests of individual owners will not generally suffer, or their
use of the highway be incommoded by the laying down and use
of the track of a horse railway upon it
,
there are nevertheless
cases where it might seriously impede, if not altogether exclude,
the general travel and use b
y
the ordinary modes, and very greatly
reduce the value o
f
a
ll
the property along the line. Suppose, for
instance, a narrow street in a city, occupied altogether b
y
whole
sale houses, which require constantly the use o
f
the whole street
in connection with their business, and suppose this to be turned
over to a street-railway company, whose line is such as to make
the road a principal avenue o
f travel, and to require such
[* 552] * constant passage of cars as to drive al
l
drayage from
the street. The corporation, under these circumstances,
will substantially have a monopoly in the use of the street; their
vehicles will drive the business from it
,
and the business property
will become comparatively worthless. And if property owners
are without remedy in such case, it is certainly a very great hard
ship upon them, and a very striking and forcible instance and
illustration o
f damage without legal injury.
When property is appropriated for a public way, and the pro
prietor is paid for the public easement, the compensation is gen
erally estimated, in practice, at the value o
f
the land itself.” If
,
therefore, no other circumstances were to be taken into the ac
count in these cases, the owner, who has been paid the value o
f
his land, could not reasonably complain o
f any use to which it
might afterwards be put b
y
the public. But, as was pointed out in
* Elliott v. Fair Haven and West- 422; People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357;
ville R
.
R
. Co., 32 Conn. 579, 586. S
. c. 27 N. Y. 188.
* Brooklyn Central, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. * Murray v. County Commis
v
. Brooklyn City R
.
R
. Co., 33 Barb. sioners, 12 Met. 457, per Shaw,
Ch. J.
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the Connecticut case," the compensation is always liable either to
exceed or to fall below the value of the land taken, in consequence
of incidental injuries or benefits to the owner as proprietor of the
land which remains. These injuries or benefits will be estimated
with reference to the identical use to which the property is ap
propriated ; and if it is afterwards put to another use, which
causes greater incidental injury, and the owner is not allowed
further compensation, it is very evident that he has suffered by
the change a wrong which could not have been foreseen and
provided against. And if
,
o
n the other hand, h
e
is entitled in
any case to an assessment o
f damages in consequence o
f
such an
appropriation o
f
the street affecting his rights injuriously, then
h
e
must be entitled to such an assessment in every case, and
the question involved will be, not as to the right, but only of
the quantum o
f damages. The horse railway either is o
r
is not
the imposition o
f
a new burden upon the estate. If it is not, the
owner o
f
the fee is entitled to compensation in no case; if it is
,
h
e
is entitled to have a
n
assessment o
f damages in every case.
In New York, where, b
y law, when a public street is laid out
o
r dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the city, it has
been held that the legislature might authorize the construction o
f
a horse railway in a street, and that neither the city nor the
owners o
f
lots were entitled to compensation, notwith- -
standing it was “found as a fact that the lot owners [* 553]
would suffer injury from the construction o
f
the road.
The city was not entitled, because, though it held the fee, it held
it in trust for the use of all the people of the State, and not as
corporate o
r municipal property; and the land having been origi
nally acquired under the right o
f
eminent domain, and the trust
being publici juris, it was under the unqualified control of the
legislature, and any appropriation o
f it to public use b
y legisla
tive authority could not be regarded as an appropriation o
f
the
private property o
f
the city. And so far as the adjacent lot
owners were concerned, their interest in the streets, distinct
from that o
f
other citizens, was only as having a possibility o
f
reverter after the public use o
f
the land should cease; and the
value o
f this, if any thing, was inappreciable, and could not en
title them to compensation.”
* Imlay v. Union Branch R
.
R
.
* People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357 ;
Co., 26 Conn. 257. s. c. 27 N
.
Y
.
188. The same ruling
44
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In Indiana, it was at one time held, that, by the laying out of
streets in cities and villages, the private ownership in the soil
was devested; and that, consequently, if a street was appropriated
to the purpose of a railroad, the abutting owner was not entitled
to a statutory assessment of his damages, but might sue at law, if in
consequence of the building of the railroad he was cut off from the
ordinary use of the street." But later authorities recognize owner
ship, to the centre of the street, in the abutting proprietors.” In
Iowa, where a city holds the fee in the streets as trustee for the
general public, it is held that, with consent of the city, the legis
lature may authorize the construction of an ordinary railroad
along the same, without awarding compensation to lot owners;”
or it may do so without the consent of the municipal authorities,
and without entitling the city to compensation.” In Illinois, a lot
owner filed a bill in equity to restrain the laying down of the
track of a railroad, by consent of the common council, to be
operated by steam in one of the streets of Chicago; but the
court dismissed the bill, holding that, as the title to the street
was in the city, the city might lawfully appropriate it to such a
purpose.”
as to the right of the city to compen
sation was had in Savannah, &c.
R. R. Co. v. Mayor, &c. of Savan
nah, 45 Geo. 602. And see Brook
lyn Central, &c. R. R. Co. v. Brook
lyn City R. R. Co., 33 Barb. 420 ;
Brooklyn and Newtown R. R. Co. v.
Coney Island, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Barb.
364; New York v. Kerr, 38 Barb.
369 ; Chapman v. Albany and Sche
nectady R. R. Co., 10 Barb. 360.
And as to the title reverting to
the original owner, compare Water
Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind.
364; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301;
Heard v. Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242.
Although, in the case of People v.
Kerr, the several judges seem gener
ally to have agreed on the principle
as stated in the text, it is not very
clear how much importance was at
tached to the fact that the fee to the
street was in the city, nor that the
decision would have been different if
that had not been the case.
1 Protzman v. Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467;
New Albany and Salem R. R. Co.
v. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 353; Same t.
Same, 12 Ind. 551. See also Street
Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio,
N. s. 523 ; State v. Cincinnati Gas, &c.
Co., 18 Ohio, N. s. 292.
* Cox v. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co., 48
Ind. 178; Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind.139.
* Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c.
R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246.
* Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c.
R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455.
* Moses v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne,
and Chicago R. R. Co., 21 Ill. 522.
We quote from the opinion of Caton,
Ch. J. : “By the city charter, the
common council is vested with the
exclusive control and regulation of
the streets of the city, the fee-simple
title to which we have already de
cided is vested in the municipal cor
poration. The city charter also em
powers the common council to direct
and control the location of railroad
tracks within the city. In granting
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* It is not easy, as is very evident, to trace a clear line [* 554)
of authority running through the various decisions bear
this permission to locate the track in
Beach Street, the common council
acted under an express power granted
by the legislature. So that the de
fendant has all the right which both
the legislature and the common coun
cil could give it
,
to occupy the street
with its track. But the complainant
assumes higher ground, and claims
that any use o
f
the street, even under
the authority o
f
the legislature and
the common council, which tends to
deteriorate the value o
f
his property
on the street, is a violation of that
fundamental law which forbids pri
vate property to be taken for public
use without just compensation. This
is manifestly an erroneous view o
f
the
constitutional guaranty thus invoked.
It must necessarily happen that streets
will be used for various legitimate
purposes, which will, to a greater or
less extent, incommode persons re
siding o
r doing business upon them,
and just to that extent damage their
property; and yet such damage is
incident to a
ll city property, and for
it a party can claim no remedy. The
common council may appoint certain
localities where hacks and drays shall
stand waiting for employment, o
r
where wagons loaded with hay o
r
wood, o
r
other commodities, shall
stand waiting for purchasers.
may drive customers away from shops
o
r
stores in the vicinity, and yet there
is no remedy for the damage. A
street is made for the passage o
f per
sons and property; and the law can
not define what exclusive means of
transportation and passage shall be
used. Universal experience shows
that this can best be left to the deter
mination o
f
the municipal authorities,
who are supposed to be best acquainted
with the wants and necessities of the
citizens generally. To say that a
hew mode o
f passage shall be ban
This
ished from the streets, no matter how
much the general good may require
it
,
simply because streets were not so
used in the days o
f Blackstone, would
hardly comport with the advancement
and enlightenment o
f
the present age.
Steam has but lately taken the place,
to any extent, o
f
animal power for
land transportation, and for that
reason alone shall it be expelled the
streets? For the same reason camels
must be kept out, though they might
b
e profitably employed. Some fancy
horse o
r
timid lady might be fright
ened by such uncouth objects. Or
is the objection not in the motive
power, but because the carriages are
larger than were formerly used, and
run upon iron, and are confined to a
given track in the street? Then street
railroads must not be admitted; they
have large carriages which run on
iron rails, and are confined to a given
track. Their momentum is great,
and may do damage to ordinary vehi
cles o
r
foot passengers. Indeed we
may suppose o
r
assume that streets
occupied by them are not so pleasant
for other carriages or so desirable for
residences o
r
business stands, as if
not thus occupied. But for this
reason the property owners along the
street cannot expect to stop such im
provements. The convenience o
f
those who live a
t
a greater dis
tance from the centre o
f
a city re
quires the use o
f
such improvements,
and for their benefit the owners of
property upon the street must submit
to the burden, when the common
council determine that the public
good requires it
.
Cars upon street
railroads are now generally, if not
universally, propelled b
y
horses, but
who can say how long it will be be
fore it will be found safe and profita
ble to propel them with steam, o
r
some other power besides horses?
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[* 555] ing upon the * appropriation of the ordinary highways
and streets to the use of railroads of any grade or species;
but a strong inclination is apparent to hold that, when the fee in
the public way is taken from the former owner, it is taken for any
public use whatever to which the public authorities, with the leg
islative assent, may see fi
t
afterwards to devote it
,
in furtherance
o
f
the general purpose o
f
the original appropriation ; * and if this
is so, the owner must be held to be compensated at the time o
f
the original taking for any such possible use; and he takes his
chances o
f
that use, o
r any change in it
,
proving beneficial o
r
deleterious to any remaining property he may own, or business
h
e may be engaged in ; and it must also be held that the possi
bility that the land may, a
t
some future time, revert to him, b
y
the public use ceasing, is too remote and contingent to be consid
ered a
s property at all.” At the same time it must be confessed
that it is difficult to determine precisely how far some o
f
the deci
sions made have been governed b
y
the circumstance that the fee
Should we say that this road should
b
e enjoined, we could advance no rea
son for it which would not apply with
equal force to street railroads; so that
consistency would require that we
should stop all. Nor would the evil
which would result from the rule we
must lay down stop here. We must
prohibit every use o
f
a street which
discommodes those who reside or do
business upon it
,
because their prop
erty will else be damaged. This
question has been presented in other
States, and in some instances, where
the public have only an easement in
the street, and the owner o
f
the ad
joining property still holds the fee in
the street, it has been sustained; but
the weight o
f authority, and certainly,
in our apprehension, all sound rea
soning, is the other way.” See also
Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Joliet, 79
Ill. 25.
All the cases from which we have
quoted assume that the use o
f
the
street b
y
the railroad company is still
a public use; and probably it would
not be held that an appropriation o
f
a street, o
r o
f any part o
f it
,
by an
individual o
r company, for his o
r
their own private use, unconnected
with any accommodation o
f
the pub
lic, was consistent with the purpose
for which it was originally acquired.
See Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. Ann.
842; Green v. Portland, 32 Me. 431.
1 On this subject see, in addition
to the other cases cited, West v. Ban
croft, 32 Vt. 367; Kelsey r. King,
3
2 Barb. 410; Ohio and Lexington
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dan:, 289;
Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. Co.,
2 C. E. Green, 76. When, however,
land is taken o
r
dedicated specifically
for a street, it would seem, although
the fee is taken, it is taken for the
restricted use only; that is to say, for
such uses as streets in cities are com
monly put to. See State v. Laverack,
34 N. J. 201; Railroad Co. v. Shur
meir, 7 Wall. 272.
* As to whether there is such possi
bility of reverter, see Heyward r.
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 7 N
.
Y
.
314; People v. Kerr, 27 N
.
Y
.
211,
per Wright, J.; Plitt v. Cox, 43
Penn. St. 486.
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was or was not in the public, or, on the other hand, have pro
ceeded on the theory that a railway was only in furtherance
of the original purpose of the appropriation, and not
* to be regarded as the imposition of any new burden, [* 556]
even where an easement only was originally taken."
Perhaps the true distinction in these cases is not to be found in
the motive-power of the railway, or in the question whether the
fee-simple or a mere easement was taken in the original appropria
tion, but depends upon the question whether the railway constitutes
a thoroughfare, or, on the other hand, is a mere local convenience.
* There is great difficulty, as it
seems to us, in supporting important
distinctions upon the fact that the
fee was originally taken for the use of
the public instead of a mere ease
ment. If the fee is appropriated or
dedicated, it is for a particular use
only; and it is a conditional fee, — a
fee on condition that the land con
tinue to be occupied for that use.
The practical difference in the cases
is, that when the fee is taken, the
possession of the original owner is
excluded; and in the case of city
streets where there is occasion to
devote them to many other purposes
besides those of passage, but never
theless not inconsistent, such as for
the laying of water and gas pipes,
and the construction of sewers, this
exclusion of any private right of occu
pation is important, and will some
times save controversies and litigation.
But to say that when a man has de
clared a dedication for a particular
use, under a statute which makes a
dedication the gift of a fee, he there
by makes it liable to be appropriated
to other purposes, when the same
could not be done if a perpetual ease
ment had been dedicated, seems to
be basing important distinctions upon
a difference which after all is more
technical than real, and which in any
view does not affect the distinction
made. The same reasoning which
has sustained the legislature in au
thorizing a railroad track to be laid
down in a city street would support
its action in authorizing it to be made
into a canal; and the purpose of the
original dedication or appropriation
would thereby be entirely defeated.
Is it not more consistent with estab
lished rules to hold that a dedication
or appropriation to one purpose con
fines the use to that purpose; and
when it is taken for any other, the
original owner has not been compen
sated for the injury he may sustain in
consequence, and is therefore entitled
to it now? Notwithstanding a dedica
tion which vests the title in the pub
lic, it must be conceded that the in
terest of the adjacent lot owners is
still property. “They have a pecul
iar interest in the street, which nei
ther the local nor the general public
can pretend to claim; a private right
of the nature of an incorporeal here
ditament, legally attached to their con
tiguous grounds and the erections
thereon ; an incidental title to certain
facilities and franchises assured to
them by contracts and by law, and
without which their property would
be comparatively of little value.
This easement, appurtenant to the
lots, unlike any right of one lot
owner in the lot of another, is as much
property as the lot itself.” Crawford
v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. S. 459. See
some very pertinent and sensible re
marks on the same subject by Ranney,
J., in Street Railway v. Cummins
ville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 541.
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When land is taken or dedicated for a town street, it is unquestion
ably appropriated for a
ll
the ordinary purposes o
f
a town' street;
not merely the purposes to which such streets were formerly ap
plied, but those demanded b
y
new improvements and new wants.
Among these purposes is the use for carriages which run upon a
grooved track; and the preparation of important streets in large
cities for their use is not only a frequent necessity, which must
b
e supposed to have been contemplated, but it is almost as much
a matter o
f
course as the grading and paving. The appropriation
o
f
a country highway for the purposes o
f
a railway, on the other
hand, is neither usual nor often important; and it cannot with
any justice be regarded as within the contemplation o
f
[* 557] the parties when * the highway is first established. And
if this is so, it is clear that the owner cannot be consid
ered as compensated for the new use at the time o
f
the original
appropriation.
The cases thus far considered are those in which the original
use is not entirely foreign to the purpose o
f
the new appropria
tion ; and it is the similarity that admits o
f
the question which has
been discussed. Were the uses totally different, there could be
n
o question whatever that a new assessment o
f compensation
must be made before the appropriation could be lawful." And in
* Where lands were appropriated upon it
. Clearly it was not using it
by a railroad company for their pur as a street. So far from that, what
poses, and afterwards leased out for
private occupation, it was held that
the owner of the fee was entitled to
maintain a writ of entry to establish
his title and recover damages for the
wrongful use. Proprietors o
f Locks,
&c. v
. Nashua and Lowell R
.
R. Co.,
104 Mass. 1
;
s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 181.
Where land has been taken for a
street, it cannot be appropriated for
the erection o
f
a market building
without making compensation. State
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f Mobile, 5 Port. 279;
State r. Laverack, 34 N. J. 201. The
opinion o
f Beasley, Ch. J., in the
New Jersey case, will justify liberal
quotations. He says (p. 204): “I
think it undeniable that the appro
priation o
f
this land to the purposes
of a market was an additional burthen
the act authorized to be done was
incongruous with such use; for the
market was an obstruction to it, con
sidered merely as a highway. . . .
When, therefore, the legislature de
clared that these streets in the city
o
f
Paterson might be used for market
purposes, the power which was con
ferred in substance was an authority
to place obstructions in these public
highways. The consequence is that
there is no force in the argument,
which was the principal one pressed
upon our attention, that the use o
f
these streets for the purpose now
claimed is as legitimate as the use o
f
a public highway by a horse railroad,
which latter use has been repeatedly
sanctioned b
y
the courts o
f
the State,
The two cases, so far as relates to
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any case, to authorize lands already taken for one public use to be
appropriated to another, there must be distinct and express legis
lative authority."
principle, stand precisely opposite.
I have said that a market is an ob
struction to a street, that it is not a
use of it as a street, but, if unauthor
ized, is a nuisance. To the contrary
of this, a horse railroad is a new mode
of using a street as such, and it is
precisely upon this ground that it has
been held to be legal. The cases
rest upon this foundation. That a
horse railway was a legitimate use of
a highway was decided in Hinchman
v. Paterson Horse Railroad Co., 2
C. E. Greene, 76; and, in his opin
ion. Chancellor Greene assigns the
following as the reasons of his judg
ment: “The use of the road is nearly
identical with that of the ordinary
highway. The motive-power is the
same. The noise and jarring of the
street by the cars is not greater, and
ordinarily less than that produced by
omnibuses and other vehicles in or
dinary use. Admit that the nature
of the use, as respects the travelling
public, is somewhat variant, how does
it prejudice the land-owner? Is his
property taken 2 Are his rights as a
land-owner affected? Does it inter
fere with the use of his property any
more than the ordinary highway?’
It is clear that this reasoning can
have no appropriate application to a
case in which it appears that the use
of the street is so far from being
nearly identical with that of the ordi
nary highway that in law it has al
ways been regarded as an injury to
1 In re Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 53
N. Y. 574; State v. Montclair R. Co.,
35 N. J. 328; Railroad Co. v. Dayton,
23 Ohio, N. s. 510. When for a way
land already used for that purpose is
taken, every thing upon it is also
taken; such as flag-stones, bridges,
such public easement, and on that
account an indictable offence.
“I regard, then, a right to hold
a market in a street as an easement
additional to, and in a measure in
consistent with, it
s ordinary use as a
highway. The question therefore is
presented, Can such easement be con
ferred by the legislature on the public
without compensation to the land
owner? I have already said that
from the first it has appeared to me
this question must be answered in
the negative. I think the true rule
is
,
that land taken by the public for
a particular use cannot be applied
under such a sequestration to any
other use to the detriment of the
land-owner. This is the only rule
which will adequately protect the
constitutional right of the citizen.
To permit land taken for one pur
pose, and for which the land-owner
has been compensated, to be applied
to another and additional purpose, for
which he has received no compensa
tion, would be a mere evasion o
f
the
spirit o
f
the fundamental law o
f
the
State. Land taken and applied for
the ordinary purpose o
f
a street would
often be an improvement o
f
the adja
cent property; an appropriation o
f it
to the uses o
f
a market would, per
haps, as often be destructive o
f
one
half the value of such property.
Compensation for land, therefore, to
b
e
used a
s
a highway, might, and
many times would be, totally inade
culverts, &c.; and the assessment o
f
damages should cover the whole,
Ford v. County Commissioners, 64
Me. 408; also, any buildings which
it may be necessary to destroy, La
fayette, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Winslow,
66 Ill. 219.
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Although the regulation of a navigable stream will give to the
persons incidentally affected no right to compensation, yet if the
stream is diverted from its natural course, so that those entitled
to it
s
benefits are prevented from making use o
f
it as before, the
deprivation o
f
this right is a taking which entitles them to com
pensation, notwithstanding the taking may be for the purpose o
f
creating another and more valuable channel o
f navigation." The
owners o
f
land over which such a stream flows, although they do
not own the flowing water itself, yet have a property in the use
o
f
that water as it flows past them, for the purpose o
f producing
quate compensation if such land is to
b
e
used a
s
a public market place.
Few things would be more unjust
than, when compensation has been
made for land in view of one of these
purposes, to allow it to be used with
out compensation for the other. The
right o
f
the public in a highway con
sists in the privilege o
f passage, and
such privileges as are annexed as in
cidents by usage o
r custom, as the
right to make sewers and drains and
to lay gas and water pipes. These
subordinate privileges are entirely
consistent with the primary use o
f
the highway, and are no detriment to
the land-owner. But I am not aware
o
f any case in which it has been held
that the public has any right in a
highway which is incongruous with
the purpose for which it was origi
nally created, and which a
t
the same
time is injurious to the proprietor o
f
the soil. Such certainly has not been
the course o
f judicial decision in our
own courts. Indeed the cases appear
to be a
ll ranged on the opposite side.
I have shown that the legalization of
the use o
f
a street by a horse railroad
has been carefully placed on the
ground that such an appropriation o
f
the street was merely a new mode o
f
its legitimate and ordinary use. The
rationale adopted excludes by neces
sary implication the hypothesis that
the dedication of a street to a new
purpose, inconsistent with it
s original
nature, would be legal with respect
to the uncompensated land-owner.
But beyond this it has been expressly
declared that such superadded use
would be illegal. In the opinion of
Mr. Justice Haines, in Starr v. Cam
den and Atlantic R
.
R
. Co., 4 Zab.
592, it is very explicitly held that the
constitution o
f
this State would pre
vent the legislature from granting to
a railroad company a right to use a
public highway as a bed for their
road without first making compensa
tion to the owner of the soil. And
in the case of Hinchman v. The
Paterson Horse Railroad Co. already
cited, Chancellor Greene quotes these
views, and gives the doctrine the high
sanction o
f
his own approval. See
also the Central R. R. Co. v. Het
field, 5 Dutch. 206.”
The learned judge then distin
guishes Carter v. Wright, 27 N
. J.
76, and quotes, as sustaining his own
views, State v. Mayor, &c. o
f Mobile,
5 Porter, 279; Trustees o
f Presby
terian Society v. Auburn and Roches
ter R. R
. Co., 3 Hill, 569; Williams
v
. N. Y. C
.
R
.
R. Co., 16 N. Y. 111;
Angell on Highways, $ 243 et seq.,
and cases cited.
* People v. Canal Appraisers, 13
Wend. 355. And see Hatch v. Wer
mont Central R. R. Co., 25 Wt. 49;
Bellinger v. New York Central R
.
R
.
Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Gardner r. New
burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Thunder
Bay, &c. Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich.
336.
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mechanical power, or for any of the other purposes for which
they can make it available, without depriving those below them
of the like use, or encroaching upon the rights of those above ;
and this property is equally protected with any of a more tan
gible character."
What Interest in Land can be taken under the Right of Eminent
Domain.
Where land is appropriated to the public use under the right
of eminent domain, and against the will of the owner, we have
seen how careful the law is to limit the public authorities to their
precise needs, and not to allow the dispossession of the owner
from any portion of his freehold which the public use does not
require. This must be so on the general principle that the right
being based on necessity, cannot be any broader than the neces
sity which supports it
. For the same reason, it would seem that,
in respect to the land actually taken, if there can be any conjoint
occupation o
f
the owner and the public, the former should not
b
e altogether excluded, but should be allowed to occupy for his
private purposes to any extent not inconsistent with the public
use. As a general rule, the laws for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain d
o
not assume to g
o
further than to ap
propriate the use, and the title * in fee still remains in [* 558]
the original owner. In the common highways, the pub
lic have a perpetual easement, but the soil is the property of the
adjacent owner, and he may make any use o
f it which does not
interfere with the public right o
f passage, and the public can use
it only for the purposes usual with such ways.” And when the
land ceases to be used b
y
the public as a way, the owner will
again become restored to his complete and exclusive possession,
and the fee will cease to be encumbered with the easement.”
* Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284;
s. c. 35 N. Y. 454; Gardner v. New
burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
* In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb.
390, a person who stood in the public
way and abused the occupant o
f
an
adjoining lot was held liable in tres
pass a
s being unlawfully there, be
cause not using the highway for the
purpose to which it was appropriated.
* Dean v. Sullivan R
.
R
. Co., 2
Fost. 321 ; Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H.
282: Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific
R. R
. Co., 2 Iowa, 288; Weston v.
Foster, 7 Met. 299; Quimby v. Ver
mont Central R
.
R
. Co., 23 Vt. 387;
Giesy v. Cincinnati, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
4 Ohio, N
.
s. 327. See ante, p
.
*553,
note.
698 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cH. xv.
It seems, however, to be competent for the State to appropri
ate the title to the land in fee, and so to altogether exclude any
use by the former owner, except that which every individual
citizen is entitled to make, if in the opinion of the legislature it
is needful that the fee be taken." The judicial decisions to this
effect proceed upon the idea that, in some cases, the public pur
poses cannot be fully accomplished without appropriating the
complete title; and where this is so in the opinion of the legisla
ture, the same reasons which support the legislature in their right
to decide absolutely and finally upon the necessity of the taking
will also support their decision as to the estate to be taken. The
power, it is said in one case, “must of necessity rest in the
legislature, in order to secure the useful exercise and enjoyment
of the right in question. A case might arise where a temporary
use would be all that the public interest required. Another case
might require the permanent and apparently the perpetual occu
pation and enjoyment of the property by the public ; and the
right to take it must be coextensive with the necessity of the
case, and the measure of compensation should of course be grad
uated by the nature and the duration of the estate or interest of
which the owner is deprived.”” And it was therefore held,
where the statute provided that lands might be compulsorily
taken in fee-simple for the purposes of an almshouse extension,
and they were taken accordingly, that the title of the original
owner was thereby entirely devested, so that when the
[* 559] land ceased to * be used for the public purpose, the title
remained in the municipality which had appropriated it
,
and did not revert to the former owner or his heirs.” And it
* This, however, is forbidden by
the Constitution o
f
Illinois of 1870,
in the case of land taken for railroad
tracks. Art. 2
,
§ 13. And we think
it would be difficult to demonstrate
the necessity for appropriating the
fee in case o
f any thoroughfare; and
if never needful, it ought to be held
incompetent.
* Heyward v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 7 N
.
Y
.
314. See also Dingley
v
. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Brooklyn
Park Com’rs v. Armstrong, 2 Lans.
429; s. c. on appeal, 45 N. Y
. 234;
and 6 Am. Rep. 70.
* Heyward v. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 7 N. Y. 314. And see Baker
v
. Johnson, 2 Hill, 348; Wheeler c.
Rochester, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 12 Barb.
227; Munger v. Tonawanda R
.
R
.
Co., 4 N
.
Y
.
349; Rexford v. Knight,
1
1 N
.
Y. 308; Commonwealth r.
Fisher, 1 Pen. & Watts, 462; De
Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatch. 95; Coster
v
. N
. J. R. R. Co., 23 N. J. 227; Plitt
v
. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486; Brooklyn
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does not seem to be uncommon to provide that, in the case of
some classes of public ways, and especially of city and village
streets, the dedication or appropriation to the public use shall
vest the title to the land in the State, county, or city; the pur
poses for which the land may be required by the public being so
numerous and varied, and so impossible of complete specification
in advance, that nothing short of a complete ownership in the
public is deemed sufficient to provide for them. In any case,
however, an easement only would be taken, unless the statute
plainly contemplated and provided for the appropriation of a
larger interest." -
Compensation for Property taken.
It is a primary requisite, in the appropriation of lands for pub
lic purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor. Eminent
domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citi
zen is compelled to surrender to the public something beyond
his due proportion for the public benefit. The public seize and
appropriate his particular estate, because o
f
a special need for
it
,
and not because it is right, as between him and the govern
ment, that he should surrender it.” To him, therefore, the ben
efit and protection h
e
receives from the government are not
sufficient compensation; for those benefits are the equivalent for
the taxes he pays, and the other public burdens he assumes in
common with the community at large. And this compensation
must be pecuniary in its character, because it is in the nature of
a payment for a compulsory purchase.”
Park Com’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y.
234; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 70; Water
Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364.
Compare Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill.
301.
1 Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6
Pet. 498; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90;
Jackson v. Rutland and B. R. R.
Co., 25 Wt. 151; Jackson v. Hatha
way, 15 Johns. 447.
* People v. Mayor, &c. o
f
Brook
lyn, 4 N. Y
. 419; Woodbridge v.
Detroit, 8 Mich. 278; Booth v. Wood
bury, 32 Conn. 130.
* The effect of the right of emi
nent domain against the individual
“amounts to nothing more than a
power to oblige him to sell and con
vey when the public necessities re
quire it.” Johnson, J., in Fletcher
v
. Peck, 6 Cranch, 145. And see
Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103,
per Spencer, Ch. J.; People v. Mayor,
&c. o
f Brooklyn, 4 N
.
Y
. 419; Carson
v
. Coleman, 3 Stockt. 106; Young v.
Harrison, 6 Geo. 131; United States
v
. Minnesota, &c. R. R
. Co., 1 Minn.
127; Railroad Co. v. Ferris, 26 Tex.
603; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427;
State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Weckler
v
. Chicago, 61 Ill. 142, 147.
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[* 560] * The time when the compensation must be made may
depend upon the peculiar constitutional provisions of the
State. In some of the States, by express constitutional direction,
compensation must be made before the property is taken. No
constitutional principle, however, is violated by a statute which
allows private property to be entered upon and temporarily occu
pied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient proceedings,
with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs
require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper loca
tion shall be ; and the party acting under this statutory authority
would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary
possession, nor be liable to action of trespass." When, however,
the land has been viewed, and a determination arrived at to ap
propriate it
,
the question o
f compensation is to be considered ; and
in the absence o
f any express constitutional provision fixing the
time and the manner o
f making it
,
the question who is to take the
property — whether the State, or one of its political divisions or
municipalities, or
,
o
n
the other hand, some private corporation —
may b
e
a
n important consideration.
When the property is taken directly by the State, o
r by any
municipal corporation by State authority, it has been repeatedly
held not to be essential to the validity o
f
a law for the exercise o
f
the right o
f
eminent domain, that it should provide for making
compensation before the actual appropriation. It is sufficient if
provision is made b
y
the law b
y
which the party can obtain com
pensation, and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assess
ing it.” The decisions upon this point assume that, when
* Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hud N. Y
. 308; Taylor v. Marcy, 25 Ill.
son R
.
R. Co., 14 Wend. 51, and 18 518; Callison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat.
Wend. 9
;
Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me.
247; Nichols v. Somerset, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 43 Me. 356; Mercer v. McWil
liams, Wright (Ohio), 132; Walther
v
. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Fox v. W.
P
.
R
.
R. Co., 31 Cal. 538; State v.
Seymour, 35 N
. J. 47, 53.
* Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hud
son R
.
R
. Co., 18 Wend. 9
;
Rogers
v
. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 744; Calking
v
. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667; Case v.
Thompson, 6 Wend. 634; Fletcher r.
Auburn and Syracuse R
.
R
. Co., 25
Wend. 462; Rexford v. Knight, 11
244; Jackson v. Winn’s Heirs, 4 Lit.
323; People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496;
Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. 497, per
Verplanck, Senator; Gardner v. New
burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Charlestown
Branch R. R. Co. v. Middlesex, 7
Met. 78; Harper v. Richardson, 22
Cal. 251; Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill,
342; People v. Hayden, 6 Hill, 359:
Orr v. Quimby, 54 N
.
H
.
590; Cum
mings v. Ash, 50 N
.
H
.
591; White r.
Nashville, &c. R. R
. Co., 7 Heisk. 51S;
Chapman v. Gates, 54 N.Y. 132; Ham
ersley v. New York, 56 N
.
Y
.
533;
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the State * has provided a remedy by resort to which the [* 561]
party can have his compensation assessed, adequate means
are afforded for it
s satisfaction; since the property o
f
the munici
pality, o
r
o
f
the State, is a fund to which he can resort without
risk o
f
loss." It is essential, however, that the remedy be one to
which the party can resort on his own motion; if the provision be
such that only the public authorities appropriating the land are
authorized to take proceedings for the assessment, it must be held
to be void.” But if the remedy is adequate, and the party is
allowed to pursue it
,
it is not unconstitutional to limit the period
in which he shall resort to it
,
and to provide that, unless h
e shall
take proceedings for the assessment o
f damages within a specified
Loweree v. Newark, 38 N
. J. 151;
Brock v. Hishen, 40 Wis. 674; Long
v
. Fuller, 68 Penn. St. 170 (case o
f
a
school district). “Although it may not
b
e necessary, within the constitutional
provision, that the amount o
f com
pensation should be actually ascer
tained and paid before property is
thus taken, it is
,
I apprehend, the
settled doctrine, even as against the
State itself, that a
t
least certain and
adequate provision must first be made
by law (except in cases o
f public
emergency), so that the owner can
coerce payment through the judicial
tribunals o
r otherwise, without any
unreasonable o
r unnecessary delay;
otherwise the law making the appro
priation is no better than blank paper.
Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson
R. R
. Co., 18 Wend. 9. The pro
visions o
f
the statute prescribing the
mode o
f compensation in cases like
the present, when properly under
stood and administered, come fully
up to this great fundamental princi
ple; and even if any doubt could be
entertained about the true construc
tion, it should be made to lean in
favor of the one that is found to be
most in conformity with the constitu
tional requisite.” People v. Hayden,
6 Hill, 359. “A provision for com
pensation is an indispensable attend
ant upon the due and constitutional
exercise o
f
the power o
f depriving an
individual o
f
his property.” Gardner
v
. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 168; Buf
falo, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Ferris, 26
Tex. 588; Ash v. Cummings, 50
N. H
.
591, 613; Haverhill Bridge Pro
prietors v. County Com’rs, 103 Mass.
120; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 518; Langford
v
. Com’rs o
f Ramsay Co., 16 Minn.
380; Southwestern R
.
R
.
Co. v. Tele
graph Co., 46 Geo. 43.
1 In Commissioners, &c. v. Bowie,
3
4 Ala. 461, it was held that a pro
vision by law that compensation when
assessed should be paid to the owner
by the county treasurer sufficiently
secured its payment. And see Talbot
v
. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Chapman
v
. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132.
* Shepardson v. Milwaukee and
Beloit R
.
R
. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Powers
v
. Bears, 12 Wis. 220. See McCann
r. Sierra Co., 7 Cal. 121; Colton v.
Rossi, 9 Cal. 595; Ragatz v. Dubuque,
4 Iowa, 343. But in People v. Hay
den, 6 Hill, 359, where the statute
provided for appraisers who were to
proceed to appraise the land as soon
a
s it was appropriated, the proper
remedy o
f
the owner, if they failed
to perform this duty, was held to be
to apply for a mandamus.
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time, a
ll right thereto shall be barred." The right to compensa
tion, when property is appropriated by the public, may
[* 562] always be waived ; * and a failure to apply for and * have
the compensation assessed, when reasonable time and op
portunity and a proper tribunal are afforded for the purpose, may
well be considered a waiver.
Where, however, the property is not taken b
y
the State, o
r by
a municipality, but b
y
a private corporation which, though for
this purpose to be regarded as a public agent, appropriates it for
the benefit and profit o
f
its members, and which may or may not
b
e sufficiently responsible to make secure and certain the pay
ment, in all cases, o
f
the compensation which shall be assessed, it
is certainly proper, and it has sometimes been questioned whether
it was not absolutely essential, that payment be actually made be
fore the owner could be devested of his freehold.” Chancellor
Kent has expressed the opinion, that compensation and appropri
ation should be concurrent. “The settled and fundamental
doctrine is
,
that government has n
o right to take private prop
erty for public purposes, without giving just compensation; and
it seems to be necessarily implied that the indemnity should, in
cases which will admit of it
,
b
e previously and equitably ascer
tained, and b
e ready for reception, concurrently in point o
f
time
with the actual exercise o
f
the right o
f
eminent domain.” “ And
while this is not an inflexible rule unless in terms established by
the constitution, it is so just and reasonable that statutory pro
visions for taking private property very generally make payment
precede o
r accompany the appropriation, and by several o
f
the
State constitutions this is expressly required.” And on general
* People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496;
Charlestown Branch R. R. Co. v.
Middlesex, 7 Met. 78; Rexford v.
Knight, 11 N
.
Y
.
308; Taylor v.
Marcy, 25 Ill. 518; Callison v. Hed
rick, 15 Grat. 244; Gilmer v. Lime
Point, 18 Cal. 229; Harper v. Rich
ardson, 22 Cal. 251; Cupp v. Com
missioners o
f Seneca, 19 Ohio, N
.
s.
173.
* Matter o
f Albany St., 11 Wend.
149; Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray,
31; ante, p
.
*181.
* This is the intimation in Shep
ardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R. R.
Co., 6 Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears, 12
Wis. 220; State v. Graves, 19 Md.
351; Dronberger v. Reed, 11 Ind.
420; Loweree v. Newark, 38 N
. J.
151. But see Calking v. Baldwin, 4
Wend. 667.
* 2 Kent, 339, note.
* The Constitution of Florida pro
vides “that private property shall
not be taken o
r applied to public use,
unless just compensation be first made
therefor.” Art. 1
,
§ 14. See also,
to the same effect, Constitution o
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principles, it is essential that an adequate fund be provided from
which the owner of the property can certainly obtain compensa
tion; it is not competent to deprive him of his property, and turn
him over to an action at law against a corporation which
may or may not prove responsible, * and to a judgment of [* 563]
uncertain efficacy." For the consequence would be, in
some cases, that the party might lose his estate without re
dress, in violation of the inflexible maxim upon which the right is
based.
What the tribunal shall be which is to assess the compensation
must be determined either by the constitution or by the statute
which provides for the appropriation. The case is not one where,
as a matter of right, the party is entitled to a trial by jury, un
less the constitution has provided that tribunal fo
r
the purpose.”
Nevertheless, the proceeding is judicial in it
s character, and the
party in interest is entitled to have an impartial tribunal, and the
usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investigations.”
It is not competent for the State itself to fix the compensation
Colorado, art. 1
,
§ 15; Constitution
o
f Georgia, art. 1
,
§ 17; Constitution
o
f Iowa, art. 1, § 18; Constitution o
f
Kansas, art. 12, § 4
;
Constitution o
f
Kentucky, art. 13, § 14; Constitution
o
f Maryland, art. 1
,
§ 40; Constitu
tion o
f Minnesota, art. 1
,
§ 13; Con
stitution o
f Mississippi, art. 1
,
§ 13;
Constitution o
f Missouri, art. 2
,
§ 21;
Constitution o
f Nevada, art. 1
,
§ 8
;
Constitution o
f Ohio, art. 1
,
§ 19;
Constitution o
f Pennsylvania, art. 1
,
§ 10. The Constitution of Indiana,
art. 1
,
§ 21, and that o
f Oregon, art.
1
,
§ 19, require compensation to be
first made, except when the property
is appropriated by the State. The
Constitution o
f Alabama, art. 1
,
§ 24,
and o
f
South Carolina, art. 1
,
§ 23,
are in legal effect not very different.
A construction requiring payment
before appropriation is given to the
Constitution of Illinois. Cook v.
South Park Com’rs, 61 Ill. 120, and
cases cited.
tion, the Constitutions of Ohio and
Iowa do not allow benefits from the
contemplated work to be taken into
In assessing compensa- .
account; and the same is true in Kan
sas, where the appropriation is b
y
a
corporation for right o
f way.
* Shepardson v. Milwaukee and
Beloit R
.
R
. Co., 6 Wis. 605; Wal
ther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Gilmer
v
. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Curran v.
Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; Memphis and
Charleston R
.
R
.
Co. v. Payne, 37
Miss. 700; Henry v. Dubuque and
Pacific R
.
R
. Co., 10 Iowa, 540; Ash
v
. Cummings, 50 N
.
H. 591; Carr v.
Georgia R
.
R
. Co., 1 Kelly, 532;
Southwestern R
.
R
.
Co. v. Telegraph
Co., 46 Geo. 43.
* Petition o
f
Mount Washington
Co., 35 N
.
H
.
134; Ligat v. Common
wealth, 19 Penn. St. 456, 460; Rich v.
Chicago, 59 Ill. 286; Ames v. Lake
Superior, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 21 Minn.
241.
* Rich v. Chicago, 59 Ill. 293–295;
Cook v. South Park Com’rs, 61 Ill. 115;
Ames v. Lake Superior, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 21 Minn. 241. Whatever notices,
&c., the law requires, must be given.
People v. Kniskern, 54 N
.
Y
. 52;
Powers's Appeal, 29 Mich. 504.
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through the legislature, for this would make it the judge in it
s
own cause." And, if a jury is provided, the party must have the
ordinary opportunity to appear when it is to be impanelled, that
h
e may make any legal objections.” And he has the same right
to notice o
f
the time and place o
f
assessment that he would have
in any other case o
f judicial proceedings, and the assessment will
b
e invalid if no such notice is given.” These are just as well as
familiar rules, and they are perhaps invariably recognized in legis
lation.
It is not our purpose to follow these proceedings, and to at
tempt to point out the course o
f practice to be observed, and
which is so different under the statutes of different States. An
inflexible rule should govern them all, that the interest and ex
clusive right o
f
the owner is to be regarded and protected so far
a
s may b
e
consistent with a recognition o
f
the public necessity.
While the owner is not to be disseised until compensation is pro
vided, neither, on the other hand, when the public authorities
have taken such steps as to finally settle upon the appro
[* 564] priation, ought he to be left in a * state of uncertainty,
and compelled to wait for compensation until some future
time, when they may see fi
t
to occupy it
.
The land should either
b
e his o
r
h
e
should be paid for it
. Whenever, therefore, the
necessary steps have been taken o
n
the part o
f
the public to select
the property to b
e taken, locate the public work, and declare the
appropriation, the owner becomes absolutely entitled to the com
pensation, whether the public proceed at once to occupy the
property o
r
not. If a street is legally established over the land
o
f
a
n individual, he is entitled to demand payment o
f
his dam
ages, without waiting for the street to be opened.” And if a
1 Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; s. c. 11 Pet. 571,
per McLean, J.
* People v. Tallman, 36 Barb. 222;
Booneville v. Ormrod, 26 Miss. 193.
A jury, without further explanation
in the law, must be understood as one
o
f
twelve persons. Lamb v. Lane,
4 Ohio, N
.
s. 167. See ante, p
.
*319.
* Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis.
Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373;
Powers's Appeal, 29 Mich. 504. As
381;
to the right to order reassessments,
see Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 52s.
* Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38
Penn. St. 247; Philadelphia v. Dyer,
4
1 Penn. St. 463; Hallock v. Franklin
County, 2 Met. 559; Harrington r.
County Commissioners, 22 Pick. 268;
Blake v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 66; Hig
gins v. Chicago, 18 Ill. 276; County
o
f
Peoria v. Harvey, 18 lll. 364; Shaw
v
. Charlestown, 3 Allen, 538; Hamp
ton v. Coffin, 4 N. H
. 517; Clough r.
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railway line is located across his land, and the damages are ap
praised, his right to payment is complete, and he cannot be
required to wait until the railway company shall actually occupy
his premises, or enter upon the construction of the road at that
point. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the proceedings
for the assessment and collection of damages are statutory, and
displace the usual remedies; that the public agents who keep
within the statute are not liable to common-law action; 1 that it
is only where they fail to follow the statute that they render
themselves liable as trespassers;” though if they construct their
work in a careless, negligent, and improper manner, by means of
which carelessness, negligence, or improper construction a party
is injured in his rights, he may have an action at the common
law as in other cases of injurious negligence.”
* The principle upon which the damages are to be [* 565]
assessed is always an important consideration in these
cases; and the circumstances of different appropriations are
sometimes so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult
to establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the
whole of a man's estate is taken, there can generally be little
difficulty in fixing upon the measure of compensation; for it is
apparent that, in such a case, he ought to have the whole market
value of his premises, and he cannot reasonably demand more.
The question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined
upon the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that sub
ject, or whose business or experience entitles their opinions to
weight. It may be that, in such a case, the market value may
not seem to the owner an adequate compensation ; for, he may
have reasons peculiar to himself, springing from association, or
Unity, 18 N. H. 77. And where a R. R. Co., 1 Fost. 359; Brown v.
city thus appropriates land for a
street, it would not be allowed to set
up in defence to a demand for com
pensation it
s
own irregularities in the
proceedings taken to condemn the
land. Higgins v. Chicago, 18 Ill.
276; Chicago v. Wheeler, 25 Ill. 478.
1 East and West India Dock, &c.
Co. v. Gattke, 15 Jur. 61; Kimble v.
White Water Valley Canal, 1 Ind.
285; Mason v. Kennebec, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 31 Me. 215; Aldrich v. Cheshire
Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Pettibone v.
La Crosse and Milwaukee R
.
R
. Co.,
1
4 Wis. 443; Vilas v. Milwaukee and
Mississippi R
.
R
. Co., 15 Wis. 233.
* Dean v. Sullivan R. R
. Co., 2
Fost. 316; Furniss v. Hudson River
R. R
. Co., 5 Sandf. 551.
* Lawrence v. Great Northern R.
Co., 20 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 293; Bag
mall v
. London and N. W. R., 7 H.
& N
.
423; Brown v. Cayuga and Sus
quehanna R
.
R
. Co., 12 N
. Y. 487.
45
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other cause, which make him unwilling to part with the property
on the estimate of his neighbors; but such reasons are incapable
of being taken into account in legal proceedings, where the ques
tion is one of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly
impossible to measure them by any standard of pecuniary value.
Concede to the government a right to appropriate the property
on paying for it
,
and we are a
t
once remitted to the same stand
ards for estimating values which are applied in other cases, and
which necessarily measure the worth o
f property by its value
a
s a
n article o
f sale, or as a means o
f producing pecuniary re
turns.
When, however, only a portion o
f
a parcel o
f
land is appro
priated, just compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect
which the appropriation may have on the owner's interest in
the remainder, to increase o
r
diminish its value, in consequence
o
f
the use to which that taken is to be devoted, or in consequence
o
f
the condition in which it may leave the remainder in respect
to convenience o
f
use. If
,
for instance, a public way is laid out
through a tract o
f
land which before was not accessible, and if
in consequence it is given a front, or two fronts, upon the street,
which furnish valuable and marketable sites for building lots, it
may be that the value o
f
that which remains is made, in conse
quence o
f taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was be
fore, and that the owner is benefited instead o
f
damnified by the
appropriation. Indeed, the great majority o
f
streets in cities
and villages are dedicated to the public use b
y
the own
[* 566] ers o
f lands, without any other * compensation or expec
tation o
f compensation than the increase in market value
which is expected to be given to such lands thereby ; and this is
very often the case with land for other public improvements,
which are supposed to be o
f peculiar value to the locality in
which they are made. But where, on the other hand, a railroad
is laid out across a man's premises, running between his house
and his outbuildings, necessitating, perhaps, the removal o
f
some
o
f them, or upon such a grade as to render deep cuttings or high
embankments necessary, and thereby greatly increasing the in
conveniences attending the management and use o
f
the land, as
well as the risks o
f
accidental injuries, it will often happen that
the pecuniary loss which h
e would suffer b
y
the appropriation o
f
the right o
f way would greatly exceed the value o
f
the land taken,
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and to pay him that value only would be to make very inade
quate compensation.
It seems clear that, in these cases, it is proper and just that the
injuries suffered and the benefits received, by the proprietor, as
owner of the remaining portion of the land, should be taken into
account in measuring the compensation. This, indeed, is gener
ally conceded ; but what injuries shall be allowed for, or what
benefits estimated, is not always so apparent. The question, as
we find it considered by the authorities, seems to be, not so much
what the value is of that which is taken, but whether what re
mains is reduced in value by the appropriation, and if so, to what
extent; in other words, what pecuniary injury the owner sus
tains by a part of his land being appropriated. But, in estimat
ing either the injuries or the benefits, those which the owner
sustains or receives in common with the community generally,
and which are not peculiar to him and connected with his owner
ship, use, and enjoyment of the particular parcel of land, should
be altogether excluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him
for the one, or to charge him with the other, when no account is
taken of such incidental benefits and injuries with other citizens
who receive or feel them equally with himself, but whose lands
do not chance to be taken."
1 In Somerville and Easton R. R.
Co. ads. Doughty, 22 N. J. 495, a
motion was made for a new trial on
an assessment of compensation for
land taken by a railroad company,
on the ground that the judge in his
charge to the jury informed them
“ that they were authorized by law to
ascertain and assess the damages sus
tained by the plaintiff to his other
lands not taken and occupied by the
defendants; to his dwelling-house,
and other buildings and improve
ments, by reducing their value,
changing their character, obstructing
their free use, by subjecting his build
ings to the hazards of fire, his family
and stock to injury and obstruction
in their necessary passage across the
road, the inconvenience caused by
embankments or excavations, and, in
general, the effect of the railroad
upon his adjacent lands, in deteriorat
ing their value, in the condition they
were found, whether adapted for agri
cultural purposes only, or for dwell
ings, stores, shops, or other like pur
poses.”
“On a careful review of this
charge,” says the judge, delivering
the opinion of the court, “I cannot
see that any legal principle was vio
lated, or any unsound doctrine ad
vanced. The charter provides that
the jury shall assess the value of the
land and materials taken by the com
pany, and the damages. The dam
ages here contemplated are not dam
ages to the land actually occupied or
covered by the road, but such damages
as the owner may sustain in his other
and adjacent lands not occupied by
the company's road. His buildings
may be reduced in value by the con
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[* 567] * The question, then, in these cases, relates first to the
value of the land appropriated; which is to be assessed
tiguity of the road and the use of en
gines upon it
.
His lands and build
ings, before adapted and used for
particular purposes, may, from the
same cause, become utterly unfitted
for such purposes. The owner may
b
e incommoded b
y high embankments
o
r deep excavations on the line o
f
the road, his buildings subjected to
greater hazard from fire, his house
hold and stock to injury or destruc
tion, unless guarded with more than
ordinary care. It requires no special
experience o
r sagacity to perceive
that such are the usual and natural
effects o
f
railroads upon the adjoining
lands, and which necessarily dete
riorate not only their marketable but
their intrinsic value. The judge,
therefore, did not exceed his duty in
instructing the jury that these were
proper subjects for their consideration
in estimating the damages which the
plaintiff might sustain b
y
reason o
f
the location o
f
this road upon and
across his lands.” And in the same
case it was held that the jury, in as
sessing compensation, were to adopt
as the standard of value for the lands
taken, not such a price as they would
bring a
t
a forced sale in the market
for money, but such a price as they
could be purchased at, provided they
were for sale, and the owner asked
such prices as, in the opinion o
f
the
community, they were reasonably
worth ; that it was matter of univer
sal experience that land would not
always bring at a forced sale what it
was reasonably worth, and the owner,
not desiring to sell, could not reason
ably be required to take less. In
Sater v. Burlington and Mount Pleas
ant Plank Road Co., 1 Iowa, 393,
Isbell, J., says: “The terms used in
the constitution, “just compensa
tion,” are not ambiguous. They un
doubtedly mean a fair equivalent;
that the person whose property is
taken shall be made whole. But
while the end to be attained is plain,
the mode o
f arriving a
t it is not with
out it
s difficulty. On due considera
tion, we see n
o
more practical rule
than to first ascertain the fair market
able value o
f
the premises over which
the proposed improvement is to pass,
irrespective o
f
such improvement,
and also a like value of the same, in
the condition in which they will be
immediately after the land for the
improvement has been taken, irre
spective o
f
the benefit which will
result from the improvement, and the
difference in value to constitute the
measure o
f compensation. But in
ascertaining the depreciated value o
f
the premises after that part which has
been taken for public use has been
appropriated, regard must be had
only to the immediate, and not re
mote, consequence o
f
the appropria
tion; that is to say, the value o
f
the
remaining premises is not to be de
preciated by heaping consequence on
consequence. While we see no more
practical mode o
f
ascertainment than
this, yet it must still be borne in mind
that this is but a mode of ascertain
ment; that, after all, the true crite
rion is the one provided by the consti
tution, namely, just compensation for
the property taken.” See this rule
illustrated and applied in Henry r.
Dubuque and Pacific R
.
R
. Co., 2
Iowa, 300, where it is said: “That
the language o
f
the constitution
means that the person whose prop
erty is taken for public use shall
have a fair equivalent in money for
the injury done him by such taking;
in other words, that he shall be made
whole so far as money is a measure o
f
compensation, we are equally clear.
This just compensation should be
precisely commensurate with the in
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with reference to what “it is worth for sale, in view of [* 568]
the uses to which it may be applied, and not simply in
reference to it
s productiveness to the owner in the condition in
which he has seen fit to leave it." Second, if less than the whole
estate is taken, then there is further to be considered how much
the portion not taken is increased or diminished in value in con
sequence o
f
the appropriation.”
jury sustained by having the property
taken ; neither more nor less.” And
see Richmond, &c. Co. v. Rogers, 1
Duvall, 135; Robinson v. Robinson,
1 Duvall, 162; Holton v. Milwaukee,
3
1 Wis. 27; Root's Case, 77 Penn. St.
76; East Brandywine, &c. R
.
R
.
Co.
v
. Ranck, 78 Penn. St. 454.
1 Matter o
f
Furman Street, 17
Wend. 669; Tide-Water Canal Co.
v
. Archer, 9 Gill & J. 480; State v.
Burlington, &c. R
.
R
. Co., "1 Iowa,
386; Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 206;
First Parish, &c. v. Middlesex, 7
Gray, 106; Dickenson v. Inhabitants
o
f Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lexing
ton v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
* Denton v. Polk, 9 Iowa, 594;
Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Dick
enson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546;
Harvey v. Lackawanna, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
4
7 Penn. St. 428: Newby v. Platte
County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R
.
R
.
Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544; Somer
ville and Easton R. R. Co. ads
Doughty, 22 N
. J. 495: Carpenter v.
Landaff, 42 N
.
H
.
218; Troy and
Boston R. R
.
Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb.
169: Tide-Water Canal Co. v. Archer,
9 Gill & J. 480; Winona and St.
Paul R
.
R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn.
515; Nicholson p
. N. Y. and N
.
H.
R. R
. Co., 22 Conn. 74; Nichols v.
Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Harding
p
. Funk, 8 Kan. 31.5; Holton v. Mil
waukee, 31 Wis. 27. “Compensa
tion is an equivalent for property
taken, o
r
for an injury. It must be
ascertained by estimating the actual
damage the party has sustained.
That damage is the sum of the actual
value o
f
the property taken, and o
f
the injury done to the residue o
f
the
property by the use o
f
that part which
is taken. The benefit is
,
in part, an
equivalent to the loss and damage.
The loss and damage o
f
the defendant
is the value o
f
the land the company
has taken. and the injury which the
location and use o
f
the road through
his tract may cause to the remainder.
The amount which may be assessed
for these particulars the company
admits that it is bound to pay. But,
a
s
a set-off, it claims credit for the
benefit the defendant has received
from the construction of the road.
That benefit may consist in the en
hanced value of the residue of his
tract. When the company has paid
the defendant the excess of his loss
o
r damage over and above the benefit
and advantage he has derived from
the road, he will have received a just
compensation. It is objected that
the enhanced salable value of the
land should not be assessed as a ben
efit to the defendant, because it is
precarious and uncertain. The argu
ment admits that the enhanced value,
if permanent, should be assessed.
But whether the appreciation is per
manent and substantial, o
r
transient
and illusory, is a subject about which
the court is not competent to deter
mine. It must be submitted to a
jury, who will give credit to the com
pany according to the circumstances.
The argument is not tenable, that an
increased salable value is no benefit
to the owner of land unless he sells it.
This is true if it be assumed that the
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[* 569] *But, in making this estimate, there must be excluded
from consideration those benefits which the owner re
ceives only in common with the community at large in
[* 570] consequence of his ownership of other property,’ ” and
price will decline. The chance of
this is estimated by the jury, in the
amount which they may assess for
that benefit. The sum assessed is
therefore (so far as human foresight
can anticipate the future) the expo
nent of the substantial increase of the
value of the land. This is a benefit
to the owner, by enlarging his credit
and his ability to pay his debts or
provide for his family, in the same
manner and to the same extent as if
his fortune was increased by an ac
quisition of property.” Greenville
and Columbia R. R. Co. v. Partlow,
5 Rich. 437. And see Pennsylvania
R. R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445;
Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend.
153; Upton v. South Reading Branch
R. R., 8 Cush 600; Proprietors, &c.
v. Nashua and Lowell R. R. Co., 10
Cush. 385; Mayor, &c. of Lexington
v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; St. Louis, &c.
R. R. Co. v. Richardson, 45 Mo. 468;
Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Collett,
6 Ohio, N. s. 182; Bigelow v. West
Wisconsin R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478.
In Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo.
358, the right to assess benefits was
referred to the taxing power; but
this seems not necessary, and indeed
somewhat difficult on principle. See
Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana,
30–34.
1 Dickenson v. Inhabitants of
Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Newby v.
Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544;
Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 N. H. 218;
Mount Washington Co.'s Petition,
35 N. H. 134; Penrice v. Wallis, 37
Miss. 172; Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 17
Pick. 58; Meacham v. Fitchburg
R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, where the
jury were instructed that, if they
were satisfied that the laying out and
constructing of the railroad had occa
sioned any benefit or advantage to
the lands of the petitioner through
which the road passed, or lands im
mediately adjoining or connected
there with, rendering the part not
taken for the railroad more conven
ient or useful to the petitioner, or
giving it some peculiar increase in
value compared with other lands
generally in the vicinity, it would be
the duty of the jury to allow for such
benefit, or increase of value, by way
of set-off, in favor of the railroad
company; but, on the other hand,
if the construction of the railroad, by
increasing the convenience of the
people of the town generally as a
place for residence, and by its antici
pated and probable effect in increas
ing the population, business, and
general prosperity of the place, had
been the occasion of an increase in
the salable value of real estate gen
erally near the station, including the
petitioner's land, and thereby occa
sioning a benefit or advantage to him,
in common with other owners of real
estate in the vicinity, this benefit was
too contingent, indirect, and remote
to be brought into consideration in
settling the question of damages to
the petitioner for taking his particular
parcel of land. Upton v. South
Reading Branch R. R. Co., 8 Cush.
600. It has sometimes been objected,
with great force, that it was unjust
and oppressive to set off benefits
against the loss and damage which
the owner of the property sustains,
because thereby he is taxed for such
benefits, while his neighbors, no part
of whose land is taken, enjoy the
same benefits without the loss; and
the courts of Kentucky have held it
to be unconstitutional, and that full
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also those incidental injuries to other property, such as would
not give to other persons a right to compensation," while al
lowing those which directly affect the value of the remainder
of the land not taken ; such as the necessity for increased fencing,
and the like.” And if an assessment on these principles makes
the benefits equal the damages, and awards the owner nothing,
he is nevertheless to be considered as having received full com
pensation, and consequently as not being in position to complain.”
But in some States, by constitutional provision or by statute, the
party whose property is taken is entitled to have the value as
sessed to him without any deduction for benefits.”
compensation for the land taken R. R. Co., 46 Penn. St. 520; Winona
must be made in money. Sutton v.
Louisville, 5 Dana, 28; Rice v. Turn
pike Co., 7 Dana, 81; Jacob v.
Louisville, 9 Dana, 114. And some
other States have established, by their
constitutions, the rule that benefits
shall not be deducted. See Deaton
v. County of Polk, 9 Iowa, 596;
Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R. R.
Co., 4 Ohio, N. s. 308; Woodfolk v.
Nashville R. R. Co., 2 Swan, 422.
But the cases generally adopt the
doctrine stated in the text; and if
the owner is paid his actual damages,
he has no occasion to complain be
cause his neighbors are fortunate
enough to receive a benefit. Green
ville and Columbia R. R. Co. v.
Partlow, 5 Rich. 438; Mayor, &c. of
Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
1 Somerville, &c. R. R. Co. ads.
Doughty, 22 N. J. 495; Dorlan v. East
Brandywine, &c. R. R. Co., 46 Penn.
St. 520; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua
and Lowell R. R. Co., 10 Cush. 385;
Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v.
Thompson, 18 B. Monr. 735; Winona
and St. Peter's R. R. Co. v. Denman,
10 Minn. 267.
* Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Reiley,
8 Penn. St. 445; Greenville and Co
lumbia R. R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich.
439; Dearborn v. Railroad Co., 4 Fost.
179; Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 N. H.
220; Dorlan v. East Brandywine, &c.
and St. Peter's R. R. Co. v. Denman,
10 Minn. 267; Mount Washington
Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134. Where
a part of a meeting-house lot was
taken for a highway, it was held that
the anticipated annoyance to wor
shippers by the use of the way by
noisy and dissolute persons on the
Sabbath could form no basis for any
assessment of damages. First Parish
in Woburn v. Middlesex County, 7
Gray, 106.
* White v. County Commissioners
of Norfolk, 2 Cush. 361; Whitman
v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 3
Allen, 133; Nichols v. Bridgeport,
23 Conn. 189. But it is not compe
tent for the commissioners who assess
the compensation to require that
which is to be made to be wholly
or in part in any thing else than
money. An award of “one hundred
and fifty dollars, with a wagon-way
and stop for cattle,” is void, as un
dertaking to pay the owner in part in
conveniences to be furnished him,
and which he may not want, and
certainly cannot be compelled to take
instead of money. Central Ohio
R. R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio, N. s. 225.
See Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. v. Cop
pinger, 66 Ill. 510.
* Wilson v. Rockford, &c. R. R.
Co., 59 Ill. 273; Carpenter v. Jen
nings, 77 Ill. 250; Todd v. Kankakee,
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The statutory assessment of compensation will cover all con
sequential damages which the owner of the land sustains by
means of the construction of the work, except such as
[* 571] may result from * negligence or improper construction,"
and for which an action at the common law will lie, as
already stated.
&c. R. R. Co., 78 Ill. 530; Atlanta
v. Central R. R. Co., 53 Geo. 120;
Koestenbader v. Pierce, 41 Iowa,
204.
1 Philadelphia and Reading R. R.
Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Penn. St. 366;
O'Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St.
187; Aldrich v. Cheshire R. R. Co.,
1 Fost. 359; Dearborn v. Boston,
Concord, and Montreal R. R. Co., 4
Fost. 179; Eaton v. Boston, C. and M.
R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Dodge v.
County Commissioners, 3 Met. 880;
Brown v. Providence, W. and B. R. R.
Co., 5 Gray, 35; Mason v. Kennebec
and Portland R. R. Co., 31 Me. 215;
Bellinger v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,
23 N. Y. 42; Hatch v. Vt. Central
R. R. Co., 25 Wt. 49; Slatten v. Des
Moines Valley R. R. Co., 29 Iowa,
148; Whitehouse v. Androscoggin
R. R. Co., 52 Me. 208. A corpora
tion appropriating property under the
right of eminent domain is always
liable for any abuse of the privilege
or neglect of duty under the law un
der which they proceed. Fehr v.
Schuylkill Nav. Co., 69 Penn. St. 161;
Eaton v. Boston, C. and M. R. R. Co.,
51 N. H. 504; Terre Haute, &c. R. R.
Co. v. McKinley, 33 Ind. 274.
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- * CHAPTER XVI. [• 572]
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.
WHEN questions arise of conflict between national and State
authority, and questions whether the State exceeds it
s just pow
ers in dealing with the property and restraining the actions o
f
individuals, it often becomes necessary to consider the extent and
proper bounds o
f
a power in the States, which, like that o
f taxa
tion, pervades every department o
f
business and reaches to every
interest and every subject o
f profit o
r enjoyment. We refer to
what is known as the police power.
-
The police o
f
a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its
whole system o
f
internal regulation, by which the State seeks
not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against the State, but!.
establish for the intercourse of cit
izen with citizen those rules o
f good manners and good neigh
borhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict o
f rights, and to
insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment o
f
his own, so far as
is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment o
f rights by others.
In the present chapter we shall take occasion to speak of the
police power principally as it affects the use and enjoyment of
property; the object being to show the universality o
f
it
s presence,
* Blackstone defines the public
police and economy as “the due
regulation and domestic order o
f
the
kingdom, whereby the inhabitants o
f
a State, like members o
f
a well-gov
erned family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the rules o
f
propriety, good neighborhood, and
good manners, and to be decent, in
dustrious, and inoffensive in their
respective stations.” 4 Bl. Com. 162.
Jeremy Bentham, in his General View
of Public Offences, has this definition:
“Police is in general a system of pre
caution, either for the prevention o
f
crimes or of calamities. Its business
may be distributed into eight distinct
branches: 1. Police for the prevention
o
f offences; 2. Police for the preven
tion o
f calamities; 3. Police for the
prevention o
f
endemic diseases; 4
. Po
lice o
f charity; 5. Police o
f
interior
communications; 6. Police o
f public
amusements; 7. Police for recent in
telligence; 8. Police for registration.”
Edinburgh Ed. of Works, Part IX.
p
.
157.
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w"
and to indicate, so far as may be practicable, the limits which
settled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference.
No definition of the power can be more complete and satisfac
tory than some which have been given by eminent jurists in
deciding cases which have arisen from it
s exercise, and which
have been so often approved and adopted, that to present them in
any other than the language o
f
the decisions would be unwise, if
not inexcusable. Says Chief Justice Shaw, “We think it
[* 573] is a settled principle, * growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder o
f property, how
ever absolute and unqualified may b
e
his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use o
f
it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment o
f
others having a
n equal right to the enjoy
ment o
f
their property, nor injurious to the rights o
f
the com
munity. All property in this Commonwealth is . . . held subject
to those general regulations which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights o
f property, like a
ll
other
social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations estab
lished b
y
law as the legislature, under the governing and con
trolling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient. This is very different from the right
o
f
eminent domain, – the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property whenever the public exigency
requires it
,
which can be done only on condition o
f providing
a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to
is
rather th
e police power; the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner o
f
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare o
f
the Common
wealth, and o
f
the subjects o
f
the same. It is much easier to
perceive and realize the existence and sources o
f
this power than
to mark it
s boundaries, o
r prescribe limits to it
s
exercise.” "
* Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. Ind. 3
;
Indianapolis and Cincinnati
84. See also Commonwealth v. Tewks- R
.
R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. S4;
bury, 11 Met. 57; Hart v. Mayor, &c. Ohio and Mississippi R
.
R
.
Co. r.
o
f Albany, 9 Wend. 571; New Albany McClelland, 25 Ill. 140; People r.
and Salem R
.
R
.
Co. v. Tilton, 12 Draper, 25 Barb. 374; Baltimore v.
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“This police power of the State,” says another eminent judge,
“extends to the pro lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of a
ll persons, and the protection o
f
a
ll property within
the State. According to the maxim, Sic utere two ut alienum mon
lapdas, which being o
f
universal application, it must, of course,
b
e within the range o
f legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure T
others.” And again : [By this] “general police power o
f
the
State, persons and property are subjected to a
ll
kinds o
f
restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity o
f
the "State; of the perfect-right [*574]
in the legislature to d
o which, no question ever was, or,
upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far
a
s natural persons are concerned.”"
Where the power is located. In the American constitutional
system, the power to establish the ordinary regulations o
f police
has been left with the individual States, and it cannot be taken
from them, either wholly or in part, and exercised under legisla
tion o
f Congress.” Neither can the national government, through
any o
f
it
s departments or officers, assume any supervision o
f
the
police regulations o
f
the States.
State, 15 Md. 390; Police Commis
sioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597;
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N
.
Y
. 378;
Taney, Ch. J., in License Cases, 5
How. 583; Waite, Ch. J., in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 113, 124.
* Redfield, Ch. J., in Thorpe v.
Rutland and Burlington R
.
R
. Co.,
27 Wt. 149. See the maxim, Sic
utere, &c., -“Enjoy your own prop
erty in such manner as not to injure
that o
f another,” — in Broom, Legal
Maxims (5th Am. ed.), p
.
327; Whar
ton, Legal Maxims, No. XC. See also
Turbeville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264,
and 1 Salk. 13; Jeffries v. Williams, 5
Exch. 792; Humphries v. Brogden, 12
Q
.
B
.
739: Pixley v. Clark, 35 N
.
Y
.
520; Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn.
St. 80.
* So decided in United States v.
DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41, in which a sec
tion o
f
the Internal Revenue Act o
f
1867 — which undertook to make it a
All that the federal authority
misdemeanor to mix for sale naphtha
and illuminating oils, o
r
to sell o
il o
f
petroleum inflammable a
t
a less tem
perature than 110° Fahrenheit — was
held to be a mere police regulation,
and as such void within the States.
That the States may pass such laws,
see Patterson v. Commonwealth, 11
Bush, 311. On the general subject
o
f
the police power o
f
the States, see
also United States v. Reese, 92 U. S.
Rep. 214; United States v. Cruik
shank, 92 U
.
S
. Rep. 542. But the
States cannot, by police regulations,
interfere with the control by Congress
over inter-state commerce; as, for
instance, forbidding the introduction
into the State of Mexican or Texan
cattle a
t
certain seasons, Hannibal,
&c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Husen, 95 U
.
S
. Rep.
465; o
r forbidding discriminations be
tween passengers, o
n account o
f color,
&c., a
s they travel from State to State,
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. Rep. 485.
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can do is to see that the States do not, under cover of this power,
invade the sphere of national sovereignty, obstruct or impede the
exercise of any authority which the Constitution has confided to
the nation, or deprive any citizen of rights guaranteed by the
federal Constitution.”
Conflict with Federal Authority. But while the general au
thority of the State is fully recognized, it is easy to see that the
power might be so employed as to interfere with the jurisdiction
of the general government; and some of the most serious ques
tions regarding the police of the States concern the cases in
which authority has been conferred upon Congress. In those
cases it has sometimes been claimed that the ordinary police ju
risdiction is by necessary implication excluded, and that, if it
were not so, the State would be found operating within the
sphere of the national powers, and establishing regulations which
would either abridge the rights which the national Constitution
undertakes to render absolute, or burden the privileges which are
conferred by law of Congress, and which therefore cannot prop
erly be subject to the interference or control of any other au
thority. But any accurate statement of the theory upon which
the police power rests will render it apparent that a proper
exercise of it by the State cannot come in conflict with the pro
visions of the Constitution of the United States. If the power
extends only to a just regulation of rights with a view to the due
protection and enjoyment of all, and does not deprive any one of
that which is justly and properly his own, it is obvious that its
possession by the State, and it
s
exercise for the regulation o
f
the
property and actions o
f
its citizens, cannot well constitute an
invasion o
f
national jurisdiction, o
r
afford a basis for an appeal to
the protection o
f
the national authorities.
Obligation o
f
Contracts. The occasions to consider this subject
in it
s bearings upon the clause o
f
the Constitution o
f
the United
States which forbids the States passing any laws impairing the
obligation o
f
contracts have been frequent and varied ; and it
has been held without dissent that this clause does not so far
* See this subject considered a
t
to authorize a business within a State
large in the License Cases, 5 How. which is prohibited by the State.
504, the Passenger Cases, 7 How. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 471, per
283, and the Slaughter-House Case, Chase, Ch. J.
1
6 Wall. 36. Congress has no power
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remove from State control the rights and properties which depend
for their existence or enforcement upon contracts, as to relieve
them from the operation of such general regulations for the good
government of the State and the protection of the rights of in
dividuals as may be deemed important. All contracts and all
rights, it is declared, are subject to this power; and not only
may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being of the community may require,
or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may de
monstrate the necessity."
* In the case of Thorpe v. Rutland
and Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140,
a question arose under a provision in
the Vermont General Railroad Law
of 1849, which required each railroad
corporation to erect and maintain
fences on the line of their road, and
also cattle guards at a
ll
farm and
road crossings, suitable and sufficient
to prevent cattle and other animals
from getting upon the railroad, and
which made the corporation and it
s
agents liable for al
l
damages which
should be done by their agents o
r
engines to cattle, horses, o
r
other
animals thereon, if occasioned b
y
the
want o
f
such fences and cattle guards.
It was not disputed that this provision
would be valid as to such corpora
tions as might be afterwards created
within the State; but in respect to
those previously in existence, and
whose charters contained no such
provision, it was claimed that this
legislation was inoperative, since
otherwise its effect would be to modi
fy, and to that extent to violate, the
obligation o
f
the charter-contract.
“The case,” say the court, “re
solves itself into the narrow question
o
f
the right o
f
the legislature, b
y gen
eral statute, to require a
ll railways,
whether now in operation o
r
hereafter
to be chartered or built, to fence their
roads upon both sides, and provide
sufficient cattle guards a
t
all farm
and road crossings, under penalty o
f
paying all damages caused by their
neglect to comply with such require
ments. . . . We think the power o
f
the legislature to control existing rail
ways in this respect may be found in
the general control over the police o
f
the country, which resides in the law
making power in all free States, and
which is
,
b
y
the fifth article o
f
the
bill of rights of this State, expressly
declared to reside perpetually and
inalienably in the legislature; which
is
,
perhaps, no more than the enuncia
tion o
f
a general principle applicable
to all free States, and which cannot
therefore be violated so as to deprive
the legislature o
f
the power, even by
express grant to any mere public o
r
private corporation. And when the
regulation o
f
the police o
f
a city o
r
town, by general ordinances, is given
to such towns and cities, and the
regulation o
f
their own internal police
is given to railroads to be carried into
effect by their by-laws and other regu
lations, it is of course always, in all
such cases, subject to the superior
control o
f
the legislature. That is
a responsibility which legislatures
cannot devest themselves o
f if they
would.
“So far as railroads are concerned,
this police power which resides pri
marily and ultimately in the legisla
ture is twofold: 1. The police o
f
the
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[* 575] * Perhaps the most striking illustrations of the princi
ple here stated will be found among the judicial decisions
roads, which, in the absence of legis
lative control, the corporations them
selves exercise over their operatives,
and to some extent over all who do
business with them, or come upon
their grounds, through their general
statutes, and by their officers. We
apprehend there can be no manner of
doubt that the legislature may, if they
deem the public good requires it
,
o
f
which they are to judge, and in all
doubtful cases their judgment is final,
require the several railroads in the
State to establish and maintain the
same kind o
f police which is now ob
served upon some o
f
the more impor
tant roads in the country for their own
security, o
r
even such a police as is
found upon the English railways, and
those upon the continent o
f Europe.
No one ever questioned the right of
the Connecticut legislature to require
trains upon all o
f
their railroads to
come to a stand before passing draws
in bridges; o
r
o
f
the Massachusetts
legislature to require the same thing
before passing another railroad. And
by parity o
f reasoning may all rail
ways be required so to conduct them
selves a
s
to other persons, natural o
r
corporate, as not unreasonably to in
jure them o
r
their property. And if
the business o
f railways is specially
dangerous, they may be required to
bear the expense o
f erecting such
safeguards as will render it ordinarily
safe to others, as is often required o
f
natural persons under such circum
stances.
“There would be no end of illus
trations upon this subject. . . . It
may be extended to the supervision
o
f
the track, tending switches, run
ning upon the time o
f
other trains,
running a road with a single track,
using improper rails, not using proper
precaution by way o
f safety-beams in
case o
f
the breaking o
f axle-trees, the
number o
f
brakemen upon a train
with reference to the number o
f cars,
employing intemperate o
r incompe
tent engineers and servants, running
beyond a given rate o
f speed, and a
thousand similar things, most o
f
which have been made the subject
o
f legislation o
r judicial determina
tion, and all o
f
which may be. Hege
man v. Western R
. Co., 16 Barb. 353.
“2. There is also the general po
lice power o
f
the State, b
y
which per
sons and property are subjected to all
kinds o
f
restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity o
f
the State;
o
f
the perfect right in the legislature
to do which no question ever was, or,
upon acknowledged general principles,
ever can be, made, so far as natural
persons are concerned. And it is
certainly calculated to excite surprise
and alarm that the right to do the
same in regard to railways should be
made a serious question.” And the
court proceed to consider the various
cases in which the right o
f
the legis
lature to regulate matters o
f private
concern with reference to the general
public good has been acted upon as
unquestioned, o
r
sustained by judicial
decisions, and quote, as pertinent to
the general question o
f
what laws are
prohibited on the ground o
f impair
ing the obligation o
f contracts, the
language o
f
Chief Justice Marshall in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518, 629, that “the framers
of the Constitution did not intend to
restrain the States in the regulation
o
f
their civil institutions, adopted for
internal government, and that the in
strument they have given u
s
is not to
be so construed.” See, to the same
effect, Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb.
358; Waldron v. Rensselaer and Sara
toga R
.
R
. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Galena
and Chicago U
.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Loomis,
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which have held " that the rights insured to private cor- [* 576]
porations by their charters, and the manner of their exer
cise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time may
be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health,
and safety, and in order to guard properly the rights of other
individuals and corporations. Although these charters are to be
regarded as contracts, and the rights assured by them are invio
lable, it does not follow that these rights are at once, by force of
the charter-contract, removed from the sphere of State regula
tion, and that the charter implies an undertaking, on the part of
the State, that in the same way in which their exercise is
* permissible at first, and under the regulations then ex-[* 577]
isting, and those only, may the corporators continue to
exercise their rights while the artificial existence continues. The
obligation of the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the
contrary, the rights and privileges which come into existence
under it are placed upon the same footing with other legal rights
and privileges of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper
rules for their due regulation, protection, and enjoyment.
The limit to the exercise of the police power in these cases must
be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort,
safety, or welfare of society;] they must not be in conflict with
any of the provisions of the charter; and they must not, under
pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any of the
essential rights and privileges which the charter confers. In
short, they must be police regulations in fact, and not amend
ments of the charter in curtailment of the corporate franchise.1
13 Ill. 548; Fitchburg R. R. v. Grand
Junction R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 552;
Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Peters
v. Iron Mountain R. R. Co., 23 Mo.
107; Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c.
R. R. Co., 30 Mo. 546; Indianapolis
and Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Ker
cheval, 16 Ind. 84; Galena and Chi
cago U. R. R. Co. v. Appleby, 28 Ill.
283; Blair v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R.
Co., 20 Wis. 254; State v. Mathews,
44 Mo. 523; Commissioners, &c. v.
Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass.
446; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall.
560; Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dea
con, 63 Ill. 91; Ames v. Lake Supe
rior, &c. R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 241;
N. W. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
70 Ill. 634; State v. New Haven, &c.
Co., 43 Conn. 351.
* Washington Bridge Co. v. State,
18 Conn. 53; Bailey v. Philadelphia,
&c. R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; State v.
Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingrey v. Wash
burn, 1 Aiken, 268; Miller v. N. Y.
and Erie R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 513;
People v. Jackson and Michigan
Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 307; Sloan
v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24; At
torney-General v. Chicago, &c. R. R.
Co., 35 Wis. 425. In Benson v.
Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb.
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|The maxim, Sic utere two ut alienum non laedas, is that which lies
at the foundation of the power; and to whatever enactment
affecting the management and business of private corporations it
cannot fairly be applied, the power itself will not extend. \ It
has accordingly been held that where a corporation was chartered
with the right to take toll from passengers over their road, a
subsequent statute authorizing a certain class of persons to go
toll free was void." This was not a regulation of exist
[* 578] ing rights, but it took from the corporation that * which
they before possessed, namely, the right to tolls, and
conferred upon individuals that which before they had not,
namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of toll. “Pow
ers,” it is said in another case, “which can only be justified on
this specific ground [that they are police regulations], and which
would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the Constitution, can
be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort,
and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by the
public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory con
clusion that the framers of the Constitution could not, as men of
ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their
exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of
the prohibition would otherwise include it.”” And it was there
fore held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road
company, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected
them to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the
charter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as impairing
245, it is said, in considering a ferry
right granted to a city: “Franchises
of this description are partly of a
public and partly of a private nature.
So far as the accommodation of pas
sengers is concerned, they are publici
juris; so far as they require capital
and produce revenue, they are privati
juris. Certain duties and burdens
are imposed upon the grantees, who
are compensated therefor by the privi
lege of levying ferriage and security
from spoliation arising from the ir
revocable nature of the grant. The
State may legislate touching them, so
far as they are publici juris. Thus,
laws may be passed to punish neglect
or misconduct in conducting the fer
ries, to secure the safety of passengers
from danger and imposition, &c. But
the State cannot take away the ferries
themselves, nor deprive the city of
their legitimate rents and profits.”
And see People v. Mayor, &c. of New
York, 32 Barb. 102, 116; Common
wealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co.,
66 Penn. St. 41 ; Hegemen v. Western
R. R., 13 N. Y. 1.
* Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aiken,
268. Of course the charter reserved
no right to make such an amendment.
* Christiancy, J., in People v. Jack
son and Michigan Plank Road Co., 9
Mich. 307. Compare Commonwealth
v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Penn.
St. 41.
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.)*
the obligation o
f
contracts." And even a provision in a corpo
rate charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or
repeal it
,
would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pre
tence o
f amendment, or o
f
a police regulation, would have the
effect to appropriate a portion o
f
the corporate property to the
public use.” And where b
y
it
s
charter the corporation was em
powered to construct over a river a certain bridge, which must
necessarily constitute a
n obstruction to the navigation o
f
the
river, a subsequent amendment making the corporation liable for
such obstruction was held void, a
s in effect depriving the corpo
ration o
f
the very right which the charter assured to it.” So
where the charter reserved to the legislature the right o
f modifi
cation after the corporators had been reimbursed their expenses
in constructing the bridge, with twelve per cent interest
thereon, “an amendment before such reimbursement, [* 579]
requiring the construction o
f
a fifty-foot draw for the
passage o
f vessels, in place o
f
one o
f thirty-two feet, was held
unconstitutional and void." S
o it has been held that a power to
* Ibid. And see State v. Noyes,
4
7 Me. 189. Compare Camden, &c.
R. R
.
Co. v. Briggs, 2 N
. J. 623; and
also Philadelphia, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Bowers, 4 Houst. 506, in which an act
regulating freights and fares, where
no such power was reserved in the
charter, was held void. A view op
posed to this is intimated by Ryan,
Ch. J., in Attorney-General v. Chi
cago, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 35 Wis. 425.
* It has been held that the reser
vation o
f
a right to amend o
r repeal
would not justify an act requiring a
railroad company to cause a proposed
new street o
r highway to be taken
across their track, and to cause the
necessary embankments, excavations,
and other work to be done for that
purpose a
t
their own expense; thus
not only appropriating a part of their
property to another public use, but
compelling them to fi
t
it for such use.
Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co.,
21 Barb. 513. This, however, can
scarcely be a more severe exercise o
f
the power than is the amendment to
the charter o
f
a railroad corporation
which limits the rates of fare and
freight which may be charged; for
the exercise o
f
this might be carried
to an extent which would annihilate
the whole value o
f
railroad property.
The power, however, is very fully
sustained, where the right to amend
is reserved in the charter. Attorney
General v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
35 Wis. 425; Blake v. Winona, &c.
R. R
. Co., 19 Minn. 418; s. c. 18
Am. Rep. 345; Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Iowa, 94 U
.
S
. Rep. 155; Peck
v
. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 6 Biss. 177.
See a like rule applied to a ferry
company in Parker v. Metropolitan
R. R
. Co., 109 Mass. 506. A require
ment that rates o
f
fare and freight
shall be annually fixed and published
is legitimate as an exercise o
f
the po
lice power. Railroad Co. v. Fuller,
17 Wall. 560.
* Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R
.
R
.
Co., 4 Harr. 389. Compare Com
monwealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66
Penn. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.
* Washington Bridge Co. v. State,
18 Conn. 53.
46
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a municipal corporation to regulate the speed of railway car
riages, would not authorize such regulation, except in the streets
and public grounds of the city; such being the fair construction
of the power, and the necessity for this police regulation not
extending further." But there are decisions on this point which
are the other way.”
On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad cor
porations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all
beasts killed by going upon it
,
has been sustained o
n two grounds:
first, as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprie
tors, and in that view being but a reasonable provision for the
protection o
f
domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as
essential to the protection o
f persons being transported in the
railway carriages.”
1 State v. Jersey City, 29 N
. J.
170.
* In Buffalo and Niagara Falls
R. R
.
Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it
was held that a statutory power in a
city to regulate the running o
f
cars
within the corporate limits would
justify an ordinance entirely prohibit
ing the use o
f
steam for propelling
cars through any part o
f
the city.
And see Great Western R. R. Co. v.
Decatur, 33 Ill. 381; Branson v. Phil
adelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329; Whitson
v
. Franklin, 34 Ind. 396. Affirming
the general right to permit the mu
nicipalities to regulate the speed o
f
trains, see Chicago, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v.
Haggerty, 67 Ill. 113; Pennsylvania
R. R
.
Co. v. Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33;
Haas v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 41
Wis. 44. That the legislature may
compel railroad companies to carry
impartially for all, see Chicago, &c.
R
.
R
.
Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11. But
if the carriage is of persons from
State to State, the State has no such
control. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S.
Rep. 485.
* Thorpe v. Rutland and Burling
ton R
.
R
. Co., 27 Vt. 156; New Al
bany and Salem R
.
R
.
Co. v. Tilton,
1
2 Ind. 3
;
Same v. Maiden, 12 Ind.
10; Same v. McNamara, 11 Ind. 543;
Having this double purpose in view, the
Ohio and Mississippi R
.
R
.
Co. v.
McClelland, 25 Ill. 145; Madison and
Indianapolis R
.
R
.
Co. v. Whiteneck,
8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and Cincin
nati R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind.
3S; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. S4;
Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co.,
1
3 N. Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and
St. Lawrence R
.
R. Co., 35 N. H.
169, and 36 N. H. 440; Fawcett v.
York and North Midland R
. Co.,
1
5 Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R. R
.
Co., 35 N
.
H
.
356; Bulkley v. N
.
Y.
and N. H. R
.
R
. Co., 27 Conn. 479;
Jones v. Galena, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 16
Iowa, 6
;
Winona, &c. R
.
R. Co. v.
Waldron, 11 Minn. 515; Bradley e.
Buffalo, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 34 N. Y. 429;
Sawyer v. Vermont, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
105 Mass. 196; Pennsylvania R
.
R
.
Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164: s. c.
5 Am. Rep. 360; Kansas Pacific
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573;
Wilder v. Maine Central R
.
R
. Co.,
6
5 Me. 332. As to the degree of
care required o
f
railroad companies
in keeping u
p
their fences, compare
Antisdel v. Chicago, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
2
6 Wis. 145; Lemmon v. Chicago,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 32 Iowa, 151; Chicago,
&c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Barrie, 55 Ill. 226,
and cases cited therein. A statute
making railroad companies liable for
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owner of beasts killed or injured may maintain an action for
the damage suffered, notwithstanding he may not himself be free
from negligence." But it would, perhaps, require an express leg
islative declaration that the corporation should be liable
for the beasts thus destroyed to * create so great an in- [* 580]
novation in the common law. The general rule, where
a corporation has failed to obey the police regulations established
for it
s government, would not make the corporation liable to the
party injured, if his own negligence contributed with that of the
corporation in producing the injury.”
The State may also regulate the grade o
f railways, and pre
scribe how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each
injuries by fire communicated by their
locomotive engines was sustained as
to companies previously in existence,
in Lyman v. Boston and Worcester
R. R
. Co., 4 Cush. 288; Rodemacher
v
. Milwaukee, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. 41 Iowa,
297; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 592; Gorman
v
. Pacific Railroad, 26 Mo. 441. But
it is not competent to make railroad
companies liable for injuries for which
they are in no way responsible. It
is therefore held that an act imposing
upon railroad companies the expense
o
f
coroners' inquests, burial, &c., o
f
persons who may die on its cars, o
r
b
e killed b
y
collision, &c., is invalid
a
s applied to cases where the company
is not in fault. Ohio, &c. R. R. Co.
v
. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55. That it is as
competent to lessen the common law
liabilities o
f
railroad companies as to
increase them, see Kerby v. Penn
sylvania R
.
R
. Co., 76 Penn. St. 506.
And see Camden and Amboy R
.
R
.
Co. v. Briggs, 22 N
. J. 623; Trice v.
Hannibal, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 49 Mo. 188.
1 Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R. R.
Co., 13 N
.
Y
. 42; Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R
.
R
.
Co. v. Townsend,
10 Ind. 38; Jeffersonville, &c. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Nichols, 30 Ind. 321; Same v.
Parkhurst, 34 Ind. 501; Suydam v.
Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Fawcett v. York
and North Midland R
. Co., 15 Jur.
173; Waldron v. Rensselaer and
Schenectady R
.
R
. Co., 8 Barb. 390;
Horne v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence
R. R
. Co., 35 N. H. 169; O'Bannon
v
. Louisville, &c. R
.
R. Co., 8 Bush,
348; Illinois Cent. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Ar
nold, 47 Ill. 173; Hinman v. Chicago,
&c. R
.
R
. Co., 28 Iowa, 491.
* Jackson v. Rutland and Burling
ton R
.
R
. Co., 25 Wt. 150. And see
Marsh v. N
.
Y. and Erie R. R. Co.,
1
4 Barb. 364; Joliet and N. I. R
.
R
.
Co. v. Jones, 20 Ill. 221; Tonawanda
R
.
R
.
Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255,
and 4 N. Y. 255; Price v. New Jer
sey R
.
R
. Co., 31 N
. J. 229; Drake
v
. Philadelphia, &c. R
.
R
. Co., 51
Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R. R
.
Co. v. Kercheval,
1
6 Ind. 84, it was held that a clause
in the charter o
f
a railroad corpora
tion which declared that when the
corporators should have procured a
right of way as therein provided,
they should be seised in fee-simple
o
f
the right to the land, and should
have the sole use and occupation o
f
the same, and no person, body cor
porate o
r politic, should in any way
interfere therewith, molest, disturb,
o
r injure any o
f
the rights and privi
leges thereby granted, &c., would not
take from the State the power to es
tablish a police regulation making
the corporation liable for cattle killed
by their cars.
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other; and it may apportion the expense of making the neces
sary crossings between the corporations owning the roads." And
it may establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring
the bell or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before
passing highways at grade, or other places where their approach
might be dangerous to travel,” or to station flagmen at such or any
other dangerous places.” And it has even been intimated that it
might be competent for the State to make railway corporations
liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in
the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods;
though this would seem to be pushing the police power to
[* 581] an "extreme.” But those statutes which have recently
1 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Grand
Junction R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 552, and
4 Allen, 198; Pittsburgh, &c. R. R.
Co. v. S. W. Penn. R. R. Co., 77
Penn. St. 173. The legislature may
regulate the speed at highway and
other crossings. Rockford, &c. R. R.
Co. v. Hillmer, 72 Ill. 235. “While
the franchise of a railroad company
licenses generally unlimited speed,
power is reserved to the legislature
to regulate the exercise of the fran
chise for public security.” Ryan,
Ch. J., in Horn v. Chicago, &c. R. R.
Co., 38 Wis. 463. The regulation is
in favorem vitae. Haas v. Chicago,
&c. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44.
* “The legislature has the power,
by general laws, from time to time,
as the public exigencies may require,
to regulate corporations in their fran
chises, so as to provide for the public
safety. The provision in question is
a mere police regulation, enacted for
the protection and safety of the public,
and in no manner interferes with or
impairs the powers conferred on the
defendants in their act of incorpora
tion.” Galena and Chicago U. R. R.
Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548. And see
Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of New
York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor,
&c. of New York, 10 Barb. 240;
Bulkley v. N. Y. and N. H. R. R.
Co., 27 Conn. 486; Veazie v. Mayo,
45 Me. 560; s. c. 49 Me. 156; Galena
and Chicago U. R. R. Co. v. Dill,
22 Ill. 264; Same c. Appleby, 28 Ill.
283; Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co.
v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 145; Clark's
Adm'r v. Hannibal and St. Jo. R. R.
Co., 36 Mo. 202; Chicago, &c. R. R.
Co. v. Triplett, 38 Ill. 482; Common
wealth v. Eastern R. R. Co., 103
Mass. 254; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 555.
* Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jack
sonville, 67 Ill. 37. In many States
now there are railroad commissioners
appointed by law, with certain powers
of supervision, more or less extensive.
Respecting these it has been said in
Maine: “Our whole system of legis
lative supervision through the rail
road commissioners acting as a State
police over railroads, is founded upon
the theory that the public duties
devolved upon railroad corporations
by their charter are ministerial, and
therefore liable to be thus enforced.”
Railroad Commissioners v. Portland,
&c. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269; s. c. 18
Am. Rep. 208.
* Thorpe v. Rutland and Burling
ton R. R. Co., 27 Wt. 152. Carriers
of goods are liable as insurers, not
withstanding they may have been
guiltless of negligence, because such
is their contract with the shipper
when they receive his goods for
transportation; but carriers of per
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become common, and which give an action to the represent
atives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default
of another, may unquestionably be made applicable to corpora
tions previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a
remedy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to
make provision." And it cannot be doubted that there is ample
power in the legislative department of the State to adopt all
necessary legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations
of railway companies as carriers of persons and goods to accom
modate the public impartially, and to make every reasonable pro
vision for carrying with safety and expedition.”
Restraints on Sale of Liquors. Those statutes which regulate
or altogether prohibit the sale of intoxicating drinks as a bever
age have also been, by some persons, supposed to conflict with
the federal Constitution.
sons assume no such obligations at
the common law ; and where a com
pany of individuals receive from the
State a charter which makes them
carriers of persons, and chargeable
as such for their own default or neg
ligence only, it may well be doubted
if it be competent for the legislature
afterwards to impose upon their con
tracts new burdens, and make them
respond in damages where they have
been guilty of no default. In other
words, whether that could be a proper
police regulation which did not as
sume to regulate the business of the
carrier with a view to the just pro
tection of the rights and interests of
others, but which imposed a new ob
ligation, for the benefit of others,
upon a party guilty of no neglect of
duty. But perhaps such a regulation
would not go further than that in
Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where
it was held competent for the legis
lature to pass an act making the
stockholders of existing banks liable
for all corporate debts thereafter cre
ated; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain
R. R. Co., 23 Mo. 107, and Granna
han v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. Co., 30
Mo. 546, where an act was sustained
Such of these, however, as assume to
which made companies previously
chartered liable for the debts of con
tractors to the workmen whom they
had employed.
1 Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Paulk,
24 Geo. 356; Coosa River Steamboat
Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Bos
ton, Concord, and Montreal R. R. v.
State, 32 N. H. 215, a statute making
railroad corporations liable to indict
ment and fine, in case of the loss of
life by the negligence or carelessness
of the proprietors or their servants,
was adjudged constitutional, as ap
plicable to corporations previously in
existence.
* On this subject in general, see
Redf. on Railw. c. 32, sec. 2; Louis
ville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Cold.
45; New Albany and Salem R. R. Co.
v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Buckley v. N. Y.
& N. H. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 479;
Ohio & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Mc
Clelland, 25 Ill. 144; Bradley v. Buf
falo, &c. R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 429;
Boston, C. & M. R. R. Co. v. State,
32 N. H. 215; Pennsylvania R. R.
Co. v. Riblet, 66 Penn. St. 164; s. c.
5 Am. Rep. 360. And see other
cases cited, ante, pp. *578–1579, notes.
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regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other persons than those
who should be licensed by the public authorities, have not sug
gested any serious question of constitutional power. They are
but the ordinary police regulations, such as the State may make
in respect to all classes of trade or employment." But those
which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture and sale
of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed as vio
lating express provisions of the national Constitution,
[* 582] and also as "subversive of fundamental rights, and there
fore not within the grant of legislative power.
That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected
imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State
into another, because in conflict with the power of Congress over
commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the
Supreme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain
the assent of the court. The majority of the court expressed the
opinion — which, however, was obiter in those cases — that the
introduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in
the original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because
to do so would be to forbid what Congress, in it
s regulation o
f
commerce, and in the levy o
f imposts, had permitted ; * but it was
conceded b
y all, that when the original package was broken up
for use or for retail b
y
the importer, and also when the com
modity had passed from his hands into the hands o
f
a purchaser,
it ceased to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and
thereby became subject to the laws o
f
the State, and might be
taxed for State purposes, and the sale regulated b
y
the State like
any other property.” It was also decided, in these cases, that the
power o
f Congress to regulate commerce between the States did
1 Bode v
. State, 7 Gill, 326; Ban
croft r. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomas
son v. State, 15 Ind. 449; License
Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan
Board o
f
Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y.
657; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill.
59; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill.
39; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. 612.
That such laws may be applied to
corporations chartered to manufacture
liquors, as well as to others, see
Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liq
uors, 115 Mass. 153.
, 2 Taney, Ch. J., 5 How. 574; Me
Lean, J., 5 How. 589; Catron, J.,
5 How. 608. And see Brown r.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Lincoln v.
Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 335. Bradford r.
Stevens, 1
0 Gray, 379; State v. Robin
son, 49 Me. 285.
* Daniel, J., held that the right to
regulate was not excluded, even while
the packages remained in the hands
o
f
the importer unbroken (p. 612).
See also the views o
f Grier, J.
(p. 631).
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not exclude regulations by the States, except so far as they might
come in conflict with those established by Congress; and that,
consequently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate com
merce in liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire
could not be held void which punished the sale, in that State, of
gin purchased in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwith
standing the sale was in the cask in which it was imported, but
by one not licensed by the selectmen."
It would seem, from the views expressed by the several mem
bers of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as
Prohibitory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to pre
vent altogether * the manufacture and sale of intoxicating [* 583]
drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish
that object, cannot be held void as in conflict with the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties.
And in several cases it has been held that the fact that such laws
may tend to prevent or may absolutely preclude the fulfilment of
contracts previously made, is no objection to their validity.” Any
change in the police laws, or indeed in any other laws, might have
a like consequence.
The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of
conflict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental
principles, has been raised. They are looked upon as police
regulations established by the legislature for the prevention of
intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of
nuisances.” It has also been held competent to declare the liquor
* See also Bode v. State, 7 Gill,
326; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196;
State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290;
25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary, 26
Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn.
479; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330;
Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; Com
monwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97;
Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34
N. Y. 657. "
* People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330;
Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.
* Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12
Cush. 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp,
5 Gray, 97; Commonwealth v. Howe,
13 Gray, 26; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa,
202; One House v. State, 4 Greene
(Iowa), 172; Zumhoff v. State, 4
Greene (Iowa), 526; State v. Done
hey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler,
People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244;
Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196; State v.
Prescott, 27 Vt. 194; Lincoln v.
Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Gill v. Parker, 31
Vt. 610. Compare Beebe v. State, 6
Ind. 501: Meshmeier v. State, 11
Ind. 484; Wynehamer v. People, 13
N. Y. 378. In Reynolds v. Geary,
26 Conn. 179, the State law forbidding
suits for the price of liquors sold out
of the State, to evade the State law,
was sustained and applied, notwith
standing the contract was valid where
made. The general rule is
,
however,
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kept for sale a nuisance, and to provide legal process for it
s
con
demnation and destruction, and to seize and condemn the build
ing occupied as a dram shop on the same ground." And it is
only where, in framing such legislation, care has not been taken
to observe those principles o
f protection which surround the per
sons and dwellings o
f individuals, securing them against unrea
sonable searches and seizures, and giving them a right to trial
before condemnation, that the courts have felt at liberty to declare
that it exceeded the proper province of police regulation.” Per
haps there is n
o
instance in which the power o
f
the legislature to
make such regulations a
s may destroy the value o
f property, with
out compensation to the owner, appears in a more striking light
than in the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic
[* 584] drinks being lawful, and the * capital employed in it be
ing fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in,
and, b
y
a
n
enactment based o
n general reasons o
f public utility,
annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and
reduces to a nominal value the property o
n
hand. Even the
keeping o
f that, for the purposes o
f sale, becomes a criminal o
f
fence; and, without any change whatever in his own conduct o
r
employment, the merchant o
f yesterday becomes the criminal o
f
to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts the
business which to that moment was lawful becomes the subject o
f
legal proceedings, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be
proceeded against for a forfeiture.”
that if the contract is valid where
made, it is valid everywhere. See
Sortwell v. Hughes, 1 Curtis, 245;
Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167;
Hill v. Spear, 50 N
.
H
. 253; Kling
v
. Fries, 33 Mich. 275; Roethke v.
Philip Best Brewing Co., 33 Mich.
340; Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich.
469.
1 One House v. State, 4 Greene
(Iowa), 172. See also Lincoln v.
Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Oviatt v. Pond,
29 Conn. 479; State v. Robinson, 33
Maine, 568; License Cases, 5 How.
589. But see Wynehamer v. People,
13 N. Y
. 378; Welch v. Stowell, 2
Doug. (Mich.) 332. A statute pro
viding for the appointment o
f guar
dians for drunkards is competent
A statute which can do this
under the police power, and its opera
tion would not be an unlawful de
privation o
f property. Devin v.
Scott, 34 Ind. 67.
* Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125;
Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. But
see Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 4S4;
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N
.
Y
.
378.
* In a number of the States statutes
have recently been passed to make the
owners o
f premises on which traffic in
intoxicating liquors is carried on re
sponsible for all damages occasioned
b
y
such traffic. It is believed to be
entirely competent for the legislature
to pass such statutes, but whether
they can apply in cases where leases
had previously been made, must be a
serious question.
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must be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but,
whether satisfactory or not, the reasons address themselves ex
clusively to the legislative wisdom.
Tawing Forbidden Occupations. Within the last two or three
years, new questions have arisen in regard to these laws, and
other State regulations, arising out of the imposition of burdens
on various occupations by Congress, with a view to raising reve
nue for the national government. These burdens are imposed in
the form of what are called license fees; and it has been claimed
that, when the party paid the fee, he was thereby licensed to carry
on the business, despite the regulations which the State govern
ment might make upon the subject. This view, however, has
not been taken by the courts, who have regarded the congres
sional legislation imposing a license fee as only a species of taxa
tion, without the payment of which the business could not
lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did not propose
to make any business lawful which was not lawful before, or to
relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by the regula
tions of the State. The licenses give no authority, and are mere
receipts for taxes."
Other Regulations affecting Commerce. Numerous other illustra
tions might be given of the power in the States to make regula
tions affecting commerce, which are sustainable as regulations of
police. Among these, quarantine regulations and health laws of
every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are
or may be sometimes carried to the extent of ordering the destruc
tion of private property when infected with disease or
otherwise dangerous.” These regulations" have generally [* 585]
1 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462;
Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall.
475; Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10
Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36
, Ill. 301. A State may tax a business
notwithstanding the State constitu
tion forbids its being licensed. Young
blood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; s. c.
20 Am. Rep. 654. As to when
license, and not be invalid on that
ground. See ante, p. *283, note.
Under the police power, the dealing
in liquors even for lawful purposes
may be restricted to persons approved
for moral character. In re Ruth, 32
Iowa, 250.
It is usual, either by general law
or by municipal charters, to confer
license fees are taxes, see ante, p. *201
and note.
* See remarks of Grier, J., in
License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker
v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397.
A liquor law may annul a previous
very extensive powers upon local
boards of health, under which, when
acting in good faith, they may justify
themselves in taking possession of,
purifying, or even destroying, the
buildings or other property of the
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passed unchallenged. The right to pass inspection laws, and
to levy duties so far as may be necessary to render them effect
ual, is also undoubted, and is expressly recognized by the Con
stitution." But certain powers which still more directly affect
commerce may sometimes be exercised where the purpose is not
to interfere with congressional legislation, but merely to regu
late the times and manner of transacting business with a view
to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent confusion.
An act of the State of New York declared that the harbor
masters appointed under the State laws should have authority to
regulate and station a
ll ships and vessels in the stream o
f
the East
and North rivers, within the limits o
f
the city o
f
New York, and
the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels
a
s
were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes,
to make room for such others as required to be more immediately
accommodated, for the purpose o
f receiving and discharging
citizen, when the public health o
r
comfort demands such strong meas
ures. See Harrison v. Baltimore, 1
Gill, 264; Van Wormer v. Albany,
1
5 Wend. 262; Coe v. Shultz, 47
Barb. 64.
They may forbid offensive trades
being carried on in populous districts.
Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Met
ropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y.
661; Live Stock, &c. Association v.
Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall.
31; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y.
402; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64;
Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush,
139; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass.
254; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 95; Pot
ter's Dwarris on Stat. 458. That the
business is lawful in itself, and proper
to be carried on somewhere, is no ob
jection to the regulation. Watertown
v
. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315.
If they forbid the keeping of swine
in certain parts o
f
a city, their regu
lations will be presumed reasonable
and needful. Commonwealth v. Patch,
9
7 Mass. 221, citing with approval
Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269. And
though they cannot be vested with
authority to decide finally upon one's
right to property when they proceed
to interfere with it as constituting a
danger to health, yet they are vested
with quasi judicial power in deciding
upon what constitutes a nuisance,
and all presumptions favor their ac
tion. See Van Wormer v. Albany,
1
5 Wend. 262; Kennedy v. Phelps,
1
0 La. Ann. 227; Metropolitan Board
v
. Heister, 37 N. Y
.
661. And they
may unquestionably be vested with
very large power to establish pest
houses, and make very stringent regu
lations to prevent the spread o
f con
tagious diseases. As to the power o
f
the public authorities to establish a
public slaughter-house, o
r
to require
all slaughtering o
f
beasts to b
e done
a
t
one establishment, see Milwaukee
v
. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Live Stock,
&c. Association v. Crescent City, &c.
Co., 16 Wall. 31. Compare as to
right to establish monopolies, Gale r.
Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344.
A regulation forbidding the grow
ing o
f
rice within a city, on the ground
o
f injurious effect upon health, was
held valid in Green v. Savannah, 6
Geo. 1.
* Art. 1
,
§ 10, clause 2.
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theirs; and that the harbor-masters or either of them should have
authority to determine how far and in what instances it was the
duty of the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels,
to accommodate each other in their respective situations; and it
imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the direc
tions of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought
against the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his
vessel a certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters,
in order to accommodate a new arrival, it was insisted on the
defence that the act was an unconstitutional invasion of the
power of Congress over commerce, but it was sustained as being
merely a regulation prescribing the manner of exercising individ
ual rights over property employed in commerce."
* The line of distinction between that which consti- [* 586]
tutes an interference with commerce, and that which is
! Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 351.
Woodworth, J., in this case, states very
clearly the principle on which police
regulations, in such cases, are sus
tainable: “It seems to me the power
exercised in this case is essentially
necessary for the purpose of protect
ing the rights of all concerned. It is
not, in the legitimate sense of the
term, a violation of any right, but
the exercise of a power indispensably
necessary, where an extensive com
merce is carried on. If the harbor is
crowded with vessels arriving daily
from foreign parts, the power is inci
dent to such a state of things. Dis
order and confusion would be the
consequence, if there was no control.
. . . The right assumed under the
law would not be upheld, if exerted
beyond what may be considered a
necessary police regulation. The
line between what would be a clear
invasion of right on the one hand,
and regulations not lessening the
value of the right, and calculated for
the benefit of all, must be distinctly
marked. . . . Police regulations are
legal and binding, because for the
general benefit, and do not proceed to
the length of impairing any right, in
the proper sense of that term. The
sovereign power in a community,
therefore, may and ought to prescribe
the manner of exercising individual
rights over property. It is for the
better protection and enjoyment of
that absolute dominion which the in
dividual claims. The power rests on
the implied right and duty of the
supreme power to protect all by
statutory regulations; so that, on the
whole, the benefit of all is promoted.
Every public regulation in a city may,
and does in some sense, limit and
restrict the absolute right that ex
isted previously. But this is not con
sidered as an injury. So far from it
,
the individual, as well as others, is
supposed to be benefited. It may,
then, be said that such a power is
incident to every well-regulated so
ciety, and without which it could not
well exist.” See Cooley v. Board o
f
Wardens, 12 How. 289; Owners o
f
James Gray p
.
Owners o
f The John
Frazer, 21
.
How. 184; Benedict v.
Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194; Steam
ship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Port
Wardens v. The Ward, 14 La. Ann.
289; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
726, 731; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N
.
Y.
292.
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a mere police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and
shadowy, and it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists dif
fer when endeavoring to classify the cases which arise. It is not
doubted that Congress has the power to go beyond the general
regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and
to descend to the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed
advisable; and that to whatever extent ground shall be covered
by those directions, the exercise of State power is excluded.
Congress may establish police regulations, as well as the States;
confining their operation to the subjects over which it is given
control by the Constitution. But as the general police power can
better be exercised under the supervision of the local authority,
and mischiefs are not likely to spring therefrom so long as the
power to arrest collision resides in the national courts, the regu
lations which are made by Congress do not often exclude the
establishment of others by the State covering very many particu
lars. Moreover, the regulations of commerce are usually, and in
some cases must be, general and uniform for the whole country;
while in some localities, State and local policy will demand pecul
iar regulations with reference to special and peculiar circum
stances.
-
The State of Maryland passed an act requiring al
l
importers o
f
foreign goods, b
y
the bale o
r package, &c., to take out a license,
for which they should pay fifty dollars, and, in case o
f neglect o
r
refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeit
ures and penalties. License laws are o
f
two kinds: those which
require the payment o
f
a license fee by way o
f raising a revenue,
and are therefore the exercise o
f
the power o
f taxation;
[* 587] and those " which are mere police regulations, and re
quire the payment only o
f
such license fee as will cover
the expense o
f
the license and o
f enforcing the regulation." The
Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former o
f
these
classes, and it was held void as in conflict with that provision o
f
the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost,
&c., and also with the clause which declares that Congress shall
have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning o
f
the court
was this: Sale is the object o
f
a
ll importation o
f goods, and the
power to allow importation must therefore imply the power to au
1 Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347. See ante, p
.
*201. Also Dillon, Mun.
Corp. §§ 291–294 and notes.
*
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thorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a penalty
inflicted for selling an article in the character of importer was in
opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized importation;
that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer the
instant it was landed was the same in effect as a power to tax
it whilst entering the port; that consequently the law of Maryland
was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground
of it
s violating the two provisions referred to." And a State law
which required the master o
f every vessel engaged in foreign
commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, o
n
account o
f
every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State,
o
r
before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar
reasons.”
On the other hand, a law o
f
the State o
f
New York was sus
tained which required, under a penalty, that the master o
f every
vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor o
r
recorder o
f
the city o
f
New York an account of his passengers;
the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an
influx o
f persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries
and the other States, and to that end to require a report o
f
the
names, places o
f birth, &c., o
f
a
ll passengers, that the necessary
steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them from
becoming chargeable as paupers.” And a State regulation o
f
pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was con
ceded that Congress had full power to make regulations
o
n
the same * subject, which, however, it had not exer- [* 588]
cised.* These several cases, and the elaborate discussions
with which the decisions in each were accompanied, together with
the leading case o
f
Gibbons v. Ogden,” may b
e
almost said to
exhaust the reasoning upon the subject, and to leave little to be
* Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419.
* Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283;
see also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20
Cal. 534, where a State law imposing
a special tax on every Chinese per
son over eighteen years o
f age for
each month of his residence in the
State was held unconstitutional, as in
conflict with the power o
f Congress
over commerce.
* City o
f
New York v. Miln, 11
Pet. 102. See also State v. The
Constitution, 42 Cal. 581.
* Cooley v. Board o
f Wardens, 12
How. 299. See Barnaby v. State, 21
Ind. 450; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2
Wall. 450; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N
.
Y.
292.
* 9 Wheat. 1. And see Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.
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done by those who follow beyond the application of such rules
for classification as they have indicated.
Sunday Laws. We have elsewhere referred to cases in which
laws requiring all persons to refrain from their ordinary callings
on the first day of the week have been held not to encroach upon
the religious liberty of those citizens who do not observe that day
as sacred. Neither are they unconstitutional as a restraint upon
trade and commerce, or because they have the effect to destroy
the value of a lease of property to be used on that day, or to make
void a contract for Sunday services." There can no longer be any
question, if any there ever was, that such laws may be supported
as regulations of police.”
Law of the Road. The highways within and through a State
are constructed by the State itself, which has full power to pro
vide all proper regulations of police to govern the action of persons
using them, and to make from time to time such alterations in
these ways as the proper authorities shall deem proper.” A very
common regulation is that parties meeting shall turn to the right;
the propriety of which none will question. So the speed of travel
may be regulated with a view to safe use and general protection,
and to prevent a public nuisance.” So beasts may be prohibited
from running at large, under the penalty of being seized and sold.”
And it has been held competent under the same power to require
the owners of urban property to construct and keep in repair and
free from obstructions the sidewalks in front of it
,
and in case of
1 Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb.
576. And see Ex parte Andrews, 18
Cal. 678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130;
ante, p
.
*477 and notes.
* Specht v. Commonwealth, 8
Penn. St. 312; City Council v. Ben
jamin, 2 Strob 508; State v. Ambs,
20 Mo. 214; St. Louis v. Cafferata,
2
4 Mo. 94; Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich.
279; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112;
Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 259; Bloom
v
. Richards, 2 Ohio, N
.
s. 387; Lin
denmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548;
Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ez
parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130; Hudson v.
Geary, 4 R
.
I. 485; Frolickstein v.
Mobile, 40 Ala. 725.
* As to the right to change the
grade o
f
a street from time to time
without liability to parties incidentally
injured, see ante, p
.
"207.
* Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3
Pick. 473; Commonwealth v. Stodder,
2 Cush. 562; Day v. Green, 4 Cush.
433; People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469;
. People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470; Washing
ton v. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; State
v
. Foley, 31 Iowa, 527.
5 McKee p
. McKee, 8 B
.
Monr.
433; Municipality v. Blanc, 1 La.
Ann. 385; Whitfield v. Longest, 6
Ired. 268; Gooselink v. Campbell, 4
Iowa, 296; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill.
459; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9
Allen, 266.
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their failure to do so to authorize the public authorities to do it
at the expense of the property,’ the courts distinguishing
this from taxation, on the * ground of the peculiar interest [* 589]
which those upon whom the duty is imposed have in it
s
performance, and their peculiar power and ability to perform
it with the promptness which the good of the community re
quires.”
Navigable Waters. Navigable waters are also a species o
f public
highway, and as such come under the control o
f
the States. The
term “navigable,” at the common law, was only applied to those
waters where the tide ebbed and flowed, but all streams which
were o
f
sufficient capacity for useful navigation, though not called
navigable, were public, and subject to the same general rights which
the public exercised in highways b
y
land.” In this country there
has been a very general disposition to consider all streams public
which are useful as channels for commerce, wherever they are
found o
f
sufficient capacity to float to market the products o
f
the
mines, o
f
the forests, o
r
o
f
the tillage o
f
the country through which
they flow.” And if a stream is of sufficient capacity for the float
* Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick.
504; Bonsall v. Mayor o
f Lebanon,
1
9 Ohio, 418; Paxson v. Sweet, 1
Green (N. J.), 196; Lowell v. Had
ley, 8 Met. 180; Washington v.
Mayor, &c. o
f Nashville, 1 Swan,
177; Mayor, &c. v. Medbury, 6
Humph. 368; Woodbridge v. Detroit,
8 Mich. 309, per Christiancy, J.;
Matter o
f
Dorrance St., 4 R
.
I. 230;
Deblois v. Barker, 4 R
.
I. 445; Hart
v
. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226. So in
Pennsylvania it has been held compe
tent to require the owners o
f city
lots, in front o
f
which sewers are
constructed, to pay the expense there
o
f
in proportion to the street front.
Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St.
400; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn.
St. 255. And see Boston v. Shaw, 1
Met. 130; Hildreth v. Lowell, 11
Gray, 345; Cone v. Hartford, 28
Conn. 363; State v. Jersey City, 5
Dutch. 441.
* See especially the case o
f God
ard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, for a
clear and strong statement o
f
the
grounds on which such legislation
can b
e supported. Also Dillon, Mun.
Corp. § 637; Cooley on Taxation,
398.
* Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 26;
Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 283.
* Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9
;
Knox v. Chaloner, 42 Me. 150; Lan
cey v. Clifford, 54 Me. 489; Gerrish
v
. Brown, 51 Me. 256; Scott v. Will
son, 3 N
.
H. 321; Shaw v. Crawford,
1
0 Johns. 236; Munson v. Hunger
ford, 6 Barb. 265; Browne v. Scofield,
8 Barb. 239; Morgan v. King, 18
Barb. 284, 30 Barb. 9
,
and 35 N. Y.
454; Cates v. Wadlington, 1 McCord,
580; Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5
Pick. 199; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2
Mich. 519; Lorman v. Benson, 8
Mich. 18; Depew v. Board of Com
missioners, &c., 5 Ind. 8
;
Board o
f
Commissioners v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13;
Stuart v. Clark, 2 Swan, 9
;
Elder v.
Barrus, 6 Humph. 364; Dalrymple
v
. Mead, 1 Grant's Cases, 197; Com
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ing of rafts and logs in the condition in which it generally appears
by nature, it will be regarded as public, notwithstanding
[* 590] there may be times when it becomes too dry and * shal
low for the purpose. “The capacity of a stream, which
generally appears by the nature, amount, importance, and necessity
of the business done upon it
,
must b
e
the criterion. A brook,
although it might carry down saw-logs for a few days, during a
freshet, is not therefore a public highway. But a stream upon
which and it
s
tributaries saw-logs to an unlimited amount can be
floated every spring, and for the period o
f
from four to eight
weeks, and for the distance o
f
one hundred and fifty miles, and
upon which unquestionably many thousands will be annually
transported for many years to come, if it be legal so to do, has
the character o
f
a public stream for that purpose. So far the pur
pose is useful for trade and commerce, and to the interests o
f
the
community. The floating o
f logs is not mentioned by Lord Hale
De Jure Maris], and probably no river in Great Britain was,
in his day, o
r
ever will be, put to that use. But here it is common,
necessary, and profitable, especially while the country is new ; and
if it be considered a lawful mode of using the river, it is easy to
adapt well-settled principles o
f
law to the case. And they are
not the less applicable because this particular business may not
always continue; though if it can of necessity last but a short
time, and the river can be used for no other purpose, that circum
stance would have weight in the consideration o
f
the question.” "
But if the stream was not thus useful in its natural condition,
but has been rendered susceptible o
f
use b
y
the labors o
f
the
owner o
f
the soil, the right of passage will be in the nature o
f
a
private way, and the public do not acquire a right to the benefit
o
f
the owner's labor, unless he sees fit to dedicate it to their
use.”
All navigable waters are for the use of al
l
the citizens; and
there cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation o
f
missioners o
f
Homochitto River v. Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552; Weise r.
Withers, 29 Miss. 21; Rhodes v. Smith, 3 Oreg. 445; s. c. 8 Am. Rep.
Otis, 33 Ala. 578; McManus v. Car- 621. Compare Hubbard v. Bell, 54 Ill.
michael, 3 Iowa, 1 ; Weise v. Smith, 110.
3 Oreg. 445; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 621. * Wadsworth's Adm'r v
. Smith,
1 Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288; 11 Me. 278; Ward v. Warner, S
Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519; Mich. 521.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9
;
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any portion of them." The question what is a navigable stream
would seem to be a mixed question of law and fact ;” and though
it is said that the legislature of the State may determine
whether a *stream shall be considered a public highway [* 591]
or not,” yet if in fact it is not one, the legislature cannot
make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is private property,
the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public use without pro
viding for compensation.*
The general right to control and regulate the public use of
navigable waters is unquestionably in the State ; but there are
certain restrictions upon this right growing out of the power of
Congress over commerce. Congress is empowered to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; and
wherever a river forms a highway upon which commerce is con
ducted with foreign nations or between States, it must fall under
the control of Congress, under this power over commerce. The
circumstance, however, that a stream is navigable, and capable
of being used for foreign or inter-state commerce, does not ex
clude regulation by the State, if in fact Congress has not exer
cised it
s power in regard to it;" or having exercised it
,
the State
law does not come in conflict with the congressional regulations,
o
r
interfere with the rights which are permitted b
y
them.
The decisions o
f
the federal judiciary in regard to navigable
waters seem to have settled the following points : —
1
. That no State can grant an exclusive monopoly for the navi
1 Commonwealth v. Charlestown,
1 Pick. 180; Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick.
Weise v. Smith, 3 Oreg. 445; s. c. 8
Am. Rep. 621.
492; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N
. J. 1;
Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 434. They
are equally for the use o
f
the public
in the winter when covered with ice;
and one who cuts a hole in the ice
in an accustomed way, by means of
which one passing upon the ice is
injured, is liable to an action for the
injury. French v. Camp, 6 Shep.
433. An obstruction to a navigable
stream is a nuisance which any one
having occasion to use it may abate.
Inhabitants o
f
Arundel v. McCulloch,
10 Mass. 70; State v. Moffett, 1
Greene (Iowa), 247; Selman v. Wolfe,
27 Tex. 68.
* See Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552;
* Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211;
American River Water Co. v. Amsden,
6 Cal. 443; Baker v. Lewis, 33 Penn.
St. 301.
* Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284;
s. c. 35 N. Y. 454.
* Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245. In this case
it was held that a State law permitting.
a creek navigable from the sea to be
dammed so as to exclude vessels alto
gether was not opposed to the Consti
tution o
f
the United States, there
being no legislation b
y
Congress with
which it would come in conflict. And
see Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How.
518, and 18 How. 421.
47
738 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XVI.
gation of any portion of the waters within it
s
limits upon which
commerce is carried on under coasting licenses granted under the
authority o
f Congress,' since such a grant would come directly in
conflict with the power which Congress has exercised. But a
State law granting to an individual an exclusive right to navigate
the upper waters o
f
a river, lying wholly within the limits o
f
the
State, separated from tide water by falls impassable for
[* 592] purposes of “navigation, and not forming a part of any
continuous track of commerce between two or more
States, o
r
with a foreign country, does not come within the reason
o
f
this decision, and cannot be declared void as opposed to the
Constitution of the United States.”
2
. The States have the same power to improve navigable wa
ters which they possess over other highways; * and where money
has been expended in making such improvement, it is competent
for the State to impose tolls on the commerce which passes
through and has the benefit o
f
the improvement, even where the
stream is one over which the regulations o
f
commerce extend.*
3
. The States may authorize the construction o
f bridges over
navigable waters, for railroads as well as for every other species
o
f highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere
with the right o
f navigation.” If the stream is not one which is
* Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. by the grantees. Below Old Town
The case was the well-known histori
cal one, involving the validity o
f
the
grant b
y
the State o
f
New York to
Robert Fulton and his associates of
the exclusive right to navigate the
waters o
f
that State with vessels pro
pelled b
y
steam. This subject is fur
ther considered in Gilman v Philadel
phia, 3 Wall. 713; and in The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557, in which the
meaning o
f
the term “navigable
waters of the United States '' is de
fined. And see Craig v. Kline, 65
Penn. St. 399; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 636.
* Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568.
The exclusive right granted in this
case was to the navigation o
f
the
Penobscot River above Old Town,
which was to continue for twenty
years, in consideration o
f improve
ments in the navigation to be made
there were a fall and several dams on
the river, rendering navigation from
the sea impossible. And see Mc
Reynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.
* The improvement of a stream
by State authority will give no right
o
f
action to an individual incidentally
injured by the improvement. Zim
merman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. &
S
.
346.
* Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 Mc
Lean, 226; Kellogg v. Union Co., 12
Conn. 7; Thames Bank v. Lovell,
1
8 Conn. 500; McReynolds v. Small
house, 8 Bush, 447.
* See Commonwealth v. Breed,
4 Pick. 460; Depew v. Trustees o
f W.
and E
. Canal, 5 Ind. 8
;
Dover v.
Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N
.
H
. 200;
Illinois, &c. Co. v. Peoria, &c. Asso
ciation, 38 Ill. 467.
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subject to the control of Congress, the State law permitting the
erection cannot be questioned on any ground of public inconven
ience. The legislature must always have power to determine
what public ways are needed, and to what extent the accommo
dation of travel over one way must yield to the greater necessity
for another. But if the stream is one over which the regula
tions of Congress extend, the question is somewhat complicated,
and it becomes necessary to consider whether such bridge will
interfere with the regulations or not. But the bridge is not
necessarily unlawful, because of constituting, to some degree, an
obstruction to commerce, if it is properly built, and upon a proper
plan, and if the general traffic of the country will be aided rather
than impeded by its construction. There are many cases where a
bridge over a river may be vastly more important than the naviga
tion; and there are other cases where, although the traffic
upon the river is important, yet an "inconvenience caused [* 593]
by a bridge with draws would be much less seriously
felt by the public, and be a much lighter burden upon trade and
travel, than a break in a line of railroad communication necessi
tating the employment of a ferry. In general terms it may be
said that the State may authorize such constructions, provided
they do not constitute material obstructions to navigation ; but
whether they are to be regarded as material obstructions or not
is to be determined in each case upon it
s
own circumstances.
The character o
f
the structure, the facility afforded for vessels to
pass it
,
the relative amount o
f
traffic likely to be done upon the
stream and over the bridge, and whether the traffic b
y
rail would
b
e likely to be more incommoded b
y
the want o
f
the bridge than
the traffic b
y
water with it
,
are a
ll
circumstances to be taken
into account in determining this question. It is quite evident
that a structure might constitute a material obstruction on the
Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are constantly passing,
which would be unobjectionable on a stream which a boat only
enters a
t
intervals of weeks or months. The decision of the
State legislature that the erection is not a
n
obstruction is not
conclusive; but the final determination will rest with the federal
courts, who have jurisdiction to cause the structure to be abated,
if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the traffic upon the water.
Parties constructing the bridge must be prepared to show, not
only the State authority, and that the plan and construction are:
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proper, but also that it accommodates more than it impedes the
general commerce."
4. The States may lawfully establish ferries over navigable
waters, and grant licenses for keeping the same, and forbid
unlicensed persons from running boats or ferries without such
license. This also is only the establishment of a public way, and
it can make no difference whether or not the water is entirely
within the State, or, on the other hand, is a highway for inter
state or foreign commerce.”
5. The States may also authorize the construction of
[*594] dams across " navigable waters; and where no question
of federal authority is involved, the legislative permission
to erect a dam will exempt the structure from being considered a
nuisance,” and it would seem also that it must exempt the party
constructing it from liability to any private action for injury to
navigation, so long as he keeps within the authority granted, and
is guilty of no negligence.”
6. To the foregoing it may be added that the State has the
* See this subject fully considered
in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How.
518. See also Columbus Insurance
Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean,
72; Same v. Curtenius, 6 McLean, 209;
Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge
Co., 6 McLean, 237; United States
v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M.
401; Commissioners of St. Joseph Co.
v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13.
* Conway v. Taylor's Ex’r, 1 Black,
603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43;
Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27.
In these cases the State license law
was sustained as against a vessel en
rolled and licensed under the laws
of Congress. And see Fanning v.
Gregorie, 16 How. 534. Under a
power to amend the charter of a
ferry company, the legislature may
regulate the tolls chargeable by it
.
Parker v. Metropolitan, &c R
.
R
. Co.,
109 Mass. 506. Ferry rights may be so
regulated as to rates o
f ferriage, and
ferry franchises and privileges so con
trolled in the hands o
f grantees and
lessees, that they shall not be abused
to the serious detriment or incon
venience o
f
the public. Where this
power is given to a municipality, it
may be recalled a
t any time. People
v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 32 Barb.
102.
8 Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Brown r.
Commonwealth, 3 S
.
& R
. 273; Bacon
v
. Arthur, 4 Watts, 437; Hogg v.
Zanesville Co., 5 Ohio, 410; Neader
houser v. State, 28 Ind. 257. And
see Flanagan v. Philadelphia, 42
Penn. St. 219; Depew v. Trustees o
f
W. and E
. Canal, 5 Ind. 8
;
Wood
burn v. Kilbourne Manuf. Co., 1 Bis
sell, 546; s. c. 1 Abb. U. S. 158;
Hinchman v. Patterson, &c. R. R.
Co., 2 Green (N. J.) 75; Stoughton
c. State, 5 Wis. 291.
* See Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c.
R
.
R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; Roush v.
Walter, 10 Watts, 86; Parker v. Cut
ler Mill Dam Co., 7 Shep. 353; Zim
merman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. &
S
. 346; Depew v. Trustees o
f W. and
E
. Canal, 5 Ind. 8.
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same power of regulating the speed and general conduct of ships
or other vessels navigating its water highways, that it has to reg
ulate the speed and conduct of persons and vehicles upon the
ordinary highway; subject always to the restriction that its reg
ulations must not come in conflict with any regulations estab
lished by Congress for the foreign commerce or that between the
States."
Levees and Drains. Where, under legislative authority, the
construction of levees and embankments is required, to protect
from overflow and destruction considerable tracts of country,
assessments are commonly levied for the purpose on the owners
of lands lying on or near the streams or bodies of water from
which the danger is anticipated. But if the construction should
be imposed as a duty upon residents or property owners in the
neighborhood, that they should turn out periodically or in emer
gencies, and give personal attention and labor to the construction
of the necessary defences against overflow and inundation, it is
not perceived that there could be any difficulty in supporting
such a regulation as one of police, or of resting it upon the same
foundations which sustain the regulations in cities, by which
duties are imposed on the occupants of buildings to take certain
precautions against fires, not for their own protection exclusively,
but for the protection of the general public.” Laws imposing on
the owners the duty of draining large tracts of land which in
their natural condition are unproductive, and are a source of dan
ger to health, may be enacted under the same power,” though in
general the taxing power is employed for the purpose; * and
sometimes land is appropriated under the eminent domain.”
1 People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469 ;
People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470. As to the
right to regulate fisheries in navigable
waters, see Gentile v. State, 29 Ind.
409; Phipps v. State, 22 Md. 380;
People v. Reed, 47 Barb. 235.
* Cooley on Taxation, 401, 402.
See State v. Newark, 27 N. J. 185,
194, per Elmer, J.; Crowley r. Cop
ley, 2 La. Ann. 390. In Pennsylvania
it has been held that the State cannot,
as a measure of police, compel the
owner of lands bounded on inland
tide-water to construct embankments
to exclude the natural flow of the
water, but that where the State con
structs them at its own expense, and
leaves them in possession of the owner,
it may impose on him the duty of re
pair. Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn.
St. 80.
* See State v. City Council of
Charleston, 12 Rich. 702, 733.
* Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood
Co., 8 Ohio, N. s. 333; Sessions v.
Crunklinton, 20 Ohio, N. s. 349;
Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27
Mo. 495; McGeehee v. Mathis, 21
Ark. 40; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La.
Ann. 220; Scuffletown Fence Co. v.
McAllister, 12 Bush, 312.
* Commissioners empowered to
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Regulation of Civil Rights and Privileges. Congress, to give
full effect to the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitu
tion, passed an act in 1875, which provided that a
ll persons within
the jurisdiction o
f
the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment o
f
the accommodations, advantages, facili
ties, and privileges o
f inns, public conveyances on land and
water, theatres and other places o
f public amusement, subject
only to the conditions and limitations established b
y law, and
applicable alike to citizens o
f every race and color, regardless o
f
any previous condition o
f
servitude." As the general power of
police is in the States, and not in the federal government, the
power o
f Congress to make so sweeping a provision may possibly
b
e brought in question; but as the States have undoubted right
to legislate for the purpose o
f securing impartiality in the ac
commodations afforded by innkeepers and common carriers, and
a
s the proprietors o
f
theatres and other places o
f public amuse
ment are always subject to the license and regulation o
f
the law,
a corresponding enactment by the State would seem to be com
petent, and has been sustained as a proper regulation o
f police.”
Regulation o
f
Business Charges. LIn the early days o
f
the com
mon law it was sometimes thought necessary, in order to prevent
extortion, to interfere, b
y
royal proclamation o
r otherwise, and
establish the charges that might be exacted for certain com
modities o
r
services. The price o
f wages was oftener regulated
than that o
f any thing else, the local magistrates being generally
allowed to exercise authority over the subject. The practice was
followed in this country, and prevailed to some extent u
p
to the
time o
f independence. Since then it has been commonly sup
posed that a general power in the State to regulate prices was
inconsistent with constitutional liberty. It has nevertheless been
conceded that in some cases this might b
e done, and the question
o
f
the bounds to legislative power has recently been made prom
inent in what are known as the Chicago Warehouse Cases. The
legislature o
f Illinois, on the supposition that warehouse charges
a
t Chicago were excessive and unfair, undertook to limit them to
a maximum. They also required warehousemen to take out
straighten a river to protect a country against the public. Green v. Swift,
against inundation are not liable per- 47 Cal. 536.
sonally for incidental injuries to indi- * Laws o
f 1875, c. 114.
viduals. Neither is there any claim * Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661.
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licenses and observe various regulations, which are not important
here, and imposed certain penalties for a refusal to observe the
statute. The validity of the legislation was affirmed by the State
court, which overruled various objections made on constitutional
grounds, among which was, that in effect it deprived warehouse
men of their property without due process of law. The ware
housemen denied wholly the right of the legislature to prescribe
charges for private services or for the use of private property, and
it was urged by them that, if admitted at all, no bounds could
be set to it
.
The court, in sustaining the power, placed it upon
the same ground with the right to regulate the charges o
f hack
men, draymen, public ferrymen, and public millers." The case
being removed to the federal Supreme Court, the decision o
f
the
State court was affirmed, and the principle fully approved. The
ground o
f
the decision appears to b
e
that the employment o
f
these warehousemen is a public or quasi public employment; that
their property in the business is “affected with a public interest,”
and thereby brought under that general power o
f
control which
the State possesses in the case o
f
other public employments.
Says Mr. Chief Justice Waite: “Under these powers the govern
ment regulates the conduct o
f
it
s
citizens one towards another,
and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when
such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their
exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial,
and in this country from it
s
first colonization, to regulate ferries,
common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, &c., and
in so doing to fi
x
a maximum o
f charge to be made for services ren
dered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day
statutes are to be found in many o
f
the States upon some o
r all
these subjects, and we think it has never yet been successfully
contended that such legislation came within any o
f
the constitu
tional prohibitions against interference with private property.””
Some o
f
the cases here referred to seem plain enough. Ferries
are public highways, and when individuals are permitted to es
tablish them, they are allowed the sovereign prerogative o
f
charging and collecting tolls; and tolls can never be taken except
b
y
permission o
f
the State, which generally ought to and does
1 Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80. In * Munn v. Illinois, 94 U
.
S
. Rep.
this case, Justices McAllister and Scott 113, 125. In this case, Justices Field
dissented. and Strong dissented.
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prescribe their limits. A hackman exercises a public employment
in the public streets; one which affords peculiar opportunities for
impositions and frauds, and requires special supervision, insomuch
that it is commonly thought necessary to prohibit one making
himself such except with permission of the State, and the num
ber is sometimes limited so as in effect to give special privileges.
The rates of toll, when mills grind for toll, is usually fixed by law;
but there is nothing exclusive in this: the parties may make their
own bargains, and the legislative rate only controls where the
parties by implication have apparently acted in reference to it
.
In
England, formerly, the lords o
f manors, as mill-owners, had ex
clusive rights; and where an exclusive right exists in one's favor,
to compel the public to deal with him, we should have no doubt
o
f
the right in the State to compel him to deal fairly with the
public. Such a right existed in the English warehouse case o
f
Allnutt v. Inglis," in which the Court of King's Bench denied the
right o
f
the warehousemen to fi
x their own charges at discretion,
when the public, under exclusive privileges conferred upon them,
were compelled to deal with them.”
What circumstances shall affect property with a public interest
is not very clear. The mere fact that the public have an inter
est in the existence o
f
the business, and are accommodated by it
,
cannot be sufficient, for that would subject the stock o
f
the mer
chant, and his charges, to public regulation. The public have
a
n interest in every business in which an individual offers his
wares, his merchandise, his services, or his accommodations to the
public ; but his offer does not place him at the mercy o
f
the pub
lic in respect to charges and prices. If one is permitted to take
1 1
2 East, 527. the price o
f
bread we should suppose
* In Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80,
91, Chief Justice Breese, in speaking
o
f
the power to “make al
l
needful
rules and regulations respecting the
use and enjoyment o
f property,’” speaks
of familiar instances in which the
exercise of it in the State has been
unquestioned, and among them, “ in
delegating power to municipal bodies
to regulate charges o
f
hackmen and
draymen, and the weight and price o
f
bread.” Regulating the weight o
f
bread is common, and necessary to
prevent imposition; but regulating
would now meet with such resistance
anywhere, as would require a distinct
determination upon its constitutional
rightfulness. How the baker can
have the price o
f
that which he sells
prescribed for him, and not the mer
chant o
r
the day-laborer, is not appar
ent. Indeed, to admit the power
seems to render necessary the recog
nition o
f
the principle that there is
and can b
e no limit to legislative
interference but such as legislative
discretion from time to time may
prescribe.
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upon himself a public employment, with special privileges which
only the State can confer upon him, the case is clear enough ;
and it seems to have been the view of both courts in this case,
that the circumstances were such as to give the warehousemen in
Chicago, who were the only persons affected by the legislation,
a “virtual’’ monopoly of the business of receiving and forward
ing the grain of the country to and from that important point,
and by the very fact of monopoly to give their business a public
character, affect the property in it with a public interest, and
render regulation of charges indispensable."
The phrase “affected with a public interest” has been brought
into recent discussions from the treatise De Portibus Maris of Lord
Hale, where the important passage is as follows: “A man for his
own private advantage may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or
crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree
fo
r
cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; fo
r
h
e doth no more
than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most o
f
his
own. If the king or subject have a public wharf unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade
their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharves
only licensed by the queen, o
r
because there is no other wharf
in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in
that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties
for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c., neither can they be enhanced
to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate, though settled b
y
the king's license o
r
charter. For
now the wharf, crane, and other conveniences are affected with a
public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only ; as if a
man set out a street in new building on his own land; it is now
n
o longer bare private interest, but is affected b
y
a public in
terest.”
If the case of a street thrown open to the public is an apt
* See what is said by Breese, Ch.
J., in 69 Ill. 88–89, and by Waite,
Ch. J., in 94 U. S. Rep. 131. In
Attorney-General v. Chicago, &c.
R. R
. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 589, Chief
Justice Ryan, in his very able opinion
affirming the right to fix railroad
charges by amendment to charters
which reserved the power o
f
amend
ment, intimated decided views in
favor o
f
the authority under the gen
eral power o
f police. That right
would probably be claimed on the
ground that railroads receive special
privileges from the State; the emi
nent domain being always employed
in their favor, and sometimes the
power o
f
taxation.
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illustration of the public interest Lord Hale had in mind, the
interest is very manifest. It will be equally manifest in the case,
of the wharf, if it is borne in mind that the title to the soil
under navigable water in England is in the Crown, and that
wharves can only be erected by express or implied license, and
can only be made available by making use of this public property
in the soil. If
,
then, b
y public permission, one is making use o
f
the public property, and he chances to be the only one with
whom the public can deal in respect to the use o
f
that property,
it seems entirely reasonable to say that his business is affected
with a public interest which requires him to deal with the public
on reasonable terms.
In the following cases we should say that property in business
was affected with a public interest: 1. Where the business is
one the following o
f
which is not o
f right, but is permitted b
y
the State as a privilege or franchise. Under this head would be
comprised the business o
f setting up lotteries, o
f giving shows,
&c., o
f keeping billiard-tables for hire, and o
f selling intoxicating
drinks when the sale by unlicensed parties is forbidden; also
the cases o
f toll-bridges, &c. 2. Where the State, on public
grounds, renders to the business special assistance, b
y
taxation o
r
otherwise. 3. Where, for the accommodation o
f
the business,
some special use is allowed to be made o
f public property o
r o
f
a
public easement. 4. Where exclusive privileges are granted in
consideration o
f
some special return to be made to the public.
Possibly there may be other cases.
Miscellaneous Cases. It would be quite impossible to enumer
ate a
ll
the instances in which police power is or may be exercised,
because the various cases in which the exercise b
y
one individual
o
f
his rights may conflict with a similar exercise b
y
others, o
r may
b
e
detrimental to the public order o
r safety, are infinite in num
ber and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes
necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control
by individuals o
f
their property, and even to destroy it
,
where
the owners themselves have fully observed a
ll
their duties to their
fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some control
ling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A
strong instance o
f
this description is where it becomes necessary
to take, use, or destroy the private property o
f
individuals to pre
vent the spreading o
f
a fire, the ravages o
f
a pestilence, the advance
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of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity."
Here the individual is in no degree in * fault, but his [* 595]
interest must yield to that “necessity" which “knows
no law.” The establishment of limits within the denser portions
of cities and villages, within which buildings constructed of in
flammable materials shall not be erected or repaired, may also, in
some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property;
but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwith
standing this result.” Wharf lines may also be established for the
general good, even though they prevent the owners of water
fronts from building out on that which constitutes private prop
erty.” And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the
protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or
sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect
under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the
soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are only “a
just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature
have authority” to impose.”
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,
where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the
owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable
has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health
or the public safety. Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon
this ground;" and churchyards which prove, in the advance of
stances.1 Saltpetre Case, 12 Coke, 13;
Mayor, &c. of New York v. Lord,
18 Wend. 129; Russell v. Mayor, &c.
of New York, 2 Denio, 461 ; Sorocco
v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69; Hale v. Law
rence, 1 Zab. 714; American Print
Works v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 248;
Meeker v. Wan Rensselaer, 15 Wend.
397; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn.
38; Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn.
St. 80; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 756–
759. And see Jones v. Richmond,
18 Grat. 517, for a case where the
municipal authorities purchased and
took possession of the liquor of a
city about to be occupied by a cap
turing military force, and destroyed
it to prevent the disorders that might
be anticipated from free access to in
toxicating drinks under the circum
And as to appropriation by
military authorities, see Harmony v.
Mitchell, 1 Blatch. 549; s. c. in error,
13 How. 115.
* Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates,
493; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 3 Fairf.
403; Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co.,
11 Mich. 425; Vanderbilt v. Adams,
7 Cow. 352, per Woodworth, J.
* Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush.
53. See Hart v. Mayor, &c. of Al
bany, 9 Wend. 571.
* Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11
Met. 55. A statute which prohibited
the having in possession of game birds
after a certain time, though killed
within the lawful time, was sustained
in Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 10.
* Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175.
And offensive manufactures may be
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urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in
danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use
for cemetery purposes." The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe
quantities in cities or villages;” the sale of poisonous drugs,
unless labelled ; allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when
danger of hydrophobia is apprehended ; * or the keeping
[* 596] for sale unwholesome * provisions, or other deleterious
substances, – are all subject to be forbidden under this
power. And, generally, it may be said that each State has com
plete authority to provide for the abatement o
f nuisances, whether
they exist b
y
the fault o
f
individuals or not,” and even though in
their origin they may have been permitted or licensed b
y
law.”
The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to
legislative supervision, which may forbid the keeping, exhibition,
stopped. Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb.
64. See League v. Journeay, 26
Tex. 172; ante, p
.
*584, and cases cited
in note.
1 Brick Presbyterian Church v.
Mayor, &c. o
f
New York, 5 Cow.
538; Coates v
. Mayor, &c. o
f
New
York, 7 Cow. 604; Kincaid's Appeal,
6
6 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep.
377. As to the general power of reg
ulation o
f places o
f burial, see Wood
lawn Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass.
354; Lake View v. Rose Hill Ceme
tery Co., 70 Ill. 191. And see ante,
p
. *584, note.
* Foote v. Fire Department, 5 Hill,
99; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Geo. 509.
And see License Cases, 5 How. 589,
per McLean, J.; Fisher v. McGirr, 1
Gray, 27, per Shaw, Ch. J.
* Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373;
Washington v. Meigs, 1 McArthur,
53. Dogs, which are animals in which
the owner has n
o
absolute property,
are subject to such regulations as the
legislature may prescribe, and it is
not unconstitutional to authorize their
destruction, without previous adjudi
cation, when found a
t large without
being licensed and collared according
to the statutory regulation. Blair v.
Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. And see
Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Morey
v
. Brown, supra. As a measure o
f
internal police, the State has the
power to encourage the keeping o
f
sheep, and to discourage the keeping
o
f dogs, by imposing a penalty upon
the owner o
f
a dog for keeping the
same. Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind.
62. A law prohibiting the bringing
of Texas and Cherokee cattle into the
State, because o
f
the tendency to com
municate a dangerous and fatal disease
to other cattle, was sustained in Yeazel
v
. Alexander, 58 lll. 254. It has since,
however, been questioned, and in
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U
.
S
. Rep. 485,
such an act was held to be an invasion
o
f
the power o
f Congress over inter
state commerce.
* See Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt.
175; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis.
242; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass.
315. But under this power it would
not be competent for a city to tax a
lot owner for the expense of abating
a nuisance on his lot which the city
itself had created. Weeks v
. Mil
waukee, 10 Wis. 242. See Barring v.
Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 05.
* See cases o
f repealing licenses,
ante, p
.
*283 and note.
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or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction
if seized ; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that
may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming; * or forbid alto
gether the keeping of implements made use of for unlawful
games; or prevent the keeping and exhibition of stallions in
public places.”
So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed
to be sold in particular places only,” or after license ; * weights
and measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform
to the fixed standards under penalty,” and persons following par
ticular occupations of a nature requiring special public supervi
sion, such as auctioneers, draymen, hackmen, hucksters, victuallers,
and the like, are required to take out licenses, and to conform to
such rules and regulations as are deemed important for the public
convenience and protection.”
1 Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5
Hill, 121; Commonwealth v. Colton,
8 Gray, 488; State v. Hay, 29 Me.
457; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426.
* Nolin c. Mayor of Franklin, 4
Yerg. 163. A city may forbid the
keeping of swine within its densely
settled portions. Commonwealth v.
Patch, 97 Mass. 221. Or slaughter
houses. Watertown v. Mayo, 109
Mass. 315. Compare Blydenburg v.
Miles, 39 Conn. 485. Or any other
business noxious or dangerous to the
public or any portion thereof. Tay
lor v. State, 35 Wis. 298.
* In Louisana it has been held com
petent to prohibit private markets
within a certain distance of the pub
lic market. New Orleans v. Stafford,
27 La. Ann. 417.
* Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168;
Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99;
Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash
v. People, 11 Mich. 347; State v.
Leiber, 11 Iowa, 407; Le Claire v.
Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White v.
Kent, 11 Ohio, N. s. 550; Green
v. Carson, 10 Bush, 64. The power
is continuing, and markets once es
tablished may be changed at the
option of the authorities, and they
These instances are more than
cannot even by contract deprive them
selves of this power. Gale v. Kala
mazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Gall v. Cincin
nati, 18 Ohio, N. s. 563; Cougot v.
New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 21. A
constitutional provision forbidding the
General Assembly granting “ to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges
or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens,” does not preclude the li
censing of the sale of intoxicating
drinks by males only. Blair v. Kil
patrick, 40 Ind. 315.
* Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La.
Ann. 432; Page v. Fazackerly, 36
Barb. 392; Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1
Jones, L. 49; Gaines v. Coates, 51
Miss. 335; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 323,
324, and cases cited.
* Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2
Cush. 562; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis.
428; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 12; Dillon,
Mun. Corp. §§ 291–296. As to li
cense fees, and when they are taxes,
see ante, pp. *201, *495; Mayor, &c.
of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The
sale of pure milk and pure water
mixed may be made a penal offence.
Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen,
264. As to market regulations in
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sufficient to illustrate the pervading nature of this power, and
we need not weary the reader with further enumeration. Many
of them have been previously referred to under the head of
municipal by-laws.
-
-
Whether the prohibited act or omission shall be made a crimi
nal offence, punishable under the general laws, or subject to pun
ishment under municipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party
be deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the regu
lation, he might have had against other persons, are questions
which the legislature must decide. It is sufficient for us to have
pointed out that, in addition to the power to punish misdemeanors
and felonies, the State has also the authority to make extensive
and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and circumstances
in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or exercise their
rights without coming in conflict with any of those constitutional
principles which are established for the protection of private
rights or private property."
general, see Wartman v. Philadel
phia, 33 Penn. St. 202; Spaulding v.
Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Gall v. Cincin
nati, 18 Ohio, N. s. 563; Municipal
ity v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335; State
v. Fisher, 52 Mo. 174. In District of
Columbia v. Saville, 1 McArthur, 581,
an act to regulate the sale of seats
at exhibitions was held invalid as a
vexatious interference with rights of
private property. Dillon, Mun. Corp.
§§ 313–318.
* That the legislature may regulate
and limit the hours of labor of women
and children in manufacturing estab
lishments, see Commonwealth v. Ham
ilton Manufacturing Co., 120 Mass.
383.
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* CHAPTER XVII. [* 598)
THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.
ALTHOUGH by their constitutions the people have delegated
the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they
have not thereby devested themselves of the sovereignty. They
retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful
to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the
three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered,
directed, changed, or abolished by them. But this control and
direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously
agreed upon. The voice of the people, in their sovereign capac
ity, can only be of legal force when expressed at the times and
under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and
pointed out by the constitution, or which, consistently with the
constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by
statute ; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an
attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of
the agencies of government at any other time or in any other
mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or
statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be
resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, rep
resent legitimate government."
* “The maxim which lies at the
foundation of our government is that
all political power originates with the
people. But since the organization of
government it cannot be claimed that
either the legislative, executive, or
judicial powers, either wholly or in
part, can be exercised by them. By
the institution of government, the
people surrender the exercise of all
these sovereign functions of govern
ment to agents chosen by themselves,
who at least theoretically represent
the supreme will of their constituents.
Thus all power possessed by the peo
ple themselves is given and centred
in their chosen representatives.”
Davis, Ch. J., in Gibson v. Mason,
5 Nev. 291. See Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1.
Under some of the constitutions
certain votes can only be carried by a
majority of the electors voting favor
ably. This must be understood to
mean a majority of those voting at
the election on any question then sub
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The authority of the people is exercised through elections, by
means of which they choose legislative, executive, and judicial
officers, to whom are to be intrusted the exercise of powers of
government. In some cases also they pass upon other questions
specially submitted to them, and adopt or reject a measure ac
cording as a majority may vote for or against it
. It is obviously
impossible that any considerable people should in general meeting
consider, mature, and adopt their own laws; but when a law has
been perfected, and it is deemed desirable to take the expression
o
f public sentiment upon it
,
o
r upon any other single question,
the ordinary machinery o
f
elections is adequate to the end, and
the expression is easily and without confusion obtained b
y
sub
mitting such law or such question for an affirmative or negative
vote. In this manner constitutions and amendments thereof are
adopted o
r rejected, and matters o
f
local importance in many
cases, such as the location o
f
a county seat, the contracting o
f
a
local debt, the erection o
f
a public building, the acceptance o
f
a
municipal charter, and the like, are passed upon and
[* 599] determined b
y
the people whom they concern, “under
constitutional o
r statutory provisions which require o
r
permit it
.
The Right to participate in Elections.
In another place we have said that, though the sovereignty is
in the people, as a practical fact it resides in those persons who
b
y
the constitution o
f
the State are permitted to exercise the
elective franchise." The whole subject o
f
the regulation o
f elec
tions, including the prescribing o
f qualifications for suffrage, is
left b
y
the national Constitution to the several States, except as
it is provided by that instrument that the electors for representa
tives in Congress shall have the qualifications requisite for elec
tors o
f
the most numerous branch o
f
the State legislature,” and a
s
mitted to them. Taylor v. Taylor,
1
0 Minn. 107. Compare Gillespie v.
Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; State v. Mayor,
Spear, in 16 Albany Law Journal,
272, in which, among other things, the
force and scope o
f
the new amend
&c., 37 Mo. 270; State v. Binder,
3
8 Mo. 450; Bayard v. Klinge,
1
6 Minn. 249; Dunnovan v. Green, 57
Ill. 63.
* Ante, p
.
*29. See article by Dr.
ments to the federal Constitution in
their relation to suffrage are con
sidered.
* Art. 1
,
§ 2.
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the fifteenth amendment forbids denying to citizens the right to
vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Participation in the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a
right, and it is granted or denied on grounds of general policy :
the prevailing view being that it should be as general as possible
consistent with the public safety. Aliens are generally excluded,
though in some States they are allowed to vote after residence for
a specified period, provided they have declared their intention to
become citizens in the manner prescribed by law. The fifteenth
amendment, it will be seen, does not forbid denying the franchise
to citizens except upon certain specified grounds, and it is mat
ter of public history that it
s purpose was to prevent discrimi
nations in this regard as against persons o
f
African descent.
Minors, who equally with adult persons are citizens, are still ex
cluded, as are also women," and sometimes persons who have
been convicted of infamous crimes.” In some States laws will be
found in existence which, either generally o
r
in particular cases,
deny the right to vote to those persons who lack a specified prop
erty qualification, or who do not pay taxes. In some States idiots
and lunatics are also expressly excluded; and it has been sup
posed that these unfortunate classes, by the common political law
o
f England and o
f
this country, were excluded with women, mi
nors, and aliens from exercising the right o
f suffrage, even though
not prohibited therefrom b
y
any express constitutional o
r statu
tory provision.” Wherever the constitution has prescribed the
* See Opinions o
f Justices, 62 Me. Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
596; Rohrbacher v. Mayor o
f Jack
son, 51 Miss. 735; Spencer v. Board
o
f Registration, 1 McArthur, 169; Van
Walkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43;
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.
* Story on Const. (4th ed.) $ 1972.
* See Cushing's Legislative As
semblies, § 24. Also $ 27, and notes
referring to legislative cases. Mc
Crary, Law of Elections, $$ 50, 73.
Drunkenness is regarded as tempo
rary insanity. Ibid. Idiots and
insane persons are excluded in
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Dela
ware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Mary
land (provided they are under
guardianship as such), Minnesota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Convicted felons
are excluded in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Ken
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minne
sota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Persons
under guardianship are excluded in
Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachu
setts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. Paupers are excluded
in Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and West
48
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qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to by
the legislature," or otherwise than by an amendment of the con
stitution.
One of the most common requirements is
,
that the party offer
ing to vote shall reside within the district which is to be affected
b
y
the exercise o
f
the right. If a State officer is to be chosen,
the voter should b
e
a resident o
f
the State; and if a county, city,
o
r township officer, he should reside within such county, city, o
r
township. This is the general rule ; and for the more convenient
determination o
f
the right to vote, and to prevent fraud, it is now
generally required that the elector shall only exercise
[* 600] within the municipality where he has * his residence his
right to participate in either local or general elections.
Requiring him to vote among his neighbors, b
y
whom h
e will be
likely to be generally known, the opportunities for illegal or fraud
ulent voting will be less than if the voting were allowed to take
place a
t
a distance and among strangers. . And wherever this is
the requirement o
f
the constitution, any statute permitting voters
to deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.”
Virginia. Persons kept in any poor
house o
r
other asylum a
t public ex
pense are excluded in California,
Colorado, Missouri, and South Caro
lina. Persons confined in public
prisons are excluded in California,
Colorado, Missouri, and South Caro
lina. Persons under interdiction are
excluded in Louisiana; and persons
excused from paying taxes a
t
their own
request, in New Hampshire. Capacity
to read is required in Connecticut;
and capacity to read and write, in
Massachusetts.
1 See Green v. Shumway, 39 N
.
Y.
418; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1
;
Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485; Huber v.
Reiley, 53 Penn. St. 112; ante, p
.
*64,
note; People v. Canaday, 73 N
.
C
.
198. Compare State v. Neal, 42 Mo.
119. Where a disqualification to vote
is made to depend upon the commis
sion o
f crime, the election officers can
not be made the triers of the offence.
Huber v. Reiley, supra; State v.
Symonds, 59 Me. 151; Burkett v.
McCarty, 10 Bush, 758.
* Opinions o
f Judges, 30 Conn.
591; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Penn. St.
396; Chase v. Miller, 41 Penn. St. 403;
Opinions o
f Judges, 44 N
.
H
. 633;
Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 ;
People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127 ;
Opinions o
f Judges, 37 Vt. 665; Day
v
. Jones, 31 Cal. 261. The case o
f
Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304,
is not in harmony with those above
cited. So far as the election o
f rep
resentatives in Congress and electors
o
f president and vice-president is con
cerned, the State constitutions cannot
preclude the legislature from prescrib
ing the “times, places, and manner
o
f holding ” the same, as allowed by
the national Constitution, — art. 1
,
§ 4
,
and art. 2
,
§ 1
, - and a statute
permitting such election to be held
out o
f
the State would consequently
not be invalid. Opinions o
f Justices,
4
5 N
.
H
.
595; Opinions o
f Judges,
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A person's residence is the place of his domicile, or the place
where his habitation is fixed without any present intention of
removing therefrom." The words “inhabitant,” “citizen,” and
“resident,” as employed in different constitutions to define the
qualifications of electors, mean substantially the same thing ;
and one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where
he has his domicile or home.” Every person at all times must be
considered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he
has acquired at one place is considered as continuing until an
other is acquired at a different place. It has been held that a
student in an institution of learning, who has residence there fo
r
purposes o
f instruction, may vote at such place, provided he is
emancipated from his father's family, and for the time has no
home elsewhere.”
37 Wt. 665. There are now constitu
tional provisions in New York, Mich
igan, Missouri, Connecticut, Mary
land, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada,
Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania,
which permit soldiers in actual ser
vice to cast their votes where they
may happen to be stationed a
t
the
time o
f voting. It may also be al
lowed in Ohio. Lehman v. McBride,
15 Ohio, N
.
s. 573.
* Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass.
488; Rue High's Case, 2 Doug.
(Mich.) 523; Fry's Election Case,
7
1 Penn. St. 302; s. c. 10 Am. Rep.
698; Church v. Rowell, 49 Me. 367;
Littlefield v. Brooks, 50 Me. 475;
Parsons v. Bangor, 61 Me. 457; Ar
nold v. Davis, 8 R
.
I. 341; Dale v.
Irwin, 78 Ill. 170; Story, Confl.
Laws, $ 43.
* Cushing's Law and Practice o
f
Legislative Assemblies, § 36.
* Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass.
488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass.
350; Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 99
Mass. 587; Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170.
A different conclusion is arrived at in
Pennsylvania. Fry's Election Case,
7
1 Penn. 302. “The questions of
residence, inhabitancy, o
r
domicile —
for although not in al
l
respects pre
cisely the same, they are nearly so,
Temporary absence from one's home, with
and depend much upon the same evi
dence — are attended with more diffi
culty than almost any other which
are presented for adjudication. No
exact definition can be given o
f domi
cile; it depends upon no one fact or
combination o
f circumstances; but,
from the whole taken together, it
must be determined in each particu
lar case. It is a maxim that every
man must have a domicile some
where, and also that he can have but
one. Of course, it follows that his
existing domicile continues until he
acquires another; and rice versa, by
acquiring a new domicile he relin
quishes his former one. From this
view it is manifest that very slight
circumstances must often decide the
question. It depends upon the pre
ponderance o
f
the evidence in favor
o
f
two o
r
more places; and it may
often occur that the evidence of facts
tending to establish the domicile in
one place would be entirely conclu
sive, were it not for the existence o
f
facts and circumstances of a still
more conclusive and decisive char
acter, which fix it beyond question
in another. So, on the contrary,
very slight circumstances may fix
one's domicile, if not controlled by
more conclusive facts fixing it in an
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continuous intention to return, will not deprive one of his resi
dence, even though it extend through a series of years."
[* 601] * Conditions to the Evercise of the Elective Franchise.
While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitu
tional qualifications of electors, it must nevertheless devolve upon
that body to establish such regulations as will enable all persons
other place. If a seaman, without
family or property, sails from the
place of his nativity, which may be
considered his domicile of origin,
although he may return only at long
intervals, or even be absent many
years, yet if he does not by some
actual residence or other means ac
quire a domicile elsewhere, he retains
his domicile of origin.” Shaw, Ch.
J., Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1
Met. 245. And see Alston v. New
comer, 42 Miss. 186. In Inhabitants
of Abington v. Inhabitants of North
Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, it ap
peared that a town line ran through
the house occupied by a party, leav
ing a portion on one side sufficient to
form a habitation, and a portion on
the other not sufficient for that pur
pose. Held, that the domicile must
be deemed to be on the side first men
tioned. It was intimated also that
where a house was thus divided, and
the party slept habitually on one side,
that circumstance should be regarded
as a preponderating one to fi
x
his
residence there, in the absence o
f
other proof. And see Rex v. St.
Olave's, 1 Strange, 51.
By the constitutions o
f
several o
f
the States, it is provided, in sub
stance, that n
o person shall be deemed
to have gained o
r
lost a residence by
reason o
f
his presence o
r absence,
while employed in the service o
f
the
United States; nor while a student in
any seminary o
f learning; nor while
kept a
t any almshouse o
r asylum a
t
public expense; nor while confined in
any public prison. See Const. o
f
New York, Illinois, Indiana, Cali
fornia, Michigan, Rhode Island, Min
nesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. In several of the
other States there are provisions cov
ering some o
f
these cases, but not all.
A provision that no person shall be
deemed to have gained o
r
lost a resi
dence by reason o
f
his presence or
absence in the service of the United
States, does not preclude one from
acquiring a residence in the place
where, and in the time while, he is
present in such service. People r.
Holden, 28 Cal. 123. If a man takes
up his permanent abode a
t
the place
o
f
an institution o
f learning, the fact
o
f
his entering it as a student will not
preclude his acquiring a legal resi
dence there; but if he is domiciled at
the place for the purposes o
f instruc
tion only, it is deemed proper and
right that he should neither lose his
former residence nor gain a new one
in consequence thereof.
That persons residing upon lands
within a State, but set apart for some
national purpose, and subjected to the
exclusive jurisdiction o
f
the United
States, are not voters, see Opinions
o
f Judges, 1 Met. 580; Sinks r. Reese,
1
9 Ohio, N
.
s. 306; McCrary, Law of
Elections, $ 29.
* Harbaugh v. Cicotte, 33 Mich.
241; Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn.
St. 302.
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entitled to the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and ex
clude a
ll
who are not entitled from improper participation therein.
For this purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of
conducting them and o
f ascertaining the result, are prescribed,
and heavy penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote ille
gally, or instigate others to do so, o
r
who shall attempt to pre
clude a fair election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and
indeed the necessity, o
f
such regulations are undisputed. In some
o
f
the States it has also been regarded as important that lists o
f
voters should be prepared before the day o
f election, in which
should be registered the name o
f every person qualified to vote.
Under such a regulation, the officers whose duty it is to admin
ister the election laws are enabled to proceed with more delibera
tion in the discharge o
f
their duties, and to avoid the haste and
confusion that must attend the determination upon election day
o
f
the various and sometimes difficult questions concerning the
right o
f
individuals to exercise this important franchise. Elec
tors, also, b
y
means o
f
this registry, are notified in advance what
persons claim the right to vote, and are enabled to make the
necessary examination to determine whether the claim is well
founded, and to exercise the right o
f challenge if satisfied any
person registered is unqualified. When the constitution has es
tablished n
o
such rule, and is entirely silent on the subject, it has
sometimes been claimed that the statute requiring voters to be
registered before the day o
f election, and excluding from the
right all whose names do not appear upon the list, was unconsti
tutional and void, as adding another test to the qualifica
tions o
f
electors which the constitution * has prescribed, [* 602]
and as having the effect, where electors are not registered,
to exclude from voting persons who have a
n
absolute right to
that franchise b
y
the fundamental law." This position, however,
has not been generally accepted as sound b
y
the courts. The
provision for a registry deprives no one o
f
his right, but is only
a reasonable regulation under which the right may be exercised.”
* See Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. * Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485;
338. The Supreme Court of Penn- People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342;
sylvania held the contrary in Patter- State v. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State v.
son v. Barlow, 60 Penn. St. 54, which Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; State v. Ba
case is in harmony with those cited in ker, 38 Wis. 71; Byler v. Asher, 47
the next note. Ill. 101; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28
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Such regulations must always have been within the power of the
legislature, unless forbidden. Many resting upon the same prin
ciple are always prescribed, and have never been supposed to be
open to objection. Although the constitution provides that all
male citizens twenty-one years of age and upwards shall be en
titled to vote, it would not be seriously eontended that a statute
which should require a
ll
such citizens to g
o
to the established
place for holding the polls, and there deposit their ballots, and
not elsewhere, was a violation o
f
the constitution, because pre
scribing an additional qualification, namely, the presence o
f
the
elector a
t
the polls. All such reasonable regulations of the con
stitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the
preservation o
f
order in elections, to guard against fraud, undue
influence, and oppression, and to preserve the purity o
f
the ballot
box, are not only within the constitutional power o
f
the legisla
ture, but are commendable, and at least some o
f
them absolutely
essential. And where the law requires such a registry, and for
bids the reception o
f
votes from any persons not registered, an
election in a township where n
o
such registry has ever been made
will be void, and cannot be sustained b
y making proof that none
in fact but duly qualified electors have voted. It is no answer
that such a rule may enable the registry officers, by neglecting
their duty, to disfranchise the electors altogether; the remedy o
f
the electors is b
y
proceedings to compel the performance o
f
the
duty; and the statute, being imperative and mandatory, cannot
b
e disregarded." The danger, however, o
f any such misconduct
o
n
the part o
f
officers is comparatively small, when the duty is
intrusted to those who are chosen in the locality where the reg
istry is to be made, and who are consequently immediately re
sponsible to those who are interested in being registered.
All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be rea
sonable, uniform, and impartial; they must not have for their
Iowa, 270; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo.
450. As to the conclusiveness of the
registry, see Hyde v. Brush, 34 Conn.
454.
* People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich.
342; Zeiler v. Chapman, 54 Mo. 502;
Nefzger v. Davenport, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
36 Iowa, 642. The law does not be
come unconstitutional, because o
f
the
fact that, b
y
the neglect o
f
the officers
to attend to the registry, voters may
be disfranchised. Ibid. Emsworth
v
. Albin, 46 Mo. 450. But informal
ities in a registry will not vitiate it
,
and canvassers cannot reject votes
because o
f
them. State v. Baker,
3
8 Wis. 71. That a board o
f regis
tration has judicial functions, see
Fansler r. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 4S5;
s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 431.
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purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitu
tional right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its
exercise; if they do, they must be declared void."
In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities
may be requisite before any legal election can be held.
If an “election is one which a municipality may hold or [* 603]
not at its option, and the proper municipal authority de
cides against holding it
,
it is evident that individual citizens must
acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast b
y
them o
n
the
assumption o
f right must be altogether nugatory.” The same
would be true o
f
a
n election to b
e
held after proclamation for that
purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been
made.” Where, however, both the time and the place o
f
a
n elec
tion are prescribed b
y law, every voter has a right to take notice
o
f
the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place ap
pointed, notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give
notice o
f
the election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be
thus given is only additional to that which the statute itself gives,
and is prescribed for the purpose o
f greater publicity; but the
right to hold the election comes from the statute, and not from
the official notice. It has therefore been frequently held that
when a vacancy exists in an office, which the law requires shall
b
e filled a
t
the next general election, the time and place o
f
which
* Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 488;
Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N
.
s. 665.
ties thereto “shall not apply to clerks
o
r judges o
f
election for refusing to
Under the Constitution of Ohio, the
right o
f suffrage is guaranteed to
“white male citizens;” and by a long
series of decisions it was settled that
persons having a preponderance o
f
white blood were “white ” within its
meaning. It was also settled that
judges o
f
election were liable to an
action for refusing to receive the vote
o
f
a qualified elector. A legislature
unfriendly to the construction o
f
the
constitution above stated passed an
act which, while prescribing penalties
against judges o
f
election who should
refuse to receive or sanction the re
jection o
f
a ballot from any person,
knowing him to have the qualifica
tions o
f
an elector, concluded with
a proviso that the act and the penal
receive the votes o
f persons having
a distinct and visible admixture of
African blood, nor shall they be lia
ble to damages by reason o
f
such
rejection.” Other provisions o
f
the
act plainly discriminated against the
class o
f
voters mentioned, and it was
held to be clearly unreasonable, par
tial, calculated to subvert o
r impede
the exercise o
f
the right o
f suffrage
by this class, and therefore void.
Monroe v. Collins, supra.
* Opinions o
f Judges, 7 Mass. 525;
Opinions o
f Judges, 15 Mass. 537.
* People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; Mc
Kune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People
v
. Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones v. State,
1 Kan. 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.
588.
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are fixed, and that notice of the general election shall also specify
the vacancy to be filled, an election at that time and place to fill
the vacancy will be valid, notwithstanding the notice is not given;
and such election cannot be defeated by showing that a small
portion only of the electors were actually aware of the vacancy,
or cast their votes to fill it." But this would not be the case if
either the time or the place were not fixed by law, so that notice
became essential for that purpose.”
[*604] * The Manner of Erereising the Right.
The mode of voting in this country, at a
ll general elections, is
almost universally by ballot.”
* People v
. Cowles, 13 N
.
Y
.
350;
People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; State
v
. Jones, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hart
well, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith,
10 Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis.
235; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363.
The case o
f
Foster v. Scarff, 15
Ohio, N
.
s. 532, would seem to be
contra. A general election was to be
held, a
t
which b
y
law an existing
vacancy in the office o
f Judge of Pro
bate was required to be filled. The
sheriff, however, omitted all mention
o
f
this office in his notice o
f election,
and the voters generally were not
aware that a vacancy was to be filled.
Nominations were made for the other
offices, but none for this, but a can
didate presented himself for whom
less than a fourth o
f
the voters taking
part in the election cast ballots. It
was held that the election to fill the
vacancy was void.
* State v. Young, 4 Iowa, 561.
An act had been passed for the in
corporation o
f
the city o
f Washington,
and by its terms it was to be sub
mitted to the people on the 16th o
f
the following February, for their
acceptance o
r rejection, a
t
an election
to be called and holden in the same
manner as township elections under
the general law. The time o
f
notice
for the regular township elections
was, b
y
law, to be determined by the
“A ballot may be defined to be a
trustees, but for the first township
meeting fifteen days' notice was made
requisite An election was holden,
assumed to be under the act in ques
tion; but no notice was given of it
,
except b
y
the circulation, on the
morning o
f
the election, o
f
a
n extra
newspaper containing a notice that
a
n election would be held on that day
a
t
a specified place. It was held that
the election was void. The act con
templated some notice before any
legal vote could be taken, and that
which was given could not be con
sidered any notice a
t
all. This case
differs from all of those above cited,
where vacancies were to be filled at
a general election, and where the law
itself would give to the electors all
the information which was requisite.
In this case, although the time was
fixed, the place was not; and, if a
notice thus circulated on the morning
of election could be held sufficient, it
might well happen that the electors
generally would fail to be informed,
so that their right to vote might be
exercised. See also Barry v. Lauck,
5 Cold. 588. That where the law
provides for holding an election and
one is duly called, equity has no au
thority to enjoin it
,
see Walton v.
Develing, 61 Ill. 201.
* The ballot was also adopted in
England in 1872.
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piece of paper or other suitable material, with the name written
or printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the
suffrages are given in this form, each of the electors in person
deposits such a vote in the box, or other receptacle provided for
the purpose, and kept by the proper officers.” . The distinguish
ing feature of this mode of voting is
,
that every voter is thus
enabled to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable
secrecy in regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus
escape the influences which, under the system o
f
oral suffrages,
may be brought to bear upon him with a view to overbear and
intimidate, and thus prevent the real expression o
f public sen
timent.”
* In order to secure as perfectly as possible the benefits [* 605]
anticipated from this system, statutes have been passed,
in some of the States, which prohibit ballots being received or
counted unless the same are written or printed upon white paper,
without any marks or figures thereon intended to distinguish one
ballot from another.”
* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 103.
* “In this country, and indeed in
every country where officers are
elective, different modes have been
adopted for the electors to signify
their choice. The most common
modes have been either by voting
viva roce, that is
,
by the elector openly
naming the person he designates for
the office, or by ballot, which is de
positing in a box provided for the
purpose a paper on which is the name
o
f
the person h
e intends for the office.
The principal object of this last mode
is to enable the elector to express his
opinion secretly, without being sub
ject to be overawed, o
r
to any ill-will
o
r persecution on account o
f
his vote
for either of the candidates who may
be before the public. The method o
f
voting by tablets in Rome was an
example o
f
this manner o
f voting.
There certain officers appointed for
that purpose, called Diribitores, de
livered to each voter as many tablets
a
s
there were candidates, one o
f
whose
names was written upon every tablet.
The voter put into a chest prepared
These statutes are simply declaratory o
f
a
for that purpose which of these tab
lets he pleased, and they were after
wards taken out and counted. Cicero
defines tablets to be little billets, in
which the people brought their suf
frages. The clause in the constitution
directing the election o
f
the several
State officers was undoubtedly in
tended to provide that the election
should be made b
y
this mode o
f voting
to the exclusion o
f any other. In this
mode the freemen can individually
express their choice, without being
under the necessity o
f publicly de
claring the object o
f
their choice;
their collective voice can be easily
ascertained, and the evidence o
f it
transmitted to the place where their
votes are to be counted, and the result
declared with as little inconvenience
a
s possible.” Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt.
541. In this case it was held that a
printed ballot was within the meaning
o
f
the constitution which required all
ballots for certain State officers to be
“fairly written.” To the same effect
is Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312.
* See People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill.
762 [CH. xvii.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
constitutional principle that inheres in the system of voting by
ballot, and which ought to be inviolable whether declared or not.
500. In this case it was held that the
common lines on ruled paper did not
render the ballots void. See also
Druliner v. State, 29 Ind. 308, in
which it was decided that a caption
to the ticket folded inside was un
objectionable. To the same effect is
Millholland v. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363.
A ballot ought not to be rejected
because it differs from the regulations
prescribed by the code as to size,
paper, type. &c. Kirk v. Rhoads, 46
Cal. 398. The presiding officers of the
election are the sole judges of what is
a “ distinguishing mark” on a ballot,
where such a mark is forbidden ; and
ballots which they have received and
counted cannot be rejected after
wards by the Governor and Council.
Opinions of Judges, 45 Me. 602. In
Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 90, the
Supreme Court of Indiana declared
to be void the following enactment:
“It shall be the duty of the inspector
of any election held in this State, on
receiving the ballot of any voter, to
have the same numbered with figures,
on the outside or back thereof, to
correspond with the number placed
opposite the name of such voter on
the poll lists kept by the clerks of
said election.” Pettit, J., delivering
the opinion of the court, after quoting
several authorities, among others
Commonwealth v Woelper, 3 S. & R.
29; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45:
People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283;
Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535; and the
text above, says: “It is believed
that these authorities establish, be
yond doubt, that the ballot implies
absolute and inviolable secrecy, and
that the principle is founded in the
highest considerations of public pol
icy. When our present constitution
was framed, voting by ballot was in
vogue in nearly every State in the
Union. That mode of voting had
been known and understood for cen
turies. The term ballot, as desig
nating a mode of election, was then
well ascertained and clearly defined.
The eminent framers of the consti
tution certainly employed this term
with a full knowledge of its meaning.
Many of the most distinguished mem
bers of the constitutional convention
of 1850 were members of the legis
lature of 1852, the first that met
under the present constitution. That
they regarded the ballot system as
securing inviolable secrecy, is clearly
shown by the following law, which
they then helped to enact: ‘If any
judge, inspector, clerk, or other offi
cer of an election, shall open or mark,
by folding or otherwise, any ticket
presented by such elector at such
election, or attempt to find out the
names thereon, or suffer the same to
be done by any other person, before
such ticket is deposited in the ballot
box, he shall be fined in any sum
not exceeding one hundred dollars.”
2 G. & H. 473, sec. 60. If the con
stitution secures to the voter, in pop
ular elections, the protection and
immunity of secrecy, there can be no
doubt that section 2 of the act of
1869, which authorized the inspector
to number ballots, is clearly in con
flict with it and is void. I am not
unmindful of the rule that all doubts
are to be solved in favor of the consti
tutionality of legislative enactments.
This rule is well established, and is
founded in the highest wisdom. But
my convictions are clear that our con
stitution was intended to, and does,
secure the absolute secrecy of a bal
lot, and that the act in question,
which directs the numbering of tick
ets, to correspond with the numbers
opposite the names of the electors on
the poll lists, is in palpable conflict
not only with the spirit, but with the
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In the absence of such a statute, all devices by which party man
agers are enabled to distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter,
and thus determine whether he is voting for or against them, are
opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, inasmuch as they tend
to defeat the design for which voting by ballot is established, and,
though they may not render an election void, they are exceedingly
reprehensible, and ought to be discountenanced by a
ll good citi
zens. The system o
f ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every
elector is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and
with what party he pleases, and that no one is to have the right,
o
r
b
e
in position, to question his independent action, either then
o
r
a
t any subsequent time." The courts have held that a voter,
even in case o
f
a contested election, cannot be compelled to dis
close for whom he voted ; and for the same reason we think others
who may accidentally, or by trick o
r artifice, have acquired knowl
edge o
n
the subject should not be allowed to testify
* to such knowledge, o
r
to give any information in the [* 606]
courts upon the subject. Public policy requires that the
veil o
f secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself
voluntarily determines to lift it; * his ballot is absolutely privi
leged ; and to allow evidence o
f
its contents when he has not
waived the privilege, is to encourage trickery and fraud, and
would in effect establish this remarkable anomaly, that, while the
substance o
f
the constitutional pro- the ballot. The spirit of the system
vision. This act was intended to,
and does, clearly identify every man's
ticket, and renders it easy to ascertain
exactly how any particular person
voted. That secrecy which is es
teemed b
y
all authority to be essential
to the free exercise o
f suffrage, is as
much violated by this law as if it had
declared that the election should be
viva roce.”
* “The right to vote in this man
ner has usually been considered an
important and valuable safeguard o
f
the independence o
f
the humble citi
zen against the influence which wealth
and station might be supposed to ex
ercise. This object would be accom
plished but very imperfectly if the
privacy supposed to be secured was
limited to the moment o
f depositing
requires that the elector should be
secured then and at all times there
after against reproach o
r
animadver
sion, o
r any other prejudice on ac
count o
f having voted according to
his own unbiassed judgment; and
that security is made to consist in
shutting up within the privacy o
f
his
own mind all knowledge o
f
the man
ner in which he has bestowed his
suffrage.” Per Denio, Ch. J., in
People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81.
* “The ballot,” says Cicero, “is
dear to the people, for it uncovers
men's faces, and conceals their
thoughts. It gives them the oppor
tunity o
f doing what they like, and o
f
promising a
ll
that they are asked.”
Speech in defence o
f
Plaucius. For
syth's Cicero, Vol. I. p
.
339.
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law from motives of public policy establishes the secret ballot
with a view to conceal the elector's action, it at the same time
encourages a system of espionage, by means of which the veil of
secrecy may be penetrated and the voter's action disclosed to the
public."
Every ballot should be complete in itself, and ought not
to require extrinsic evidence to enable the election officer to
* See this subject fully considered
in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
And see also State v. Hilmantel, 23
Wis. 422. A very loose system pre
vails in the contests over legislative
elections, and it has been held that
when a voter refuses to disclose for
whom he voted, evidence is admissible
of the general reputation of the po
litical character of the voter, and as
to the party to which he belonged at
the time of the election. Cong.
Globe, XVI. App. 456. This is as
suming that the voter adheres strictly
to party, and always votes the
“straight ticket; ” an assumption
which may not be a very violent one
in the majority of cases, but which is
scarcely creditable to the manly in
dependence and self-reliance of any
free people; and however strongly
disposed legislative bodies may be to
act upon it
,
we are not prepared to
See any such rule o
f
evidence adopted
by the courts. If a voter chooses
voluntarily to exhibit his ballot pub
licly, perhaps there is no reason why
those to whom it was shown should
not testify to its contents; but in
other cases the knowledge o
f
its con
tents is his own exclusive property,
and h
e
can neither be compelled to
part with it
,
nor, as we think, is any
one else who accidentally o
r surrep
titiously becomes possessed o
f it
,
o
r
to whom the ballot has been shown
with a view to information, advice,
o
r alteration, a
t liberty to make the
disclosure. Such third person might
be guilty o
f
n
o legal offence if he
should do so; but he is certainly in
vading the constitutional privileges
o
f
his neighbor, and we are aware
o
f
n
o sound principle o
f
law which
will justify a court in compelling or
even permitting him to testify to what
he has seen. And as the law does
not compel a voter to testify, “surely
it cannot be so inconsistent with itself
a
s to authorize a judicial inquiry
upon a particular subject, and a
t
the
same time industriously provide for
the concealment o
f
the only material
facts upon which the results o
f
such
an inquiry must depend.” Per Denio,
Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y.
81. It was held in People v. Cicotte,
16 Mich. 283, that until it was dis
tinctly shown that the elector waived
his privilege o
f secrecy, any evidence
as to the character or contents of his
ballot was inadmissible. It was also
held that where a voter's qualification
was in question, but his want o
f right
to vote was not conceded, the privi
lege was and must be the same; a
s
otherwise any person's ballot might
b
e inquired into by simply asserting
his want o
f qualification. In State
v
. Olin, 23 Wis. 319, it was decided
that where persons who had voted a
t
a
n
election had declined to testify
concerning their qualifications, and
how they had voted, it was competent
to prove their declarations that they
were unnaturalized foreigners, and
had voted a particular way. Com
pare State v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.
In People v. Thacher, 55 N
.
Y
.
525,
the evidence o
f
voters a
s to how they
voted was received, and as they did
not object to giving it
,
it was held
proper. See on this subject Mc
Crary's Law o
f Elections, S$ 194, 195.
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determine * the voter's intention. Perfect certainty, how- [* 607]
ever, is not required in these cases. It is sufficient if an
examination leaves no reasonable doubt upon the intention, and
technical accuracy is never required in any case. The cardinal
rule is to give effect to the intention of the voter, whenever it is
not left in uncertainty; but if an ambiguity appears upon its
face, the elector cannot be received as a witness to make it good
by testifying for whom or for what office he intended to vote.”
The ballot in no case should contain more names than are
authorized to be voted for, for any particular office at that elec
tion ; and, if it should, it must be rejected for the obvious impos
sibility of the canvassing officers choosing from among the names
on the ballot, and applying the ballot to some to the exclusion of
others. The choice must be made by the elector himself, and be
expressed by the ballot. Accordingly, where only one supervisor
was to be chosen, and a ballot was deposited having upon it the
names of two persons for that office, it was held that it must be
rejected for ambiguity.” It has been decided, however, that if a
voter shall write a name upon a printed ballot, in connection with
the title to an office, this is such a designation of the name written
for that office as sufficiently to demonstrate his intention, even
though he omit to strike off the printed name of the opposing
candidate. The writing in such a case, it is held, ought to pre
vail as the highest evidence of the voter's intention, and the failure
to strike off the printed name will be regarded as an accidental
oversight.”
* People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 169;
People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; State v.
Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; People v. Bates,
11 Mich. 362. --
* People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409.
The mental purpose of an elector is
not provable; it must be determined
by his acts. People v. Saxton, 22
N. Y. 309; Beardstown v. Virginia,
76 Ill. 34. And where the intent is
to be gathered from the ballot, it is a
question of law, and cannot be sub
mitted to the jury as one of fact.
People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620.
* People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409.
See also Attorney-General v. Ely,
4 Wis. 420; People v. Loomis, 8
Wend. 396; People v. Cook, 14 Barb.
259, and 8 N. Y. 67; State v. Griffey,
5 Neb. 161. Such a vote, however,
could not be rejected as to candidates
for other offices regularly named
upon the ballot; it would be void
only as to the particular office for
which the duplicate ballot was cast.
Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.
If the name of a candidate for an
office is given more than once, it is
proper to count it as one ballot, in
stead of rejecting it as illegally thrown.
People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123; State
v. Pierce, 35 Wis. 93.
* People v. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.
This ruling suggests this query :
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[*608] * The name on the ballot should be clearly expressed,
and ought to be given fully. Errors in spelling, how
ever, will not defeat the ballot, if the sound is the same ; ' nor
abbreviations,” if such as are in common use and generally under
stood, so that there can be no reasonable doubt of the intent.
And it would seem that where a ballot is cast which contains only
the initials of the Christian name of the candidate, it ought to be
sufficient, as it designates the person voted for with the same cer
tainty which is commonly met with in contracts and other private
writings, and the intention of the voter cannot reasonably
[* 609] be open to any doubt.”
Suppose at an election where printed
slips containing the names of candi
dates, with a designation of the office,
are supplied to voters, to be pasted
over the names of opposing candi
dates, – as is very common, — a
ballot should be found in the box
containing the names of a candidate
for one office, — say the county clerk,
— with a designation of the office
pasted over the name of a candidate
for some other office, — say coroner;
so that the ballot would contain the
names of two persons for county clerk,
and of none for coroner. In such a
case, is the slip the highest evidence
of the intention of the voter as to who
should receive his suffrage for county
clerk, and must it be counted for that
office? And if so, then does not the
ballot also show the intention of the
elector to cast his vote for the person
for coroner whose name is thus acci
dentally pasted over, and should it not
be counted for that person? The
case of People v. Saxton would seem
to be opposed to People v. Seaman,
5 Denio, 409, where the court refused
to allow evidence to be given to ex
plain the ambiguity occasioned by
the one name being placed upon the
ticket, without the other being erased.
“The intention of the elector cannot
be thus inquired into, when it is op
posed or hostile to the paper ballot
which he has deposited in the ballot
As the law knows only "one
box. We might with the same pro
priety permit it to be proved that he
intended to vote for one man, when
his ballot was cast for another; a
species of proof not to be tolerated.”
Per Whittlesay, J. The case of Peo
ple v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, is also
opposed to People v. Saxton. In the
Michigan case, a slip for the office of
sheriff was pasted over the name of
the candidate for another county
office, so that the ballot contained the
names of two candidates for sheriff.
It was argued that the slip should be
counted as the best evidence of the
voter's intention; but the court held
that the ballot could be counted for
neither candidate, because of its am
biguity.
| People v. Mayworm, 5 Mich.
146; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis.
430.
* People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102.
See also upon this subject People r.
Cook, 14 Barb. 259, a:d 8 N. Y.
67; and People v. Tisdule, 1 Doug.
(Mich.) 65.
* In People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow.
102, it was held, that, on the trial of
a contested election case before a jury,
ballots cast for H. F. Yates should be
counted for Henry F. Yates, if
,
under
the circumstances, the jury were o
f
the opinion they were intended for
him; and to arrive at that intention,
it was competer" to prove that he
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Christian name, the giving of an initial to a middle name
when the party has none, or
generally signed his name H. F.
Yates; that he had before held the
same office for which these votes were
cast, and was then a candidate again;
that the people generally would apply
the abbreviation to him, and that no
other person was known in the county
to whom it would apply. This ruling
was followed in People v. Seaman, 5
Denio, 409, and in People v. Cook,
14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. The
courts also held, in these cases, that
the elector voting the defective ballot
might give evidence to enable the
jury to apply it
,
and might testify
that he intended it for the candidate
the initials of whose name he had
given. In Attorney-General v. Ely,
4 Wis. 429, a rule somewhat different
was laid down. In that case, Mat
thew H
. Carpenter was candidate for
the office o
f prosecuting attorney;
and besides the perfect ballots there
were others, cast for “ D
.
M. Carpen
ter,” “M. D. Carpenter,” “M. T.
Carpenter,” and “Carpenter.” The
jury found that there was no law
yer in the county by the name o
f
D. M. Carpenter, M. D
. Carpenter,
M. T
. Carpenter, or whose surname
was Carpenter, except the relator,
Matthew H. Carpenter; that the
relator was a practising attorney o
f
the county, and eligible to the office,
and that the votes above mentioned
were a
ll given and intended b
y
the
electors for the relator. The court
say: “How was the intention of the
voter to be ascertained? By reading
the name on the ballot, and ascertain
ing who was meant and intended by
that name? Is no evidence admissi
ble to show who was intended to be
voted for under the various appella
tions, except such evidence as is con
tained in the ballot itself? Or may
you gather the intention o
f
the voter
from the ballot, explained b
y
the sur
the giving o
f
a wrong initial,
rounding circumstances, from facts o
f
a general public nature connected
with the election, and the different
candidates which may aid you in
coming to the right conclusion?
These facts and circumstances might,
perhaps, be adduced so clear and
strong as to lead irresistibly to the
inference that a vote given for Car
penter was intended to be cast for
Matthew H
. Carpenter. A contract
may be read b
y
the light o
f
the sur
rounding circumstances, not to con
tradict it
,
but in order more perfectly
to understand the intent and meaning
o
f
the parties who made it
. By anal
ogous principles, we think that these
facts, and others o
f
like nature con
nected with the election, could be
given in evidence, for the purpose o
f
aiding the jury in determining who
was intended to be voted for. In
New York, courts have gone even
farther than this, and held, that not
only facts o
f public notoriety might
b
e given in evidence to show the in
tention o
f
the elector, but that the
elector who cast the abbreviated bal
lot may be sworn as to who was in
tended b
y
it
.
People v. Ferguson, 8
Cow. 102. But this is pushing the
doctrine to a great extent; further,
we think, than consideration o
f public
policy and the well-being o
f society
will warrant; and to restrict the rule,
and say that the jury must determine
from an inspection o
f
the ballot itself,
from the letters upon it
,
aside from
all extraneous facts, who was intended
to be designated by the ballot, is es
tablishing a principle unnecessarily
cautious and limited. In the present
case, the jury, from the evidence
before them, found that the votes
[above described] were, when given
and cast, intended, by the electors
who gave and cast the same respec
tively, to be given and cast for Mat
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[* 610] will “not render the ballot nugatory; nor will a fail
ure to give the addition to a name —such as “Junior'
:
—render it void, as that is a mere matter of description, not
constituting a part of the name, and if given erroneously
[* 611] may be treated as surplusage.”
thew H. Carpenter, the relator. Such
being the case, it clearly follows that
they should be counted for him.”
See also State v. Elwood, 12 Wis.
551; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84,
per Denio, Ch. J.; Talkington v.
Turner, 71 Ill. 234; State v. Gates,
43 Conn. 533.
On the other hand, it was held,
in Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine,
559, that votes could not be counted
for a person of a different name from
that expressed by the ballot, even
though the only difference consisted.
in the initial to the middle name.
But see People v. Cook, 14 Barb.
259, and 8 N. Y. 67. And in People
v. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 65, fol
lowed in People v. Higgins, 3 Mich.
233, it was held that no extrinsic
evidence was admissible in explana
tion or support of the ballot; and
that, unless it showed upon its face
for whom it was designed, it must be
rejected. And it was also held, that
a ballot for “J. A. Dyer’” did not
show, upon its face, that it was in
tended for the candidate James A.
Dyer, and therefore could not be
counted with the ballots cast for him
by his full name. See also Opinions
of Justices, 64 Me. 596. This rule
is convenient of application, but it
probably defeats the intention of the
electors in every case to which it is
applied, where the rejected votes
could influence the result, — an in
tention, too, which we think is so ap
parent on the ballot itself, that no
person would be in real doubt con
cerning it
.
In People v. Pease, 27
N. Y
.
64, in which Moses M. Smith
was a candidate for county treasurer,
Selden, J., says: “According to well
But where the * name
settled rules, the board o
f
canvassers
erred in refusing to allow to the
relator the nineteen votes given for
Moses Smith and M. M. Smith : ”
and although we think this doctrine
correct, the cases he cites in support
o
f
it (8 Cow. 102, and 5 Denio, 40.9)
would only warrant a jury, not the
canvassers, in allowing them; or, a
t
least, those cast for M. M. Smith.
The case o
f People v. Tisdale was
again followed in People v. Cicotte,
1
6 Mich. 283; the majority o
f
the
court, however, expressing the opin
ion that it was erroneous in principle,
but that it had (for twenty-five years)
been too long the settled law o
f
the
State to be disturbed, unless b
y
the
legislature.
* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259;
8 N. Y. 67; State c. Gates, 43 Conn.
533. But see Opinions of Judges, 3S
Me. 597.
* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259,
and 8 N. Y. 67. In this case, the
jury found, as matter of fact, that
ballots given for Benjamin Welch
were intended for Benjamin Welch,
Jr.; and the court held, that, as a
matter o
f law, they should have been
counted for him. It was not decided,
however, that the canvassers were a
t
liberty to allow the votes to Benjamin
Welch, Jr.; and the judge, delivering
the prevailing opinion in the Court of
Appeals, says (p. 81), that the State
canvassers cannot be charged with
error in refusing to add to the votes
for Benjamin Welch, Jr., those which
were given for Benjamin Welch, with
out the junior. “They had not the
means which the court possessed, on
the trial o
f
this issue, o
f obtaining,
by evidence aliunde, the several
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upon the ballot is altogether different from that of a candidate,
and not the same in sound and not a mere abbreviation, the
evidence of the voter cannot be
intended."
received to show for whom it was
Upon the question how far extrinsic evidence is admissible by
way of helping out any imperfec
county returns, the intention of the
voters, and the identity of the candi
date with the name on the defective
ballots. Their judicial power extends
no further than to take notice of such
facts of public notoriety as that cer
tain well known abbreviations are
generally used to designate particular
names, and the like.” So far as this
case holds, that the canvassers are
not chargeable with error in not
counting the ballots with the name
Benjamin Welch for Benjamin Welch,
Jr., it is, doubtless, correct. But
suppose the canvassers had seen fi
t
to do so, could the court hold they
were guilty o
f usurpation in thus
counting and allowing them? Could
not the canvassers take notice of such
facts o
f general public notoriety as
everybody else would take notice of?
Or must they shut their eyes to facts
which all other persons must see?
The facts are these: Benjamin Welch,
Jr., and James M. Cook are the can
didates, and the only candidates, for
State Treasurer. These facts are
notorious, and the two political par
ties make determined efforts to elect
one or the other. Certain votes are
cast for Benjamin Welch, with the
descriptive word “junior" omitted.
The name is correct, but, as thus
given, it may apply to some one else;
but it would be to a person notoriously
not a candidate. Under these cir
cumstances, when the facts o
f
which
it would be necessary to take notice
have occurred under their own super
vision, and are universally known, so
that the result of a contest in the
courts could not be doubtful, is there
any reason why the canvassers should
tions in the ballot, no rule can be
not take notice o
f
these facts, count
the votes which a jury would subse
quently be compelled to count, and
thus save the delay, expense, vexa
tion, and confusion o
f
a contest? If
their judicial power extends to a de
termination of what are common and
well-known abbreviations, and what
names spelled differently are idem
sonans, why may it not also extend
to the facts, o
f
which there will com
monly be quite as little doubt, as to
who are the candidates at the election
over which they preside? It seems to
us, that, in every case where the name
given on the ballot, though in some
particulars imperfect, is not different
from that o
f
the candidate, and facts
o
f general notoriety leave no doubt
in the minds of canvassers that it
was intended for him, the can
vassers should be a
t liberty to do
what a jury would afterwards be
compelled to do, - count it for such
candidate.
1 A vote for “Pence ’’ cannot be
shown to have been intended for
“Spence.” Hart v. Evans, 8 Penn.
St. 13. Where, however, wrong ini
tials were given to the Christian name,
the ballots were allowed to the candi
date; the facts o
f public notoriety
being such as to show that they were
intended for him. Attorney-General
v
. Ely, 4 Wis. 420. This case goes
farther in permitting mistakes in bal
lots to be corrected on parol evidence
than any other in the books. Mr.
M'Crary, in his Law of Elections, de
votes his seventh chapter to a careful
discussion o
f
the general subject o
f
imperfect ballots.
49
770 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. xvii.
laid down which can be said to have a preponderating weight of
authority in its support. We think evidence of such facts as may
be called the circumstances surrounding the election—such as
who were the candidates brought forward by the nominating con
ventions; whether other persons of the same names resided in
the district from which the officer was to be chosen, and if so
whether they were eligible or had been named for the office; if a
ballot was printed imperfectly, how it came to be so printed, and
the like — is admissible for the purpose of showing that an im
perfect ballot was meant for a particular candidate, unless the
name is so different that to thus apply it would be to contradict
the ballot itself; or unless the ballot is so defective that it fails to
show any intention whatever: in which cases it is not
[* 612] admissible. And we also “think that in any case to
allow a voter to testify by way of explanation of a ballot
otherwise fatally defective, that he voted the particular ballot,
and intended it for a particular candidate, is exceedingly danger
ous, invites corruption and fraud, and ought not to be suffered.
Nothing is more easy than for reckless parties thus to testify to
their intentions, without the possibility of their testimony being
disproved if untrue ; and if one falsely swears to having deposited
a particular ballot, unless the party really depositing it sees fit to
disclose his knowledge, the evidence must pass unchallenged, and
the temptation to subornation o
f perjury, when public offices are
a
t stake, and when it may be committed with impunity, is too
great to allow such evidence to be sanctioned. While the law
should seek to give effect to the intention o
f
the voter, whenever
it can be fairly ascertained, yet this intention must be that which
is expressed in due form o
f law, not that which remains hidden
in the elector's breast ; and where the ballot, in connection with
such facts surrounding the election as would be provable if it
were a case o
f contract, does not enable the proper officers to
apply it to one o
f
the candidates, policy, coinciding in this par
ticular with the general rule o
f
law as applicable to other trans
actions, requires that the ballot shall not be counted for such
candidate."
* This is substantially the New of those decisions. See People r.
York rule as settled by the later deci- Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, for a discussion
sions, if we may accept the opinion of of this point. Also State v. Griffey,
Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 5 Neb. 161.
N. Y
.
84, a
s taking the correct view
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The ballot should also sufficiently show on it
s
face for what
office the person named upon it is designated : but here again
technical accuracy is not essential, and the office is sufficiently
named if it be so designated that no reasonable doubt can exist
a
s to what is meant. A great constitutional privilege—the high
est under the government—is not to be taken away on a mere
technicality, but the most liberal intendment should be made in
support o
f
the elector's action wherever the application o
f
the
common-sense rules which are applied in other cases will enable
us to understand and render it effectual."
* Where more than one office is to be filled at an elec- [* 613]
tion, the law may either require all the persons voted for,
for the several offices, to be so voted for b
y
each elector on the
same ballot, or it may provide a different receptacle for the ballots
for some one office or set o
f
offices from that which is to receive
the others. In such a case each elector will place upon the ballot
to be deposited in each the names o
f
such persons as h
e
desires
to vote for, for the different offices to be filled at the election for
which that box is provided.
* In People v. Matteson, 17 Ill.
167, it was held that where “police
magistrates’’ were to be chosen, votes
cast for “police justices” should be
counted, as they sufficiently showed
upon their face the intention o
f
the
voters. So where the question was
submitted to the people, whether a
part o
f
one county should be annexed
to another, and the act o
f
submission
provided that the electors might ex
press their choice by voting “for
detaching R-,” or “against de
taching R–,” it was held that votes
cast for “R- attached,” and for
“R— detached,” and “for divi
sion,” and “against division,” were
properly counted b
y
the canvassers,
as the intention of the voters was
clearly ascertainable from the ballots
themselves with the aid o
f
the extrin
sic facts o
f
a public nature connected
with the election. State v. Elwood,
12 Wis. 551. So where trustees of
common schools were to be voted for,
it was held that votes for trustees of
If
,
for instance, State and township
public schools should be counted;
there being no trustees to be voted
for at that election except trustees of
common schools. People v. McManus,
3
4 Barb. 620. In Phelps v. Gold
thwaite, 16 Wis. 146, where a city and
also a county superintendent o
f
schools
were to be chosen a
t
the same election,
and ballots were cast for “superin
tendent o
f schools,” without further
designation, parol evidence o
f sur
rounding circumstances was admitted
to enable the proper application to be
made o
f
the ballots to the respective
candidates. In Peck v. Weddell, 17
Ohio, N
.
s. 271, a
n act providing for
a
n
election o
n the question o
f
the re
moval o
f
a county seat to the “town’’
o
f Bowling Green, was held not in
valid b
y
reason o
f Bowling Green
being in law not a “town,” but an
incorporated village. In voting for a
county seat it was held proper to count
votes cast for a town b
y
it
s popular,
which differed from it
s legal name.
State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 343.
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officers are to be chosen at the same election, and the ballots are
to be kept separate, the elector must have different ballots for
each ; and if he should designate persons for a township office on
the State ballot, such ballot would, to that extent, be void, though
the improper addition would not defeat the ballot altogether, but
would be treated as surplusage, and the ballot be held good as a
vote for the State officers designated upon it." But an accidental
error in depositing the ballot should not defeat it
. If an elector
should deliver the State and township ballots to the inspector o
f
election, who b
y
mistake should deposit them in the wrong boxes
respectively, this mistake is capable o
f being corrected without
confusion when the boxes are opened, and should not prevent the
ballots being counted as intended. And it would seem that, in
any case, the honest mistake, either o
f
the officer o
r
the elector,
should not defeat the intention o
f
the latter, where it was not left
in doubt b
y
his action.”
The elector is not under obligation to vote for every office to be
filled at that election; nor where several persons are to be chosen
to the same office is he required to vote for as many as
[* 614] are to be "elected. He may vote for one o
r any greater
number, not to exceed the whole number to be chosen.
In most of the States a plurality of the votes cast determines the
election. In others, as to some elections, a majority; but in de
termining upon a majority or plurality, the blank votes, if any, are
not to be counted ; and a candidate may therefore be chosen with
out receiving a plurality o
r majority o
f
voices o
f
those who actually
participated in the election. Where, however, two offices o
f
the
same name were to be filled at the same election, but the notice
o
f
election specified one only, the political parties each nominated
one candidate, and, assuming that but one was to be chosen, no
elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one having
a majority was alone chosen ; the opposing candidate could not
claim to be also elected, as having received the second highest
* See People v. Cook, 14 Barb. that he has voted b
y
mistake in the
259, and 8 N. Y
.
67. wrong precinct, to withdraw from the
* People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362. ballot box and destroy a ballot which
See Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann. he professes to identify as the one
175; McKinney v. O'Connor, 26 Tex. cast by him. Harbaugh v. Cicotte,
5
. But inspectors o
f
election have no 33 Mich. 241.
authority, on the assertion o
f
a voter
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number of votes, but as to the other office there had been a failure
to hold an election."
The Freedom of Elections.
To keep every election free of all the influences and surround
ings which might bear improperly upon it
,
o
r might impel the
electors to cast their suffrages otherwise than as their judgments
would dictate, has always been a prominent object in American
legislation. We have referred to fundamental principles which
protect the secrecy o
f
the ballot, but in addition to these there
are express constitutional and statutory provisions looking to the
accomplishment o
f
the same general purpose. It is provided by
the constitutions o
f
several o
f
the States that bribery o
f
a
n elector
shall constitute a disqualification o
f
the right to vote or to hold
office ; * the treating o
f
a
n elector, with a view to influence his
vote, is in some States made an indictable offence : * courts are not
allowed to be held, for the two reasons, that the electors ought to
be left free to devote their attention to the exercise of
this high trust, and that * suits if allowed on that day [* 615]
might be used as a means o
f intimidation; “legal process
* People v. Kent County Canvas
sers, 11 Mich. 111.
* See the Constitutions o
f Mary
land, Missouri, New Jersey, West
Virginia, Oregon, California, Kansas,
Texas, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Ala
bama, Florida, New York, Massachu
setts, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Nevada, Tennessee, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Wiscon
sin. And it has been held on general
principles that if an elector is induced
to vote in a particular way b
y
the
payment o
r promise o
f any money
or other valuable consideration for
such vote, his vote should be rejected
a
s illegal. State v. Olin, 23 Wis.
327. The power to reject for such a
reason, however, is not in the inspec
tors, but in the court in which the
right to try the title to the office is
vested. State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213;
s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 485. In this case
it was held to be a sufficient reason
for the court to reject votes, that they
were obtained by means o
f
the candi
date's promise to perform the duties
of the office for less than the official
salary.
* State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph 32.
And see the provision in the Constitu
tion o
f
Vermont on this subject. A
resort to this species o
f
influence
would generally, a
t
the present time,
prejudice the candidate's interests
instead o
f advancing them, but such
has not always been the case. Mr.
Madison, after performing valuable
service for the State in its legislature,
was defeated when offering himself
for re-election, in the very crisis o
f
the Revolution, by the treating o
f
his
opponent. See his Life by Rives,
Vol. I. p
.
179.
* But it was held in New York that
the statute o
f
that State forbidding
the holding o
f
courts on election days
did not apply to the local elections.
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in some States, and for the same reasons, is not permitted to be
served on that day; intimidation of voters by threats or other
wise is made punishable;' and generally all such precautions as
the people in framing their organic law, or the legislature after
wards, have thought might be made available for the purpose,
have been provided with a view to secure the most completely
free and unbiassed expression of opinion that shall be possible.
Betting upon elections is illegal at the common law, on grounds
of public policy;” and al
l
contracts entered into with a view im
properly to influence an election would be void for the same
reason.”
Matter o
f
Election Law, 7 Hill, 194;
Redfield v. Florence, 2 E
.
D
. Smith,
339.
* As to what shall constitute intim
idation, see Respublica v. Gibbs, 3
Yeates, 429.
* Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426;
Lansing v. Lansing, 8 Johns. 454;
Ball v. Gilbert, 12 Met. 397 ; Laval
v
. Myers, 1 Bailey, 486; Smyth v.
McMasters, 2 Browne, 182; McAllis
ter v. Hoffman, 16 S
.
& R
.
147; Stod
dard v. Martin, 1 R
.
I. 1
:
Wroth v.
Johnson, 4 H. & M. 284; Tarelton r.
Baker, 18 Vt. 9; Davis v. Holbrook,
1 La. Ann. 176; Freeman v. Hardwick,
1
0 Ala. 316; Wheeler v. Spencer, 15
Conn. 28; Russell v. Pyland, 2
Humph. 131; Porter v. Sawyer, 1
Harr. 517; Hickerson v. Benson, 8
Mo. 8
;
Machir v. Moore, 2 Grat. 257;
Rust v. Gott, 9 Cow. 169; Brush v.
Keeler, 5 Wend. 250; Fisher v. Hil
dreth, 117 Mass. 558; McCrary, Law
o
f Elections, $149.
* In Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill, 27,
it was held that an agreement b
y
the
defendant to pay the plaintiff $1000,
in consideration that the latter, who
had built a log-cabin, would keep it
open for political meetings to further
the success o
f
certain persons nomi
nated for members o
f Congress, &c.,
by one o
f
the political parties, was
illegal within the statute o
f
New
York, which prohibited contributions
o
f money “for any other purpose in
And with a just sense o
f
the danger o
f military inter
tended to promote the election o
f any
particular person or ticket, except for
defraying the expenses o
f printing
and the circulation o
f votes, hand
bills, and other papers.” This case
is criticised in Hurley v. Van Wagner,
2
8 Barb. 109, and it is possible that it
went further than either the statute
o
r public policy would require. In
Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546, the
defendant being indebted to the plain
tiff, who was a candidate for town
representative, the parties agreed that
the former should use his influence
for the plaintiff’s election, and do
what he could for that purpose, and
that if the plaintiff was elected, that
should be a satisfaction of his claim.
Nothing was specifically said about
the defendant’s voting for the plain
tiff, but he did vote for him, and
would not have done so, nor favored
his election, but for this agreement.
The plaintiff was elected. Held, that
the agreement was void, and consti
tuted no bar to a recovery upon the
demand. See also Meachem r. Dow,
32 Wt. 721, where it was held that a
note executed in consideration of the
payee's agreement to resign public
office in favor o
f
the maker, and use
influence in favor o
f
the latter's ap
pointment as his successor, was void
in the hands o
f
the payee. See also
Duke v. Ashbee, 11 Ired. 112; Mc
Crary, Law o
f Elections, $ 192. In
Pratt v. People, 29 Ill. 54, it was held
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ference, where a trust is to be exercised, the highest as well as
the most delicate in the whole machinery of government, it has
not been thought unwise to prohibit the militia being called out
on election days, even though for no other purpose than for en
rolling and organizing them.” The ordinary police is the peace
force of the State, and it
s presence suggests order, individual
safety, and public security; but when the military appear upon
the stage, even though composed o
f
citizen militia, the circum
stances must b
e
assumed to b
e extraordinary, and there is always
a
n appearance o
f threatening and dangerous compulsion which
might easily interfere seriously with that calm and unimpassioned
discharge o
f
the elector's duty which the law so justly favors. The
soldier in organized ranks can know no law but such as is given
him by his commanding officer; and when he appears at the polls,
there is necessarily a suggestion o
f
the presence o
f
a
n enemy
against whom h
e may b
e compelled to exercise the most extreme
and destructive force ; and that enemy must generally be the
party out o
f power, while the authority that commands the force
directed against them will be the executive authority of the State
for the time being wielded b
y
their opponents. It is consequently
o
f
the highest importance that the presence o
f
a military force a
t
the polls be not suffered except in serious emergencies, when dis
orders exist or are threatened for the suppression o
r prevention
o
f
which the ordinary peace force is insufficient; and any statute
which should provide for or permit such presence as a usual oc
currence o
r except in the last resort, though it might not be void,
would nevertheless be a serious invasion o
f
constitutional right,
and should not b
e
submitted to in a free government without
vigorous remonstrance.”
that an agreement between two elec
tors that they should “pair off,” and
both abstain from voting, was illegal,
and the inspectors could not refuse to
receive a vote o
f
one o
f
the two; on
the ground o
f
his agreement.
1 See Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns.
521.
* The danger, and w
e
may say also,
the folly of military interference with
the deliberations or action of electors
except in the last necessity, was fear
fully illustrated in the case of the
“Manchester Massacre,” which oc
curred in 1819. An immense meet
ing o
f
radical parliamentary reform
ers, whose objects and purposes
appeared threatening to the govern
ment, was charged upon by the mili
tary, with some loss o
f life, and with
injury to the persons of several hun
dred people. As usual in such cases,
the extremists of one party applauded
the act and complimented the military,
while the other party was exasperated
in the last degree, b
y
what seemed to
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[*616) * The Elector not to be deprived of his Vote.
That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of the privi
lege by the action of the authorities, is a fundamental prin
ciple.
It has been held, on constitutional grounds, that a law creating
a new county, but so framed as to leave a portion of it
s territory
unorganized, so that the voters within such portion could not
participate in the election o
f county officers, was inoperative and
void." S
o
a law submitting to the voters o
f
a county the ques
tion o
f removing the county seat is void if there is no mode
under the law b
y
which a city within the county can participate
in the election.” And although the failure o
f
one election pre
cinct to hold an election, or to make a return o
f
the votes cast,
might not render the whole election a nullity, where the electors
o
f
that precinct were a
t liberty to vote had they so chosen, o
r
where, having voted but failed to make return, it is not made to
appear that the votes not returned would have changed the re
sult,” yet if any action was required of the public authorities
preliminary to the election, and that which was taken was not
such as to give all the electors the opportunity to participate, and
no mode was open to the electors b
y
which the officers might be
compelled to act, it would seem that such neglect, constituting
a
s it would the disfranchisement o
f
the excluded electors pro hac
vice, must o
n general principles render the whole election nuga
them an unnecessary, arbitrary, and
unconstitutional exercise of force.
The most bitter and dangerous feel
ing was excited throughout the coun
try by this occurrence, and it is not
too much to say that if disorders
were threatening before, the govern
ment had done nothing in this way to
strengthen it
s authority, o
r
to insure
quiet o
r dispassionate action. No
one had been conciliated; no one had
been reduced to more calm and delib
erate courses; but, on the other hand,
even moderate men had been exas
perated and inclined to opposition by
this violent, reckless, and destructive
display o
f
coercive power. See Han
o
f S
t Clair, 11 Mich. 63.
sard's Debates, Vol. XLI. pp. 4, 51,
230.
* People v. Maynard, 15 Mich.
471. For similar reasons the act for
the organization o
f Schuyler County
was held invalid in Lanning v. Car
penter, 20 N. Y
.
477.
* Attorney-General v. Supervisors
For a
similar principle see Foster v. Scarff,
15 Ohio, N
.
s. 532.
* See Er parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42:
Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. c.
County Court o
f Davidson, 1 Sneed,
637; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68;
Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34.
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tory; for that cannot be called an election or the expression of
the popular sentiment where a part only of the electors have been
allowed to be heard, and the others, without being guilty of fraud
or negligence, have been excluded."
If the inspectors of elections refuse to receive the vote of an
elector duly qualified, they may be liable both civilly and crimi
nally for so doing : criminally, if they were actuated by improper
and corrupt motives; and civilly, it is held in some of the States,
even though there may have been no malicious design in
so doing ; * * but other cases hold that, where the inspec- [*617]
tors are vested by the law with the power to pass upon
the qualifications of electors, they exercise judicial functions in
so doing, and are entitled to the same protection as other judicial
officers in the discharge of their duty, and cannot be made liable
except upon proof of express malice.” Where, however, by the
law under which the election is held, the inspectors are to receive
the voter's ballot, if he takes the oath that he possesses the con
stitutional qualifications, the oath is the conclusive evidence on
which the inspectors are to act, and they are not at liberty to
refuse to administer the oath, or to refuse the vote after the oath
1 See Fort Dodge v. District Town
ship, 17 Iowa, 85; Barry v. Lauck, 5
Cold. 588. In People v. Salomon, 46
Ill. 415, it was held that where an
act of the legislature, before it shall
become operative, is required to be
submitted to the vote of the legal
electors of the district to be affected
thereby, if the election which is at
tempted to be held is illegal within
certain precincts containing a major
ity of the voters of the district, then
the act will not be deemed to have
been submitted to the required vote,
and the result will not be declared
upon the votes legally cast, adverse to
what it would have been had no ille
gality intervened.
2 Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;
Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass, 244, note;
Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350;
Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Gates
v. Neal, 23 Pick. 308; Blanchard v.
Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Jeffries v. An
keny, 11 Ohio, 372; Chrisman v.
Bruce, 1 Duvall, 63; Monroe v. Col
lins, 17 Ohio, N. s. 665; Gillespie v.
Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
* Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns.
114; Wecherley v. Guyer, 11 S. &
R. 35; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Dougl.
(Mich.) 411; Peavey v. Robbins, 3
Johns. L. 339; Caulfield v. Bullock,
18 B. Mon. 494; Miller v. Rucker, 1
Bush, 135; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duv.
63; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88;
Turnpike v. Champney, 2 N. H. 199;
Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Bevard
v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; Elbin v.
Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Friend v. Ha
mill, 34 Md. 298; Pike v. Megoun, 44
Mo. 492; see State v. Daniels, 44
N. H. 383, and Goetcheus v. Mathew
son, 61 N. Y. 420. In the last case
the whole subject is fully and care
fully examined, and the authorities
analyzed. Compare Byler v. Asher,
47 Ill. 101; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md.
135.
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has been taken. They are only ministerial officers in such a
case, and have no discretion but to obey the law and receive the
vote."
The Conduct of the Election.
The statutes of the different States point out specifically the
mode in which elections shall be conducted ; but, although there
are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern
them all. As the execution of these statutes must very often fall
to the hands of men unacquainted with the law and unschooled
in business, it is inevitable that mistakes shall sometimes occur,
and that very often the law will fail of strict compliance. Where
an election is thus rendered irregular, whether the irregularity
shall avoid it or not must depend generally upon the effect the
failure to comply strictly with the law may have had in obstruct
ing the complete expression of the popular will, or the produc
tion of satisfactory evidence thereof. Election statutes are to be
tested like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality, in view
of the great public purposes which they accomplish ; and except
where they specifically provide that a thing shall be done
[*618) in the manner indicated and not otherwise, * their pro
visions designed merely for the information and guidance
of the officers must be regarded as directory only, and the elec
tion will not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, pro
viding the irregularity has not hindered any who were entitled
from exercising the right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the
evidences from which the result was to be declared. In a lead
ing case the following irregularities were held not to vitiate the
election: the accidental substitution of another book for the holy
evangelists in the administration of an oath, both parties being
ignorant of the error at the time; the holding of the election by
persons who were not officers de jure, but who had colorable
authority, and acted de facto in good faith;” the failure of the
* Spriggins v. Houghton, 2 Scam. * As to what constitutes an officer
377; State v. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; de facto, the reader is referred to the
People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588. And careful opinion in State v. Carroll, 38
see People v. Gordon, 5 Call, 235; Conn. 449; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 409.
Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duvall, 63; Also to Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass. 231;
Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 131; Com
Goetcheus v. Mathewson, 61 N. Y. monwealth v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St.
420. 436; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio, N. s.
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board of inspectors to appoint clerks of the election ; the closing
of the outer door of the room where the election was held at
sundown, and then permitting the persons within the room to
vote; it not appearing that legal voters were excluded by closing
the door, or illegal allowed to vote; and the failure of the in
spectors or clerks to take the prescribed oath of office. And it
was said, in the same case, that any irregularity in conducting an
election which does not deprive a legal elector of his vote, or
admit a disqualified person to vote, or cast uncertainty on the
result, and has not been occasioned by the agency of a party
seeking to derive a benefit from it
,
should be overlooked
in a proceeding to try the right to an office depending on
such election."
610; Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss 151,
and authorities referred to in these
cases severally. Also Cooley on Tax
ation, 184–186; McCrary's Law o
f
Elections, $$ 75–79.
* People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259,
and 8 N
.
Y. 67. To the same effect,
see Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; True
hart v. Addicks, 2 Tex. 217; Dishon
v
. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212: Attorney
General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; State v.
Jones, 19 Ind. 356: People v. Hig
gins, 3 Mich. 233; Gorham v. Camp
bell, 2 Cal. 135; People v. Bates, 11
Mich. 362; Taylor v. Taylor, 10
Minn. 112; People v. McManus, 34
Barb. 620; Whipley v. McCune, 12
Cal. 352; Bourland v. Hildreth, 26
Cal. 161 ; Day v. Kent, 1 Oreg. 123;
Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54; Ewing v.
Filley, 43 Penn. St. 384; Howard v.
Shields, 16 Ohio, N
.
s. 184; State
v
. Stumpf, 21 Wis. 579; McKinney v.
O'Connor, 26 Tex. 5
;
Sprague v.
Norway, 31 Cal. 173; Sheppard's
Election Case, 77 Penn. St. 295;
Wheelock's Election Case, 82 Penn.
St. 297; Pike Co. v. Barnes, 51 Miss.
305. In Er parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42,
it was held, that, where the statute
required the inspectors to certify the
result o
f
the election on the next day
thereafter, o
r sooner, the certificate
made the second day thereafter was
This rule is an eminently proper one, and it
sufficient, the statute as to time being
directory merely. In People v. Mc
Manus, 34 Barb. 620, it was held that
an election was not made void by the
fact that one o
f
the three inspectors
was b
y
the statute disqualified from
acting, by being a candidate a
t
the
election, the other two being qualified.
In Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173,
it was decided that where the judges
o
f
an election could not read, and for
that reason a person who was not a
member of the board took the ballots
from the box, and read them to the
tellers, a
t
the request o
f
the judges,
the election was not affected by the
irregularity. In several cases. and
among others the following, the
general principle is asserted that any
irregularities o
r misconduct, not
amounting to fraud, is not to be
suffered to defeat an election unless
it is made to appear that the result
was thereby changed. Loomis v. Jack
son, 6 W. Va. 613, 692; Morris v. Wan
laningham, 11 Kan. 269; Supervisors o
f
Du Page v. People, 65 Ill. 360; Chicago
v
. People, 80 Ill. 496; People v. Wilson,
62 N. Y. 186. The failure to hold
the election a
t
the place appointed
may not be fatal if no one lost his
vote in consequence. Dale v. Irwin,
78 Ill. 170. And a candidate who
participates in the election actually
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furnishes a very satisfactory test as to what is essential and
what not in election laws." And where a party contests
[*619] * an election on the ground of these or any similar irreg
ularities, he ought to aver and be able to show that the
result was affected by them.” Time and place, however, are of
the substance of every election,” and a failure to comply with the
law in these particulars is not generally to be treated as a mere
irregularity."
held, will not be allowed to question
its validity on that ground People
v. Waite, 70 Ill. 25. But where the
law gave three hours for an election
and the polls were closed in forty
minutes, the proceedings were held
invalid. State v. Wallem, 37 Iowa,
131.
* This rule has certainly been ap
plied with great liberality, in some
cases. In People v. Higgins, 3 Mich.
233, it was held that the statute re
quiring ballots to be sealed up in a
package, and then locked up in the
ballot-box, with the orifice at the top
sealed, was directory merely; and that
ballots which had been kept in a
locked box, but without the orifice
closed or the ballots sealed up, were
admissible in evidence in a contest
for an office depending upon this elec
tion. This case was followed in Peo
ple. v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, and it
was held that whether the ballots
were more satisfactory evidence than
the inspector's certificates, where a
discrepancy appeared between them,
was a question for the jury. In Mor
ril v. Haines, 2 N. H. 246, the statute
required State officers to be chosen by
a check-list, and by delivery of the
ballots to the moderator in person;
and it was held that the requirement
of a check-list was mandatory, and
the election in the town was void if
none was kept. The decision was
put upon the ground that the check
list was provided as an important
guard against indiscriminate and
illegal voting, and the votes given by
ballot without this protection were
therefore as much void as if given
viva voce. An election adjourned
without warrant to another place, as
well as an election held without the
officers required by law, is void.
Commonwealth v. County Commis
sioners, 5 Rawle, 75. An unauthor
ized adjournment of the election for
dinner — it appearing to have been in
good faith, and no one having been
deprived of his vote thereby — will
not defeat the election. Fry v.
Booth, 19 Ohio, N. s. 25.
* Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann.
175; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283:
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107;
Dobyns v. Weadon, 50 Ind. 298.
* Dickey r. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343;
Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82. See
p. *618, note.
* The statute of Michigan requires
the clerks of election to keep lists of
the persons voting, and that at the
close of the polls the first duty of
the inspectors shall be to compare the
lists with the number of votes in the
box, and if the count of the latter ex
ceeds the former, then to draw out
unopened and destroy a sufficient
number to make them correspond.
In People r. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, it
appeared that the inspectors in two
wards of Detroit, where a surplus of
votes had been found, had neglected
this duty, and had counted all the
votes without drawing out and de
stroying any. The surplus in the
two wards was sixteen. The actual
majority of one of the candidates over
the other on the count as it stood (if
certain other disputed votes were re
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What is a Sufficient Election.
Unless the law under which the election is held expressly re
quires more, a plurality of the votes cast will be sufficient to
elect, notwithstanding these may constitute but a small
portion of those * who are entitled to vote," and notwith- [*620]
standing the voters generally may have failed to take
notice. of the law requiring the election to be held.”
If several persons are to be chosen to the same office, the requi
site number who shall stand highest on the list will be elected.
But without such a plurality no one can be chosen to a public
office; and it is held in many cases that if the person receiving
the highest number of votes was ineligible, the votes cast for him
will still be effectual so far as to prevent the opposing candidate
being chosen, and the election must be considered as having
failed.”
jected) would be four. It was held
that this neglect of the inspectors did
not invalidate the election; that had
the votes been drawn out, the proba
bility was that each candidate would
lose a number proportioned to the
whole number which he had in the
box; and this being a probability
which the statute providing for the
drawing proceeded upon, the court
should apply it afterwards, apportion
ing the excess of votes between the
candidates in that proportion.
* Augustin v. Eggleston, 12 La.
Ann. 366; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20
Wis. 544. See also State v. Mayor,
&c., of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270; State
v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450.
* People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508.
Even if the majority expressly dissent,
yet if they do not vote, the election by
the minority will be valid. Oldknow
v. Wainwright, 1 W. Bl. 229; Rex
v. Foxcroft, 2 Burr. 1017; Rex v.
Withers, referred to in same case.
Minority representation in certain
cases has been introduced in New
York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, and
the principle is likely to find favor
elsewhere.
* State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112;
Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 597;
State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Saun
ders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Fish v.
Collens, 21 La. Ann. 289; Sublett v.
Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266; s. c. 12 Am.
Rep. 338; State v. Swearingen, 12
Geo. 24; Commonwealth v. McCluley,
56 Penn. St. 270; Matter of Corliss
(Sup. Ct. R. I.), 16 Am. Law Reg.
15. See State v. Wail, 53 Mo. 97.
In People v. Molliter, 23 Mich. 341,
a minority candidate claimed the
election on the ground that the votes
cast for his opponent, though a ma
jority, were ineffectual, because the
name was abbreviated. Held, that
they were at least effectual to pre
clude the election of a candidate who
received a less number. But it has
been held that if ineligibility is
notorious, so that the electors must
be deemed to have voted with full
knowledge of it
,
the votes for an in
eligible candidate must be declared
void, and the next highest candidate
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The admission of illegal votes at an election will not necessarily
defeat it; but to warrant its being set aside on that ground, it
should appear that the result would have been different had they
been excluded." And the fact that unqualified persons are
allowed to enter the room, and participate in an election, does
not justify legal voters in refusing to vote, and treating the elec
tion as void, but it will be held valid if the persons declared
chosen had a plurality o
f
the legal votes actually cast.” So it is
held that a
n exclusion o
f legal votes — not fraudulently, but
through error in judgment — will not defeat an election; not
withstanding the error in such a case is one which there was no
mode o
f correcting, even by the aid o
f
the courts, since it cannot
b
e known with certainty afterwards how the excluded electors
would have voted, and it would obviously be dangerous to receive
and rely upon their subsequent statements as to their inten
tions, after it is ascertained precisely what effect their
[*621] * votes would have upon the result.” If
,
however, the
inspectors o
f
election shall exclude legal voters, not be-,
cause o
f
honest error in judgment, but wilfully and corruptly,
and to a
n
extent that affects the result, or if by riots or other
wise legal voters are intimidated and prevented from voting, o
r
for any other reasons the electors have not had opportunity for
the expression o
f
their sentiments through the ballot-box, the
election should be set aside altogether, as having failed in the
is chosen. This is the English doc- disqualified person void, they must be
trine: King v. Hawkins, 10 East,
211; 2 Dow. P
.
C
. 124; King v.
Parry, 14 East, 549; Gosling v. Veley,
7 Q
.
B
. 406; Rex v. Monday, 2
Cowp. 530; Rex v. Foxcroft, Burr.
1017; s. c. 1 Wm. Bl. 229; Reg. v.
Cooks, 3 E
.
& B
.
249; French v.
Nolan, 2 Moak, 711. And see the
following American cases: Price v.
Baker, 41 Ind. 572; Hatcheson v. Til
der, 4 H. & McH. 279; Common
wealth v. Green, 4 Whart. 521;
Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Carson
v
. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 327; People
v
. Clute, 50 N
.
Y
. 451; s. c. 10 Am.
Rep. 508. It would seem that, if the
law which creates the disqualification
expressly declares all votes cast for the
treated as mere blank votes, and can
not be counted for any purpose.
* Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cow. 153;
First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns,
2
1 Pick. 148; Blandford School Dis
trict v. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39; People r.
Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; Judkins v.
Hill, 50 N. H
.
140. Votes received
illegally will be rejected by the court
in an action to try title to an office.
State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566;
Harbaugh v. Cicotte, 33 Mich. 241.
* First Parish in Sudbury v.
Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
* Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B
.
Monr.
515. See Burke v. Supervisors o
f
Monroe, 4 W. Wa. 371.
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purpose for which it was called." Errors of judgment are inevi
table, but fraud, intimidation, and violence the law can and should
protect against. A mere casual affray, however, or accidental dis
turbance, without any intention of overawing or intimidating the
electors, cannot be considered as affecting the freedom of the elec
tion; * nor in any case would electors be justified in abandoning the
ground for any light causes, or for improper interference by others
where the officers continue in the discharge of their functions,
and there is opportunity for the electors to vote.” And, as we
have already seen, a failure of an election in one precinct, or dis
order or violence which prevent a return from that precinct, will
not defeat the whole election, unless it appears that the votes
which could not be returned in consequence of the violence would
have changed the result.* It is a little difficult at times to adopt
the true mean between those things which should and those
which should not defeat an election ; for while on the one hand the
law should seek to secure the due expression of his will by every
legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or misconduct
that may tend to prevent it
,
so, o
n
the other hand, it is to be
borne in mind that charges o
f irregularity and misconduct are
easily made, and that the dangers from throwing elections open
to be set aside o
r
controlled by oral evidence, are perhaps a
s
great as any in our system. An election honestly conducted
under the forms o
f
law ought generally to stand, notwithstand
ing individual electors may have been deprived o
f
their votes, o
r
unqualified voters been allowed to participate. Individuals may
suffer wrong in such cases, and a candidate who was the real
choice o
f
the people may sometimes b
e deprived o
f
his election;
but as it is generally impossible to arrive at any greater
certainty o
f
* result b
y
resort to oral evidence, public pol- [* 622]
icy is best subserved b
y allowing the election to stand,
* Where one receives a majority
o
f
all the votes cast, the opposing
candidate cannot be declared elected
on evidence that legal voters sufficient
to change the result offered to vote
for him, but were erroneously denied
the right; but the election may be
declared to have failed, and a new
election be ordered. Renner v. Ben
nett, 21 Ohio, N
.
S
. 431. See also
Matter o
f Long Island R
.
R
. Co., 19
Wend. 37; People v. Phillips, 1 Denio,
389 ; State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio,
N. s. 354.
* Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 184.
* See First Parish in Sudbury v.
Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
* Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42.
ante, p
.
*616 and note.
See
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and trusting to a strict enforcement of the criminal laws for
greater security against the like irregularities and wrongs in the
future.
The Canvass and the Return.
If the election is purely a local one, the inspectors who have
had charge of the election canvass the votes and declare the re
sult. If
,
o
n
the other hand, their district is one precinct o
f
a
larger district, they make return in writing o
f
the election over
which they have presided to the proper board o
f
the larger district;
and if the election is for State officers, this district board will trans
mit the result o
f
the district canvass to the proper State board,
who will declare the general result. In all this, the several boards
act for the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with
judicial powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have
occurred with any officer who preceded them in the performance
o
f any duty connected with the election, or to pass upon any dis
puted fact which may affect the result." Each board is to receive
the returns transmitted to it
,
if in due form, as correct, and is to
ascertain and declare the result as shown b
y
such returns;” and
if other matters are introduced into the return than those which
the law provides, they are to that extent unofficial, and such state
ments must be disregarded.” If a district or State board of can
* State v. Charleston, 1 S. C
.
N
.
s.
30. And see cases cited in the next
note.
* Er parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42;
Brower v. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; Peo
ple v. Hilliard, 29 Ill. 413 ; People
v
. Jones, 19 Ind. 357 ; Ballou v. York
County Com’rs, 13 Shep. 491; Mayo
v
. Freeland, 10 Mo. 629; Thompson
v
. Circuit Judge, 9 Ala. 338; Peo
ple v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492; O'Farrell
v
. Colby, 2 Minn. 180; People v.
Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v.
Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; Morgan v.
Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Dishon
v
. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; People v.
Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N
.
Y
. 67;
Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; Attor
ney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567;
Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420;
State v. Governor, 1 Dutch. 331;
State v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch.
354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 6S;
People v. Pease, 27 N
.
Y
. 45; Phelps
v
. Schroder, 26 Ohio St. 549; State
v
. State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498;
Opinion o
f Justices, 53 N
.
H
. 640;
State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 343; State
v
. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540; State v.
Rodman, 43 Mo. 256; State v. Steers,
44 Mo. 223; Bacon v. York Co., 26
Me. 491; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn.
107; Opinion o
f Justices, 64 Me. 5SS.
* Er parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42. Re
turns void on their face may be re
jected. State v. State Canvassers,
36 Wis. 498. But, if not void on their
face, the election board to which they
are returned have no jurisdiction to
go behind them and inquire into ques
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vassers assumes to reject returns transmitted to it on other
grounds than those appearing upon it
s face, or to declare persons
elected who are not shown b
y
the returns to have received the
requisite plurality, it is usurping functions, and its conduct
will be reprehensible, if not even criminal. The action of such
boards is to be carefully confined to an examination o
f
the
papers before them, and a determination o
f
the * result [*623]
therefrom, in the light o
f
such facts o
f public notoriety
connected with the election as every one takes notice o
f,
and
which may enable them to apply such ballots as are in any
respect imperfect to the proper candidates o
r
offices for which
they are intended, provided the intent is sufficiently indicated
by the ballot in connection with such facts, so that extra
neous evidence is not necessary for this purpose. If canvass
ers refuse o
r neglect to perform their duty, they may be
compelled b
y
mandamus ; though as these boards are created
for a single purpose only, and are dissolved b
y
a
n adjournment
without day, it has been held that, after such adjournment, man
damus would be inapplicable, inasmuch as there is no longer any
board which can act.” But we should think the better doctrine
to be, that if the board adjourn before a legal and complete per
formance o
f
their duty, mandamus would lie to compel them to
meet and perform it.” But when the board themselves have once
performed and fully completed their duty, they have no power
afterwards to reconsider their determination and come to a differ
ent conclusion.*
tions o
f
fraud in the election. Phelps * To this effect is State v. Gibbs,
v
. Schroeder, 26 Ohio St. 549. A
certificate to be made by a justice
and inspectors is void on its face if
signed b
y
the justice alone. Perry v.
Whitaker, 71 N. C
.
475. ,
1 Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush, 523;
Burke v. Supervisors o
f Monroe, 4 W.
Va. 371; State v. County Judge, 7
Iowa, 186; Magee v. Supervisors, 10
Cal. 376; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind.
488; Commonwealth v. Emminger,
74 Penn. St. 479.
* Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 346;
People v. Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217;
State v. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256.
1
3 Fla. 55. And see People v. Board
o
f Registration, 17 Mich. 427; People
v
. Board, &c. o
f Nankin, 15 Mich. 156;
Lewis v. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 102.
* Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33 N
.
Y.
603; State v. Warren, 1 Houston, 43;
State v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540. If
they recount and give the certificate
to another, such action is a mere
nullity. Bowen v. Hixon, 45 Mo.
340; People v. Robertson, 27 Mich.
116; Opinions o
f Justices, 117 Mass.
599; State v. Donewirth, 21 Ohio,
N. s. 216.
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Contesting Elections.
As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial
functions only, their returns, and the certificates of election which
are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the officers
who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the final decision
must rest with the courts." This is the general rule, and the
exceptions are of those cases where the law under which the can
vass is made declares the decision conclusive, or where a special
statutory board is established with powers of final decision.”
Whatever may be the office, an election to it is only made by the
candidate receiving the requisite majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast; * and whoever, without such election, intrudes into
an office, whether with or without the formal evidences of title,
may be ousted on the proper
1 State v. Justices of Middlesex,
Coxe, 24.4; Hill v. Hill, 4 McCord,
277; Wammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala.
31; State v. Clerk of Passaic, 1
Dutch. 354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2
Swan, 68; Attorney-General v. Bars
tow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v.
Ely, 4 Wis. 420; People v. Van Cleve,
1 Mich. 362; People v. Higgins, 3
Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa,
212; State v. Johnson, 17 Ark. 407;
State v. Fetter, 12 Wis. 566; State v.
Avery, 14 Wis. 122; People v. Jones,
20 Cal. 50; Newcum v. Kirtley, 13
B. Monr. 515; Commonwealth v.
Jones, 10 Bush, 725; People v. Sea
man, 5 Denio, 409; People v. Cook,
8 N. Y. 67; People v. Matteson, 17
Ill. 167; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn.
107; Calaveras County v. Brockway,
30 Cal. 325. An illegal election may
be contested and set aside, even though
but one person was voted for. Er
parte Ellyson, 20 Grat. 10.
* See Grier v. Shackleford, Const.
Rep. 642; Batman v. Megowan, 1
Met. (Ky.) 533; State v. Marlow, 15
Ohio, N. s. 114; People v. Goodwin,
22 Mich. 496; Baxter v. Brooks, 29
Ark. 173; s. c. 11 Am. Law Rev. 534.
For the proceedings in the State of New
judicial inquiry.* The general
York in the canvass of votes for gov
ernor in 1792, where the election of
John Jay to that office was defeated
by the rejection of votes cast for him
for certain irregularities, which, un
der the more recent judicial decisions,
ought to have been overlooked, see
Hammond's Political History of New
York, ch. 3. The law then in force
made the decision of the State can
vassers final and conclusive. The
Louisiana Returning Board cases will
readily occur to the mind; but those
must be regarded as standing by
themselves, because the legislative
provisions under which they were had
were unlike any others known to our
history, and assumed to confer extra
ordinary and irresponsible powers.
* In some cases it is provided by
law, that, if there is a tie vote, the two
persons receiving an equal and the
highest number shall cast lots, and
the election shall be thereby deter
mined. The drawing of lots, how
ever, would not preclude an inquiry, at
the suit of the State, into previous
irregularities. People v. Robertson,
27 Mich. 116.
* Whether jury trial in the case of
contested elections is matter of right,
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doctrine is here stated; but in one important case it was denied
that it could apply to the office of chief executive of the State.
The case was one in which the incumbent was a candidate for
re-election, and a majority of votes was cast for his opponent.
Certain spurious returns were, however, transmitted to the State
canvassers, which, together with the legal returns, showed a plu
rality for the incumbent, and he was accordingly declared chosen.
Proceedings being taken against him by quo warranto in the
Supreme Court, he objected to the jurisdiction, on the ground
that the three departments of the State government, the legisla
tive, the executive, and the judicial, were equal, co-ordinate, and
independent of each other, and that each department must be
and is the ultimate judge of the election and qualification of it
s
own member or members, subject only to impeachment and ap
peal to the people; that the question, who is rightfully entitled
to the office o
f governor, could in no case become a judicial ques
tion ; and that as the Constitution provides no means for ousting
a successful usurper o
f
either o
f
the three departments o
f
the
government, that power rests exclusively with the people, to be
exercised by them whenever they think the exigency requires it."
There is a basis o
f
truth in this argument: the executive o
f
the
State cannot be subordinated to the judiciary, and may, in general,
refuse obedience to writs by which this may be attempted.” But
when the question is
,
who is the executive o
f
the State, the
judges have functions to perform, which are at least as important
a
s
those o
f any other citizens, and the fact that they are judges
can never be a reason why they should submit to a usurpation.
A successful usurpation of the executive office can only be ac
complished with the acquiescence o
f
the other departments; and
the judges, for the determination o
f
their own course, must, in
some form, inquire into or take notice o
f
the facts. In a contro
versy o
f
such momentous import, the most formal and deliberate
inquiry that the circumstances will admit of is alone excusable;
and, when made and declared, the circumstances must be extraor
seems to be made a question. That
it is, see State v. Burnett, 2 Ala. 140;
St. 332; State r. Johnson, 26 Ark.
281. It is, however, conceded in
People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, dic
tum, People v. Albany, &c. R
.
R
. Co.,
57 N. Y. 161. That it is not, is held
in Ewing v. Filly, 43 Penn. St. 384;
Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penn.
Pennsylvania that, in a proceeding to
forfeit an office, jury trial is of right.
* Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4
Wis. 567.
* See ante, p
.
*116.
788 CONSTITUTIONAI, LIMITATIONS. [ch. xvii.
dinary in which it will not be effectual. In the case referred to,
the usurper, though the candidate of a party embracing half the
voters of the State, found himself utterly stripped of power by
the decision of the court against him ; public support fell away
from him, and success in his usurpation became an impossibility.
The decision guided and determined the popular sentiment, and
perhaps saved the State from disorder, violence, and anarchy."
Where, however, the question arises collaterally, and not in a
direct proceeding to try the title to the office, the correctness of
the decision of the canvassers cannot be called in question, but
must be conclusively presumed to be correct;” and where the
election was to a legislative office, the final decision, as well by
parliamentary law as by constitutional provisions, rests with the
legislative body itself, and the courts, as we have heretofore
seen,” cannot interfere.
The most important question which remains to be mentioned,
relates to the evidence which the courts are at liberty to receive,
and the facts which it is proper to spread before the jury
[*625] for their * consideration when an issue is made upon an
election for trial at law.
The questions involved in every case are, first, has there been
an election ? and second, was the party who has taken possession
of the office the successful candidate at such election, by having
received a majority of the legal votes cast 24 These are ques
1 Some attention to conflicts be
tween the several departments of
government was given by the author
* Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22
Barb. 72; Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33
N. Y. 603; Howard v. Diarmid, 26
Ark. 100.in an essay on Checks and Balances
in government, published in the “In
ternational Review,” for 1876. A
question like that above mentioned
could not arise in respect to the presi
dency, as Congress must canvass and
declare the result. In some recent
cases, in which the office of Governor
was in question, though the decision
was placed by the constitution in the
hands of the legislature, the final
result was only determined by popu
lar acquiescence. The difficulty was,
that the legislative authority was as
much in dispute as the executive.
The cases of South Carolina and
Louisiana are here specially referred to.
And see Hulseman r.
Rens, 41 Penn. St. 396, where it was
held that the court could not inter
fere summarily to set aside a certifi
cate of election, where it did not
appear that the officers had acted
corruptly, notwithstanding it was
shown to be based in part upon
forged returns.
* See ante, p. *133. See also
Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Penn.
St. 341.
* See cases cited, p. note.
Also State v. The Judge, 13 Ala. SO3;
People v. Robertson, 27 Mich. 116;
Commonwealth v. Emminger, 74
Penn. St. 479; Dobyns v. Weadon,
*622
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tions which involve mixed considerations of law and fact, and the
proper proceeding in which to try them in the courts is by quo
warranto, when no special statutory tribunal is created for the
purpose."
Upon the first question, we shall not add to what we have
already said. When the second is to be considered, it is to be
constantly borne in mind that the point of inquiry is the will of
the electors as manifested by their ballots ; and to this should all
the evidence be directed, and none that does not bear upon it
should be admissible.
We have already seen that the certificates or determinations of
the various canvassing boards, though conclusive in collateral in
quiries, do not preclude an investigation by the courts into the
facts which they certify. They are prima facie evidence, how
ever, even in the courts; * and this is so, notwithstanding altera
tions appear; the question of their fairness in such a case being
for the jury.” But back of this prima facie case the courts may
go, and the determinations of the State board may be corrected
by those of the district boards, and the latter by the ballots them
selves when the ballots are still in existence, and have been kept
as required by law.” If
,
however, the ballots have not been kept
a
s required b
y law, and surrounded b
y
such securities as the law
has prescribed with a view to their safe preservation as the best
evidence o
f
the election, it would seem that they should not be
received in evidence at all,” or, if received, that it should be left
50 Ind. 298. The right to the office
comes from the ballots, and not from
the commission. State v. Draper, 50
Mo. 353. Where the officers acted
fraudulently in the conduct o
f
a
n
election, their returns may be re
jected, and the result be arrived a
t
from other proofs exclusively. Su
pervisors v. Davis, 63 Ill. 405.
1 People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167;
People v. Cover, 50 Ill. 100. If the
proceeding is commenced before the
office which is in contest has expired,
it may be continued to a conclusion
afterwards. State v. Pierce, 35 Wis. 93.
* Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68;
Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb.
72; Calaveras County v. Brockway,
30 Cal. 325.
* State v. Adams, 2 Stew. 231.
See State v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422.
* People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich.
362; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233;
State v. Clerk o
f Passaic, 1 Dutch.
354; State v. Judge, &c., 13 Ala.
805; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259;
s. c. 8 N
.
Y
. 67; People v. Cicotte,
1
6 Mich. 283; Attorney-General v.
Ely, 4 Wis. 420. The ballot is al
ways the best evidence o
f
the voter's
action. Wheat v. Ragsdale, 27 Ind.
191; People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123.
* People v. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320.
But see People v. Higgins, 3 Mich.
233.
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to the jury to determine, upon al
l
the circumstances o
f
the case,
whether they constitute more reliable evidence than the inspect
ors' certificate," which is usually prepared immediately
[*626] on the close o
f
* the election, and upon actual count o
f
the ballots as then made b
y
the officers whose duty it
is to do so.
Something has already been said regarding the evidence which
can b
e
received where the elector's ballot is less complete and
perfect in it
s expression o
f
intention than it should have been.
There can be no doubt under the authorities that, whenever a
question may arise as to the proper application o
f
a ballot, any
evidence is admissible with a view to explain and apply it which
would be admissible under the general rules o
f
evidence for the
purpose o
f explaining and applying other written instruments.
But the rule, as it appears to us, ought not to g
o
further. The
evidence ought to be confined to proof o
f
the concomitant cir
cumstances; such circumstances as may be proved in support o
r
explanation o
f
a contract, where the parties themselves would
not be allowed to give testimony as to their actual intention,
when unfortunately the intention was ineffectually expressed.”
And we have seen that no evidence is admissible as to how par
ties intended to vote who were wrongfully prevented or excluded
from so doing. Such a case is one o
f wrong without remedy, so
far as candidates are concerned.” There is more difficulty, how
ever, when the question arises whether votes which have been
cast b
y
incompetent persons, and which have been allowed in the
canvass, can afterwards be inquired into and rejected because o
f
the want o
f qualification.
If votes were taken viva voce, so that it could always be deter
mined with absolute certainty how every person had voted, the
objections to this species o
f scrutiny after an election had been
held would not be very formidable. But when secret balloting
is the policy o
f
the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how
any elector has voted, except as h
e may voluntarily have waived
his privilege, and when consequently the avenues to correct in
formation concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against
judicial exploration, it seems exceedingly dangerous to permit
1 People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. vious New York cases. See also At
* People v. Pease, 27 N
.
Y
. 84, per torney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420.
Denio, Ch. J., commenting upon pre- * See ante, p. *620.
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any question to be raised upon this subject. For the evidence
voluntarily given upon any such question will usually come from
those least worthy of credit, who, if they have voted without
legal right in order to elect particular candidates, will be
equally ready to testify "falsely, if their testimony can [* 627]
be made to help the same candidates ; especially when,
if they give evidence that they voted the opposing ticket, there can
usually be no means, as they will well know, of showing the evi
dence to be untrue." Moreover, to allow such scrutiny is to hold
out strong temptation to usurpation of office, without pretence or
color of right; since the nature of the case, and the forms and
proceedings necessary to a trial are such that, if an issue may be
made on the right of every individual voter, it will be easy, in
the case of important elections, to prolong a contest for the major
part if not the whole of an official term, and to keep perpetually
before the courts the same excitements, strifes, and animosities
which characterize the hustings, and which ought, for the peace
of the community, and the safety and stability of our institutions,
to terminate with the close of the polls.”
Upon this subject there is very little judicial authority, though
legislative bodies, deriving their precedents from England, where
the system of open voting prevails, have always been accustomed
to receive such evidence, and have indeed allowed a latitude of
inquiry which makes more to depend upon the conscience of the
witnesses, and of legislative committees, in some cases, than upon
the legitimate action of the voters. The question of the right to
inquire into the qualifications of those who had voted at an elec
tion, on a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, was directly
presented in one case to the Supreme Court of New York, and
the court was equally divided upon it.” On error to the Court
of Appeals, a decision in favor
1. It has been decided in Wisconsin
that where an unqualified person is
called to prove that he voted at an
election, and declines to testify, the
fact of his having voted may be
proved, and then his declarations may
be put in evidence to show how he
voted. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 319.
This may give the incompetent voter
a double vote. First, he votes for
the ticket of his choice, and then, on
of the right was rendered with
a contest, he declares he voted the
other way, and a deduction is made
from the opposite vote accordingly.
See Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill.
34.
* This is one reason, perhaps, why
in the case of State officers a statutory
tribunal is sometimes provided with
powers of summary and final decision.
* People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588.
792 [CH. XVII.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
the concurrence of five judges, against three dissentients." The
same question afterwards came before the Supreme Court of
Michigan, and was decided the same way, though it appears from
the opinions that the court were equally divided in their views.”
To these cases we must refer for the full discussion of the rea
sons influencing the several judges; but future decisions alone
can give the question authoritative settlement.”
1 People v. Pease, 29 N. Y. 45.
* People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
See further the case of State v. Hil
mantel, 23 Wis. 422, where it was de
cided that those who had voted illeg
ally might be compelled to testify for
whom they voted. The question was
discussed but briefly, and as one of
privilege merely.
* Considerable stress was laid by
the majority of the New York Court
of Appeals on the legislative practice,
which, as it seems to us, is quite too
loose in these cases to constitute a
safe guide. Some other rulings in
that case also seem more latitudina
rian that is warranted by sound prin
ciple and a due regard to the secret
ballot system which we justly esteem
so important. Thus, Selden, J., says:
“When a voter refuses to disclose or
fails to remember for whom he voted,
I think it is competent to resort to
circumstantial evidence to raise a pre
sumption in regard to that fact. Such
is the established rule in election cases
before legislative committees, which
assume to be governed by legal rules
of evidence (Cush. Leg. Assem.
§§ 199 and 200); and within that
rule it was proper, in connection with
the other circumstances stated by the
witness Loftis, to ask him for whom
he interded to vote; not, however, on
the ground that his intention, as an
independent fact, could be material,
but on the ground that it was a cir
cumstance tending to raise a presump
tion for whom he did vote.” Now
as, in the absence of fraud or mis
take, you have arrived at a knowledge
of how the man voted, when you have
ascertained how, at the time, he in
tended to vote, it is difficult to dis
cover much value in the elector's
privilege of secrecy under this ruling.
And if “circumstances” may be
shown to determine how he probably
voted, in cases where he insists upon
his constitutional right to secrecy,
then, as it appears to us, it would be
better to abolish altogether the secret
ballot than to continue longer a sys
tem which falsely promises secrecy,
at the same time that it gives to party
spies and informers full license to in
vade the voter's privilege in secret
and surreptitious ways, and which
leaves jurors, in the absence of any
definite information, to act upon their
guesses, surmises, and vague conjec
tures as to the contents of a ballot.
Upon the right to inquire into the
qualifications of those who have voted,
in a proceeding by quo warranto to
test the right to a public office, Jus
tice Christiancy, in People v. Cicotte,
16 Mich. 311, expresses his views as
follows: —
“I cannot go to the extent of hold
ing that no inquiry is admissible in
any case into the qualification of vot
ers or the nature of the votes given.
Such a rule, I admit, would be easy
of application, and, as a general rule,
might not be productive of a great
amount of injustice, while the multi
tude of distinct questions of fact in
reference to the great number of
voters whose qualifications may be
contested, is liable to lead to some
embarrassment, and sometimes to
protracted trials, without a more
satisfactory result than would have
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been attained under a rule which
should exclude all such inquiries.
Still, I cannot avoid the conclusion
that in theory and spirit our constitu
tion and our statutes recognize as
valid those votes only which are given
by electors who possess the constitu
tional qualifications; that they recog
nize as valid such elections only as
are affected by the votes of a majority
of such qualified electors; and though
the election boards of inspectors and
canvassers, acting only ministerially,
are bound in their decisions by the
number of votes deposited in accord
ance with the forms of law regulating
their action, it is quite evident that
illegal votes may have been admitted
by the perjury or other fault of the
voters, and that the majority to which
the inspectors have been constrained
to certify and the canvassers to allow
has been thus wrongfully and ille
gally secured; and I have not been
able to satisfy myself that, in such a
case, these boards, acting thus minis
terially, and often compelled to admit
votes which they know to be illegal,
were intended to constitute tribunals
of last resort for the determination of
the rights of parties claiming an elec
tion. If this were so, and there were
no legal redress, I think there would
be much reason to apprehend that
elections would degenerate into mere
contests of fraud.
“The person having the greatest
number of the votes of legally quali
fied electors, it seems to me, has a
constitutional right to the office; and
if no inquiry can be had into the
qualification of any voter, here is a
constitutional right depending upon a
mode of trial unknown to the consti
tution, and, as I am strongly inclined
to think, opposed to its provisions.
I doubt the competency of the legis
lature, should they attempt it
,
which
I think they have not, to make the
decision o
f inspectors o
r
canvassers
final under our constitution.”
The opposite view is expressed
by Justice Campbell as follows (ib.
p
.
294): —
“The first inquiry is whether an
election can be defeated as to any
candidate by showing him to have
received illegal votes. The authori
ties upon election questions are, in
this country, neither numerous nor
satisfactory. In England, where
votes are given viva roce, it is always
easy to determine how any voter has
given his voice. And in some States
o
f
the Union, a system seems to pre
vail o
f numbering each ballot as
given, and also numbering the voter's
name on the poll list, so as to furnish
means o
f
verification when necessary.
It has always been held, and is not
disputed, that illegal votes d
o
not
avoid an election, unless it can be
shown that their reception affects the
result. And where the illegality con
sists in the casting o
f
votes b
y per
sons unqualified, unless it is shown
for whom they voted, it cannot be
allowed to change the result.
“The question of the power of
courts to inquire into the action o
f
the authorities in receiving o
r reject
ing votes is
,
therefore, very closely
connected with the power o
f inquiring
what persons were voted for b
y
those
whose qualifications are denied. It is
argued for the relator that neither o
f
these inquiries can be made. No use
can fairly be made in such a contro
versy as the present o
f
decisions o
r
practice arising out o
f any system o
f
open voting. The ballot system was
designed to prevent such publicity,
and not to encourage it
.
And the
course adopted b
y
legislative bodies
cannot be regarded as a safe guide
for courts of justice. There is little
uniformity in it
,
and much o
f it is
based o
n English precedents belong
ing to a different practice. The view
taken o
f
contested elections by these
popular bodies is not always accurate,
o
r
consistent with any settled princi
ples.
“There is no case so far as I have
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been able to discover, under any
system of voting by closed ballot,
which has held that any account could
be taken of rejected votes in a suit to
try title for office. The statutes here,
and probably elsewhere, require the
election to be made out by the votes
given. But it is plain enough that in
most cases it would be quite as easy
to determine for whom a rejected
voter would have voted as for whom
any other actually did vote. In many
cases it would be easier, because the
vote is always ready and tendered
with better opportunities of observa
tion than are given where it is received
and deposited. But the element of
uncertainty has been regarded as suf
ficient to cause the rejection of any
such inquiry, and, in most cases,
probably it would not be admissible
under the statutes. But the policy
which leads to this result must have
some bearing upon the construction
of the whole system.
“So far as I have been able to dis
cover by means of the somewhat im
perfect indexes on this head, there is
but one case in which the decision has
turned upon the propriety of allowing
inquiry into the qualifications of
voters, and the identification of their
tickets when claimed to be disqualified.
That case was the case of People v.
Pease, 27 N. Y. 45. In the Supreme
Court the judges, although arriving
at a general result, were equally di
vided on this point. In the Court of
Appeals, the judges elected to that
tribunal were also equally divided, and
the majority of the Supreme Court
judges, belonging to it by rotation,
turned the scale, and decided that the
inquiry was proper. The decision
was based chiefly upon English au
thorities ; the previous New York
decisions having turned principally on
other errors which rest upon some
what different grounds.
“New York, so far as may be in
ferred from the absence of decisions
elsewhere, seems, until recently, to
have been the only State preserving
the ballot system, in which the right
to office by election is open to exami
nation on the merits to any consid
erable extent. The courts of that
State have gone farther than any others
in opening the door to parol proof.
Some of the Western States have,
upon the authority of the New York
cases, permitted some of these matters
to be litigated, but they are not in
any majority. And it is quite mani
fest that the decisions have not in
general acted upon any careful con
sideration of the important questions
of public policy underlying the ballot
system, which are so forcibly explained
by Denio, Ch. J., in his opinion in
People v. Pease; and it is a little re
markable that in New York, while so
many doors have been opened by the
decisions, the law requires a
ll
the
ballots, except a single specimen o
f
each kind, to be destroyed; thus leav
ing the number o
f
votes o
f
each kind,
in al
l
cases, to be determined by the
inspectors, and rendering any correc
tion impossible. I think the weight
o
f reasoning is in favor of the view o
f
Judge Denio in the New York case,
that no inquiry can be made into the
legality o
f
votes actually deposited by
a voter upon any ground o
f personal
right as an elector.
“The reasons why such an inquiry
should be prevented do not necessarily
rest on any assumption that the in
spectors act throughout judicially,
although under our registration sys
tem that objection has a force which
would not otherwise be so obvious.
Neither do they rest in any degree
upon the assumption that one rule o
r
another is most likely to induce per
jury, as very hastily intimated in
People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But
a very strong ground for them is found
in the fact that our whole ballot system
is based upon the idea that, unless in
violable secrecy is preserved concern
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ing every voter's action, there can be
no safety against those personal or
political influences which destroy indi
vidual freedom of choice.
“It is altogether idle to expect
that there can be any such protection
where the voter is only allowed to
withhold his own oath concerning the
ticket he has voted, while any other
prying meddler can be permitted in a
court of justice to guess under oath
at it
s
contents. If the law could per
mit an inquiry a
t all, there is no reason
whatever for preventing an inquiry
from the voter himself, who alone can
actually know how he voted, and who
can suffer n
o
more b
y
being compelled
to answer than b
y having the fact es
tablished otherwise. The reason why
the ballot is made obligatory by our
constitution is to secure every one the
right of preventing any one else from
knowing how he voted, and there is
no propriety in any rule which renders
such a safeguard valueless.
“It has always been the case that
the rules o
f
evidence have, on grounds
o
f public policy, excluded proof tend
ing to explain how individuals have
acted in positions where secrecy was
designed for their protection or that
o
f
the public. No grand juror could
be permitted to disclose as a witness
the ballots given by himself o
r
others
upon investigations o
f
crime. In
formers cannot be compelled to dis
close to whom they have given their
information. And many official facts
are denied publicity. In al
l
o
f
these
cases, the rule is not confined to
one person any more than to another;
for public policy is against publication
from any source. And if
,
a
s
is clear,
a man is entitled to keep his own vote
secret, it is difficult to see how any
testimony whatever can be allowed,
from any source, to identify and ex
plain it
.
“The statutes contain some pro
visions bearing upon these topics with
considerable force. By sec. 47 o
f
the
Compiled Laws, every voter is com
pelled to deliver his ballot folded; and,
by sec. 52, the inspector is prohibited
from either opening o
r permitting it
to be opened.
“The devices adopted for creating
different appearances in the ballots o
f
different parties are such palpable
evasions o
f
the spirit o
f
the law as to
go very far towards destroying the
immunity o
f
the voter, and in some
States it has been found desirable to
attempt by statute the prevention o
f
such tricks; but the difficulty of doing
this effectually is exemplified in People
v
. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492, where the evi
dence seems to have shown that a
uniform variation may be entirely
accidental. Unless some such differ
ence exists, it would be idle to attempt
any proof how a person voted, and it
would be better to do away a
t
once
with the whole ballot than to have
legal tribunals give any aid o
r counte
nance to indirect violations of its
security; and the evidence received in
the present case exemplifies the im
propriety o
f
such investigations. In
some instances, a
t least, the only proof
that a voter, complained o
f
a
s illegal,
cast his ballot for one or the other of
these candidates, was, that he voted
a ticket externally appearing to belong
to one o
f
the two political parties, and
containing names o
f
both State and
county officers. To allow such proof
to be received in favor o
f
o
r against
any particular candidate on the ticket,
is to allow very remote circumstances
indeed to assume the name of evidence.
And the necessity of resorting to such
out-of-the-way proofs only puts in a
clearer light the impropriety and ille
gality o
f entering upon any such
inquiry, when the law sedulously de
stroys the only real proofs, and will
not tolerate a resort to them. And
the whole State is much more inter
ested than any single citizen can be,
in emancipating elections from all
those sinister influences, which have so
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great a tendency to coerce or deceive
electors into becoming the mere in
struments of others.
“But there are further provisions
bearing more directly on the propriety
and necessity of allowing no inquisi
tion into individual votes.
“County officers are among those
included under sec. 31 of the Compiled
Laws, which declares that ‘the persons
having the greatest number of votes
shall be deemed to have been duly
elected.’ The law does not confine
this to votes cast by authorized voters,
and can only be applied to votes cast .
and recorded in the manner provided
by law. And although this section,
standing alone, might be open to con
struction, yet, when the whole law is
taken together, there are provisions
not to be reconciled with any rule
allowing single voters and their votes
to be made the subject of inquiry. It
will not be denied, that an inquiry
into the legality of a particular voter's
qualifications, after his vote has been
cast, is of a strictly judicial nature;
and it cannot be proper or legal to
allow such an inquiry in one case, and
not in another. But it will be found
not only that the rejection of votes
from the count is required to be in
such a way as to preclude any con
sideration of the person giving or
putting them in, but that there are
cases where even a legal inquiry into
the ballots themselves is prevented.
“In the first place, when two or
more ballots are so folded together as
to present the appearance of one, and
if counted will make the ballots exceed
the names on the poll-list, they are to
be destroyed. And whenever, for any
other reason, the number of ballots
found in the box exceeds the number
of names on the corrected poll-lists,
the inspectors are required to draw
out and destroy unopened a number
equal to the excess. This is
,
o
f
course, upon the assumption that the
excess has probably been caused by
fraud, and assumes that no man's
vote ought to be counted, unless the
testimony o
f
the poll-lists shows that
h
e actually handed in his ballot. It
is
,
therefore, altogether likely, upon
any theory o
f probabilities, that, in
drawing out these extra ballots, they
will really be ballots lawfully put in,
and this probability is in the ratio
furnished b
y
a comparison o
f
numbers
between lawful and unlawful votes.
In other words, it is more than likely
to punish the innocent, instead o
f
the
guilty. The true method o
f arriving
a
t
the truth would be to inquire what
vote each voter on the list actually
cast, and destroy the remainder. The
absurdity o
f
this process upon such a
large scale is such as to need n
o point
ing out. But unless something very
like it is done in such a case as the
present, the result obtained by any
partial inquiry will be no better than
guesswork. Where votes are thrown
out, no one can tell whether the illegal
voter whose vote is sought to be as
sailed has not already had his vote
cancelled. The adoption o
f
the prin
ciple o
f
allotment is the most sensible
and practicable measure which could
be devised, and I cannot conceive how
it can be improved upon by any sub
sequent search.
“But when the inspectors have
made their returns to the county can
vassers, and b
y
those returns a tie vote
appears between two o
r
more candi
dates, who are highest on the list,
their right to the office is to be deter
mined b
y lot, and the person drawing
the successful slip is to be “deemed
legally elected to the office in question.’
Compiled Laws, $$ 76, 132, 133.
“In case the State canvassers (who
can only count the votes certified to
them) find a tie vote, the legisla
ture has power to choose between the
candidates. Constitution, art. 8
,
§ 5.
In these cases, there can be no further
scrutiny; and in the case o
f
State
officers, if such a scrutiny were had,
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no end could be reached within any
reasonable time, and there would be a
practical impossibility in attempting
to conduct it in any time within the offi
cial term, or to approach accuracy in a
count of some thousand or more
ballot-boxes before a jury. Yet State
officers are not less important to the
private elector, and, of course, are not
to the community at large, than local.
And the nearer a vote approaches a
tie, the more likely it is that a rigid
scrutiny might change its character.
There is no more reason for prevent
ing investigation behind the ballots in
the one case than in the other.
“The statute also takes very ef
ficient measures to prevent any need
less litigation by shutting out any
preliminary resort to the means of in
formation. If the officers do their
duty, no one else can ever know
whether their count is correct or not,
until a suit is brought and issue joined
upon it
.
The ballots are required to
b
e
sealed up, and not opened except
for the inspection of the proper au
thorities, in case o
f
a contest. The
only ballots open to public inspection
are those which are rejected upon the
canvass for defects apparent on their
face. These ballots are not sealed up
with the rest, but are filed; while,
therefore, it can be determined by
inspection whether votes which have
been thrown out should have been
counted, the law does not seem to
favor any unnecessary disturbance o
f
the official returns, and any one who
assumes to dispute an election is com
pelled to begin his suit before he can
have access to the means o
f proof.
This is not the usual course of litiga
tion, and the rule has a strong bearing
upon the policy to be deduced from
the law.
“ Under our statute, there is no
general provision which makes the
canvass for local officers conclusive in
all cases, and therefore the rule is
recognized that the election usually
depends upon the ballots, and not
upon the returns. These being writ
ten and certain, the result o
f
a recount
involves no element o
f difficulty o
r
ambiguity, beyond the risk o
f mis
takes in counting o
r footing up num
bers, which may, in some respects, b
e
more likely in examining the ballots
o
f
a whole county than in telling off
those o
f
a town or ward, but which
involves no great time o
r
serious dis
advantage. But the introduction o
f
parol evidence concerning single voters
in a considerable district, can rarely
reach all cases o
f illegality effectually,
and must so multiply the issues as to
seriously complicate the inquiry. And
when we consider that, for many
years, legislation has been modified
for the very purpose of suppressing
illegal voting, and when we know that
hundreds of elections must have been
turned by the ballots o
f unqualified
voters, the absence o
f any body o
f
decisions upon the subject is very
strong proof that inquiry into private
ballots is felt to be a violation of the
constitutional safeguard on which we
pride ourselves as distinguishing our
elections from those which we are
wont to regard as conducted on un
safe principles.”
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ABBREVIATIONS, -
when ballots rendered ineffectual by, 766–768.
AB INCONVENIENTI,
doctrine of, in construction, 81–86.
ACCUSATIONS OF CRIME,
are actionable, per se
,
528.
self, not to be compelled, 383-891.
how made with a view to investigation and trial, 379.
(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)
varying form o
f,
cannot subject party to second trial, 406.
ACCUSED PARTIES,
testimony of, in their own behalf, 389–391.
confessions of 385–388.
-
(See PERsonAL LIBERTY.)
ACQUIESCENCE,
in irregular organization o
f corporations, 312.
ACTION, .
against election officers for refusing to receive votes, 777.
for negligent o
r improper construction o
f public works, 712.
for property taken under right o
f
eminent domain, 699-704.
(See EMIN ENT DomAIN.)
for exercise o
f legislative power by municipal bodies, 253, 254.
for slander and libel, rules for, 527–532.-
modification o
f,
b
y
statute, 538.
(See LIBERTY of SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.)
rights in, cannot be created b
y
mere legislative enactment, 459.
nor taken away b
y legislature, 449.
nor appropriated under right o
f
eminent domain, 657.
nor forfeited, except b
y
judicial proceedings, 449–452.
statutory penalties may be taken away before recovery o
f judgment,
449, n., 480, n.
limitation to suits, 453-456.
statutes for, are unobjectionable in principle, 453.
subsequent repeal o
f
statute cannot revive rights, 358, 454.
principle on which statutes are based, 455.
cannot apply against a party not in default, 455.
must give parties a
n opportunity for trial, 456.
for causing death b
y
negligence, &c., 725.
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ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
(See STATUTEs.)
ADJOURNMENT OF SUIT,
from regard to religious scruples of party, 595, n.
ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE,
on its own motion, 160.
by the governor, 160.
ADMINISTRATORS,
(See ExECUtors AND ADMINISTRATORs.)
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,
exercise of, by the Revolutionary Congress, 7.
conferred upon courts of United States, 12.
ADMISSIONS,
of accused parties as evidence, 384–391.
(See CoNFEssions.)
ADVERTISEMENT,
notice to foreign parties by, 505, 506.
not effectual to warrant a personal judgment, 506.
AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT,
not to be taxed, 24, 601–604.
AGREEMENTS,
(See CoNTRActs.)
ALABAMA,
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 133, n.
exercise of the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
bills, how to be signed, 165, n.
legislative journals to be signed by presiding officer, 165, n.
no law to embrace more than one object, to be expressed in title, 172, n.
right of jury to determine the law in cases of libel, 399, n.
protection of person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 521, n.
privilege of legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused. 596.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n
.
ALIENS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 37, 38, 753.
ALIMONY,
payment o
f,
cannot b
e ordered b
y
legislature, 137.
decree for, not valid unless process served, 507.
AMBASSADORS,
jurisdiction o
f
United States courts in respect to, 14.
AMENDMENT,
o
f
money bills, may be made b
y
Senate, 160.
o
f
indictments, 331.
o
f statutes, 183–185.
republication o
f
statute amended, 183, 184.
b
y
implication, 185.
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AMENDMENT, - continued.
at the same session of their passage, 186.
of defective proceedings by legislation, 359, 462–477.
of State constitutions, 28.
(See STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)
AMERICAN COLONIES,
(See Colos IEs.)
AMUSEMENT,
regulation of places of 749.
APPEAL,
right of, may be taken away, 481.
effect of change in the law pending an appeal, 477.
APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE,
(See OFFICE.)
APPORTIONMENT,
of powers between the States and the nation, 2.
between the departments of the State government, 42–47, 49, 109–112.
of taxes, 617.
of debts and property on division of municipal corporations, 233,234, n.
(See TAXAtion.)
APPRAISAL, -
of private property taken by the public, 699–712.
APPRAISEMENT LAWS,
how far invalid, 355.
APPRENTICE,
control of master over, 421.
APPROPRIATION,
-
of private property to public use, 652.
(See EMINENT DomAIN.)
APPROVAL OF LAWS,
(See GoverNort.)
ARBITRARY ARRESTS,
illegality of 368–372.
(See PERsonAL LIBERTY.)
ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,
-
distinguished from taxation, 611.
ARBITRARY POWER,
unknown among common-law principles, 29.
cannot be exercised under pretence of taxation, 611, 632, 633.
ARBITRARY RULES,
of construction, danger of, 72, 74, 75, 102.
of presumption, 403, n.
ARBITRATION,
submission of controversies to, 500.
ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI,
in constitutional construction, 85, 86.
ARKANSAS,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted by the legislature, 133, n.
exercise of the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
51
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ARKANSAS, - continued.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
limited time for introduction of new bills, 169, n.
no law to embrace more than one object, to be expressed in title, 172, n.
protection of person and property by the law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in
,
521, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f
competency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
ARMS,
right to bear, 433,434.
exemption from bearing, o
f persons conscientiously opposed, 595, 596.
ARMY,
quartering in private houses, 378.
jealousy o
f standing army, 433.
ARREST,
privilege o
f legislators from, 163.
o
n criminal process. (See CRIMEs.)
o
f judgment, new trial after, 406 and n.
ART, WORKS OF, -
criticism o
f,
how far privileged, 568, 569.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
adoption of, 8.
why superseded, 8
,
9
.
ASSESSMENTS,
for local improvements, generally made in reference to benefits, 619, 620.
special taxing districts for, 619.
not necessarily made on property according to value, 619.
are made under the power o
f taxation, 620.
not covered b
y
the general constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
620.
not unconstitutional to make benefits the basis for, 621, 629, 636.
apportionment necessary in cases o
f
622.
may b
e
made in reference to frontage, 631, 632.
but each lot cannot be compelled to make the improvement in front o
f it
,
632, 633.
for drains, levees, &c., 635. -
in labor for repair o
f
roads, 637, 638.
ATTAINDER,
meaning o
f
the term, 317.
bills o
f,
not to b
e passed b
y
State legislatures, 10, 42,317.
cases o
f
such bills, 318–322.
bills o
f
pains and penalties included in, 319.
ATTORNEYS,
exclusion o
f,
from practice is a punishment, 322.
right to notice o
f proceedings therefor, 416, n., 506, n.
laws requiring service from, without compensation, 494,
punishment o
f,
for misconduct, 416, 417.
(See Counsel.)
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AUTHORS,
not to be assailed through their works, 569.
criticism of works o
f,
how far privileged, 569.
B.
BAIL,
accused parties entitled to, 379–381.
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 381.
o
n
habeas corpus, 430.
control o
f
bail over principal, 422.
BAILMENT,
(See CoMMON CARRIERs.)
BALLOT,
correction o
f
abuses by, 234, n.
system o
f voting by, generally prevails, 760.
right o
f
the elector to secrecy, 763.
must b
e complete in itself, 764.
abbreviated names, 766.
how far open to explanation, 769, 770, 790.
(See ELECTIONs.)
BANKRUPTCY,
power o
f Congress over, 11.
legislation by the States, 24, 359, 360.
revival o
f
debts barred by discharge, 359.
BEARING ARMS,
persons conscientiously opposed to, are excused, 595, 596.
constitutional right o
f,
433.
BEASTS,
police regulations regarding, 749.
regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 722.
BENEFITS,
may b
e
taken into account in assessments for local improvements, 621,
629, 636.
what may b
e
deducted when private property is taken b
y
the public, 706.
BETTERMENT LAWS,
principle of
,
484.
are constitutional, 485.
owner cannot b
e compelled to improve his lands, 482.
not applicable to lands appropriated b
y
the public, 487, n
.
BETTING ON ELECTIONS,
illegality of
,
774.
BEVERAGES,
police regulations to prevent the sale o
f intoxicating, 725.
BILL OF RIGHTS (English),
a declaratory statute, 30, 315.
BILL OF RIGHTS (National),
not originally inserted in Constitution, 314.
reasons for omission, 314.
objections to Constitution on that ground, 315–317.
afterwards added b
y
amendments, 317.
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BILL OF RIGHTS (State),
generally found in constitution, 44.
classes of provisions in, 45, 46.
what prohibitions not necessary, 212.
BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,
constitutional provisions for three readings, 96, 97, 170.
title of, to express object, 98, 172–183.
when they become laws, 158, n.
(See LEGISLATURE of the STATE.)
BILLS OF ATTAINDER,
not to be passed by State legislature, 19, 42, 317.
meaning of attainder, 317.
cases of such bills, 318, 322.
BILLS OF CREDIT,
States not to emit, 19.
BILLS OF PAINS AND PENALTIES,
included in bills of attainder, 319.
BLASPHEMY,
punishment o
f,
does not violate religious liberty, 588–593.
nor the liberty o
f speech, 527.
published in account o
f judicial proceedings is not privileged, 560.
BOATS,
ſerry, licensing o
f
740.
speed o
f,
o
n navigable waters may b
e regulated b
y
States, 740.
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS,
not to be affected b
y retrospective legislation, 472, 478, n
.
BONDS,
issue o
f, b
y
municipalities in aid o
f
internal improvements, 144, 260–272.
BOOKS,
criticism o
f,
how far privileged, 569.
indecent, sale of, may b
e prohibited, 749.
BOUNTIES,
when earned, become vested rights, 480.
payment o
f,
to soldiers b
y municipal corporations, 274–281.
BOUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS,
b
y
municipal corporations, how far valid, 274–281.
BRIDGES,
erection of, b
y
State authority over navigable waters, 738, 739.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERs.)
BUILDINGS,
condemnation and forfeiture o
f,
a
s nuisances, 728.
destruction of, to prevent spread o
f fires, 655, n.
appropriation of, under right o
f
eminent domain, 654.
BURIAL,
right of, subject to control, 247, n.
BURLESQUES,
libels b
y
means of, 529.
BY-LAWS,
o
f municipal corporations, 241–247.
must be reasonable, 243–247.
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BY-LAWS, - continued.
must be certain, 246.
must not conflict with constitution of State or nation, 241, 242.
nor with statutes of State, 242.
imposing license fees, 245.
C.
CALIFORNIA,
Mexican law retained in the system of 35, n.
divorces not to be granted by the legislature, 133, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
no law to embrace more than one object, to be expressed in title, 172, n.
right of jury to determine the law in cases of libel, 399, n.
protection of person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in
,
520, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f incompetency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
CANALS, -
appropriation o
f private property for, 664.
when are private property, 738, n
.
CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE,
criticism o
f,
how far privileged, 539–551, 567.
ineligibility of
,
how to affect election, 781.
CANVASSERS,
act ministerially in counting and returning votes, 784.
whether they may b
e compelled b
y
mandamus to perform duty, 785.
certificate of, conclusive in collateral proceedings, 786.
(See ELECTIONs.)
CARRIERS,
regulation o
f charges o
f
745.
police regulations making them liable for beasts killed, 725, n.
change o
f
common-law liability o
f,
b
y
police regulations, 722-725, 742-746.
may b
e
made responsible for death caused b
y
negligence, &c., 723.
but not for injuries for which they are not responsible, 723, n.
CATTLE,
police regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 723.
CEMETERIES,
further use o
f,
may b
e prohibited when they become nuisances, 747.
CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS,
in England and America, 522–526.
CENTRALIZATION,
American system the opposite o
f
228.
CHARACTER,
bad, o
f attorney, sufficient reason to exclude him from practice, 416.
slander of, 551–553.
good, o
f
defendant in libel suit, n
o
defence to false publication, 579.
benefit of, in criminal cases, 403, n.
CHARTERS,
o
f liberty, 32.
colonial, swept away by Revolution, 35.
exceptions o
f
Connecticut and Rhode Island, 35.
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CHARTERS, - continued.
forfeiture o
f,
is a judicial question, 128,
municipal, do not constitute contracts, 233.
control o
f legislature over, 232, 233.
construction o
f
235, 257.
(See MUNICIPAL Corporations.)
o
f private corporations are contracts, 339.
police regulations affecting, 718–725.
strict construction o
f
494–497.
amendment of 339, 719.
CHASTITY,
accusation o
f
want of, not actionable per se, 529.
statutory provisions on the subject, 530.
CHECKS AND BALANCES,
in constitutions, 44.
CHILDREN,
control o
f parent, &c., over, 420.
obtaining possession of, by habeas corpus, 431.
decree for custody o
f,
in divorce suits, 507.
CHRISTIANITY,
its influence in the overthrow o
f
slavery, 364, 365.
in what sense part o
f
the law o
f
the land, 588–592.
(See RELIGious LIBERTY.)
CHURCH ENDOWMENTS,
not to b
e
taken away b
y
legislature, 334, n
.
CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS,
forbidden b
y
State constitutions, 584.
CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS,
powers and control o
f 580, n
.
discipline o
f members, 542, n.
CITIES AND WILLAGES,
(See MUNICIPAL Corporations.)
CITIZENS,
who are, 13.
o
f
the several States, privileges and immunities o
f,
14, 19, 20, 490–498.
discriminations in taxation of, 498, 606.
jurisdiction o
f
United States courts in respect to, 12–14, 361.
CIVIL RIGHTS,
protection o
f,
b
y
amendments to constitution, 742-746.
discriminations not to be made in, on account o
f religious beliefs, 580–586.
(See CITIZENs; CLAss LEGISLATION.)
CLASS LEGISLATION,
private legislation which grants privileges, 487–498.
party petitioning for, estopped from disputing validity, 488.
public laws may be local in application, 488.
special rules for particular occupations, 489, 492.
proscription for opinion's sake unconstitutional, 489.
suspensions o
f
laws must b
e general, 490, 491.
each individual entitled to be governed b
y
general rules, 490, 491.
discriminations should b
e
based upon reason, 492.
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CLASS LEGISLATION, - continued.
equality of rights, &c., the aim of the law, 493.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 493-498.
discriminations not to be made on account of religious beliefs, 580–586.
CLERICAL ERRORS,
in statutes, disregarding, 186, n.
COINING MONEY,
power over, 11.
COLLUSION,
conviction by, no bar to new prosecution, 404, n.
COLONIES,
union of, before Revolution, 6.
authority of the Crown and Parliament in, 7.
Revolutionary Congress and it
s powers, 8
.
controversy with the mother country, 31, 32.
legislatures of, 33.
substitution o
f
constitutions for charters of, 35.
censorship o
f
the press in, 522, 523.
COLOR,
not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 13, 753.
COLORADO,
special statutes authorizing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to b
e granted b
y
the legislature, 134, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title o
f
acts to embrace the object, 173, n
.
municipalities of
,
restrained from aiding in public improvements, 266, n.
protection o
f person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in
,
522, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
religious liberty in
,
583, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
COMMERCE,
power o
f
Congress to regulate, 11.
State regulations valid when they d
o
not interfere with those o
f
Congress,
726–733.
(See Police Power.)
State taxation o
f
subjects o
f
732, 733.
(See TAXATION.)
in intoxicating drinks, how far State regulations may affect, 725-728.
COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE,
collection o
f
information by, 163.
contempts o
f witnesses, how punished, 164.
employment o
f
counsel before, 168, n
.
COMMON CARRIERS,
police regulations regarding, 719–725.
(See RAILwAY CoMPANIES.)
COMMON LAW,
Federal courts acquire no jurisdiction from, 25, 26, 535.
pre-existing the Constitution, 28.
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COMMON LAW, - continued.
what it consists in, 28.
it
s general features, 29.
modification of, b
y
statutes, 30.
colonists in America claimed benefits of, 31, 32.
how far in force, 31, n.
evidences of, 33.
decisions under, as precedents, 64.
gradual modification of, 67.
to b
e kept in view in construing constitutions, 74.
statutes in derogation of, 74, n
.
not to control constitutions, 74.
municipal by-laws must harmonize with, 246, 247.
rules o
f liability for injurious publications, 522, 527–532.
modification o
f, by statute, 538.
modification b
y police regulations o
f
common-law liability o
f carriers,
722–725.
COMMON RIGHT,
statutes against, said to b
e void, 200–204.
COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,
must have consent o
f Congress, 19.
are inviolable under United States Constitution, 335.
COMPENSATION,
for private property appropriated b
y
the public, 699.
(See EMINENT DomAIN.)
what the tax-payer receives as an equivalent for taxes, 620.
COMPLAINTS,
for purposes o
f search-warrant, 372.
o
f
crime, how made, 379.
COMPULSORY TAXATION,
b
y
municipal bodies, 285–288.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS,
full faith and credit to be given in each State to those o
f
other States,
20–22. -
parties and privies estopped by, 57–66, 511.
but not in controversy with new subject-matter, 61.
strangers to suit not bound by, 60.
irregularities do not defeat, 511.
(See JURISDICTION.)
CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION,
power o
f
the States to adopt, 144–147.
CONDITIONS,
what may b
e imposed o
n right o
f
suffrage, 451, n., 757, 758.
(See ELEctions.)
precedent to exercise o
f right o
f
eminent domain, 658.
CONFEDERACY OF 1643,
brought about b
y
tendency o
f
colonies to union, 6.
CONFEDERATE DEBT,
not to b
e
assumed o
r paid, 13.
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CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF,
adoption o
f,
8
.
authority to supersede, 9
,
n
.
CONFESSIONS,
dangerous character of, as evidence, 385.
must appear to have been made voluntarily, 385.
excluded if solicitations or threats have been used, 386.
will not prove the corpus delicti, 386.
CONFIDENCE,
communications in, when privileged, 533, 534.
between attorney and client, is client's privilege, 412,413, and n
.
CONFIRMING INVALID PROCEEDINGS,
o
f
a judicial nature, 129-131.
admissible when deſects are mere irregularities, 462.
(See RETRospective LAws.)
CONFISCATIONS,
require judicial proceedings, 450, 451.
during the Revolutionary War, 320.
CONFLICT OF LAWS,
in divorce cases, 502 and n.
(See UNconstitutioNAL LAws.)
CONFRONTING WITH WITNESSES,
in criminal cases, 392 and n.
CONGRESS OF 1690,
brought together by tendency o
f
colonies to union, 6.
CONGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION,
powers assumed and exercised by, 6–8.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
general powers o
f
11–14.
enabling acts by, for formation o
f
State constitutions, 38–41.
cannot divest vested rights, 449.
exercise o
f power o
f
eminent domain by, 653.
regulations o
f
commerce by, are supreme, 725, 737.
(See PolicE Power.)
CONNECTICUT,
charter government of, 35.
municipalities of
,
restrained from aiding public improvements, 266, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection o
f
person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in
,
518, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious liberty in, 584, n.
CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF,
(See RELIGious LIBERTY, 580–583.)
CONSENT,
conviction b
y
collusion n
o bar to new prosecution, 404, n
.
cannot confer jurisdiction o
f subject-matter upon courts, 499.
cannot authorize jury trial b
y
less than twelve jurors, 395 and n.
is a waiver o
f irregularities in legal proceedings, 511.
waiver o
f
constitutional privileges by, 219, 393, n., 488 and n.
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CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,
caused by exercise of legal right give no ground of complaint, 481.
do not constitute a taking of property, 676-680.
are covered by assessment of damages when property taken by the public,
711.
but not such as result from negligence or improper construction, 712.
CONSTITUTION,
definition of, 2, 3.
object of, in the American system, 46, 47.
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND,
theory of 4.
power of Parliament under, 4.
developed by precedents, 62, n.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
origin of 6–9.
ratification of, 8, 9.
government of enumerated powers, formed by, 10, 210.
general powers of the government under, 11–14.
judicial powers under, 14–16, 26.
(See Courts of the UNITED STATEs.)
prohibition by, of powers to the States, 19, 361, 752.
guaranty of republican government to the States, 23.
implied prohibitions on the States, 24.
and on municipal corporations, 241.
reservation of powers to States and people, 25.
difference between, and State constitutions, 11, 209.
construction of, 10, 11, 25.
amendment of State constitutions, how limited by, 41, 42.
new amendments to, 12.
protection of person and property by, as against State action, 314–361.
bill of rights not at first inserted in, and why, 314.
addition of, afterwards, 315–317.
bills of attainder prohibited by, 317–322.
(See BILLs of ATTAINDER.)
er post facto laws also forbidden, 323–333.
(See Ex post facto LAws.)
laws impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 333–361.
what is a contract, 333–339.
what charters of incorporation are, 339, 340.
whether release of taxation is contract, 341, 346.
whether States can relinquish right of eminent domain, 343, 652.
or the police power, 345, 652.
general laws of the States not contracts, 347.
what the obligation of the contract consists in, 653.
power of the States to control remedies, 351–360.
and to pass insolvent laws, 359, 360.
(See OBLIGATION OF CoNTRACTs.)
police regulations by the States, when in conflict with, 720, 737.
(See PolicE Power.)
taxation of the subjects of commerce by the States, 732, 733.
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CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,
compared with that of the United States, 11, 209.
formation and amendment of, 28–47.
conditions on, imposed by Congress, 39, n.
construction of, 48–103.
not the source of individual rights, 47.
(See StATE CoNst ITUTIONs: CoNsTRUCTION of STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS,
for formation and amendment of State constitutions, 38–41.
proceedings o
f,
a
s bearing o
n
construction o
f
constitution, 80, 81.
of 1787 sat with closed doors, 524.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,
meaning o
f
the term, 3
.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES,
may b
e
waived generally, 219. (See WAIvER.)
CONSTRUCTION, -
meaning o
f
and necessity for, 48, 49.
o
f
United States Constitution and laws by United States courts, 15.
o
f
State constitution and laws b
y
State courts, 16–18, 361.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
meaning o
f
the term “construction,” 49, n.
necessity for, 48.
questions o
f,
arise whenever powers to b
e exercised, 50.
who first to decide upon, 50–52.
in certain States judges may be called upon for opinions in advance, 51.
in what cases construction b
y legislature o
r
executive to b
e final, 51–54.
in what cases not, 53, 54.
when questions o
f,
are addressed to two o
r
more departments, 53.
final decision upon, rests generally with judiciary, 54–57, 65, 66.
reasons for this, 55.
this does not imply pre-eminence o
f authority in the judiciary, 56, n.
the doctrine o
f
res adjudicata, 58–66.
decisions once made binding upon parties and privies, 58, 59.
force o
f judgment does not depend on reasons given, 60.
strangers to suit not bound by, 61.
nor the parties in a controversy about a new subject-matter, 61.
the doctrine o
f
stare decisis, 58–66.
only applicable within jurisdiction o
f
court making the decision, 63.
importance o
f
precedents, 62, n
. -
when precedents to b
e disrega ded, 65.
when other departments to follow decisions o
f
the courts, and when
not, 65, 66.
uniformity o
f construction, importance o
f
67.
not to be affected b
y
changes in public sentiment, 67.
words o
f
the instrument to control, 68–70, 79, 102, n., 158.
intent o
f people in adopting it to govern, 67–70.
intent to be found in words employed, 68 and n., 70.
whole instrument to be examined, 70, 71, 72, n
.
words not to be supposed employed without occasion, 71.
effect to b
e given to whole instrument, 71.
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CONSTRUCTION ( F STATE CONSTITUTIONS, - continued.
irreconcilable provisions, 71 and n.
general intent as opposed to particular intent, 72 and n.
words to be understood in their ordinary sense, 72, 102, n.
of art, to be understood in technical sense, 73.
importance of the history of the law to, 3, 79.
common law to be ke it n view, 74–76.
but not to control constitution, 74.
whether provisions in derogation o', should be strictly construed, 74, n.
arbitrary rules o
f,
dangerous, 73–76, 102.
and especially inapplicable to constitutions, 71.
same word presumed employed in same sense throughout, 75.
t is not a conclusive rule, 75.
operation to be prospective, 76.
implied powers to carry into e ect express powers, 77, 78.
power granted in general terms is coextensive with the terms, 78.
when constitution prescribes conditions to a right, legislature cannot add
others, 78.
mischief to be remedied, consideration o
f
79.
prior sate o
f
the law to b
e examined, 80.
proceedings o
f
constitutional convention may be consulted, 80.
reasons why unsatisfactory, 80, 81.
weight o
f
contemporary and practical construction, 81, 82.
the argument ab inconvenienti, 82–85, 86, n
.
deference to construction b
y
executive officers, 83, 84.
plain intent not to be defeated by, 84–88.
injustice o
f provisions will not render them void, 87, 88.
nor authorize courts to construe them away, 88.
doubtful cases of, duty o
f
officers acting in, 88, 89.
directory and mandatory statutes, doctrine of, 89–94.
not applicable to constitutions, 94–99.
has been sometimes applied, 95–97.
authorities generally the other way, 98.
self-executing provisions, 99–102.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES,
b
y
judiciary conclusiveness o
f
115.
to be such as to give them effect, if possible, 223.
conflict with constitution not to be presumed, 224.
directory and mandatory, 83–94.
contemporary and practical, weight to be given to, 81–86.
to b
e prospective, 461.
-
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE, 504, 505.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION,
force and effect of, 81–86.
CONTEMPTS,
o
f
the legislature, punishment of, 161–163.
o
f legislative committees, 164.
n
o jury trial in cases o
f
394, n
.
CONTESTED ELECTIONS,
right o
f
the courts to determine upon, 787.
(See ELECTIONs.)
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CONTESTED FACTS,
cannot be settled by statute, 117, 126, 127.
CONTESTED SEATS,
legislative bodies to decide upon, 161.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
-
powers assumed and exercised by, 6–8.
CONTINGENT LEGISLATION,
authority of the States to adopt, 142, 146, n., 147, n.
CONTRACTS,
for lobby services, illegal, 165, 166.
to influence elections, are void, 774.
cannot be made for individuals by legislative act, 459 and n.
charters of municipal corporations do not constitute, 231—233.
of private corporations are, 340.
of municipal corporations ultra vires void, 237.
invalid, may be validated by legislature, 464–479.
obligation of, not to be violated, 153, 333.
(See OBLIGATION of CoNTRActs.)
COPYRIGHT,
Congress may secure to authors, 12.
COR: ORATE CHARTERS,
(See CHARTERs.)
CORPORATE FRANCHISES, -
may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 655.
CORPORATE PROPERTY,
legislative control of, 289.
CORPORATIONS,
organization of, not a judicial function, 122, n.
private, may be authorized to take lands for public use, 670–672.
irregular organization of, may be valida'ed, 463,467, n.
(See CHARTERs, MUNICIPAL CorportATIONs.)
CORPUS DELICTI,
not to be proved by confessions, 386.
CORRESPONDENCE,
private, inviolab lity of 375 and n.
COUNSEL,
constitutional right to, 326, 327, 408–417.
oath of 409 and n.
duty of 409, 410, 413, 417.
denial of, in England, 409–411.
court to assign, for poor persons, 412.
whether those assigned may refuse to act, 412.
privilege of
,
is the privilege o
f
the client, 413 and n
.
independence o
f
413 and n., 416, n.
not at liberty to withdraw from cause, except b
y
consent, 413.
how far he may g
o
in pressing for acquittal, 414, 415.
duty of
,
a
s between the court and the prisoner, 413, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 415, 416.
summary punishment o
f,
for misconduct, 416.
limitation o
f
client's control over, 417 and n.
(Sce Atroit NEYs.)
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COUNSEL, - continued.
may be employed before 'egislative committees, 166.
but not as lobbies, 166, n.
not liable to action for what he may say in judical proceedings, 553–556.
unless irrelevant to the case, 555.
not privileged in afterwards publishing his argument, if it contains injuri
ous re ection , 509.
newspaper publisher not justified in publishing speech of a criminal re
flecting on his counsel, 568.
COUNTERFEITING,
Congress may provide for punishment of 11, 25.
States also may punish, 25.
COUNTIES AND TOWNS,
difference from chartered incorporations, 296.
(See MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs.)
COUNTY SEAT,
change of, 481.
COURTS,
duty o
f,
to refuse to execute unconstitutional laws, 86, n., 98, 99, 194
e
t
e /.
contested elections to be determined by, 786.
not to be directed b
y legislature in decisions, 114–116.
action o
f,
not to b
e
set aside b
y legislature, 116.
must act b
y
majorities, 117.
• not to b
e open o
n
election days, 773.
power to declare, laws unconstitutional a delicate one, 194, 195.
will not be exercised b
y
bare quorum, 197.
nor unless necessary, 198.
nor on complaint o
f
one not interested, 199.
nor o
f
one who has assented, 199.
will not declare laws void because solely o
f unjust provisions, 199–204.
nor because in violation o
f
fundamental principles, 205–207.
nor because conflicting with the spirit o
f
the constitution, 208–210.
nor unless a clear repugnancy between the laws and the constitution.
209–213.
special, for trial o
f rights o
f particular individuals, 492.
of star chamber, 423.
o
f
high commission, 423.
martial, 394, n.
o
f
the United States, to be created b
y Congress, 12.
general powers of, 14.
removal o
f
causes to, from State courts, 15.
to follow State courts as to State law, 16, 17.
to decide finally upon United States laws, &c., 14, 361.
require statutes to apportion jurisdiction, 26.
have n
o
common-law jurisdiction, 26.
in what cases may issue writs o
f
habeas corpus, 426–428.
CREDIT,
bills o
f
19.
CREDITOR,
control o
f
debtor by, 422.
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CRIMES,
committed abroad, punishment o
f,
155.
legislative convictions o
f prohibited, 19, 42, 317.
e
x post facto laws prohibited, 19, 42, 323.
punishment o
f,
b
y
servitude, 366.
search-warrants for evidence of
.
(See SEARCHES AND SEizures.)
accusations of, how made, 379.
presumption o
f
innocence, 379, 381.
right o
f
accused party to bail, 380, 381.
prisoner refusing to plead, 382.
trial to be speedy, 382, 383. º
and public, 383.
and not inquisitorial, 384.
prisoner's right to make statement, 384–392.
confessions as evidence, 385–392.
prisoner to be confronted with the witnesses, 392.
exceptional cases, 392.
to b
e b
y jury, 379, 394.
jury must consist o
f
twelve, 394.
right to jury cannot be waived, 395.
prisoner's right to challenges, 395.
jury must be from vicinage, 395, 396.
must unanimously concur in verdict, 396.
must b
e left free to act, 396.
judge not to express opinion upon the facts, 397.
-
nor to refuse to receive the verdict, 397.
but is to give instruction in the law, 399.
how far jury may judge o
f
the law, 398-401.
acquittal by jury is final, 398, 399.
accused not to b
e
twice put in jeopardy, 403-406.
what is legal jeopardy, 404.
when molle prosequi equivalent to acquittal, 404.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 405.
second trial after verdict set aside, 405, 406.
cruel and unusual punishments prohibited, 400–408.
counsel to be allowed, 408-417.
oath of, 409 and n.
duty of, 409, 410, 413, 416.
denial of, in England, 410.
court to designate, for poor persons, 412.
whether one may refuse to act, 412.
privilege o
f,
is the privilege o
f
the client, 413 and n.
not at liberty to withdraw from case, except b
y
consent, 413.
how far h
e may g
o
in pressing for acquittal, 414, 415.
duty of
,
a
s between the court and the prisoner, 413, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 415, 416.
summary punishment of, for misconduct, 416, 506, n.
not to be made the instrument o
f injustice, 417.
habeas corpus for imprisoned parties, 418–432.
accusations o
f,
are libellous, per se
,
530-534.
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CRIMES, -continued.
but privileged if made in course of judicial proceedings, 551, 553.
violations of police regulations of States, 750.
CRITICISM,
of works of art and literary productions is privileged, 568.
but not the personal character of the author, 569.
of public entertainments and sermons, 569, n.
CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,
succession to, may be changed by Parliament, 105.
union of the colonies under, 6.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,
constitutional prohibition o
f,
406–408.
what are, 407, 408.
CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENTS,
for counterfeiting money, 25.
under State and municipal laws, 242.
CURATIVE LAWS, 460–479.
CURTESY, ESTATE BY THE,
power o
f legislature to modify o
r abolish, 447.
CUSTODY,
o
f
wards, apprentices, servants, and scholars, 420, 421.
o
f
wiſe b
y
husband, 419.
o
f
children b
y
parents, 420, 431.
o
f principal by his bail, 422.
CUSTOMS,
(See CoMMON LAw; DUTIES AND IMposts.).
D.
DAM,
to obtain water power, condemnation o
f
land for, 663, 666–669.
effect o
f repeal o
f
act permitting, 481, n.
erection o
f,
across navigable waters b
y
State authority, 740.
destruction of, when it becomes a nuisance, 747.
DAMAGES,
in libel cases, increased b
y
attempt a
t justification, 547.
when exemplary, not to b
e awarded, 569.
for property taken b
y
the public, must be paid, 699.
(See EMINENT Domais.)
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA,
what consequential injuries are, 481,678.
DEATH,
common carriers may be made liable for causing, 725.
DEBATES, -
in Parliament, formerly not suffered to be published, 523.
in American legislative bodies, publication of, 524, 525, 569, 572.
privileges o
f
members in, 556–5.58.
(See FitEEdom o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
THE PREss.)
DEBT,
public, declared inviolable, 13.
confederate, not to b
e
assumed o
r paid, 13.
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DEBT, - continued.
imprisonment for, may be abolished as to pre-existing obligations, 351,352.
imprisonment for, now generally abolished, 422.
DEBTOR,
control of creditor over, 422.
DEBTS BY THE STATE,
prohibition of
,
whether it precludes indebtedness b
y municipalities, 271.
DECENTRALIZATION,
the peculiar feature in American government, 228.
DECISIONS,
judicial, binding force o
f
57–66.
- (See Judicial Proceedings.)
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
was a declaratory statute, 315.
(See BILL of Rights.)
DECLARATORY STATUTES,
in English constitutional law, 29–32.
are not encroachments upon judicial power, 112–115.
judgments not to be reversed b
y
means o
f
113–115.
purpose and proper force o
f
112–116.
DEDICATION,
o
f
lands to public use, 292, n., 706.
DEEDS,
invalid, may be confirmed b
y
legislature, 470, 471.
but not to prejudice o
f
bona fide purchasers, 472. -
DEFENCES,
not based upon equity, may be taken away b
y legislature, 461–479.
under statute o
f
limitations are vested rights, 453.
DEFINITIONS,
of a State, 1.
of a nation, 1.
o
f
a people, sovereignty and sovereign State, 1.
o
f
a constitution, 2
,
3
.
o
f
a
n
unconstitutional law, 4
.
o
f
construction and interpretation, 48, 49.
o
f
self-executing provisions, 90–102.
o
f legislative power, 110, 111, 113.
o
f judicial power, 110–112, 115.
o
f declaratory statutes, 112.
o
f
due process o
f law, 437.
of law of the land, 437.
o
f
personal liberty, 418.
o
f
natural liberty, 493, n.
o
f liberty of the press, 525, 527.
o
f liberty of speech, 527.
o
f religious liberty, 580–583.
of taxation, 598.
o
f
the eminent domain, 651.
o
f
police power, 713.
o
f domicile, 755.
52
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DELAWARE,
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
right of jury to determine the law in cases of libel, 399, n.
protection of person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 519, n.
privilege of legislators in debate, 556, n.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 583, n.
religious tests forbidden, 583, n.
DELEGATION OF POWER,
of judicial power, not admissible, 117.
by the legislature not admissible, 145–152.
except as to powers of local government, 145. .
by municipal corporations invalid, 248.
DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT,
division of powers between, 42–47, 49, 106–114.
equality of 56, n., 57, n.
DESCENT, LAW OF, 445–448.
DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH,
constitutional right to punish, 594, 734.
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY,
to prevent calamities, 257–258, n.
DIRECTORY STATUTES,
what are, and what are mandatory, 89–95.
doctrine o
f,
not admissible a
s
to constitutional provisions, 94–99.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS,
what are, 50–53.
department to which they are confided decides finally upon, 50–53, 138, n
.
DISCRIMINATIONS,
cannot b
e
made in taxation between citizens o
f
different States, 606.
in legislation between different classes, 487–495.
in the privileges and immunities o
f
citizens, 13, 19, 20, 497, 753.
not to b
e
made o
n
account o
f religious belief, 580–584.
DISCUSSION,
right of, 432. -
|
(See Liberty o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
the PREss.)
DISFRANCHISEMENT,
o
f
voters, may render a statute void, 776.
what classes excluded from suffrage, 36–38, 88, 752, 753.
DISTRICTS,
for schools, powers o
f 296, 302–304.
exercise by, o
f power of eminent domain, 671.
for taxation, necessity for, 617, 619.
not to tax property outside, 622.
taxation to b
e uniform within, 624.
DIVISION OF POWERS,
between sovereign States, 2
.
between the States and the Union, 2
.
among departments o
f
State government, 42–46, 50, 107.
DIVISION OF TOWNSHIPS, &c.,
question o
f,
may be submitted to people, 144.
disposition o
f property and debts on, 233, n.
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DIVORCE,
question o
f,
is properly judicial, 132.
power o
f
the legislature over, 132, 133.
general doctrine o
f
the courts o
n
the subject, 134.
conflicting decisions, 134–136.
legislative divorce cannot go beyond dissolution o
f
the status, 137.
constitutional provisions requiring judicial action, 133, n.
laws for, do not violate contracts, 348.
and may b
e applied to pre-existing causes, 325, n
.
what gives jurisdiction in cases o
f,
501, 502.
actual residence o
f
one party in the State sufficient, 502.
conflict o
f
decisions o
n
this subject, 502, 503, n
.
not sufficient if residence merely colorable, 502.
necessity for service o
f
process, 504.
cannot be served out o
f State, 505.
substituted service b
y publication, 505, 506.
restricted effect o
f
such notice, 506.
order as to custody o
f children, 507.
alimony not to b
e
awarded if defendant not served, 508.
DOGS,
police regulation o
f
748.
DOMAIN,
ordinary, o
f
the State, distinguished from eminent domain, 650.
DOMICILE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce cases, 502.
but must be boma fide, 502.
o
f
wife may b
e
different from that o
f
husband, 503, n
.
o
f
one party, may give jurisdiction in divorce cases, 502. '
o
f
voters, meaning of, 755.
DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,
for same act under State and municipal law, 242.
for counterfeiting money, 25.
DOUBLE TAXATION,
sometimes unavoidable, 639.
DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS,
o
f
constitutional law, duty in case o
f
88, 89, 220–224.
DOWER,
legislative control o
f
estates in
,
447.
DRAINS,
appropriating property for purposes o
f,
665.
special assessments for, 613, n., 635–637.
ordered under police power, 741.
DRUNKENNESS,
does not excuse crime, 593, n
.
is a temporary insanity, 753, n.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
meaning o
f
the term, 437, 460, n
.
(See Law o
f
the LAND.)
DUPLICATE PUNISHMENTS, -
by States and United States, 24.
b
y
States and municipal corporations, 242.
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DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the United States, 11.
what the States may lay, 19.
DWELLING-HOUSE,
is the owner's castle, 29, 367.
homicide in defence of, 377.
quartering soldiers in, prohibited, 378.
DYING DECLARATIONS,
admissible in evidence on trials for homicide, 393.
inconclusive character of the evidence, 393.
E.
EASEMENTS, -
acquirement by the public under right of eminent, domain, 651.
private, cannot be acquired under this right, 661–663.
(See EMIN ENT DOMAIN.)
ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS,
powers and control of, 580, n.
ELECTIONS,
on adoption of State constitutions, 35–39.
people exercise the sovereignty by means of 751.
who to participate in
,
752.
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to b
y legislature, 78, n
.
exclusion o
f
married women, aliens, minors, idiots, &c., 753.
conditions necessary to participation, 753, 756–759.
presence o
f
voter a
t place o
f domicile, 754.
what constitutes residence, 755.
registration may be made a condition, 757.
preliminary action b
y
the authorities, notice, &c., 758.
mode o
f exercising the right, 760.
the elector's privilege o
f secrecy, 760–764.
a printed ballot is “written,” 761, n
.
ballot must be complete in itself, 764.
technical accuracy not essential, 766–769.
explanations b
y
voter inadmissible, 765.
must not contain too many names, 765.
name should b
e given in full, 766.
sufficient if idem sonans, 766.
what abbreviations sufficient, 766, 767.
erroneous additions not to affect, 768.
extrinsic evidence to explain imperfections, 769, 770.
ballot must contain name o
f
office, 771.
but need not be strictly accurate, 771.
diſferent boxes for different ballots, 771.
elector need not vote for every office, 772.
plurality o
f
votes cast to elect, 772, 781.
effect if highest candidate is ineligible, 781.
freedom o
f elections, 773.
bribery o
r treating o
f voters, 773.
militia not to be called out on election day, 775.
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ELECTIONS, - continued.
courts not to be open on election day, 773.
bets upon election are illegal, 774.
contracts to influence election are void, 774.
elector not to be deprived of his vote, 450, n
.,
776.
statutes which would disfranchise voters, 776.
failure to hold election in one precinct, 776.
liability o
f inspectors for refusing to receive vote, 777.
elector's oath when conclusive o
n inspector, 777.
conduct of the election, 778.
effect o
f irregularities upon, 778, 779.
what constitutes a sufficient election, 781.
not necessary that a majority participate, 781.
admission o
f illegal votes not to defeat, 782.
- unless done fraudulently, 782.
effect o
f
casual affray, 783.
canvass and return, 784.
canvassers are ministerial officers, 784.
canvassers not to question returns made to them, 785.
whether they can b
e compelled b
y
mandamus to perform duty, 785.
contesting elections in the courts, 786.
canvassers' certificate a
s evidence, 788.
courts may go behind certificate, 787.
what surrounding circumstances may be given in evidence, 790.
whether qualification o
f
voters may b
e inquired into, 791.
to legislative body, house to decide upon, 161.
EMANCIPATION,
o
f
slaves in Great Britain and America, 13, 362–367.
o
f
children b
y parents, 420.
EMERGENCY,
declaration o
f
192, n
.
EMIN ENT DOMAIN,
distinguished from ordinary domain o
f
States, 650.
definition of, 652.
right of, rests upon necessity, 651.
cannot b
e bargained away, 343, 652.
general right is in the States, 653.
for what purposes nation may exercise right, 653, 654.
a
ll property subject to right, 654.
exception o
f money and rights in action, 656.
legislative authority requisite to, 657.
legislature may determine upon the necessity, 657, 672.
conditions precedent must be complied with, 658.
statutes for exercise o
f,
not to b
e
extended b
y
intendment, 660.
the purpose must b
e public, 661.
private roads cannot be laid out under, 661.
what constitutes public purpose, 663.
whether erection o
f
mill-dams is
,
666–669.
property need not be taken to the State, 671.
individuals or corporations may be public agents fo
r
the purpose, 672.
822 INDEX.
EMIN ENT DOMAIN,- continued.
the taking to be limited to the necessity, 674–676.
statute for taking more than is needed is ineffectual, unless owner assents,
675.
what constitutes a taking of property, 676.
incidental injuries do not, 676–680.
any deprivation of use of property does, 680.
water front and right to wharfage is property, 680.
right to pasturage in streets is property, 681.
taking of common highway for higher grade of way, 681.
if taken for turnpike, &c., owner not entitled to compensation, 682.
difference when taken for a railway, 683, 684.
owner entitled to compensation in such case, 687.
whether he is entitled in case of street railway, 687.
decisions where the ſee of the streets is in the public, 688–693.
distinction between a street railway and a thoroughfare, 693. 694.
right to compensation when course of a stream is diverted, 696.
whether the ſee in the land can be taken, 697–699.
compensation must be made for property, 699.
must be pecuniary, 699.
preliminary surveys may be made without liability, 700.
need not be first made when property taken by State, &c., 700.
sufficient if party is given a remedy by means of which he may obtain
it
,
701.
time for resorting to remedy may be limited, 701.
waiver o
f right to compensation, 702.
when property taken b
y
individual o
r private corporation, compen
sation must be first made, 702.
tribunal for assessment of, 703.
time when right to payment is complete, 704.
principle on which compensation to be assessed, 705.
allowance o
f
incidental injuries and benefits, 706, 707.
not those suffered or received in common with public at large, 710, 711.
if benefits equal damages, owner entitled to nothing, 711.
assessment o
f
damages covers a
ll consequential injuries, 712.
for injuries arising from negligence, &c., party may have action, 712.
ENABLING ACT,
to entitle Territory to form State constitution, 35, 36, 38.
ENGLAND,
(See GREAT BRITAIN.)
ENUMERATED POWERS,
United States, a government of, 10.
EQUALITY,
o
f protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 13.
o
f
the several departments o
f
the government, 56, n
.
o
f rights and privileges, the aim of the law, 493.
grants o
f special privileges construed strictly, 493–497.
religious, 580–597.
(See RELIGIOUs LIBERTY.)
EQUITABLE TITLES,
may b
e changed b
y
legislature into legal, 470 and n., 471.
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ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS,
may be overruled, 65.
when they should not be, 65.
ERRORS,
waiver o
f,
in legal proceedings, 511.
judgments, &c., not void by reason o
f
511.
curing by retrospective legislation, 461–479.
in conduct o
f elections, effect of, 772, 778–780.
ESSENTIAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,
taxation, eminent domain, &c., cannot be bartered away, 343, 346,
652.
ESTABLISHMENTS,
religious, are forbidden b
y
State constitutions, 584.
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS,
special legislative authority to sell lands for payment o
f
debts is consti
tutional, 118–129.
such acts forbidden b
y
some constitutions, 119, n
.
legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 124–126.
ESTATES IN LAND, -
subject to change b
y
the legislature before they become vested, 446.
but not afterwards, 114, n
.
ESTOPPEL,
b
y judgment only applies to parties and privies, 60.
does not depend o
n
reasons given b
y
the court, 61.
does not apply in controversy about new subject-matter, 61.
o
f
the State b
y
it
s legislation, 88, n
.,
312, n
.
o
f
individuals b
y legislation, 117, 488.
EVASION, -
o
f
constitutional provisions, 169, n.
EVIDENCE,
b
y
recitals in statutes, 117.
collecting by legislature, 163.
complete control o
f legislature over rules o
f,
353, 457–460.
conclusive rules of, not generally admissible, 458, 459.
confessions o
f
accused parties as, 384–393.
dying declarations, when are, 392, 393.
search-warrants to obtain, not constitutional, 373, 376, n
.
correspondence not to b
e
violated to obtain, 376, n.
accused party not compelled to give, against himself, 384.
b
y
accused parties in their own favor, 389, n
.
against accused parties, to be given publicly, and in their presence,
383, 392.
communications by client to counsel not to be disclosed, 413.
in State courts, State laws control, 603, n
.
to explain imperfections in ballots, 769, 788.
EVIL TO BE REMEDIED,
weight of, in construing constitutions, 79, 102, n
.
what in view in requiring title o
f
act to state the object, 173–175.
EXAMINATIONS, -
o
f
accused parties, when to be evidence against them, 384, 385.
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EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENTS,
constitutional prohibition of, 408.
EXCESSIVE TAXATION,
- renders tax proceedings and sales void, 646.
EXCISE TAXES,
Congress may lay, 11.
EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,
grant of, 13, n., 346.
not to be taken by implication, 493–496.
strict construction of, 343, 346, 493–496.
are subject to right of eminent domain, 344.
EXECUTION,
exemptions from, may be increased without violating pre-existing con
tracts, 351.
and may be recalled, 479.
imprisonment upon, may be abolished, 351.
EXECUTIVE,
construction of constitution by, 49–54.
weight of practical construction by, 83.
power of
,
to pardon and reprieve, 139, 140.
approval o
r
veto o
f
laws by, 186–188.
EXECUTIVE POWER,
what is, 110.
not to be exercised b
y legislature, 106, 138–141.
o
f
the United States, 14.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,
special statute, authorizing sales by, 118–129.
propriety o
f judicial action in these cases, 118.
legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 126.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
against publisher o
f
newspaper, 569.
EXEMPTIONS,
from taxation, when not repealable, 154, 342, 480, n
.
power o
f
the legislature to make, 640.
from public duties, &c., may be recalled, 276, 479.
o
f property, from right of eminent domain, 343.
o
f property, from police power of the State, 345.
from execution, may b
e
increased without violating contracts, 351.
o
f
debtor from imprisonment, 351, 4:22.
privilege o
f,
may b
e
made to depend upon residence, 498.
laws for, not to be suspended for individual cases, 490.
EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS,
how far binding on parties interested, 508.
publication of
,
not privileged, 560.
EXPECTANCY,
interests in, are not vested rights, 445–448.
EXPEDIENCY,
questions o
f,
are legislative, 205–207.
EXPOSITORY ACTS,
(See DECLARATony STATUTEs.)
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EX POST FACTO LAWS,
States not to pass, 19, 42, 323.
meaning of the term, 323.
only applies to criminal laws, 323.
classification of 324.
laws in mitigation of punishment are not, 326.
what is in mitigation, and what not, 326–331.
modes of procedure in criminal cases may be changed, 331.
punishment of second offences, 332.
EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL,
must be under forms of law, 751.
(See Elections.)
EXPULSION,
of legislative members for misconduct, 161, 162.
EXTRADITION,
of criminals as between the States, 21, 396.
of persons accused of libel, 396, n.
between sovereignties, 22, n.
F.
FACT AND LAW,
province of judge and jury respectively, 395-402.
in libel cases, 572.
FAST DAYS,
appointment of, does not violate religious liberty, 587.
FEDERAL COURTS,
(See Courts of the UNITED STATEs.)
FEDERALIST,
on the power to supersede the Articles of Confederation, 9, n.
reasons o
f,
for dispensing with national bill o
f rights, 314.
reference in
,
to laws violating obligation o
f
contracts, 333.
FEE,
whether the public may appropriate, in taking lands, 697–699.
FEMALES,
accusation o
f
want o
f
chastity not actionable, per se
,
529.
statutes o
n
the subject, 529.
excluded from suffrage, 753.
(See MARRIED Wom EN.)
FERRY FRANCHISES, -
granted to municipal corporations, may be resumed, 338.
strict construction of, 497.
grants o
f,
b
y
the State across navigable waters, 739.
police regulations respecting, 719.
FEUDAL SYSTEM,
Mackintosh's definition of, 29, n
.
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT,
provisions o
f 13, 753.
FINE,
remission of, 139, n
.
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FIRE,
destruction of buildings to prevent spread o
f,
655, n., 746.
precautions against, by establishing fire limits, 747.
FISHERY,
public rights of
,
in navigable waters, 651.
restrictions upon, 247.
FLORIDA,
judges of
,
to give opinions to the governor, 51, n.
divorces not to be granted b
y legislature, 133, n.
exercise o
f
the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in
,
521, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious liberty in
,
584, n
.
religious belief, not to be a test o
f
competency o
f witness, 596, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 702, n.FOREIGNERS, (See ALIENs.)
FORFEITURES,
under municipal by-laws, 249, n
.
must b
e judicially declared, 321, 322,450, 451.
FORMS,
prescribed by constitution are essential, 94–99, 214.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
protections o
f
12, 360, 361, 497, 742-746.
FOURTH OF JULY,
celebration o
f,
a
t public expense, 258.
FOX'S LIBEL ACT,
provisions o
f
574.
import and purpose of, 574, 575.
FRANCHISES,
o
f incorporation, when they constitute contracts, 339, 340.
granted to municipal bodies may b
e resumed, 295,336.
repeal o
f,
where right to repeal is reserved, 481, 720.
strict construction o
f 235, 494–497.
police regulations respecting, 719–725.
may b
e appropriated under right o
f
eminent domain, 653.
FRAUD,
a
s affecting decrees o
f divorce, 502, n.
FREEDMEN,
made citizens, 361, 753.
FREEDOM,
maxims of, in the common law, 28, 29.
gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 362,367.-
(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)
FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS,
provisions to secure, 773, 774.
bribery and treating o
f
electors, 773.
militia not to be called out on election day, 775.
courts not to be open on election day, 773.
betting on elections illegal, 774.
contracts to influence elections void, 774.
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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
Hamilton's reasons why protection o
f,
b
y
bill o
f rights not important, 314.
opposing reasons b
y Jefferson, 316, n.
(See LIBERTY o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
THE PREss.)
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
definition of, 527.
(See LIBERTY o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
THE PRESS.)
FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE,
to be delivered u
p
b
y
the States, 21.
surrender of, under treaties, 22, n
.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW,
constitutions are, 2.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
bills of, in State constitutions, 45.
in the national Constitution, 314–317.
in England, 30, 315.
are before constitutions, 46, 47.
statutes in violation of, 205–212.
under fourteenth amendment, 12, 361, 498.
G.
GAMING IMPLEMENTS,
keeping of
,
for unlawful games, may be prohibited, 749.
GENERAL INTENT, -
when to control particular intent, 71, n
.
GENERAL LAWS,
exceptions from, in some cases, 115–125.
required instead o
f special, by some constitutions, 155, 156, n.
in cases o
f divorce, 133, n.
control municipal regulations, 242.
due process o
f
law does not always require, 437-439, 487-492.
submission of, to vote o
f people invalid, 141–152.
suspension of, 490.
changes in, give citizens no claim to remuneration, 443.
respecting remedies, power to change, 326–332, 351–359, 448–456.
GENERAL WARRANTS,
illegality of, 368–371.
GEORGIA,
divorce cases to be adjudged b
y
the courts, 133, n
.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 521, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
GOOD MOTIVES AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS,
defence of, in libel cases, 577.
-
burden o
f proof on defendant to show, 578.
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GOVERNMENT,
constitutional, what is
,
3
.
republican, to be guaranteed to the States, 23.
o
f
the United States, origin o
f
6–8.
GOVERNOR,
mandamus to, 141, n.
approval o
r
veto o
f
laws by, 186, 187.
messages to legislature, 189.
power to prorogue or adjourn legislature, 160.
power to convene legislature, 189.
legislative encroachment on powers o
f,
138–141.
power to pardon, 139, 140.
to appoint officers and remove them, 138, 139.
to reprieve, 140, n
.
GRADE OF RAILROADS,
legislature may establish for crossings, 723.
GRADE OF STREETS,
change o
f,
gives parties no right to compensation, 252.
special assessments for grading, 619, 629–633. -
GRAND JURY,
criminal accusations by, 379.
presentments by, are privileged, 552.
GRANTS,
are contracts, and inviolable, 333.
by States, cannot be resumed, 334.
of franchises, strict construction of, 235, 494–497.
when they constitute contracts, 339, 340.
to municipal bodies, may b
e recalled, 336.
GREAT BRITAIN,
how it became a constitutional government, 3
, n., 63, n.
power o
f
Parliament to change constitution, 4.
meaning o
f
unconstitutional law in, 4.
-
control over American colonies, 6
,
30–33. .
statutes of, how far in force in America, 32–34.
bill o
f rights of, 30, 315.
habeas corpus act o
f 30, 425.
local self-government in, 228.
declaration o
f
rights o
f
316.
bills o
f
attainder in, 318, 319.
money bills to originate in the Commons, 160, n
.
emancipation o
f
slaves in
,
362–367.
prosecutions for libel in
,
534, 572-575.
(See PARLIAMENT.)
GUARANTIES, (See FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTs; JURY TRIAL; LAw of
-
The LAND ; LIBERTY.)
GUARDIANS,
special statutes authorizing sales by, 118–129.
propriety o
f judicial action in such cases, 118.
control o
f
ward by, 420. -
appointment o
f,
in divorce suits, 507.
authority o
f,
is local, 507, n
.
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GUNPOWDER,
police regulations concerning, 748.
H.
HABEAS CORPUS,
writ o
f,
a principal protection to personal liberty, 418, 423.
personal liberty, meaning of, 418.
restraints upon, to prevent o
r punish crime, &c., 418.
growing out o
f
relation o
f
husband and wife, 419.
o
f parent and child, 420.
o
f guardian and ward, 420.
o
f
master and apprentice, 421.
of master and servant, 421.
of teacher and scholar, 421.
o
f principal and bail, 422.
o
f
creditor and debtor, 422.
insecurity of
,
formerly, in England, 422–424.
habeas corpus act, and it
s purpose, 30, 425.
general provisions o
f
425, 426.
adoption of
,
in America, 426.
writ o
f,
when to b
e
issued b
y
national courts, 426, 427.
generally to issue from State courts, 427.
return to
,
where prisoner held under national authority, 429.
cases for, determined b
y
common law, 429.
not to be made a writ of error, 430.
what to b
e inquired into under, 430.
to obtain custody o
f children, 431.
HACKMEN,
regulation o
f charges of, 742-746.
HARBOR REGULATIONS,
establishment o
f,
b
y
the States, 730.
wharf lines may be prescribed, 747.
HARDSHIP,
o
f particular cases not to control the law, 86, 87, n.
unjust provisions not necessarily unconstitutional, 87, 88,639.
HEALTH,
police regulations for protection o
f,
729, 747.
draining swamps, &c., in reference to
,
635, 741.
HEARING,
right to, in judicial proceedings, 456, 503–509.
in cases o
f appropriation o
f lands, 700–704.
HEIRSHIP,
right to modify, 445.
HIGH SEAS,
not subject to exclusive appropriation, 2.
States n
o authority upon, 155.
HIGHWAYS,
establishment of, under right o
f
eminent domain, 651.
when owner entitled to compensation in such case, 704.
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HIGHWAYS, - continued.
appropriation o
f,
to purposes o
f turnpike, railroad, &c., whether it entitles
owner to compensation, 681–696.
(See EMIN ENT Doxtain.)
regulations o
f,
b
y
States under police power, 734, 741.
HOMESTEADS,
provisions for when self-executing, 101.
exemption of, from execution, 352.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
power o
f legislature to divorce, 132–137.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 502-507.
(See Divorce.)
control o
f
husband over wife, 419.
obligation o
f
husband to support wife, 419, n.
right as between, to custody o
f children, 431.
property rights, how far subject to legislative control, 446, 447.
validating invalid marriage b
y legislation, 465.
I.
IDEM SONANS,
ballots sufficient in cases of, 766.
IDIOTS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 753.
special legislative authority for sale o
f
lands o
f 118–127, 488.
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,
have n
o obligation, 349.
legalization o
f
359, 467–470.
for lobby legislative services, 166.
designed to affect elections, 774.
ILLINOIS,
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n
.
divorces not to b
e granted by the legislature, 133, n.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 173, n
.
special legislative sessions, 190, n.
time when acts take effect, 190.
provision in relation to special laws, 225.
municipalities restrained from aiding public improvements, 266, n
.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 271, 272.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious liberty in
,
584, n
.
taking land for railroad tracks, 698.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
IMMUNITIES,
o
f
citizens o
f
the several States, 19, 497.
citizens not to be deprived of, 13.
IMPAIRING CONTRACTS,
(See OBLIGATION o
f
CoNTRActs.)
IMPEACHMENT,
o
f judges for declaring law unconstitutional, 196, n.
INDEX. 831
IMPLICATION,
amendments by, not favored, 185.
repeals by, 185.
-
grant of powers by, in State constitutions, 77, 78.
corporations established by, 239.
IMPLIED POWERS,
of municipal corporations, what are, 235-255.
granted by State constitutions, 77, 78.
IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,
to the States by the national Constitution, 24.
upon legislative power, 199–213.
IMPORTS,
State taxation of, 732, 733.
IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the Union, 11.
what the States may lay, 19.
taxation by, 617.
IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN,
not admissible in America, 367.
IMPRISONMENT,
for legislative contempt must terminate with the session, 164.
for debt may be abolished as to existing contracts, 351.
unlimited, cannot be inflicted for common-law offence, 407.
relief from. (See HABEAs Corpus.)
IMPROVEMENTS,
owner of land cannot be compelled to make, 483, 664.
betterment laws, 483-487.
local, assessments for the making of, 619–637.
(See AssessMENTs.)
INCHOATE RIGHTS,
power of the legislature in regard to, 445–448.
INCIDENTAL INJURIES,
by change in the law, give no claim to compensation, 481.
(See EMIN ENT Doxia IN.)
INCOMPETENT PERSONS,
legislative authority for sale of lands of 118–129, 488.
exclusion of, from suffrage, 753.
INCONTINENCE,
accusation o
f,
against female, not actionable, per se
,
529.
statutory provisions respecting, 529.
INCORPORATIONS,
charters o
f private, are contracts, 339, 340.
charters o
f municipal, are not, 2.31—233, 336.
control o
f,
b
y
police regulations, 719–722.
(See CHARTERs; MUNICIPAL Corporations.)
INDEBTEDNESS BY STATE,
prohibition of
,
whether it precludes debts b
y
towns, counties, &c., 271.
INDECENT PUBLICATIONS,
sale o
f,
may b
e prohibited, 748, 749.
parties not free to make, 528.
832
-
INDEX.
INDEMNIFICATION,
of officers of municipal corporation where liability is incurred in supposed
discharge of duty, 254, 255.
power of legislature to compel, 257.
not to be made in case of refusal to perform duty, 259.
INDEMNITY,
for property taken for public use.
(See EMIN ENT DoMAIN.)
for consequential injuries occasioned by exercise of legal rights, 481.
INDEPENDENCE, -
declaration of, by Continental Congress, 8.
new national government established by, 7.
celebration of, at public expense, 258.
of the traverse jury, 396.
of the bar, 412, 413, n., 416, n.
INDIANA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted by the legislature, 133, n.
exercise of the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
prohibition of special laws when general can be made applicable, 156, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title of acts to embrace the subject, 173, n.
no act to be amended by mere reference to it
s title, 184, n.
approval o
f
laws b
y governor of
,
188, n
.
time when acts take effect, 191, 226, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n.
privilege o
f
legislators in debate, 556, n
.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
religious belief not to be test o
f
incompetency o
f witness, 596, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
INDICTMENT,
criminal accusations to be by, 379.
trial on defective, 332, n., 404.
(See CRIMEs.)
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
provisions for protection o
f,
in State constitutions, 44, 45.
in national Constitution, 314–317.
d
o
not owe their origin to constitutions, 46, 47.
English statutes declaratory o
f
29, 30, 315.
(See PERsonAi. LIBERTY.)
INELIGIBILITY,
o
f highest candidate, how to affect election, 781.
INFANTS,
excluded from suffrage, 37, 753.
special statutes authorizing sale o
f
lands o
f 118–126, 463.
custody of, by parents, 420, 431.
emancipation of, 420.
control of, b
y
masters, guardians, and teachers, 420, 421.
INFERIOR COURTS,
duty of, to pass upon constitutional questions, 198.
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INFERIOR COURTS, - continued.
distinguished from courts of general jurisdiction, 508, 509.
disproving jurisdiction of, 508, 509.
INFORMALITIES,
right to take advantage o
f,
may b
e
taken away b
y
legislation, 461–479.
do not defeat jurisdiction o
f court, 511.
waiver of, in legal proceedings, 511.
INHABITANT,
meaning of, in election laws, 754.
INITIALS,
to Christian name of candidate, whether sufficient in ballot, 767.
INJUSTICE,
o
f
constitutional provisions, cannot be remedied b
y
the court, 88.
o
f
statutes, does not render them unconstitutional, 200.
in taxation, sometimes inevitable, 639.
INNOCENCE,
o
f
accused parties, presumption o
f
379–382.
only to be overcome b
y
confession in open court, o
r verdict, 382.
conclusive presumptions against, 403, n
.
INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,
not permitted where the common law prevails, 384.
accused parties not compellable to give evidence against themselves,
384-391.
INSANITY,
defence of, in criminal cases, 379, n
.
INSOLVENT LAWS,
right o
f
the States to pass, 359, 360.
congressional regulations supersede, 360.
what contracts cannot be reached by, 360.
creditor making himself a party to proceedings is bound, 360.
INSPECTION LAWS,
o
f
the States, imposts o
r
duties under, 19.
constitutionality of
,
729.
INSURRECTIONS,
employment o
f
militia for suppression o
f
12.
INTENT,
to govern in construction o
f constitutions, 68.
whole instrument to be examined in seeking, 70, 71.
in ineffectual contracts, may be given effect to b
y
retrospective legislation,
464–479.
question of, in libel cases, 572-578.
in imperfect ballot, voter cannot testify to, 765.
what evidence admissible o
n question o
f 769, 790.
INTEREST, -
in party, essential to entitle him to question the validity o
f
a law, 199.
in judge, precludes his acting, 211, 514–517.
o
f
money, illegal reservation of, may be legalized, 467, 468.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,
giving municipal corporations power to subscribe t
o
,
is not delegating
legislative power, 145, n
.
53
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INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, - continued.
constitutionality of municipal subscriptions to, 260–272.
special legislative authority requisite, 267.
negotiable securities issued without authority are void, 267.
prohibition to the State engaging in
,
whether it applies to municipalities,
269–272.
retrospective legalization o
f securities, 472–475.
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
equality o
f
States under, 2
.
INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS,
States n
o jurisdiction over, 154, 155.
INTERPRETATION,
meaning o
f
49, n
.
(See CoNSTRUction of STATE CoNstitutions.)
INTIMIDATION,
o
f
voters, secrecy as a protection against, 761.
securities against, 773–775.
INTOXICATING DRINKS,
submitting question o
f
sale o
f,
to people, 150–152.
power o
f
States to require licenses for sale o
f
725–729.
power o
f
States to prohibit sales o
f
725–729.
payment o
f
license fee to United States does not give right to sell as
against State laws, 729.
furnishing to voters, 773.
INTOXICATION,
not an excuse for crime, 593, n
.
is temporary insanity, 753, n
.
INTRODUCTION OF BILLS,
for revenue purposes, 100.
generally, 167.
INVASIONS,
employment o
f
militia to repel, 12.
INVENTIONS,
securing right in, to inventors, 12.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
gradual abolition o
f,
in England, 862–367.
a
s
a punishment ſor crime, 367.
(See PERsonAL LIBERTY.)
IOWA,
divorces not to b
e granted by legislature, 133, n.
exercise o
f
the pardoning power restrained, 140, n
.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 173, n
.
power o
f legislature when convened b
y governor, 189, n
.
time when acts are to take effect, 193.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 271, 272.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in
,
520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n
.
religious belief not to b
e
test o
f
incompetency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n
.
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IRREGULARITIES,
in judicial proceedings, not inquirable into on habeas corpus, 430, 431.
do not render judicial proceedings void, 511.
waiver of, 511.
may be cured by retrospective legislation, 462–479.
effect of, upon elections, 778–780.
IRREPEALABLE LAWS,
legislature cannot pass, 152–154, 347.
Parliament cannot bind it
s successors, 153.
laws which constitute contracts are inviolable, 154.
whether essential powers o
f government can be bartered away, 341–346,
652.
municipal corporations cannot adopt, 251-253.
J.
JEOPARDY,
party not to be twice put in, for same cause, 403–406.
what constitutes, 404.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 405.
when molle prosequi is a
n acquittal, 404.
second trial after verdict set aside, 405, 406.
acquittal o
n
some counts is a bar pro tanto to new trial, 406.
varying form o
f
the charge, 406.
duplicate punishments under State and municipal laws, 242.
JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATURE,
is a public record, 164.
is evidence whether a law is properly adopted, 165.
presumption o
f
correct action where it is silent, 165.
JUDGE,
disqualification o
f
interest, 514–516.
not to urge opinion upon the jury, 397.
to instruct the jury on the law, 399.
JUDGE-MADE LAW,
objectionable nature of, 69, n.
JUDGMENTS,
conclusiveness o
f
those o
f
other States, 22.
general rules a
s
to force and effect, 57–66. -
must apply the law in force when rendered, 477.
are void if jurisdiction is wanting, 479, 499, 508, 516.
irregularities do not defeat, 430, 431, 511.
(See Judicial Proceedings; JURIsdiction.)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS,
o
f
federal courts conclusive o
n questions o
f
federal jurisdiction, 15.
o
f
State courts followed in other cases, 16.
general rules a
s
to force and effect o
f,
57–66.
JUDICIAL POWER,
o
f
the United States, 26.
(See Courts o
f
the UNITED STATEs.)
not to b
e
exercised b
y
State legislatures, 104, 157, 492, 758.
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JUDICIAL POWER, - continued.
what it is
,
110–112, 430, n
.
distribution of, 109, n
.
declaratory statutes not an exercise o
f
112–115.
such statutes not to be applied to judgments, 116.
instances o
f
exercise of, 115–117.
is apportioned b
y legislature, 109, n.
legislature may exercise, in deciding contested seats, 161.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
confirmation o
f invalid, by legislature, 130, 131, 461.
are void if court has no jurisdiction o
f
the case, 499.
jurisdiction o
f subject-matter, what is
,
499.
consent will not confer, 499.
if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 499.
law encourages voluntary settlements and arrangements, 500.
arbitrations distinguished ſrom, 500.
transitory and local actions, 501.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 501, 502.
necessity for service o
f
process, o
r
substitute therefor, 504-506.
proceedings in rem and in personam, 505.
bringing in parties b
y publication, 505.
n
o personal judgment in such case, 506, 508.
decree for custody o
f children, effect o
f,
508.
contesting jurisdiction, 508, 509.
courts o
f general and special jurisdiction, 508, 509.
record of, how far conclusive, 508, 509.
irregularities do not defeat, 430, 431, 511.
waiver of, 511.
judicial power cannot b
e delegated, 512.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 513, n.
judge not to si
t
when interested, 514–517.
statements in course o
f,
how ſar privileged, 551-556.
publication o
f
accounts o
f
trials privileged, 559, 560.
but must be fair and full, 560.
and not ex parte, 560-562.
and not contain indecent o
r blasphemous matter, 560.
JUDICIARY,
construction o
f
constitution by, 54–57.
equality o
f,
with legislative department, 56, n
.
independence o
f 57, n.
when its decisions to be final, 54–67.
(See Courts; Judicial Power; Judicial Proceedings.)
JURISDICTION,
o
f
courts, disproving, 24, 508, 509.
want o
f,
cannot b
e cured b
y legislation, 130.
o
f
subject-matter, what it consists in
,
499.
not to b
e
conferred b
y
consent, 499, 511.
if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 499.
in divorce cases, what gives, 501, 502.
necessity for service o
f
process, 504-507.
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JURISDICTION, - continued.
irregularities do not affect, 430, 431, 511.
interest in judge, effect o
f,
514–517.
general and special, distinguished, 508, 509.
where it exists, proceedings not to be attacked collaterally, 511.
in tax proceedings, 622.
o
f
federal courts, 11–18, 26, 360, 361, 535.
in cases o
f
habeas corpus, 430–432.
JURY,
independence o
f
396, 398 and n., 403, n.
JURY TRIAL,
how far required b
y
United States Constitution, 25.
the mode for the trial o
f
criminal accusations, 379–393.
importance o
f 396, n.
must b
e speedy, 382.
and public, 383.
and not inquisitorial, 384.
prisoner to be confronted with witnesses, 392.
statement b
y prisoner, 388-391.
(See CoNFEssioNs.)
to be present during trial, 393.
jury to consist o
f twelve, 391, 704, n.
challenges o
f,
395.
must b
e
ſrom vicinage, 32, 395, 396.
must b
e left free to act, 396.
how far to judge o
f
the law, 398-402, 518, n.
in libel cases, 572–577.
acquittal by, is final, 398, 399.
judge to instruct jury on the law, 399.
but not to express opinion o
n facts, 399.
nor to refuse to receive verdict, 399.
accused not to b
e
twice put in jeopardy, 403-406.
what is legal jeopardy, 404.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 404, 405.
when molle prosequi equivalent to verdict, 404.
second trial after verdict set aside, 404, 405.
right to counsel, 408-417.
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, 25, 513, n.
in cases o
f contempt, 394, n.
in case o
f municipal corporations, 288, n.
JUST COMPENSATION,
what constitutes, when property taken b
y
the public, 699-712.
(See EMIN ENT DomAIN.)
JUSTIFICATION,
in libel cases b
y
showing truth o
f charge, 530, 577.
showing o
f good motives and justifiable őccasion, 577, 578.
unsuccessful attempt at, to increase damages, 547.
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K.
KANSAS,
power to grant divorces vested in the courts, 133, n.
exercise of the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
requirement of general laws when they can be made applicable, 156, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title of acts to embrace the subject, 172, n.
no act to be amended by mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 271.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 520, 521, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f incompetency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
KENTUCKY,
-
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to b
e granted by legislature, 133, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 172, n
.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 271.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection to person and property b
y
the law o
f
the land, 436, n.
compact with Virginia, 335, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
exclusion o
f religious teachers from office, 583, n.
religious liberty in, 583, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
L.
LAW,
common, how far in force, 31, n.
(See CoMMON LAw.)
and fact, respective province o
f
court and jury as to, 395–402, 572–577.
the jury as judges o
f,
397–402, 572-577.
LAW-MAKING POWER,
(See LEGISLATUREs of THE STATEs.)
LAW OF THE LAND,
protection of
,
insured b
y
magna charta, 435.
American constitutional provisions, 12, 13, 19, 436, n.
meaning o
f
the term, 437–442, 460, n
.
vested rights protected by, 443.
meaning o
f
vested rights, 443, 461, 471.
subjection o
f,
to general laws, 443,444.
interests in expectancy are not, 445–448.
rights acquired through the marriage relation, 447.
legal remedies not the subject o
f
vested rights, and may be changed,
448, 449.
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LAW OF THE LAND,- continued.
statutory privileges are not, 479.
rights in action are, 449.
forfeitures must be judicially declared, 450–452.
limitation laws may be passed, 453-456, 460.
rules of evidence may be changed, 457, 458.
retrospective laws, when admissible, 460, 479.
cannot create rights in action, 460.
nor revive debts barred by statute of limitations, 460.
may cure informalities, 461–478.
may perſect imperfect contracts, 358, 462–474.
may waive a statutory forfeiture, 467, n., 468, n.
may validate imperfect deeds, 469–473.
but not as against bona ſide purchasers, 472.
cannot validate proceedings the legislature could not have authorized,
477–479.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction in courts, 478.
consequential injuries give no right to complain, 480.
sumptuary laws inadmissible, 483.
betterment laws, 484-487.
unequal and partial laws, 487–498.
invalid judicial proceedings, 499.
what necessary to give courts jurisdiction, 499–501.
consent cannot confer, 499, 500.
in divorce cases, 501, 502, 505.
process must be served or substitute had, 504, 505.
proceedings in rem and in personam, 505.
bringing in parties by publication, 504, 505.
no personal judgment in such case, 506, 508.
process cannot be served in another State, 505.
jurisdiction over guardianship of children in divorce cases, 507.
courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the rules as to ques
tioning their jurisdiction, 508, 509.
irregular proceedings do not defeat jurisdiction, 511.
waiver of irregularities, 511.
judicial power cannot be delegated, 512.
judge cannot si
t
in his own cause, 514–515.
objection to his interest cannot b
e waived, 516.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 26, n., 513, n.
(See TAxation : EMiNENT DomAIN; Police Power.)
LAWS, ENACTMENT OF,
(See StATUTEs.)
LAWS IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
(See Onligation of CoNTRActs.)
LAWS, EX POST FACTO,
(See Er Post Facto Laws; REtrospective Laws.)
LEGAL PROCEEI)INGS,
publication o
f
accounts o
f,
how far privileged. 559–562.
statements in course o
f,
when privileged, 551–553.
(See JUDICIAL Pitock Edings.)
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LEGAL TENDER,
only gold and silver to be made, by the States, 19.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
division of, 159.
not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 106–140.
equality of
,
with other departments, 56, n., 57, n.
discretion of, not to be controlled b
y
the courts, 52, n., 95, n
(See LEGISLATUREs of The STATES.)
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,
whether they are a
n
exercise o
f judicial power, 132–137.
impropriety of, 133, 137, n.
LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES,
not to be inquired into b
y courts, 164, 166, 224–226, 253.
presumption o
f
correctness o
f,
225, 226, 254.
LEGISLATIVE POWERS,
enactments in excess of, are void, 4
,
211.
distinguished from judicial, 110.
cannot b
e delegated, 141–151.
exercise o
f,
will not give right o
f action, 253.
cannot extend beyond territorial limits, 154, 155.
grant of
,
will not warrant exercise o
f
executive o
r judicial powers, 106–
140.
LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
privilege o
f publication o
f
569–572.
members not to b
e questioned for words in course of, 556–558.
LEGISLATORS,
contested elections of, to be decided b
y
house, 161.
duty of, not to violate constitution, 223.
presumed correctness o
f motives, 225, 226.
privilege of
,
in debate, 556–558.
right of, to publish speeches, 569–572.
LEGISLATURES, COLONIAL,
statutes adopted by, in ſorce at Revolution, 33.
LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES,
power to originate amendments to State constitution, 40 and n.
construction o
f
constitution by, 49–54.
deference due to judicial construction by, 65.
powers o
f,
compared with those o
f Parliament, 104, 105, 208, 209.
not to exercise executive o
r judicial powers, 106, 139, 210–212,491, 758.
complete legislative power vested in, 106, 204, 208, 209.
specification o
f powers in constitution unnecessary. 107.
declaratory statutes not the exercise o
f judicial power, 112–115.
cannot set aside judgments, grant new trials, &c., 116, 117, 492.
how far may bind parties b
y
recital o
f
facts in statutes, 117.
power of, to grant divorces, 132–137.
delegation o
f legislative power inadmissible, 141–152.
but conditional legislation is not, 142.
-" nor making charters subject to acceptance, 143.
nor conferring powers o
f
local government, 144–152, 230.
irrepealable legislation cannot be passed, 152–154, 347.
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LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, - continued."
but exemptions from taxation may be made, 154, 342, 640.
power of, limited to territory of the State, 154.
discretionary powers o
f,
how restricted, 155–157.
courts no control over, 157.
enactment o
f
laws by, 158–194.
must b
e under the constitutional forms, 158, 159.
parliamentary common law o
f,
159, 162, 163.
division of, into two houses, 159, 160.
when to meet, 160.
proroguement by executive, 160.
rules of order of 161, 162.
election and qualification o
f members, determination o
f,
161.
contempts o
f,
may b
e punished by, 161, 162.
but not b
y
commit ees, 164.
members o
f,
may b
e expelled, 161, 162.
their privilege from arrest, &c., 163.
committees of, for collection o
f information, &c., 164.
power of, to terminate with session, 164.
journals of
,
to b
e evidence, 164, 165.
action o
f,
to b
e presumed legal and correct, 165.
motives o
f
members not to be questioned, 165, 225, 254,
“lobby” services illegal, 166.
bills, introduction and passage o
f,
167–171.
three several readings o
f
96, 97. 170.
yeas and nays to b
e
entered o
n journal, 171.
vote on passage of, what sufficient, 171.
title of, formerly no part o
f it
,
172.
constitutional provisions respecting, 98, 99, 172, n
.
purpose o
f these, 173.
they are mandatory, 182, 183.
particularity required in stating object, 175—177.
what is embraced b
y title, 180–182.
effect if more than one object embraced, 179–181.
effect if act is broader than title, 181–183.
amended statutes, publication of, at length, 184, 185.
repeal o
f
statutes a
t
session when passed, 186.
signing o
f
bills b
y
officers o
f
the houses, 186.
approval and veto o
f
bills b
y governor, 186–188.
governor's messages to, 189.
special sessions o
f,
189.
when acts to take effect, 190–193.
power o
f
the courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, 194–227.
full control o
f,
over municipal corporations, 231-234, 279, 280–288.
legalization by, o
f irregular municipal action, 278.
o
f
invalid contracts, 359, 463-477.
o
f irregular sales, taxation, &c., 462–479.
not to pass bills o
f attainder, 19, 42, 317.
nor er post facto laws, 19, 42, 323.
nor laws violating obligation o
f contracts, 19, 42, 154, 333.
(See OBLIGATION O
F
CONTRACTs.)
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LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES, - continued.
insolvent laws, what may be passed, 359.
right to pe ition, 432.
vested rights protected against, 435–498.
(See Law of the LAND.)
control by, of remedies in criminal cases, 326–333.
in civil cases, 351–361, 448–460.
control of rules of evidence, 353, 457.
may change estates in land, 445.
and rights to property under the marriage relation, 447.
limitation laws may be passed by, 453-456.
retrospective legislation by, 460–479.
(See RETRospective Legislation.)
privileges granted by, may be recalled, 479.
consequential injuries from action o
f,
481.
sumptuary laws, 483.
betterment laws, 484-487.
unequal and partial legislation, 487-498.
general laws not always essential, 487,488.
special rules for particular occupations, 489.
proscriptions for opinion's sake, 489.
suspensions o
f
laws in special cases, 490.
special remedial legislation, 488, 492.
special franchises, 492-498.
restrictions upon suffrage, 494, 752.
power o
f,
to determine for what purposes taxes may be levied, 608–617,
643.
cannot authorize property to be taxed out o
f
it
s district, 622-627.
must select the subjects o
f taxation, 640.
may determine necessity o
f appropriating private property to public use,
657, 672.
authority of, requisite to the appropriation, 657.
cannot appropriate property to private use, 661.
LETTERS,
legal inviolability of, 375, n.
LEVEES,
establishment o
f,
under police power, 741.
special assessments for, 635.
LIBEL,
(See Liberty of SPEECH AND o
f
THE PREss.)
LIBERTY,
personal,
(See PERsonal LIBERTY.)
o
f
the press,
(See LIBERTY o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
the PREss.)
religious,
(See RELigious Liberty.)
of discussion, 432.
o
f bearing arms, 433.
o
f petition, 432.
charters of, 32, n
.
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LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS,
Hamilton's reasons why protection o
f,
b
y
bill o
f rights, was not important,
314.
opposing reasons b
y Jefferson, 316, n.
Congress to pass no law abridging, 518.
State constitutional provisions respecting, 518, n.
these create n
o
new rights, but protect those already existing, 519–522.
liberty o
f
the press neither well defined nor protected at the common law,
522. -
censorship o
f publications, 522–524.
debates in Parliament not suffered to be published, 523.
censorship in the Colonies, 524.
secret sessions o
f
Constitutional Convention, 524.
and o
f
United States Senate, 524.
what liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press consists in, 525.
general purpose o
f
the constitutional provisions, 526, 527.
rules o
f
common-law liability for injurious publications, 528–532.
modification of, b
y
statute, 538.
privileged cases, 532–534.
libels upon the government indictable at the common law, 534.
prosecutions for, have ceased in England, 535.
sedition law for punishment of, 535.
whether now punishable in America, 537.
criticism upon officers and candidates for office, 539–551.
statements in the course o
f judicial proceedings, 551–556.
privilege o
f
counsel, 553–556.
privilege o
f legislators, 556–558.
publication o
f privileged communications through the press, 559–572.
publication o
f
speeches o
f
counsel, &c., not privileged, 559.
fair and impartial account o
f judicial trial is
,
559.
but not o
f
e
x parte proceedings, 559.
whole case must b
e published, 560.
must b
e
confined to what took place in court, 560.
must not include indecent o
r blasphemous matter, 560.
privilege o
f
publishers o
f news, 563-569.
publishers generally held to same responsibility as other persons, 567.
not excused by giving source o
f information, 567.
nor because the publication was without their personal knowledge, 567.
nor b
y
it
s being a criticism on a candidate for office, 567.
nor b
y
it
s constituting a fair account o
f
a public meeting, 567, 568.
criticisms by, on works o
f
art and literary productions, 568.
exemplary damages against publishers, 569.
publication o
f legislative proceedings, how far privileged, 569.
rule in England, 569.
the case o
f
Stockdale v. Hansard, 570, n.
publication o
f
speeches b
y
members, 571, 572.
the jury as judges o
f
the law in libel cases, 572.
Woodfall's and Miller's cases, 572, 573.
Mr. Fox's Libel Act, 574.
the early rulings on the subject in America, 575.
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LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS, - continued.
provisions on the subject in State constitutions, 576, n.
the truth as a defence when good motives and justifiable ends in the pub
lication can be shown, 577.
burden of proof on the deſendant to show them, 578.
that publication was copied from another source is not sufficient, 579, n.
motives or character of defendant no protection, if publication is false,
579, n.
LICENSE,
of occupations in general, 749.
for ferry across navigable waters, 740.
revoking, where a fee was received therefor, 345, n.
LICENSE FEES,
when are taxes, 246, n.
limited generally to necessary expenses, &c., 246.
payment o
f,
to United States, does not give rights as against State laws,
720.
LICENSER,
o
f
intended publications, 522–524.
(See Liberty of SPEECH AND of THE PRESS.)
LICENTIOUSNESS, -
distinguished from liberty, 548, n.
LIEN,
statutory, may be taken away, 351.
LIFE,
action for taking, through negligence, &c., 725.
not to b
e
taken but b
y
due process o
f
law, 13, 19, 436, n
.
LIMITATION,
o
f
time to apply for compensation for property taken b
y public, 700, 701.
LIMITATION LAWS,
may cut off vested rights, 453-456.
opportunity to assert rights must first be given, 455.
cannot operate upon party in possession, 455.
legislature to determine what is reasonable time, 456.
suspension o
f
455, n., 490, n.
legislature cannot revive demands barred by, 454.
legislature may prescribe form for new promise, 359.
do not apply to State or nation, 456, n.
LIMITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER,
are only such as the people have imposed b
y
their constitutions, 106.
(See Legislatures of THE STATEs)
LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,
copyright to, Congress may provide for, 11, 12.
privilege o
f
criticism of, 568, 569.
LOBBY SERVICES,
contract for, unlawful, 106–168, n., 259, n
.
LOCAL OFTION LAWS,
constitutionality of
,
150–152.
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,
State constitutions framed in reference to, 44, 212.
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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, - continued.
the peculiar feature of the American system, 228.
(See MUNIcipal Corporations.)
LOCAL TAXATION,
(See TAxATION.)
LOCALITY OF PROPERTY,
may give jurisdiction to courts, 506–508.
taxation dependent upon, 622–628, 643.
LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION,
constitutional provisions to prevent, 172–183.
LORD’S DAY,
laws for observance o
f,
how justified, 594, 734.
LOUISIANA,
code of, based upon the civil law, 35, n.
divorces not to b
e granted by special laws, 133, n
.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
title o
f
acts to embrace the object, 172, n
.
no act to be amended b
y
mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n
time when acts are to take effect, 192, 193.
liberty o
f speech and of the press in, 521, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
exclusion o
f religious teachers from office, 583, n.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753, n.
LUNATICS,
excluded from suffrage, 753.
special statutes for sale o
f
lands o
f
118–128.
M.
MAGNA CHARTA,
grant of, did not create constitutional government, 3
,
n
.
a declaratory statute, 30, 315. -
it
s
maxims the interpreters o
f
constitutional grants of power, 212
provision in, for trial b
y
peers, &c., 435.
MAILS,
inviolability o
f 375, n.
MAINE,
judges to give opinions to governor and legislature, 51, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 309, n.
protection to person and property b
y
the law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 518, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
periodical valuations for taxation, 618.
exclusions from suffrage in
,
753, n
.
•MAJORITY,
what constitutes two-thirds, 171.
what sufficient in elections, 752, 772.
MALICE,
presumption o
f,
from falsity o
f injurious publications, 528, 566, 567.
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MALICE, - continued.
in refusing to receive legal votes, 777.
presumption in cases of homicide, 403, n.
MANDAMUS,
to the executive, 141, n.
to compel registration of voters, 757.
to compel canvassers to perform duty, 785.
MANDATORY STATUTES,
doctrine of, 89–94.
constitutional provisions always mandatory, 94–99, 171, 182.
but courts cannot always enforce, 157.
MANUFACTURING PURPOSES,
whether dams for, can be established under right of eminent domain,
666–668.
taxation in aid of, 610, n.
MARKETS,
State power to re ulate, 749.
MARRIAGE, -
validating invalid, by retrospective legislation, 465.
legislative control of r ghts springing from, 447.
between whites and blacks, 490, n.
power of the legislature to annul, 132–137.
(See Divorce; MARRIED Wom EN.)
MARRIED WOMEN,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 37, 753.
statutes enlarging rights of, 74, n.
testimony of, in favor of husband, 390, n.
invalid deeds o
f,
may b
e
validated b
y
legislature, 470, 471.
control of, b
y
husband, 419, 420.
(See Divorce; Dower.)
MARSHES,
draining Qf, at d assessments therefor, 635, 636, 665.
MARTIAL LAW,
when may b
e declared, 379, n, 394, n
.
legality o
f
action under, 450, 451, n.
danger from, 775.
MARYLAND,
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted b
y legislature, 133, n.
limited time for introduction o
f
new bills, 169.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 172, n
.
no act to b
e
amended by mere reference to its title, 183, 184, n
.
right o
f ury to determine the law in a
ll
criminal cases, 899, n.
protection o
f person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 519, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
exclusion o
f religious teachers from office, 583, n.
religious tests for office in
,
584, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
exclusions from suffrage in
,
753, n
.
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MASSACHUSETTS, -
judges of
,
to give opinions to governor and legislature, 51, n
.
constitutional provision respecting divorces, 133, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
protection o
f
person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f
speech' and o
f
the press in
,
518, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 5 6
,
n
.
periodical valuations for taxation, 618.
exclusions from suffrage in
,
753, n
.
MASTER,
o
f apprentice, servant, and scholar, power o
f,
421.
MAXIMS,
o
f government, laws in violation of, 205–207.
o
f
the common law, what they consist in
,
29.
gradual growth and expansion of, 67.
for construction o
f
statutes,
a statute is to be construed as prospective, and not retrospective, in
its operation, 76. -
such a
n interpretation shall be put upon a law as to uphold it
,
and
give effect to the intention o
f
the law-makers, 71. -
words in a statute are presumed to be employed in their natural and
ordinary sense, 72, 102, n.
contemporary construction is best and strongest in the law, 81–87.
a statute is to b
e
construed in the light o
f
the mischief it was designed
to remedy, 7", 80.
h
e
who considers the letter merely, goes but skin deep into the
meaning, 103, n
.
statutes in derogation o
f
the common law are to be construed strictly,
75, n
.
a
n argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in the law, 82–86.
general p inciples,
n
o
man can b
e judge in his own cause, 514–517.
consent excuses error, 219, 220, 511.
the law does not concern itself about trifles, 647.
that to which a party assents is not in law an injury, 219, 220.
no man shall b
e
twice vexed for one and the same cause, 57–66.
every man's house is his castle, 29, 367.
that which was originally void cannot b
y
mere lapse o
f
time become
valid, 455.
necessity knows no law, 747.
so enjoy your own as not to injure that o
f another, 715.
MEANING OF WORDS,
(See DEFINIT.ons.)
MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,
regulation o
f
749.
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
contested seats o
f,
decided b
y
the house, 161.
punishment of, for contempts, &c., 161, 162.
power o
f
the houses to expel, 161, 162.,
exemption o
f,
from arrest, 163.
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MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, - continued.
publication of speeches by, 569–572.
privilege of
,
in debate, &c., 556–558.
MICHIGAN,
right of
,
to admission to the Union under ordinance o
f 1787, 35, n.
repeal o
f
acts o
f
Parliament in
,
34, n
.
repeal o
f
laws derived from France, 35, n
.
right o
f married women to property in, 74, n
.
special statutes authorizing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n
.
divorces not to b
e granted by the legislature, 133, n
.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n
.
limited time for introduction of new bills, 169.
title o
f
acts to embrace the object, 172, n
.
no act to b
e
amended b
y
mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n
.
special legislative sessions, 190, n
.
time when acts are to take effect, 190, 191.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 272.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 899, n.
protection o
f
person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
religious liberty in
,
583, n
.
religious belief not to b
e
test o
f
incompetency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
periodical valuations for taxation, 618.
MILITARY BOUNTIES,
b
y
municipal corporations, when legal, 274–281.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
when not admissible, 394, n
.
(See MARTIAL LAw.)
MILITIA,
control of 12, 24, 52, n
.
not to be called out o
n election days, 775.
MILL-DAMS,
construction of, across navigable waters, 740.
abatement of, as nuisances, 747.
MILL-DAM ACTS,
d
o
not conſer vested rights, 481.
constitutionality of
,
666–669.
MILLERS,
regulation o
f
charges o
f
742-746.
taxation in aid of, 610, n
.
MINNESOTA,
divorces not to b
e granted b
y
the legislature, 133, n
.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n
.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 172, n
.
approval o
f
laws b
y
the governor o
f,
187.
protection o
f person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
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MINNESOTA, - continued.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f
incompetency o
f witness, 596, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753, n.
MINORS,
(See INFANTs.) |
MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED,
may throw light on constitutional clause, 79, 223.
MISSISSIPPI,
constitutional provision respecting divorces, 133, n.
exercise o
f
the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n
.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n.
time when acts are to take effect, 190. -
municipalities of
,
restrained from aiding public improvements, 266, n.
protection o
f person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 522, n.
religious tests for office in, 583, n.
compulsory support, &c., o
f religious worship forbidden, 584.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n
.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753, n.
MISSOURI,
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to b
e granted by legislature, 134, n.
restrictions upon legislative power in constitution of, 155, 156, n.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title o
f
act to embrace the subject, 173, n
.
no act to be amended b
y
mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n
.
time when acts are to take effect, 190, n
.
special legislative sessions, 190, n.
municipalities restrained from aiding public improvements, 266, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection o
f
person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 521, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f
incompetency o
f
witness, 596, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n
.
exclusions from suffrage in, 754, n.
MONEY,
coinage and regulation o
f 11, 19.
legal tender, 19.
punishment o
f counterfeiting, 11, 25.
bills for raising, to originate in lower house in some States, 160.
cannot b
e appropriated under right o
f
eminent domain, 656.
MONOPOLIES,
odious nature of, 494.
grant of
,
not presumed, 495.
in navigable waters, 737, 738.
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MORAL OBLIGATIONS,
recognition of
,
b
y municipal bodies, 255–257.
MORTGAGES,
right to possession under, cannot b
e
taken away b
y legislature, 356.
MOTIVES,
o
f
legislative body not to be inquired into b
y courts, 165, 225–227.
nor those o
f municipal legislative body, 254.
good, when a defence in libel cases, 577.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
question o
f
formation o
r
division o
f,
may b
e
submitted to people interested,
143.
powers o
f
local government may b
e
conferred upon, 143–152, 230.
whether they may engage in internal improvements, &c., 144, 260–272.
general view o
f
the system, 228–231.
legislature prescribes extent o
f powers, 230.
charter of, the measure o
f
their authority, 231.
complete control o
f,
b
y legislature, 207, n., 230, 233.
whether it may compel them to assume obligations aside from their ordi
nary functions, 281–289.
charter of, not a contract, 233.
implied powers o
f
235, 254, 255.
effect o
f changes in, 232, n.
charter to be strictly construed, 235.
contracts, ultra vires, void, 237, 257, 258, 267.
negotiable paper issued by, when valid, 259, 267.
may exist b
y prescription, 239.
powers thereof, 239.
what by-laws they may make, 235, 241, 242.
must not b
e opposed to constitution o
f
State o
r nation, 241.
nor to charter, 242.
nor to general laws o
f
the State, 242.
nor be unreasonable, 243.
nor uncertain, 246.
cannot delegate their powers, 248–250.
nor adopt irrepealable legislation, 251-253.
nor preclude themselves from exercise o
f police power, 251-253.
nor grant away use o
f
streets, 251-253.
incidental injuries in exercise o
f powers give no right o
f action, 253.
may indemnify officers, 254, 255.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 259.
may contract to pay for liquors destroyed, 257, n
.
powers o
f,
to b
e
construed with reference to the purposes o
f
their crea
tion, 257.
will not include furnishing entertainments, 258.
o
r loaning credit o
r making accommodation paper, 259.
must be confined to territorial limits, 260.
power of
,
to raise bounty moneys, &c., 273–281.
legislative control o
f corporate property, 289-295, 339.
towns, counties, &c., how differing from chartered corporations, 296, 303–
305.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, - continued.
judgments against, may be collected of corporators, 296–303.
but only in New England, 301, 302.
not liable for failure of officers to perform duty, 303.
chartered corporations undertake for performance of corporate duty, 302.
liability to persons injured by failure, 302–310.
corporate organization how questioned, 311, 312.
imperfect acts o
f,
may b
e validated, 466, 467, n., 473.
must tax a
ll property within their limits alike, 625, 626.
cannot tax property not lying within their limits, 623.
bounds o
f,
cannot b
e arbitrarily enlarged in order to bring in property
for taxation, 623–628.
obtaining water for, under right o
f
eminent domain, 665.
taking o
f
lands for parks for, 665, n.
MUTE,
wilfully standing, when arraigned, 382.
N.
NATION,
definition of, 1.
distinguished from State, 1.
(See UNITED STATEs.)
NATURALIZATION,
power o
f Congress over, 11.
NAVIGABLE WATERS,
made free b
y
ordinance o
f
1787, 34, n
.
right o
f
States to improve and charge toll, 34, n., 738.
what are, and what not, 735.
are for use o
f
a
ll equally, 736.
general control of, is in the States, 737.
congressional regulations, when made, control, 737.
States cannot grant monopolies of, 737, 738.
States may authorize bridges over, 738.
when bridges become nuisances, 739.
States may establish ferries across, 739, 740.
States may authorize dams of, 740.
regulation o
f
speed o
f
vessels upon, 741.
rights o
f
fishery in, 651.
frontage upon, is property, 680.
(See WATERcourses.)
NAVIGATION,
right of
,
pertains to the eminent domain, 651.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERs.)
NEBRASKA,
divorces not to b
e granted by legislature, 133; n.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title o
f
acts to embrace the subject, 172, n
.
-
n
o
act to b
e
amended b
y
mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
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NEBRASKA, - continued.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 521, n.
privilege of legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
religious belief not to be test of incompetency of witness, 596, n.
NECESSITY,
is the basis of the right of eminent domain, 652, 672, 673.
extent of property to be taken is limited by, 674.
destruction of buildings to prevent spread of fire, 746.
NEGLIGENCE,
as a foundation for rights under betterment laws, 486.
carriers of persons may be made responsible for deaths by, 725.
in the construction of public works, may give right of action, 712.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
when municipal corporations liable upon, 268-271, n.
NEWADA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 133, n.
title of act to embrace the subject, 173, n.
no act to be amended by mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n.
when acts take effect, 190, n
.
special legislative sessions, 190, n.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
religious belief not to be test o
f incompetency o
f witness, 596, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
disqualifications for suffrage in, 753, n.
-
NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY,
o
f
1643, why formed, 6.
NEW HAMPSHIRE,
judges o
f,
to give opinions to the governor and to the legislature, 51, n.
causes o
f
divorce to be heard b
y
the courts, 133, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n.
approval o
f
laws, 186, 187, n
.
municipalities restrained from aiding public improvements, 266, n
.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n.
constitutional provision respecting retrospective laws, 462, n.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in
,
518, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious liberty in, 584, 585, n.
disqualifications from suffrage in
,
753, n
.
NEW JERSEY, -
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to b
e granted b
y legislature, 133, n
.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n
.
title o
f
act to embrace the object, 172, 173, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 519, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
disqualifications from suffrage in
,
753, n
.
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NEW STATES,
admission of 35–47.
NEW TRIALS,
not to be granted by the legislature, 116, 492.
not granted on application of State in criminal cases, 398.
may be had after verdict set aside on application of defendant, 405.
but not on counts on which he was acquitted, 406.
(See JEoPARDY.)
NEW YORK, - -
amendment of constitution of, 40, n.
divorces to be granted only in judicial proceedings, 133, n.
title of act to express the subject, 173, n.
approval of laws by governor of 187.
right of jury to determine the law in cases of libel, 399, n.
protection to person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 518, 519, n.
privilege of legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious liberty in
,
584, n
.
religious belief not to be test o
f
incompetency o
f witness, 596, n
.
NEWSPAPERS,
publication o
f privileged communications in, 559–562.
whether they have any privilege in publishing news, 563.
privilege not admitted b
y
the courts, 564–569.
when publisher not liable to vindictive damages, 569.
(See LIBERTY o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
THE PREss.)
NOBILITY,
titles o
f,
forbidden to be granted, 23.
NOLLE PROSEQUI,
when equivalent to acquittal, 404.
NON COMPOTES MENTIS,
legislative authority for sale o
f
lands o
f,
118–129.
excluded from suffrage, 753.
NON-RESIDENT PARTIES,
subjecting to jurisdiction o
f
court b
y publication, 504-508.
restricted effect o
f
the notice, 506.
discrimination in taxation of, 606.
NORTH CAROLINA,
ratification o
f
constitution by, 9.
divorces not to b
e granted b
y legislature, 133, n.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in, 521, n
.
religious tests for office in, 583, n
.
disqualifications from suffrage in, 753, n.
NOTICE,
necessity for, in legal proceedings, 504-509.
bringing in non-resident parties b
y publication o
f 504, 505.
o
f
elections, when essential to their validity, 759.
NUISANCE,
liability o
f municipal corporations for, 311, n.
when bridges over navigable waters are, 739.
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NUISANCE, - continued.
when dams are, and may be abated, 747.
obstructions in navigable streams are, 736.
forbidding use of cemeteries which have become, 747.
general power in the States to abate, 748.
created by public, not to be abated at expense of individual, 748, n.
-
O.
OATH,
of attorneys, 409, 410.
test, may be punishment, 321, n.
of voter, when conclusive of his right, 777.
blasphemy and profanity punishable by law, 588–594.
OBJECT OF STATUTE,
in some States required to be stated in title, 172–183.
OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
States not to pass laws violating, 19, 42, 153, 333.
what is a contract, 333–343.
agreements by States are, 334, 335.
executed contracts, 335.
appointments to office are not, 336.
municipal charters are not, 233, 336.
franchises granted to municipal corporations are not, 338.
but grants of property in trust are, 839.
and grants of property for municipal use, 290.
private charters of incorporation are, 339, 340.
whether an exemption from taxation is
,
154, 341, 342.
it is if granted for a consideration, 342.
whether right o
f
eminent domain can b
e relinquished, 343.
o
r
the right to exercise the police power, 345.
change in general laws o
f
the State does not violate, 347.
nor divorce laws, 348.
such laws not to devest rights in property, 348.
what obligation consists in, 348-350.
remedies for enforcement o
f
contracts may b
e changed, 351–354.
imprisonment for debt may be abolished, 351.
exemptions from execution may b
e increased, 352.
rules o
f
evidence may b
e changed, 353.
but a
ll remedy cannot be taken away, 354.
repeal o
f
statute giving remedy cannot destroy contracts, 355.
appraisement laws cannot b
e
made applicable to existing debts, 355.
right to possession under mortgages cannot be taken away, 356.
nor time to redeem lands shortened or extended, 356.
laws staying execution, how far invalid, 357, 358.
when power o
f municipal taxation may not be taken away, 358.
stockholders liable for corporate debts may not be released b
y law, 358.
whether a party may release, b
y
contract, a privilege granted for reasons
o
f
State policy, 359.
when a contract requires new action to it
s enforcement, changes may be
made as to such action, 359.
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OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, - continued.
new promise to revive a debt may be required to be in writing, 359.
laws validating invalid contracts do not violate Constitution, 359.
nor laws extending corporate franchises, 359.
State insolvent laws, how far valid, 359-361.
effect of police laws, 715–729.
OBSCENITY,
in legal proceedings, not to be published, 560.
sale of obscene books and papers may be prohibited, 749.
OBSCURITIES,
aids in interpretation of 79–86.
(See CoNstruction of STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)
OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION,
when bridges and dams to be considered such, 739–741.
when channels cut by private parties are private property, 736.
OCEAN,
(See HIGH SEAs.)
. OFFICE,
term o
f,
when cannot b
e enlarged b
y
law, 78, n
.
appointments to, do not constitute contracts, 336.
whether they pertain to the executive, 138, n
.
right to, not to be contested on habeas corpus, 430, n.
OFFICER,
duties of, when cannot b
e
taken away, 79, n
.
protection o
f dwelling-house against, 29, 367.
general warrants t
o
,
are illegal, 368–371. *
may break open house to serve criminal warrant, 372.
service o
f
search-warrant by,
(See SEARCHES AND SEizures.)
privilege o
f
criticism of, 539–551, 567.
removal of, 139, n.
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to, by the legislature, 78.
duty of, when doubtful o
f
constitutional construction, 88, 89.
o
f
the legislature, election o
f
161.
d
e jure, who are, 778.
municipal, may be indemnified by corporation, 254.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 259.
election of,
(See ELECTIONs.)
appointments to
,
not necessarily a
n
executive function, 138.
OHIO,
general laws to b
e uniform, 76, 77, n
.
legislature not to grant divorces, o
r
exercise judicial power, 133, n
.
legislature forbidden to exercise the appointing power, 138, n.
title o
f
act to embrace the subject, 172, n
.
no act to be amended b
y
mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n
.
constitutional provision respecting retrospective laws, 462, n.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in
,
583, n
.
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OHIO, - continued.
religious belief not to be test of incompetency of witness, 596, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
OMNIPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT,
meaning of the term, 4, 105.
OPINION, .
proscription for, is unconstitutional, 489.
on religious subjects to be free, 580–586.
religious tests forbidden in some States, 583, n.
of witnesses on religious subjects not to constitute disqualification in some
States, 596.
judicial, force o
f,
a
s precedents, 61–66.
ORDINANCE OF 1787,
how far still in force, 33–35.
admission o
f
States to the Union under, 35.
ORDINANCES, MUNICIPAL,
(See By-LAws.)
OREGON,
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to b
e granted b
y legislature, 133, n.
exercise o
f
the pardoning power restrained, 140, n
.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n
.
privilege o
f legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title o
f
act to embrace the subject, 173, n
.
no act to b
e
amended by mere reference to its title, 183, 184, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in
,
520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n
.
disqualifications from suffrage in, 753, n.
OVERRULING DECISIONS,
when should take place, 65.
P.
PAPERS,
private, exempt from seizure, 368, n., 375, n.
protected the same a
s property, 443, n.
PARDON,
power of
,
to b
e
exercised b
y governor, 139, n
.
constitutional provisions as to rules for, 140, n.
power to, does not include reprieves, 140, n
.
PARENT, -
right of
,
to custody o
f child, 420.
respective rights o
f
father and mother, 431.
PARLIAMENT,
power of, to change the constitution, 4
,
105, 212.
acts of, adopted in America, 32.
repeal o
f
acts o
f 34, n.
comparison o
f
powers with those o
f
State legislatures, 104, 107, 212, 213.
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PARLIAMENT, - continued.
may exercise judicial authority, 106.
bills of attainder by, 317.
publication of proceedings o
f,
not formerly allowed, 523.
publication o
f
speeches b
y
members, 569–572.
publication o
f reports and papers o
f,
569–572.
PARLIAMENTARY LAW,
influence of, in construction o
f constitutions, 158, 159.
legislative power in regard to, 161.
power to preserve order, &c., under, 161, 162.
privilege by, o
f
members from arrest, 163.
PARTIAL LEGISLATION,
legislature to govern b
y
equal laws, 489–493.
special laws for particular individuals not permissible, 492.
suspensions o
f
laws not allowed in special cases, 492.
regulations for special localities o
r classes, 492, 493.
equality o
f rights, &c., the aim o
f
the law, 493.
strict construction o
f
special privileges and grants, 493, 496.
and o
f
discriminations against individuals and classes, 493, 494.
and o
f
statutes in derogation o
f
the common law, 74, n
.
citizens o
f
other States not to b
e discriminated against, 497.
PARTICULAR INTENT,
control o
f,
b
y
general intent, 71, n
.
PARTIES,
defendants in criminal suits, evidence of, 388–391.
not compellable to testify against themselves, 384,494.
how subjected to jurisdiction o
f
courts, 504.
estopped b
y judgment, 60.
PARTITION, -
legislature may authorize sale o
f
lands for purposes of, 124.
PASSENGERS,
power o
f
States to require report o
f,
from carriers, and to levy tax upon,
733.
making carriers responsible for safety o
f
725.
PASTURAGE,
right of, in public highway, is property, 681, n
.
PAUPERS,
exclusion o
f,
from suffrage, 753.
PAVING STREETS,
assessments for, not within constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
619.
special taxing districts for, 628–632.
assessments may b
e
made in proportion to benefits, 629.
o
r
in proportion to street front, 631.
but each separate lot cannot be made a separate district, 632.
PEACE AND WAR,
power over, o
f
the revolutionary Congress, 7.
o
f Congress under the Constitution, 12.
PENALTIES,
for the same act under State and municipal laws, 242.
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PENALTIES,- continued.
given by statute may be taken away, 450, 468, n
.,
480. "
for violation o
f police regulations, 749.
PENNSYLVANIA,
divorces not to b
e granted b
y legislature, 133, n.
revenue bills must originate in lower house, 160, n
.
title o
f
act to embrace the subject, 173, n
.
time when acts take effect, 193.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in, 519, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office in
,
583, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
experiment o
f,
with single legislative body, 159, n
.
PEOPLE,
reservation o
f powers to, by national Constitution, 25.
sovereignty vested in, 36, 751.
formation and change o
f
constitutions by, 38.
who are the, 36–39, 752.
exercise o
f
sovereign powers by, 757.
PERSONAL LIBERTY,
gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 362–366.
constitutional prohibition o
f
slavery in America, 366.
o
f
bills o
f attainder, 19, 42, 317.
(See BILLs o
f
ATTAINDER.)
o
f
e
x post facto laws, 19, 42, 323.
(See Er Post Facto LAws.)
of unreasonable searches and seizures, 367.
(See SEARCHES AND SEizures.)
o
f quartering soldiers in private houses, 378.
protection of
,
in one's dwelling-house, 29, 367, 378.
criminal accusations, how made, 379.
bail for accused parties, 380.
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 381.
trials for crimes, 381–417.-
(See CRIMEs.)
meaning o
f
the term, 418, 493.
legal restraints upon, 418–422. -
right to, in England, did not depend on any statute, 422.
reason why it was not well protected, 423.
evasions o
f
the writ o
f
habeas corpus, 423.
the habeas corpus act, 30, 425.
did not extend to American Colonies, 426.
general adoption o
f
426.
writ o
f
habeas corpus, 426.
when national courts may issue, 427.
State courts to issue generally, 428.
return to
,
when prisoner held under national authority, 428, 429.
not to be employed as a writ o
f error, 430.
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PERSONAL LIBERTY, - continued.
-
application for, need not be made in person, 429, n.
what the officer to inquire into, 430.
to enforce relative rights, 431.
PETIT JURY,
trial by,
(See JURY TRIAL.)
PETITION,
right of 432, 433, 541, 542.
PETITION OF RIGHT,
was a declaratory statute, 30, 315.
quartering soldiers upon subjects forbidden by, 378.
PICTURES,
libels by, injury presumed from, 529.
indecent, sale o
f,
may b
e prohibited, 748, 749.
PLURALITY,
sufficient in elections, 781.
POISONS,
regulation o
f
sales of, 748.
POLICE POWER,
exercise o
f, by municipal corporations, 247.
pervading nature o
f
713–715.
definition of, 713, n
.
the maxim on which it rests, 715.
States n
o power to relinquish it
,
342–345.
power o
f
States to make regulations which affect contracts, 715–727.
how charters o
f private incorporation may be affected by, 716–728.
charters cannot b
e
amended o
n pretence o
f,
719, 720.
nor rights granted b
y
charters taken away, 720, 721.
railroad corporations may be required to fence track, 722.
and made liable for beasts killed on track, 722.
grade o
f railways and crossings may be prescribed, 723.
requirement that bell shall be rung o
r
whistle sounded a
t crossings, &c.,
724. -
whether carriers o
f persons may not be made insurers, 724.
action may b
e given for death caused b
y
negligence, 725.
sale o
f intoxicating drinks may be regulated b
y
States, 725.
regulation of
,
does not interfere with power o
f Congress over com
merce, 726.
sale o
f intoxicating drinks as a beverage may be prohibited b
y
States, 727.
payment o
f
United States license fee does not give rights as against State
law, 729.
quarantine and health regulations b
y
States, 729.
harbor regulations by the States, 730. -
line o
f
distinction between police regulations and interference with com
merce, 731, 732.
police regulations may b
e
established b
y
Congress, 732.
State requirement o
f
license fee from importers illegal, 732.
State regulations to prevent immigrants becoming a public charge, 733.
State regulations o
f pilots and pilotage, 731, 732.
Sunday laws a
s regulations o
f police, 734.
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POLICE POWER, - continued. -
regulation by States of use of highways, 734.
owners of urban property may be required to build sidewalks, 734.
construction of levees on river fronts, 741.
control of navigable waters by States, 735.
restrictions on this control, 737.
monopolies not to be granted, 738.
States may improve and charge tolls, 738.
may authorize bridges, 738.
when these bridges to be abated, 739.
may establish ferries, 740.
may authorize dams, 740.
when the dams may be abated, 740.
may regulate speed of vessels, 740, 741.
regulations of civil rights and privileges, 742.
regulations of business charges, 742.
other cases of police regulations, 746.
destruction of property to prevent spread of fire, 747.
establishment of fire limits, wharf lines, &c., 747.
regulations respecting gunpowder, poisons, dogs, unwholesome provisions,
&c., 748.
regulations for protection of public morals, 748.
market regulations, 749.
prohibited act or omission may be made criminal, 750.
POLICE REGULATIONS,
power to establish, may be conferred on municipal corporations, 148–152.
(See PolicE Power.)
POLICE REPORTS,
publication of 560.
POLITICAL OPINIONS,
citizens not to be proscribed for, 489.
POLITICAL POWER,
distinguished from judicial, 122, n.
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
equality of 488, 489, 580–585.
POPULAR RIGHTS,
not measured by constitutions, 45–47.
POPULAR WOTE,
submission of laws to
,
not generally allowable, 141.
(See ELECTIONs.)
POPULAR WILL,
expression o
f,
a
s
to amendment o
f constitutions, 41.
must be obtained under forms o
f law, 751.
(See ELECTIONs.)
POSSESSION,
-
importance o
f,
in limitation laws, 455, 456.
POST-OFFICES, -
and post-roads, Congress may establish, 11.
inviolability o
f correspondence through, 376, n
.
POWDER,
police regulations concerning storage o
f
748.
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POWERS,
of government, apportionment o
f, b
y
State constitutions, 42–46.
o
f Congress, 11, 12.
o
f
State legislatures, 104–157.
(See JUDICIAL Power; LEGISLATIVE Powers)
PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION,
weight to be given to, 81–86.
not to override the Constitution, 86.
PRECEDENTS,
importance of, 61, 62.
judicial, how far binding, 61-66.
law made by, 69, 70, n.
only authoritative within country where decided, 63, 64.
when to be overruled, 65.
o
f
executive department, force of, 81–86.
PRECIOUS METALS,
in the soil belong to sovereign authority, 651.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS,
o
f
persons accused o
f
crimes, 384.
publication o
f procetdings on, not privileged, 560.
PRESCRIPTIVE CORPORATIONS,
powers of, 239.
PRESENCE,
o
f prisoner at his trial, 393.
PRESIDENT,
powers and duties o
f,
14.
calling out the militia by, 52, n.
PRESS, LIBERTY OF, -
(See LIBERTY of SPEECH AND of THE PRESS.)
PRESUMPTION,
-
o
f constitutionality o
f
statutes, 204, 221.
o
f
existence o
f corporation, 239.
o
f
innocence o
f
accused party, 379, 380.
o
f
correctness o
f
legislative motives, 225, 254.
PRICES,
regulation of, 742.
PRINCIPAL AND BAIL,
custody o
f principal by bail, 422.
FRINTED BALLOTS,
answer the requirement o
f written, 761, n.
PRIVATE BUSINESS,
taxation to aid, 265, 266, n
.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
-
distinguished from public, 341, n
.
charters of, are contracts, 340.
PRIVATE PAPERS,
(See PAPERs.)
PRIVATE PROPERTY,
right to, is before constitutions, 47, 212, n., 439, n.
o
f
municipal corporations, how far under legislative control, 289, 200.
when affected with a public interest, 742-746.
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PRIVATE PROPERTY, - continued.
owners cannot be compelled to improve, 483, 664.
appropriating under right of eminent domain, 650.
trial of right to, 459.
protection of
,
against municipal action, 247.
(See EMINENT DoMAIN; WESTED RIGHTs.)
PRIVATE ROADS,
cannot b
e laid out under right o
f
eminent domain, 661.
PRIVATE STATUTES,
not evidence against third parties, 118.
to authorize sales b
y guardians, &c., are constitutional, 118–129, 488.
PRIVIES,
estoppel of, by judgment, 60.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,
meaning o
f
the term, 532.
when made in answer to inquiries, 533, 534.
between principal and agent, 534.
where parties sustain confidential relations, 534.
discussing measures o
r principles o
f government, 534–538.
criticising officers o
r candidates, 539–551. e
made in the course o
f judicial proceedings, 551–553.
made b
y
counsel, 553–556.
by legislator to constituents, 569–572.
b
y
client to counsel, 413.
PRIVILEGES,
o
f
citizens o
f
the several States, 20–22, 606, 607.
citizens not to b
e deprived of, 13, 361.
protection of
,
rests with the States, 361, n., 742.
o
f legislators, 163.
special, strict construction o
f
488–497.
regulation o
f
742.
PROCEEDINGS,
o
f
constitutional convention may be looked to on questions o
f construction,
80, 81.
o
f
legislative bodies, publication of
,
523–525, 569–572.
PROFANITY,
in judicial proceedings, publication o
f
560.
punishment o
f,
588–593.
PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,
not to be disclosed, 413.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, -
to influence legislation cannot b
e
contracted for, 166, n.
law requiring, without compensation, to be strictly construed, 494.
(See Coussel.)
PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES,
in the federal Constitution, 19–25.
in forming o
r amending constitutions, 41, 42.
PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAWS,
constitutionality of, 727.
PROPERTY,
qualification for suffrage, 753.
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PROPERTY, - continued.
protection o
f,
b
y
fourteenth amendment, 13.
o
f municipal corporations, control o
f
289, 290.
(See EMIN ENT DomAIN; PRIvate ProPERTY; WESTED RIGHTs.)
PROROGUEMENT,
o
f
the legislature by governor, 160.
PROSCRIPTION,
o
f
persons, for their opinions, 489, 580–585.
PROSECUTING OFFICERS,
duty of
,
to treat accused parties with judicial fairness, 382 and n., 417,418.
PROTECTION,
the equivalent for taxation, 699.
PROVISIONS,
regulations to prevent sale o
f unwholesome, 748.
PUBLIC CORFORATIONS,
(See MUNICIPAL Corporations.)
PUBLIC DEBT,
inviolability o
f
13.
PUBLIC GOOD,
laws should have reference to, 141, 142, n., 156.
PUBLIC GRANTS,
strict construction of, 495.
(See CHARTER; FRANCHise.)
PUBLIC GROUNDS,
lands dedicated for, not to be put to other uses, 292, n.
PUBLIC INTEREST,
when property affected with, 742-746.
PUBLIC MORALS,
regulations for protection o
f 748, 749.
(See RELIGIOUs LIBERTY.)
PUBLIC OFFICERS,
(See OFFICER.)
PUBLIC OPINION,
not to affect construction o
f constitution, 67.
expression o
f,
b
y
elections, 751, 752.
PUBLIC PURPOSES,
appropriation o
f property for, 650.
(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)
PUBLIC STATUTES,
what are, 488.
PUBLIC TRIAL, °
accused parties entitled to, 383.
not essential that everybody be allowed to attend, 383.
PUBLIC USE,
o
f property, what constitutes, 663.
(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)
PUBLICATION,
o
f statutes, 190–193.
o
f
debates in Parliament formerly not suffered, 523.
o
f
books, &c., censorship of, 522–524.
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PUBLICATION, - continued.
of debates in American legislative bodies, 524, 525.
of legislative speeches, 569–572. -
of judicial proceedings, 559–562.
of notice to non-resident parties, 504-507.
(See LIBERTY of SPEECH AND of THE PREss.)
PUBLISHERS OF NEWS, -
not privileged in law, 563–569.
PUNISHMENTS,
what changes in
,
the legislature may make applicable to previous offences,
325–331.
o
f
crimes b
y servitude, 366, 367.
cruel and unusual, prohibited, 406–408.
must not exceed measure the law has prescribed, 408.
(See BILLS OF ATTAINDER ; CRIMES: Ez Post Facto LAws.)
Q.
QUALIFICATIONS,
o
f
officer o
r
voter under constitution cannot be added to b
y
legislature, 78.
o
f
members o
f legislature to be determined b
y
the two houses, 161.
o
f
voter, inquiring into, on contested election, 791.
QUARANTINE,
regulations by the States, 729.
QUARTERING SOLDIERS,
in private houses in time o
f
peace forbidden, 378.
QUASI CORPORATIONS, 295.
QUORUM,
majority of
,
generally sufficient for passage o
f
laws, 171.
o
f
courts, must act b
y
majorities, 117.
full court generally required on constitutional questions, 197.
R.
RACE,
not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 13.
marriages between persons o
f different, 490, n.
RAILROADS,
authorizing towns, &c., to subscribe to
,
is not delegating legislative power,
144.
whether such subscriptions may be made, 260–272.
appropriations o
f
lands for, 665.
and o
f
materials for constructing, 654.
and o
f
lands for depot buildings, &c., 676.
corporations may take, 671.
(See EMINENT DoMAIN.)
appropriation o
f
highways for, 681–684.
must b
e legislative permission, 681.
whether adjoining owner entitled to compensation, 682.
police regulations in respect to, 714–725.
requiring corporations to fence track and pay for beasts killed, 722.
INDEX. 865
RAILROADS,- continued.* regulation of grade and crossings, 723.
provisions regarding alarms, 724.
responsibility for persons injured or killed, 724, 725.
bridges for, over navigable waters, 738.
READING OF BILLS, -
constitutional provisions for, 96, 169, 170.
REAL ESTATE,
not to be taxed out of taxing district, 622, 623.
within taxing district to be taxed uniformly, 625.
taking for public use,
(See EMINENT DoMAIN.)
REASONABLENESS,
of municipal by-laws, 243.
of limitation laws, 456.
of police regulations,
(See PolicE Power.)
REBELLIONS,
employment of militia to suppress, 12.
RECITALS,
in statutes, not binding upon third parties, 117.
when they may be evidence, 117.
RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES,
control over, 43, n.
RECORDS,
public, of the States, full faith and credit to be given to, 22, 23.
judicial, not generally to be contradicted, 23, 509.
(See Judicial PRoceedings.)
REDEMPTION,
right of cannot be shortened or extended by legislature, 356.
REFUSAL TO PLEAD,
in criminal case6, consequence of
,
382.
REGISTRATION,
o
f
voters, may b
e required, 757.
REGULATION,
o
f
commerce by Congress, 14, 725, 734.
o
f
navigable waters b
y
Congress, 737, 738.
police, by the States,
(See Police Power.)
o
f
the right o
f suffrage, 756–759.
right of, does not imply a right to prohibit, 247, n.
REHFARING,
(See NEw TRIALs.)
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
care taken b
y
State constitutions to protect, 580–586.
distinguished from religious toleration, 581.
does not preclude recognition o
f superintending Providence b
y public
authorities, 587.
nor appointment o
f
chaplains, thanksgiving and fast days, 588.
55
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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, - continued.
nor recognition that the prevailing religion of the State is Christian,
588.
the maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land, 588–595.
punishment of blasphemy does not invade, 589–592.
or of other forms of profanity, 593.
Sunday laws, how justified, 594, 734.
respect for religious scruples, 595.
religious belief, as affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses,
596. -
REMEDIAL STATUTES,
liberal construction of, 75, n.
parties obtaining, are bound by, 117.
REMEDY,
-
power of legislature over, in criminal cases, 325–333.
in civil cases, 116, 351–359, 448–456.
legislature cannot take away a
ll remedy, 354.
may give new remedies, and defences, 351.
may limit resort to remedies, 453-456.
for compensation for property taken b
y public, 699-701.
REMOVAL,
o
f
causes from State to national courts, 15, 16.
REPEAL,
o
f
old English statutes, 34, n., 35, n.
all laws subject to, 152–154.
o
f
statutes a
t
same session o
f passage, 186.
b
y implication, not favored, 186.
o
f
a law, terminates right to give judgment under it
,
476.
o
f
laws conflicting with unconstitutional law, 224.
question o
f,
not to be referred to the people, 148, 149.
REPORTS,
o
f public meetings, 543, 544.
o
f
legislative proceedings, publication o
f
522–525, 569–572.
o
f judicial proceedings, publication o
f
559–562.
(See LIBERTY o
f
SPEECH AND o
f
the PREss.)
REPRESENTATION,
constructive, 73, n
.
(See LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATors.)
REPRIEVE,
power of
,
not included in power to pardon, 140, n
.
REPBULICAN GOVERNMENT,
guarantee o
f,
b
y
United States to the States, 23, 41.
maxims o
f,
d
o
not constitute limitations on legislative power, 205, 206.
REPUBLICATION,
o
f
amended statutes under certain State constitutions, 183, 184.
RES A DJ UDICATA,
parties and privies estopped b
y judgments, 60.
force o
f judgment does not depend on reasons assigned, 60.
strangers not bound by, 61. -
parties and privies not bound in new controversy, 61.
INDEX.
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RESERVED POWERS,
under United States Constitution in the States and people, 25.
RESIDENCE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce suits, 501, 502.
but not unless bona fide, 502.
as affecting right to impose personal taxes, 622.
of voters, what constitutes, 754–756.
RESTRICTIONS,
on trade by municipal by-laws, 246.
in United States Constitution on powers of the States, 19–25.
on power of people to amend constitutions, 39, 41.
on powers of legislature,
(See LEGislatures oF THE STATEs.)
RESUMPTION OF GRANTS,
-
by the States is forbidden, 334.
RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION,
when admissible generally, 113,460–479.
cannot revive demands which are barred, 460.
nor create a demand where none ever equitably existed, 460.
may take away defences based on informalities, 461.
may cure irregularities in legal proceedings, 462.
or in corporate action, &c., 463,463.
what defects can and what cannot be covered by, 462, 463.
may validate imperfect marriages, 465.
or other imperfect contracts, 467, 469.
or invalid deeds, 469–472.
may take away defence of usury, 467. .
bona fide purchasers not to be affected by, 472.
legalizing municipal action, 278, 474.
pendency of suit does not affect power to pass, 476. *
cannot make good what the legislature could not originally have permitted,
477.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction, 478, 479.
forbidden in some States, 461, 462, n.
statutes generally construed to operate prospectively, 76, 461.
prospective construction of constitution, 76.
REVENUE,
in some States bills for, to originate with lower house, 160.
cannot be raised under right of eminent domain, 656.
(See TAXATION.)
REVISION,
of State constitutions, 39–47.
of statutes,
(See StATUTEs.)
REVOLUTION, AMERICAN,
powers of the Crown and Parliament over Colonies before, 6–8.
Congress of the, it
s powers, 7–9.
division o
f
powers o
f
government a
t
time o
f,
7
,
n
.
REWARDS,
cannot b
e paid b
y
towns for apprehension o
f
offenders, 258, n
.
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RHODE ISLAND,
ratification of Constitution by, 9.
charter government of, 35.
judges of, to give opinions to governor and legislature, 51, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
impeachment of judges, 196, n.
protection to person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 518, n.
privilege of legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
periodical valuations for taxation, 618.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753.
RIGHTS,
distinguished from the remedy, 348-350.
vested,
(See WESTED RIGHTs.)
in action,
(See Action.)
ROADS,
appropriation of private property for, 664, 665.
appropriation of materials for constructing, 654.
appropriation of
,
for railroads, &c., 681–684.
(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)
regulation o
f
use o
f,
b
y
States, 734.
action for exclusion from, 679, n
.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
(See CoNSTRUCTION o
f
STATE CoNstitutions.)
RULES OF EVIDENCE,
power o
f
the legislature to change, 353, 457–460.
(See EvidKNCE.)
RULES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDER,
are under the control o
f
the legislature, 158–166.
(See LEGISLATUREs o
f
THE STATEs.)
S.
SABBATH, e
laws for observance of, 594, 734.
SALE OF LANDS,
o
f
incompetent persons, &c., special legislative authority for, 118–129.
propriety o
f judicial action in such cases, 118.
SCHOOL-HOUSES,
exercise o
f right o
f
eminent domain for sites for, 665.
SCHOOLS,
impartial rights in, 490, n.
SCOTLAND,
servitude in, 366.
SEAMEN,
impressment o
f,
367.
SEARCH-WARRANTS, -
(See SEARCHES AND SEIzurEs.)
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
the maxim that every man's house is his castle, 29, 367.
unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited, 367, 368.
origin of the prohibition, 368.
history of general warrants in England, 368, n.
general warrants in America, 369–371.
search-warrants, their arbitrary character, 372.
only granted after a showing of cause on oath, 372.
must specify place to be searched and the object, 372.
particularity of description required, 372.
should be served in daytime, 373.
must be directed to proper officer, 373.
must command accused party and property, &c., to be brought before
officer, 373, 374. -
cannot give discretionary power to ministerial officer, 374.
not allowed to obtain evidence of intended crime, 374.
cases in which they are permissible, 374–376.
not to seize correspondence, 376, n.
for libels, illegal at common law, 376, n.
officer following command o
f,
is protected, 377.
and may break open doors, 377.
SEAS,
(See HIGH SEAs.)
SECESSION,
not admitted by the Constitution, 10.
SECRECY,
inviolability of
,
in correspondence, 376, n.
elector's privilege o
f
761.
privilege of, as between counsel and client, 413. *
SEDITION LAW,
-
passage of, and prosecutions under, 535, 536.
SELF-ACCUSATION,
not to be compelled, 384-391.
SELF—DEFENCE,
right to, 377, n
.
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS,
what are and are not, 99–102.
SELF-GOVERNMENT,
(See ELECTIONs; MUNICIPAL Corporations.)
SERMONS, -
privilege o
f
criticism of, 550, n
SERVANT, -
control of, by master, 421.
SERVICES,
laws requiring, without compensation, strictly construed, 494.
to influence legislation cannot b
e
contracted for, 166.
o
f child, right o
f
father t
o
,
420.
SERVITUDE, (See SLAvery.)
SIDEWALKS,
owners o
f
lots may be compelled to build under police power, 734.
(See AssessMENTs.)
t -
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SIGNING OF BILLS,
by officers of legislature, 186.
by the governor, 186.
SLANDER,
general rules of liability for, 528–531.
(See LIBERTY of SPEECH AND of THE PRESS.)
SLAVERY,
former state o
f,
in England, 363.
causes o
f
it
s disappearance, 363-365.
in Scotland, 366. -
in America, 366, 367.
now prohibited, 13.
- servitude in punishment o
f crime, 366.
SLAVE CONTRACTS,
enforcement of, 350, n
.
SOLDIERS,
quartering of, in private houses prohibited, 378.
municipal bounties to, 274–281.
military suffrage laws, 755, n.
jealousy o
f standing armies, 433.
SOUTH CAROLINA,
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
title o
f
act to embrace the object, 172, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in cases o
f libel, 399, n.
protection o
f
person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436,
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in
,
521, n.
religious tests for office in, 583, n
.
private property not to be taken without compensation, 703, n.
exclusions from suffrage in
,
753.
SOWEREIGN POWERS,
separation o
f
44, 107, 110, 117.
cannot b
e granted away, 151, 251, 341–346.
SOWEREIGN STATE,
what it is, 1.
American States not strictly such, 7–9.
SOWEREIGNTY,
definition of, 1.
territorial and other limits of, 2.
in America, rests in people, 36, 751.
division o
f
powers o
f,
in American system, 2
,
51.
legislature not to bargain away, 151, 152, 341–346. .
exercise o
f,
b
y
the people, 751.
(See ELECTIONs.)
SPECIAL JURISDICTION,
courts of, 508.
SPECIAL LAWS,
ſorbidden in certain States where general can be made applicable, 133,
134 n., 155, n., 156, n
.
due process o
f
law does not always forbid, 487–498.
for sale o
f lands, &c., 115-129.
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SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,
strict construction of, 487–498.
SPECIAL SESSIONS OF LEGISLATURE,
calling of, by the governor, 160, 189.
SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,
(See LIBERTY of SPEECH AND of THE PREss.)
SPEECHES,
of legislators, publication of 569–572.
SPEED, -
upon public highways, regulation of, 734, 741.
SPEEDY TRIAL,
right of accused parties to, 382.
SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION,
must be found in the words employed, 87, 88.
laws in supposed violation of 208.
STALLIONS,
prohibition of standing o
f,
in public places, 749.
STAMP,
defence to contract based o
n
the want o
f,
may b
e
taken away, 471.
cannot b
e required on process o
f
State courts, 603.
upon contracts, 603, n
.
STAMP ACT CONGRESS,
what led to, 7
.
STANDING ARMIES,
jealousy of, 433.
STANDING MUTE,
o
f
accused party, proceeding in case o
f,
382.
STAR CHAMBER,
court of, 423.
STATE,
definition of, 1
.
sovereign, what is
,
1
.
distinguished from nation, 1
.
limits to jurisdiction of, 2.
STATE BUILDINGS,
local taxation for, 261, n., 284, n.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
in existence when United States Constitution was formed, 28.
pre-existing laws, common and statutory, 28–33, 35, n
.
ordinance o
f 1787, 34, n.
colonial, charters, 35.
how modified when not containing provisions herefor, 36.
theory that the people are sovereign, 36.
general rules for modification of, 38–47.
right o
f people o
f
territories to form, 38.
right to amend, rests in people as an organized body politie, 39.
will o
f
the people must b
e expressed under forms o
f
law, 39.
conventions to amend o
r revise, 41.
limitations b
y
Constitution o
f
the United States on power to amend, 41.
protection o
f personal rights by, 42, 44, 45.
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STATE CONSTITUTIONS, - continued.
unjust provisions, &c., must be enforced, 43.
what is generally to be expected in, 43.
are not the origin of individual rights, 45.
are presumed to have been drafted with care, 72.
are successors of English charters of liberty, 73.
construction of, 48.
(See CoNstruction of STATE CoNstitutioss.)
STATE COURTS, -
removal of causes from, to United States courts, 15.
to decide finally questions of State law, 16.
protection to personal liberty by, 361, n., 426.
(See Courts.)
STATE INDEBTEDNESS,
prohibition of
,
will not prevent indebtedness b
y
municipal corporations,
270, 271.
STATEMENT, -
o
f
defendant in criminal case, right to make, and effect of, 384–393.
STATES ATTORNEY,
fairness required of, 415.
STATES OF THE UNION,
in what sense sovereign, 7
.
always subject to a common government, 10.
suits between, in Federal courts, 14.
division o
f
powers between, and the nation, 2
.
not suable b
y individuals, 14.
powers prohibited to, 19–22, 24.
faith to be given to public records of, 22.
-
privileges and immunities o
f
citizens o
f 19, 22, 606, 607.
agreements of, are inviolable, 334.
compacts between, are inviolable, 335.
STATUS,
o
f marriage, control of, b
y legislature, 132.
(See Divorce.)
STATUTES,
adopted from other States, construction o
f,
64."
directory and mandatory, 89–93.
enactment of, 158-193.
constitutional requirements must be observed, 158, 159.
common parliamentary law as affecting, 159.
the two houses must act separately, 159, 160. -
to proceed in their own way in collecting information, 163, 164.
journals o
f
houses a
s evidence, 164, 165.
introduction o
f bills, 167–170.
three several readings o
f bills, 96, 97, 170.
yeas and nays, entry o
f
171.
what sufficient vote o
n passage, 171.
title o
f bill, formerly no part of it
,
172.
constitutional provisions requiring object to be expressed, 97,98.
these provisions mandatory, 182.
INDEX. 873
STATUTES, - continued.
evil to be remedied thereby, 173–175.
particularity required in stating object, 175.
“other purposes,” ineffectual words in
,
177.
examples as to what can b
e held embraced in
,
177, 178.
effect if more than one object embraced, 179, 180.
effect where act broader than title, 181, 182.
amendatory, 183–186.
-
requirement that act amended b
e
set forth at length, 184.
this not applicable to amendments b
y implication, 185.
repeal o
f,
a
t
same session o
f
their passage, 186.
by unconstitutional act, 224.
approval o
f, by the governor, 186–188.
passage o
f,
a
t special sessions, 189.
when to take effect, 190–193.
publication o
f 192, 193.
presumed validity o
f 203, 208–210, 221–224.
power o
f
courts to declare their unconstitutionality, 194, 205.
not to be exercised b
y
bare quorum, 197.
nor unless decision on the very point necessary, 198.
nor on complaint o
f party not interested, 199.
nor solely because o
f unjust provisions, 200–204.
nor because violating fundamental principles, 205–207.
nor because opposed to spirit o
f Constitution, 208–214.
nor in any doubtful case, 220–225.
may b
e
unconstitutional in part, 214–219.
instances of, 217, 218.
-
constitutional objection to, may be waived, 219.
motives in passage o
f,
not to b
e inquired into, 225–227.
consequence when invalid, 227.
whether jury may pass upon, 415, n.
retrospective, 460-479.
construction of, to b
e
such a
s
to give effect, 223.
presumption against conflict with Constitution, 223, 224.
to b
e prospective, 461.
contemporary and practical, 81–86.
e
x post facto, 323-332.
(See Ex Post Facto LAws.)
violating obligation o
f contracts, 333–361.
(See OBLIGATION of CoNTRActs.)
unequal and partial, 489–498.
of limitation, 453-456.
o
f Parliament, how far in force in America, 30–33.
STATUTORY LIENS,
whether they may b
e
taken away, 351, n
.
STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,
are not vested rights, 479.
strict construction of, 487–498.
STAY LAWS,
law taking from mortgagees right to possession invalid as to existing
mortgages, 355, 356.
-
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STAY LAWS, - continued.
law extending time of redemption of lands previously sold is void, 356.
law shortening redemption void, 356.
stay of execution on existing demands for unreasonable or indefinite time
is void, 357.
STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,
municipal subscriptions to, 144, 260–272.
when liable for debts cannot be released by legislative act, 358.
STREETS,
power of cities, &c., to change grade o
f,
252.
power to control, 253.
special assessments for grading and paving, 628–634.
assessment o
f
labor upon, 637.
exercise o
f right of eminent domain for, 664.
and for materials for constructing, 654.
when owner o
f
land to receive compensation, 703.
appropriation of, for railways, 681–694.
police regulations for use of, 734.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION,
o
f
laws in derogation o
f
common law, 74, n
.
o
f
charters, 235, 495.
o
f
statutes granting special privileges, 487–498.
o
f
statutes requiring gratuitous services, 493.
o
f
statutes taking property for public use, 658, 659.
SUBJECT OF STATUTE,
required in some States to be stated in title, 172–183.
SUBMITTING LAWS TO POPULAR WOTE,
whether it is a delegation o
f legislative power, 141–152.
authorities generally do not allow, 145.
corporate charters, &c., may be submitted, 143, 230.
and questions o
f
divisions o
f towns, &c., 144.
and questions o
f
local subscriptions to improvements, 144.
SUBSCRIPTIONS,
to internal improvements b
y municipal corporations, 144, 262-272.
submitting questions of, to corporation is not delegating legislative power,
144.
power o
f
taxation to provide for, cannot be taken away, 358.
SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN,
power o
f
Parliament to change, 105.
SUFFRAGE,
right of
,
in forming new constitutions, 36, 38, 44.
restrictions upon, to be construed strictly, 494.
constitutional qualifications for, not to be added to b
y legislature, 78.
who to exercise generally, 752.
regulation o
f right of
,
756–758.
right o
f
not conferred on women b
y
the new amendments, 13.
(See ELECTIONs.)
SUIT,
notification o
f,
b
y publication, 505.
(See ACTION.)
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SUMPTUARY LAWS,
odious character of, 483.
SUNDAY,
laws to prevent desecration o
f,
how defended, 594.
police regulations regarding, 734.
SUPPORT,
o
f children, liability o
f
father for, 420.
lateral, o
f lands, right to, 679. n
.
SUPREMACY OF PARLIAMENT,
extent of, 4
,
105, 108, 318.
SUPREME LAW,-
Constitution, laws, and treaties o
f
United States to be, 14.
o
f
a State, constitution to be, 2
,
3
.
SURRENDER,
o
f
fugitives from justice, 21, 22.
SUSPENSION OF LAWS,
when authorized must b
e general, 490.
for limitation o
f actions, 455, n
.
SWAMPS,
drains for, 665, 741.
special assessments for draining, 635.
T.
TAKING OF PROPERTY,
o
f
individuals for public use, 635, n., 651.
(See EMIN ENT DoMAIN; TAXAtion.)
TAX LAWS,
directory and mandatory provisions in
,
89–93.
(See TAXATION.)
TAX SALES,
curing defective proceedings in, b
y
retrospective legislation, 477, 488.
what defects should avoid, 647–649.
deeds given upon, may b
e
made evidence o
f title, 458, 459.
conditions to redemption from, 459, n.
(See TAXAtion.)
TAXATION,
and representation to g
o
together, 3
2
and n
.,
73, n., 142, n., 205.
construction o
f grant o
f
267, n
.
right of
,
compared with eminent domain, 699.
exemptions from, b
y
the States, when not repealable, 154, 341.
can only be for public purposes, 157, 211, 607, 616.
must b
e b
y
consent o
f
the people, 142, n
.
license fees distinguished from, 245.
by municipalities, power o
f legislature over, 144, 260, 339.
reassessment o
f irregular, may be authorized, 255.
irregular may be confirmed b
y legislature, 377, 378.
necessary to the existence o
f government, 598.
unlimited nature o
f power of, 598–604.
o
f
agencies o
f
national government b
y
the States impliedly forbidden,
600–604.
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TAXATION, - continued.
of agencies of the States by the national government also forbidden, 602.
of the subjects of commerce by the States, 605,731.
discriminations in, as between citizens of different States, 606.
legislature the proper authority to determine upon, 608–617.
apportionment essential to, 617.
taxing districts, necessity of 618, 622.
apportionment not always by values, 618, 624.
license fees and other special taxes, 619.
assessments for local improvements, 619.
benefits from the improvement may be taken into the account, 619,
629, 636. ,
general provisions requiring taxation by value do not apply to these
assessments, 621.
taxation of persons or property out of the district is void, 623–628, 643.
must be uniform throughout the district, 625.
local assessments may be made in proportion to frontage, 632.
necessity for apportionment in such case, 632.
special taxing districts for drains, levees, &c., 634, 635.
taxation in labor for repair of roads, &c., 637.
difficulty in making taxation always equal, 639.
hardships of individual cases do not make it void, 639.
legislature must select the objects of taxation, 640.
exemptions of property from, 640, 641.
constitutional provisions which preclude exemptions, 642, 643.
special exemptions void, 641, n., 642, n.
legislative authority must be shown for each particular tax, 643–646.
excessive taxation, 656.
the maxim de minimis ler non curat not applicable in tax proceedings,
647.
what defects and irregularities render tax sales void, 648.
TEACHER AND SCHOLAR, -
control of former over latter, 421.
TECHNICAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
danger of resorting to, 75, n., 99, 99–102.
TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,
right to secrecy in, 375, n.
TEMPERANCE LAWS,
right of the States to pass, 725–727.
TENNESSEE,
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 133, n.
title of act to express the object, 172, n.
constitutional provision relating to amendment of acts, 184, n.
when acts to take effect, 192, n.
right of jury to determine the law in libel cases, 399, n.
protection to person and property by law of the land, 436, n.
constitutional provision respecting retrospective laws, 462, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in
,
520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
exclusion o
f religious teachers from office, 583, n
.
w
INDEX. 877
TERRITORIAL LIMITATION,
to the powers of sovereignty, 2.
to the exercise of power by the States, 154, 155.
to municipal authority, 260.
to power of taxation, 622-627, 643.
TERRITORIES,
power of eminent domain in, 653.
legislation for, 33, n.
formation of constitutions by people of, 38–40.
TEST OATHS, -
when may constitute a punishment, 321, 322.
forbidden in some States, 584, n.
TEXAS,
admission to Union, 10.
Mexican law retained in the system of 35, n.
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 133, n.
legislative rules regulating pardons, 140, n. -
no act to be amended by mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n.
title o
f
acts to express the object, 172, n.
right o
f jury to determine the law in libel cases, 399, n
.
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 436, n
.
constitutional provision respecting retrospective laws, 462, n
.
liberty o
f speech and o
f
the press in
,
522, n
.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753.
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT,
provisions of
,
12, 361.
IME,
loss o
f remedy by lapse of, 453–456.
and place are o
f
the essence o
f
election laws, 758, 759.
TITLE TO LEGISLATIVE ACT,
requirement that it shall state subject, &c., is mandatory, 97–99, 172–183.
TITLES OF NOBILITY,
States not to grant, 23, 41.
TOLERATION,
a
s distinguished from religious liberty, 580–582.
TOWN EXPENSES,
cannot embrace pay for lobby services, 166, n., 259, n
.
(See MUNIcipAL Corporations.)
TOWNSHIPS,
importance of, in the American system, 239, n.
origin o
f
228.
distinguished from chartered corporations, 296.
collection from corporators o
f judgments against, 297-303.
not liable for neglect o
f
duty b
y
officers, 302.
apportionment o
f
debts, &c., on division, 292, 355.
indemnification of officers of, 224, 259.
(See MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs.)
TRADE,
by-laws in general restraint o
f 246, 247.
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TRAVEL, -
obstructions to, on navigable waters, 739.
regulating speed of, 734, 741.
TRAVERSE JURY,
trial of accused parties by, 394-406.
(See JURY TRIAL.)
TREASON,
evidence required to convict of 385.
TREATIES,
of the United States, to be the supreme law, 14.
States forbidden to enter into, 19.
TREATING WOTERS,
laws against, 773.
TRIAL,
of right to property, 459.
new, not to be granted by legislature, 116, 492.
of accused parties to be by jury, 379.
must be speedy, 382.
must be public, 383.
(See CRIMEs; JURY TRIAL.)
TRUST,
the legislative not to be delegated, 141, 249.
TRUSTEES,
special statutes authorizing sales by, constitutional, 118–129.
rights of cestuis que trust not to be determined by legislature, 127.
municipal corporations as, 231, 339, n.
TRUTH,
as a defence in libel cases, 530, 549, 577.
necessity of showing good motives for publication of 577.
TURNPIKES,
exercise of eminent domain for, 664, 665.
appropriation of highways for, 681.
change of to common highways, 683, n.
TWICE IN JEOPARDY,
punishment of same act under State and national law, 24.
under State law and municipal by-law, 242.
-
(See JEoPARDY.)
TWO-THIRDS OF HOUSE,
what constitutes, 171.
- U.
ULTRA VIRES,
contracts of municipal corporations which are, 237,258, 259,267, n.
UNANIMITY,
required in jury trials, 396.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
definition of the term, 4.
first declaration of, 196, n.
power of the courts to annul, 194.
whether jury may pass upon, 415, n.
(See Courts; STATUTEs.)
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UNEQUAL AND PARTIAL LEGISLATION,
special laws of a remedial nature, 488.
local laws, or laws applying to particular classes, 488–493.
proscription of parties for opinions, 489.
suspensions of the laws must be general, 490, 491.
distinctions must be based upon reason, 492.
equality the aim of the law, 493.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 494–497.
discrimination against citizens of other States, 20, 497.
UNIFORMITY,
in construction of constitutions, 67.
in taxation, 616, 622.
(See TAxATION.)
UNION,
of the Colonies before the Revolution, 6.
UNITED STATES,
division of powers between the States and Union, 2.
origin of its government, 6.
Revolutionary Congress, and it
s powers, 7, 8
.
Articles o
f
Confederation and their failure, 6–9.
formation o
f
Constitution of, 8
.
government o
f,
one o
f
enumerated powers, 10, 11, 210.
general powers of, 11–14.
it
s
laws and treaties the supreme law, 15.
judicial powers of, 15, 25.
removal o
f
causes from State courts to courts of, 15.
prohibition upon exercise o
f powers by the States, 19–22.
guaranty o
f
republican government to the States, 23.
implied prohibition o
f powers to the States, 24.
reservation o
f powers to States and people, 25.
consent of, to formation o
f
State constitutions, 38.
(See CoNGREss; CoNstitution o
f
UNITED STATEs ; Courts o
f
UNITED
STATEs; PREsideNT.)
UNJUST DEFENCES,
no vested right in, 461.
UNJUST PROVISIONS,
in constitutions, must be enforced, 87.
in statutes, do not necessarily avoid them, 199—203.
(See PARTIAL LEGIslation )
UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS,
(See ILLEGAL CoNTRActs.)
UNMUZZLED DOGS,
restraining from running at large, 748.
UNREASONABLE BAIL,
not to be required, 380.
UNREASONABLE BY-LAWS,
are void, 243.
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
(See SEARCHES AND SEizures.)
UNWHOLESOME PROVISIONS,
prohibiting sale o
f
748.
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USAGE AND CUSTOM,
(See CoMMON LAw.)
USURY,
right to defence o
f,
may b
e
taken away b
y
legislature retrospectively, 468.
W.
VACANCIES,
in office filling, 79, n.
-
VALIDATING IMPERFECT CONTRACTS,
b
y
retrospective legislation, 359, 462–477.
(See RETRosPECTIVE LEGISLATION.)
VALUATION,
o
f property for taxation, 618.
(See TAXATION.)
o
f
land taken for public use,
(See EMINENT DoMAIN.)
VENUE,
in criminal cases, 393, n., 395.
change of, 393, n., 396, n.
VERDICT,
jury not to be controlled b
y judge in giving, 396.
judge cannot refuse to receive, 397.
jury may return special, 398.
but cannot be compelled to do so, 398.
general, covers both the law and the facts, 398, 400.
in favor o
f
defendant in criminal case, cannot be set aside, 398, 399, 403.
against accused, may be set aside, 400.
in libel cases, to cover law. and fact, 399, 572.
to be a bar to new prosecution, 403.
when defendant not to b
e deprived o
f,
b
y
nolle prosequi, 404.
not a bar if court had no jurisdiction, 404.
o
r if indictment fatally defective, 405.
when jury may be discharged without, 405.
set aside o
n
defendant's motion, may be new trial, 405, 406.
o
n
some o
f
the counts, is bar to new trial thereon, 406.
cannot b
e
received from less than twelve jurors, 395.
VERMONT,
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n
.
betterment, law of, 485.
liberty o
f speech and o
f press, 518, n.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
WESTED RIGHTS,
not conferred b
y
charters o
f municipal incorporation, 233.
grants o
f property to corporations not revocable, 290–295, 334.
under the marriage relation, cannot be taken away, 348.
not to be disturbed except b
y
due process o
f law, 212, 247, n., 442.
meaning o
f
the term, 443, 461, 471.
subjection o
f,
to general laws, 443.
interests in expectancy are not, 445, 447.
rights under the marriage relation, when are, 447.
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WESTED RIGHTS, - continued.
in legal remedies, parties do not have, 448, 449.
exceptions, 355.
statutory privileges are not, 479.
in rights of action, 449.
forfeitures o
f,
must b
e judicially declared, 451, 452.
time for enforcing, may be limited, 453-456, 460.
do not exist in rules o
f evidence, 460.
rights to take advantage o
f
informalities are not, 461–472.
o
r o
f
defence o
f usury, 468.
VILLAGES AND CITIES,
(See MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs.)
WILLEINAGE,
in England, 362-365.
VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,
when publisher o
f
newspaper not liable to, 469.
WIOLATING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
(See OBLIGATION o
f
CoNTRActs.)VIRGINIA,
repeal o
f
acts o
f
Parliament in, 34, n.
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted b
y legislature, 134.
exercise o
f
the pardoning power restrained, 140, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 160, n.
n
o
act to b
e
amended b
y
mere reference to title, 183, 184, n.
compact with Kentucky, 335, n.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in
,
522, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
excluded from suffrage in, 753.
VOID CONTRACTS,
(See CoNTRActs.)
VOID JUDGMENTS,
(See JURIsdiction.)
VOID STATUTES,
VOLUNTEERS,
in military service, municipal bounties to, 274–281.
VOTERS,
franchise o
f,
cannot b
e
made to depend o
n impossible condition, 451, n.
constitutional qualifications o
f,
cannot b
e
added to b
y legislature, 78, n.
privilege o
f secrecy o
f
761.
whether qualifications o
f,
can b
e inquired into in contesting election, 790,
(See StATUTEs.)
791.
(See ELECTIONs.)
W.
WAGERS,
upon elections, are illegal, 774.
WAIVER,
o
f
constitutional objection, 219, 220.
56
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WAIVER, - continued.
of irregularities in judicial proceedings, 511.
of objection to interested judge, 516.
of right to full panel of jurors, 395.
of right to compensation for property taken by public, 702.
in capital cases, 393, n.
of elector’s right to secrecy, 763.
WAR AND PEACE,
power of Revolutionary Congress over, 7.
control of questions concerning, by Congress, 12.
WARD,
control of guardian over, 421.
special statutes for sale of lands of 118–129.
WAREHOUSEMEN,
regulation of charges of, 742-746.
WARRANTS,
general, their illegality, 368–372.
service of, in criminal cases, 372.
search-warrants, 372.
(See UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIzures.)
WATER RIGHTS,
right to front on navigable water is property, 680.
right of the States to establish wharf lines, 747.
right to use of, in running stream, 696.
appropriation of streams under right of eminent domain, 655, 665.
(See NAVIGABLE WATElts; WATER-Courses.)
WATER—COURSES,
navigable, and rights therein, 735-741.
dams across, for manufacturing purposes, 666–669, 740.
bridges over, under State authority, 738, 739.
licensing ferries across, 739, 740.
construction of levees upon, 665, 741.
flooding premises by, the liability ſor, 680.
incidental injury by improvement of, gives no right of action, 738, n.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERs; WATER Rights.)
WAYS,
(See Highways; PRIvate RoADs; Roads; STREETs.)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,
Congress may fix standard of 11.
regulation of
,
b
y
the States, 749.
WEST VIRGINIA,
special statutes licensing sale o
f
lands forbidden, 119, n
.
divorces not to be granted b
y
legislature, 134, n
.
-
protection to person and property b
y
law o
f
the land, 437, n
.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press in
,
519, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
religious liberty in
,
583, n
.
exclusions from suffrage in, 753.
WIIARFAGE,
right to, is property, 680.
States may establish wharf lines, 747.
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WHIPPING,
punishment by, 328.
WIDOW,
(See DoweR.)
WIFE,
(See Divorce; Dower; MARRIED WomeN.)
WILL,
imperfect, cannot be validated after title passed, 114, n.
WISCONSIN,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 119, n.
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 133, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 163, n.
title of act to embrace the subject, 173, n.
no act to be amended by mere reference to it
s title, 183, 184, n
.
time when acts take effect, 192.
restriction upon power to contract debts, 271.
liberty o
f
speech and o
f
the press, 520, n
.
privilege o
f legislators in debate, 556, n
.
religious tests for office forbidden in, 583, n.
religious belief not to be test o
f incompetency o
f witness, 596, n
.
exclusions from suffrage in
,
753.
-
WITCHCRAFT,
confessions of, 385.
WITNESSES,
power to summon and examine before legislative committees, 164.
accused parties to b
e confronted with, 392.
not compellable to be against themselves, 389–391, 494.
evidence by, in their own favor, 391, n
.
not liable to civil action for false testimony, 551.
unless the testimony was irrelevant, 552, n
.
competency and credibility o
f,
a
s depending o
n religious belief, 596 and n
.
testimony o
f
wife o
n behalf o
f
husband, 390, n
.
WOMEN,
(See MARRIED WoMEN.)
WORKS OF ART, -
liberty o
f
criticism o
f
568.
WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,
unconstitutional character of, 369–371.
WRITS OF HABEAS COR PUS,
(See HABEAs CoRPUs.)
Y.
YEAS AND NAYS,
in some States, on passage o
f
laws to b
e
entered o
n journals, 171.
Cambridge: Press o
f
John Wilson & Son.

REDUCING LEGISLATION.
THE constitutional amendment providing
for biennial Legislatures in this State has at
tracted little attention, because there does not
appear to be much difference of opinion with
regard to it
.
The press is in favor o
f it
,
and
if there is any deep o
r widespread hostility to
it in the Legislature, there have been no indi
cations as yet o
f
such a feeling. This fact is
o
f itself o
f
considerable interest. The ap
proval by so important a State a
s New York
o
f
a
n
amendment cutting down the period o
f
active legislation by one-half would furnish a
striking indication o
f
the direction which mo
dern constitutional reform is taking.
A glance at the Constitution of any State as
it stands to-day, will show that the most im
portant changes introduced into it within the
past forty years have been for the purpose o
f
cutting down the powers o
f
the Legislature.
Most o
f
them are, a
s
the subjects to which
they relate show, intended to guard against
the invasion o
f
fundamental popular rights by
the arbitrary o
r corrupt use o
f legislative
power, to prevent inequality, o
r
the granting
o
f special privileges. In this State, for in
stance, the Legislature is forbidden to change
anybody's name, to lay out a road, to incor
porate a village, to change the place o
f
trial
for a lawsuit, to increase o
r
decrease any
officer's salary during his term o
f office, to
charter a railroad, o
r
to grant any corporation
any exclusive franchise o
r privilege whatever.
It may pass laws on these subjects, to be sure,
but they must b
e general laws, establishing
universal rules, and not granting special privi
leges. -
Nor can the Legislature audit o
r
allow any
private claim o
r
account against the
State,
nor grant any extra compensation t
o any
officer o
r employee o
f
the State ; nor can it
loan o
r pledge the credit o
f
the State to any
individual, association, o
r corporation ; nor
can it in general contract any debt o
n behalf
o
f
the State, unless the law which provides
for it imposes a
t
the same time a direct annual
tax sufficient to pay the debt in full in eighteen
years; nor without a direct submission
of the
law after it
s passage to the people at a general
election.
The constitutions o
f many other States con
tain similar provisions, a
s well as others relating
to the passage o
f bills, and the formalities to
b
e
observed in their passage to guard against
any legislative fraud, which are a
ll in
spired b
y
the same distrust o
f
the once
wide
authority exercised b
y
the Legislature.
Such constitutional amendments show very
clearly that the Legislature is looked upon in
i constitutional period, in the middle of which
modern times with much the same jealousy
that the Executive once was. When most of
our Constitutions were drawn up, it was the
Crown, or that branch of the Government
which corresponded to the Crown in this
country, that was dreaded. It was the
Executive that showed a tendency to
exercise it
s powers unfairly, corruptly,
and tyrannously, while the Legislature
was generally looked upon as the ally
and representative o
f
the people in its
struggle against the executive. From the
time, indeed, o
f Magna Charta down to the
opening o
f
what may be called the modern
we new are, the efforts o
f
constitutional refor
mers have always been to limit the rights o
f
the
Executive—to prevent it from oppressing the
subject o
r
citizen. Beginning with the denial
o
f
the once-established right o
f
the Crown to
“sell justice,” or, in other words, to sell the
writs through which redress in court was ob
tained, all preregative was gradually taken
away, until the English King had,in the modern
American Constitution, been transformed into
the American Governor, shorn o
f every ves
tige o
f authority which could make the office
a
n instrument o
f oppression o
r wrong. But
the very body through which most o
f
these re
forms had been accomplished, which had in
sisted o
n popular rights against the Executive,
was in it
s
turn to afford a refuge in a new
form for the tyranny and corruption and fa
voritism and injustice which it had helped to
destroy, and when this had been made plain,
a new popular movement was required to
throw around the Legislature restrictions
analogous to those which were first
found necessary in the case o
f
the Crown.
The effect that this modern constitutional
movement has had in the reduction o
f legisla
tion may be best seen b
y
a comparison o
f
the
two annual bulky volumes o
f
acts which were
turned out at Albany only a few years ago
with the thin octavo which now contains
a
ll
that the Legislature finds it necessary to d
o
every year. That the reduction in the sub
jects o
f legislation may be supplemented with
advantage b
y
a reduction o
f
the time given to
legislation, and the substitution o
f
biennial
for annual meetings, as has been already done
in several other States, does not seem to be
disputed even in the body most interested in
preserving the present system—the Legislature
itself. -
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